Article 8. Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony.

- Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony are punishable only in the cases in which the law specially provides a penalty therefor. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. There is proposal when the person who has decided to commit a felony proposes its execution to some other person or persons. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2001 JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, Petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.: JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense of the rights of the individual from the vast powers of the State and the inroads of societal pressure. But even as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on individuality beyond which the State cannot tread-asserting that "individual spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish with very little regard to social interference - he veritably acknowledges that the exercise of rights and liberties is imbued with a civic obligation, which society is justified in enforcing at all cost, against those who would endeavor to withhold fulfillment. Thus he says The sole end for which tnankind is warranted, individually or collectitlely, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any mcl11ber of a civilized cotnmunity, against his will, is to prevent harnl to others. Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to selfpteservation. With the end of maintaining the integrity and cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the State to formulate a system of laws that would compel obeisance to its collecti"e wisdom and inflict punishment for non-observance. The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism wrought changes in the social order, carrying with it a new formulation of fundamental rights and

duties more attuned to the imperatives of contemporary socio-political ideologies. In the process, the web of rights and State impositions : became tangled and obscured, enmeshed in threads of multiple shades and colors, the skein irregular and broken. Antagonism often outright collision, between the law as the expression of the will of the State, and the zealous attempts by its members to preserve of their individuality and dignity, irievitably followed. It is when individual rights are pitted against State authority that judicial conscience is put to its severest test. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder),1 as amended by RA 7659,2 wishes to impress upon us that the, assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality-mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have transgressed constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 Clnd 4 which are reproduced hereunder: Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar Schemes: (1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; (2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks Or any other form of pecuniary" benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public office concerned; (3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or government "owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; (4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; (5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to

benefit particular persons or special interests; or (6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people anti the Republic of the Philippines. Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State (underscoring supplied). Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire illgotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring supplied). On 4 Apri12001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No.26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d) Crim. Case No.26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No.26565, for illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No.142, as amended by RA 6085).1wphi1.nt On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with respect to specification "d" of the charges in the Information in Crim. Case No.26558; and, for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised were only lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/ reinvestigation of offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law under which they are charged were never raised in that Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility

of the Plunder Law. On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No.26558 finding that "a probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by that Sandiganbayan. On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information Crim. Case No.26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein, offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001 the Government filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash, and five (5) days later or on 26 June 2001 petitioner submitted his Reply to the Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the Sandiganhayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash. As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September 2001, the issues for resolution in the instant petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process; and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it. Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is predicated on the basic principle that a legislative measure is presumed" to be in harmony with the Constitution.3 Courts invariably train their sights on this fundamental rule whenever a legislative act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional adjudication. This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the government. It to encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate branch the legislature. If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in, determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act with Qution and forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort. In construing therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain Whether an interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the question of constitutionality. In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon4 We held that as long as there is some basis for the decision of the court, the constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched and the case will be decided on other available grounds. Yet the force of the presumption is not sufficient to catapult a fundamentally deficient or law into the safe environs of constitutionality. Of course, where the, law clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed domain of the organic law; it must be struck down on sight lest the positive commands of the fundamental law be unduly eroded.

Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party challenging the validity of the.statute. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed an infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain."5 And petitioner has miserably failed in the instant case to discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder Law. As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus 1, That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in Connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or i coll.C;llllguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons; 2, That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of the following overt or criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employnlent in any business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or (j) by' taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to file damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and, 3, That the aggregate anlount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth, amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render thcm liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating illgotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law.

In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense which petitioner is alleged to have committed: "The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC- Director, EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accUses former PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a. 'JOSE VELARDIE,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, John DOES a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan QR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No.7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No.7659, committed as follows: That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/ CONSPIRACY WITH HIS CO-AACUSED, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY RELATIVES By AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY BUSINESS ASSOCIATES WlLORDINA TES AND/ R OTHER PERSONS BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION AUTHORITY RELA TIONSHIP CONNECTION OR, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTL Y ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt QR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS. described as follows: (a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES. MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545.000.000.00). MORE OR LESS. FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF .c!IFT. SHARE. PERCENTAGE. KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT. BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connection with co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND LANE DOES. in consideration OF TOLERA TION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING; (b) by DIVERTING RECEIVING , misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY. for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or ll'ss, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (P200.000.000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang,

Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE DOES; (italic supplied). (c) by directing, ordering and compelling, EQR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351.878.000 SHARES OF STOCKS. MORE OR LESS. and the Social Security System (555), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK. MORE OR LESS. OF THE BELLE CORPORA TION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (Pl.102.965.607.50) AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY pesos (P744.612.450.00). RESPECTIVELY OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (Pl,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND ,ANE DOES COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS {P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EOUIT ABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE:' (d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS GIFTS SHARES. PERCENTAGES. KICKBACKS OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES. in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE' AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK." We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous as there is obviously none that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is complete informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense. Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms ,rcombination" and "series" in the key phrase ,a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word ,rpattem" in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right due process.

The rat ionalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or beeause of the employment of terms without defining them;6 much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law." Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,7 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.8 The intention of the lawmakers who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted definition of the words "coinbination" and "series:" Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure individual characters. Series -a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal succession. That Cong'ress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their popular meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative--deliberations on the bill which eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law: DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMI1TEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May 1991 REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE,HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we actually mean to say, if there are hvo or more means, we mean to say that number one and two or number one and something else are included, how about a series of the same act? For example, through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these be included also? REP.,GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series. REP. ISIDRO: Series. REP, GARCIA: Yeah, we include series. REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination. REP. GARCIA: Yes.

REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that REP. GARCIA: Two. REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of one enumeration. REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice. REP. ISIDRO: Not twice? . REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice -but combination, two acts. REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, that's it. When we say combination, we mean, two different acts. It cannot be a repetition of the same act. REP. GARCIA: That be referred to seies, yeah. REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two. REP. GARCIA: A series REP. ISIDRO: That's not series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination or series, we seem to say that two or more, di ba? REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very good suggestion because if it is only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. So x x x x REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di. SEN. TANADA: So that wouldfall under the term "series?" REP. GARCIA: Series, oo. REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two missappropriations. REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be combination. Series. REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination? REP. GARCIA: Yes. REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different? REP. GARCIA: Yes.

SEN. TANADA: Two different. REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts. REP. GARCIA: For example, ha... REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition... DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989 SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes "one"l or maybe even "two" acts may already result in such a big amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the words "a series of overt or," to read, therefore: "or conspiracy COMMITTED by criminal acts such as." Remove the idea of necessitating "a series." Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural. SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this. THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be. SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because "a series" implies several or many; two or more. SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr, President x x x x THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime. But when we say "acts of plunder" there should be, at least, two or more. SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different categories of enumerauon provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3). On the other hand, to constitute a "series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec, 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law. As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandigabayan 9 that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -

x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful schenle' indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused,vary, the overt or criminal acts nlust form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal. Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction. A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.10 But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed against such activities.11 With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case. The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice.12 It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes. Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza during the deliberations of the Court that the allegations that the Plunder Law is

vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its nleaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essental of due process of law."13 The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."14 A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity."15 The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deferred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challerge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment."16 In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,17 the Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challerge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid."18 As for the vagueness doctrines it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others."19 In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute,

theestablished rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional."20 As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant."21 Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety. Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected.22 It constitutes a departure from the case and controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts.23 But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris24 [T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . .ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided. For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort,"25 and is generally disfavored.26 In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged.27 In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed and argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined than real. Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words in the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the law. Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and with reference to every other part. To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted for its passage, petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its appropriate committees by reason of which he even registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional anchorage. The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan28 must be to illustrate and emphasize the point that courts are loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the law itself is

so imperfect and deficient in its details, and is susceptible of no reasonC1ble construction that will support and give it effect. In that case, petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 3, par.(e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for being vague. Petitioners posited, among others, that the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic with no common law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or administrative precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates due process in that it does not give fair warning or sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Petitioners further argued that the Information charged them with three (3) distinct offenses to wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through manifest partiality; (b) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through evident bad faith; and, (c) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable negligence while in the discharge of their official function and that their right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was violated because they were left to guess which of the three (3) offenses, if not all, they were being charged and prosecuted. In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer from the constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable negligence" merely describe the different modes by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the statute may be committed, and the use of all these in the same Information does not mean that the indictment charges three (3) distinct offenses. The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adeqllate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized (Webster, Third International Dictionary, p. 2514); or without justification or adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept. of Justice, C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative AlVlual Pocket Part, p. 19). The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act consider a corrupt practice and make unlawful the act of the public officer in: x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted, benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions "1 through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, x x x (Section 3 [el, Rep. Act 3019, as amended). It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal provisions penalize is the act of a public officer, in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions, in giving any private party benefits, advantage or preference which is unjustified, unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the use of the term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which was understood in its primary and general acceptation. Consequently, in that case, petitioners' objection thereto was held inadequate to declare the section unconstitutional. On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the

Plunder Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. -For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or CO11S1'iracy to amass, accumulate or acquire illgotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.29 The use of the "reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in the application of criminal law .It is critical that the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. This "reasonable doubt" standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.30 The following exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo Garcia on this score during the deliberations in the floor of the House of Representatives are elucidating DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9 October 1990 MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is alleged in the information must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. If we will prove only one act and find him guilty of the other acts enumerated in the information, does that not work against the right of the accused especially so if the amount committed, say, by falsification is less than PIOO million, but the totality of the crime committed is PIOO million since there is malversation, bribery, falsification of public document, coercion, theft ? MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there is an enumeration of the things taken by the robber in the information -three pairs of pants, pieces of jewelry. These need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but these will not prevent the conviction of a crime for which he was charged just because, say, instead of 3 pairs of diamond earrings the prosecution proved two. Now, what is required to be

proved beyond reasonable doubt is the element of the offense. MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of plunder the totality of the amount is very important, I feel that such a series of overt criminal acts has to be taken singly. For instance, in the act of bribery, he was able to accumulate only PSO,OOO and in the crime of extortion, he was only able to accumulate PI million. Now, when we add the totality of the other acts as required under this bill through the interpretation on the rule of evidence, it is just one single act, so how can we now convict him? MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an essential element of the crime, there is a need to prove that ele111ent beyond reasonable doubt. For example, one essential element of the crime is that the amount involved is P100 million. Now, in a series of defalcations and other acts of corruption in the enumeration the total amount would be PIIO orPI20 million, but there are certain acts that could not be proved, so, we will sum up the amounts involved in those transactions which were proved. Now, if the amount involved in these transactions, proved beyond reasonable doubt, is P100 million, then there is a crime of plunder (underscoring supplied). It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner refashion the standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The burden still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to constitute the crime. The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime suffers from a dismal misconception of the import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the accused is charged, in an Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted to at least P50,000,000.00.31 A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion that "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated othewise, such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate acts. , This conclusion is consistent with reason and common sense. There would be no other explanation for a combination or series of overt acts or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more,

than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth." The prosecution is therefore not required to make a deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily follows with the establishment of a series or combination of the predicate acts. Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that "pattern" is "a very important element of the crime of plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime," such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be convicted under the plunder law without applying Section 4 on the Rule of Evidence if there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of the acts complained of? ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes enumerated in the Revised Penal Code, but not plunder. JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime are proved beyond reasonable doubt without applying Section 4, can you not have a conviction under the Plunder Law? ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor. JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in convicting an accused charged for violation of the Plunder Law? ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a substantive element of the law x x x x JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is do we have to avail of Section 4 when there is proof beyond reasonable doubt on the acts charged constituting plunder? ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of evidence and it contains a substantive element of the crime of plunder. So, there is no way by which we can avoid Section 4. JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar as the predicate crimes charged are concerned that you do not halve to go that far by applying Section 4? ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very important element of the crime of plunder and that cannot be avoided by the prosecution.32 We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of

plunder can be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal: SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. -For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder x x x x It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the rest of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the law; after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a separability clause Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. -If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remaining provisions of this Act and the application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby. Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared invalid as a result of the nullity of some of its provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is not really so, all the provisions thereof should accordingly be treated independently of each other, especially if by doing so, the objectives of the statute can best be achieved. As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner. In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Taada made during the deliberation on S.B. No.733:

SENATOR TAADA ...And the evidence that will be required to convict him would not be evidence for each and every individual criminal act but only evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of plunder.33 However, Senator Taada was discussing 4 as shown by the succeeding portion of the transcript quoted by petitioner: SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the Gentleman's view, would provide for a speedier and faster process of attending to this kind of cases? SENATOR TAADA: Yes, Mr. President 34 Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown. Indeed, 2 provides that Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the, crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties,-the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court. The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent. It is true that 2 refers to "any person who participates with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder." There is no reason to believe, however, that it does not apply as well to the public officer as principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."35

Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No.7659. Referring to these groups of heinous crimes, this Court held in People v. Echegaray:36 The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human being. ... Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and i. serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death; and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, pi1rricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped , which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature. There are crimes however in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context. no less heinous are the effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses

involving government officials, employees or officers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society . The legislative declaration in R.A. No.7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se37 and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. BIg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts. To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned by People v. Echegaray38 to the archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration of the Court therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part of it.1wphi1.nt Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and profligacy of officials in high places which have shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has become more elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the government. Drastic and radical measures are imperative to light the increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and economically catastrophic looting of the national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if left unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral and institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of the legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against the avarice and other venalities in public office. These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues of national importance can equal the amount of interest and passion generated by petitioner's ignominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution and trial under a virginal statute. This continuing saga has driven a wedge of dissension among our people that may linger for a long time. Only by responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism and prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the midst of ferment. PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISIONw G.R. No. 145927 August 24, 2007c SIMON FERNAN, JR. and EXPEDITO TORREVILAS,[1] Petitioners vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. The instant petition under Rule 45 originated from 119 criminal cases1[2] filed with the Sandiganbayan (SB) involving no less than 36 former officials and employees of the then Ministry of Public Highways (MPH) and several suppliers of construction materials for defalcation of public funds arising from numerous transactions in the Cebu First Highway Engineering District in 1977.Because of the sheer magnitude of the illegal transactions, the number of people involved, and the ingenious scheme employed in defrauding the government, this infamous 86 million highway scam has few parallels in the annals of crime in the country. The Facts cralawThe SB culled the facts2[6] this way: On June 21, 1978, COA Regional Director Sofronio Flores Jr. of COA Regional Office No. 7, directed auditors Victoria C. Quejada and Ruth I. Paredes to verify and submit a report on sub-allotment advises issued to various highway engineering districts in Cebu, particularly, the Cebu City, Cebu 1st, Cebu 2nd and the Mandaue City Highway Engineering Districts.Complying with the directive, they conducted an investigation and in due course submitted their findings.Their report (Exhibit C) confirmed the issuance of fake Letters of Advice of Allotments (LAAs) in the districts mentioned.They discovered that two sets of LAAs were received by the districts.One set consists of regular LAAs which clearly indicated the covering sub-allotment advices and were duly signed by Mrs. Angelina Escao, Finance Officer of the MPH Regional Office.The LAAs were numbered in proper sequence and duly recorded in the logbook of the Accounting, Budget and Finance Division. The other set consists of fake LAAs which do not indicate the covering sub-allotment advice and were signed by Chief Accountant Rolando Mangubat and Engr. Jose Bagasao, instead of the Finance Officer.These fake LAAs 1 2

were not numbered in proper sequence; they were mostly undated and were sometimes duplicated.They could not be traced to the files and records of the Accounting, Budget and Finance Division.The accounting entry for the disbursements made on the fake LAAs was debited to the Accounts-Payable Unliquidated Obligations (8-81-400) and credited to the Checking Account with the Bureau of Treasury (8-70-790).Nevertheless, the expenditures were taken from obligations of the current year (1978) because all the supporting papers of the payment vouchers were dated in that year.The entries in the journal vouchers filed with the MPH Regional Office were adjusted every month to 881-400 (unliquidated or prior years obligation), 8-83-000 (liquidated or current year obligations) and 8-70-700 (Treasury/Agency Account).All of these were approved for the Finance Officer by Chief Accountant Rolando Mangubat. Mangubat, however, had no authority to approve them because since October 1977, he had already been detailed to the MPH Central Office. There were indications that the practice had been going on for years. xxxx Due to these serious irregularities, then President Marcos created a Special Cabinet Committee on MPH Region VII Ghost Projects Anomalies which in turn organized a Special Task Force composed of representatives from the Finance Ministry Intelligence Bureau (FMIB), National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Bureau of Treasury and the Commission on Audit.The mission of the task force was to conduct a wider and more extended investigation in all the fifteen (15) highway engineering districts of MPH Region VII, including the Cebu First Highway Engineering District, the 1977 questionable disbursements of which are the subject matter of these cases. xxxx cralawFor a better understanding of these highways cases, the flow in the release of funds to the various agencies of the government and the control devices set up for disbursement and accounting of public funds should first be explained.A chart (Exhibit B) graphically shows the flow of allotments from the Ministry down to the district level. On the basis of appropriation laws and upon request made by heads of agencies, the then Ministry of Budget released funds to the various agencies of the government by means of an Advice of Allotment (AA) and a Cash Disbursement Ceiling (CDC).The Advice of Allotment is an authority for the agency to incur obligations within a specified amount in accordance with approved programs and projects. The Cash Disbursement Ceiling is an authority to pay.Upon receipt of the AA and CDC from the Budget, the Central Office of the agency prepares the Sub-Advice of Allotment (SAA) and the Advice of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (ACDC) for each region, in accordance with the disbursement allotment.These are sent to the Regional Office.Upon receipt, the Budget Officer of the region prepares the corresponding Letters of Advice of Allotment (LAA) which are forwarded to the various districts of the region (The amount that goes to each district is already indicated in the Advice of Allotment).Only upon receipt of the LAA is the district office authorized to incur obligations. Now, how are funds released by the Regional Office to the different districts and ultimately paid out to contractors, the District Engineer submits to the Regional Director

a request for allotment in accordance with the program of work prepared by the former. This procedure starts with the preparation of a Requisition for Supplies and Equipment (RSE) in the District Office by the Senior Civil Engineer, approved by the District Engineer, and signed by the Chief Accountant of the Highway Engineering District, who certifies as to the availability of funds.The RSE is then submitted to the Regional Director for approval.Once it is approved, a Request for Obligation of Allotment (ROA) is prepared by the Chief Accountant of the district Senior Civil Engineer.The ROA signifies that a certain amount of district funds has been set aside or earmarked for the particular expenditures stated in the RSE.On the basis of the ROA, the District Office puts up advertisements, [conducts] biddings, makes awards and prepares purchase orders which are served on the winning bidder.The District Office also prepares a summary of deliveries with the corresponding delivery receipts and tally sheets, conducts inspection and prepares the General Voucher for the payment of deliveries.Once the General Voucher (GV) has been prepared, the corresponding check in the form of a Treasury Check Account for Agency (TCAA) is drawn by the Disbursing Officer and finally released to the contractor. At the end of every month, the Report of Checks Issued by Deputized Disbursing Officer (RCIDD) is prepared, listing all the checks issued during that period.The RCIDDO is submitted to the accounting division of the region.Upon receipt of the RCIDDO, the Regional Office draws a journal voucher, debiting the account obligation (liquidated or unliquidated obligation, whichever is applicable), and crediting the account Treasury Check Account for Agency (TCAA).The RCIDDO is recorded in the Journal of Checks Issued by Deputized Disbursing Officers (JCIDDO) and posted in the general ledger at the end of each month. Simultaneous with the flow of the RCIDDO, the ROAs are summarized in the Reports of Obligations Incurred (ROI) in the District Office, once or twice a month, depending upon the volume of transactions.The ROI is then submitted to the Regional Office.Upon receipt of the ROI, the accountant of the Regional Office draws a journal voucher taking up the following entry: debiting the appropriation allotted (0-90-000) and crediting the obligation incurred (0-82-000). This is recorded in the general voucher and posted to the general ledger at the end of each month.The journal voucher is prepared, closing the account 8-70-709 to 8-71-100-199 at the end of each month.It is also recorded and posted to the general ledger.At the end of the month, the balances of each account shown in the general ledger are summarized in a statement called the trial balance. The trial balance is submitted to the MPH Central Office in Manila where it is consolidated with other trial balances submitted by other regional offices. xxxx The elaborate accounting procedure described above with its system of controls was set up obviously to make sure that government funds are properly released, disbursed and accounted for.In the hands of untrustworthy guardians of the public purse, however, it proved to be inadequate.There were loopholes which an unscrupulous person adroit in government accounting could take advantage of to surreptitiously draw enormous sums of money from the government. Sometime in February, 1977, accused Rolando Mangubat (Chief Accountant), Delia

Preagido (Accountant III), Jose Sayson (Budget Examiner), and Edgardo Cruz (Clerk II), all of MPH Region VII, met at the Town and Country Restaurant in Cebu City and hatched an ingenious plan to siphon off large sums of money from government coffers.Mangubat had found a way to withdraw government money through the use of fake LAAs, vouchers and other documents and to conceal traces thereof with the connivance of other government officials and employees.In fine, the fraudulent scheme involved the splitting of LAAs and RSEs so that the amount covered by each general voucher is less than P50,000.00 to do away with the approval of the Regional Auditor; the charging of disbursements to unliquidated obligations due the previous year to provide the supposed source of funds; and the manipulation of the books of account by negation or adjustment, i.e., the cancellation of checks through journal vouchers to conceal disbursements in excess of the cash disbursement ceiling (CDC), so as not to reflect such disbursements in the trial balances submitted to the Regional Office. Mangubat enticed Preagido, Cruz and Sayson to join him.All three agreed to help him carry out his plan.They typed the fake LAAs during Saturdays. Cruz and Sayson also took charge of negotiating or selling the fake LAAs to contractors at 26% of the gross amount.Preagido on her part manipulated the General Ledger, Journal Vouchers and General Journal thru negative entries to conceal the illegal disbursements.Thus, in the initial report of the auditors (Exhibit D), it was discovered that the doubtful allotments and other anomalies escaped notice due to the following manipulations: The letter-advices covering such allotments (LAA) were generally not signed by the Finance Officer nor recorded in the books of accounts.Disbursements made on the basis of these fake LAAs were charged to the unliquidated Obligations (Account 8-81-400), although the obligations being paid were not among those certified to the unliquidated obligations (Account 8-81-400) at the end of the preceding year.To conceal the overcharges to authorized allotments, account 881-400 and the excess of checks issued over authorized cash disbursements ceiling, adjustments were prepared monthly through journal vouchers to take up the negative debit to Account 8-81-400 and a negative credit to the Treasury Checking Account for Agencies Account 8-70-790.These journal vouchers in effect cancelled the previous entry to record the disbursements made on the basis of the fake LAAs. Thus, the affected accounts (Accounts 8-81-400 and 8-70790), as appearing in the trial balance would not show the irregularity.The checks, however, were actually issued. cralawThe four formed the nucleus of the nefarious conspiracy.Other government employees, tempted by the prospect of earning big money, allowed their names to be used and signed spurious documents. cralawAlthough the anomalies had been going on for sometime (February 1977 to June 1978), the PNB and Bureau of Treasury had no inkling about it until the NBI busted the illegal operations. (Some of the recipients of the stolen funds spent lavishly and bought two cars at a time).The reason for this is that, at that time, the PNB and Bureau of Treasury were not furnished copy of the mother CDC and the local branch of the PNB did not receive independent advice from the PNB head office in Manila.There were no deposits of money made with the PNB from which withdrawals could be charged.Only CDCs were presented to it, and not knowing that some of the CDCs were fake, the PNB branch paid out the checks drawn against them.The bank had also no way

of knowing what amount was appropriated for the district; consequently, it did not know if the limit had already been exceeded.Only an insider steep in government accounting, auditing and banking procedures, particularly their flaws and loopholes, could have pulled off such an ingenious and audacious plan. cralawx x x x cralawFocusing our attention now on the anomalies committed in the Cebu First District Engineering District, hereinafter referred to as the Cebu First HED for brevity, the Court finds that the same pattern of fraud employed in the other highway engineering districts in MPH Region VII was followed.The Cebu First HED received from Region VII thirty-four Letters of Advice of Allotment (LAAs) in the total sum of P4,734,336.50 and twenty-nine (29) corresponding Sub-Advices of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (SACDCs), amounting to P5,160,677.04 for the period January 1, 1977 to December 31, 1977.But apart from this, the Cebu First HED appears to have also received for the same period another set of eighty-four (84) LAAs amounting to P4,680,694.76 which however, could not be traced to any Sub-Advice of Allotment (SAA) or matched to the Advices of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (ACDCs) received from the MPH and Regional Office.This is highly irregular and not in consonance with accounting procedures. cralawIt was also made to appear that the payments were made for alleged prior years obligations and chargeable to Account 8-81-400, obviously because, they were not properly funded.Furthermore, the list of projects in Region VII for 1977 showed that Cebu First HED completed rehabilitation and/or improvement of roads and bridges in its districts from February to May 1977, with expenditures amounting to P613,812.00.On the other hand, the expenditures for barangay roads in the same district in 1977 amounted to P140,692.00, and these were all completed within the period from November to December, 1977.These completed projects were properly funded by legitimate LAAs and CDCs in the total amount of only P754,504.00.However, an additional amount of P3,839,810.74 was spent by the Cebu First HED for maintenance of roads and bridges for the same year (1977) but the same could not be traced to any authoritative document coming from the MPH. cralawx x x x cralawA total of 132 General Vouchers, emanating from fake LAAs and ACDCs, were traced back to Rolando Mangubat, Regional Accountant of Region VII and Adventor Fernandez, Regional Highway Engineer, also of Region VII.Those LAAs and ACDCs became the vehicles in the disbursement of funds amounting to P3,839,810.74, through the vouchers purportedly issued for the purchase and delivery of the aforementioned materials allegedly used for the maintenance and repair of the national highways within the Cebu First HED.Despite the enormous additional expenditure of P3,839,810.74, the roads and bridges in the district, as found out by the NBI, did not show any improvement.As testified to by several barangay captains, the road maintenance consisted merely of spreading anapog or limestone on potholes of the national highway. Obviously, the vouchers for payments of alleged maintenance of roads and bridges in

the additional amount of P3,839,810.74 were prepared for no other purpose than to siphon the said amount from the government coffer into the pockets of some officials and employees of Region VII and the Cebu First HED, as well as the suppliers and contractors who conspired and confederated with them.

The nuclei of this massive conspiracy, namely: Rolando Mangubat, Jose Sayson, and Edgardo Cruz, all of MPH Region VII, were found guilty in all 119 counts and were accordingly sentenced by the SB. The other conniver, Delia Preagido, after being found guilty in some of the cases, became a state witness in the remainder.On the basis of her testimony and pertinent documents, Informations were filed, convictions were obtained, and criminal penalties were imposed on the rest of the accused. cralawOn the other hand, petitioners were both Civil Engineers of the MPH assigned to the Cebu First Highway Engineering District.Petitioner Fernan, Jr. was included among the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 2879, 2880, 2881, 2885, 2914, and 2918 allegedly for having signed six (6) tally sheets or statements of deliveries of materials, used as bases for the preparation of the corresponding number of general vouchers.Fund releases were made to the suppliers, contractors, and payees based on these general vouchers. cralawThe Information against Fernan, Jr. in SB Criminal Case No. 2879 reads as follows:

The undersigned accuses Rocilo Neis, Rolando Mangubat, Adventor Fernandez, Angelina Escao, Delia Preagido, Camilo de Letran, Manuel de Veyra, Heracleo Faelnar, Basilisa Galvan, Matilde Jabalde, Josefina Luna, Jose Sayson, Edgardo Cruz, Leonila del Rosario, Engracia Escobar, Abelardo Cardona, Leonardo Tordecilla, Agripino Pagdanganan, Ramon Quirante, Mariano Montera, Mariano Jarina, Leo Villagonzalo, Asterio Buqueron, Zosimo Mendez, Simon Fernan, Jr. and Juliana de los Angeles for estafa thru falsification of public and commercial documents, committed as follows: That on, about and during the period from December 1, 1976 up to January 31, 1977,both dates inclusive, in the City of Cebu and in Cebu Province, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Rocilo Neis, Assistant District Engineer of Cebu HED I; Rolando Mangubat, the Chief Accountant of Region VII of the Ministry of Public Highways and Adventor Fernandez, Regional Highway Engineer of same Regional Office, conniving with each other to defraud the Philippine Government with the indispensable cooperation and assistance of Angelina Escao, Finance Officer of Region VII of the Ministry of Public Highways; Delia Preagido, Assistant Chief Accountant of same Regional Office; Camilo de Letran, Chief Accountant of Cebu I HED; Manuel de Veyra, Regional Director, MPH, Region VII; Heracleo Faelnar, then Assistant Director

MPH Region VII; Basilisa Galvan, Budget Officer, MPH, Region VII; Matilde Jabalde, Supervising Accounting Clerk, MPH, Region VII; Josefina Luna, Accountant II, MPH, Region VII; Jose Sayson, Budget Examiner, MPH, Region VII, Edgardo Cruz, Accountant I, MPH, Region VII; Leonila del Rosario, Chief Finance and Management Service, MPH, Central Office; Engracia Escobar, Chief Accountant, MPH, Central Office; Abelardo Cardona, Assistant Chief Accountant, MPH, Central Office; Leonardo Tordecilla, Supervising Accountant, MPH, Central Office; Agripino Pagdanganan, Budget Officer III, MPH, Central Office; Ramon Quirante, Property Custodian of Cebu I HED; Mariano Montera, Senior Civil Engineer Engineer of Cebu I HED; Mariano Jarina, Clerk in the Property Division of Cebu I HED; Leo Villagonzalo, Auditors Aide of Cebu I HED; Zosimo Mendez, Auditor of Cebu I HED; Asterio Buqueron, Administrative Officer of Cebu I HED; Simon Fernan, Jr., Civil Engineer of Cebu I HED and Juliana de los Angeles, an alleged supplier, all of whom took advantage of their official positions, with the exception of Juliana de los Angeles, mutually helping each other did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify and/or cause the falsification of the following documents, to wit: 1. Request for Allocation of Allotment 2. Letter of Advice of Allotment 3. Advice of Cash Disbursement Ceiling 4. General Voucher No. B-15 5. Check No. 9933064 6. Abstract of Bids 7. Purchase Order 8. Statement of Delivery 9. Report of Inspection 10. Requisition for Supplies or Equipment 11. Trial Balance by making it appear that Regional Office No. VII of the Ministry of Public Highways regularly issued an advice of cash disbursement ceiling (ACDC) and the corresponding letter of advice of allotment (LAA) to cover the purchase of 1,400 cu. m. of item 1083[7] for use in the repair of the Cebu Hagnaya Wharf road from Km. 50.30 to Km. 60.00, when in truth and in fact, as all the accused knew, the same were not true and correct; by making it appear in the 3

voucher that funds were available and that there were appropriate requests for allotments (ROA) to pay the aforesaid purchase; that a requisition for said item was made and approved; that a regular bidding was held; that a corresponding purchase order was issued in favor of the winning bidder; that the road construction materials were delivered, inspected and used in the supposed project and that the alleged supplier was entitled to payment when in truth and in fact, as all the accused know, all of the foregoing were false and incorrect and because of the foregoing falsifications, the above-named accused were able to collect from the Cebu I HED the total amount of TWENTY EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (P28,000.00), Philippine Currency, in payment of the non-existing deliveries; that the said amount of P28,000.00 was not reflected in the monthly trial balance submitted to the Central Office by Region VII showing its financial condition as the same was negated thru the journal voucher, as a designed means to cover-up the fraud; and the accused, once in possession of the said amount, misappropriated, converted and misapplied the same for their personal needs, to the damage and prejudice of the Philippine Government in the total amount of TWENTY EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (P28,000.00), Philippine Currency. Criminal Case No. 2879 Main Documents Falsified December 1, 1. General 1976 up to Voucher No. January 31, B-15; 1977 2. Check No. 9933064; December 1, 1. Request for 1976 up to Allocation of January 31, Allotment 1011977 12-105-76; 2. General Voucher No. B-55; 3. Check No. 9933104; January 2, 1977 1. Request for up to February Allocation of 28, 1977 Allotment 1012-56-77; 2. General Voucher No. B-245; 3. Check No. 9933294; January 2, 1977 1. Request for up to January Allocation of 31, 1977 Allotment 101Dates of Commission Items Allegedly Purchased 1,400 cu. m. of item 108 for use in the repair of the CebuHagnayaWharf road from Km. 50.30 to Km. 60.00 1,400 cu. m. of item 108 for use in the repair of the Bogo-Curva-Medellon road from Km. 110.00 to Km. 119.00 Amount of Fraud PhP 28,000.00

2880

PhP 28,000.00

2881

2885

Approximately 1,500 cu. m. of item 108 for use in the repair and rehabilitation of damaged roads and bridges by Typhoon Aring at the Tabogon-Bogo provincial road from Km. 92 to Km. 98 materials for use in the repair and rehabilitation of the Daan-Bantayan

PhP 31,000.00

PhP 30,000.00

2914

2918

12-112-76; 2. General Voucher No. B-76; 3. Check No. 9933125; October 1, 1. General 1977 up to Voucher No. November 30, B-927; 1977 2. Check No. 9403425; January 2, 1977 1. General up to February Voucher No. 28, 1977 B-107; 2. Check No. 9933157;

road from Km. 127.00 to Km. 136

1,200 cu. m. of item 108 for use in the rehabilitation of the CajelLugo, Barbon barangay road 1,500 cu. m. of item 108 for the rehabilitation of the CebuNorthHagnayaWharf road from Km. 71 to Km. 76

PhP 27,000.00

PhP 30,000.00

On the other hand, petitioner Torrevillas was one of the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 2855, 2856, 2858, 2859, 2909, 2910, 2914, 2919, and 2932. The Information against Torrevillas in SB Criminal Case No. 2855 reads as follows:

The undersigned accuses Rocilo Neis, Rolando Mangubat, Adventor Fernandez, Angelina Escao, Delia Preagido, Camilo de Letran, Manuel de Veyra, Heracleo Faelnar, Basilisa Galvan, Matilde Jabalde, Josefina Luna, Jose Sayson, Edgardo Cruz, Leonila del Rosario, Engracia Escobar, Abelardo Cardona, Leonardo Tordecilla, Agripino Pagdanganan, Ramon Quirante, Jorge de la Pea, Leo Villagonzalo, Asterio Buqueron, Expedito Torrevillas, Mariano Montera and Rufino V. Nuez for estafa thru falsification of public and commercial documents, committed as follows: That on, about and during the period from June 1, 1977 up to June 30, 1977,both dates inclusive, in the City of Cebu and in Cebu Province, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Rocilo Neis, Assistant District Engineer of Cebu HED I; Rolando Mangubat, the Chief Accountant of Region VII of the Ministry of Public Highways and Adventor Fernandez, Regional Highway Engineer of same Regional Office, conniving with each other to defraud the Philippine Government with the indispensable cooperation and assistance of Angelina Escao, Finance Officer of Region VII of the Ministry of Public Highways; Delia Preagido, Assistant Chief Accountant of same Regional Office; Camilo de Letran, Chief Accountant of Cebu I HED; Manuel de Veyra, Regional Director, MPH, Region VII; Heracleo Faelnar, then Assistant Director MPH Region VII; Basilisa Galvan, Budget Officer, MPH, Region VII; Matilde Jabalde, Supervising Accounting Clerk, MPH, Region VII; Josefina Luna,

Accountant II, MPH, Region VII; Jose Sayson, Budget Examiner, MPH, Region VII, Edgardo Cruz, Accountant I, MPH, Region VII; Leonila del Rosario, Chief Finance and Management Service, MPH, Central Office; Engracia Escobar, Chief Accountant, MPH, Central Office; Abelardo Cardona, Assistant Chief Accountant, MPH, Central Office; Leonardo Tordecilla, Supervising Accountant, MPH, Central Office; Agripino Pagdanganan, Budget Officer III, MPH, Central Office; Ramon Quirante, Property Custodian of Cebu I HED; Jorge de la Pea, Auditor of Cebu I HED; Leo Villagonzalo, Auditors Aide of Cebu I HED; Asterio Buqueron, Administrative Officer of Cebu I HED; Expedito Torrevillas, representative of the Engineers Office, Cebu I HED; Mariano Montera, Senior Civil Engineer Engineer of Cebu I HED; and Rufino V. Nuez, an alleged supplier, all of whom took advantage of their official positions, with the exception of Rufino V. Nuez, mutually helping each other did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify and/or cause the falsification of the following documents, to wit: 1. Request for Allocation of Allotment 101-10-186-76; 10-190-76; 10192-76; 10-188-76; 10-180-76 2. Letter of Advice of Allotment 3. Advice of Cash Disbursement Ceiling 4. General Voucher No. B-613 5. Check No. 9403099 6. Abstract of Bids 7. Purchase Order 8. Statement of Delivery 9. Report of Inspection 10. Requisition for Supplies or Equipment 11. Trial Balance by making it appear that Regional Office No. VII of the Ministry of Public Highways regularly issued an advice of cash disbursement ceiling (ACDC) and the corresponding letter of advice of allotment (LAA) to cover the purchase of 153.63 m. t. of item 3104[8] for use in asphalting of the Toledo-Tabuelan road at Km. 108.34 to Km. 109.52, when in truth and in fact, as all the accused knew, the same were not true and correct; by making it appear in the voucher that funds were available and that there were appropriate requests for allotments (ROA) to pay the aforesaid purchase; that a requisition for said item was made 4

and approved; that a regular bidding was held; that a corresponding purchase order was issued in favor of the winning bidder; that the road construction materials were delivered, inspected and used in the supposed project and that the alleged supplier was entitled to payment when in truth and in fact, as all the accused know, all of the foregoing were false and incorrect and because of the foregoing falsifications, the above-named accused were able to collect from the Cebu I HED the total amount of FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY ONE PESOS & 85/100 (P48,431.85), Philippine Currency, in payment of the non-existing deliveries; that the said amount of P48,431.85 was not reflected in the monthly trial balance submitted to the Central Office by Region VII showing its financial condition as the same was negated thru the journal voucher, as a designed means to cover-up the fraud; and the accused, once in possession of the said amount, misappropriated, converted and misapplied the same for their personal needs, to the damage and prejudice of the Philippine Government in the total amount of FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY ONE PESOS & 85/100 (P48,431.85), Philippine Currency. CONTRARY TO LAW. cralawThe Torrevillas cases were substantially the same save for the details highlighted in the aforequoted typical accusatory pleading.For ease of reference, Torrevillas criminal cases are particularized as follows: Criminal Case No. 2855 Main Documents Falsified June 1, 1977 up 1. Request for to June 30, Allocation of 1977 Allotment 10110-186-76; 10190-76; 10192-76; 10188-76; 10180-76; 2. General Voucher No. B613; 3. Check No. 9403099; June 1, 1977 up 1. Request for to June 30, Allocation of 1977 Allotment 10110-15-76; 9201-76; 8-15276; 8-153-76;9Dates of Commission Items Allegedly Purchased 153.63 m. t. of item 310 for use in asphalting of the ToledoTabuelan road from Km. 108.34 to Km. 109.52 Amount of Fraud PhP 48,431.85

2856

153.76 m. t. of item 310 for use in the asphalting of the ToledoTabuelan road

PhP 48,472.84

2858

2859

2909

181-76; 9-18476 2. General Voucher No. B619; 3. Check No. 9403105; June 1, 1977 up 1. Request for to July 31, 1977 Allocation Allotment 1016-234-76; 6237-76; 6-23976; 6-241-76; 6-240-76 2. General Voucher No. B629; 3. Check No. 9403115; June 1, 1977 up 1. Request for to June 31, Allocation of 1977 Allotment 1017-63-76; 8-10276; 8-121-76 2. General Voucher No. B631; 3. Check No. 9403117; September 1, 1. General 1977 up to Voucher No. BNovember 30, 928; 1977 2. Check No. 9403426;

from Km 108.34 to Km. 109.52

151.35 m. t. of item 310 for use in the asphalting of the ToledoTabuelan road from Km. 108.34 to Km. 109.52

PhP 47,713.09

110.01 m. t. of item 310 for use in asphalting of the ToledoTabuelan road from Km. 108.34 to Km.109.52 1,200 cu.m. of item 108 for use in the rehabilitation of the BuanoyCantibas, Balaban barangay road 1,200 cu. m. of item 108 for use in the rehabilitation of the MagayCanamukan, Compostela barangay road 1,200 cu. m. of item 108 for use in the

PhP 34,680.65

PhP 27,900.00

2910

September 1, 1977 up to November 30, 1977

1. General Voucher No. B929; 2. Check No. 9403427;

PhP 27,900.00

2914

October 1, 1977 1. General up to November Voucher No. B30, 1977 927;

PhP 27,000.00

2. Check No. 9403425; 2919 January 2, 1977 1. General up to February Voucher No. B28, 1977 244; 2. Check No. 9933293;

2932

June 1, 1977 up 1. Request for to July 31, 1977 Allocation of Allotment 1017-83-76; 7-8476; 7-124-76; 8-153-76; 8170-76; 2. General Voucher B-643; 3. Check No. 9403130;

rehabilitation of the Cajel-Lugo, Barbon barangay road 1,550 cu. m. of item 108 for use in the repair and rehabilitation of damaged roads and bridges at the ToledoTabuelan national road from Km. 71 to Km. 83 250 gals of aluminum paint 324 gals of red lead paint for use in the maintenance of national roads and bridges

PhP 31,000.00

PhP 44,762.58

The Sandiganbayans Ruling The anti-graft court was fully convinced of the guilt of petitioner Fernan, Jr.; and in its December 4, 1997 Decision, it found him criminally liable in the six (6) cases against him, thus: In Criminal Case No. 2879, the Court finds accused JOSE SAYSON, RAMON QUIRANTE, MARIANO MONTERA, ZOSIMO MENDEZ, MARIANO JARINA and SIMON FERNAN, Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Twenty Eight Thousand Pesos (P 28,000.00); and, to pay their proportionate share of the costs.5[9] (Emphasis supplied.) 5

In Criminal Case No. 2880, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON QUIRANTE, MARIANO MONTERA, ZOSIMO MENDEZ, and SIMON FERNAN, Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Twenty Eight Thousand Pesos (P 28,000.00); and, to pay their proportionate share of the costs.6[10] (Emphasis supplied.) In Criminal Case No. 2881, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON QUIRANTE, ZOSIMO MENDEZ and SIMON FERNAN, Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Thirty One Thousand Pesos (P 31,000.00); and, to pay their proportionate share of the costs. 7 [11] (Emphasis supplied.) In Criminal Case No. 2885, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN JOSE SAYSON, RAMON QUIRANTE, ZOSIMO MENDEZ and SIMON FERNAN, Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P 30,000.00); and, to pay their proportionate share of the costs.8[12] (Emphasis supplied.) In Criminal Case No. 2914, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON QUIRANTE, EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS and SIMON FERNAN, Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an 6 7 8

indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Twenty Seven Thousand Pesos (P 27,000.00); and, to pay their proportionate share of the costs.9[13] (Emphasis supplied.) In Criminal Case No. 2918, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON QUIRANTE, ZOSIMO MENDEZ, SIMON FERNAN, Jr. and ISMAEL SABIO, Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P 30,000.00); and, to pay their proportionate share of the costs.10[14] (Emphasis supplied.) cralaw cralawPetitioner Torrevillas suffered the same fate and was convicted in the nine (9) criminal cases, to wit: In Criminal Case No. 2855, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON QUIRANTE, MARIANO MONTERA, and EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Forty Eight Thousand Four Hundred Thirty One Pesos and 85/100 (P 48,431.85); and, to pay their proportionate share of the costs.11[15](Emphasis supplied.) In Criminal Case No. 2856, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON QUIRANTE, MARIANO MONTERA and EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an 9 10 11

indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Forty Eight Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Two Pesos and 84/100 (P 48,472.84); and, to pay their proportionate share of the costs.12[16] (Emphasis supplied.) In Criminal Case No. 2858, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON QUIRANTE, MARIANO MONTERA and EXPEDITO TOREVILLAS, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Forty Seven Thousand Seven Hundred Thirteen Pesos and 9/100 (P47,713.09); and, to pay their proportionate share of the costs. In Criminal Case No. 2859, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON QUIRANTE, MARIANO MONTERA and EXPEDITO TOREVILLAS, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Thirty Four Thousand Six Hundred Eighty pesos and 65/100 (P34,680.65); and , to pay their proportionate share of the costs.13[17] In Criminal Case No. 2909, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON QUIRANTE, FLORO JAYME and EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Twenty Seven Thousand Nine Hundred Pesos (P 27,900.00); and, to pay

12 13

their proportionate share of the costs.14[18] (Emphasis supplied.) In Criminal Case No. 2910, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON QUIRANTE, FLORO JAYME and EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Twenty Seven Thousand Nine Hundred Pesos (P 27,900.00); and, to pay their proportionate share of the costs.15[19] (Emphasis supplied.) In Criminal Case No. 2914, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON QUIRANTE, EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS and SIMON FERNAN, Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Twenty Seven Thousand Pesos (P 27,000.00); and, to pay their proportionate share of the costs. (Emphasis supplied.) In Criminal Case No. 2919, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON QUIRANTE, MARIANO MONTERA, ZOSIMO MENDEZ, EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS and ISMAEL SABIO, Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Thirty One Thousand Pesos (P 31,000.00); and, to pay their proportionate share of the costs.16[20] (Emphasis supplied.) In Criminal Case No. 2932, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON QUIRANTE, MARIANO MONTERA, PEDRITO SEVILLE and EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in 14 15 16

Articles 318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Forty Four Thousand Seven Hundred Sixty Two Pesos and 58/100 (P 44,762.58); and, to pay their proportionate share of the costs.17[21] (Emphasis supplied.) cralawPetitioners made the supplication before the court a quo to recall the adverse judgments against them which was declined by the August 29, 2000 SB Resolution. cralawFirm in their belief that they were innocent of any wrongdoing, they now interpose the instant petition to clear their names. The Issues cralawPetitioners put forward two (2) issues, viz: I THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN TOTALLY IGNORED PETITIONERS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT WHEN IT RULED THAT THE BURDEN OF CONVINCING THE HON. COURT THAT THE DELIVERIES OF THE ROAD MATERIALS ATTESTED TO HAVE BEEN RECEIVED BY THEM WERE NOT GHOST DELIVERIES RESTS WITH THE ACCUSED AND NOT WITH THE PROSECUTION. II THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN CONVICTING PETITIONERS AS CO-CONSPIRATORS DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO SPECIFICALLY PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES THAT WOULD IMPLICATE THEM AS CO-CONSPIRATORS AND JUSTIFY THEIR CONVICTION. The Courts Ruling cralawWe are not persuaded to nullify the verdict. 17

Petitioners guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt cralawPetitioners mainly asseverate that their guilt was not shown beyond a peradventure of doubt and the State was unable to show that government funds were illegally released based on alleged ghost deliveries in conjunction with false or fake tally sheets and other documents which they admittedly signed. cralawWe are not convinced. cralawOur Constitution unequivocally guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.18[22]This sacred task unqualifiedly means proving the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.Definitely, reasonable doubt is not mere guesswork whether or not the accused is guilty, but such uncertainty that a reasonable man may entertain after a fair review and consideration of the evidence.Reasonable doubt is present when after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidences, leaves the minds of the [judges] in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge; a certainty that convinces and directs the understanding, and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it.19[23] cralawA thorough scrutiny of the records is imperative to determine whether or not reasonable doubt exists as to the guilt of accused Fernan, Jr. and Torrevillas. cralawPetitioners were charged with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents as defined and penalized under Articles 318 and 171 in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, thus:

ART. 318. Other deceits. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of not less than the amount of the damage caused and not more than twice such amount shall be imposed upon any person who shall defraud or damage another by any deceit not mentioned in the preceding articles of this chapter. 18 19

ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee; or notary or ecclesiastical minister. The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts: xxxx 4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts; ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

The complex crime is pruned into the following essential elements: For estafa 1. Deceit: Deceit is a specie of fraud.It is actual fraud, and consists in any false representation or contrivance whereby one person overreaches and misleads another, to his hurt.There is deceit when one is misled, either by guile or trickery or by other means, to believe to be true what is really false.20[24] 2. Damage: Damage may consist in the offended party being deprived of his money or property as a result of the defraudation, disturbance in property right, or temporary prejudice.21[25] For falsification 1. That the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public; 2. That he takes advantage of his official position; 3. That he falsifies a document by committing any of the acts defined under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.22[26] cralaw cralawBefore the SB, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated September 1, 1988 was entered into between the State and the accused with the following stipulations and admissions: (1) To expedite the early termination of the instant cases and abbreviate the testimony of Mrs. Delia Preagido, the prosecution and the accused have agreed to reproduce and adopt as the testimony of Preagido in the instant cases, her previous testimonies in Criminal Cases Nos. 889, etc. (Mandaue City HED 78 cases), on May 18 and 19, 1982 20 21 22

and in Criminal Cases Nos. 1446-1789, etc. (Danao City HED 77 cases) on November 10, 1987 and March 14, 1988, both on direct and cross examination x x x without prejudice to whatever direct and/or cross examination question, that may be propounded by the Prosecution and the accused on said State witness, which questions will only be limited to the fake or irregular LAAs and SACDCs issued to Cebu I HED in 1977, the sale of such fake or irregular LAAs and SACDCs issued to Cebu I HED in 1977, the sale of such fake or irregular LAAs and SACDCs in said engineering district in the said year and the participation of the accused thereon; (2) That in the event Mrs. Delia Preagido is presented to testify as a State witness in the instant cases without reproducing and adopting her previous testimonies in the Mandaue City HED 78 and the Danao City HED 77 cases, she will identify documents and exhibits which have been previously marked and identified by other prosecution witness x x x. (3) That in the previous testimonies of Mrs. Delia Preagido in the Mandaue City HED 78 and the Danao City HED 77 cases, she identified twenty-six separate lists containing names of officials and employees of MPH, Regional Office No. VII, of the various Highways Engineering Districts in MPH, Region VII, and the MPH Central Office who have allegedly received money or various sums from 1977 to 1978 out of the proceeds or sales of fake LAAs in 1977 and 1978 and, therefore, to obviate Mrs. Preagidos previous testimony of these lists, the Prosecution hereby reproduces and adopts specifically such testimony and the markings of the lists, i.e., Exhibits KKK, KKK-1 to KKK-25 in the Mandaue City HED 78 cases and Exhibits 0000, 0000-1 to 0000-25 in the Danao City HED 77 cases, substituted or re-marked accordingly as Exhibits LL, LL1 to LL-25 in the instant cases.23[27]

cralawAs a result of this MOA, the testimony of state witness Preagido on the modus operandi of the conspirators, or the unique and distinct method of procedure by which the malversation of public funds in Region VII of the MPH was perpetrated and accomplished, dealt a major blow to the defenses raised by petitioners.Preagidos vital testimony, wherein she identified the methods, documents, exhibits, and other pertinent papers that led to the crafting of fake Letters of Advice of Allotment (LAAs),24[28] general vouchers, disbursement of funds for non-existent projects, general vouchers, and other documents, was not even successfully refuted or overturned by petitioners. cralawPreagido confirmed and admitted under oath that the illegal disbursement of public funds pertained to non-existent projects and was supported by fake LAAs, fake general vouchers, and other pertinent papers that were also falsified.The fake LAAs and general vouchers were, in turn, supported by signed tally sheets that pertained to alleged ghost deliveries of road construction materials for nonexistent or illegal projects. 23 24

The fake tally sheets, delivery receipts, reports of inspection, requests for supplies and materials, and other related documents signed on separate occasions by petitioners, which were attached as supporting documents to corresponding general vouchers; the alleged amounts and quantities of road construction materials delivered; and the specific fake general vouchers, checks, and other pertinent documents issued which led to the illegal disbursement of funds are summarized as follows: Petitioner Fernan, Jr. Criminal Case No. 2879 Specific Exhibits T-86-f-1, etc. (Tally Sheets) Main Documents Falsified Items Allegedly Purchased 1,400 cu. m. of item 108 for use in the repair of the CebuHagnayaWharf road from Km. 50.30 to Km. 60.00 1,400 cu. m. of item 108 for use in the repair of the Bogo-Curva-Medellon road from Km. 110.00 to Km. 119.00 FAKE LAAs that authorized purchase Not numbered contrary to official procedure Not numbered contrary to official procedure Amount of Fraud PhP 28,000.00

2880

2881

2885

1. General Voucher No. B-15; 2. Check No. 9933064; T-87-f-1, 1. Request etc. for (Tally Allocation Sheets) of Allotment 101-12-10576; 2. General Voucher No. B-55; 3. Check No. 9933104; T-104-g- 1. Request 1, etc. for (Tally Allocation Sheets) of Allotment 101-2-5677; 2. General Voucher No. B-245; 3. Check No. 9933294; T-89-f-1, 1. Request etc. for (Tally Allocation

PhP 28,000.00

Approximately 1,500 cu. m. of item 108 for use in the repair and rehabilitation of damaged roads and bridges by Typhoon Aring at the Tabogon-Bogo provincial road from Km. 92 to Km. 98

Not numbered contrary to official procedure

PhP 31,000.00

Materials for use in the repair and rehabilitation of the Daan-Bantayan

Not numbered contrary to

PhP 30,000.00

Sheets)

2914

T-115-g1, etc. (Tally Sheets) T-116-f1, etc. (Tally Sheets)

2918

of Allotment 101-12-11276; 2. General Voucher No. B-76; 3. Check No. 9933125; 1. General Voucher No. B-927; 2. Check No. 9403425; 1. General Voucher No. B-107; 2. Check No. 9933157;

road from Km. 127.00 to Km. 136

official procedure

1,200 cu. m. of item 108 for use in the rehabilitation of the CajelLugo, Barbon barangay road 1,500 cu. m. of item 108 for the rehabilitation of the CebuNorthHagnayaWharf road from Km. 71 to Km. 76 Petitioner Torrevillas Not numbered contrary to official procedure

PhP 27,000.00

PhP 30,000.00

Criminal Case No. 2855

Specific Exhibits T-33-f (Delivery Receipt); T33-f-1 (Daily Tally Sheet);

Main Documents Falsified 1. Request for Allocation of Allotment 10110-186-76; 10190-76; 10192-76; 10188-76; 10180-76; 2. General Voucher No. B613; 3. Check No. 9403099; 1. Request for Allocation of Allotment 10110-15-76; 9201-76; 8-152-

Items Allegedly Purchased 153.63 m. t. of item 310 for use in asphalting of the ToledoTabuelan road from Km. 108.34 to Km. 109.52

FAKE LAAs that authorized purchase Not numbered contrary to official procedure

Amount of Fraud PhP 48,431.85

2856

T-34-f (Delivery Receipt); T34-f-1 (Daily Tally

153.76 m. t. of item 310 for use in the asphalting of the Toledo-

Not numbered contrary to official procedure

PhP 48,472.84

2858

2859

2909

2910

76; 8-153-76;9181-76; 9-18476 2. General Voucher No. B619; 3. Check No. 9403105; T-35-f 1. Request for (Delivery Allocation Receipt); T- Allotment 10135-f-1 6-234-76; 6(Daily Tally 237-76; 6-239Sheet); 76; 6-241-76; 6-240-76 2. General Voucher No. B629; 3. Check No. 9403115; T-36-f 1. Request for (Delivery Allocation of Receipt); T- Allotment 10136-f-1 7-63-76; 8(Daily Tally 102-76; 8-121Sheet); 76 2. General Voucher No. B631; 3. Check No. 9403117; T-113-b 1. General (Request for Voucher No. BSupplies and 928; Equipment); 2. Check No. T-113-d 9403426; (Report of Inspection); T-113-c (Abstract of Sealed Quotation) T-114-c 1. General (Request for Voucher No. BSupplies and 929; Equipment); 2. Check No. T-114-e 9403427; (Report of

Sheet);

Tabuelan road from Km 108.34 to Km. 109.52

151.35 m. t. Not numbered of item 310 contrary to for use in the official asphalting of procedure the ToledoTabuelan road from Km. 108.34 to Km. 109.52

PhP 47,713.09

110.01 m. t. Not numbered of item 310 contrary to for use in official asphalting of procedure the ToledoTabuelan road from Km. 108.34 to Km.109.52 1,200 cu.m. Not numbered of item 108 contrary to for use in the official rehabilitation procedure of the BuanoyCantibas, Balaban barangay road 1,200 cu. m. Not numbered of item 108 contrary to for use in the official rehabilitation procedure of the MagayCanamukan,

PhP 34,680.65

PhP 27,900.00

PhP 27,900.00

2914

2919

Inspection); T-114-f (Abstract of Sealed Quotation) T-115-c (Request for Supplies and Equipment); T-115-e (Report of Inspection); T-115-f (Abstract of Sealed Quotation) T-117-g (Delivery Receipt); T117-g-1, etc. (Daily Tally Sheets)

Compostela barangay road

1. General Voucher No. B927; 2. Check No. 9403425;

1,200 cu. m. Not numbered of item 108 contrary to for use in the official rehabilitation procedure of the CajelLugo, Barbon barangay road

PhP 27,000.00

1. General Voucher No. B244; 2. Check No. 9933293;

2932

1. Request for Allocation of Allotment 1017-83-76; 7-8476; 7-124-76; 8-153-76; 8170-76; 2. General Voucher B643; 3. Check No. 9403130; cralaw

1,550 cu. m. Not numbered of item 108 contrary to for use in the official repair and procedure rehabilitation of damaged roads and bridges at the ToledoTabuelan national road from Km. 71 to Km. 83 250 gals of Not numbered aluminum contrary to paint 324 gals official of red lead procedure paint for use in the maintenance of national roads and bridges

PhP 31,000.00

PhP 44,762.58

On the part of petitioners, they readily admitted that they either signed the tally sheets and/or delivery receipts, reports of inspection, requests for supplies and materials, and other related documents which became part of the supporting documents that led to the issuance of general vouchers and eventually

the disbursement of public funds.25[29] The tally sheets are statements of delivery that purportedly indicated the specified quantities of materials for the construction and maintenance of roads that have been delivered on supposed project sites on given dates at specific places. cralawAs a result of petitioners signatures in the tally sheets and/or delivery receipts, reports of inspection, requests for supplies and materials, and other supporting documentswhich became the basis for payment to supplierspublic funds were released via general vouchers and checks to the said suppliers despite the fact that the latter did not make any deliveries in accordance with projects allegedly funded by mostly fake LAAs. cralawThe accusation that there were no actual deliveries of road construction and maintenance materials in support of projects or otherwise funded by LAAs was proven true by the testimonies of the various barangay captains and residents of the barangay who were supposed to be benefited by the construction and repair activities of the Cebu First Highway Engineering District.The testimonies of these barangay captains and residents are summarized as follows:26[30]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

1. MACARIO LIMALIMA,Barangay Captain of Barangay Antipolo, Medellin, Cebu, testified that his barangay is traversed by the national highway stretching to a distance of 2 kilometers and 750 meters (Km. 122; Km. 123 to 125).He described the road as full of potholes.Except for filling up these potholes with anapog or crushed limestone, no major repairs were undertaken on the said road in 1978 or in previous years. (TSN., pp. 6-14, June 5, 1986).27[31] 2. FELOMINO ORBISO, Barangay Captain of Cawit, Medellin, Cebu, from 1972 to 1981, testified that his barangay is traversed by the national highway, stretching from Km. 125 to Km. 127.9.He described the road as a rough or dirt road.No improvement was ever made on this road whether during the year when he gave his statement to the NBI (1978) or in previous years. The road remained in bad shape, with numerous potholes which the camineros merely filled up with limestone. (TSN., pp.14-19, June 5, 1986).28[32] 3.TIMOTEO ANCAJAS, Barangay Captain of Paypay, Daan Bantayan, Cebu, from 1972 to 1982, testified that his barangay is traversed by the national highway, stretching from Km. 132 to Km. 134 , or a distance of 2 kilometers.He described the portion of the highway as a rough road with potholes.He stated that the only improvement done on this road was the filling up of the potholes with anapog or crushed limestone and this was 25 26 27 28

done only once in 1977.It even took the camineros three months from the time the limestones were delivered to start working on the road. (TSN., pp. 20-26, June 5, 1986).29[33] 4. LUCIA PEAFLOR, Barangay Captain of Don Pedro, Bogo, Cebu, from 1966 to 1982, testified that her barangay is traversed by the national highway, stretching from Km. 103 to Km. 105 , up to the boundary of San Remigio, and from the boundary to Daan Bantayan, a distance of more than 3 kilometers.It was only in 1984 or 1985 when this portion of the national highway was asphalted.Prior to that, the road was maintained by filling up the potholes with crushed limestone or anapog.These potholes started to appear between January and June of 1977.However, as alleged by her in her affidavit (Exh. II-1-d), these potholes were filled up only from January to June, 1978. (TSN., pp. 28-46, June 5, 1986).30[34] 5.MARCELO CONEJOS, Barangay Captain of Tapilon, Daan Bantayan, from 1972 to 1982, testified that his barangay is traversed by the national highway, stretching from Km. 130 to Km. 134, or a distance of 4 kilometers.In 1977, said portion of the national highway was in bad condition and that nothing was done to improve it until 1982, except for the time when the potholes were filled up with crushed limestones. (TSN., pp. 48-56, June 5, 1986).31[35] 6. REMEDIOS FELICANO, Barangay Captain of Looc, San Remigio, Cebu from 1977 to 1982, testified that her barangay is traversed by the national highway, stretching form Km. 109 to Km. 110.She described said portion of the national highway as stoney.The only maintenance work undertaken to improve the road was the filling up of potholes with crushed limestone which camineros gathered from the roadside. (TSN., pp.57-67, June 5, 1986).32[36] 7. ALBERTO BRANSUELA, a resident of Barangay San Jose, Catmon, Cebu, from 1974 to 1978, testified that barangay San Jose is traversed by the national highway (Km. 58), covering a distance of kilometer more or less.He stated that while this portion of the national highway was already asphalted as of 1977, there were potholes which the camineros filled up with anapog taken from the roadside. (TSN., pp. 69-80), June 5, 1986).33[37] 8. CARIDAD PUNLA, Acting Barangay Captain of Barangay Corazon, Catmon, Cebu, from 1977 to 1982, testified that the Poblacion of Catmon is traversed by the national highway, stretching from Km. 57 to Km. 58.In 1977, only more than of this portion of the national highway was cemented while the remaining portion was asphalted.While said portion of the national highway already had cracks and potholes as of 1977, the real problem was the uneven elevation of the surface of the shoulder of the road.No general repair was undertaken by the authorities to correct the uneven elevation, except for the work done by the camineros who covered up the potholes. (TSN., pp. 81-89, June 5, 29 30 31 32 33

1986).34[38] 9.FELIPE MOLIT, Barangay Captain of Bao, Sugud, Cebu, from 1975 to 1982, testified that barangay Bao was traversed by the national highway, stretching from Km. 59 to Km. 60 1/2.He described said portion of the national highway as a gravel road surfaced with anapog.In 1977, the said road already had potholes which maintenance men filled up with anapog beginning in March, 1977.The anapog was hauled in from Km. 64, the usual excavation place of anapog.It took only 3 truckloads of anapog to cover the entire length of the 1 kilometers traversing their barangay. (TSN., pp. 90-99, June 5, 1986).35[39] 10. LEONARDO PINOTE, Barangay Captain of Barangay Argawanon, San Remigio, Cebu, from 1972 to 1980, testified that his barangay is traversed by the national highway covering a distance of kilometers more or less.In 1977, this portion of the national highway was a rough road with potholes.In the same year, camineros worked on the road, using wheelbarrows, shovels and rakes, pitching up the potholes with anapog.(TSN., pp. 29-35, June 6, 1986).36[40] 11.PEDRO ORSAL, Barangay Captain of Poblacion, San Remigio, Cebu, from January 1972 to 1980, testified that his barangay is traversed by the national highway, from Km. 107 to Km. 110, or a distance of three kilometers more or less.In 1977, the road from Km. 107 to Km. 108 was a gravel road. It was properly maintained by the highways people, and every time potholes appeared on the road, they would be filled-up with anapog.This material was dumped along the road by trucks of the Bureau of Public Highways.On the other hand, the road leading to the heart of the poblacion was asphalted, but with potholes.In 1977, the potholes were filled up by camineros with gravel delivered by dump trucks of the Bureau of Public Highways.It was only in 1978 when the road was re-asphalted and extended from the junction of the poblacion to the adjacent barrio of Looc. x x x (TSN., pp.36-45, June 6, 1986).37[41] The inescapable conclusion from the aforementioned testimonies of the barangay captains and residents of Cebu whose respective barangay are traversed by the national highway is that there were no actual major repair works undertaken on the national highway except the filling of potholes by crushed limestone (anapog). Clearly, there were no deliveries of supplies and materials for asphalting and repair of roads described in the tally sheets and other supporting documents signed by petitioners. While petitioner Torrevillas presented Vice-Mayor Emigdio Tudlasan of Tabuclan, Cebu, who testified that he saw the asphalting of the Tabuclan Road from kilometers 18 to 19, said testimony is not conclusive on the actual delivery of the supplies indicated in the tally sheets, as Tudlasan was not present at the time of alleged delivery. Moreover, his testimony runs counter to the testimonies of 34 35 36 37

Barangay Captain Remedios Feliciano of Looc, San Remigio, Cebu and Barangay Captain Pedro Orsal of Poblacion, San Remigio, Cebu. Feliciano testified that she was Barangay Captain of Looc, San Remigio, Cebu from 1977 to 1982; that her barangay is traversed by the national highway, stretching from km. 109 to km. 110; and that the only work undertaken to improve the road was the filling up of potholes with crushed limestone which camineros gathered from the roadside. On the other hand, Orsal testified that he was Barangay Captain of Poblacion, San Remigio, Cebu, from January 1972 to 1980; that his barangay is traversed by the national highway, from km. 107 to km. 110; that in 1977, the road from km. 107 to km. 108 was a gravel road maintained by the highways people, and every time potholes appeared on the road, they would be filled-up with anapog, which was dumped along the road by the Bureau of Public Highways; and that it was only in 1978 when the road was re-asphalted and extended from the junction of the poblacion to the adjacent barrio of Looc. Compared to the testimony of Vice-Mayor Tudlasan, the testimonies of Barangay Captains Feliciano and Orsal are entitled to more weight and credit, and are more credible considering the fact that they are residents of the area where the road supposedly to be repaired is located plus the fact that they saw only limestone, not asphalt, that was used in the repair of the road in 1977. The testimonies of Feliciano and Orsal are further buttressed by the findings and statements of government witnesses, namelyRuth Inting Paredes, Supervising Commission on Audit (COA) Auditor assigned to Region VII; Felicitas Cruz Ona, Supervising COA Auditor assigned to the main COA office; Federico A. Malvar, Senior National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Agent of the Anti-Graft Section and member of the COA NBI team assigned to investigate the anomalies; Rogelio C. Mamaril, Supervising NBI Agent of the Anti-Fraud and Action Section; and Delia Comahig Preagido, Accountant III, MPH, Region VIIto the effect that the general vouchers and LAAs that corresponded to the aforementioned tally sheets signed by petitioner Torrevillas were fake or falsified.Undeniably, the government witnesses have no motive to testify falsely against petitioner Torrevillas and, hence, credible. We conclude that there were no actual deliveries of supplies for asphalting of road and repair on kilometers 108 and 109, which were the subjects of Criminal Case Nos. 2855, 2856, 2858, and 2859. Glaring is the finding of the SB that the Cebu First Highway Engineering District, to which petitioners were assigned, had fake LAAs totaling to PhP 4,924,366.50, while the fake Cash Disbursement Ceilings issued amounted to PhP 6,271,150.38[42]The Cebu First Highway Engineering

38

District had also issued checks per unrecorded reports in the total sum of PhP 1,135,176.82. 39 [43]Therefore, the total illegal disbursements in the Cebu First Highway Engineering District alone were a staggering PhP 12,330,693.32 circa 1977. Of this total, petitioner Fernan, Jr. freely admitted signing tally sheets which pertained to nonexistent deliveries of road construction supplies and materials totaling PhP 146,000,40[44] including PhP 27,000 in Criminal Case No. 2914 where petitioner Torrevillas was among the co-accused.41[45] These tally sheets were attached as the supporting papers to fake general vouchers which facilitated the release of check payments to suppliers. These checks were allegedly paid to suppliers Juliana de los Angeles (Criminal Case Nos. 2879, 2880, 2881, 2885, and 2914) and Ismael Sabio, Jr. (Criminal Case No. 2918).42[46]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary On his part, petitioner Torrevillas voluntarily admitted to signing tally sheets, reports of inspection, requisitions of supplies and equipment, and other pertinent documents totaling an even greater amount of PhP 337,861.01,43[47] including PhP 27,000 in Criminal Case No. 2914 where petitioner Fernan, Jr. was among the co-accused.44[48]These documents signed by petitioner Torrevillas were likewise attached as supporting papers to fake general vouchers which facilitated the release of check payments to suppliers. These checks were allegedly paid to suppliers Rufino V. Nuez (Criminal Case Nos. 2855, 2856, 2858, and 2859), Juliana de los Angeles (Criminal Case Nos. 2909, 2910, and 2914), Ismael Sabio, Jr. (Criminal Case No. 2919), and Manuel Mascardo (Criminal Case No. 2932).45 [49]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary These general vouchers and checks could not be traced to genuine LAAs.Ergo, there were no actual deliveries of supplies and materials for the road repair and rehabilitation in Region VII, which were the subjects of the criminal cases where petitioners were charged.

39 40 41 42 43 44 45

We find no reason to disturb the findings of the court a quo that all the essential elements of the crime of estafa through falsification of public documents were present.There is no question that petitioners, at the time of the commission of the crime, were public officerscivil engineersassigned to the MPH.Their signing of tally sheets and related documents pertaining to the alleged deliveries of supplies for road repair and construction constitutes intervention and/or taking advantage of their official positions, especially considering that they had the duty to inspect the purported deliveries and ascertain the veracity of the documents and the statements contained in them. The tally sheets bearing their signatures contained false recitals of material facts which the petitioners had the duty to verify and confirm.These tally sheets were attached as supporting documents to fake LAAs and subsequently became the bases for the disbursement of public funds to the damage and prejudice of the government.Indubitably, there exists not even an iota of doubt as to petitioners guilt. The essential elements of estafa through falsification of public documents are present in the cases against petitioners, as follows: 1. Deceit: Petitioners Fernan, Jr. and Torrevillas made it appear that supplies for road construction and maintenance were delivered by suppliers allegedly in furtherance of alleged lawful projects when in fact said supplies were not delivered and no actual asphalting or repair of road was implemented.In doing so, petitioners: 1.1. Were public officers or employees at the time of the commission of the offenses; 1.2. Took advantage of their official position as highway engineers; and 1.3. Made untruthful statements in several narrations of fact. 2. Damage: The government disbursed PhP 146,000 in the case of Fernan, Jr. and PhP 337,861.01 in the case of Torrevillas, as payments to various suppliers for the delivery of non-existent supplies. cralawBy way of defense, petitioners posit that the tally sheets and other documents could in fact be traced to genuine LAAs that were in the custody of the NBI.Unfortunately, these genuine LAAs were not introduced in evidence.It is an age-old axiom that s/he who alleges something must prove it. Petitioners assertion that the documents they signed were all genuine and duly covered by genuine LAAs was substantiated only by their own self-serving and uncorroborated testimonies.We hesitate to

give much weight and credit to their bare testimonies in the face of clear, convincing, overwhelming, and hard evidence adduced by the State. If the genuine LAAs were vital to their defense, and they firmly believed that the documents were indeed in the custody of the NBI, then petitioners could have easily procured the compulsory process to compel the production of said documents.However, petitioners miserably failed to avail of subpoena duces tecum which the court a quo could have readily granted.The inability to produce such important and exculpatory pieces of evidence proved disastrous to petitioners cause.Their conviction was indeed supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt which was not overturned by defense evidence. Petitioners acted in conspiracy with one another Petitioners vigorously claim error on the part of the lower court when it made the finding that they were co-conspirators with the other parties accused despite the dearth of evidence to amply demonstrate complicity. We are not convinced by petitioners postulation. Indeed, the burden of proving the allegation of conspiracy falls to the shoulders of the prosecution. Considering, however, the difficulty in establishing the existence of conspiracy, settled jurisprudence finds no need to prove it by direct evidence.In People v. Pagalasan, the Court explicated why direct proof of prior agreement is not necessary:

After all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy.Conspiracies are clandestine in nature.It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design.Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other, were in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment.To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.46[50]

In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, we categorized two (2) structures of multiple conspiracies, namely: (1) 46

the so-called wheel or circle conspiracy, in which there is a single person or group (the hub) dealing individually with two or more other persons or groups (the spokes); and (2) the chain conspiracy, usually involving the distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in which there is successive communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer. 47 [51]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary We find that the conspiracy in the instant cases resembles the wheel conspiracy. The 36 disparate persons who constituted the massive conspiracy to defraud the government were controlled by a single hub, namely: Rolando Mangubat (Chief Accountant), Delia Preagido (Accountant III), Jose Sayson (Budget Examiner), and Edgardo Cruz (Clerk II), who controlled the separate spokes of the conspiracy.Petitioners were among the many spokes of the wheel. We recall the painstaking efforts of the SB through Associate Justice Cipriano A. Del Rosario, Chairperson of the Third Division, in elaborating the intricate web of conspiracy among the accused, thus: Mangubat enticed Preagido, Cruz and Sayson to join him.All three agreed to help him carry out his plan.They typed fake LAAs during Saturdays.Cruz and Sayson also took charge of negotiating or selling fake LAAs to contractors at 26% of the gross amount.Preagido manipulated the general ledger, journal vouchers and general journal through negative entries to conceal the illegal disbursements.In the initial report of COA auditors Victoria C. Quejada and Ruth I. Paredes it was discovered that the doubtful allotments and other anomalies escaped notice due to the following manipulations: The letter-advices covering such allotments (LAA) were not signed by the Finance Officer nor (sic) recorded in the books of accounts.Disbursements made on the basis of these fake LAAs were charged to the unliquidated obligations (Account 8-81-400), although the obligations being paid were not among those certified to the unliquidated obligations (Account 8-81-400) at the end of the preceding year.To conceal the overcharges to authorized allotments, account 881-400 (sic) and the excess of checks issued over authorized cash disbursements ceiling, adjustments were prepared monthly through journal vouchers to take up the negative debit to Account 8-81-400 and a negative credit to the Treasury Checking Account for Agencies Account 8-70-790.These journal vouchers in effect cancelled the previous entry to record the disbursements made on the basis of fake LAAs. Thus the affected accounts (Accounts 8-81-400 and 8-70-790), as appearing in the trial balance, would not show the irregularity.The checks, however, were actually issued.48[52] 47 48

The four formed the nucleus of the nefarious conspiracy.Other government employees, tempted by the prospect of earning big money, allowed their names to be used and signed spurious documents. xxxx 3. cralawCebu First Highway Engineering District Anomalies

Focusing our attention now on the anomalies committed in the Cebu First District Engineering District, hereinafter referred to as the Cebu First HED for brevity, the Court finds that the same pattern of fraud employed in the other highway engineering districts in MPH Region VII was followed.The Cebu First HED received from Region VII thirtyfour Letters of Advice of Allotment (LAAs) in the total sum of P4,734,336.50 and twenty-nine (29) corresponding Sub-Advices of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (SACDCs), amounting to P5,160,677.04 for the period January 1, 1977 to December 31, 1977.But apart from this, the Cebu First HED appears to have also received for the same period another set of eighty-four (84) LAAs amounting to P4,680,694.76 which however, could not be traced to any Sub-Advice of Allotment (SAA) OR MATCHED TO THE Advices of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (ACDCs) received from the MPH and Regional Office.This is highly irregular and not in consonance with accounting procedures. It was also made to appear that the payments were made for alleged prior years obligations and chargeable to Account 81-400, obviously because, they were not properly funded.Furthermore, the list of projects in Region VII for 1977 showed that Cebu first HED completed rehabilitation and/or improvement of roads and bridges in its districts from February to May, 1977, with expenditures amounting to P613,812.00.On the other hand, the expenditures for barangay roads in the same district in 1977 amounted to P140,692.00, and these were all completed within the period from November to December, 1977.These completed projects were properly funded by legitimate LAAs and CDCs in the total amount of only P754,504.00.However, an additional amount of P3,839,810.74, was spent by the Cebu First HED for maintenance of roads and bridges for the same year (1977) but the same could not be traced to any authoritative document coming from the MPH. The following payments for materials purchased for the year 1977 were made to appear as payment for prior years obligation and were paid out of fake LAAs: Supplier Rufino Nuez J. delos Angeles Iluminada Vega Florencio Gacayan No. of Vouchers 29 21 11 10 Kind of Materials Item 310 Item 108 Item 108 Item 108 Measurement 4,640,275 mt 22,290 cu.m. 8,325 cu.m. 7,800 cu.m. Amount P1,374,135.00 433,300.00 191,500.00 156,000.00

Ismael Sabio, Jr. FBS Marketing Cebu Hollow Blocks Bienvenido Presillas T.R. Eustaquio Ent. Santrade Mktg. Pelagia Gomez M & M Ent. Freent Ind.

6 3 2 4 1 1 1 1 1

Item 108 Lumber Hollow Blocks Equip. Rental Office Supplies Johnson Products Item 108 Paints Office Supplies

6,198 cu.m.

123,960.00 70,610.00 19,880.00 29,580.00 7,461.90 8,392.90

2,000 cu.m.

40,000.00 49,736.20 590.20

Total

P2,505,147.00

The NBI also discovered that there were purchases of materials in 1977 that were charged to current obligations but paid out of spurious LAAs, to wit: Supplier Rufino Nuez Juliana delos Angeles Iluminada Vega Florencio Gacayan Vicon Ent. Ismael Sabio, Jr. Jabcyl Mktg. No. of Vouchers 11 16 3 2 1 5 3 Kind of Materials Item 310 Item 108 Item 108 Item 111 Item 200 Item 108 Item 108 Steel Frame Item 108 Bridge Materials Total Measurement 162,549 m.t. 5,000 cu.m. 13,280 cu.m. 1,00 cu.m. 307 cu.m. 3,600 cu.m. 2,400.00 cu.m. Amount P529,475.00 P276,400.00 24,000.00 7,982.00 72,090.00 48,000.00 19,042.74 6,950 cu.m. 139,000.00 128,764.80 P1,339,663.74 Grand Total .P3,839,810.74 A total of 132 General Vouchers, emanating from fake LAAs and ACDCs, were traced back to Rolando Mangubat, Regional Accountant of Region VII and Adventor

Fernandez, Regional Highway Engineer, also of Region VII. Those LAAs and ACDCs became the vehicles in the disbursement of funds amounting to P3,839,810.74, through the vouchers purportedly issued for the purchase and delivery of the aforementioned materials allegedly used for the maintenance and repair of the national highways within the Cebu First HED.Despite the enormous additional expenditure of P3,839,810.74, the roads and bridges in the district, as found out by the NBI, did not show any improvement (Exhibit II).As testified to by several barangay captains, the road maintenance consisted merely of spreading anapog or limestone on potholes of the national Highway. Obviously, the vouchers for payments of alleged maintenance of roads and bridges in the additional amount of P3,839,810.74 were prepared for no other purpose than to siphon off the said amount from the government coffer into the pockets of some officials and employees of Region VII and the Cebu First HED, as well as the suppliers and contractors who conspired and confederated with them.49[53] After a close re-examination of the records, the Court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the antigraft court that petitioners are co-conspirators of the other accused, headed by Chief Accountant Rolando Mangubat, who were similarly convicted in practically all the 119 counts of estafa.Undisturbed is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts and in the absence of strong and compelling reasons or justifications, it will accord finality to the findings of facts of the SB.The feeble defense of petitioners that they were not aware of the ingenuous plan of the group of accused Mangubat and the indispensable acts to defraud the government does not merit any consideration.The State is not tasked to adduce direct proof of the agreement by petitioners with the other accused, for such requirement, in many cases, would border on near impossibility.The State needs to adduce proof only when the accused committed acts that constitute a vital connection to the chain of conspiracy or in furtherance of the objective of the conspiracy.In the case at bench, the signing of the fake tally sheets and/or delivery receipts, reports of inspection, and requests for supplies and materials by petitioners on separate occasions is vital to the success of the Mangubat Group in siphoning off government funds.Without such fabricated documents, the general vouchers covering the supply of materials cannot be properly accomplished and submitted to the disbursing officer for the preparation of checks. State witness Ruth Paredes, Supervising COA Auditor, elaborated on the procedure regarding the award of the contract more specifically to the payment of the contractor or supplier.Once the Request for Supplies and Equipment is approved by the Regional Office, the Request for Obligation of Allotment (ROA) or the request for funds is signed by the District Engineer pursuant to the approved plans and 49

budget and signed by the district accountant as to availability of funds. The district office will advertise the invitation to bid and award the contract to the lowest bidder.The Purchase Order (PO) is prepared and addressed to the winning bidder.Upon delivery of the supplies and materials, the supplier bills the district office for payment.Consequently, the requisitioning officer will prepare the general voucher which must be accompanied by the following documents: a. The ROA; b. The PO; c. The abstract of Bid together with the Bid quotations; d. The delivery receipts together with the tally sheets; and e. The tax clearance and tax certificate of the supplier. After the preparation and submission of the general voucher and the supporting documents, the disbursing officer shall prepare and draw a check based on said voucher.The check is countersigned by an officer of the district office and/or the COA Regional Director based on the amount of the check. Thus, it is clear that without the tally sheets and delivery receipts, the general voucher cannot be prepared and completed.Without the general voucher, the check for the payment of the supply cannot be made and issued to the supplier.Without the check payment, the defraudation cannot be committed and successfully consummated.Thus, petitioners acts in signing the false tally sheets and/or delivery receipts are indispensable to the consummation of the crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents. Surely, there were ghost or false deliveries of supplies and materials as convincingly shown by the testimonies of the barangay captains, officials, and residents of the areas where the materials were allegedly used.More importantly, if there were actual deliveries of materials made, then there would be no need to fake the LAAs because the suppliers will have to be paid the cost of said materials plus a reasonable profit.As a result, there is nothing or not much to share with the more than 30 or so co-conspirators, for the suppliers would not be too dim-witted to part with even their cost in buying the materials they allegedly supplied.Moreover, the fake delivery receipts and tally sheets signed by petitioners were linked to the general vouchers upon which check payments were made to the suppliers who were found guilty of participating in the fraud.With respect to petitioner Fernan, Jr., he signed tally sheets on the ghost deliveries of Juliana de los Angeles and Ismael Sabio, Jr. On the part of petitioner Torrevillas, he signed false tally sheets and delivery receipts on supplies allegedly delivered by Rufino

V. Nuez, Juliana de los Angeles, Ismael Sabio, Jr., and Manuel Mascardo.Lastly, the checks issued to these suppliers based on general vouchers supported by the false tally sheets and general vouchers signed by petitioners cannot be traced to any genuine LAAs, resulting in the inescapable conclusion that these LAAs were unauthorized; hence, fake or fabricated.These are undisputed tell-tale signs of the complicity by petitioners with the Mangubat syndicate. In People v. Mangubat, the court a quo elucidated the conspiracy in the Cebu highway scam in a trenchant manner: Where the acts of each of the accused constitute an essential link in a chain and the desistance of even one of them would prevent the chain from being completed, then no conspiracy could result as its consummation would then be impossible or aborted.But when each and everyone of the accused in the instant cases performed their assigned tasks and roles with martinet-like precision and accuracy, by individually performing essential overt acts, so much so that the common objective is attained, which is to secure the illegal release of public funds under the guise of fake or simulated public documents, then each and everyone of said accused are equally liable as co-principals under the well-established and universally-accepted principle that, once a conspiracy is directly or impliedly proven, the act of one is the act of all and such liability exists notwithstanding no-participation in every detail in the execution of the offense.50[54] In sum, the required quantum of proof has been adduced by the State on the conspiracy among the accused including petitioners. The conviction of petitioners must perforce be sustained. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the December 4, 1997 Decision of the SB in the consolidated criminal cases subject of this petition. No costs. SO ORDERED.

50

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC [G.R. No. 148965 : February 26, 2002] JOSE JINGGOY E. ESTRADA, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Respondents. DECISION PUNO, J.: A law may not be constitutionally infirm but its application to a particular party may be unconstitutional. This is the submission of the petitioner who invokes the equal protection clause of the Constitution in his bid to be excluded from the charge of plunder filed against him by the respondent Ombudsman. The antecedent facts are as follows: In November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then President of the Republic of the Philippines, five criminal complaints against the former President and members of his family, his associates, friends and conspirators were filed with the respondent Office of the Ombudsman. On April 4, 2001, the respondent Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution[1 finding probable cause warranting the filing with the Sandiganbayan of several criminal Informations against the former President and the other respondents therein. One of the Informations was for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080 and among the respondents was herein petitioner Jose Jinggoy Estrada, then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila. The Information was amended and filed on April 18, 2001. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 26558, the case was assigned to respondent Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. The arraignment of the accused was set on July 10, 2001 and no bail for petitioners provisional liberty was fixed. On April 24, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash or Suspend the Amended Information on the ground that the Anti-Plunder Law, R.A. No. 7080, is unconstitutional and that it charged more than one offense. Respondent Ombudsman opposed the motion. On April 25, 2001, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest for petitioner and his co-accused. On its basis, petitioner and his co-accused were placed in custody of the law. On April 30, 2001, petitioner filed a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion[2 alleging that: (1) no probable cause exists to put him on trial and hold him liable for plunder, it appearing that he was only allegedly involved in illegal gambling and not in a series or combination of overt or criminal acts as required in R.A. No. 7080; and (2) he is entitled to bail as a matter of right. Petitioner prayed that he be excluded

from the Amended Information and be discharged from custody. In the alternative, petitioner also prayed that he be allowed to post bail in an amount to be fixed by respondent court.[3 On June 28, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Resolve Mayor Jose Jinggoy Estradas Motion To Fix Bail On Grounds That An Outgoing Mayor Loses Clout An Incumbent Has And That On Its Face, the Facts Charged In The Information Do Not Make Out A Non-Bailable Offense As To Him.[4 On July 3, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Strike Out So-Called Entry of Appearance, To Direct Ombudsman To Explain Why He Attributes Impropriety To The Defense And To Resolve Pending Incidents.[5 On July 9, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioners Motion to Quash and Suspend and Very Urgent Omnibus Motion.[6 Petitioners alternative prayer to post bail was set for hearing after arraignment of all accused. The court held: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES for lack of merit the following: (1) MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND dated April 24, 2001 filed by accused Jose Jinggoy Estrada; (2) MOTION TO QUASH dated June 7, 2001 filed by accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada; and (3) MOTION TO QUASH (Re: Amended Information dated 18 April 2001) dated June 26, 2001 filed by accused Edward S. Serapio. Considering the denial of the MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND of accused Jose Jinggoy Estrada, his VERY URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION, praying that he be: (1) dropped from the information for plunder for want of probable cause and (2) discharged from custody immediately which is based on the same grounds mentioned in this MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND is hereby DENIED. Let his alternative prayer in said OMNIBUS MOTION that he be allowed to post bail be SET for hearing together with the petition for bail of accused Edward S. Serapio scheduled for July 10, 2001, at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon after the arraignment of all the accused.[7 The following day, July 10, 2001, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Resolution. Respondent court denied the motion and proceeded to arraign petitioner. Petitioner refused to make his plea prompting respondent court to enter a plea of not guilty for him.[8 Hence, this petition. Petitioner claims that respondent Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in: 1) not declaring that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face and, as applied to petitioner, and denying him the equal protection of the laws; 2) not holding that the Plunder Law does not provide complete and sufficient standards; 3) sustaining the charge against petitioner for alleged offenses, and with alleged conspirators, with which and with whom he is not even remotely connected - contrary to the dictum that criminal liability is personal, not vicarious - results in the denial of substantive due process; 4) not fixing bail for petitioner for alleged involvement in jueteng in one count of the information which amounts to cruel and unusual punishment totally in defiance of the principle of proportionality.[9

We shall resolve the arguments of petitioner in seriatim. I. Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him and denies him the equal protection of the laws.[10 The contention deserves our scant attention. The constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080, the Anti-Plunder Law, has been settled in the case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.[11 We take off from the Amended Information which charged petitioner, together with former President Joseph E. Estrada, Atty. Edward Serapio, Charlie Atong Ang, Yolanda T. Ricaforte and others, with the crime of plunder as follows: AMENDED INFORMATION The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a. ASIONG SALONGA AND a.k.a JOSE VELARDE, together with Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Charlie Atong Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows: That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC OFFICER, BEING THEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount OR TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows: (a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with co-accused CHARLIE ATONG ANG, Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AN (sic) JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING; (b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR

INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS [P130,000,000.00], more or less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS [P200,000,000] tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocor Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-accused Charlie Atong Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES; (c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCK MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,102,965,607.50] AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS [P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P189,700,000.00], MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME JOSE VELARDE; (d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME JOSE VELARDE AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK. CONTRARY TO LAW. Manila for Quezon City, Philippines, 18 April 2001[12 Petitioners contention that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional as applied to him is principally perched on the premise that the Amended Information charged him with only one act or one offense which cannot constitute plunder. He then assails the denial of his right to bail. Petitioners premise is patently false. A careful examination of the Amended Information will show that it is divided into three (3) parts: (1) the first paragraph charges former President Joseph E. Estrada with the crime of plunder together with petitioner Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Charlie Atong Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda Ricaforte and others; (2) the second paragraph spells out in general terms how the accused conspired in committing the crime of plunder; and (3) the following four sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail the predicate acts constitutive of the crime of plunder pursuant to items (1) to (6) of R.A. No. 7080, and state the names of the accused who committed each act.

Pertinent to the case at bar is the predicate act alleged in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information which is of receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances, money in the aggregate amount of P545,000,000.00 for illegal gambling in the form of gift, share, percentage, kickback or any form of pecuniary benefit x x x. In this sub-paragraph (a), petitioner, in conspiracy with former President Estrada, is charged with the act of receiving or collecting money from illegal gambling amounting to P545 million. Contrary to petitioners posture, the allegation is that he received or collected money from illegal gambling on several instances. The phrase on several instances means the petitioner committed the predicate act in series. To insist that the Amended Information charged the petitioner with the commission of only one act or offense despite the phrase several instances is to indulge in a twisted, nay, pretzel interpretation. It matters little that sub-paragraph (a) did not utilize the exact words combination or series as they appear in R.A. No. 7080. For in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,[13 we held that where these two terms are to be taken in their popular, not technical, meaning, the word series is synonymous with the clause on several instances. Series refers to a repetition of the same predicate act in any of the items in Section 1 (d) of the law. The word combination contemplates the commission of at least any two different predicate acts in any of said items. Plainly, sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information charges petitioner with plunder committed by a series of the same predicate act under Section 1 (d) (2) of the law. Similarly misleading is petitioners stand that in the Ombudsman Resolution of April 4, 2001 finding probable cause to charge him with plunder together with the other accused, he was alleged to have received only the sum of P2 million, which amount is way below the minimum of P50 million required under R.A. No. 7080. The submission is not borne out by the April 4, 2001 Resolution of the Ombudsman, recommending the filing of charges against petitioner and his co-accused, which in pertinent part reads: xxx Respondent Jose Jinggoy Estrada, the present Mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila, appears to have also surreptitious collection of protection money from jueteng operations in Bulacan. This is gleaned from the statements of Gov. Singson himself and the fact that Mayor Estrada, on at least two occasions, turned over to a certain Emma Lim, an emissary of the respondent governor, jueteng haul totalling P2 million, i.e., P1 million in January, 2000 and another P1 million in February, 2000. An alleged listahan of jueteng recipients listed him as one Jingle Bell, as affirmed by Singson [TSN 8 & Dec. 2000 SICt/17 Oct. 2000 SBRC/SCI].[14 Hence, contrary to the representations of the petitioner, the Ombudsman made the finding that P2 million was delivered to petitioner as jueteng haul on at least two occasions. The P2 million is, therefore, not the entire sum with which petitioner is specifically charged. This is further confirmed by the conclusion of the Ombudsman that: xxx It is clear that Joseph Ejercito Estrada, in confabulation with Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Atty. Edward Serapio and Yolanda Ricaforte, demanded and received, as bribe money, the aggregate sum of P545 million from jueteng collections of the operators thereof, channeled thru Gov. Luis Chavit Singson, in exchange for protection from arrest or interference by law enforcers; x x x.[15

To be sure, it is too late in the day for the petitioner to argue that the Ombudsman failed to establish any probable cause against him for plunder. The respondent Sandiganbayan itself has found probable cause against the petitioner for which reason it issued a warrant of arrest against him. Petitioner then underwent arraignment and is now on trial. The time to assail the finding of probable cause by the Ombudsman has long passed. The issue cannot be resurrected in this petition. II. Next, petitioner contends that the plunder law does not provide sufficient and complete standards to guide the courts in dealing with accused alleged to have contributed to the offense.[16 Thus, he posits the following questions: For example, in an Information for plunder which cites at least ten criminal acts, what penalty do we impose on one who is clearly involved in only one such criminal act? Is it reclusion perpetua? Or should it be a lesser penalty? What if another accused is shown to have participated in three of the ten specifications, what would be the penalty imposable, compared to one who may have been involved in five or seven of the specifications? The law does not provide the standard or specify the penalties and the courts are left to guess. In other words, the courts are called to say what the law is rather than to apply what the lawmaker is supposed to have intended.[17 Petitioner raises these hypothetical questions for he labors hard under the impression that: (1) he is charged with only one act or offense and (2) he has not conspired with the other accused named in subparagraphs (b) to (d) of the Amended Information, ergo, the penalty imposable on him ought to be different from reclusion perpetua to death. R.A. No. 7080, he bewails, is cloudy on the imposable penalty on an accused similarly situated as he is. Petitioner, however, overlooks that the second paragraph of the Amended Information charges him to have conspired with former President Estrada in committing the crime of plunder. His alleged participation consists in the commission of the predicate acts specified in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information. If these allegations are proven, the penalty of petitioner cannot be unclear. It will be no different from that of the former President for in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of the other. The imposable penalty is provided in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, viz: Section 2. Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with the members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court. III. Petitioner also faults the respondent Sandiganbayan for sustaining the charge against petitioner for alleged offenses and with alleged conspirators, with which and with whom he is not even remotely connected contrary to the dictum that criminal liability is personal, not vicarious results in the denial of substantive due process.[18

The Solicitor General argues, on the other hand, that petitioner is charged not only with the predicate act in sub-paragraph (a) but also with the other predicate acts in sub-paragraphs (b), (c) & (d) because he is indicted as a principal and as co-conspirator of the former President. This is purportedly clear from the first and second paragraphs of the Amended Information.[19 For better focus, there is a need to examine again the allegations of the Amended Information vis--vis the provisions of R.A. No. 7080. The Amended Information, in its first two paragraphs, charges petitioner and his other co-accused with the crime of plunder. The first paragraph names all the accused, while the second paragraph describes in general how plunder was committed and lays down most of the elements of the crime itself. Subparagraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail the predicate acts that constitute the crime and name in particular the co-conspirators of former President Estrada in each predicate act. The predicate acts alleged in the said four sub-paragraphs correspond to the items enumerated in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act of receiving, on several instances, money from illegal gambling, in consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling, and expressly names petitioner as one of those who conspired with former President Estrada in committing the offense. This predicate act corresponds with the offense described in item [2] of the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (b) alleged the predicate act of diverting, receiving or misappropriating a portion of the tobacco excise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur, which act is the offense described in item [1] in the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of the law. This subparagraph does not mention petitioner but instead names other conspirators of the former President. Sub-paragraph (c) alleged two predicate acts - that of ordering the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social Security System (SSS) to purchase shares of stock of Belle Corporation, and collecting or receiving commissions from such purchase from the Belle Corporation which became part of the deposit in the Jose Velarde account at the Equitable-PCI Bank. These two predicate acts fall under items [2] and [3] in the enumeration of R.A. No. 7080, and was allegedly committed by the former President in connivance with John Does and Jane Does. Finally, sub-paragraph (d) alleged the predicate act that the former President unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts, kickbacks, in connivance with John Does and Jane Does, and deposited the same under his account name Jose Velarde at the Equitable-PCI Bank. This act corresponds to the offense under item [6] in the enumeration of Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. From the foregoing allegations of the Amended Information, it is clear that all the accused named in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d), thru their individual acts, conspired with former President Estrada to enable the latter to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17. As the Amended Information is worded, however, it is not certain whether the accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) conspired with each other to enable the former President to amass the subject ill-gotten wealth. In light of this lack of clarity, petitioner cannot be penalized for the conspiracy entered into by the other accused with the former President as related in the second paragraph of the Amended Information in relation to its sub-paragraphs (b) to (d). We hold that petitioner can be held accountable only for the predicate acts he allegedly committed as related in subparagraph (a) of the Amended Information which were allegedly done in conspiracy with the former President whose design was to amass ill-gotten wealth amounting to more than P4 billion. We hasten to add, however, that the respondent Ombudsman cannot be faulted for including the predicate acts alleged in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) of the Amended Information in one, and not in four, separate Informations. A study of the history of R.A. No. 7080 will show that the law was crafted to avoid the mischief and folly of filing multiple informations. The Anti-Plunder Law was

enacted in the aftermath of the Marcos regime where charges of ill-gotten wealth were filed against former President Marcos and his alleged cronies. Government prosecutors found no appropriate law to deal with the multitude and magnitude of the acts allegedly committed by the former President to acquire illegal wealth.[20 They also found that under the then existing laws such as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Revised Penal Code and other special laws, the acts involved different transactions, different time and different personalities. Every transaction constituted a separate crime and required a separate case and the over-all conspiracy had to be broken down into several criminal and graft charges. The preparation of multiple Informations was a legal nightmare but eventually, thirty-nine (39) separate and independent cases were filed against practically the same accused before the Sandiganbayan.[21 R.A. No. 7080 or the Anti-Plunder Law[22 was enacted precisely to address this procedural problem. This is pellucid in the Explanatory Note to Senate Bill No. 733, viz: Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt terminologies like kleptocracy and economic treason, punishes the use of high office for personal enrichment, committed thru a series of acts done not in the public eye but in stealth and secrecy over a period of time, that may involve so many persons, here and abroad, and which touch so many states and territorial units. The acts and/or omissions sought to be penalized do not involve simple cases of malversation of public funds, bribery, extortion, theft and graft but constitute plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the national economy. The above-described crime does not yet exist in Philippine statute books. Thus, the need to come up with a legislation as a safeguard against the possible recurrence of the depravities of the previous regime and as a deterrent to those with similar inclination to succumb to the corrupting influence of power. There is no denying the fact that the plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the national economy is made up of a complex and manifold network of crimes. In the crime of plunder, therefore, different parties may be united by a common purpose. In the case at bar, the different accused and their different criminal acts have a commonalityto help the former President amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged the different participation of each accused in the conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive protection money from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation and receive commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former President Estrada. In the American jurisdiction, the presence of several accused in multiple conspiracies commonly involves two structures: (1) the so-called wheel or circle conspiracy, in which there is a single person or group (the hub) dealing individually with two or more other persons or groups (the spokes); and (2) the chain conspiracy, usually involving the distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in which there is successive communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer.[23 From a reading of the Amended Information, the case at bar appears similar to a wheel conspiracy. The hub is former President Estrada while the spokes are all the accused, and the rim that encloses the spokes is the common goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e., the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.

IV. Some of our distinguished colleagues would dismiss the charge against the petitioner on the ground that the allegation of conspiracy in the Amended Information is too general. The fear is even expressed that it could serve as a net to ensnare the innocent. Their dissents appear to be inspired by American law and jurisprudence. We should not confuse our law on conspiracy with conspiracy in American criminal law and in common law. Under Philippine law, conspiracy should be understood on two levels. As a general rule, conspiracy is not a crime in our jurisdiction. It is punished as a crime only when the law fixes a penalty for its commission such as in conspiracy to commit treason, rebellion and sedition. In contrast, under American criminal law, the agreement or conspiracy itself is the gravamen of the offense.[24The essence of conspiracy is the combination of two or more persons, by concerted action, to accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or some purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means.[25 Its elements are: agreement to accomplish an illegal objective, coupled with one or more overt acts in furtherance of the illegal purpose; and requisite intent necessary to commit the underlying substantive offense.[26 A study of the United States Code ought to be instructive. It principally punishes two (2) crimes of conspiracy[27conspiracy to commit any offense or to defraud the United States, and conspiracy to impede or injure officer. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States is penalized under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 371,[28 as follows: Sec. 371. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States. If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons to any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor. Conspiracy to impede or injure officer is penalized under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 372, viz: Sec. 372. Conspiracy to impede or injure officer. If two or more persons in any State, Territory, Possession, or District conspire to prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, any person from accepting or holding any office, trust or place of confidence under the United States, or from discharging any duties thereof, or to induce by like means any officer of the United States to leave the place, where his duties as an officer are required to be performed, or to injure him in his person or property on account of his lawful discharge of the duties of his office, or while engaged in the lawful discharge thereof, or to injure his property so as to molest, interrupt, hinder, or impede him in the discharge of his official duties, each of such persons shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than six years, or both. Section 371 of 18 U.S.C. punishes two acts: (1) conspiracy to commit any offense against the United States; and (2) conspiracy to defraud the United States or any agency thereof. The conspiracy to commit any offense against the United States refers to an act made a crime by federal laws.[29 It refers

to an act punished by statute.[30 Undoubtedly, Section 371 runs the whole gamut of U.S. Federal laws, whether criminal or regulatory.[31 These laws cover criminal offenses such as perjury, white slave traffic, racketeering, gambling, arson, murder, theft, bank robbery, etc. and also include customs violations, counterfeiting of currency, copyright violations, mail fraud, lotteries, violations of antitrust laws and laws governing interstate commerce and other areas of federal regulation.[32 Section 371 penalizes the conspiracy to commit any of these substantive offenses. The offense of conspiracy is generally separate and distinct from the substantive offense,[33 hence, the court rulings that acquittal on the substantive count does not foreclose prosecution and conviction for related conspiracy. [34 The conspiracy to defraud the government refers primarily to cheating the United States out of property or money. It also covers interference with or obstruction of its lawful governmental functions by deceit, craft or trickery, or at least by means that are dishonest.[35 It comprehends defrauding the United States in any manner whatever, whether the fraud be declared criminal or not.[36 The basic difference in the concept of conspiracy notwithstanding, a study of the American case law on how conspiracy should be alleged will reveal that it is not necessary for the indictment to include particularities of time, place, circumstances or causes, in stating the manner and means of effecting the object of the conspiracy. Such specificity of detail falls within the scope of a bill of particulars.[37 An indictment for conspiracy is sufficient where it alleges: (1) the agreement; (2) the offense-object toward which the agreement was directed; and (3) the overt acts performed in furtherance of the agreement.[38 To allege that the defendants conspired is, at least, to state that they agreed to do the matters which are set forth as the substance of their conspiracy. To allege a conspiracy is to allege an agreement.[39 The gist of the crime of conspiracy is unlawful agreement, and where conspiracy is charged, it is not necessary to set out the criminal object with as great a certainty as is required in cases where such object is charged as a substantive offense.[40 In sum, therefore, there is hardly a substantial difference on how Philippine courts and American courts deal with cases challenging Informations alleging conspiracy on the ground that they lack particularities of time, place, circumstances or causes. In our jurisdiction, as aforestated, conspiracy can be alleged in the Information as a mode of committing a crime or it may be alleged as constitutive of the crime itself. When conspiracy is alleged as a crime in itself, the sufficiency of the allegations in the Information charging the offense is governed by Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. It requires that the information for this crime must contain the following averments: Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.- A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused, the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed. When the offense was committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information. The complaint or information to be sufficient must state the name of the accused, designate the offense given by statute, state the acts or omissions constituting the offense, the name of the offended party, the approximate date of the commission of the offense and the place where the offense was committed.

Our rulings have long settled the issue on how the acts or omissions constituting the offense should be made in order to meet the standard of sufficiency. Thus, the offense must be designated by its name given by statute or by reference to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.[41 The information must also state the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances.[42 The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment.[43 No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged.[44 Every element of the offense must be stated in the information.[45 What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes.[46 The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.[47 To reiterate, when conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the elements of said crime must be set forth in the complaint or information. For example, the crime of conspiracy to commit treason is committed when, in time of war, two or more persons come to an agreement to levy war against the Government or to adhere to the enemies and to give them aid or comfort, and decide to commit it.[48 The elements of this crime are: (1) that the offender owes allegiance to the Government of the Philippines; (2) that there is a war in which the Philippines is involved; (3) that the offender and other person or persons come to an agreement to: (a) levy war against the government, or (b) adhere to the enemies, to give them aid and comfort; and (4) that the offender and other person or persons decide to carry out the agreement. These elements must be alleged in the information. The requirements on sufficiency of allegations are different when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in itself but only as the mode of committing the crime as in the case at bar. There is less necessity of reciting its particularities in the Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense charged. The conspiracy is significant only because it changes the criminal liability of all the accused in the conspiracy and makes them answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their participation in the crime.[49 The liability of the conspirators is collective and each participant will be equally responsible for the acts of others,[50 for the act of one is the act of all.[51 In People v. Quitlong,[52 we ruled on how conspiracy as the mode of committing the offense should be alleged in the Information, viz: x x x. In embodying the essential elements of the crime charged, the information must set forth the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused so that the accused can properly prepare for and undertake his defense. One such fact or circumstance in a complaint against two or more accused persons is that of conspiracy. Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary recital of fact which, if not excepted from or objected to during trial, may be corrected or supplied by competent proof, an allegation, however, of conspiracy, or one that would impute criminal liability to an accused for the act of another or others, is indispensable in order to hold such person, regardless of the nature and extent of his own participation, equally guilty with the other or others in the commission of the crime. Where conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated, the individual acts done to perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary importance, the act of one being imputable to all the others (People v. Ilano, 313 SCRA 442). Verily, an accused must know from the information whether he faces a criminal responsibility not only for his acts but also for the acts of his co-accused as well.

A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or allege all the details thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence proving the common design or the facts connecting all the accused with one another in the web of the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to describe conspiracy with the same degree of particularity required in describing a substantive offense. It is enough that the indictment contains a statement of facts relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise language, with as much certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a manner that can enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended, and with such precision that the accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. It is said, generally, that an indictment may be held sufficient if it follows the words of the statute and reasonably informs the accused of the character of the offense he is charged with conspiring to commit, or, following the language of the statute, contains a sufficient statement of an overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy, or alleges both the conspiracy and the contemplated crime in the language of the respective statutes defining them (15A C.J.S. 842-844). xxx x x x. Conspiracy arises when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy comes to life at the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith to actually pursue it. Verily, the information must state that the accused have confederated to commit the crime or that there has been a community of design, a unity of purpose or an agreement to commit the felony among the accused. Such an allegation, in the absence of the usual usage of the words conspired or confederated or the phrase acting in conspiracy, must aptly appear in the information in the form of definitive acts constituting conspiracy. In fine, the agreement to commit the crime, the unity of purpose or the community of design among the accused must be conveyed such as either by the use of the term conspire or its derivatives and synonyms or by allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy. Conspiracy must be alleged, not just inferred, in the information on which basis an accused can aptly enter his plea, a matter that is not to be confused with or likened to the adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it. In establishing conspiracy when properly alleged, the evidence to support it need not necessarily be shown by direct proof but may be inferred from shown acts and conduct of the accused. xxx. Again, following the stream of our own jurisprudence, it is enough to allege conspiracy as a mode in the commission of an offense in either of the following manner: (1) by use of the word conspire, or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude, etc;[53 or (2) by allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common understanding would know what is intended, and with such precision as would enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts.[54 The allegation of conspiracy in the information must not be confused with the adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it. A conspiracy is proved by evidence of actual cooperation; of acts indicative of an agreement, a common purpose or design, a concerted action or concurrence of sentiments to commit the felony and actually pursue it.[55 A statement of this evidence is not necessary in the information. In the case at bar, the second paragraph of the Amended Information alleged in general terms

how the accused committed the crime of plunder. It used the words in connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused. Following the ruling in Quitlong, these words are sufficient to allege the conspiracy of the accused with the former President in committing the crime of plunder. V. We now come to petitioners plea for bail. On August 14, 2002, during the pendency of the instant petition before this Court, petitioner filed with respondent Sandiganbayan an Urgent Second Motion for Bail for Medical Reasons. Petitioner prayed that he be allowed to post bail due to his serious medical condition which is life-threatening to him if he goes back to his place of detention. The motion was opposed by respondent Ombudsman to which petitioner replied. For three days, i.e., on September 4, 20 and 27, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan conducted hearings on the motion for bail. Dr. Roberto V. Anastacio, a cardiologist of the Makati Medical Center, testified as sole witness for petitioner. On December 18, 2001, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court an Urgent Motion for Early/Immediate Resolution of Jose Jinggoy Estradas Petition for Bail on Medical/Humanitarian Considerations. Petitioner reiterated the motion for bail he earlier filed with respondent Sandiganbayan.[56 On the same day, we issued a Resolution referring the motion to respondent Sandiganbayan for resolution and requiring said court to make a report, not later than 8:30 in the morning of December 21, 2001. On December 21, 2001, respondent court submitted its Report. Attached to the Report was its Resolution dated December 20, 2001 denying petitioners motion for bail for lack of factual basis.[57 Basing its finding on the earlier testimony of Dr. Anastacio, the Sandiganbayan found that petitioner failed to submit sufficient evidence to convince the court that the medical condition of the accused requires that he be confined at home and for that purpose that he be allowed to post bail.[58 The crime of plunder is punished by R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 7659, with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Under our Rules, offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment are non-bailable when the evidence of guilt is strong, to wit: Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.[59 Section 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which reads: Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. The constitutional mandate makes the grant or denial of bail in capital offenses hinge on the issue of

whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. This requires that the trial court conduct bail hearings wherein both the prosecution and the defense are afforded sufficient opportunity to present their respective evidence. The burden of proof lies with the prosecution to show strong evidence of guilt.[60 This Court is not in a position to grant bail to the petitioner as the matter requires evidentiary hearing that should be conducted by the Sandiganbayan. The hearings on which respondent court based its Resolution of December 20, 2001 involved the reception of medical evidence only and which evidence was given in September 2001, five months ago. The records do not show that evidence on petitioners guilt was presented before the lower court. Upon proper motion of the petitioner, respondent Sandiganbayan should conduct hearings to determine if the evidence of petitioners guilt is strong as to warrant the granting of bail to petitioner. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed for failure to show that the respondent Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. SO ORDERED.