How to do Things with Words - The Polyphonic Way

Igor . agar, Institute for Sociology at the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia

It is the philosopher's privilege to wonder, Plato even observes that "to wonder is the only beginning of philosophy" (1952 : 155 d 3-4). As a philosopher, I will thus take this opportunity to wonder. You may find it surprising that 35 years after its discovery, I still consider performativity a source of wonder. However, what really is wondrous i s the fact that, although the performative phenomena have not ceased to rouse wonder, no agreement has been reached as to the basic mechanisms which produce performative effects. I will therefore wonder particularly about the fact that a speech act theory - at least in it's present definition or definitions - so fragmentary, i.e., imperfect, vet so rigid, i.e., difficult to apply, could be proposed as a model of interpretation for such a dynamic phenomenon as dialogue or conversation. I will attempt to do the opposite, that is, I will propose a dialogical, even polylogical interpretation of performativity, and I will call this interpretation - like Ducrot - polyphonic. Of course I do not claim to have discovered the solution to the performative problem; I am merely trying to emphasize it again in terms of a problem, and here as well I will proceed by means of wonderments. Thus I find the utterance (1) I promise. extremely wondrous. You will of course object that the expression is taken out of co(n)text (whatever the definition of the term "co(n)text" may be): when one makes a promise one always promises something. Let us now examine the utterance (1) in its "developed" form: (1') I promise to come. Unfortunately, here as well the utterance seems very wondrous. Can you imagine someone saying:
(1') I promise to come.

just like that, out of the blue? Very unlikely. And again, you will object that the utterance has been taken out of co(n)text and that the speaker is responding to a question such as (2) Are you coming? I agree, but allow me to say that I have always had troubles digesting this dialogical linkage (3) A: Are you corning?
B: I promise to come.

Perhaps in some Greek tragedy, but not in everyday conversation. There is something not quite right; there is too much of something or something is missing. What is my point? The most usual answer to the question (2) is undoubtedly - if we remain in the "positive" register - either (4) Yes. or (1") I am coming. and not (1'). If wee answer by (1') there is, in it's relation to the question, a surplus in my answer, something which indicates that something is missing. Let us compare the following two bits of conversation: I (3') A: Are you coming? B: I am coming II (3) A: Are you coming? B: I promise to come.

What is the difference between the two? In the first version, B gives a straight answer to the question of

A, confirming his arrival. In the second version, B does not give a straightforward answer to the question of A, but performs an act of promise, solemnly obliging himself to come. What does this mean? If one more closely observes the answer of B in the second version, one notices that he does not answer A s question at all! A did not ask him to promise to come, but only whether he was coming or not. This is not a matter of picking nits. I am only trying to follow Austin who in Sense and Sensibilia insists on the following Leibniz-like maxim: "If there are differences in ordinary language there must be a good reason for it." Therefore we must treat them seriously. It thus becomes evident that in the second version B answers to some other question, to some other intervention in the conversation, which is absent from the provided fragment of conversation, but is interpretatively presupposed by the presence, by the very utterance of the perfonnative prefix. The "basic structure" of the second version of the dialogue should have therefore been polylogical and not only dialogical, something like the following: (3) A: We are throwing a surprise party tomorrow evening. Are you corning? B: Yes. I am coming. C: That would be a surprise. You never come. B:1 promise to come. One often objects to the fact that the example of promising is somewhat special, and thus not reliable and insufficiently determinative in order to draw conclusions from it. Let us therefore take some other verbs, for instance order and request. I can hardly suppress my wonderment at the following utterance: (5)I order you to leave the room. or (6) I request that you close the door. Taken of course out of co(n)text. Such an utterance usually presupposes at least one other, anterior and misunderstood utterance of which it is the explanation, e.g.: (5') A: Leave the room! B: Excuse me? A: I order you to leave the room! or (6') A: Close the door. B: What? A:I request that you close the door!

Notice that this procedure very much resembles one proposed by Austin as a last resort to rescue his so called first theory of performativity before he dissolved it into his more general theory of speech acts: It is therefore not at all necessary that an utterance be performative, i.e., expressed in one of the socalled normal forms. To say "Close the door!" is just as performative - it is a question of the same performance of an act - as saying "I order you to close it!" (Austin 1962 : 174). And the conclusion which Austin draws is the following: if one is not certain whether an utterance is performative, one could always "translate" it into its normal or canonical form, i.e., prefixed by an explicit performative. Does this mean that a performative - and I must insist on the concept of performativity such as defined by Benveniste (1976: 277), who also opposed to the dissolution of performative into an illocutionary act, a concept which insists on the necessity that each performative utterance must name the performance of the spoken word and its performer; I therefore limit myself knowingly to what is commonly referred to as explicit performatives and I will not deal with utterances which could bear whatever potential illocutionary

force - does this mean that a performative is not only polyphonic, but also - God forbid - merely constative, at least in the explanatory sense, which means that it explains the force of the utterance of which it is the sequel? Let us consider what I call the Strawsons line segment. There is a passage in the famous piece by Strawson on the intention and convention in speech acts, which, in my opinion, is not sufficiently appreciated, and made use of even less. When he discusses relations between the acts which he calls "essentially conventional", and acts which he qualifies as "essentially intentional", in other words when he discusses the possibility of introducing conventions in the performance of essentially intentional acts, Strawson makes the following observation: Evidently, in this case., ... the scheme has to be extended to make room for explicit reference to social convention. It can, with some strain be so extended. But as we move further into the region of institutionalized procedures, the strain becomes too much for the scheme to bear. On the one hand, one if its basic features - namely, the reference to an intention to secure a definite response in an audience (over and above the securing uptake) has to be dropped. On the other, the reference to social conventions of procedure assumes a very much greater importance. And a little further he concludes: In the case of an illocutionary act of a kind not essentially conventional, the act of communication is performed if uptake is secured, if the utterance is taken to be used with the complex overt intention with which it is issued. But even though the act of communication is performed, the wholly overt intention which lies at the core of the intention complex may, without any breach of rules or conventions, be frustrated.... It is different with the utterance which forms part of a wholly convention-governed procedure. Granted that uptake is secured, then any frustration of the wholly overt intention of the utterance (the intention to further the procedure in a certain way) must be attributable to a breach of rule or convention. The speaker who abides by the conventions can avowably have the intention to further the procedure in the way to which his current linguistic act is conventionally appropriated only if he takes it that the conventional conditions for so furthering it are satisfied and hence takes it that his utterance will not only reveal his intentions but give them effect. There is nothing parallel to this in the case of the illocutionary act of a kind not essentially conventional (Strawson 1969 : 398). One is confronted to a very extraordinary line segment: at one extreme pole there are the so-called "essentially intentional" illocutionary acts and at the other extreme pole there are the so-called "essentially conventional" illocutionary acts. But we have observed that the illocutionary acts located somewhere in the middle of the line segment - where the conventions and intentions were supposed to interweave - do not exist, i.e., can not exist: they are either conventional or intentional. And there is even more to it than that! "Essentially conventional" acts can be successful even though the speaker did not have the supposedly corresponding intention to perform the act; on the other hand the "essentially intentional" acts may not
be successful even though the speaker had done everything that the audience recognizes his intention. The

conclusion which one can draw from the above statements is that, evidently, the intention is not pertinent for the "happiness" of the performatives. What they need is a minimum of conventionality. The "essentially conventional" performatives can not, for obvious reasons, complain about the lack of conventionality: in most cases, it is the social conventions which secure it for them. The "essentially intentional" performatives must on the other hand confront and compensate for this lack. Consequently - and that is my (hypo)thesis - they try to represent the image, the description of the act of uttering in progress, they stage that missing link of social conventionality in order to secure recognition of the intentioned act. We know that Ducrot - whose theorization I will not take up here, because it is well known, even though in my opinion insufficiently utilized - distinguishes not only between the speaking subject (sujet parlant) as an empirical being, and the speaker as a being of discourse, but also distinguishes, "inside" the concept of the speaker, between several utterers which are thus purely discursive and intra-linguistic entities. The speaker is responsible only for the utterance or, more precisely, for the act of uttering as an event of the emergence of a given utterance; while within the utterance he presents several utterers which are (at) the

origin of the viewpoints expressed through the utterance. The utterers are thus the elements of meaning of the utterance, and their confrontation, the confrontation of their viewpoints, characterizes and gives a description of the act of uttering the utterance. A suitable example, or rather an appropriate proof of the polyphonic nature of language is provided by negative utterances. I resort to these because they demonstrate quite clearly that the utterers in Ducrot's sense of the term are no wild dreams. Let us take the following utterance (7) This balloon is not red. The speaker of this utterance presents (at least) two utterers: the first utterer who affirms the fact that the balloon is red and the second one, opposing the first one, and negating that the balloon is red. But what makes it possible to proceed in this fashion? What gives us the right to distinguish between several utterers within a single utterance? The very fact that in reality there is nothing that actually, "materially" corresponds to the qualifier non-red, i.e., there is no entity in the "real world" which could be qualified, in a positive way, as 'non-red.' There are only green, blue, yellow, etc. balloons. This proves that whenever we say (affirm) that something is not ..., we oppose an utterance (perhaps an anterior, or hidden utterance) which affirms the contrary. The speaker of an utterance such as (7) thus necessarily confronts two utterers with inverse opinions, by assimilating into the one which opposes the red nature of the balloon. However, one can not, of course, present the viewpoints of different utterers, the way I have just done by tinkering around with example (3"). Consequently, it is not possible to assign to the viewpoints of different utterers, which have been presented within an utterance, a status equal to the status of the utterance which has been taken as the starting point of the analysis, because they are nothing but the products of the same analysis and therefore have only a theoretical status. The viewpoints of the different utterers should be presented in terms of attitudes, positions and orientations, so that one can end up by analyzing example (1') with a speaker and (at least) three utterers1: U1 presents the fact F (the surprise party of tomorrow evening) and words its presentation in the form of an invitation; U2 recognizes the presentation of U1 by accepting the invitation; U3 doubts the sincerity of U2 and therefore presents its consent (the consent of U2) as doubtful; U2' opposes U3 and confirms its consent by a solemn turn of phrase. I would even venture an argumentative formulation by saying that the speaker S (the speaker which utters (1'), and for this very reason) assimilates himself into the viewpoint of U2' and thus argues for the conclusion of C: It is necessary to take the second intervention of U2 (i.e., U2', to which S assimilates by uttering it) as sufficient argument of his arrival. The performative would be therefore not only polyphonic - description of its act of uttering by intervention of several utterers, facilitating the recognition of its force with the addressee - but also argumentative: the explicit performative (1 promise to come) being an argument stronger (for my arrival) than an utterance endowed by whatever possible illocutionary force (e.g., l am coming).

In order to support this thesis I will quote Austin himself. Already in his article "Other Minds", dating back to 1939, in which for the first time he approaches the performative issues, Austin on one hand compares expressions such as 1 promise to ... and I intend to ... , and on the other hand expressions such as I know that ... and I am sure that and observes something very significant. He states that as long as I confine myself to expressions such as 1 intend to ..., in a certain way, they concern only me: only I know that I intend to do something. And if my partner in dialogue will take such an expression of my intentions as sufficient assurance in order to undertake his actions himself, that, in a way, only concerns him: he will react in accordance with his evaluation of my sincerity and my dependability, on one hand, and my faculties and my capacities on the other. But as soon as I say 1 promise to ..., and no longer only 1 intend to ..., he has the right, he is even obliged to react as if the promised thing - as promised - carried its performance in itself, independently of his evaluation of my faculties and my capacities, of my dependability and my sincerity. The same is true of 1 know that ... in relation to I am sure that ..., (even though 1 know that ... is not performative).

The argumentative interpretation is therefore not at all arbitrary, and one could easily build an argumentative scale on which the explicit performative would be included as the strongest argument for
the (possibility of) fulfillment of the propositional content,

common to all the utterances which are located on the same argumentative scale. Let us take our original utterance (1') which yields the following scale: /my arrival/ I promise to (come) I will (come)

I intend to (come)2 Let us not forget, however, that we are at the "essentially intentional" pole of our line segment, at the pole which is in this way - by way of the presentation of several utterers - forced to compensate for the lack of conventionality. But what is happening at the "essentially conventional" pole? We remember that Austin (and the performative theory in general) often has been criticized, particularly by sociologists, that he attributed to the spoken words an internal magical force. Bourdieu for example states that the illocutionary force of expressions ... could not he found in the words themselves, as "performatives" ... The power of spoken words is nothing else than the delegated power of the spokesman, and his spoken words ... are nothing but evidence, evidence among others of the guarantee of the delegation vested in him. To try to understand linguistically- the power of the linguistic manifestations, to seek in language the principle of the logic and efficiency of the language of the institution, means to forget that authority is vested in the language from the outside ... (Bourdieu 1982: 105). Indeed, Austin has never negated it - at least not in his first theory - and this is exactly what he is conveying when he discusses the "appropriate circumstances" and "authorized persons". But if that is the case, one must - even on the "essentially conventional" side, the side which would not actually need to compensate for the lack of conventionality, by staging its own act of uttering distinguish between the speaker and at least two utterers. Let us cover this distance between the two poles by outlining the contours of a theory already somewhat forgotten, namely the theory proposed by H.A. Prichard. Prichard, who was one of Austin's teachers, is today almost forgotten and his writings either forgotten or difficult to obtain. There is only a thin collection of his articles available, published by Oxford University Press in 1965, titled ]Moral Obligation. Still, before the war he was one of the most eminent professors of moral philosophy at Oxford. Even though he opposed to any logical or linguistic approach to the philosophical problems, he greatly admired Austin, which yielded several exchanges of opinions between the two philosophers (in 1947 they even endeavored correspondence on the nature of promising, but unfortunately the letters have been lost). Moreover, the nature of promising (and verbal acts which oblige us to do another act in general) was a permanent obsession of Prichard, an obsession which had left traces in almost all of his writing, and which has profoundly (Zagar 1987) influenced Austin in his performative research.
How does Prichard define promising? One thing is obvious, he says, promising requires the actual use of the word "promise" or else of some equivalent, such as undertake, agree , give my word , or will in I will . This being so, we can at least say that when I promise X to do some action, I am causing X to hear a certain noise, which has a definite meaning both to X and to me, together with the term ordinarily used for the action, in such a way that X believes that the sound proceeded from me (Prichard 1965: 172). But here arises another question which was Prichard's true preoccupation: how can a simple fact of having uttered several "noises" oblige me to do something? Even before uttering these several "noises", Prichard explains, I have already made the promise, not to utter such "noises,' in connection to one phrase focused on one action, without committing oneself to accomplish that action.

To say I promise, for Prichard is nothing but some "noises" which could not oblige a person to do anything, if one does not presuppose an anterior, more general promise. But what does this mean? How to detect this fundamental anterior promise? The procedure proposed by Prichard is the following: let us imagine a phase in time in which one does not (yet) believe that by uttering some verbal formula one commits oneself to perform an action. One can therefore ask oneself the following two questions: 1. Is it possible, at this stage, at least to desire to be able to commit oneself to perform an action by the simple uttering of some special form of language? 2. And if one could desire such a thing, does there exist a procedure by which one could make such a commitment function? It must be abundantly clear, says Prichard, that one can promise only in a group of at least two persons, of which each realizes that the other is a being which does not only believe he has certain obligations, but which will also act in a way in which he thinks he is obliged to act. And our welfare does not depend only on the fact that the others believe themselves obliged to react in a certain way, but also on our aptitude to believe that they will in fact act in this way. Taking into account the preceding considerations necessarily leads us to ask ourselves what is required in order to fulfill this complex cooperation. Prichard proposes the following procedure: let us attain it by first fixing on a certain noise or mark on paper which could be made in connection with using the term for an action, and then agreeing or promising not to make this noise or mark in connection with using the term for some action without going on to do the action. If we do this the trick will be done, because then, by making the noise or mark thus, we shall be bringing into existence the obligation to do the action in virtue of our general agreement or promise ... And if we can make out that it would be simply impossible to think that the production of the noises would give rise to an obligation, unless we thought that we had already made some promise about our making such noises, than we have got to allow that in some way or other we have this thought, and that therefore there must have been some such promise, though from the nature of the case we must have made it somehow without language (Prichard 1965: 177-178). What I wanted to draw your attention to by these quotations is not so much Prichard's mythical transcendental methods, taken literally, but above all the spirit of his ideas, the presupposition that a promise can not suffice in itself, and that it presupposes a network of utterers (at least virtual) so that it can exist, so that it can have the credibility and force required, in short, the presupposition according to which a promise, or more generally, an explicit performative, is nothing but a crystallization of the polylogue and a crystal (isation) of its own conditions of the act of uttering. If this is not the case, it is not and can not be anything but some "noises", as affirmed by Prichard, and confirmed by the experience of everyday life. Thus the person which solemnly baptizes a ship - like in the famous Austin's example - can be nothing but a speaker, the utterer into which he is assimilated, being what Bally - discussing the "No smoking" sign3 called a "moral entity." But let us make one more step forward. A moral entity, as we saw in Prichard's theory, is nothing uniform, i.e., it does not speak with one single voice, it behaves as if it spoke with one single voice, but in doing so hides a plurality. One can also go another step further: in order that a performative can succeed on the "essentially conventional" side, it is necessary that the plurality be hidden, which is not surprising: for a social convention to be efficient, it is necessary that it speak with one single voice. This is evidenced for example by the fact that on the "essentially conventional" side, one can not build an argumentative scale. One can not state that an utterance such as "I baptize this ship Liberty" is a more powerful argument or a weaker argument than any other utterance: there is nothing but this utterance which can baptize a vessel, and it is the social conventions that require it.

Notes
1 I insist on "at least" because I believe that speaking of utterers in the Ducrot sense it is absolutely necessary to have recourse to the "Occam's razor" i.e., to multiply the linguistic entities only if one has sufficient (and necessary) arguments for such a procedure. In other words, I am not at all persuaded that in order to explain the pragmatic uses of French toujours (Cadiot, Ducrot, Nguyen and Vicher 1985 : 105124) - perhaps the most detailed application of the polyphonic theorization of Ducrot - one would (really) need five (5) utterers. 2 In fact even the propositional content should have been presented in form of a scale, which would also necessitate the introduction of topoi, but the limited space forces me to confine myself to the basic features. 3 I borrowed this example from Ducrot (1989 : 189).

References
Austin, J. L. 1962. Performatif - Constatif. In La Philosophie Analitique, Paris: Minuit. Benveniste, E. 1976. La philosophie analytique et le langage. In Problmes de linguistique gnrale I, Paris : Gallimard (coll. TEL). Bourdieu, P. 1982. Ce que parler veut dire, Paris : Fayard. Cadiot, Ducrot, Nguyen and Vicher. 1985. Sous un mot, une controverse: Les emplois pragmatique de "Toujours". In Modles linguistiques VII/2, Lille : PU L. Ducrot, O. 1952. L'nonciation et polyphonie chez Charles Bally. In Logique, structure, nonciation. Paris : Minuit. Plato. 1924. Theaetetus. (trans. By Harold North Fowler). London and Cambridge : Loeb Classical Library. Prichard, H. A. 1965. The Obligation to Keep a Promise. In Moral Obligation. Oxford : Oxford University Press. Strawson, P. F. 1969. Intention and Convention in Speech Acts. In Fann, K. T. (ed.). Symposium on J.L. Austin. London and Henley : Routledge & Kegan Paul. agar, . I. 1987. The Obligation to Keep a Promise. Manuscript.