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Chapter VII

Pyrrhus of Epirus and Defensive Imperialism

Enter Pyrrhus, Stage Right


With the death of Alexander the Great, and the subsequent 40-year war of succession, Rome was granted the breathing room needed to emerge with a vengeance from the sacking of 390 BC. Fear of attack from neighboring city-states on every border drove Romes expansion ever outward, in a form of what historians call defensive imperialism. In other words, better to attack those now, who would only attack you later. To echo the later Roman historian Vegetius, si vis pacem, parare bellum, if you want peace, then prepare for war. Rome became an almost accidental empire, driven by the fear instilled by the Gallic destruction of the city. Rome, however, usually practiced tolerance and assimilation of her defeated subjects, preferring to make them into new and useful allies from whom she could draw troops and supplies to further fuel her legions. Unlike her imperial history to follow, Rome did not levy tribute on Italian cities that were conquered.1 A system of founding colonies in conquered territory, populated by Roman citizens and her soldiery, helped to spread Roman influence further and further south in the Italian peninsula.
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A tribute is a tax on conquered peoples.

Meanwhile, Etruscan power was waning north of the Tiber River, as their territory was squeezed on both their northern and southern borders. In the south they were being conquered and absorbed by Rome, while in the north the Gauls descended out of the Alps and south of the Po Valley to raid their city-states. The Apennine Mountains divide Rome from Italys eastern coast, which meant she naturally expanded up and down the west coast into the heavily Geek influenced part of Southern Italy, and into the Etruscan north. Conflicts with the Samnites of central Italy during the 4th century brought Roman influence further and further south, eventually bringing their expansion to the Bay of Naples and other neighboring Greek city-states. By the time the Samnite Wars (343-290 BC) were over for Rome, Alexanders empire was already broken into the three major divisions: the Ptolemaic pharaohs in Egypt, the Antigonid Empire in Greece, and the Seleucid Empire in Persia. To the west of Egypt, Carthage controlled the North African coast, and was waging war with the troublesome Greek city of Syracuse in Sicily, which refused to submit to Carthaginian rule of the island. Spain and northern Europe

were filled with small but powerful tribes of Celtic2 and Germanic peoples, which often mistrusted each other and were in a constant state of war. Such was the state of the Mediterranean world at the start of the 3rd century BC. It was at this time that Romes influence came in contact with the powerful southern Greek city of Tarentum. Located on the inner heel of Italy along the northern shore of the Bay of Tarentum, this Greek city-state was a powerful merchant and naval power in Southern Italy. In 282 BC, the conflict with Tarentum started when Rome came to the aid of another Greek city-state, Thurii, which was being attacked by a neighboring city.

The Romans sent troops and a handful of ships to the Bay of Tarentum in response. However, they were never to sail into those waters, which were the exclusive domain of Tarentum. The Roman ships were quickly sunk by the superior Greek warships, and this escalated to a state of war with the Tarentines. Feeling threatened by the proximity of Romes power, Tarentum called upon those Greeks back home across the Ionian Sea to aid her against this upstart Italian hill tribe which now threatened Greek independence.
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Celts and Gauls are the same people, and the names are often interchanged. It was Julius Caesar who stated that the word Celts is of Greek origin, while the Romans called the same people Gauls.

The general who answered Tarentums call for help was Pyrrhus of Epirus, a competent and skillful general who saw an opportunity to expand his kingdom into Italy, while veiling it in the role of a protector of Greek independence. There was no Greek power in Italy itself that could stand up to the Roman expansion, so all hope was put in Pyrrhus and his army. While some cities like Thurii were friendly to Rome, there were very few Greeks in Southern Italy who saw Pyrrhus as a greater threat than Rome.

Questions and Reflection


1. 2. 3. When has the Kingdom of Epirus been discussed before? Looking back at the map on page ***, why did the Etruscans, Romans and Greeks not spread east in Italy? What is the name of the Greek city-state that asked Pyrrhus for help?

Reflection Essay 1. Is there a time in American history that weve acted with defensive imperialism, and if so, is it justified? Why?

The Roman army of the Middle Republic


In 280 BC Pyrrhus arrived in Italy at the head of an army that Rome had never before encountered; a force of highly trained Greek phalangites and a host of war elephants. However, the Roman army that Pyrrhus faced no longer resembled the Greek style hoplites that it started as back during the 8th century. In all the years that Rome had waged war, her army had evolved. Starting out as a characteristically Greek phalanx of soldiers equipped with a round shield, spear, helmet, and sword, the Roman army had evolved over the three centuries since the creation of the Roman Republic.

The old-style phalanx was not effective when the Romans expanded into the mountainous terrain of central Italy against the Samnites in the 4th century. It was a simple fact: a phalanx had extreme difficulty when it moved over anything but flat terrain. As it has been noted, Alexander and his phalanx had difficulty just getting over a riverbank and maintaining a solid line of soldiers at the Battle of Issus in 333 BC. The old, solid line of soldiers locked shield-to-shield cannot by its very nature maintain cohesion when fighting uphill. Therefore, in what would become a hallmark of Roman warfare, the Romans adapted their army to be more mobile. They formed their army, called a legion, into three lines of infantry, with each line broken down into sub-units of men called maniples. In Latin, the word manus means hand, so in essence these were handfuls of men, usually 120 strong each, while a legion at full strength numbered around 4,800 men. In the very front of the army the Romans would have velites, short-range skirmishers equipped with various light weapons. These could be dislodged against an enemy, and the velites could retreat behind the army for safety. A couple hundred cavalry held the flanks, with the main infantry in the center. Each maniple had enough space between another maniple to allow the lines to move through each other, giving the Roman army the look of a checkerboard formation. This was done to allow a battle line, if needed, to retire in good order back behind the safety of fresh troops. This gave the legions something that the phalanx did not have: flexibility. The first line of Roman heavy infantry was called the hastati, and represented the newer units, who had seen some battle, but were the most raw and least experienced battle line. If the fight was beyond the hastati, they fell back through the gaps in the line, letting the second line take over the fight. In fact, the Romans typically used the hastati to exhaust an enemys strength, so they could hit them with their second line, which would be fresh for the fight. This second line was called the principes, and was comprised of soldiers who had seen some experience in battle. Theywere the core of the Roman army, and represented the seasoned soldier, who was usually in his mid-twenties. However, even they might break in the face of a tough opponent. If the Roman army needed to retreat from the battlefield, they relied on the third line to step forward and protect the army from a rout and potential disaster. An army that could not maintain order could easily turn a retreat into a rout. Then, in full flight, the fleeing troops could be hunted down by an enemys cavalry and suffer terrible losses, since soldiers tend to throw away their weapons in the panic of flight. For that reason, the Roman third line,

called the triarii, was equipped differently than that of the first two lines. The hastati and principes had both spear and sword, with the spear (pilum) roughly 6-8 feet in length and meant to be thrown en masse at the enemy. Instead, the triarii had longer spears, which were used in a manner similar to the Macedonian phalanx. Composed of the most experienced veterans of the Roman army, the soldiers of the triarii were expected to save a legion if it faced potential defeat. Calm and cool under pressure, the older soldiers of the triarii would protect the rear of a retreating legion. The Roman expression ad triarios redisse (it has come to the triarii) became synonymous with a desperate situation. This was the Roman army that Pyrrhus of Epirus faced in 280 BC.

Questions and Reflection


4. 5. 6. What are the names of the three Roman lines of an army? Which line was expected to win a normal Roman engagement? What is a maniple?

Reflection Essay 2. Why did the Roman army look different when they faced Pyrrhus, when in the beginning they looked the same as a Greek army?

First Engagement: Heraclea


Pyrrhus and his army landed on Italian soil with the public message that he was coming to the aid of his Greek cousins in Southern Italy, however, he saw the chance to expand his power westward from Epirus. His army consisted of about 20,000 phalangites, 3,000 cavalry and even 20 war elephants. Pyrrhus brought with him knowledge of phalanx warfare perfected generations before by Alexander the Great. It is commonly mistaken that the first time the Romans encountered elephants was during the Second Punic War against Hannibal in 218 BC, but it was actually sixtysix years before when Pyrrhus brought his Hellenistic army to Italy. The Tarentines had invited Pyrrhus to come to their aid, but soon found out, to their dismay, that Pyrrhus was more interested in securing a position of power in Southern Italy than crusading Greek independence from Rome. Nonetheless, Rome presented the more immediate and barbaric invader to the Italic Greeks, and they threw their support to Pyrrhus. The two armies first met at the Battle of Heraclea which was along the western shore of the Bay of Tarentum. This was the first time that the Romans faced off against three things: elephants, a Greek phalanx, and most importantlya Greek general. This was not some local Latin or Samnite hill tribe, nor some invading mass of Gauls, but a true professional army the Romans faced. The two armies met and joined battle on the banks of the River Siris near the town of Heraclea. Pyrrhus drew up his army, seeing the Romans open the battle with their velites. He charged the Roman cavalry with his Macedonian and Thessalian contingents, and drove them off the battlefield. In the center of the battle, Pyrrhus Epriote phalanx tried to push its way through the massed Roman infantry, but could not break through its ranks. For the Romans, things were worse and already getting desperate. Seven times the Roman lines charged the phalanx, but every time they were hurtled back. Fear or folly drove the Roman legionaries to try and roll under the phalangite spears, vainly trying to grab the Greek sarissae. Once the Romans threw their spears, they only had their short swords to use against the much longer Greek spears. It proved lethally useless and the Roman maniples buckled.

In a manner similar to Alexander and other Greek generals, Pyrrhus wore armor that made him easily recognizable on the battlefield. Curiously, he took off that armor and gave it to a bodyguard to wear, who was unfortunately cut down by the Romans soon thereafter. The Romans cheered, and rallied, thinking Pyrrhus had fallen in battle. Seeing his men beginning to panic, Pyrrhus rode down the Greek line, cheering his men on and reassuring them he was alive after all.3 At this point in the battle the Roman cavalry had rallied and returned to the battlefield, and was pressing in on Pyrrhus flanks. Seeing the decisive moment, Pyrrhus played his trump card: his elephants, which he had kept in reserve until this key moment. The Roman horses panicked at the sight and smell of the elephants, which threw the whole of the Roman army into confusion, routing them from the battlefield. Pyrrhus ordered his cavalry to pursue and cut down the retreating Romans, further exacerbating their defeat. The Romans left an estimated 10,000 dead on the battlefield, while Pyrrhus had only slightly less. It was a victory for Pyrrhus and his army, but in that victory was sown the seeds for his ultimate defeat.

The Battle of Ausculum


The term Pyrrhic Victory means that, while you might be victorious against an enemy, the enemy did such damage to your own army that you are unable to exploit it and ultimately will lose the war. This was going to be the case for Pyrrhus, who after the Battle of Heraclea, continued further north into Apulia, and in 279 BC met the Romans again at the Battle of Ausculum. Led by both consuls, Publius Decius Mus (the Mouse) and Publius Sulpicius Saverrio, the Romans fought a hard, two-day battle against Pyrrhus. Both sides had roughly 40,000 infantry and cavalry, while Pyrrhus also now had Tarentines and Samnites, who saw in this foreign invader a chance to overthrown their recent Roman oppressors. Having had time to prepare for this battle, the Romans had anti-elephant countermeasures ready: ox-led chariots with long spears, skirmishers with spears to throw at the elephants, and pots filled with burning pitch to hopefully scare them. As the battle progressed that first day, both sides suffered losses.
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We do not know the motivation for this move by Pyrrhus. The Romans would site cowardice, but that seems unlikely.

The Romans had one of their four legions routed along with their Latin allies, while for Pyrrhus the Tarentines and Epriotes in the center had to fall back. Retreating to a nearby hill, the Romans broke off their attack, while Pyrrhus himself retreated to deal with an attack on his own camp, which was promptly crushed. Both sides spent a wary night encamped on nearby hills for protection. At dawn on the second day, both sides renewed the battle on an open plain between the two hills. The battles outcome was in doubt until Pyrrhus, as he had done at Heraclea, seized the opportunity to use his elephants, which once again broke through the Roman line. The Roman anti-elephant countermeasures worked briefly, until Epriote skirmishers destroyed the ox-led chariots. The elephants charged once again and broke completely through the Roman line. At the same time Pyrrhus ordered his Royal Cavalry Guard to charge the Roman line. Overrun, the Romans fled the field, and the consul Publius Mus lay dead.4 While victorious, Pyrrhus lost about 4,000 menmany of them his officers, while the Romans lost nearly 6,500. It was at this time that Pyrrhus famously said, One more such victory and we shall be undone. This was the origin of the phrase Pyrrhic Victory, since Pyrrhus decided to seek a new opportunity than the conquest of Italy. That opportunity would be Sicily.

The Publius Decius Mus family had a record of dying on the battlefield; his grandfather (same name and also a consul), pledged his life to the gods if his army would be victorious against the Latins in 340 BC. His father (also a consul and also the same name) made an identical devotio and also died in battle against the Samnites in 312 BC.

On to Sicily
At this point Pyrrhus tried to negotiate a truce with Rome, asking only for Tarentine independence, but was offer was rebuffed by the Senate. Led by the aged and blind former consul Appius Claudius Caecus, creator the first Roman highway and aqueduct (the Via Appia and Aqua Appia), the Senate turned down any offer from Pyrrhus and vowed to continue the war5. Pyrrhus, seeing a lack of any strong allies in southern Italy, decided to change opponents and aid the Greek city of Syracuse in Sicily against the powerful city-state of Carthage, which had been trying for centuries to subjugate the entire island. Carthage, located in North Africa, saw Syracuse as the only real Greek threat left on the island of Sicily.

Ironically, Rome formed a military alliance with Carthage. In an attempt to aid Rome, Carthaginian ships sailed up the Tiber, only to be sent back to Carthage with the polite refusal for any direct help on Italian soil. Never again would a Carthaginian ship come so close to Rome.

Landing his forces successfully in Sicily in 278 BC, Pyrrhus drove off the Carthaginians from their siege of Syracuse and forced them back to the western port city of Lilybaeum. He then proclaimed himself king of Sicily and captured the Carthaginian stronghold of Mt. Eryx the following year.6 The only city in Sicily left for Carthage was Lilybaeum, and Pyrrhus began peace negotiations with the Carthaginians. Pyrrhus knew the siege of Lilybaeum would be costly, so he thought a peace accord would be the wiser course of action. The Sicilian Greeks were not pleased that Carthage still had a port city in Sicily, and the peace process broke down. The Sicilian Greeks pushed Pyrrhus to lay siege to Lilybaeum. He then demanded manpower and money from his Sicilian allies in order to throw Carthage out, but his measures became so unpopular that he lost Greek support, which prompted the Sicilians to shockingly side with Carthage against Pyrrhus. Another Carthaginian army was sent to exploit the situation, but Pyrrhus promptly defeated it. The situation in Sicily became poisonous for Pyrrhus, and it was at this time that he received word that the Tarentines were in desperate situation. They were about to be defeated by the Romans, so Pyrrhus decided to go back to Italy with his army and aid them in their conflict.
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Pyrrhus was also given the choice to become king of Macedonia, whose king was killed in 279 when the Gauls invaded Greece and sacked Delphi. He thought the better opportunity lay in Sicily and Italy for he and his sons.

The Battle of Beneventum


Having given up on Sicily and returned to Italy, in 275 BC Pyrrhus met the Romans at the town of Maleventum (literally evil wind) and was defeated. In the three years that Pyrrhus was in Sicily, the Romans had called up thousands of recruits and had been training fresh legions. At the Battle of Beneventum, Pyrrhus designs for the conquest of Italy were forever stopped by the more numerous Roman forces. For their good fortune, the Romans changed the name of the town from Maleventum to Beneventum (good wind), which still retains its ancient name to this day: Benevento. Pyrrhus had lost two-thirds of his army by this point in the campaign, and after retreating to Tarentum, decided to go back to Greece. Leaving Italy, he famously prophesized, Oh, what a battlefield I am leaving for Carthage and Rome! That battlefield would be Sicily, the natural convergence point for these two great expanding powers of the western Mediterranean. Pyrrhus knew that the Greeks in Southern Italy would fall under Roman dominance, while the Carthaginian expansion in Sicily would now continue. Sicily would be the future conflict of Rome and Carthage. Pyrrhus returned to Greece and took the city of Argos, where he was killed. As he was going through the defeated city, an old woman threw a roof tile down upon his head, knocking him from his horse. Standing nearby was an enemy soldier, hidden in the crowd. The Argive drew his sword and slew the great commander where he had fallen in the street. Pyrrhus was

46 years old. With the death of Pyrrhus, there was no further aid that would be coming to the Greek city-states of Southern Italythey were now on their own to face Rome. Within the next few years, Roman forces dominated Italy from the northern regions all the way down to the tip of the boot. There, across the narrow Straits of Messina lay the fertile plains of Sicily, the powerful city of Syracuse and the expanding power of Carthage. As a sign of Roman preeminence, the Ptolemaic pharaohs of Egypt officially recognized Rome as a power by opening an embassy and dialogue between them. Rome had now thrust herself onto the world stage.

In this photo, from the Sicilian port of Messina, Sicilys tip of land (back left) extends to the Strait of Messina towards Italy (back right). Less than two miles apart separate Italy from Sicily at this point.

Questions and Reflection


7. 8. 9. 10. 11. What is a Pyrrhic Victory? What prompted Pyrrhus to give up in Italy the first time? What was the only Carthaginian stronghold left in Sicily after Pyrrhus invasion? What made Greek support fall away from Pyrrhus in Sicily? What was the original name of the Roman town of Beneventum?

Reflection Essay 3. Thinking back on Pyrrhus and his generalship, what would your opinion of him be? Would you classify him as a successful general?

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