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Elcano vs. Hill (1977)

Case Notes

(Torts and

Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. CA (1993) Coca-Cola Bottlers vs. CA (1993) Child Learning vs. Tagorio (2005) Quasi delict distinguished from culpa criminal Barredo vs. Garcia (1942)
FACTS: Pedro Fontanilla, is a driver of Malate Taxicab owned by Fausto Barredo. At half past 1am in May 3, 1936, the taxi driven by Fontanilla collided with a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapilis. The carretela was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two days later. Consequently, a criminal action was brought, reserving the right to institute a separate civil action. Fontanilla was convicted of the criminal charge. Thereafter, on March 7, 1939, the parents of Faustino Garcia filed an action in the CFI of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. CFI decision: granted damages to the Garcia family. CA decision: modified the RTC decision by reducing the amount of the award. DEFENSE: the liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by the Revised Penal Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been no civil action against Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held responsible in this case. ISSUE: WON Fausto Barredo (employer) can be held primarily liable for damages for the act of his employee. RULING: Yes. The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction between civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer in this case the defendant-petitioner is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the Civil Code. The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood in the past, it might not be inappropriate to indicate their foundations. Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property through any degree of negligence even the slightest would have to be indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasidelito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code. Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium. Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability effective, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy under our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the procedure indicated by the defendant

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is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of common knowledge that professional drivers of taxis and similar public conveyances usually do not have sufficient means with which to pay damages. Why then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go through this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure? In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice. At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of these servants and employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter's careful conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, "they should reproach themselves, at least, some for their weakness, others for their poor selection and all for their negligence." And according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just that such responsibility should fall upon the principal or director who could have chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon the injured person who could not exercise such selection and who used such employee because of his confidence in the principal or director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary responsibility of the employer on the principle of representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before third persons the employer and employee "vienen a ser como una sola personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en la de quien le emplea y utiliza." ("become as one personality by the merging of the person of the employee in that of him who employs and utilizes him.") All these observations acquire a peculiar force and significance when it comes to motor accidents, and there is need of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles. Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.

Joseph vs Bautista (1989)

FACTS: Patrocinio Perez is the owner of a cargo truck conveying cargoes and passengers for a consideration from Dagupan City to Manila. It was driven by Domingo Villa. Luis Joseph, boarded the truck with a cargo of livestock. While on the highway, the truck tried to overtake a tricycle going on the same direction. On the other hand, a pick up truck owned by Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan, then driven by Lazaro Villanueva tried to overtake the cargo truck which was trying to overtake the tricycle, thereby forcing the cargo truck to veer towards the shoulder of the road and to ram a mango tree. As a result, Joseph sustained a bone fracture in one of his legs. Thus, an action against the driver and the owner of the cargo truck for breach of contract of carriage and against the driver and owner of the pick up truck for quasi delict was filed. The owner and the driver of the pick up truck together with their insurer paid Joseph with his expenses incurred in relation to the accident. He therefore, waived his claims (for quasi delict) against them. By virtue of such waiver, Perez, the owner of the cargo truck moved for the dismissal of the case (for breach of contract of carriage) on the ground that the waiver of the other defendants inured to his benefit because they were solidarily liable to Joseph. RTC decision: dismissed the complaint. ISSUE: WON the release and waiver of the case for quasi delict waives the plaintiffs right to prosecute for breach of contract of carriage. RULING: Yes (the waiver in this case inured to the benefit of the common carrier). A cause of action is understood to be the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff. 3 It is true that a single act or omission can be violative of various rights at the same time, as when the act constitutes juridically a violation of several separate and distinct legal obligations. However, where there is only one delict or wrong, there is but a single cause of action regardless of the number of rights that may have been violated belonging to one person. 4 The singleness of a cause of action lies in the singleness of the delict or wrong violating the rights of one person. Nevertheless, if only one injury resulted from several wrongful acts only one cause of action arises. 5 In the case at bar, there is no question that the petitioner sustained a single injury on his person. That vested in him a single cause of action, albeit with the correlative rights of action against the different respondents through the appropriate remedies allowed by law. The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that there was only one cause of action involved although the bases of recovery invoked by petitioner against the defendants therein were not

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necessarily identical since the respondents were not identically circumstanced. However, a recovery by the petitioner under one remedy necessarily bars recovery under the other. This, in essence, is the rationale for the proscription in our law against double recovery for the same act or omission which, obviously, stems from the fundamental rule against unjust enrichment.

Rafael Reyes Trucking vs. People (2000)

FACTS: Romeo Dunca, the driver of a trailer truck tractor (for the transport of San Miguel Corp. beer products), registered under the name of Reyes Trucking. While traveling from Tuguegarao to Pampanga, it approached a damaged portion of the road covering the full width of the truck's right lane going south and about six meters in length. These made the surface of the road uneven because the potholes were about five to six inches deep. The left lane parallel to this damaged portion is smooth. They used to evade this damaged road by taking the left lance but at that particular moment, because of the incoming vehicle, they had to run over it. This caused the truck to bounce wildly. Dunca lost control of the wheels and the truck swerved to the left invading the lane of the Nissan. As a result, Dunca's vehicle rammed the incoming Nissan dragging it to the left shoulder of the road and climbed a ridge above said shoulder where it finally stopped, causing damage to property, injuries and death to Feliciano Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr. Thus a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in double homicide and damage to property. The accused plead not guilty. The heirs of the deceased Dy, made a reservation to file a separate civil action against the accused arising from the offense charged. Thereafter, the family filed a case against the employer, Rafael Reyes Trucking, for quasi delict. The family withdrew their reservation for the filing of a civil action arising ex delicto and prosecuted it together with the criminal action. However, they did not withdraw their claim for quasi delict against the employer. RTC decision: found the truck driver guilty beyond reasonale doubt; ordered the driver to pay P84K as damages and ordered for the dismissal of the case for quasi delict. A supplemental decision was issued ordering Rafael Reyes Trucking to be subsidiarily liable in case of the drivers insolvency. During the pendency of the appeal, the respondent jumped bail so the. CA decision: affirmed the decision and the supplemental decision of the RTC. ISSUE 1: WON the employer can be held subsidiarily liable to his employee who is found guilty in a criminal case despite a separate civil action filed against it for quasi delict. RULING: No. As regards the first issue, the answer is in the negative. Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as employer of the accused who has been adjudged guilty in the criminal case for reckless imprudence, can not be held subsidiarily liable because of the filing of the separate civil action based on quasi delict against it. In view of the reservation to file, and the subsequent filing of the civil action for recovery of civil liability, the same was not instituted with the criminal action. Such separate civil action was for recovery of damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, arising from the same act or omission of the accused. 27 Pursuant to the provision of Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, when private respondents, as complainants in the criminal action, reserved the right to file the separate civil action, they waived other available civil actions predicated on the same act or omission of the accused-driver. Such civil action includes the recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. 28 The intention of private respondents to proceed primarily and directly against petitioner as employer of accused truck driver became clearer when they did not ask for the dismissal of the civil action against the latter based on quasi delict. Xxx It might be argued that private respondents as complainants in the criminal case withdrew the reservation to file a civil action against the driver (accused) and manifested that they would pursue the civil liability of the driver in the criminal action. However, the withdrawal is ineffective to reverse the effect of the reservation earlier made because private respondents did not withdraw the civil action against petitioner based on quasi delict. ISSUE 2: WON the Court can award damages in a criminal action involving an employee despite a separate civil action for quasi delict against the employer. RULING: No. With regard to the second issue, the award of damages in the criminal case was improper because the civil action for the recovery of civil liability was waived in the criminal action by the filing of a separate civil action against the employer. As enunciated in Ramos vs. Gonong, 34 "civil indemnity is not part of the penalty for the crime committed." The only issue brought before the trial court in the criminal action is whether accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol is

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guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property. The action for recovery of civil liability is not included therein, but is covered by the separate civil action filed against the petitioner as employer of the accused truck-driver. dctai In this case, accused-driver jumped bail pending his appeal from his conviction. Thus, the judgment convicting the accused became final and executory, but only insofar as the penalty in the criminal action is concerned. The damages awarded in the criminal action was invalid because of its effective waiver. The pronouncement was void because the action for recovery of the civil liability arising from the crime has been waived in said criminal action.

Santos vs. Pizardo (2005)

FACTS: Dionisio M. Sibayan, a driver of Viron Transit Bus collided with a lite ace van which claimed the lives of the van's driver and three (3) of its passengers, including a two-month old baby, and caused physical injuries to five (5) of the van's passengers. A criminal action for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries was thereafter filed. There was a reservation for filing a separate civil action arising from the crime. Sibayan was adjudged guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. A separate civil action for damages was filed against Sibayan, Viron transit and its owner, citing the judgment convicting Sibayan. As a defense, Sibayan, et al filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription. RTC decision: dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription. CA decision: dismissed the petition for certiorari for the reason that it was not the proper remedy. ISSUE: WON there was prescription. RULING: None. A reading of the complaint reveals that the allegations therein are consistent with petitioners' claim that the action was brought to recover civil liability arising from crime. Although there are allegations of negligence on the part of Sibayan and Viron Transit, such does not necessarily mean that petitioners were pursuing a cause of action based on quasi delict, considering that at the time of the filing of the complaint, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Besides, in cases of negligence, the offended party has the choice between an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi delict under the Civil Code. An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. 15 Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant and the similar proscription against double recovery under the Rules above-quoted. At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue opened for them by their reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so because the prescription of the action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime especially as the latter action had been expressly reserved.

Manliclic vs. Calaunan (2007)

FACTS: At morning on July 12, 1988, a Philippine Rabbit Bus Liner, Inc. (PRBLI) bus driven by Mauricio Manliclic and an owner type jeep driven by Marcelo Mendoza and owned by Modesto Calaunan collided while traveling along the North Expressway. The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep causing the latter to move to the shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting to further extensive damage. The bus veered to the left and stopped 7 to 8 meters from point of collision. Consequently, a criminal case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries was filed against Manliclic. Thereafter, a separate civil action for damages was filed against Manliclic and PRBLI. The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case. When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case be received in evidence in the civil case in as much as these witnesses are not available to testify in the civil case. RTC decision: in favor of Calaunan. It held the driver and PRBLI solidarily liable. CA decision: affirmed the RTC.

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ISSUE: WON PRBLI exercised due diligence in the selection of its employees. RULING: No. In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI maintains that it had shown that it exercised the required diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic. In the matter of selection, it showed the screening process that petitioner Manliclic underwent before he became a regular driver. As to the exercise of due diligence in the supervision of its employees, it argues that presence of ready investigators (Ganiban and Cabading) is sufficient proof that it exercised the required due diligence in the supervision of its employees. DACIHc In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience and service records. In the supervision of employees, the employer must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary measures for the breach thereof. To fend off vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence, that they complied with everything that was incumbent on them. 44 In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 45 it was explained that: Due diligence in the supervision of employees on the other hand, includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant concern of the employer, acting through dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory functions. In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of said company guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. The mere allegation of the existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies, without anything more, is decidedly not sufficient to overcome such presumption. TSacAE We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning to all employers, that "the formulation of various company policies on safety without showing that they were being complied with is not sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising from negligence of its employees. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that in recruiting and employing the erring driver the recruitment procedures and company policies on efficiency and safety were followed." . . . . The trial court found that petitioner PRBLI exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection but not in the supervision of its employees. It expounded as follows: From the evidence of the defendants, it seems that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines has a very good procedure of recruiting its driver as well as in the maintenance of its vehicles. There is no evidence though that it is as good in the supervision of its personnel. There has been no iota of evidence introduced by it that there are rules promulgated by the bus company regarding the safe operation of its vehicle and in the way its driver should manage and operate the vehicles assigned to them. There is no showing that somebody in the bus company has been employed to oversee how its driver should behave while operating their vehicles without courting incidents similar to the herein case. In regard to supervision, it is not difficult to observe that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. has been negligent as an employer and it should be made responsible for the acts of its employees, particularly the driver involved in this case. We agree. The presence of ready investigators after the occurrence of the accident is not enough to exempt petitioner PRBLI from liability arising from the negligence of petitioner Manliclic. Same does not comply with the guidelines set forth in the cases above-mentioned. The presence of the investigators after the accident is not enough supervision. Regular supervision of employees, that is, prior to any accident, should have been shown and established. This, petitioner failed to do. The lack of supervision can further be seen by the fact that there is only one set of manual containing the rules and regulations for all the drivers of PRBLI. 46 How then can all the drivers of petitioner PRBLI know and be continually informed of the rules and regulations when only one manual is being lent to all the drivers? For failure to adduce proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees, petitioner PRBLI is held solidarily responsible for the damages caused by petitioner Manliclic's negligence.

Quasi delict distinguished from culpa contractual

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Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez (1931)

FACTS: On February 2, 1930, a passenger bus and an automobile of private ownership collided while attempting to pass each other on the Talon bridge on the Manila South Road in the municipality of Las Pinas, Province of Rizal. The bus was driven by Abelardo Velasco, and owned by Saturnino Cortez. The automobile was driven by Bonifacio Gutierrez, 18 years of age, and was owned by Bonifacio's father and mother, Mr. and Mrs. Manuel Gutierrez. At the time of the collision, the father was not in the car, but the mother, together with several other members of the Gutierrez family were accommodated therein. A passenger in the autobus, by the name of Narciso Gutierrez, was en route from San Pablo, Laguna, to Manila. The collision between the bus and the automobile resulted in Narciso Gutierrez suffering a fractured right leg which required medical attendance for a considerable period of time. ISSUE: WON the bus owner and driver or the private automobile is liable. RULING: Both are liable. The guaranty given by the father at the time the son was granted a license to operate motor vehicles made the father responsible for the acts of his son. Based on these facts, pursuant to the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code, the father alone and not the minor or the mother, would be liable for the damages caused by the minor. We are here dealing with the civil law liability of parties for obligations which arise from fault or negligence. At the same time, we believe that, as has been done in other cases, we can take cognizance of the common law rule on the same subject. In the United States, it is uniformly held that the head of a house, the owner of an automobile, who maintains it for the general use of his family is liable for its negligent operation by one of his children, whom he designates or permits to run it, where the car is occupied and being used at the time of the injury for the pleasure of other members of the owner's family than the child driving it. The theory of the law is that the running of the machine by a child to carry other members of the family is within the scope of the owner's business, so that he is liable for the negligence of the child because of the relationship of master and servant. (Huddy On Automobiles, 6th ed., sec. 660; Missell vs. Hayes [1914], 91 Alt., 322.) The liability of Saturnino Cortez, the owner of the truck, and of his chauffeur Abelardo Velasco rests on a different basis, namely, that of contract which, we think, has been sufficiently demonstrated by the allegations of the complaint, not controverted, and the evidence.

Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) vs. CA (1992)

FACTS: Carlitos Bautista was enrolled as a 3rd year commerce student at PSBA. On August 30, 1985, he was stabbed in the 2nd floor premises of the school by outsiders/ not members of the school community. Consequently, Carlitos parents filed an action for damages before the court against PSBA and its corporate officers. The parents sought to adjudge them liable for the victim's untimely demise due to their alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of security precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack on the victim. On the other hand, PSBA sought to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action against them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic institutions, such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the rule in the Article 2180. RTC decision: in favor of the parents. CA decision: affirmed the RTC. ISSUE: WON educational institutions like PSBA can be held liable for damages. RULING: Yes, provided the breach of contract was coupled with bad faith. Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco parentis. This Court discussed this doctrine in the afore-cited cases of Exconde, Mendoza, Palisoc and, more recently, in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals. 6 In all such cases, it had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this material situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable. However, does the appellate court's failure to consider such material facts mean the exculpation of the petitioners from liability? It does not necessarily follow. When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher

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education or a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations. Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof. Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extracontractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this impression has not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract. In Air France vs. Carroscoso (124 Phil. 722), the private respondent was awarded damages for his unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat aboard the petitioner airline. It is noted, however, that the Court referred to the petitioner-airline's liability as one arising from tort, not one arising from a contract of carriage. In effect, Air France is authority for the view that liability from tort may exist even if there is a contract, for the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. (Austro-America S.S. Co. vs. Thomas, 248 Fed. 231).

Air france vs. Carasscoso (1966)

FACTS: Carasscoso is a civil engineer. He was one of the 48 Filipino pilgrims who left from Manila to Lourdes in March 30, 1958. He was issued a first class roundtrip ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok he occupied the first class seat, however, in Bangkok he was forced to vacate said seat by the manager of Air France on the ground that there was a white man who has a better right to the seat. RTC decision: in favor of Carasscoso. CA decision: affirmed the RTC with slight modification on the amount of award. ISSUE: WON Air France is liable for damages. RULING: Yes. The responsibility of an employer for the tortuous act of its employees-need not be essayed. It is well settled in law. 41 For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner's his employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says: "Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage." In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon the provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable. 42 6. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. 43 And this, because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rude or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. 44 Thus, "Where a steamship company 45 had accepted a passenger's check, it was a breach of contract and a tort, giving a right of action for its agent in the presence of third persons to falsely notify her that the check was worthless and demand payment under threat of ejection, though the language used was not insulting and she was not ejected. 46 And this, because, although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort". 47 And in another case, "Where a passenger on a railroad train, when the conductor came to collect his fare, tendered him the cash fare to a point where the train was scheduled not to stop, and told him that as soon as the train reached such point he would pay the cash fare from that point to destination, there was nothing in the conduct of the passenger which justified the conductor in using insulting language to him, as by calling him a lunatic," 48 and the Supreme Court of South Carolina there held the carrier liable for the mental suffering of said passenger. Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner-air carrier a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.

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(Torts and

Regino vs. Pangasinan Colleges (2004)

FACTS: Khristine Rhea Regino, reared in a poor family and went to college through the support of her relatives, was a 1st year computer science student at Pangasinan Colleges of Scinece and Technology (PCST). She enrolled in Ms. Gamurots logic and Ms. Baladads statistics class. The school held a fund-raising activity, the proceeds of which shall go to the construction of the schools tennis and volleyball courts. The students were required to pay for two (2) tickets each at P100. The students who will pay will be recompensed with additional points/scores in their examinations while those who were not will be denied the opportunity to take their final examinations. Regino was not able to buy the tickets because of financial and religious reasons. Consequently, she was not allowed to take the final examinations for her logic and statistics classes. Thus, Regino filed a complaint (as pauper litigant) for damages against PCST. The latter filed a Motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies, arguing that question raised involved the determination of the wisdom of an administrative policy of the PCST, hence, the case should have been initiated before CHED. RTC decision: in favor of PCST. It granted the motion to Dismiss. CA decision: ISSUE : WON the school is liable for torts despite the existence of student-school contract. RULING: Yes. Reciprocity of the School-Student Contract In Alcuaz v. PSBA, 23 the Court characterized the relationship between the school and the student as a contract, in which "a student, once admitted by the school is considered enrolled for one semester." 24 Two years later, in Non v. Dames II, 25 the Court modified the "termination of contract theory" in Alcuaz by holding that the contractual relationship between the school and the student is not only semestral in duration, but for the entire period the latter are expected to complete it." 26 Except for the variance in the period during which the contractual relationship is considered to subsist, both Alcuaz and Non were unanimous in characterizing the school-student relationship as contractual in nature. CTHDcE The school-student relationship is also reciprocal. Thus, it has consequences appurtenant to and inherent in all contracts of such kind it gives rise to bilateral or reciprocal rights and obligations. The school undertakes to provide students with education sufficient to enable them to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the students agree to abide by the academic requirements of the school and to observe its rules and regulations. 27 The terms of the school-student contract are defined at the moment of its inception upon enrolment of the student. Standards of academic performance and the code of behavior and discipline are usually set forth in manuals distributed to new students at the start of every school year. Further, schools inform prospective enrollees the amount of fees and the terms of payment. In practice, students are normally required to make a down payment upon enrollment, with the balance to be paid before every preliminary, midterm and final examination. Their failure to pay their financial obligation is regarded as a valid ground for the school to deny them the opportunity to take these examinations. The foregoing practice does not merely ensure compliance with financial obligations; it also underlines the importance of major examinations. Failure to take a major examination is usually fatal to the students' promotion to the next grade or to graduation. Examination results form a significant basis for their final grades. These tests are usually a primary and an indispensable requisite to their elevation to the next educational level and, ultimately, to their completion of a course. xxx In the present case, PCST imposed the assailed revenue-raising measure belatedly, in the middle of the semester. It exacted the dance party fee as a condition for the students' taking the final examinations, and ultimately for its recognition of their ability to finish a course. The fee, however, was not part of the school-student contract entered into at the start of the school year. Hence, it could not be unilaterally imposed to the prejudice of the enrollees. SIcCEA Such contract is by no means an ordinary one. In Non, we stressed that the school-student contract "is imbued with public interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational institutions." Xxxx Generally, liability for tort arises only between parties not otherwise bound by a contract. An academic institution, however, may be held liable for tort even if it has an existing contract with its

Damages)

Case Notes

(Torts and

students, since the act that violated the contract may also be a tort. We ruled thus in PSBA vs. CA, 34 from which we quote: ". . . A perusal of Article 2176 [of the Civil Code] shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this impression has not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract. In Air France v. Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722), the private respondent was awarded damages for his unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat aboard the petitioner airline. It is noted, however, that the Court referred to the petitioner-airline's liability as one arising from tort, not one arising form a contract of carriage. In effect, Air France is authority for the view that liability from tort may exist even if there is a contract, for the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. . . . This view was not all that revolutionary, for even as early as 1918, this Court was already of a similar mind. In Cangco v. Manila Railroad (38 Phil. 780), Mr. Justice Fisher elucidated thus: '. . . . When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties.' HSDIaC "Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, particularly Article 21 . . ."