O 092133Z FEB 09 FM AMEMBASSY QUITO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0003 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 QUITO 000100 SUBJECT: CORREA ANGRY OVER

CONDITIONS ON VETTED UNIT REF: A. QUITO 57 B. QUITO 10 Classified By: Ambassador Heather Hodges for reason 1.4 (D) 1. (C) Summary: During his February 7 weekly radio/TV address, an indignant President Correa, reading from a January 8 letter from the DHS/ICE Attache in Quito, rejected coordinated selection of personnel for an anti-smuggling/contraband unit and announced the Attache's expulsion, apparently unaware that he had departed three weeks earlier. He threatened that the GOE would do similar checks on pilots flying counter-narcotics surveillance planes under the gas-and-go model after the FOL departs. We suspect the influence of the new security minister and/or retribution for the embarrassment caused by the arrest of a government official involved in FARC narcotics trafficking may have prompted Correa's statements. It remains to be seen to what extent this move will affect cooperation with other U.S.-supported and vetted

units.

End Summary. -----------------------------------EVENTS THAT LED TO CORREA'S OUTBURST ------------------------------------

2. (C) The Department of Homeland Security / Immigration and Customs Enforcement (DHS/ICE), using funding from the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs through the Narcotics Affairs Section, has supported the Ecuadorian National Police National Intelligence Directorate's Center for Anti-Contraband Operations (COAC) since FY 2003. A verbal agreement existed between the ICE Attache and police commanders that the personnel would submit to polygraph tests in order to avoid corruption. USG assistance to the unit, which targeted those involved in human smuggling as well as contraband, totaled $720,000 to date. 3. (C) In December 2008, Ecuadorian National Police commander General Jaime Hurtado informed DHS/ICE Attache Armando Astorga that he had decided to appoint a new COAC chief without coordinating with DHS/ICE. Astorga attempted to persuade Hurtado to follow agreed procedures. When his efforts failed, Astorga sent the January 8 letter to Hurtado, with the concurrence of his headquarters and the Ambassador. It stated that DHS/ICE operational and logistical support would be terminated and asked for the return of all equipment previously provided. The letter suggested that the decision could be revisited if

circumstances change.

It said in part:

The DHS/ICE Quito office is completely in agreement that assigning personnel of the unit is a power of the National Police of Ecuador and specifically of its leadership. Nevertheless, we do not agree that the chief and/or personnel of the unit should be assigned without previous coordination on the respective selection and conducting integrity checks that are fundamental requirements to protect the security of the unit and the confidentiality of the investigations. 4. (SBU) President Correa read selections from the letter in his February 7 radio address. Addressing Attache Astorga, he said he should keep his $340,000 in suspended assistance and the $160,000 additional funding anticipated this year, terming it "dirty money." Correa directed police commander Hurtado to return everything to the last computer flash drive. He called the U.S. insolent for not understanding that since January 2007 (his inauguration), Ecuador was not a colony. To applause, he said Ecuador should make a donation of $160,000 annually to the U.S. for a project to avoid torture in the U.S., such as is happening at Guantanamo. (Complete transcript of Correa's remarks e-mailed to WHA/AND.) 5. (SBU) Correa then turned to counternarcotics cooperation under the gas-and-go model, which the Ambassador had proposed to him on January 26, to be implemented after the closure of the U.S. Forward Operating Location (FOL) in Manta (Ref A). He said,

"Madam Ambassador, I accept that these Coast Guard planes can land on Ecuadorian soil once the Manta base (sic) leaves, with one condition: that we will have to check on the pilots that come flying these planes so that no criminals enter our country." (Note: We were rather surprised Correa raised the gas-and-go agreement in principle. We had expected the GOE to announce it only after careful preparation. End Note.) -----------------------------------------------AMBASSADOR HIGHLIGHTS NEGATIVE EFFECT TO FOREIGN MINISTER -----------------------------------------------6. (C) After hearing about Correa,s Saturday address, the Ambassador immediately called Foreign Minister Falconi to express her deep concern about Correa,s actions and words. Falconi said that the Astorga letter had been unacceptable. The Ambassador reminded Falconi that in their meeting on January 12 (Ref B), she had raised the situation with the anti-smuggling unit as an example of the distancing of the GOE and the U.S., and that she had followed up faxing a copy of the letter (apparently Falconi never received the letter). Falconi told the Ambassador that the U.S. had to realize that Ecuador was a sovereign country and that the U.S. was dealing with a "different government" than in the past. The Ambassador noted that in any case the U.S. had been dealing with the Correa Administration for two years and various vetted units had been functioning. She added that she believed that Correa's actions and words could have a negative effect on relations

between the U.S. and Ecuador. Falconi said he would tell Correa about their conversation. 7. (C) The next day (February 8), FM Falconi summoned the Ambassador to the Ministry at 7 PM to express formally President Correa's and the government's "deep indignation" over the January 8 letter from DHS/ICE Attache Astorga to police commander Hurtado. Falconi specified as objectionable three parts of the Astorga letter: the language on the agreement "not functioning satisfactorily for our governments," the list of items to be returned to the USG, and the decision to reconsider the $160,000 destined for a human smuggling unit. Falconi rejected any interpretation of the letter's language other than Correa's. Falconi said he had spoken with Correa subsequent to Falconi's February 7 telephone call with the Ambassador, and relayed the Ambassador's deep concern. Falconi expressed regret that this issue was getting in the middle of our cooperative relations. 8. (C) Addressing the GOE's objection to U.S. vetting of personnel in supported units, the Ambassador explained that there were a number of these special vetted units, not just in Ecuador, but around the world. She walked Falconi through the process of establishing these units, pointing out that they were created under mutual verbal agreements, and that the DHS unit had been operating for the duration of the Correa administration. At several points in the discussion, the Ambassador attempted to clarify with Falconi whether the GOE was prohibiting USG

vetting, in which case we would have to suspend cooperation with other supported units. Falconi ducked the question, asserting that vetting was unacceptable for Ecuador's sovereignty, but that the Coordinating Minister for Internal and External Security, Miguel Carvajal, was responsible for regularizing the agreements. The Ambassador noted that she had spoken with Minister Carvajal on February 6, about suspension of cooperation to another vetted unit, and that Minister Carvajal had suggested formalizing agreements on the units. 9. (C) The Ambassador noted that Astorga had been discussing the situation with General Hurtado since December 2008, and that Astorga's letter summarizing the situation was sent on January 8, including copies to other relevant officials. The Ambassador even sent a facsimile of the letter to then Bilateral Afffairs Under Secretary Carlos Jativa on January 12, subsequent to her first meeting with Minister Falconi. It is not clear to us why this had become an issue only now. We disagreed with the GOE's characterization of the letter. Moreover, even in the event the President was upset with the letter, his public outburst was not the appropriate manner to address it. Expelling an embassy official was a very serious step. 10. (C) Falconi claimed that he had never seen the letter. He asserted that President Correa, in the wake of the March 1 Colombian attack on the FARC camp in Angostura, told the Ecuadorian police that there could be no more agreements of this type, and that Ecuador was reclaiming its sovereignty. Falconi also asserted that Correa had

the right to communicate any way he desired. The Ambassador said, yes, and if that is what he wants, then he must realize that there will be a negative reaction. She noted that she had not spoken in public about all the anti-U.S. rhetoric, but all of Correa's remarks -- including his comments during and after his trips to Cuba and Iran -- were being seen in Washington. 11. (C) Just as the meeting appeared to be over, Deputy Foreign Minister Pozo reminded Falconi that he had a letter to deliver to the Ambassador. The letter was actually addressed to DHS/ICE Attache Astorga, and signed by Correa's private secretary, Galo Mora, but according to Falconi dictated by President Correa. The Mora letter (e-mailed to WHA/AND) essentially repeats Correa's tirade from his February 7 address. The Ambassador advised Falconi that if the Ecuadorians wanted to speak of indignation, the letter and Correa's remarks about torture by the United States were an insult, especially to the Obama Administration. She said she was very disappointed by the turn of events, since recent bilateral communications had been promising. She added that President Correa's agreement in principle to a gas-and-go arrangement had been very positive. 12. (C) Since Mora's letter to Astorga raised post-Manta arrangements, the Ambassador noted those discussions should more appropriately be addressed to her, but she wondered precisely what was meant by Ecuadorian vetting of USG aircrews, since an unworkable proposal would spoil a good dialogue to date. Falconi ducked answering that question as

well, indicating that discussions should continue with the Under Secretary for Sovereignty and Borders Affairs. 13. (C) February 9 Post Script: The Ambassador received a call from close Embassy contact, and former Under Secretary for Bilateral Affairs, Carlos Jativa. He said Falconi and Deputy Foreign Minister Pozo had asked him to call and express concern about what had happened. They had asked him to pass on their desire to have good relations with the U.S. -------------------------------WHO IS PUSHING CORREA'S BUTTONS? -------------------------------14. (C) Those working for President Correa know he has a tendency to rant and rave before looking into the facts of a matter or considering the consequences of his words. We suspect Minister Carvajal, working through presidential personal secretary Mora, provided Correa a copy of Astorga's letter and described it in a way that set him off. Carvajal has close connections with the Cuban government and may have been looking for an opportunity to harm U.S. relations with Ecuador. 15. (C) Another factor behind the turn of events may have been anger over the exposure of links to the Correa government by the Ostaiza brothers, who were involved in narcotics trafficking and money laundering on behalf of the Revolutionary Armed

Forces of Colombia (FARC). This affair (see septel) has embarrassed the Correa administration and forced former security minister Gustavo Larrea to drop his candidacy for the National Assembly in April elections. 16. (C) It is worth noting that Correa had returned a few days earlier from a trip to Venezuela, where Chavez may have pressed him to be more critical of the United States or where his revolutionary fervor may have been reenergized. We do not see that Correa would gain much electoral advantage from his remarks since the majority of Ecuadorians view the U.S. positively and/or see the necessity of a constructive relationship with us. --------------------------------------------------TEMPEST IN A TEAPOT, OR MORTAL BLOW TO US PROGRAMS? --------------------------------------------------17. (C) COMMENT: While it is quite clear that DHS/ICE cooperation with the COAC unit is over, it remains to be seen what impact the weekend's events will have on cooperation with other vetted units that we support. The USG needs to stick to its principles in terms of conditions for our support in sensitive areas of law enforcement. At the same time, we do not want to leave the GOE in a corner with no way out if cooler heads do begin to prevail and we have the opportunity to continue programs that support U.S. security interests. We hope a conversation the week of February 9 with Minister Carvajal will give us an indication whether vetted

unit cooperation will be able to continue, perhaps under written agreements. We will also need to follow up with the MFA to see if Correa was serious about vetting our pilots. Depending on press coverage this week, we may want to consider releasing the full text of the Astorga letter. HODGES (Edited and reformatted by Andres for ease of reading.)