Larin vs. Executive Secretary GR. No.

L- 112745, October 16, 1997

FACTS:

The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Aquilino T. Larin, Revenue Specific Tax Officer, then Assistant Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and his co-accused of the crimes of violation of some provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code and R.A 3019. His conviction was reported to the President of Philippines through a memorandum. Sr. Deputy Executive Secretary Leonardo Quisumbing acting under the authority of the President issued Memorandum Order No. 164 which provides for the creation of an executive Committee to investigate the administrative charge against petitioner. The petitioner questioned the administrative complaint filed against him. Meanwhile, the President issued E.O. No. 132 which mandates for the streamlining of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Under said order, some positions and functions are either abolished, renamed, decentralized or transferred to other offices, while other offices are also created. The Excise Tax Service, of which the petitioner was the Assistant Commissioner, was one of those offices that was abolished. Consequently, under A.O. No. 101, petitioner was found guilty of grave misconduct in the administrative charge and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of his leave credits and retirement benefits including disqualification for reappointment in the government service. Petitioner questioned his unlawful removal from office. Petitioner challenged the authority of the President to dismiss him from office. He argued that in so far as presidential appointees who are Career Executive Service Officers, the President exercises only the power of control not the power to remove. He likewise assailed that he was removed as a result of the reorganization made by the Executive Department in the BIR pursuant to E.O. No. 132. He claimed that there is yet no law enacted by Congress which authorizes the reorganization by the Executive Department of executive agencies, particularly the BIR. On the other hand, the respondents contended that since petitioner is a presidential appointee, he falls under the disciplining authority of the President. Respondents claimed that he was not dismissed by virtue of EO 132 but because he was found guilty of grave misconduct in the administrative cases filed against him.

ISSUES: 1. Is the President has the power to discipline the petitioner? 2. Is the petitioners acquittal in the criminal case entails the dismissal of the administrative charge against him? 3. Is the reorganization of the BIR pursuant to EO No. 132 tainted with bad faith?

DECISION: 1. YES Petitioner is a presidential appointee who belongs to career service of the Civil Service. Being a presidential appointee, he comes under the direct disciplining authority of the President. This is in line with the well settled principle that the power to remove is inherent the power to appoint conferred to the President by Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution. Thus, Memorandum Order No. 164, which created a committee to investigate the administrative charge against petitioner, was issued pursuant to the power of removal of the President. This power of removal, however, is not an absolute one which accepts no reservation. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, career service is characterized by the existence of security of tenure, as contra-distinguished from non-career service whose tenure is co-terminus with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or limited to a period specified by law or to the duration of a particular project for which purpose the employment was made. The fact that petitioner is a presidential appointee does not give the appointing authority the license to remove him at will or at his pleasure for it is admitted fact that he is likewise a career service officer who under the law is the recipient of tenurial protection, thus, may only be removed for a cause and in accordance with procedural due process.

2. YES Where the very basis of the administrative case against petitioner is his conviction in the criminal action which was later on set aside by this Court upon a categorical and clear finding that the acts for which he was administratively held liable are not unlawful and irregular, the acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal case

necessarily entails the dismissal of the administrative action against him, because in such a case, there is no more basis nor justifiable reason to maintain the administrative suit.

3. YES While the Presidents power to reorganize cannot be denied, this does not mean however that the reorganization itself is properly made in accordance with law. Wellsettled is the rule that reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith. Thus, in Dario vs. Mison, this Court has had the occasion to clarify that: As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make the bureaucracy more efficient. In that event no dismissal or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case the security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the abolition which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid abolition takes place and whatever abolition is done is void ab initio. There is an invalid abolition as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds.

Canonizado vs. Aguirre GR. No. L- 133132, January 25, 2000

FACTS:

The NAPOLCOM was originally created under RA No. 6075 (An Act Establishing The Philippine National Police Under A Reorganized Department Of the Interior And Local Government, And For Other Purposes). Petitioners Edgar Dula Torre, Alexis Canonizado, Rogelio Pureza and respondent Jose Adiong were members of the NAPOLCOM under RA 6975. Dula Torres was first appointed on January 8, 1991 for a six year term and was reappointed on January 23, 1997 for another 6 years. Canonizado was appointed on January 25, 1993 to serve the unexpired term of another Commissioner which ended on Dec. 31, 1995. On Aug. 23, 1995, he was re-appointed for another 6 years. Pureza was appointed on Jan, 2, 1997 for similar term of 6 years. Respondent Adiongs appointment was issued on July 23, 1996. None of their terms had expired at the time the amendatory law was passed. On March 6, 1998, RA 8551 took effect; it declared that the terms of the current Commissioners were deemed as expired upon its effectivity. Consequently, President Ramos appointed Romeo Cairme on March 11, 1998 as member of the NAPOLCOM for full 6 year term. Adiong was also given a term extension of 2 years since he had served less than 2 years of his previous term. Completing the membership of the NAPOLCOM are Leo Magahum and Cleofe Factoran. Petitioners argue that their removal from office by virtue of Sec. 8 of RA 8551 violates their security of tenure. Public respondents insist that the express declaration in Sec. 8 of RA 8551 that the terms of petitioners offices are deemed expired discloses the legislative intent to impliedly abolish NAPOLCOM created under RA 6975 pursuant to bona fide reorganization.

ISSUE: 1. Whether petitioners were removed by virtue of a valid abolition of their office by Congress?

DECISION: NO. RA 8551 did not expressly abolish petitioners positions. This is precisely what RA 8551 seeks to do-declare the offices of the petitioners vacant, by declaring that the terms of office of the current Commissioners are deemed expired, thereby removing petitioners herein from the civil service. Congress may only be conceded this power if it is done pursuant to a bona fide abolition of the NAPOLCOM. RA 8551 did not expressly abolish petitioners positions. In order to determine whether there has been an implied abolition, it becomes necessary to examine the changes introduced by the new law in the nature, composition and functions of the NAPOLCOM. The creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function. It is acknowledged that Congress may abolish any office it creates without impairing the officers right to continue in the position held and that such power may be exercised for various reasons, such as the lack of funds or in the interest of economy. However, in order for the abolition to be valid, it must be made in good faith, not for political or personal reasons, or in order to circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service employees. An abolition of office connotes an intention to do away with such office wholly and permanently, as the word abolished denotes. Where one office is abolished and replaced with another office vested with similar functions, the abolition is legal nullity.