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Al Qaeda Highly Unlikely A Cohesive Organization With Strong And

Centralized Control, Intent And Direction; Command Likely To Continue


To Degrade Over The Next 6-12 Months

Executive Summary: Al Qaeda is now best seen as a “Movement” and is currently highly unlikely
to be anything more than a loose coalition of terrorist groups. Lacking central operating authority, a
diffuse mission and ideology combined with an inconsistency in strategic plans, the original Al
Qaeda leadership has lost control over the agenda that drives the Movement as a whole. As each
sub-group in the Movement pursues its own plans, rifts in the Movement have begun to show.
Analytical Confidence: High

From Single Group to Movement


Al Qaeda has undergone a drastic transformation since
9/11. Though initially weakened after losing its safe
haven in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda inspired existing
terrorist groups and new self-generating cells to rally
under bin Laden’s symbolic banner. Al Qaeda has now
become a franchise in which disparate groups take
upon themselves its ‘global jihadist’ mantle.1∗

Lack of Central Operational Authority


Though the original Al Qaeda ‘Proper’ (AQP)
continues to attempt to reconstitute itself,2 it has lost
centralized operating authority over the Al Qaeda A video presentation on the Origins of the Al Qaeda
‘Movement’ as a whole. Many emerging groups cannot Movement can be accessed on the electronic version of
this document by clicking here.
receive direct orders from AQP because they have very
few or no direct ties to it.3

• Example: Though AQP’s Al-Zawahiri attempted to take credit for the inspiration of the
London underground bombings,4 leaked reporting from investigations of the incident by the
British government indicates that the attackers conceived and conducted the operation
completely independently from AQP leadership.5

Even in cases where direct ties remain between AQP and other groups in the Movement, AQP does
not dictate attack targets and methods to the other factions. Thus, while the other factions may
consult or receive support from AQP leadership, each group carries out its attacks independently.

• Examples: Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) likely continues6 to enjoy a relationship of mutual benefit
with AQP, but it has likely never been subservient to it and has chosen its own targets.7
• Though the East Turkestan Islamic Movement has loose ties to AQP and has attempted a
global jihadist-type attack in Kyrgyzstan, it functions beyond AQP’s control.8


Footnotes are embedded with a direct hyperlink to each information source. Thus, these footnotes can be accessed using the
electronic version of this document or accessed and printed at http://mciisodnichallenge.blogspot.com/2008/09/reference.html. In-
text hyperlinks lead to additional data visualizations or articles that explain concepts with which the reader may not be familiar.
2
Although jihadists have immortalized many of Al Qaeda’s operational techniques online,9 their
interpretation and execution are not universally consistent or controlled. For example, jihadist
groups operating in Iraq and
Central Asia utilize tactics that
differ starkly from those of AQP.
10

• Examples: While AQP tries


to avoid killing Muslim
civilians, Al Qaeda in Iraq
(AQI) has done so regularly
and with exceptional
violence.11
• While AQP tries to cooperate
with other jihadis, the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan has
Attacks conducted under the direct command of AQP leadership
been difficult or hostile to account for only 29% of all the Movement’s major attacks.
other terrorist groups, even at
times targeting them for murder.12

Inconsistency of Strategic Plans


The Movement follows no single road map to achieve its diverse goals. Instead, though groups may
swear allegiance to AQP, in practical terms they each interpret its directives differently13 and
pursue their own agendas, as evidenced by the pattern of their attacks.

• Examples: Even since swearing its allegiance to Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb almost exclusively targeted installations of the Algerian government, 14 which the
group seeks to overthrow.15
• The 2004 Madrid train bombings were not a part of any strategic vision from AQP
leadership. Instead, the attacks were a result of that cell’s assumption that influencing a local
election to sway against US policy in Iraq would benefit the global jihadist cause.16

The lack of a common strategic plan is also evidenced by the conflicts between factions in the
Movement. AQP strongly disapproved of AQI’s tactics, as evidenced by al-Zawahiri’s letter to al-
Zarqawi which was recovered after the latter’s death.17 Clashes over affiliation with the Movement
have also arisen within individual groups, such as the tension in recent years that has:

• Divided members of JI,18


• Caused splits in Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,19 and
• Inspired splinter20 or other rival groups that sometimes fight in outright opposition to AQI.21

Diffuse Mission & Ideology


Though it is bound together by devotion to general ideals of global jihad, there is no single intent
driving the Al Qaeda Movement. First, no central authority in the Movement manages the content
and flow of global jihadist propaganda. Instead, each group has adopted and adapted the Al Qaeda
Propaganda Model for its own purposes.22 Even among individual factions, there is increasingly
little unity in the dissemination of ideology.
3
• Example: Within AQI there are dozens
of subgroups each of which
independently manages their media
operations and tailors its message to
meet specific needs.23

The loss of ideological control has also affected


how new terrorists are recruited into the Al
Qaeda Movement. To enter the Movement
now, candidates increasingly self-radicalize via
the internet or through social activities such as
sports clubs.24
The Diversity of Producers Using the
Al Qaeda Propaganda Model for their own purposes. Accordingly, as each faction and its subgroups
adapt the AQP message to fit their needs,
AQP’s core religious message has been diluted. Using religion as a medium to transmit its
increasingly diffuse message,25 the Movement is now tied to nebulous ideals revolving around
social rebellion.26

A Trend of Continuing Command Disintegration


The centrality of the Movement is likely to
continue to deteriorate over the next 6-12
months. Analysis of the Movement’s attacks
shows that the number of major attacks
conducted under the direct leadership of AQP
continues to decrease each year. Also, the
inter-group conflicts, combined with the
increasing diffusion of the global jihadist
message, and the tarnishing of Al Qaeda’s
reputation,27 indicate that the Movement is
unlikely to develop or maintain a cohesive
While AQP conducted the most attacks prior to 9/11, other
strategic plan or ideology in the near term. groups have gradually come to dominate the global jihad.

Notes on Tools & Techniques: To produce this analysis, the team utilized several interesting tools
and techniques to gather and process data. Most of the tools used are available for free online.

• To utilize the concept of the ‘Web 2.0’ as an interactive environment, the team used
‘crowdsourcing’ for collection, utilizing mass email and blogging to produce open calls for
resources, the team broadened its take of high-quality sources. Responses came from
Terrorism.com, the International Relations and Security Network in Zurich, King’s College
in London, and MCIIS students and alumni, and other sources.
• The team also used Deep Web search engines such as Turbo 10 and Kartoo.
• A project collection blog allowed analysts to upload, catalog, and retrieve data at any time.
• Palo Alto Research Center’s Analysis of Competing Hypothesis software helped structure
the team’s findings.
• To visualize the analyzed data, the team used several conceptual modeling and visualization
programs, including i2 Analyst Notebook, and bubbl.us. A video was also produced using
online media from YouTube and Google Images and video production software.

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