THE TRUE WARFIGHTER IN 3RD GEN SAF INTRODUCTION The 3G SAF can be summed up in three Gs: the Google-lisation

of war; the ability to get a God's eye view of the battlefield, and lastly pure Grunt - William Choong Snr Writer, The Straits Times In the current on-going six-part series by the Straits Times starting from 9 July, it offers the readers an insight to the 3rd Generation Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) transformation. Senior Writer, Mr William Choong, correctly identified, in the first of the 6-part series, that the SAF's 3 rd Gen transformation as essentially the local offshoot of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) which seeks to transform militaries across the world with the help of high technology1. Indeed, throughout history, advancement in technology has modernised, evolved and transformed militaries: New air, land and sea platforms and capabilities were brought forth with technology, new warfare doctrine were made possible. Yet throughout the RMAs in history, there remains one constant: War has always been fought with soldiers on either side. Be it from the prehistorical clashes of sticks and stones in the stone age, to the first ever recorded American Civil war in 1861 between the Union and Confederate, till the current Long War against non-state insurgents today. RMA for 3rd Gen SAF is based on Integrated Knowledge-based Command and Control (IKC2), which allows for Precision Warfare: Precision Information, Precision Manoeuvre and Precision Fires. These are the science in the battlefield, the technology behind the warfare, and the tangibles: behind our survival as a nation. THE CHIEF INCALCULABLE- THE HUMAN WILL In war the chief incalculable is the human will2 - G.H. Liddell Hart
1 William Choong, (9July 2009), See First, think quicker, kill faster, The Straits Times. Singapore Press Holdings. 2 B.H Liddel Hart, (1974), Strategy. New York: All American Library. pp. 323

In warfare, potential adversaries can also procure, modernise and transform their military and capabilities to be on equal footing with our nation. So, if two potential warring adversary were to go into the battlefield, what would make a Main Battle Tank (MBT) A, a better and more superior armour platform than, say, MBT B? Amidst the science, technology and the tangibles, what would give a nation the edge over its adversary, equipped with the equivalent platforms? The answer lies in what has remained constant throughout all the wars in history: The soldiers at the front line and their indomitable, incalculable human will. It is the country with the soldier who is willing to go the extra mile, to put in extra during training, and to never give up when the going gets tough that will give a country the edge. CONSCRIPTION WHO LACKS CONVICTIONPROBLEM A DIFFERENT

Unlike established army that relies on a volunteer corps, a conscript army presents a different set of problems. Big nation states, such as United States of America, with a population of 307 million3, and can rely on a large pool of resources which provide a steady stream of volunteers. While there may be a multitude of reasons why one may choose to join the military, the crux of the matter was that they had a choice, and they chose to serve the nation. This is unlike the case of Norway, or the Republic of Singapore for that matter. Both countries, incidentally, have a population of 4.6 million4, and both relying heavily on conscription to build up its military force. The difference between the military in Norway and Singapore, with the United States, was that a large majority of a conscript Army was not given a choice between serving the nation, versus, say working or pursuing an education. And because of that, there would be lingering doubt in the willingness of the conscript soldier to hold a weapon and kill when the nation calls. As such, there must be a concerted effort and dedication inculcating the willingness of a conscript soldier to stand a post, or possess the same indomitable, incalculable human will that will the SAF and edge over the adversary.

3 Central Intelligence Agency, (July 2009), The World Fact Book . Retrieved 08 Aug 09, from Central Intelligence Agency.https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos.html 4 ibid

WAR - A MANIFESTATION OF POLITICS The political objective is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and the means can never be considered in isolation from their purposes5 - Carl Von Clausewitz von Clausewitz theorised the relationship between war and politics was that war is simply a continuation of politics by other means. This implies that all wars are a manifestation of politics: an exercise to compel the adversary, and impose our will on the enemy6. Although that is the reason why countries wage war, that, however is not the reason that compels the tactical soldier to fight, with or without the 3rd Gen equipment/ platforms, at the frontline. Hence, then, what would make the soldier, be convicted to the cause of a war? This is the fundamental question to address that would convince the soldier to got the extra mile and never give up. Soldiers risk their lives in the battlefield not for the continuation of politics, but clich as it may sound, for the soldier fighting alongside him. To the soldier, it is his buddy, his section, his platoon, that matters most to him, not the politics behind the war. INVESTING IN HUMAN CAPITAL Having now understood what would give the edge over the adversary (the human will), the potential problem faced with a conscript Army (lack of choice, lack of conviction), and the reason why able-bodied man and woman are willing to hold a weapon and kill at the frontline (his/her fellow soldier), it is now clear that the real driver for a credible and capable SAF 3rd Gen or otherwise, lies in the human capital. While terms like IKC2, Systems-ofsystems, or 1800-DIAL-A-BOMB are sexier and catchier monikers, they cannot replace the true warfighters in the battlefield. When correctly motivated and consistently touched with positive experiences, a soldier, even a conscript one, can possess the incalculable human will, as identifies by Liddell Hart. This is especially important in our current climate of limited human resource space. It is also important to continue to invest in our human capital, such as through upgrading courses, so
5 Carl von Clausewitz, trans & ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret. (1984). On War. United States of America: Princeton University Press. pp.119 6 MCDP 1: Warfighting. pp.4

as to improve analytical understanding of a situation and enhances decision making. After all, a commander, supported with infrastructure to provide him a God's-eye view to facilitate him out-OODA-ing the adversary, the commander will still make the incorrect decision if he is not properly trained or educated. CONCLUSION While the current RMA effort address the hardware and software of transformation, it is also important to keep in sight the heartware of it all, especially so for a conscript Armed Force like the SAF. It is imperative to be constantly in cognisance of the intangibles that will provide the SAF the edge over the adversary. In the pursuit of 3rd Gen transformation, the SAF must never get lostin-the-sauce and neglect the very basic element that can win the war. Only by complementing the true warfighter, with new warfighting concepts/ platforms/ capabilities made possible by transformation, can the SAF be truly Ready, Relevant and Decisive.

References Printed Resources William Choong, (9July 2009), See First, think quicker, kill faster, The Straits Times. Singapore Press Holdings. B.H Lidell Hart, (1974). Strategy. New York: All American Library. Carl von Clausewitz, trans. & ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret. (1984). On War. United States of America: Princeton University Press. Department of Navy, United States Marine Corps. ( June 1997). MCDP 1: Warfighting. United States of America: US Government Printing Office. Electronic Sources Central Intelligence Agency, ( July 2009), The World Fact Book. Retrieved 08 aug 09 from Central Intelligence Agency website: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos.html

Bibliography Printed Sources Martin Van Creveld. (2008). The Changing Face of War:Combat from the Marne to Iraq. United States of America: Ballantine Books, NY.