The Jerusalem Institute For Israel Studies

Defining Water Needs for Fully Exploited Resources: A Necessary Step for Israeli-Palestinian Reconciliation

2011

The research was conducted by the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies and was made possible through funding by Green Cross and the Peres Center for Peace.

The statements made and the views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors.

Management of the project:

Dr. Stephan Robinson, Green Cross Switzerland Mr. Oren Blonder, the Peres Center for Peace Dr. Amir Eidelman, the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies

Israeli-Palestinian research team:

Prof. Eran Feitelson Dr. Abd El-Rahman Tamimi Dr. Amos Bein Prof. Richard Laster Dr. Amer Marei Gad Rosenthal Sand Salhout

Research assistants:
Ram Almog Adv. Dan Livney Amit Tubi

Coordinators:
Maha Abu-Laban Galit Hazan

The document is available at: www.jiis.org

Abstract
Israeli-Palestinian water issues await a settlement. Previous studies suggest that agreements over shared water resources are reached when the parties discuss concrete needs rather than vague principles. Yet, the questions: what is a 'need'( in contrast to an economic demand), how such needs should be defined and whether they can be prioritized, have remained mute. This study proposes definitions of needs, based on discussions at an international workshop (Geneva, May 2-5 , 2008) in which some of the leading experts in the field took part. The needs were prioritized and then applied to the Israeli-Palestinian context.

Four normative needs are identified and grouped into two priorities. The leading priority is freshwater for a high level of human and economic development (basic domestic need). Based on a modification of the Maltese experience, this need was defined as 60 cubic meter per capita per year (m3/c/yr). The second priority is water needed for religious and cultural purposes, including minimal flows needed to sustain ecosystem requirements (environmental need) and the minimal amount of water needed for farming in places where farmers have no alternative source of livelihood (termed peripheral farming needs).

The implications of these definitions for the Israeli-Palestinian case are identified through four scenarios: 1) a reference scenario, where current domestic use remains unchanged; 2) a scenario in which all the four normative needs noted above are supplied; 3) a scenario of a 'warm' peace with economic growth in which all the normative needs are met and 4) a scenario which includes returnees. The fourth scenario assumes a return of Palestinian refugees, in two sub-scenarios differing in the timing and extent of return. The water implications of these scenarios are compared to the water sources available for Israelis and Palestinians combined. The "basic domestic needs" are compared to the average annual yield of freshwater resources while the total "normative needs" (basic domestic, cultural, environmental and peripheral farming) are compared to the total net recharge of freshwater and brackish water. In order to take into account extended

droughts and the possibility of climatic changes, two sensitivity analyses were carried out assuming an average annual yield decline by 20% and by 40%.

The analyses showed that the basic domestic need can be supplied in Israel and the West Bank under all scenarios, except for 2030 for the scenarios which include returnees. Under prolonged drought, however, more water will already be required in 2020 than that implied by arbitrarily sharing the Mountain Aquifer, in order to provide normative basic needs in the West Bank. In contrast, the resources underlying the Gaza Strip cannot meet even the basic domestic need under any scenario. Hence, there is an urgent need for augmentation of water sources for the Gaza Strip, regardless of ability to pay and whichever scenario occurs.

Neither Gaza nor the West Bank can meet the combination of priority 1 and priority 2 needs under all scenarios without additional water. This is largely due to the relatively large amounts of water needed for peripheral farming in both areas. Hence, it seems that there is a need to differentiate between the priority needs. Essentially, as long as the environmental needs of the Jordan River are not taken into account and cultural needs are small, basic domestic need can be met under most of the scenarios. Thus, from a policy perspective, the question of environmental and cultural needs should be separated from that of peripheral farming.

Several policy implications can be drawn on the basis of these observations: 1. Israel and the Palestinians should seek to augment water supply, most probably through desalination on the Mediterranean shore and or by some import of water, to ensure the provision of basic domestic needs and environmental needs including prolonged drought conditions. 2. Water augmentation schemes would be needed as an integral part of any return of refugees program. 3. The Gaza Strip needs immediate augmentation through sea water desalination even in the short run in order to meet normative basic domestic needs,. 4. Augmentation of water through desalination/water import, to supply basic domestic needs, merits subsidy and should not be based on ability to pay

considerations. Water augmentation needed to supply demands beyond the four 3

normative needs should be supplied only if the users are willing to pay the marginal economic and social costs (which includes energy and environmental externalities). 5. There is a need to provide water for maintaining livelihood of farmers in peripheral areas. Further deliberations are required on how this should be handled, and at what level society would be willing to subsidize this provision. 6. A possible next step of the study would be to consider the water needs of Jordan.

Table of contents

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Introduction ................................................................................... 6 The Needs-based Approach............................................................................... 9 Methodology........... .............................................................................................. 12 The Needs for Water........................................................................................... 14 The Water Resources Available to Israelis and Palestinians ............... 17

5.1 Natural Water Resources ....................................................................................... 19 5.2 The Mountain Aquifer system ............................................................................... 21 5.2.1 The Western Mt. Aquifer ................................................................................. 22 5.2.2 The Eastern and the Northeastern aquifers .................................................... 25 5.3 The Lower Jordan valley water resources 27 5.4 Recycled water ....................................................................................................... 28 5.5 Desalination of Sea Water ..................................................................................... 30 6. The Scenarios.. ............................................................................................. 32 7. The Water Balances ........................................................................................... 42 8. Conclusions and Policy Implications ........................................................... 50 References . ...................................................................................... 54 Appendices .................................................................................................................. 55 Appendix 1: The participants in the Geneva workshop, 2-4 May 2008 ................ 56 Appendix 2: A summary of the discussions in the Geneva workshop .................. 60

1. Introduction
The Middle East in general and the Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian nexus in particular, have long been considered one of the most water constrained regions in the world. Water has been prominent on the Israeli-Palestinian agenda since the outset of the peace process in the early Nineties of the previous century. It still remains so, as its allocation and use have not yet been agreed upon.

The resolution of conflicts over water use is often seen as a zero-sum game. The common approach to such conflicts, which is also reflected in international law, is to first assess the amount of water to be divided and then allocate it according to several principles among the parties. However, studies that have scrutinized international water agreements have indicated that agreements are only reached once the parties go beyond the legalistic definitions noted in international law and start discussing their actual needs (Wolf, 1999). In the Israeli-Arab setting the first agreement reached (though not ratified), the Johnston accords, was also essentially a need-based agreement. In essence, that agreement was based on an assessment of the potential irrigation needs of the various riparians, as they were viewed at the time. Yet, in the fifty plus years that elapsed since those accords were negotiated the nature of water consumption in the region has changed. In the Fifties of the previous century most of the water was used for irrigation, and agriculture was viewed as a major contributor to the GDP, a major base for employment and a base for food security. Since then the percentage of fresh water used for irrigation declined, primarily in Israel, as the urban population grew, and the importance of agriculture in the national economy and as a basis for employment declined drastically. Today agriculture accounts for less than 3% of the labour force in Israel and approximately 17% of the Palestinian labour. Grain supply is no longer based on local production. Rather, as Allan (2001) has noted long ago, most of the water used for food in the Middle East is virtual water, that is it is supplied through the global food market, as all countries in the Middle East rely on the global food market for their most basic staples (particularly wheat and meat). 6

Thus, while it seems that it is necessary to return to the discussion of needs in order to move Israeli-Palestinian discussions of water forward, the meaning of needs is not commensurate with what it meant fifty years ago. Hillel Shuval (1992) was the first to recognize this, and suggested that water be allocated on a basis of water per capita parity, and that 125 cubic meters per person per year be determined as the minimal amount of water needed to maintain a high quality of living (based on Israeli domestic water consumption patterns). In subsequent years several other analysts have strived to define what minimal water needs are, usually focusing on domestic use, often defined as the human right to water (i.e. Gleick, 1996; Brooks 2007; Chenoweth, 2008). Yet, these studies have not addressed all possible needs, some of which may not be for human consumption, such as the needs of nature.

The purpose of this study is to define water needs, according to the current views and discourses, and analyze the implications of such definitions for the Israeli-Palestinian case. In doing so, this study advances actually an alternative approach to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian water allocation conflict. Rather than taking the current fresh water resources as the starting point and asking how they should be divided, we first ask what is the water needed for, and then whether these needs can be addressed on the basis of existing fresh water resources, or whether water augmentation is needed to address these needs. The steps identified through this approach can then serve as a basis for an agreement between the parties. In essence, this study strives to provide a 'road map' for a way forward. Whether this road will be followed is left to decision makers.

This project was undertaken under the auspices of Green Cross International, Green Cross France and Green Cross Switzerland, The Peres Center for Peace and the Jerusalem Institute, with financial support of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Yet, the views expressed herein are solely those of the team. Moreover, it is not the purpose of this study to formulate an Israeli-Palestinian water agreement. Rather, it comes only to propose a new approach to analyze and consider the water issues between the two sides. The particulars of the agreement are left, as should be, to decision makers on both sides.

This report begins with a description of the needs approach. Then the steps taken in this study to implement this approach are described. The first of these, the definition of needs, is presented in section 4. Then, as a background for examining its implications in the Israeli-Palestinian context, the resources available in the region and those shared by the two parties are described in section 5. As the implications are a function of future conditions, and these are highly uncertain, a number of possible scenarios are outlined in section 6. Then, in section 7, the implications of these scenarios, vis--vis the existing natural resources, are analyzed, followed by conclusions and recommendations.

2. The Needs-based Approach

There have been multiple documents written stating principles for allocating transboundary or shared water resources. Most have pertained primarily to surface water. The most notable are the 1966 Helsinki Rules and the more recent 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. Groundwater, which is at the core of Israeli-Palestinian water concerns, was first addressed in the 1986 Seoul rules, which essentially extended the Helsinki rules to ground water, and more recently in the 2004 Berlin Rules, where a new more comprehensive set of principles was introduced (Dellapenna, 2008). Essentially, all these documents, as well as most of the countless papers that seek to provide guidelines for allocating water among rivals follow the pattern depicted in Figure 1. That is, they seek to define principles for allocating the water, taking into account the water resources and their state, the history of use and the physical features, mainly the way boundaries transact the resource. Most of the discussion in the literature focuses on the principles, and these vary thus over time and from one document to another.

Figure 1: The Typical Water Allocation Approach

Resources Boundaries

Historic Users Principles

Water Allocations To countries Agreements

Institutions

Since Shuval's (1992) seminal proposal increasing attention has been accorded to water needs. Much of this attention focused on either determining what the minimal basic needs are (Gleick, 1996) or on definitions of the human right to water (Irujo, 2007), particularly since the 2002 reinterpretation of articles 11 and 12 of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of the United Nations (Biswas, 2007). However, as Biswas (2007) notes this reinterpretation still leaves many issues open for discussion. Moreover, once needs are viewed as the basic factor in determining water allocations in shared resources, the basic approach delineated in Figure 1 has to change, as it can be argued that the supply of those needs may take precedence over historic use or the physical layout.

If water needs are indeed the main drivers of allocations then they need to first be elucidated. The definition of needs will inevitably reflect the global sanctioned

discourse and values, which can then be incorporated in principles. These will pertain to various potential users (perhaps including non-human consumptive uses). Thus the allocations for particular parties in a specific shared resource will have to reflect the needs as defined through discourse and principles, the potential users within each party, which will be a function of the boundaries between them, as well as the state of the resource (assuming that the principle of no appreciable harm is also retained). These relationships are depicted in Figure 2.

Once the basic relations between need-based allocations and the state of the resources have been identified it is likely that some measures will need to be taken to meet the needs without irreversibly impairing the resource (be it a surface or a groundwater basin). The allocations, and the measures that will be seen as vital for providing the water without adversely affecting the resources, will then have to be incorporated in the agreements. In order to implement the agreement and the measures some institutions will most likely be needed. The process that is depicted in Figure 2 is thus largely a bottom-up process, in contrast to the top-down process shown in Figure 1. While the process seen in Figure 1 essentially begins with the resource and principles to allocate water between parties, which is then supplied to local consumers, the process depicted in Figure 2 essentially begins with the users. Their needs and their numbers and identities 11

determine the allocations made to the various parties, and the measures the parties agree upon to take in order to supply those needs.

Figure 2: The Needs-based Process

Sanctioned Discourse and Values

Principles

Potential Users

(Sanctioned) Needs

Boundaries

Allocations

Resources

Agreements

Measures

Institutions

As can be clearly seen in Figure 2 the central question in the needs-based approach is what constitutes a need. The second question that comes up is what should be the relations between need-determined allocations and the state of the water resources. That is, should need definitions be altered if the allocation of water according to them irreversibly impairs the resource, and how should the measures that may be taken to prevent or mitigate such impairment be incorporated in the discussion. These tensions are depicted by broken arrows in Figure 2.

In order to implement the process shown in Figure 2 it is thus necessary first to address these questions. In the next section the methodology used to address these issues is described, as well as that used to implement the process in the Israeli-Palestinian setting.

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3. Methodology
The study comprised of four main tasks. The first was to agree upon the definition of water needs. To this end an international workshop was convened, attended by some of the leading authorities in the field was convened 2-4 May 2008 in Geneva, Switzerland. The workshop was limited to chosen participants so meaningful discussions could take place following each presentation. In addition two open-discussion sessions concluded the workshop, one devoted to the definition of needs in general and one to first implications for the Israeli-Palestinian case. The participants are listed in Appendix 1, and the summary of the discussions is added as Appendix 2.

In the workshop a three tier definition of needs was agreed upon. In the next three tasks the research team strived to assess the implications of this definition for the IsraeliPalestinian case. To this end the team had to build a series of scenarios for the IsraeliPalestinian case. In doing so the team had to overcome a series of sensitive issues, such as what should be the data sources, how to count East Jerusalem's population, and how to address the return of refugees, in addition to the usual sets of issues that need to be addressed in any scenario-building exercise (such as what are the bounds of the scenarios, for which years to run the scenarios, and what are the main trends and how to quantify them).

As there is no mutually agreed-upon data source the research team decided that each party will rely on the official statistics of its side. Thus, the Israeli researchers relied on the data of the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, while the Palestinians relied on the official statistics of the Palestinian Authority. As both sides include East Jerusalem in their statistics this population was double-counted. However, as there is an under-count of foreign workers in Israel the double counting may help correct this lacuna. It was assessed that these two populations (East Jerusalem and foreign workers in Israel) are on the same order of magnitude, and thus the double counting does not affect the results. The actual scenarios that were formulated are further detailed in section 6.

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The implications of the scenarios can only be derived once the needs identified in the various scenarios are compared to the available water resources, and particularly the fresh water resources (both surface and underground). Thus, the third task was to summarize the existing information regarding the total water resources available to the parties. This task too was accomplished by reliance on each side's data, though in this case there it was necessary to come up with a single agreed-upon description. The results of this task are presented in section 4.

Finally, it was necessary to assess the implications of the scenarios, given the supply constraints identified in section 5. These implications, derived by comparing the water implications of the normative needs as defined by us for all scenarios with the state of the water resources is presented in Section 7.

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4. The Needs for Water

Water is a necessity for life, of both humans and other natural systems. From an anthropocentric perspective the basic domestic need has the top priority. There have been several attempts to assess what this basic need is (Glieck, 1996; Chenoweth, 2008). In the 2-4 May 2008 Geneva workshop the approach that was adopted is based on Chenoweth's (2008) work. Essentially, Chenoweth searched for the lowest consumption that allows a non agricultural economy to function effectively and support a high level of human and economic development (as measured by the Human Development Index). Based on the Maltese experience he estimated it to be around 135 liter per capita per day (l/c/d). To this loses in the system have to be added. These only rarely are below 10%. By combining these figures and by assessing that it may be impossible for Middle East countries to emulate the Maltese example exactly and to lower all water losses to 10%, the Geneva workshop concluded that the figure for basic human needs should be set at 60 cubic meter per capita per year (m3/c/yr).

However, three additional needs were identified in the Geneva workshop. The first, are cultural needs, such as the water used for religious ceremonies and purification. In the Middle East the amounts needed for these purposes are minute, and thus can be accounted for within the 60 m3/c/yr amount. However, these needs should be mentioned as in some circumstances they may be more substantial locally. The second additional needs are those of nature. These needs are the minimal flows that are necessary to sustain the long term ecosystem structure and functions. These flows should be defined as the amounts and quality of the water discharged at the proper timing, which are determined by historic patterns. In other words, the flows are not limited to a single amount, but should include both variability and quality dimensions. Needless to say that the specific flows should be determined on a case-by-case basis. Yet, even when there is insufficient data (as is the case in most parts of the world) some approximations of these needs can be assessed.

The third additional need is that of farmers who have no alternative source of livelihood without relocation. These are termed herein as peripheral farming needs. The rationale 14

behind this need is social. That is, if there is a societal responsibility to allow people to make a living without requiring relocation in situations where there is no readily available non-farming employment within a reasonable commute, there is a need to supply the water that will make this farming possible. It is important to note that this need does not imply that all the water currently used for farming should be viewed as a need. Rather, only the minimal amounts needed for farmers in peripheral areas to derive a socially-determined living standard should be viewed as a need. Any additional water demanded for irrigation either in more central areas where there is an alternative source of employment within a reasonable commute distance,1 or for additional crops above those needed to allow for an average living standard by the farmers, constitutes an economic demand, rather than a need.2 It should also be noted that the level of

agricultural production need not be at a subsistence level. Rather it is the agricultural production system that produces at least a normatively determined basic level of livelihood with the minimal amount of water. However, if the minimal amount of water allows a sophisticated agriculture that produces high incomes (such as is the case in the Arava) this is of course preferable.

Table 1 summarizes the definitions of water needs as used in this study. It should be noted that not all the needs can be quantified a-priory. Actually only the basic domestic need can be quantified in this manner. All others are context-sensitive. As can be seen from Table 1 overall there are four needs. These are prioritized

according to their order in Table 1. The basic human need is considered the top priority. The other three needs are secondary priorities. There is no clear order among them, though there can be some advantage to cultural and nature needs over peripheral farming. This is the order that was used in this study.

Clearly the definition of a "reasonable commute" can vary between societies, and is affected by the level of transportation infrastructure and services. In the Israeli-Palestinian case it implies a daily commute of 2-3 hours each way. 2 Farming does have social benefits such as landscape and as an environmental sink. Thus farming as an activity may merit subsidies. This, however, does not imply that farming as such is a need, and thus water for farming does not necessarily merit subsidies (even if the farming activity does), and cannot be considered a normative need according to the principles advanced here.

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Table 1: Water Needs Definitions and Determination Priority 1 Need Basic domestic Definition Minimal amount necessary to assure a high level of human and economic development without agriculture Minimal amount necessary for religious and cultural practices Minimal flow necessary to sustain long term ecosystem structure and functions Minimal amount for maintaining farming where not alternative livelihood is available within a reasonable commute Determination 60 m3/c/yr

2 3

Cultural Nature

By society By basin By country which areas are beyond a reasonable commute from alternative employment and what is the minimal water needed for agriculture

Peripheral farming

It should be noted that the amounts of water included as a need are always the minimal amounts which are necessary for continuing the activity. Any amount of water that is desired above these amounts, regardless of the specific use it is desired for, constitutes an economic demand. The differentiation between a need and an economic demand is crucial, as needs should be supplied as an obligation regardless of whether the user can pay the cost of supply, while an economic demand is based on its ability to pay the market value, which should reflect the full cost of water provision to it (ideally, including the externality costs). Still, it should not be implied that needs have to be supplied free of charge. Rather, ability to pay should not be a constraint on supply, but charges may still be applied.

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5. The Water Resources Available to Israelis and Palestinians

The natural water resources in the eastern Mediterranean and specifically in the State of Israel and the Palestinian Authority are limited and constrained by climate conditions. The area (Figure 3), which stretches between the Dead Sea Jordan Rift Valley and the Mediterranean, is mostly semi-arid with higher precipitation figures over its northern and Central Mountain and coastal belts.

Rainfall, which occurs in winter only, drops from over 500-700 to less than 100 mm/year over a short distance both southward and eastward. About 35% of the land consists of harsh desert with less than 100 mm/year. Winters are characterized by a few intensive rain storms and almost all the rain falls within a period of 3-4 months. Summers are hot, dry with no rainfall for over 6-7 month. Annual fluctuations in rainfall are extreme and droughts are common and frequently repeated for 2 and even 3 successive years. Seasonal extreme events and extended dry spells in between the rain storms are increasing in frequency over recent years, possibly reflecting climate induced changes.

Almost all the water resources in the area derive from groundwater (springs and boreholes) and as such are highly dependent on the precipitation regime and its infiltration/recharge capacity. This in turn reflects both the overall precipitation figures and their annual and seasonal spread; generally, recharge rates diminish with decreasing average annual precipitation and with increased dry spell in between rain events. Current figures suggest that although average precipitation has not changed significantly over recent years, the average recharge capacity follows a diminishing trend probably because of the increase in dry spells during rainy seasons.

Because of the erratic precipitation regime and its effect on the recharge capacity a reliable water supply system requires a large storage capacity to bridge seasonable fluctuations and repeated droughts. As such, much of the water supply in the region is managed along with boreholes abstraction rather than through natural spring outlets. The borehole abstraction system enables increase of ground water level amplitude and 17

enlargement of operative storage capacity. Still storage is limited; overexploitation and reduction of water levels beyond certain thresholds (defined as "red lines") in almost all resources disturb hydraulic equilibrium and enhance salinization.

Almost all water resources are highly vulnerable to anthropogenic contamination and quality deterioration. Recharge areas to groundwater resources are increasingly affected by urbanization processed (which reduce the infiltration rates and increase the danger of pollution) and other parts are cultivated with increasing usage of recycled water, fertilizers and herbicides.

Figure 3: Rainfall spread in the Middle East

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5.1 Natural Water Resources The main natural water resources in the region and their long term average annual recharge are presented in Figure 4. The overall cumulative average annual figure is about 1,915 million cubic meters (mcm/y) and includes brackish water. Annual fluctuations are large and oscillate by more than 50% around the average. Furthermore, recent

observations exhibit a declining trend of about 10-20% in the water yields of almost all resources. (The quantitative water assessments are based on data derived from the Israeli and the Palestinian water authorities, Mekorot, Co. Ltd, and complimentary sources).

Figure 4: The water resources in the region, including brackish water. The Mountain aquifer system which is shared by Israel and the Palestinian Authority comprises about 37% of the regional water resource (water resource assessments are based on data derived from the Israeli and the Palestinian water authorities, Mekorot, Co. Ltd, and complimentary sources). Other than the Sea of Galilee which is fed partly by flood water, all resources are groundwater which drains naturally to the Mediterranean and the Dead Sea through springs and direct seepages. Not included in the current discussion are numerous small 19

springs which drain local perched horizons and issue several tens to a few hundred thousands cm/y. These springs which cumulatively yield some 20-30 mcm/y are entirely consumed by small local communities and/or sustain small ecosystems and as such, are not connected to any regional water resource.

Enhanced artificial recharge of flood water is currently exercised almost only in the coastal aquifer with a long term average figure of 25-30 mcm/y (included in Figure 4). Current studies point to a limited potential to increase these figures, apparently by no more than another 30-50 mcm/y. Limitation reflects the erratic precipitation regime and also terrain constraints. Open reservoirs constructed in several places to capture runoff for direct irrigation are usually intercepting recharge flow to regional resources, and are therefore not added water to the natural resources budget.

The overall storage capacity of all resources combined is limited and amounts to around 1-1.5 times the overall annual long term renewable average. Currently (winter 2008/9) all water resources are heavily exhausted, spring discharge and water levels are at record lows. The current situation reflects repeated droughts, annual recharge figures below average and miss-management.

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5.2 The Mountain Aquifer system The Mountain Aquifer forms the main Israeli-Palestinian shared water system and therefore merits a detailed discussion. The aquifer system stretches mostly over the Mountain Range and extends further to its surrounding foothills (Fig. 5). The aquifer is an Upper Cretaceous karst water system divided into several aquifer units. The aquifer rock units are made mostly of dolomite and limestone of Cenomanian-Turonian age exposed along the mountain belt which corresponds with a regional NE trending anticlinorium system (Fig 6). The karst nature of the rock terrain over the recharge area diminishes the runoff to less than 1% of the total annual precipitation and the precipitation is divided mostly between evapo-transpiration (the water lost by direct evaporation and through plant activity) and recharge to groundwater. The recharge area is thus also highly susceptible to contamination and, though no large contamination events have been recorded so far, the potential for such events is rapidly increasing.

Figure 5 The Mountain Aquifer system 21

Figure 6: East-west schematic hydrogeological cross section through the Mountain Aquifer system (along the line marked in Fig 5) The system is recharged over the exposed dolomite and limestone rock units which make the aquifer and the water discharge to the west and east (Figs 5 and 6). The aquifer system is divided into the Western, the Northeastern and the Eastern mountain aquifers (Figure 5). 5.2.1 The Western Mt. Aquifer The aquifer stretches from the underground water divide in the east and the Mediterranean coastal belt to the west, below the coastal aquifer and a thick impervious Senonian-Neogene sequence. The aquifer is mostly isolated from the Mediterranean Sea and naturally drains through the fresh Yarkon and brackish Taninim springs (Fig. 7). The structural and hydrogeological configuration of the aquifer localize abstraction mostly to the western foothills of the mountain belt, where the water table is relatively shallow and abstraction yields in boreholes are very high. The aquifer maintains a delicate interface between an ancient brine body to the west and the fresh meteoric water system to the east (Fig. 8 and 9). The brine body which is gradually flushed out of the system is the source for the brackish water in the Taninim springs. The system abstraction is managed through its storage capacity and is

constrained by "red lines", minimum water levels defined such as to avoid eastward

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migration of the brine/fresh water interface and salinization of water at production facilities (Figs 9 and 10)

. Figure 7: The Western Mt. Aquifer distribution area with its natural outlets (blue squares) and "red line" monitoring sites (red circles) (modified after Guttmam and Zukerman, 1995, TAHAL Report 01/95/72 )

Figure 8: An East-West hydrogeological cross section through the Western Mt. Aquifer (after Bein and Guttman, 2000, Water Engineering, 43: 1-9) 23

Figure 9: Distribution of fresh and saline water bodies in the Western Mt. Aquifer (modified after Guttmam and Zukerman, 1995, TAHAL Report 01/95/72)

Figure 10: Long term water table hydrographs at the "red line" monitoring sites in the Western Mt. Aquifer)

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5.2.2 The Eastern and the Northeastern aquifers The aquifer distribution is presented in Figure 11. The Northeastern Aquifer comprises two rock units, a lower Upper Cretaceous (Ce-T) unit and an upper Eocene unit, and is recharged through precipitation over the exposure of both. The separated hydrogeologic aquifer units merge close to the main spring outlets due to fault structures and therefore are considered as one aquifer system. The spring outlet water, issuing along the southeastern faults of the Bet Shean valley, are partly brackish and includes a brine component of the Lisan Lake which infiltrated into the sequence some 25,000 years ago.

The Eastern aquifer is divided into a regional lower unit and an upper unit which is intersected by some large and deep creeks (Fig 12). The upper unit is drained through several large fresh water springs spread between the margins of the Rift Valley and along large creeks upstream (such as Wadi Qelt). The lower regional unit is drained mostly by the large brackish spring system of Ein Fesh'a and to a lesser degree through seeps along the south western Rift Valley faults. As in the springs of Bet Shean, the salinity at the outlet of the system derives from the Lake Lisan brine which infiltrated into the sequence some 25,000 years ago.

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Figure 11: The Eastern and Northwestern aquifers and their main outlet areas Production of freshwater from the Eastern Mt. Aquifer is significantly more complicated than from the Western Mt. Aquifer. Because of the structural configuration of the Rift Valley and its hydrological history, the freshwater water body upstream the Rift Valley is found at relatively great depth and aquifer exhibits low hydraulic conductivity. Increased abstraction in deep boreholes resulted in severe water table drawdown (such as in Herodion boreholes). It appears therefore that further development of abstraction from the Eastern Mt. Aquifer should consider desalination of the brackish water at the outlet system.

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Figure 12: An E-W hydrogeological cross section along the Eastern Mt. Aquifer. The upper aquifer unit (Ce-T) is intersected by deep creeks and drains at such intersections. The lower unit (Ce-LC) is continuous and drains mostly as brackish water along the northwestern margins of the Dead Sea basin.

5.3

The Lower Jordan valley water resources

The Jordan drainage basin crosses political boundaries and its water resources are shared, controlled and consumed at different levels by Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority. At present almost all its fresh water resources are fully utilized and the natural flow to the Dead Sea terminal basin is intercepted upstream. The remaining flow in the lower Jordan River is of low quality and largely saline. Because of its multi national status final water allocation agreements between its various riparians awaits a regional political settlement. Hence this resource is not included in the present study.

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5.4 Recycled water The scarcity of water in the region together with the necessity to treat waste water so as to prevent the contamination of groundwater resources makes recycling of effluents a prime option to increase water availability. Recycling technology advanced significantly in recent years. Consequently, waste water can and is practically treated to a level that allows unlimited agricultural use, and even to mix with fresh groundwater resources. Such water is significantly more affordable than desalination of sea water and its production at specified quality and salinity levels should be prioritized because of its dual purpose, environmental and water resource augmentation.

The potential of recycled water is dependent on the consumption of freshwater, the quality of the resources, the infrastructure and the social and industrial state of the communities involved. Integrating recycled water into the water supply system requires careful planning and identification of targets and customers, quality levels, and treatment, storage and supply methodologies and management. Table 2: Operating recycling waste water facilities in Israel (source: Israeli Water Authority), current and future yields after facility upgrades

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Operating and planned waste water recycling facilities in Israel are presented in Table 2. Current facilities produce about 250 mcm/y treated water suitable for unrestricted agriculture irrigation; another 130-150 mcm/y will gradually become productive until the end of 2010. The largest facility (130-140 mcm/y) is that of the Dan metropolitan region (TelAviv region) which includes a subsurface infiltration and treatment phase. Two others, West Jerusalem and Western Galilee (50-60 mcm/y) employ modern biochemical reactors and others are currently upgraded. Recycling of waste water in the Palestinian Authority is under various stages of planning. Implementation is delayed despite funding agreements with several donor countries led by Germany. The overall potential is estimated to be in the range of 120-140 mcm/y (Table 3). Table 3: Planned Palestinian treatment facilities for waste water effluents (EMWATER Project Group, 2004)

29

5.5 Desalination of Sea Water and water import Large scale desalination of seawater is already implemented in the region and its expansion is underway. Although desalination of sea water (SW), which essentially constitutes an unlimited resource, is a straight forward process, its implementation is constrained by environmental factors and costs (construction, electricity & maintenance). Still, because of the increasing stress on the natural resources in the region, its gradual implementation is unavoidable. So far only Israel has built desalination plants. A plant was also planned for Gaza, where it is urgently needed to supply potable water.

Import of fresh water (from Turkey and other northeast Mediterranean countries) is another possibility considered in recent years as an alternative to augment available resources in the region. Initial analyses showed that desalination enjoys significant advantages over imports. But recent development in technologies and a more analysis, which will include all externalities involved, may show that water import are a viable alternative. The current situation of sea water desalination facilities in Israel is presented in Table 4. To date (winter 2008/9), SW desalination amounts to about 150 mcm/y; another 50 mcm/y of brackish water is desalinated but that amount is mostly included in the overall natural resources presented in Figure 5. Recent governmental decisions are expected to expedite implementation of new facilities, and another 150 mcm/y desalination capacity is expected by the end of 2010.

31

Table 4: Operating and planned sea water desalination facilities in Israel (Source: The Ministry of National Infrastructures, Israeli Water Authority)

31

6. The Scenarios
In order to test the implications of the needs as defined in section 4 for the IsraeliPalestinian case four basic scenarios were formulated for three time periods. The first scenario reflects a situation in which no agreement is reached and hence the current domestic use in the Palestinian areas is maintained at 33 CM/person/year, while the basic domestic use in Israel is set at 60 CM/person/year. As this amount is lower than the basic domestic need defined in section 4 scenario 1 serves as a basis against which all other scenarios can be tested. The second scenario assumes that an agreement has been reached in which the principles as defined in section 4 are implemented. That is, each side is to receive the basic domestic need in the top priority, as well as the second priority environmental and peripheral farming needs (which are also included in scenario 1). In scenario 3 the same assumption is retained but it is assumed that peace will lead to rapid economic growth in the Palestinian areas. Such growth implies that travel

restrictions have been eased and hence more Palestinians will be integrated into the urban economy. Consequently, Palestinian domestic demand will rise faster, beyond the basic domestic need, ultimately almost equaling current Israeli domestic demand by 2030, while peripheral farming is reduced (though total agricultural demand increases). The fourth scenario, which is sub-divided into two sub-scenarios, describes the possibility of returnees to the region (i.e. west of the Jordan River). The sub-scenarios reflect different assumptions regarding the rate of return. According to the first subscenario 10% of potential returnees will return in 2020 and an additional 10% in 2030, while in the second sub-scenario 30% will return in 2030.

All the scenarios were run for three time periods: 2010, 2020 and 2030. The base population growth was the medium population growth forecast by the official Israeli and Palestinian agencies. These were 1.58% until 2015 and 1.34% from 2015 until 2030 in Israel, versus a fixed rate in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip: 2.3% and 3.3% throughout the period for the Palestinians. The base year from which all population growth is forecasted is 2007, in which there were 7.12 million Israelis and 3.76 million Palestinians. 32

In addition to the population-based domestic water demand (which included both the needs and the demand that exceeds the basic domestic need) minimal environmental needs were assessed, as well as the peripheral farming needs. In order to complete the scenarios total farming demand was also added.

The minimal environmental needs were based on expert judgment. In the Israeli side they are based on estimates prepared by the Nature and Parks Authority regarding the net water amounts needed to maintain minimal flows in the coastal streams. It should be noted that the total amount of water is greater than this minimal amount, but it is assumed that some of the water can be recycled to consumptive use from the streams' mouths, and thus the net loss is lower. The Palestinian side calculated the environmental need-based on one third of the base flow of all springs in the west bank excluding the Jordan river. The environmental needs are assumed to be insensitive to population growth, and hence are held constant in all scenarios. The environmental needs included in the scenarios does not include the water necessary for rehabilitation of the lower Jordan River or the Dead Sea, as these require vastly greater amounts of water, and cannot be discussed without taking into account the needs of the Kingdom of Jordan, which are beyond the scope of the present study.

Peripheral farming need was defined in section 4 to include the minimal water needed by those farmers for whom there is no alternative source of income within a reasonable commute. In Israel these farmers were seen to be all of those located in the Arava, which is a remote area with no nearby urban centers, and part of those located in the northern Jordan rift valley (where alternative employment exists, but is scarce and relatively low paying). Thus, the current use by these farmers was seen as the peripheral farming need on the Israeli side. As the Arava farmers rely on local sources, which are not shared with the Palestinians, this amount does not practically impinge on the results of the study.3 In the Palestinian side most areas could be argued to be within a

reasonable commute from urban centers. However, given the current travel difficulties in the West Bank, and the economic situation in the West Bank and Gaza it was
3

It is worth noting that the Arava aquifers are shared with Jordan and have been an important element in the peace agreement signed between Israel and Jordan in 1994.

33

perceived that the ability to find an alternative source of income in the Palestinian economy is constrained, and thus most farmers in the mountainous and eastern parts of the West Bank as well as most of the Gaza farmers were included in this rubric. Hence, a relatively large amount was defined to be a peripheral farming need. The only scenario in which this amount is lower is the third scenario, in which Palestinian economic growth allows a larger share of farmers to be incorporated in the urban economy.

As the amount of water needed for religious purposes in Islam, Judaism and Christianity is minute cultural needs were not included in the scenarios. In addition to the needs specified above a third priority the economic demand was estimated too. In the Israeli case the domestic economic demand was defined as the difference between current per capita consumption (104.5 m3/c/yer) and the basic domestic need. In the Palestinian side the economic domestic demand is also the

difference between per capita domestic consumption and the basic domestic need. This comes into play, however, only under the economic growth scenario. The agricultural domestic demand in the Israeli side is estimated as the difference between the current long-term Israeli agricultural consumption and the peripheral farming need. It is

assumed that despite the expected decline in this amount in 2010 due to the current drought, below what is shown in the scenarios, this amount will rebound back to the levels noted in the scenarios, mainly due to the greater availability of recycled wastewater. In the Palestinian side the economic agricultural demand (the difference between total agricultural demand and the peripheral farming needs) largely amounts to the water used by farmers in the western part of the West Bank and around the major cities, where alternative employment exists.

The assumptions underlying the four scenarios, in water terms, are detailed in Table 5. Then, the actual total amounts of water calculated according to these assumptions are presented by scenario in Tables 6-10. The calculation separate the West Bank (WB) from the Gaza Strip as there are no joint water reservoirs shared by the two and no direct water conveyance between them. Thus from a water system perspective these are two separate systems. Returnee water demand was added to those of the West Bank. Thus, while we do show the total amounts for the Palestinians (under the rubric of the 34

Palestinian Authority PA), the more meaningful entries are for the West Bank and Gaza_as_such.

35

Table 5: Assumptions Underlying the Demand Scenarios

Scenario 4a: Normative + Returnees (10% in 2020+10% in 2030)
P.A. 60.0 17.0 338.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 39.2 987.0 46.0 55.0 124.9 144.4 164.9 31.5 37.5 45.0 124.9 144.4 164.9 31.5 37.5 45.0 124.9 144.4 164.9 987.0 123.9 987.0 52.0 68.0 31.5 40.5 51.0 124.9 144.4 164.9 987.0 Israel 60.0 65.0 120.0 44.5 44.5 44.5

Priority

Need

Scenario 1: Current Domestic Use

P.A. Israel 60.0 65.0 120.0 44.5 44.5 44.5

Scenario 2: Normative Domestic Use

P.A. 60.0 17.0 338.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 39.0 Israel 60.0 65.0 120.0 44.5 44.5 44.5

Scenario 3: Normative + Economic Growth

P.A. 60.0 17.0 255.7 0.0 20.0 40.0 Israel 60.0 65.0 120.0 44.5 44.5 44.5

Scenario 4b: Normative + Returnees (30% in 2030)

P.A. 60.0 17.0 338.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 39.2 46.0 76.0 31.5 37.5 61.0 124.9 144.4 164.9 987.0 Israel 60.0 65.0 120.0 44.5 44.5 44.5

Basic domestic need:

m 3 per capita
Environmental needs: 10 m Peripheral farming:
6 3

33.0 17.0 338.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 39.0 46.0 55.0 31.5 37.5 45.0

106 m 3
Domestic demand: 2010 2020 2030 2010 3 Agricultural demand

m 3 per
capita

106 m 3

2020 2030 2010

Other demands:

2020 2030

106 m 3
36

Table 6: Scenario 1 The Base Scenario

2010 Total P.A. 4048.5 Total P.A.+ Israel 11512.6 2020 Total P.A. 4887.3 Total P.A.+ Israel 13515.6 2030 Total P.A. 5753.4 Total P.A.+ Israel 15610.1

W.B. Population (thousands) 2486.6

Gaza 1561.9

Israel 7464.1

W.B. 2958.2

Gaza 1929.1

Israel 8628.3

W.B. 3429.9

Gaza 2323.5

Israel 9856.7

Water Needs (mcm) Basic domestic needs - 1st priority Environmental needs Peripheral farming Sub Total 2nd priority Domestic demand Agricultural demand Other demands Sub total 3rd priority Total demand

82.1 12.0 209.0 221.0 0.0 27.0 21.0 48.0 351.1

51.5 5.0 129.0 134.0 0.0 12.0 10.5 22.5 208.0

133.6 17.0 338.0 355.0 0.0 39.0 31.5 70.5 559.1

447.8 65.0 120.0 185.0 332.2 987.0 124.9 1444.0 2076.9

581.4 82.0 458.0 540.0 332.2 1026.0 156.4 1514.5 2636.0

97.6 12.0 209.0 221.0 0.0 32.0 25.0 57.0 375.6

63.7 5.0 129.0 134.0 0.0 14.0 12.5 26.5 224.2

161.3 17.0 338.0 355.0 0.0 46.0 37.5 83.5 599.8

517.7 65.0 120.0 185.0 384.0 987.0 144.4 1515.3 2218.0

679.0 82.0 458.0 540.0 384.0 1033.0 181.9 1598.8 2817.8

113.2 12.0 209.0 221.0 0.0 38.0 30.0 68.0 402.2

76.7 5.0 129.0 134.0 0.0 17.0 15.0 32.0 242.7

189.9 17.0 338.0 355.0 0.0 55.0 45.0 100.0 644.9

591.4 65.0 120.0 185.0 438.6 987.0 164.9 1590.5 2366.9

781.3 82.0 458.0 540.0 438.6 1042.0 209.9 1690.5 3011.8

37

Table 7: Scenario 2 The Normative Use Scenario

2010 2020 2030 Total P.A.+ Israel 11512.6 Total P.A. 4887.3 Total P.A.+ Israel 13515.6 Total P.A. 5753.4 Total P.A.+ Israel 15610.1

W.B. Population (thousands) Water Needs (mcm) Basic domestic need - 1st priority Environmental needs Peripheral farming Sub Total 2nd priority Domestic demand Agricultural demand Other demands Sub total 3rd priority Total demand 2486.6

Gaza 1561.9

Total P.A. 4048.5

Israel 7464.1

W.B. 2958.2

Gaza 1929.1

Israel 8628.3

W.B. 3429.9

Gaza 2323.5

Israel 9856.7

149.2 12.0 209.0 221.0 0.0 27.0 21.0 48.0 418.2

93.7 5.0 129.0 134.0 0.0 12.0 10.5 22.5 250.2

242.9 17.0 338.0 355.0 0.0 39.0 31.5 70.5 668.4

447.8 65.0 120.0 185.0 332.2 987.0 124.9 1444.0 2076.9

690.8 82.0 458.0 540.0 332.2 1026.0 156.4 1514.5 2745.3

177.5 12.0 209.0 221.0 0.0 32.0 25.0 57.0 455.5

115.7 5.0 129.0 134.0 0.0 14.0 12.5 26.5 276.2

293.2 17.0 338.0 355.0 0.0 46.0 37.5 83.5 731.7

517.7 65.0 120.0 185.0 384.0 987.0 144.4 1515.3 2218.0

810.9 82.0 458.0 540.0 384.0 1033.0 181.9 1598.8 2949.7

205.8 12.0 209.0 221.0 0.0 38.0 30.0 68.0 494.8

139.4 5.0 129.0 134.0 0.0 17.0 15.0 32.0 305.4

345.2 17.0 338.0 355.0 0.0 55.0 45.0 100.0 800.2

591.4 65.0 120.0 185.0 438.6 987.0 164.9 1590.5 2366.9

936.6 82.0 458.0 540.0 438.6 1042.0 209.9 1690.5 3167.1

38

Table 8: Scenario 3 The Economic Development Scenario

2010 Total P.A. 4048.5 Total P.A.+ Israel 11512.6 2020 Total P.A. 4887.3 Total P.A.+ Israel 13515.6 2030 Total P.A. 5753.4 Total P.A.+ Israel 15610.1

W.B. Population (thousands) Water Needs (mcm) Basic domestic need- 1st priority Environmental needs Peripheral farming Sub Total 2nd priority Domestic demand Agricultural demand Other demands Sub total 3rd priority Total demand 2486.6

Gaza 1561.9

Israel 7464.1

W.B. 2958.2

Gaza 1929.1

Israel 8628.3

W.B. 3429.9

Gaza 2323.5

Israel 9856.7

149.2 12.0 157.5 169.5 0.0 79.5 21.0 100.5 419.2

93.7 5.0 98.2 103.2 0.0 44.8 10.5 55.3 252.2

242.9 17.0 255.7 272.7 0.0 124.3 31.5 155.8 671.4

447.8 65.0 120.0 185.0 332.2 987.0 124.9 1444.0 2076.9

690.8 82.0 375.7 457.7 332.2 1111.3 156.4 1599.8 2748.3

177.5 12.0 157.5 169.5 59.2 84.5 25.0 168.7 515.7

115.7 5.0 98.2 103.2 38.6 46.8 12.5 97.9 316.8

293.2 17.0 255.7 272.7 97.7 131.3 37.5 266.5 832.5

517.7 65.0 120.0 185.0 384.0 987.0 144.4 1515.3 2218.0

810.9 82.0 375.7 457.7 481.7 1118.3 181.9 1781.9 3050.5

205.8 12.0 157.5 169.5 137.2 90.5 30.0 257.7 633.0

139.4 5.0 98.2 103.2 92.9 49.8 15.0 157.7 400.4

345.2 17.0 255.7 272.7 230.1 140.3 45.0 415.4 1033.3

591.4 65.0 120.0 185.0 438.6 987.0 164.9 1590.5 2366.9

936.6 82.0 375.7 457.7 668.8 1127.3 209.9 2006.0 3400.3

39

Table 9: Scenario 4a The stepwise Return Scenario

2010 Total P.A. 4048.5 Total P.A.+ Israel 11512.6 2020 Total P.A. 5267.3 Total P.A.+ Israel 13895.6 2030 Total P.A. 6665.4 Total P.A.+ Israel 16522.1

W.B. Population (thousands) Water Needs (mcm) Basic domestic demand- 1st priority Environmental needs Peripheral farming Sub Total 2nd priority Domestic demand Agricultural demand Other demands Sub total 3rd priority Total demand 2486.6

Gaza 1561.9

Israel 7464.1

W.B. 3338.2

Gaza 1929.1

Israel 8628.3

W.B. 4341.9

Gaza 2323.5

Israel 9856.7

149.2 12.0 209.0 221.0 0.0 27.4 21.0 48.4 418.6

93.7 5.0 129.0 134.0 0.0 11.8 10.5 22.3 250.0

242.9 17.0 338.0 355.0 0.0 39.2 31.5 70.7 668.6

447.8 65.0 120.0 185.0 332.2 987.0 124.9 1444.0 2076.9

690.8 82.0 458.0 540.0 332.2 1026.2 156.4 1514.7 2745.5

200.3 12.0 209.0 221.0 0.0 36.0 28.0 64.0 485.3

115.7 5.0 129.0 134.0 0.0 16.0 12.5 28.5 278.2

316.0 17.0 338.0 355.0 0.0 52.0 40.5 92.5 763.5

517.7 65.0 120.0 185.0 384.0 987.0 144.4 1515.3 2218.0

833.7 82.0 458.0 540.0 384.0 1039.0 184.9 1607.8 2981.5

260.5 12.0 209.0 221.0 0.0 47.0 36.0 83.0 564.5

139.4 5.0 129.0 134.0 0.0 21.0 15.0 36.0 309.4

399.9 17.0 338.0 355.0 0.0 68.0 51.0 119.0 873.9

591.4 65.0 120.0 185.0 438.6 987.0 164.9 1590.5 2366.9

991.3 82.0 458.0 540.0 438.6 1055.0 215.9 1709.5 3240.9

41

Table 10: Scenario 4b Large Late (2030) Return Scenario

2010 Total P.A. 4048.5 Total P.A.+ Israel 11512.6 2020 Total P.A. 4887.3 Total P.A.+ Israel 13515.6 2030 Total P.A. 7201.4

W.B. Population (thousands) Water Needs (mcm) Basic domestic demand- 1st priority Environmental needs Peripheral farming Sub Total 2nd priority Domestic demand Agricultural demand Other demands Sub total 3rd priority Total demand 2486.6

Gaza 1561.9

Israel 7464.1

W.B. 2958.2

Gaza 1929.1

Israel 8628.3

W.B. 4877.9

Gaza 2323.5

Israel 9856.7

T P. Is

17

149.2 12.0 209.0 221.0 0.0 27.4 21.0 48.4 418.6

93.7 5.0 129.0 134.0 0.0 11.8 10.5 22.3 250.0

242.9 17.0 338.0 355.0 0.0 39.2 31.5 70.7 668.6

447.8 65.0 120.0 185.0 332.2 987.0 124.9 1444.0 2076.9

690.8 82.0 458.0 540.0 332.2 1026.2 156.4 1514.7 2745.5

177.5 12.0 209.0 221.0 0.0 32.0 25.0 57.0 455.5

115.7 5.0 129.0 134.0 0.0 14.0 12.5 26.5 276.2

293.2 17.0 338.0 355.0 0.0 46.0 37.5 83.5 731.7

517.7 65.0 120.0 185.0 384.0 987.0 144.4 1515.3 2218.0

810.9 82.0 458.0 540.0 384.0 1033.0 181.9 1598.8 2949.7

292.7 12.0 209.0 221.0 0.0 53.0 46.0 99.0 612.7

139.4 5.0 129.0 134.0 0.0 23.0 15.0 38.0 311.4

432.1 17.0 338.0 355.0 0.0 76.0 61.0 137.0 924.1

591.4 65.0 120.0 185.0 438.6 987.0 164.9 1590.5 2366.9

41

7. The Water Balances

The implications of the different definitions of needs for the Israeli-Palestinian case require that the demand scenarios developed in section 6 be compared to the available water resources, as described in section 5. However, not all needs and demands can be supplied from all sources. Some of the needs and demands, namely domestic use has stricter quality restrictions than other uses. Also environmental needs may have particular quality constraints, as various aquatic ecosystems are sensitive to water quality. Moreover, in making the comparisons we need to take into account the different priorities that were outlined.

In order to address these limitations three balances were calculated for every scenario: Balance 1: Natural fresh water minus the basic domestic need. This balance comes to address the question whether there is enough freshwater to supply the basic domestic need. Balance 2: Natural fresh water + Brackish water minus priorities 1 and 2. That is, whether there is sufficient natural water (fresh plus brackish) that can supply the basic domestic needs environmental needs and peripheral farming needs. It can be argued that peripheral farming needs can also be supplied by recycled wastewater. But as the water for peripheral farming is needed is by definition in peripheral areas, it is highly unlikely that there will be a source for wastewater to recycle in these areas.4 Balance 3: Total availability minus total demand. That is, whether there is sufficient water (including wastewater recycling) to supply all the demands whether needs or economic demand without sea water desalination.

One of the climatic features of the south-Eastern Mediterranean region is the prevalence of droughts, and particularly series of repeated drought years (Amiran, 1994). Thus, it can be argued that the average water yield is not the correct criterion against which to balance the water demand and needs. This is particularly true when a need approach is taken, as it is implicitly assumed that needs are inflexible and hence have to be supplied, from a normative perspective, in all years, including in the
4

The Gaza strip is somewhat of an exception to this assumption as there are urban concentrations near al parts of the strip, and thus potentially there can be sufficient recycled wastewater for farming in all parts of the Gaza strip. This issue is picked up later in the discussion of the results.

42

tail end of a series of drought years. To account for this two sensitivity analyses were undertaken. The first assumed that the annual recharge is 20% lower than average and the second that the annual recharge is 40% less than average. These sensitivity analyses may also account for climate change. While it is still uncertain what will be the exact implications of climate change for precipitation levels in the southeastern part of the Mediterranean, it seems that the intervals between rain episodes will increase, thereby reducing replenishment rate to the aquifers (Golan-Engelico, 2008). Thus, in taking a long term view a sensitivity analyses with lesser available freshwater recharge is warranted for climate change reasons too.

As the goal of this study is to facilitate water agreements and not replace negotiations, the balances calculated here should be viewed as initial sensitivity analyses whose purpose is to identify issues that should be addressed if needs are to be supplied. Hence, for the purpose of this analysis the average yield of the Eastern and Northeastern mountain aquifers was divided in two between the parties. While this implies more water for Palestinians on the West Bank than is available today, it does not imply what the actual allocation will or should be. Rather, this division is used for the research purposes only as a benchmark to assess how much water is needed to supply the normative needs of Palestinians and Israelis, relative to these arbitrary amounts.5 As the Gaza Strip relies largely on the aquifer beneath it, its needs under the different scenarios are compared to the average yield of this aquifer.

In Table 11 the three balances for the four scenarios assuming an average multi-year recharge rate are presented for Israel, the West Bank and Gaza. Minus signs (and bolded figures) portray situations in which the needs and demands included in the particular balance exceed the supply, and thus water augmentation is necessary to fulfill the needs and demands.

The results in Table 11 show that Israel and the West Bank can meet the normative domestic basic need under all scenarios, except in the returnees' scenarios in 2030. That is, if there is a return of refugees there it will be necessary to augment existing

The division used hereby does not imply therefore what the allocations or rights might or should be.

43

water supplies by 2030 in order to meet the normative domestic needs as defined in this study.

The case of Gaza is different. It cannot meet the normative basic domestic needs under all scenarios. Moreover, it cannot even meet current Palestinian consumption levels (scenario 1). Thus, Gaza will require additional water, largely through sea water desalination, under all scenarios and soon.

44

Table 11: Summary of Water Balances in mcm with Average Net Recharge Balance 1 197.9 -6.5 191.4 918.4 1109.8 130.8 -48.7 82.1 918.4 1000.4 130.8 -48.7 82.1 918.4 1000.4 130.8 -48.7 82.1 918.4 1000.4 130.8 -48.7 82.1 918.4 1000.4 2010 Balance 2 36.9 -135.5 -98.6 892.2 793.6 -30.2 -177.7 -207.9 892.2 684.2 21.3 -146.9 -125.6 892.2 766.5 -30.2 -177.7 -207.9 892.2 684.2 -30.2 -177.7 -207.9 892.2 684.2 Balance 3 -6.1 -158.0 -164.1 -212.8 -376.9 -73.2 -200.2 -273.4 -212.8 -486.2 -74.2 -202.2 -276.4 -212.8 -489.2 -73.6 -200.0 -273.6 -212.8 -486.4 -73.6 -200.0 -273.6 -212.8 -486.4 Balance 1 182.4 -18.7 163.7 848.5 1012.2 102.5 -70.7 31.8 848.5 880.3 102.5 -70.7 31.8 848.5 880.3 79.7 -70.7 9.0 848.5 857.5 102.5 -70.7 31.8 848.5 880.3 2020 Balance 2 21.4 -147.7 -126.3 822.3 696.0 -58.5 -199.7 -258.2 822.3 564.1 -7.0 -168.9 -175.9 822.3 646.4 -81.3 -199.7 -281.0 822.3 541.3 -58.5 -199.7 -258.2 822.3 564.1 Balance 3 -5.6 -154.2 -159.8 -198.9 -358.7 -85.5 -206.2 -291.7 -198.9 -490.6 -145.7 -246.8 -392.5 -198.9 -591.4 -115.3 -208.2 -323.5 -198.9 -522.4 -85.5 -206.2 -291.7 -198.9 -490.6 Balance 1 166.8 -31.7 135.1 774.8 909.9 74.2 -94.4 -20.2 774.8 754.6 74.2 -94.4 -20.2 774.8 754.6 19.5 -94.4 -74.9 774.8 699.9 -12.7 -94.4 -107.1 774.8 667.7 2030 Balance 2 5.8 -160.7 -154.9 748.6 593.7 -86.8 -223.4 -310.2 748.6 438.4 -35.3 -192.2 -227.9 748.6 520.7 -141.5 -223.4 -364.9 748.6 383.7 -173.7 -223.4 -397.1 748.6 351.5 Balance 3 -22.2 -162.7 -184.9 -254.7 -439.6 -114.8 -225.4 -340.2 -254.7 -594.9 -253.0 -320.4 -573.3 -254.7 -828.1 -184.5 -229.4 -413.9 -254.7 -668.6 -232.7 -231.4 -464.1 -254.7 -718.8

Scenario 1

Scenario 2

Scenario 3

Scenario 4a

Scenario 4b

W.B. Gaza P.A. Israel Total W.B. Gaza P.A. Israel Total W.B. Gaza P.A. Israel Total W.B. Gaza P.A. Israel Total W.B. Gaza P.A. Israel Total

45

Balance 2 examines whether the addition of environmental and peripheral farming needs changes the picture that is, can the total normative needs identified in section 4 (both priority 1 and priority 2) be supplied on the basis of net average recharge of freshwater and brackish water.

The results in Table 11 suggest that while Israel can meet all the normative needs (balance 2) for the whole time horizon (until 2030) Palestinians in the West Bank can meet them only under scenario 3 until 2020.6 From 2020 onward these normative needs cannot be supplied in the West Bank under the arbitrary division assumed. As the environmental needs identified in the West Bank are very small, this gap between normative needs and availability is largely a result of the large amount seen as necessary for peripheral farming in the West Bank. Thus, while it is possible to meet also all the environmental needs (both within Israel and in the West Bank), it is impossible to meet all the peripheral farming needs in the West Bank. The situation in Gaza is of course much direr. Yet, in contrast to the West Bank and Israel, there are significant close by sources of wastewater in the Gaza Strip. Hence, in the Gaza Strip the peripheral farming gap can be conceivably addressed by wastewater recycling.

Table 11 also shows that under all scenarios the economic demands (balance 3) cannot be fully met without augmentation, even in Israel. Thus, it seems that

augmentation of water will be needed by all parties and for all parts of the region if also the economic demand is to be met.

In Tables 12-13 the results of the sensitivity analyses are shown for the three balances for 2010, 2020 and 2030. As can be expected the results described in Table 11, which constitute the three left columns in Tables 12-13, present a more optimistic picture than in the likely situations where recharge is beneath the net multi-year average. That is, the ability to meet the various needs when the yield is below the multi-year average is much more constrained.

Balance 2 is positive for the Palestinians also under scenario 1. However, in this scenario the Palestinians do not receive the full basic domestic need.

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Table 12: Balance 1 Sensitivity Analyses Average Recharge 2010 2020 2030 W.B. Gaza P.A. Israel Total W.B. Gaza P.A. Israel Total W.B. Gaza P.A. Israel Total W.B. Gaza P.A. Israel Total W.B. Gaza P.A. Israel Total
197.9 -6.5 191.4 918.4 1109.8 130.8 -48.7 82.1 918.4 1000.4 130.8 -48.7 82.1 918.4 1000.4 130.8 -48.7 82.1 918.4 1000.4 130.8 -48.7 82.1 918.4 1000.4 182.4 -18.7 163.7 848.5 1012.2 102.5 -70.7 31.8 848.5 880.3 102.5 -70.7 31.8 848.5 880.3 79.7 -70.7 9.0 848.5 857.5 102.5 -70.7 31.8 848.5 880.3 166.8 -31.7 135.1 774.8 909.9 74.2 -94.4 -20.2 774.8 754.6 74.2 -94.4 -20.2 774.8 754.6 19.5 -94.4 -74.9 774.8 699.9 -12.7 -94.4 -107.1 774.8 667.7

Average Recharge 20% 2010 2020 2030

141.9 -15.5 126.4 645.1 771.5 74.8 -57.7 17.1 645.1 662.2 74.8 -57.7 17.1 645.1 662.2 74.8 -57.714 17.1 645.1 662.2 74.8 -57.7 17.1 645.1 662.2 126.4 -27.7 98.7 575.3 674.0 46.5 -79.7 -33.2 575.3 542.0 46.5 -79.7 -33.2 575.3 542.0 23.7 -79.7 -56.0 575.3 519.2 46.5 -79.7 -33.2 575.3 542.0 110.8 -40.7 70.1 501.6 571.7 18.2 -103.4 -85.2 501.6 416.4 18.2 -103.4 -85.2 501.6 416.4 -36.5 -103.4 -139.9 501.6 361.6 -68.7 -103.4 -172.1 501.6 329.5

Average Recharge 40% 2010 2020 2030

85.9 -24.5 61.4 371.9 433.3 18.8 -66.7 -47.9 371.9 324.0 18.8 -66.7 -47.9 371.9 324.0 18.8 -66.7 -47.9 371.9 324.0 18.8 -66.7 -47.9 371.9 324.0 70.4 -36.7 33.7 302.0 335.7 -9.5 -88.7 -98.2 302.0 203.8 -9.5 -88.7 -98.2 302.0 203.8 -32.3 -88.7 -121.0 302.0 181.0 -9.5 -88.7 -98.2 302.0 203.8 54.8 -49.7 5.1 228.3 233.5 -37.8 -122.4 -150.2 228.3 78.1 -37.8 -112.4 -150.2 228.3 78.1 -92.5 -112.4 -204.9 228.3 23.4 -124.7 -112.4 -237.1 228.3 -8.8

Scenario 1

Scenario 2

Scenario 3

Scenario 4a

Scenario 4b

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Table 13: Balance 2 Sensitivity Analyses Average Recharge 2010 2020 2030 W.B. 36.9 21.4 5.8 Gaza -135.5 -147.7 -160.7 Scenario 1 P.A. -98.6 -126.3 -154.9 Israel 892.2 822.3 748.6 Total 793.6 696.0 593.7 W.B. -30.2 -58.5 -86.8 Gaza -177.7 -199.7 -223.4 Scenario 2 P.A. -207.9 -258.2 -310.2 Israel 892.2 822.32 748.6
Total 684.2 21.3 -146.9 -125.6 892.2 766.5 -30.2 -177.7 -207.9 892.2 684.2 -30.2 -177.7 -207.9 892.2 684.2 564.1 -7.0 -168.9 -175.9 822.3 646.4 -81.3 -199.7 -281.0 822.3 541.3 -58.5 -199.7 -258.2 822.3 564.1 438.4 -35.3 -192.3 -227.9 748.6 520.7 -141.5 -223.4 -364.9 748.6 383.7 -173.7 -223.4 -397.1 748.6 351.5

Average Recharge 20% 2010 2020 2030

-19.1 -144.5 -163.6 618.9 455.3 -86.2 -186.7 -272.9 618.9 346.0 -34.7 -155.9 -190.6 618.9 428.3 -86.2 -186.7 -272.9 618.9 346.0 -86.2 -186.7 -272.9 618.9 346.0 -34.6 -156.7 -191.3 549.1 357.8 -114.5 -208.7 -323.2 549.1 225.8 -63.0 -177.9 -240.9 549.1 308.1 -137.3 -208.7 -346.0 549.1 203.0 -114.5 -208.7 -323.2 549.1 225.8 -50.2 -169.7 -219.9 475.4 255.5 -142.8 -232.4 -375.2 475.4 100.2 -91.3 -201.6 -292.9 475.4 182.5 -197.5 -232.4 -429.9 475.4 45.4 -229.7 -232.4 -462.1 475.4 13.3

Average Recharge 40% 2010 2020 2030

-75.1 -153.5 -228.6 345.7 117.1 -142.2 -195.7 -337.9 345.7 7.8 -90.7 -164.9 -255.6 345.7 90.1 -142.2 -195.7 -337.9 345.7 7.8 -142.2 -195.7 -337.9 345.7 7.8 -90.6 -165.7 -256.3 275.87 19.5 -170.5 -217.7 -388.2 275.87 -112.4 -119.0 -186.9 -305.9 275.87 -30.1 -193.3 -217.7 -411.0 275.87 -135.2 -170.5 -217.7 -388.2 275.87 -112.4 -106.2 -178.7 -284.9 202.1 -82.7 -198.8 -241.4 -440.2 202.1 -238.1 -147.3 -210.6 -357.9 202.1 -155.8 -253.5 -241.4 -494.9 202.1 -292.8 -285.7 -241.4 -527.1 202.1 -325.0

Scenario 3

W.B. Gaza P.A. Israel

Total

Scenario 4a

Scenario 4b

W.B. Gaza P.A. Israel Total W.B. Gaza P.A. Israel Total

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As can be seen in Table 12 the basic domestic needs can be met overall (that is when Israelis, Palestinians and all water resources are combined) even in extreme drought situations, except in the case of returnees in 2030. In the West Bank the basic domestic needs cannot be supplied by 2020 in the case of a 40% decline in net recharge, and in the cases of a 20% decline with returnees (scenarios 4a and 4b) under the arbitrary allocation assumed. Not surprisingly the Gaza Strip cannot meet the basic domestic needs under any scenario from 2010 onward, even when the average recharge is maintained.

In Table 13 it can be seen that the West Bank cannot meet the second priority needs under all scenarios in drought situations, even in 2010. Israel, in contrast, can supply all the normative needs, including second priority needs under the assumed arbitrary allocations, even in extreme droughts. However, the total amount of fresh and

brackish water is insufficient to meet all the first and second priority needs of both Israelis and Palestinians by 2020 if annual recharge drops by 40%. That is, under such severe circumstances even reallocation from Israel to the Palestinians will not suffice to meet those needs. In the case of a 20% decline the total amount of water west of the Jordan River may suffice, except for scenarios with returnees.

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8. Conclusions and Policy Implications

Water is a necessity for life. Water is also necessary to maintain ecological services and as a base for sustenance. These widely agreed-upon insights can serve as a departure point for addressing water conflicts in general, and in the Israeli-Palestinian case in particular. By identifying the minimal needs necessary for a high level of human and economic development, the minimal environmental needs and the minimal amounts needed to assure an adequate standard of living to those farmers that have no alternative means for sustenance; we advance herein a new approach for allocating water and addressing the needs of both people.

The use of water can be divided into needs and demands. Needs are those uses for which there is no substitute and should normatively be supplied, regardless of the ability to pay. Demand is the use of water that constitutes something people, farmers or business want, but is not normatively justified. Hence, demands should be supplied in principle according the willingness to pay the social marginal cost of supply (that is, including the externality costs). The needs can be prioritized into two levels. The top priority (priority 1 in our tables) is the minimal domestic need. Based on a modification of the Maltese example, this need, defined as the minimal amount of water needed for a high level of human and economic development, was set at 60 m3/c/yr. This amount can be seen as universally applicable, at least in arid and semiarid regions. The second priority constitutes of three needs, only two of which are meaningful in the Israeli-Palestinian case. These are the minimal flows needed to sustain ecological systems (termed environmental needs), the cultural needs of various societies and the minimal amounts of water needed to sustain farming in areas where farmers have no alternative sources of livelihood (a need which may change as a function of social and economic developments). In contrast to the basic domestic needs these needs are highly sensitive to local circumstances and hence should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. In the Israeli-Palestinian case cultural needs are minute, and thus were not quantified in this study.

These three normative needs were assessed in the Israeli-Palestinian case in four basic scenarios for three time periods (2010, 2020 and 2030). The first was a reference 51

scenario, which assumed that current domestic use per capita is maintained. The second assumed that the normative needs will be supplied. The third assumed that with peace there will be rapid economic growth also in the Palestinian areas, and that the normative needs be supplied. The fourth, assumed a return of Palestinian

refugees, mainly to the West Bank, in two sub-scenarios differing in the timing and extent of return. The water implications of these scenarios were compared to the water sources available for Israelis and Palestinians combined. The basic domestic needs were compared to the average annual yield of freshwater resources while the total normative needs (basic domestic, environmental and peripheral farming) were compared to the average annual yield of freshwater and brackish water. In order to take into account likely extended droughts and the possibility of climatic changes two sensitivity analyses were also carried our. One assumed that the average annual yield will decline by 20% and the second that it will decline by 40%.

The analyses show that the basic domestic need can be supplied in Israel and the West Bank under all scenarios. However, suitable investments are needed by 2030 to supply the new returnees with the basic domestic need as identified above. Under prolonged drought, however, the West Bank will not be able to provide the normative needs already in 2020 under the assumed reallocation. Thus, there is justification to augment water to the West Bank to alleviate drought situations. In contrast, the resources underneath the Gaza Strip cannot meet even the basic domestic need under any scenario. Hence, there is a need for augmentation for the Gaza Strip regardless of ability to pay and scenario. The direct policy implication of this finding is that there is justification for donor-funded desalination of seawater in Gaza already today.

Both Gaza and the West Bank cannot meet the combination of priority 1 and priority 2 needs under all scenarios. This is largely due to the relatively large amounts of water needed for peripheral farming in both areas. Paradoxically, the problem in this case is more severe in the West Bank, as in Gaza peripheral farming can conceivably receive recycled wastewater (and if desalination is introduced, there will be also more wastewater to recycle). Hence, it seems that there is place to differentiate between the various priority 2 needs. Essentially, environmental needs are small and can be

51

supplied under most of the scenarios in which priority 1 is met.7 Thus, from a policy perspective the question of environmental needs should be separated from that of peripheral farming. It seems that the aforementioned policy recommendations should be extended to include the supply of environmental needs (excluding the lower Jordan River), as these will not affect the overall water planning substantially.

The issue of peripheral farming, in contrast, requires additional deliberations. In particular there is place to discuss whether the continuation of farming in peripheral areas merits additional desalination and/or upgrading and long-distance conveyance of recycled water.8 This question is a normative question, as it essentially asks to what extent is society ready to pay a higher cost for water in order to maintain the livelihood of farmers in peripheral areas? This question should be posed to decision makers and opened for public discussion, and hence at this point the research team does not make any recommendations regarding the extent to which desalination or other augmentation schemes should be undertaken in order to supply this need. However, the entire agriculture demand was not part of the scope of this study as the choice of future types and size of agriculture will be driven by several issues such as socioeconomic factors, economical integration at the regional level, climate change and land use policies.

The calculations mentioned in this report are based on the premise that each society has to give a priority to basic domestic needs and less for agriculture needs. Concurrently, both parties should be encouraged to reduce the dependency of agriculture on fresh water. The revisiting of water use in agriculture sector is recommended and encouraged within the context of each society.

On the basis of these observations several policy implications can be drawn in conclusion: 1. Israel and the Palestinians should seek to augment supply, most likely through desalination on the Mediterranean shore, to assure the provision of basic
7

The exceptions are those scenarios which are just above the break-even point, such as scenario 4a for 2020 when annual recharge is 20% below average or scenarios 2-4 for 2030 when recharge is 40% below average. 8 It should be noted that it is unlikely that desalinated seawater will serve directly for irrigation in the peripheral areas. Rather they will serve municipal areas further west, thereby releasing existing water sources for this agriculture.

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domestic needs and environmental needs also under prolonged drought conditions (that is, a multi-year drought). 2. If and when a return of refugees is considered it is necessary to consider water augmentations schemes in order to provide the basic domestic needs to all the population. These should be an integral part of any return program. 3. The Gaza Strip needs immediate augmentation through sea water desalination in order to meet the normative basic domestic needs, even in the short run. 4. The desalination needed to supply basic domestic needs merits subsidization. It should not be based on ability to pay considerations. In contrast, the

desalination that is needed to supply demands above the normative basic domestic need (whether by households, businesses or farmers) should be supplied only if the users are willing to pay the marginal social cost of desalination. These include the environmental externalities of desalination. 5. There is a need to provide water for agriculture in peripheral areas to maintain the livelihood of farmers who have not alternative source of livelihood. The question how this should be handled, and what is the level to which society is willing to subsidize this provision requires further deliberations. Also this should be taken within the socioeconomic conditions in each side.

The question how the needs identified here and the policy recommendations made above are going to be addressed requires coordination between the parties. Hence, in order to implement the needs based approach advanced here it is necessary also to strengthen the institutions coordinating water planning and supply between the parties.9

It is our hope that the combination of the needs based approach advanced herein and the policy recommendations resulting from it, with the institutional development needed to implement these recommendations will help turn the water issues from a source of contention to a basis for cooperation.

For some directions on possible ways to strengthen these institutions, see Haddad et al. (2001).

53

References

Allan T., 2001, The Middle East Water Question: Hydropolitics and the Global Economy, I.B. Tauris, London. Amiran David H.K., 1995, Rainfall and Water Management in Semi-Arid Climates: Israel as en example.The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, Jerusalem. Biswas A.K., 2007, Water as a juman right in the MENA region: Challenges and opportunities, International Journal of Water Resources Development 23, 209-225. Brooks D., 2007, Human rights to water in North Africa and the Middle East: What is new and what is not; what is important and what is not, International Journal of Water Resources Development 23 227-241. Chenoweth J., 2008, Minimum water requirements for social and economic development, Desalination 229, 245-256. Dellapenna J., 2008, The Berlin Rules on water resources: The new paradigm for international water law, 13th IWRA World Water Congress, Montpellier, 1-4 Sept. EMWATER Project Group, 2004, Prospects of Efficient Management and Water Reuse in Palestine, Institute for Water Studies, Birzeit University, West Bank, Palestine. Glieck P., 1996, Basic water requirements for human activities: Meeting basic needs, Water International 21, 83-92. Haddad M., Feitelson E., Arlosoroff S. and Nasseredin T., 2001, A proposed agenda for Israeli-Palestinian management of shared groundwater, in: E. Feitelson and M. Haddad (eds) Management of Shared Groundwater Resources: The IsraeliPalestinian Case with an International Perspective, Kluwer. Irujo A.E., 2007, The right to water, International Journal of Water Resources Development 23, 267-283. Shuval H., 1992, Approaches to Resolving the Water Conflicts Between Israel and her Neighbors - A Regional Water-for-Peace Plan, Water International, 17, 122-143. Wolf A., 1999, Criteria for equitable allocation: The heart of international water conflict, Natural Resources Forum 23, 3-30.

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Appendices

55

Appendix 1: The participants in the Geneva workshop, 2-4 May 2008

International Workshop "Defining Water Needs for Fully Exploited Resources; a Necessary Step for Israeli-Palestinian Reconciliation", Geneva, Switzerland, 2 4 May 2008

A. Participants Palestinian team members & Experts:

Dr. Abdelrahman S.M. Alamarah, Director General, Palestinian Hydrology Group Dr. Amer M.M. Sawalha, El-Quds University Dr. Ayman Ismail Ibrhaim Rabi, Palestinian Hydrology Group Mohammed Ayman J.M. Jarrar, Palestinian Water Authority

Dr. Nidal Saleem, Swiss water researcher Israeli Team members & Experts
Prof. Eran Feitelson, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Prof. Richard Laster, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Dr. Amos Bein, The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies Gadi Rosenthal, KivunStrategy, Economics and Business Prof. Avital Gasith, Tel Aviv University Dr. Itay Fischhendler, Department of Geography, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

56

Experts from the USA

Dr. Peter Gleick, Director, Pacific Institute for Studies in Development, Environment and Security Prof. David Eaton, LBJ School of Public Affairs, The University of Texas at Austin Prof. Joseph Dellapenna, Villanova University Prof. Aaron Wolf, Oregon State University

Experts from Europe

Dr. Jonathan Chenoweth, Surrey University, UK Dr. Esteban Castro, School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, Newcastle University, UK Dr. Pedro Arrojo-Agudo, University of Zaragoza, Spain Dr. Francois Molle, Institut de Recherche pour le Dveloppement, France Dr. Undala Alam, Cranfield University

Representative of the Peres Center for Peace

Prof. Samuel Pohoryles, Director, The Andreas Agricultural Development Trust, Deputy Director General, The Peres Center for Peace

Representative of The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies

Prof. Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, Head of The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies

Coordinators
Oren Blonder, The Peres Center for Peace Galit Hazan, The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies Eng. Maha F. Z. Issa, The Palestinian Team

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B. Schedule

International Workshop Defining Water Needs for Fully Exploited Resources Friday, 2 May Sunday, 4 May 2008 Palais des Nations and Hotel Warwick, Geneva, Switzerland Preliminary Program

Friday, 2 May 2008 Arrival Day and Opening Ceremony

Opening ceremony and welcome addresses Dinner with the workshop participants Saturday, 3 May 2008 Day One 09:00 a.m. 10:00 a.m. 1. Greetings and Background Dr Bertrand Charrier Dr Abed Al Rahman Tamimi Prof Samuel Pohoryles Prof Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov Prof Eran Feitelson, Setting the Scene 10:00 a.m. 11:30 a.m. 2. Basic Water Needs Dr Peter Gleick Dr Franois Molle, The Unstable Nature of Water Needs: Spatial, Temporal and Social Discontinuities Discussion: What should be included in basic/domestic needs? Chair: Dr Abed Al Rahman Tamimi Coffee Break 12:00 p.m. 13:30 p.m. 3. Needs in a Historical Legal and International Context Prof Aaron Wolf, Water Needs in International Agreements Prof Joseph Dellapenna, Water Needs in International Law Discussion: What are the limitations of the legal consensus? Chair: Prof Richard Laster Lunch Break 14:30 p.m. 16:00 p.m.

58

4. Economic and Societal Needs Dr Jonathan Chenoweth, Minimum Water Requirements for Social and Economic Development Dr Pedro Arrojo-Agudo Discussion: Which economic activities, if any, should be considered as needs? Chair: Dr Franois Molle Coffee Break 16:30 p.m. 18:30 p.m. 5. What Should Be the Role of Markets and Ability to Pay in Determining Needs? Dr Esteban Castro Dr Undala Alam Gadi Rosenthal Discussion: Economics, ethics and needs Chair: Prof David Eaton Dinner Sunday, 4 May 2008 Day Two 09:00 a.m. 10:30 a.m. 6. Water Needs of Nature Prof Avital Gasith, Water Needs for Nature Protecting Nature's Services to Human Society Under Conditions of Water Scarcity Discussion: How should minimal requirements for nature be defined in water scarce settings? Chair: Dr Bertrand Charrier Coffee Break 11:00 a.m. 13:00 p.m. 7. Needs Culture and Society Prof David Eaton, Human Needs, Hydrology, History and Water Rights Dr Itay Fischhendler, The Role of Uncertainties in Determining Water Needs Discussion: Should societies be differed when discussing needs? Chair: Prof Aaron Wolf Lunch Break 14:30 p.m. 16:00 p.m. 8. Summary by Prof Eran Feitelson: What Have we Learned? Open discussion Coffee Break 16:30 p.m. 18:00 p.m. 9. Concluding Discussion: Implications for Israeli-Palestinian Setting

59

Appendix 2: A summary of the discussions in the Geneva workshop

International Workshop
Defining Water Needs for Fully Exploited Resources Friday, 2 May Sunday, 4 May 2008 1. GREETINGS AND BACKGROUND Palais des Nations and Hotel Warwick, Geneva, Switzerland The Greetings and welcome addresses were given by Dr. Bertrand Charrier, vice president of Green Cross international, Dr. Abed Al Rahman Tamimi from Palestinian Hydrology group, Oren blonder on behalf of Pr. Samuel Pohoryles of Peres Center for Peace, Pr. Yaacov Bar-Siman-tov of Jerusalem Institute for Israelis Studies, and Pr. Eran Feitelson of Hebrew University. The main elements are presented in the article of Bertrand Charrier Water needs approach in Middle East.

1.1.1 2 BASIC WATER NEEDS

Dr. Francois Molle: The Unstable Nature of Water Needs: Spatial, Temporal and Social Discontinuities There is a basic biophysical requirement of needs. These derive certain quantitative minimum values that can vary from 68L/day in Malta, for example, to 1200 L/day in Las Vegas. In these two settings people refer to domestic needs as a social construction. These can derive from differed irrigation situations, cultural habits and wealth. Here, however, there is a tight correlation between needs and supply where increased supply leads to a variability in what is perceived as a need. The regulations for need are also controlled through prices and available water technologies that regulate demand. The regulations for these are humanly designed where technological possibilities largely contribute to availability and thus demand. Uses and wealth impact on needs which are also influenced by the available technology. While these needs impact on demand and are regulated by price, the availability is affected by actual supply as determined by available infrastructure and distribution and allocation. These, in turn, also impact on needs, thus 61

demonstrating the impact of context on determining water needs. There is a core need, which are viewed as human rights to water and are generally perceived of as being 50L/day. The second is home food production where there is no economic substitute for irrigated agriculture. These core needs also change depending on where the point of analysis is taken. For example, a farmer would perceive of differing water needs than another individual in society. However, a difficulty arises where aggregating up to societal needs is difficult since contexts and positions determining needs vary greatly. Needs and availability also differ within special discontinuities where analysis of water needs, based on varying availabilities, depending on the size of the region considered, will result in different conceptions of need formation. Furthermore, needs vary with time where varied needs depending on temporal requirements can imply a varied understanding of availability. Implications for the debate: Beware of simplistic indicators: they don't consider differences in context, quality, uses and scales World Water Assessment Program: scarcity as "the condition of insufficient water of satisfactory quality and quantity to meet human and environmental needs" : not a very operational definition. Water use is partly a social construct with economic and political dimensions (Malta vs. Las Vegas) and cannot be separated from supply Core domestic needs (human right) and water for food production are "special" because of food security and livelihood security issues. In areas with fully committed resources, allocation is the central issue. Allocation is always highly contested (whatever mechanism is used) and as such is inherently political. The definition of water "needs" at different scales (eventually supply and allocation) reflects the governance regime. Whether the outcome of the process is perceived as legitimate, efficient, fair or equitable depends on how democratic and inclusive the process is.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Tamimi: These considerations are important and determining indicators is a task that needs to be outlined within the greater project. Also, water for food production and determining sustainable levels for irrigation are important. Economic activities differ among communities and we must be aware of the impact of allocation on these differences and how we define needs based on different economic situations.

61

Dr. Fischendler: The terming of Las Vegas water use is not based on need but rather on consumption. Consumption should not be an indicator of need. Dr. Molle: However, it is used as an economic argument that the decision to use water in this way has the most productive economic impact and thus, is a need of the community. Dr. Robinson: A way to shift concept of needs is through education. Furthermore, the impact of energy can also shift conceptualizations of need. Energy uses can both define and create new problems and solutions regarding water needs. Dr. Molle: This points again to the idea that technological availability and innovation have a large impact on conceptualizations of need. Dr. Salim: Effects of climate change must also be considered in their impacts on the economic availability of water. Dr. Arrojo-Agudo: Environmental impacts of an economic determination of needs usually take a toll on the most vulnerable populations regarding water allocation and these populations must be the most considered ones in our analysis. Environment should therefore be moved closer to the core. Dr. Alam: The use of water as an input should be considered rather than water as an output because what we are focused on are the uses of water for food production, energy, economic growth etc. Water is not simply an economic input and we should focus on the input. Pr. Wolf: A focus on needs should be on one of survival. Human beings, animals and ecosystems need a basic level of water that is critical for survival. Further, what is the end of the definition of need? Is it for a political decision on economic activity? An international agreement? Dr. Tamimi: Need is a must while demand is broader and a wish. Allocation is a capacity to allocate. Dr. Charrier: There are certain universal principles of the core, as expressed by Pr. Wolf. Constant biological survival and sustainable development. It should be a priority of governments to have this basic allocation. This includes a right to sanitation and basic human needs. Dr. Castro: What is basic is determined by cultural needs. Dr. Gasith: Water needs are psychologically determined, even for immigrants who are used to certain types of lifestyles. Economic and energy availabilities can determine the possibilities of needs but at base, these are individually and psychologically determined by societies. Pr. Feitelson: A focus on vulnerable population however needs cannot simply be defined as drinking water otherwise it would be closed. What is not needs 62

based can be substituted, then we can talk about demands and broader concepts. Dr. Castro: These decisions and impacts are all highly political.

3. NEEDS IN A HISTORICAL LEGAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

Pr. Aaron Wolf: Water Needs in International Agreements Water needs within shared basins are particularly difficult to determine because of the existence of borders. Solutions need to be politically viable and because of this, concepts of rights and needs change due to political realities in transboundary basins. In order to arrive at politically viable solutions, uncomplicated agreements must be reached. An analysis of 3,600 water related treaties from 805-1997 are analyzed to determine negotiating notes over transboundary water resources. While legal instruments have recently emerged to guide water agreements towards norms of equitable utilization, prior notification and a principle of no harm, as enshrined in the 1997 UN Conventions, legal principles regarding such treaties are rather flexible. Fixed quantities according to allocations are only included in 73 treaties and within these, irrigation and hydropower considerations, which are not thoroughly explained, are used to justify amounts. Wolf puts forward a framework for developing criteria of water allocations. This initial position of allocations is rights based where geography and chronology of prior use are used to determine allocations. Then are Interim, needs based positions. Final agreements concern parties interests and identification of baskets of benefits (economic, needs and other types of bargaining) and finally, implementation where an equitable distribution of benefits is achieved. Treaties and agreements that focused on needs have been varied throughout history. They Egypt/Sudan treaty of 1959 employed a concept of acquired rights while the 1956 Johnston Plan assigned needs based on amounts of irrigable land in the watershed of the relevant states. Within the Johnston plan, after water was allocated, the states were able to do with it as they pleased. While this concept has evolved greatly over time, the concept of the use of international allocations as an internal issue, has persisted. One concept of basic needs can be found in the Murray Darling; South African Rivers treaty which notes minimum basic human and ecosystem needs as fixed with a market mechanism used to determine further needs. In determining needs, a concept of unequal priorities has emerged where domestic and sanitary uses are viewed, nearly universally, as the most basic and principle needs. Following these basic needs, priorities follow generally a similar conception of Maslows hierarchy of needs. 63

However, while allocation has been considered in determining needs within treaties, water quality has been largely left out of negotiations. Furthermore, the determination of needs, instead of a concept of rights is a profound transformative movement as the implications can shift understandings of equitable use and can introduce other environmental and social concerns in determining allocations, rather than simply political ones. Also, conceptions of equity change when considering needs as simple solutions to equity problems, such as financial grants, become more complicated as social and spiritual needs can enter into equity solutions. The move from rights, to needs, to interests and then to equity correspond to varying levels of cooperation over transboundary resources. As equity is pursued, cooperation becomes more meaningful and perceptible. Further, Maslows hierarchy proves to be useful in determining basic needs that must also include ecosystem needs.

In conclusion, needs in treaties are simple, understandable and politically viable. These needs can be used as a negotiating strategy within political negotiations. Clear allocations with conflict resolution and enforcement mechanisms allow for sovereignty in addressing internal politics. Defining basic human and ecosystem needs provides minimum and allows for flexibility above these levels. Pr. Joseph Dellapenna - Water Needs in International Law Even if not ensuring strict rules, international law is helpful in the sense that they provide guidelines for international dispute settlement and are thus invaluable to solving transboundary water conflicts. International Law should be seen as a process. While there are dispute settlement mechanisms and bodies, these are still limited in their use. The overarching source of international law is derived from customary international law where a consistent practice of states comes to be seen to have opinio juris or a sense of legal obligation. These senses of legal obligation provide legal arrangements for international cooperation over water. In terms of water law, only riparians have a claim to transboundary waters, disputes are solved through a process of claim and counter-claim and these are usually solved through a negotiated solution. The principles of sovereignty, equitable utilization and absolute riverine integrity have thus far come to be overarching principles of international water law.

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Codification: Within international water law, rights have been traditionally recognized as a function needs. International water law has been principally codified under the 1966 Helsinki Rules, that focused upon equitable utilization, and the 1997 UN Convention, that related this first principle with a no harm rule. However, these failed to incorporate other areas of law such as international environmental law, human rights law, humanitarian law and paradigms of joint, basin-wide management. In order to account for these shortcomings, the International Law Commission agreed to the 2004 Berlin Rules that sought to incorporate a new paradigm of joint management, focused on participatory management, conjunctive management, integrated management, sustainability and minimization of environmental harm. This new paradigm seeks to build upon the three aforementioned principles of international water law. Furthermore, the principle of equitable utilization is deliberately left open for debate, depending on particular basin situations. There are no a priori considerations to this principle within the Berlin rules, other than vital human needs be considered. With regards to participatory management, the Berlin Rules attempt to ensure equal rights of access to water, right to a voice in decisions affecting ones life, access to education, protection of particularly vulnerable communities, access to education concerning water resources, a right to compensation and a right to legal remedies. The Berlin Rules also seek to accommodate sustainability and a minimization of environmental harm by maintaining ecological integrity through the use of the precautionary principle. International cooperation can thus be understood under international law as, exchange of information, notification of programs, projects, or activities, consultations, harmonization and coordination of national policies and establishment of joint management institutions. Minimizing transboundary harm and equitable utilization work conjointly with due regard for one another.

Discussion: What are the Limitations of the Legal Consensus? Pr. Eaton: Since so many states fail to recognize and adhere to customary international law, why should such principles be accepted? Pr. Dellapenna: These types of enshrinements of state practice into customary international law should not be seen as hard and fast law but rather as soft law that demonstrate a process of commitment. This demonstrates opinio juris and should be seen as a process to provide guidelines for behavior as derived through various international law instruments. Dr. Tamimi: What is the added value of international law in defining needs? How do you use international law as an entry point for needs? 65

Pr. Dellapenna: International law provides a set of factors that should be considered when determining proper allocations. As demonstrative of national and international experience, International Law demonstrates how these types of conflicts should be solved and what principles should be used to solve them. Furthermore, for equitable principles to gain force, they have to be imbedded within legal instruments. When this happens, principles and rules become confirmed. Pr. Bar-Simon-Tov: In the determination of water rights and needs, where do principles of justice, equity and fairness come into play? Is there any monitoring system or mediation guidelines? Pr. Dellapenna: The principles are based on fairness. While countries may make many sorts of claims relating to needs that can be negotiated, claims on rights are far more difficult to define according to these principles. Fairness it more dependant on determining these needs, rather than rights. Pr. Wolf: From personal understanding, rights are defined as needs. Once there is a legal right, defined by needs, an understanding of justifiable rights emerges. However, international law is a process and really provides an umbrella of principles that outlines processes for solving disputes that comes out providing principles for how resources are allocated. Furthermore, in terms of negotiation and mediation, there is surely some level of this considering the World Bank having signed off on the Indus Basin treaty, for example. Good offices may be served by external actors. These can often take the form of institutions of joint management that develop over time. Dr. Arrojo-Agudo: In the conversation regarding legal rights and needs, we can determine two main categories which are the first: 1) Basic Human Rights and 2) Economic uses that can be measured through economic rationality. The second category is a right but not a priority. Pr. Laster: Who decides what is a priority? Dr. Molle: Also, what of environmental rights? There are sophisticated models developed to understand ecological needs and limits to availability. These needs can be used in political bargaining though, to argue for increased allocations. At the end of the day, whatever the models determine, allocation is left up to politics. Dr. Charrier: Only 16 countries have ratified the UN Convention and the majority of these are downstream countries. The reason for this is that it limits the sovereignty of upstream states to be able to use and access the water as they please. The GA is making a campaign to ratify the Convention by more countries and there is an effort to have it ratified with a permanent secretariat. . International law helps to print the main principles and that is very important with regards to ethics and management. Without international law or national law there are no ethical principles to be implemented. What is the significance of this non-ratification? 66

Pr. Dellapenna: The non-ratification is not so important as The Convention represents reflects world community principles and is quite a comprehensive statement that has been referred to by the ICJ and was approved by the General Assembly 104 to 3. The customary principles have already been established and thus ratification does not necessarily matter. Dr. Alam: Principles can become adhered to from a simple view that they are appropriate. Dr. Robinson: Perhaps positive incentives could be used to encourage ratification and adherence. Conventions should serve not only as regulations but also to provide a benefit that would not be available otherwise. Pr. Laster: These principles are not developed out of nowhere but are rather developed over time as appropriate and eventually, they become codified in law. This serves as a legal framework, however, once issues move outside of this legal framework, they become political. Thus, the centrality of politics to transboundary water issues remains central.

1.1.2 4 ECONOMIC AND SOCIETAL NEEDS

Dr. Jonathan Chenoweth Minimum Water Requirements for Social and Economic Development At a basis, there must be some criteria for examining basic needs and what is an adequate amount of water in different contexts. This is needed in order to determine minimum water requirements. According to human rights law, while there is no clearly defined international legal minimum water requirement, it is clear that social and economic development issues enter into considerations of international water law. Expressions for basic water needs have been expressed by various institutions and authors such as the WHO who defines 20 l/c/d for hygiene purposes all the way to the World Water Assessment program that determined 4,654 l/c/d as drinking water required for an active and healthy human life. It can be seen that numerical 67

determinations of minimum water needs have been largely varied across a broad spectrum. The ways that these numbers have been determined vary as well and thus, a clear standard for determining basic water needs is not available. A basis for estimating water needs for social and economic development should be based on what is viable and what is not. What is reasonable and what is not? In considering these questions, we arrive at important value judgments that must be made. Furthermore, water withdrawals for agriculture and food security are no longer clearly linked as almost all countries participate in the global food market, so arguing values for basic economic development varies greatly depending on context. Also, even developing countries that have adequate supplies of water largely import their grain resources as exemplified by Sierra Leone who has 30,189 annual cubic meters of water available for agriculture, however imports 44% of its grain. This reality reveals that per/capita availability cannot truly be used as an indicator of national development. Therefore, we should examine water uses to determine water needs for social and economic development. We should examine water usage rates within countries with a high human development score to identify minimum threshold. Secondly, a sect oral approach can be used to determine which water intense sectors are needed for social and economic development. In an examination of such countries, there is a great range of variance concerning domestic consumption rates from 61 l/c/d in Uruguay to 769 l/c/d in Canada. Above a relatively low threshold, water usage does not impact quality of life. Industrially, countries with a high level of human development can be seen to be relatively low, such as 3.4 l/c/d in Malta and 12 l/c/d/ in Cyprus. This is the case even in water scarce countries such as Kuwait who uses 13.7 l/c/d. Building on these cases, with special reference to the Maltese situation, it can be determined that high human development is possible with less than 125 l/c/d (not allowing for distribution losses). Where this is seen not to be the case, in many instances, domestic uses are calculated within industrial development data and thus, results become skewed. The sectoral approach cannot be fully examined due to a lack of sufficient data however, it has been shown that in the UK, 34 l/c/d supports 90% of economic activity, when considered sectorally. Therefore, in non-agricultural economies that import much of their food, less than 35 l/c/d is needed to provide a high quality of life. Furthermore, Shuval has noted that in countries that rely on domestic food production, 68 l/c/d is generally required as a sufficient amount. In terms of environmental flow, determination is highly dependent on contextual situations. Therefore, allowing for distribution losses, approximately 135 l/c/d can be noted as required as a minimum amount of water distribution for high human development. Presently, only Kuwait and UAE have less than this amount. Therefore, economic and social development is still possible with extremely low levels of water availability. The role of technology and 68

desalinization can also decrease scarcity and improve access to water resources that will have a significant impact on development. Dr. Pedro Arrojo-Agudo Cooperative and Sustainable management of the Jordan River Basin: Economic Assessment There is a current shift towards sustainable development approaches based on cooperation regarding shared resources. There is also a shift from current resource management approaches to an ecosystem approach under an integrative perspective. There is also a shift from military to cooperative perspectives. These types of integrative management perspectives become complicated as different actors consider different values when estimating water needs concerning the productive uses of water, the social values of environmental sustainability and fairness and economic values as well. The values at stake in the Jordan basin are 1) Productive Value: or irrigation productivity 2) Fairness Value: or saving military costs derived from greater equity and less tension and 3) Environmental Values: costs & benefits derived from Dead Sea sustainability. From an ecosystem perspective, environmental and social values are hydrologically connected to basins and these eventually combine with the economic and productive uses of water to more fully inform a broad, integrative approach to water management. We must move away from a resource approach to an ecosystem approach where environmental concerns and basic sustainability needs are considered before economic uses. While these uses are legitimate, they are not considered as basic needs or human rights. In order to determine the productive capacity of water within an ecosystem approach, we must estimate the opportunity costs of water from the bench mark of net profits, without subsidies, for each crop in different country contexts. When pursued, this analysis reveals that inefficient water uses, with high opportunity costs, do not make economic or environmental sense and resources used for such activity should be reallocated. In this reallocation, the value of fairness should be used as levels of unfairness in distribution serves as a benchmark for tensions. We assume the level of unfairness in the distribution of available water as a benchmark of the level of tension. A sensitivity analysis is applied in order to estimate the effect of assigning a concrete proportion of the military tension to the water unfairness factor (from 10% to 100%). Assuming the minimum military expenditure required by the NATO as a conservative reference for countries without significant threats, the difference between this expenditure and the present military budget in each country gives the cost of military tension. 69

In order to model the relationship between saved military costs and increasing water fairness we assume: 1. The same amount of water per person for all countries (max.fairness) leads to minimum military budget (NATO ref.). 2. The marginal value of fairness decreases when water is transferred from Israel to the Arabs, until reaching zero for maximum equity. 3. With these hypothesis, we build a quadratic function for modeling this decreasing marginal value. Assuming that 100% of military budget saving is due to the improvement of water fairness, the marginal value of the first m 3 ceded by Israel amounts to 28 /m3 for Israel and to 15/m3 for the Arabs. Even assuming only 10% of this, 2.8+1.5 = 4.3 /m3 is a very high value: 10 times higher than desalination sea water costs. Israel must balance the benefits from reducing military budgets and the cost of diminishing irrigation. The Arabs must account benefits from both factors. In the case of Palestinians it must be accounted the value of compensating water stress. Adding cost and benefits for Israel and Arabs, following the coherence of cooperative games, the maximum gain results transferring 460 hm3. Assuming 100% of military saving, total gains would be 9,841 Million. From an economic point, there exists a a vast territory of change and a lot of money to affect water for economics.

Discussion: Which Economic Activities, if any, should be considered as needs? Dr. Alam: We should maintain a focus on survival as the most important need. While maintaining livelihood is obviously important basic food availability is a most fundamental need. If one cant grow their own, they must be able to achieve the necessary income to purchase foods thus, water for such requirements can become included in survival. Depending on how this income is derived, impacts on water availability will follow. When we are talking about needs, we are talking about the ability to raise finances to live whether it is through agriculture or purchasing of food. Dr. Tamimi: Domestic consumption varies greatly within societies with one family need including livestock and other considerations in some societies but not in others. Therefore, what constitutes human development differs across societies and may not be a very useful element in determining water needs. Furthermore, correlation with education and other factors that determine high development may not have a direct bearing on water allocation. Furthermore, accessibility and availability are heavily determined by climatic factors, irrespective of government policy. Also, focusing on the economic value of

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water in deterring allocations based on fairness miss the social impacts of availability and also overlooks the basic health value of access. Dr. Chenoweth: Determination of domestic needs is complicated because within statistical analysis, these may be confused with commercial needs. You can also correlate almost any indicator of development with water need and therefore, the value isnt necessarily on the indicator but how one uses it. Therefore, high HDI is used as a goal but not necessarily as the best indicator of water use. Dr. Arrojo-Agudo: The value of the economic assessment is to demonstrate how shifts towards a more cooperative management can provide resources, as saved from military uses, towards more productive activities such as desalinization. Increased funds available through cooperation can be seen as the incentive that Dr. Robinson had referred to earlier that provides added value in considering water resources from such an economic perspective. However, one cannot only consider the economic perspective, especially for most vulnerable populations where choices regarding economic activities are largely unavailable. Pr. Eaton: If one considers using these saved funds for investment in the development of water resources, very trivial amounts would be seen as productive in increasing cooperative and accessibility capacities. Dr. Chenoweth: A large portion of the 135 l/c/d can be derived from recycled sources of water. Beyond this minimum number, if the aforementioned shifts take place, there exists great potential for enhancing quality of life, therefore, other needs , beyond maintaining capacity for life, can come to be taken into consideration. Pr. Feitelson: It is not as simple as water for peace and a shift away from military concerns, as motivated by water cooperation, otherwise the issue in the Jordan Basin would have been resolved long ago. In this case, the conflict is not about water. Saving on security, brought on by water cooperation, is a false view. Should water markets be created? When you move beyond the 135 l/c/d into greater economic needs, the question of societal context and economic activity within different communities become central. In communities where subsistence agriculture is still dominant, economic demands on water will be greater than in other, non-agricultural communities. Therefore, considerations beyond basic livelihoods as provided by the 135 l/c/d become problematic. Pr. Gasith: We must also consider the economic costs of waste water treatment and production as caused through domestic water use. Dr. Tamimi: Domestic situations and interests regarding water needs help to determine broader economic and international relations between states, depending on their riparian positions. This has implications also for water markets where states may not want to see their resources being provided by 71

multinationals. Therefore, political considerations enter into need determinations that can be constrained and guided, depending on context. Dr. Charrier: Even though large amounts of military spending was saved following the end of the cold war, not much of these funds went into development spending. While only 10% of military spending during this time, would solve most of the concerns of the developing world, humanity has not pursued such a course and this mentality is a difficulty that must be overcome. Pr. Laster: The social impact of negotiation and participation in water need determinations are more important than the economic outcomes of such agreements. Dr. Tamimi: A problem with the Oslo agreements was that there was no public ownership on the decisions made and thus, the public did not largely adhere to or respect agreed upon principles. Outside of economic considerations, social impact and involvement is central to the solving of such issues. Dr. Molle: The consideration of broad economic interests, above basic human needs, becomes muddled in particular societal context. There are far too many indicators of economic and social development to be included beyond these basic needs and no amount of economic subsidies can compensate for the loss or unavailability of basic livelihoods.

5 WHAT SHOULD BE THE ROLE OF MARKETS AND ABILITY TO PAY IN DETERMINING NEEDS?
Dr. Esteban Castro Markets, Water Needs and Water Rights: Exploring the Contradictions In having a greater understanding of the role of markets, the concept of water governance is important where fully exploited resource situations depend not only on unavailable resources because of use but also because of governance strategies and bodies that manage essential water services. How do market mechanisms shape or determine the nature of basic, life enhancing and other water needs? Is the "market" (understood as a social institution) relevant to this effect? What kinds of needs are or could eventually be determined or governed through the market? It must be noted that market mechanisms cannot solely determine what basic needs are but they shape and influence such considerations. Before a conversation of markets though, it must be understood that water values are not reducible to the economic dimension. Also, recognizing waters economic value is not the same as pricing it and recognizing water rights does not imply gratuity. Further, pricing water does not equal converting it into a commodity. 72

There are few places where water markets actually exist. Water transfers are more often resembling of diplomatic negotiations rather than simple commodity transactions. The main goals of the neoliberal market reforms are: 1)Changing the status of essential goods and services from public to private goods 2)Canceling the notion that essential services (such as water for essential human needs) are a social right or a public sector duty 3)Reducing the role of the state to facilitator of private sector activities (little or no regulation, guaranteeing and protecting business sustainability) 4)Subordinating social and ecological concerns to the requirements of private sector profitability, especially of global financial interests 5)Reducing the role of citizens to that of consumers (from citizen rights to consumer rights). However useful these techniques may be for providing criteria to support difficult policy decisions such as authorizing abstraction rights in endangered aquatic environments, the problem is that the results derived are often interpreted as representing peoples perceptions on a range of dimensions that are irreducible to the market sphere. Different languages of valuation in mutual conflict often reflect far deeper confrontations about the control and distribution of water resources, a struggle often fought through the deployment of alternative and often irreconcilable value systems. The indigenous water systems include collective and individual forms of water rights, specific forms of authority that coexist and overlap with the state institutions, and very dynamic normative frameworks adaptable to changing natural and social conditions (i.e. changes in the availability of water resources, in water needs owing to population growth, migration, etc.) Symbolic and religious values attached to water are also an important characteristic alongside the material valuation of the resource. It is worth noting that material values are expressed in a diversity of forms, not necessarily in terms of Western-style market valuation systems. The question of citizenship and societal values attached to water use brings the debate between citizenship rights to the fore. T.H. Marchall notes the social element of such rights as the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being

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according to the standards prevailing in the society. Therefore, a question of governance, with respect to these rights emerges. Governance becomes relevant for our discussion as it has to do with shaping and sustaining the arrangements of authority and power within which actors make decisions and frame policies that are binding on individual and collective actors within different territorial bounds. While an idealized form of governance incorporates market, state and civil society influences, there are problems of communication and interaction where whos concerns being addressed may not related to greater public desires. Within the neoliberal framework, the market has a far greater share in determining governance and with respect to water. While this is the case, these governance structures have a large impact on the social construction of needs and how rights are allocated. Therefore, market governance can shift conceptions of allocation, depending on market values and beliefs about economic gain. Dr. Undala Alam Who Decides what is a Need? The concept of need refers to requiring something because it is essential and very important, rather than just desirable. This concept seems simple as anything that is not seen as essential or very important is not considered a need. However, the situation becomes more complicated when considering who acts as the judge of determining what needs are. This is further complicated by considering why a particular judge views water needs as essential. Ultimately, physical well being is at the base yet, from a utilitarian perspective, engineering, economic and other needs begin to enter into the debate. Furthermore, other aspects of well being include spiritual, emotional and mental that cannot be determined simply by examining physical well being. In examining these questions, the importance of frames of reference in determining water uses becomes explicitly clear. This, once again, notes the significance of politics where determination of need is more of a question of access and control to resources, rather than the availability of the resource itself. Individuals who decide what water needs are, will determine subsequent access. Here, values and norms governing decisions may differ between decision makers, such as government (concerned with progress), and villagers (concerned with livelihood).

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Decision makers consider risk when determining policy. However, whos risk is at stake has a large impact on subsequent allocation and availability, with regards to water resources. While risks face the environment, citizen population and government, it is often political risks of the decision makers that override policy considerations. Maintaining a status quo allocation to farmers in a fully exploited situation, for example, would minimize risk to politicians but increase environmental risk and vice versa. Finally, how these decisions are arrived at are often outside of public purview and are thus, possibly highly subjective and determined with particular decision maker interest in mind. Individuals and citizens should be involved in decision making coalitions regarding affected areas. The frames of reference of decision makers is of central importance when determining water needs. Gadi Rosenthal Markets and market mechanisms as a location of meeting between buyers and sellers cant be a total solution for water allocation problems. This is largely due to the reality that water is considered to be a public good and free markets cannot solve these problems, especially considering differences in purchasing power of individuals and the subsequent problems that arise when attempting to meet basic minimum needs. However, this understanding does not end the debate on the role of markets but rather, opens up a new set of questions. While we have been focusing on allocation as who gets and how much, we can now ask who we can now ask who will pay and how much? These questions become significant in a fully exploited situation. In fully exploited situations, solutions usually come from increasing available amounts, through desalinization, that must be paid for. While a majority of the costs can be covered by donating countries, individuals have to pay the costs of such activity as well. A difficulty a rises when understanding that those who determine cost levels are usually powerful actors, serving to protect their interests. Increasing energy costs and capital availability all make water availability more difficult for poorer populations and therefore, a focus on determination of cost and who, exactly needs to pay for the maintenance of their basic needs is of central importance. Should those that can pay pay, and those that cant dont? 75

Dicsussion: Economics, Ethics, Needs Dr. Tamimi: If we change a focus of rights from citizen to customer, then customer satisfaction becomes of central importance where governance can become less significant. When you have a citizen, you consider bottom up approaches to the determination of costs and basic needs remain central, as opposed to customer needs. Therefore, water governance based on bottom up approaches is important in ensuring access. There are also invisible powers, as Dr. Alam pointed out, that determine needs. These must be removed if honest and transparent allocation negotiations are to be fruitful. Dr. Chenoweth: Government policies and governance can have a significant effect on consumption patterns as exemplified by legislation to ban use of incandescent light bulbs. Dr. Arrojo-Agudo: Water is different from other resources, such as wood for example, where one idea that the utilities of other resources are exchangeable by money. The utilities of water can have nothing to do with this type of economic consideration, such as providing for a satisfying physical life. Using water for wealth production is economics but as basic needs, these considerations become secondary. Also, energy considerations are important when examining desalinization. The costs of such energy use must be addressed, therefore, energy is centrally involved in any economic considerations surrounding water. Dr. Castro: We cannot assume that reducing water uses to customers takes away their rights as citizens. The particular understanding of markets that is hegemonic at the moment focuses on free-market frameworks, however, we have rival understandings of what governance means. This understanding of governance is one instrument. However, other market governance strategies can have different formulations and prescriptions. Governance starts at defining where the society should go. Markets are means to determine this. Who decides that and how is it decided are thus very important and such examinations can impact market direction. Dr. Alam: Different stake holders will have different perspectives regarding water use such as an energy engineer will view water used for conservation as an inefficient use of a resource. Based on these differing perceptions, allocation and reallocations will have various economic interpretations. Pr. Wolf: Of the treaties that incorporate water purchases, the first type of purchases included are for drinking water. However, we must aim to protect drinking water from market forces that could make such resources unavailable to large portions of populations. Pr. Dellapenna: We have not had researchers arguing for the inclusion of market mechanisms to determine need, as with the Washington Consensus.

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Pr. Bar-Siman-Tov: Economic considerations alone are not sufficient in determining needs. Poltiical and religious factors are important, especially within the Jordan Basin. Dr. Fischhendler: Markets are risky in the sense that they do not secure basic water needs and removes responsibility in ensuring rights to water from governments. Dr. Charrier: Marketization and privatization can be effective such as in France, for example, where routes, guidelines and infrastructure are all secure. In Africa, however, a lack of rules and guidelines allow multinationals to turn large profits due to overpriced resources and over-exploitation. This process, in the developing world, can exclude individuals from access. Pr. Feitelson: Here, we are not talking about markets in terms of buying and selling and privatization. Here we are considering whether water should be socially ensured or left up to affordability. We all understand that basic drinking water should not be free for those who can pay. The problem with this is relatively, the poor pay the most for access. If one can pay for water, they should be allowed to buy as must as desired. The only consideration that should be made is that the cost should include the full real price of water, without subsidies, in order to ensure a legitimate strategy that does not misrepresent affordability and includes externalities. Another understanding is that of a social commitment where the society should provide certain basic water needs, irrespective of contextual or market considerations. Dr. Castro: The problem is that when water services are privatized, they become complete monolopolies so the idea of a water market is a misnomer when considering water privatization. This is very much the case in the UK where private water companies are protected by a 25 year warning period if the government was to nationalize the water sector. Oftentimes, these companies are owned by politicians that determine economic policy. Government involvement is necessary if the life-enhancing uses of water are to be used in a truly equitable way. Dr. Alam: In water markets, we are not discussing the purchasing of water itself but rather, the purchasing of the ability to attain it. Communities pay for commodified drinking water when such water is readily available to them through natural sources. Thus markets are about provision and not the resources themselves. Pr. Laster: Markets are obviously unavailable as a mechanism to determine water needs. We must therefore look to a cooperative solution in determining prices for water that is affordable and acceptable. Pr. Feitelson: We are talking about two groups of needs. First is a vulnerable group that should have their basic needs met, regardless of the cultural norms 77

of society. Then, life enhancement and dignity serve as a second, buffer group or priorities. While this may include the use of water for profit, such as a particularly desired agricultural sector, they are clearly beyond the first, non economic water considerations. Pr. Wolf: Basic human and spiritual needs should be considered outside of international negotiations. These should form the basis of minimum water requirements.

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6. WATER NEEDS OF NATURE

Pr. Avital Gasith Water Needs for Nature Protecting Natures Services to Human Society Under Conditions of Water Scarcity Water needs are largely affected by geomorphology and climactic setting. Climate affects rainfall and geomorphology affects the landscape which both have an effect on geochemistry as an aspect of water quality as well. Rainfall affects the hydrograph which in turn, determines nutrient loading that impact upon biotic structures. These biota can affect the condition of ecosystems through changing oxygen concentrations. Furthermore, watersheds act as a sink for water and material that moves in and out of the ecosystem and are thus, heavily affected by human action. The well being of fresh water ecosystems depends largely on a narrow range of amount and quality of received waters. Human impacts of pollution, diversion and modifications all impact the water system and these activities are the focus of restoration efforts at quelling the human impact of ecosystem destruction. Consumptive and non-consumptive benefits of water depend on the maintenance of the flow and integrity of the water system. These all, in turn, impact on the well being of the system as all of the consumptive benefits of drinking, irrigation, fishing and industry, and some of the non-consumptive benefits, such as transport, power and purification, have a great impact on a highly sensitive system. In principle, though, how much of the ecosystem services (environmental flow) that is wished to be used, is determined politically. While such decisions have great societal impacts, decisions and determinations are largely left to political decision makers. Most services and long-term benefits 79

to society are gained when aquatic ecosystems are functionally intact and biologically complex. With respect to quality, the highest quality water should be used for drinking while industrial processes do not require such great quality considerations. In terms of protecting quality, simply maintaining flow is not sufficient. Flow variability must be maintained as well. Natural aquatic ecosystems are dynamic fluctuating systems. The intensity, frequency and timing of the fluctuations are system specific. In addition, it is difficult to determine thresholds of how much change a system can allow before it fails because it varies seasonally and inter-annually and it involves a risk of an irreversible change. In order to protect ecosystem services, administrative and management actions must be taken. These include incorporating ecosystem needs, especially variable flow regimes, within water management policies. Water resources should also be seen from a water shed perspective to view them within a larger landscape context. These should all coincide with increased restoration efforts, using ecological principles as guidelines. Towards this end, downstream diversion projects should be focused upon as they ensure protection of streams integrity for a greater portion of a rivers flow and maximize ecosystem service. Minimum flow is the amount (and quality) of water discharged at the proper timing (historic pattern) that sustains the long-term ecosystem structure and functions. This should be determined by Ecologists and hydrologists who should jointly assess relationship between flow and response of the ecosystem These actors should be involved in the political decisions made with respect to water allocations. Discussion: How Should Minimal Requirements for Nature be Defined in Water Scarce Settings? Dr. Charrier: Groundwater sources must be included in such ecosystem management. With respect to this, how can land management be integrated into water management? Pr. Gasith: Groundwater and land considerations must be included in watershed management schemes. Dr. Fischhendler: Level of environmental quality is determined societally. A pristine state of nature cannot be a realistic goal as any use of the watershed will decrease its quality. Therefore, a social decision must be made on where, between full exploitation and pristine nature, the ecosystem will be found. Pr. Gasith: Transbasin transfers are unacceptable because of the devastating environmental effect of introducing new biota to an ecosystem and instead of restoration, you can get transformation where increased effluent can damage watershed integrity. Therefore, while water policies are social in nature,

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education about the environmental impacts of particular policies should direct decision makers, and general publics, in positive directions. Dr. Arrojo-Agudo: In terms of the Jordan Basin, strong religious and cultural factors see land value as more important than ecosystem protection. Pr. Gasith: Eventually, Israel recognized natures right to water but historically, policy had not considered environmental impacts. A shift towards integrated management can correct for this. Pr. Feitelson: While joint management is a goal, these frameworks are unrealistic given the political and power considerations of riparian relationships. Upstream states will not want to have to make land use and sovereignty considerations that impact on downstream water systems, especially in an area where land use is highly emotional and visceral, as in Israel/Palestine. Furthermore, claims made by these sovereign entities must be viewed as legitimate. Who decides for a society the type of environment they should have? Dr. Arrojo-Agudo: Large basin transfers do not only not make sense from an ecological perspective but they are also very costly. Instead, desalinization should be used to provide restoration efforts. Dr. Alam: Thus far, we have been discussing the impacts of environmental degradation on ecosystem services. However, the ecosystem itself must enjoy a right to water from, irrespective of human considerations. Human considerations may not always be commensurate with a given surrounding. Environmental education, in this sense, is central in aiding the development of sustainable policies. Pr. Gasith: This highlights the role of practitioners and not only politicians in the decision making processes. Pr. Laster: Integrated management also entails consulting with users such as farmers, who have a vested stake in the water policies. This increases transparency and acceptability of arrived at solutions. Furthermore, environmental concerns can be legally represented by individuals who speak on behalf of the environment and protect its concerns. Dr. Bein: In order to maintain high water availability and to breach droughts, storage capacitates of water systems must be increased by reducing water table levels. While this may impact the flow levels of some springs and small sources of water, it increases overall storage capacities from which the general population can benefit. Pr. Gasith: This policy has not worked in the region as predicting refill rates is impossible and, therefore, environmentally dangerous. 2.5% of all fresh water has been considered as a minimum standard for environmental allocation.

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Pr. Wolf: The environment may not have legal rights per say but if it doesnt its existence is threatened. In river basin management organizations, environmental concerns can be represented by an individual and where decisions are arrived at by consensus, this individual must consent. Dr. Arrojo-Agudo: When you take away rights from nature, you take away rights from the poorest and most vulnerable populations as their livelihoods are usually closely linked to environmental health and well-being. Dr. Molle: Decisions of environmental quality are largely left up to society to determine. It has no human voice and the impacts of development within watersheds not only affects the environment but other human groups as well, geographically and temporally. The mechanism by which environmental interventions should be decided must address these risks. Dr. Charrier: The impact of an ecological footprint is not societal decision. We are not separate from nature and cannot simply choose to exclude it.

7. NEEDS CULTURE AND SOCIETY

Prof. David Eaton: Human Needs, Hydrology, History and Water Rights In cases of fully exploited basins, no permanent solutions are readily available. Solutions lie within the realm of management. Cooperation is the only way to achieve such joint management solutions and through these, allocations and subsequent investment in new water, better water management and conservation strategies and to invest in water reuse programs. Investment here is the key where new resources will be developed through cost sharing and investment in infrastructure and more efficient water development. Principles serve here as points of entry for debates and ways of engaging in disputes with one another, they are opportunities for disputes with other another. While not legally binding, the provide good principles by which debates can be begun surrounding joint management. The final decisions will be political ones. In this sense, all requests for needs must be viewed as legitimate as only through stable win/win solutions will water negotiations prove to be fruitful and lasting. In order to achieve such joint management, all stake holders must be consulted. Here, individuals suggestions and definitions of concepts, such as no net loss, are arrived at through a joint process of consultation and referral. The most stringent definitions and lowest common denominators should be used in determining minimum levels of cooperation in order to ensure satisfaction from both parties. In water sharing agreements, the importing country can be provided with investment and benefits to offset the costs of 82

sharing and this could, in turn, create new and better water availability, eventually increasing total water availability for both parties. What Should Be the Management Principles for an Over-Allocated Water Basin? Each party should walk away from the table with respect, Each party should have their needs acknowledged as legitimate, Parties should agree voluntary to share shortages, Parties should agree voluntarily to share benefits, If any action by a party goes against another partys interest, conflict is assured, The real challenge is physical processes, social change and time,The solution is investment and cooperation.

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Dr. Itay Fischhendler The Role of Uncertainties in Determining Water Needs A focus on water needs as solving transboundary fully exploited water situations opens a large degree of uncertainty to the decision making context. Uncertainties can jeopardize providing the needs and sustainability of a natural resource. How does one balance between needs and uncertainties? For example, how do you compensate price in drought years and plan for such uncertainty? Infrastructure, climate and global economic uncertainties all affect how needs are paid for. Two mechanisms to allocate needs are the uniform and differential mechanisms. On either end of the spectrum of these mechanisms are adjustable and fixed needs where adjustable needs are open to negotiation and changeable while fixed needs are close to rights in the sense that even under changing conditions, these needs cannot be revoked. Adjustable; if the future is uncertain and you can not do much about it because the uncertainty is not under you control, you prioritize sustainability on secured needs. Fixed: if you can predict the future and even fix it you can commit yourself to securing water needs on the expense of sustnability. To better conceptualize when are we going to use each of the strategies to allocate the needs A gambling approach: Adjustable: take high risk since he does not know his allocation for next year but can gain a lot since if it play it right in the negotiations process every year he will get all the water 84

Percentage: also belong to the strategy although here the risks are lower since it secures some flow. Solid investor: he wishes to know in advance how much water he gets regardless the future situation but his gains are low as he will get only minimal water amount. Fixed and maximum: - he does not like the risk that why he wants his needs to be secured but he also likes the benefits that is why he wish to have the maximum amount of water Prioritization: he secures minimal amount but he has the option to get more and that is why he is more risky than fixed, based on minimal needs. Surly we can set a different strategy for each components of water needs. We can say that for domestic use we should adopt strategy II which is conservative but for water for nature we should adopt strategy I.

Discussion: Should Societies be Differed When Discussing Needs? Pr. Eaton: Respect for sovereignty in needs determination is absolutely essential. This is the first step in ensuring cooperation for management and investment. Rights are needed to demonstrate respect for needs and selfcontrol on infringing on the rights of other parties. Dr. Fischhendler: Not all needs are adjustable and each strategy towards risk has pros and cons that are context specific. Dr. Tamimi: The situation in fully exploited situations, especially between conflicting parties, is one of constant uncertainty. Here, management procedures are closed to conflict management. In high risk situations such as these, large degrees of flexibility may threaten resource availability in an unacceptable way. Further, creating incentives for reducing uncertainty and risk has been overlooked. These may include non-water resources. Dr. Alam: In examining these joint management frameworks, it is important to maintain similar scales of analysis. National and sub-national parties will have different criteria and justifications for determining needs. Also, in the case of basin transfers, efficiency must be remembered as inefficient transfers serve to unnecessarily worsen availability situations. Pr. Eaton: The case is that indeed there are a lot of inefficiencies. One can improve the efficiencies in the context of river basin management and institutions. Pr. Bar-Siman-Tov: During war situations, policies are particularly unilateral in minimizing risks and, thus, focusing on conflict management strategies provides difficulties in promoting cooperation. Dr. Arrojo-Agudo: In situations of scarcity, ethical considerations must remain at the forefront. Increasing investments for production misses the ethical point of water needed for most vulnerable populations. Priorities must 85

be placed above demands and some priorities are more legitimate than others, from an ethical perspective. These should be considered in management and conservation strategies. Economic incentives and considerations should not determine solutions for addressing situations of scarcity that impact on basic human rights.

8 SUMMARY BY Pr Eran Feitelson: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? Original goals were to identify optional definitions of water needs that can serve as a basis for water allocations and management in Israeli and Palestinian case and to take apart the concept of needs to see how it can be implemented in the real world looking at the wider scope of issues than the Israeli Palestinian case. What did we learn or agree upon? There is a basic human need for water (around 60 m cubed / person / year). Livelihood and vulnerability of weak groups may lead to an additional allocation for economic use by these groups. Vulnerability is seen as a situation where this group has no alternatives for subsistence. They are usually marginal groups or some remote group that is weak politically and economically. If you take away water from these groups, they have no livelihood in addition to low levels of drinking and domestic uses. There is a second level of needs that is societally sanctioned but differed across societies. The society thinks its a need and these differ across societies. The needs of nature include quality and flow parameters. However the type of nature desired is socially constructed. Its not the same parameters that we use for human needs. Need definitions need to be politically acceptable. In order to provide for these needs, an institutional structure must be established to allow for variations and modifications within an acceptable framework. Water uses beyond societal consensus and those geared at market profit should be allocated by price mechanisms. Pr. Wolf: Basic spiritual needs are to be included in basic human needs given their low respective cost and high personal value. Outstanding questions include: How to address population growth, How to define vulnerability and livelihood, Do we differentiate between needs as a basis for international allocation and internal use international or transnational issue, Are needs of nature a base or second tier socially construed buffer. How should we think about differences across societies and are societies = countries, Should cost alleviation be considered in addressing or defining needs, How should quality and recycling considerations be incorporated.

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DISCUSSION: Pr. Wolf: Depending on for what we are determining needs is very significant. If for a treaty, certain aspects of water needs must be taken of the table for the sake of coherence and clarity. If for society, a more thorough and nuanced understanding of needs is required. Also, needs change with time and acceptable definitions of needs change as societies desires change. Pr. Feitelson: Needs have to be aggregated from the bottom up. In the case of Israel Palestine, simply dividing allocations is difficult because of the closely integrated nature of the water resources there. A focus on allocations, therefore, presupposes a conversation about needs that are nonnegotiable. These needs do not change over time or space but should be viewed as constant. Mr. El-Fayez: Needs must therefore be delineated between national and international where international needs are non-negotiable and national needs are society specific. Dr. Tamini: As an academic exercise, it is fine to examine secondary needs but there is immediacy in determining the first level of needs in order to bring concrete ideas to the negotiating table. Secondary needs become too complicated for meaningful and immediate negotiation. Pr. Eaton: All needs must be seen as legitimate otherwise a stable solution cannot be achieved. Pr. Dellapenna: It is too difficult to recognize all needs as legitimate since resources are limited. Water managers cannot find resources to accommodate all expressions of need. In addition, needs will change and therefore, institutions and management strategies need to be able to cope with changes in population and supply. Also, internal considerations within a state, regarding shared resources, affect the entire watershed and as such, domestic considerations ought to be considered. Pr. Fietelson: A discussion of institutions is outside of the purview of the needs debate. Basic needs will have to be enshrined within institutions but first, a determination of these needs is precedent. While second level needs provide buffers for variation, first level needs must form the basis of the debate. At first, however, the number of 60 cubic meters/person/year has been put on the table as a minimum allocative amount for basic human needs. Dr. Tamimi: The basic amount must be able to be brought back and applied directly to the Israeli/Palestinian case. Pr. Wolf: Human and spiritual needs can be seen as the most basic level while other needs become more significant within management considerations.

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Dr. Charrier: After we have arrived at basic needs, the quantitative measure of other needs, depending on their priority, is relatively easy to determine when measured by experts. Pr. Eaton: Livelihood should also be included in the determination of basic human needs. Dr. Castro: We have all also agreed that environmental concerns should be included in order to sustain ecosystem and human water availability. Environmental and social justice need to be considered in basic rights. Pr. Fietelson: In addition to the 60 should we have a quantity for non per capita basis but on an ecosystem basis. We can aggregate from different springs and flows and the minimum to allow the ecosystem to survive to the next year to overcome the drought. Therefore, an equation for determining the scenarios in the upcoming months can be 1) 60mcy/person + 2) base flow environment what is needed for the environment not to collapse in drought year + 3) livelihoods of vulnerable = basic water needs. Base flow determinations need to come from ecologists as these vary depending on geographic location. This framework can subsequently be applied in different situations in consideration of available resources. Dr. Sawalha: The question of availability in natural resource capacities is central in being able to have broader discussions regarding management of the servicing of these needs. Dr. Molle: In the case of Israel/Palestine, such a framework is feasible. However, allocations may necessarily change in the following generation. Pr. Feitelson: Quality and recycling also need to be considered. Financial ability to supply these needs will determine their actual implementation and realization. The needs of sanitation to adds to the cost through waste water treatment. These also determine the scope of activities that basic water can be used for. The higher the levels of treatment, the more activities that can be addressed.

9 CONCLUDING DISCUSSION: IMPLICATION FOR ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN SETTING

Pr. Eaton: It is very important, in any resolution, that we come first to recognize Palestinian water rights. Palestinians should have complete control over their waters and should be able to do with it, what they wish. These are infallible rights as a sovereign nation and should have complete control over resources such as the Mountain Aquifer. Any needs that Palestinians define and wish to have, they ought to be able to achieve. There wont be enough water for Palestinians in cases of increased population and thus water resources must be increased. This also requires increased funding so water autonomy can be achieved. While other riparians must be considered as well, 88

in order to ensure development, sufficient and autonomous water rights and resources are required for the Palestinian people. Dr. Tamimi: Before these questions can be addressed, much research needs to be done by the Palestinians on how to improve infrastructure and resources, as well as to determine desired levels of resource requirements. Local strategies and priorities must be determined. Furthermore, a determination of what type of economy Palestinians desire will greatly impact future water allocations and needs. Pr. Dellapenna: Absolute sovereignty is not possible when discussing water resources because of the inherently shared and flowing nature of the resource. What one party chooses to do with water resources in the region has a very real impact on the other thus needs of both parties must be considered. In this sense, you cannot accept all demands as legitimate. Pr. Laster: Equitable use remains the central principle in determining allocation, even if both parties are sovereign. Dr. Tamimi: Other considerations of the peace process have a great bearing on water resources in Palestine. If Jerusalem is divided or united, who will provide water there? What of the water needs of the 142 settlements in the West Bank? Will there be access to the Jordan River resources? What of an influx of refugees and the water demands they will place on the system? What is the future of the agricultural sector in Palestine? In order to address theses concerns, we need the input of impartial, third party experts and scientists. Solutions must be based on political and economic facts. This focus on expertise and science can quell the emotive aspects of the water negotiation between Israel and Palestine. Pr. Feitelson: Water resources in Palestine would tap into the National Water Carrier program. Whoever comes as a refugee will come from water poor countries and the Israelis are coming from water rich countries. Each person that comes, does he come with an entitlement and water expectations. A large question also is whether or not international financing and utility would be supplying water within the region to add and distribute resources Dr. Tamimi: Up until now, the Israeli/Palestinian debate has focused on how the Palestinians can get water rights and how Israelis can control these water rights. We need to move away from this regime and begin to think outside the box. Palestinians feel water rights as part of their dignity and sovereignty. Here, we should attempt to move away from such thinking towards a more innovative framework where equity and cooperation is at heart. Pr. Feitelson: If we go 20 years back Palestinian society was less agricultural than now and there were different conceptions of water rights. Agriculture is able to change and as soon as there is another option for sustaining livelihoods, individuals move away from agriculture. With respect to future

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scenarios, one where agriculture is not the main source of livelihoods will shift water needs. Pr. Eaton: The challenge that here is the shot term. How can there be improvements in the short term and cant be some mechanisms that gives the Palestinians the sovereignty and authority to make immediate water decisions so peoples lives can be approved. Pr. Wolf: There is a grave humanitarian issue and 60 cubic meters a year should be agreed to here in order to have an immediate bargaining chip and standard to address these humanitarian concerns in the short term. Dr. Charrier: What do the Palestinians need for dependency liberation? Dr. Tamimi: The Palestinians arent looking for charity. They want full control of resources and the capacity to bring water to their people. Viewing agreements as charity undermine the legitimacy of solutions because they are viewed more as psychological appeasement, rather than the creation of a legitimate solution in a viable state. Pr. Feitelson: The main point is that the scenarios will not make a short term difference. These will be part of a broader, long-term agreement that needs input and movement from third parties and international negotiations. So a short-term solution needs to be provided by emergency measures that takes pre-approval effect. This has to be seen as an emergency act and then eventually, to connect all Palestinian homes to a water source. While movement can be taken in the short-term under a pre-approval humanitarian action response, only a long-term solution will be meaningful. Pr. Laster: The role of Jordan should be included during the development of scenarios. Dr. Charrier/ Pr.Feiteilson: The 60 cubic/person/year should be accepted and agreed to here and conveyed in a press release. Pr. Wolf: These types of exercises can improve the situation as any press release may shift the thinking of involved parties. Dr. Alam: It is not believed that the Israelis are interested in having complete control over the water resources in the area. While everyone needs to control what they use and require control for supply management and business, complete control is viewed as illegitimate by both parties. If parties officials truly believe this, prospects for cooperation are enhanced. Dr. Tamimi: The Palestinians are interested in control over their own resources as if not, they will not be able to legitimately plan an economy and sustainable livelihoods for their people. Pr. Feiteilson: The situation in the Gaza strip can only be solved through desalinization. This may not be able to be controlled by either party but by an 91

international party which raises concerns about who has control over the taps of the water resource.

Dr. Charrier: Other parties, including Syria and Jordan, should be included in future negotiations to have a more complete solution to water difficulties in the area. The framework developed here can help to move forward in studying different scenarios and to bring these to the region. Dr. Tamimi: International experts contribute to the peace process and help to improve the quality of life of individuals in the region by bringing impartial information and a spirit of cooperation. Passing taboo subjects in water negotiations has been seen to be very productive and essential in achieving long term settlements and peace between the two parties. Traditional views and goals must be abandoned for more holistic and cooperative ones.

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