Delhi's Watery Woes

OCCASIONAL PAPER - 1
A Cross-sectoral Analysis of the Water Crisis in Delhi
Delhis Watery Woes
A Cross-sectoral Analysis of the Water Crisis in Delhi
Delhis Watery Woes
Dr. Arun Kumar Singh
Copyright The Author, 2006
Centad Occasional Papers are intended to disseminate the preliminary ndings of ongoing research both within and outside Centad on issues linked to trade and development for the purpose of exchanging ideas and catalysing debate. The views, analysis and conclusions are of the author/s only and may not necessarily reect the views or position of Centad. Readers are encouraged to quote or cite this paper with due acknowledgement to the author and Centad.
The author of this paper, Dr. Arun Kumar Singh, is a writer, researcher and activist. A geologist by training, Dr. Singh has done his M. Tech. in Applied Geology, Ph.D. in remote sensing and plate tectonics with a diploma in Soil and Water Conservation Engineering. From 1977-88 he has also worked on teaching and research assignments at Sagar University and Bhopal University. His other published books are Interlinking of Rivers in India: A Preliminary Assessment (2003), Privatisation of Rivers in India (2004) and Privatisation of Water Supply in Mumbai (2006), among others. He has also published over 300 articles on environmental and developmental issues.
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Acknowledgements
During the course of this study, author has interacted with a large number of persons who have been kind enough to share their valuable experience, knowledge, expertise and information for which author is thankful to them. These include ofcials of Delhi Jal Board, trade union leaders of workers union of Delhi Jal Board, and Municipal Corporation of Delhi. In this regard, I would especially like to thank Mr. S. A. Naqvi, Delhi Jal Board and Water Workers Alliance, who has been kind enough to grant me his valuable time for a series of meetings, often at very short notice, and had been very patient to explain everything to last meticulous detail. I have been immensely beneted by these sessions. Similarly author wishes to thank many ofcials of Delhi government posted in different departments like, Department of Urban Development, Department of Environment and others. Thanks are also due to ofcials of Central Ground Watter Board who have been kind enough to discuss various dimensions related to the problems of water availability, augmentation and supply in Delhi. The author wishes to thankfully acknowledge the cooperation extended by NGOs like Tapas, Pani Panchayat, and Parivartan, especially the last. Mr. Arvind Kejriwal of Parivartan, has been very helpful by giving me liberal access to all the documents they have obtained from Delhi Government, under the newly introduced Delhi Right to Information Act, after a long hassle of six months with government. The author has also been beneted by the continuing discussions with a number of friends on this issue over a period of time and wishes to put a few names on record. These are Mr. Anupam Mishra (Gandhi Peace Foundation), Mr. Shubhranshu Chowdhary (T. V. Journalist), Mr. Vinod Verma (BBC, Delhi), and Prof. Sanjai Bhatt (Delhi School of Social Works). Author wishes to express his sincere thanks to Dr. Samar Verma, Centad, for giving him an opportunity to carry out this study. Interactions with Mr. Robin Koshy (Centad) throughout the study-tenure have been helpful to ensure that the study remain focused content wise. However, any shortcoming in the text presented here should be attributed only to author and none of the persons named above are responsible for it in any manner. Similarly, the views expressed herein are exclusively authors own and should not be necessarily misconstrued as the views of the Centad.
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Preface
Delhi, the capital city of India begins to reel under a water crisis in summer and lot of noise is made for further augmentation of water from other sources. The phenomenon, rst experienced in the decade of seventies has aggravated with each passing year. The everswelling population of Delhi, drying up of its own traditional water harvesting structures, a number of management and administrative lapses, transformation of Yamuna literally into a water sewer, misuse and abuse of water resources, non-recovery of secondary and tertiary water, and host of other factors have compounded the problem manifold. The net result is increase in the plight of common masses in summer and there seems to be no respite in near future too. Summer of 2005 was no exception when we witnessed a drama being played in public for demand of more water and its acceptance and immediate denials The present study is an attempt to explore this multi-facet problem and various dimensions related to it water disputes with neighbouring states, ofcial structure of water supply, policy level issues, management issues, and so on and so forth. The ongoing debate over the privatisation of Delhi Jal Board and its implications are also been commented, including the questionable manner in which this process is being pursued within the overall national framework of reforms and liberalisation in water sector. Lastly options for future have been explored. ARUN KUMAR SINGH
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Abbreviations
ADB ASI BCM CGWB CPWD DDA DGS&S DJB DWSB DWSSP EOI FIR GATS GATT GEF JJ JTUs LPCD MAF MCD MLD MNC MOU NCT NDMC NRW O&M PPF PRSP PWC SAP SYL TMC TOR UWSS WTO : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : Asian Development Bank Archaeological Survey of India Billion Cubic Metres Central Groundwater Board Central Public Works Department Delhi Development Authority Directorate General of Supplies and Disposals Delhi Jal Board Delhi Water and Sewage Board Delhi Water Supply and Sewage Project Expression of Interest First Information Report General Agreement on Trade in Services General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Global Environmental Facility Jhuggi-Jhompri Jackson Turbidity Units Litres Per Capita Per Day Million Acre Feet Municipal Corporation of Delhi Million Litres per Day Multi National Corporation Memorandum of Understanding National Capital Territory New Delhi Municipal Corporation Non-Revenue Water Operation & Maintenance Project Preparation Facility Poverty Reduction Strategic Programme Price Waterhouse Cooper Structural Adjustment Programme Satluj-Yamuna Link Thousand Million Cubic Metres Terms of Reference Urban Water Supply Sewerage World Trade Organisation
v
Contents
Acknowledgements Preface Abbreviations 1. Introduction 1.1 Population of Delhi 1.2 Physiographic Features of Delhi 1.3 Green Cover of Delhi 1.4 Delhi: Water in the Past 1.5 Current Sources of Water for Delhi 1.6 Present Water Requirements of Delhi 1.7 Hydro Politics of Water in Delhi 2. Water Rights and DelhiHaryana Water Dispute 2.1 What are Water Rights? 2.2 Evolution of Water Rights in India 2.3 Groundwater Rights 2.4 Yamuna River and Delhi-Haryana-Uttar Pradesh Triangle 2.5 The Ravi-Beas Water Dispute: Haryana-Punjab 2.6 The Satluj-Yamuna Link (SYL): Haryana-Punjab 2.7 The Constitutional Crisis 2.8 Arguments put forth by Punjab and Haryana 3. I. Bottlenecks in Delhi Water Supply System Policy/Institutional Issues 3.1 Loss of Water during Water Transportation from Haryana 3.2 Financial Loss Incurred during Water Transportation from Haryana 3.3 Faulty Site Selection of Water Treatment Plants 3.4 Policy of Power Tariff for Delhi Jal Board 3.5 Inter-Departmental Wrangling 3.6 Lack of Innovation in Water Supply 3.7 Mirage of Proposed 24X7 Scheme II. Distributional/Technical Issues 3.8 Energy and Water: Interdependency and Implications
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iii iv v 1 1 1 3 5 9 9 10 11 12 12 17 18 19 19 21 22 27 27 27 28 28 30 30 31 31 32 32
3.9 Faulty Water Supply Network 3.10 Recycling Water within Treatment Plants 3.11 DJBs Sewage Treatment Plants (STPs) 3.12 Quality of DJB Supplied Water 3.13 Iniquitous Distribution of Water in Delhi 3.14 Five Star Hotels and VIP Residences 3.15 Water Supply Hours per Day 3.16 The Non-Revenue Water (NRW) 3.17 Problems Related with Groundwater Exploitation and its Quality 3.18 Emergence of a Water Maa III. Other Technical Issues 3.19 Non-Enforcement of Legal Rights by DJB against Violators 3.20 Water Meters 3.21 Water Tariff Hike 3.22 Problems of Rainy Season 3.23 Plight of the Yamuna River 4. Privatisation of Delhi Jal Board and Its Impact 4.1 Current Status of Water Sector Reforms in India 4.2 Genesis of Privatisation of DJB 4.3 World Banks Loan for Delhi Water Supply and Sewage Project (DWSSP) 4.4 Selection of Price Waterhouse Cooper (PWC) as Consultant 4.5 World Bank Price Waterhouse Cooper Linkage 4.6 Suez-Degremont: Sonia Vihar Water Treatment Plant 4.7 Impacts of Privatisation 4.8 Groundwater of Delhi for MNCs? 4.9 Alternatives to Privatisation 4.10 World Banks Recommendations put on Hold 4.11 World Banks Policies: An Overview 5. The Conict Resolution and Other Options for Delhi 5.1 General 5.2 Proposals of Pani Morcha 5.3 Rejuvenation of Traditional Water Harvesting Structures 5.4 Grey Water Reclamation Project 5.5 Ocean of Groundwater found on Delhis Border 6. Concluding Note
33 34 34 35 35 39 39 40 41 42 43 43 43 44 44 44 49 49 50 52 53 56 57 58 61 62 63 64 81 81 81 84 85 85 87
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List of Tables Table 1: Different Categories of JJ Settlement in Delhi Table 2: Sources of Water for Delhi Table 3: Water Treatment Plants in Delhi Table 4: Water Augmentation Schedule of DJB for 2021 Table 5: Iniquitous Water Distribution in Delhi Table 6: Water Supply Structure in Delhi Table 7: Average Daily Household Water Supply (hours/day) Table 8: Water Consumption in Delhi Table 9: List of DJB Units Transferred to MNCs Table 10: Categorisation of DJB Employees Table 11: PWC-Proposed Water Tariff Structure Table 12: Loan from the Government to Finance the Cash Decit Table 13: Waterbodies Existing in Delhi List of Maps Map 1: The Ridge Forest in Delhi Map 2: Encroachment in The Ridge Forest, Delhi Map 3: Water Channels of Delhi Map 4: Changing Course of Yamuna River Map 5: Present Map of Delhi Map 6: Location of Water Treatment Plants in Delhi Map 7A: Water Zones in Delhi Map 7B: Ward-wise Water Supply Map 8: Drains/Nallas Meeting River Yamuna in Delhi Annexure: 1 Annexure: 2 Annexure: 3 Annexure: 4 Annexure: 5 Annexure: 6 Annexure: 7 Annexure: 8 2 4 6 7 8 29 37 38 46 25 66 67 68 69 74 78 79 1 9 10 30 36 39 40 48 52 59 60 61 85
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LPCD I. II. : Litres Per Capita Per Day
Legend: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. Police camp DESU Power Tower Converted into a Park Hindurao Hospital Blasting Site Ravindra Rangshala Gurudwara Nanak Sahib and petrol Pump Widening of Shankar Road Schools (Manav Sthali, Army Public, Springdales and J. D. Tytler) 10. Talkatora Complex 11. Army Camp 12. Petrol Pump 13. Buddha Jayanti Park 14. Delhi Polo Ground 15. Army School Housing Complex 16. SITE 17. Shooting Range 18. Mahavir Jayanti Park 19. Residential Colonies
Policy/Institutional Issues Distributional/Technical Issues
Annexure: 1 Annexure: 2 Annexure: 3 Annexure: 4 Annexure: 5 Annexure: 6 Annexure: 7 Annexure: 8
1. Introduction
rom earlier times, Delhi has been a chosen seat of power for successive dynasties Slave Dynasty, Khiljis, Tughlaqs, Sayyads and Lodis between 12th and 16th centuries. Later the Mughals made it their capital in the 17th century and nally the British also made Delhi their capital in the 20th century. So it was considered natural for Delhi to be the capital of independent India in 1947. Before entering into any discussion on the prevailing water crisis in Delhi, it would be relevant to have a birds eye view of the city, the way its population lives, its forest cover, the Yamuna river and some other related aspects.
1.1. Population of Delhi

The national capital city of Delhi is spread over an area of 1483 sq km inclusive of the area falling under New Delhi Municipal Corporation (NDMC) and the Delhi Cantonment. On the basis of the Census data, it has a population of 1.37 crores in 2001 and as per the new Draft Master Plan of DDA, the city has a population of 1.60 crores. The Delhi Jal Board (DJB) is the ofcial agency responsible for the provision of drinking water to the citizens of Delhi. A majority of the population of Delhi, about 1.06 crores, live in Jhuggi-Jhompri (JJ) clusters while a mere 31 lakh people live in Planned Colonies. The distribution of different categories of JJ colonies is shown in Table 1. There are 2938 JJ clusters in Delhi, as per the latest available ofcial data.
Different Categories of JJ Settlement in Delhi
S. No. Settlement-Type 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Unauthorised JJ Colonies Regularised JJ Colonies JJ Clusters Urban Villages Rural Villages Number of Settlements 1071 567 820 126 135 TABLE 1
1.2. Physiographic Features of Delhi

The area under Delhi can be divided into following physiographic features: the ridge and its forest, undulating surfaces, plains and ood plains, the Najafgarh drain and the Yamuna River.
6. Harijan Colonies 219 Ridge is a part of the Aravalli Range, Source: NCR Fact Sheet entering Delhi from the South, bifurcating into two and nally spreading itself into a wider tableland. The ridge is divided into Northern Ridge (Delhi University), Central Ridge, South Central Ridge (Mehrauli) and Southern Ridge (Map 1). The Northern Ridge has an area of 87 ha, the Central Ridge has an area of 869 ha, the South Central Ridge has an area of 626 ha and the Southern Ridge has an area of 6,200 ha including 1900 ha of the recently notied Asola Wildlife Sanctuary.
Delhis Watery Woes
MAP 1
The Ridge Forest in Delhi
2 Introduction
The width of the Ridge varies from 50-100 meters at Wazirabad to as wide as 2.5 km near Chanakyapuri. The total Ridge area in Delhi is approximately 22.9 sq km. In 1912, when Delhi became the capital of British India, the Ridge was declared a forest under the Indian Forest Act 1913 and a similar status was extended to the Central Ridge in 1942. Further, in 1980 the Northern Ridge and Southern Ridge were also declared as reserve forests. At present, only two segments of the Ridge the Northern Ridge and the Southern Ridge remain as green buffers. In 1960, 48 percent of the ridge area was covered under forest while today it is a mere eight percent. To make matters worse MCD is using a part of the ridge for dumping garbage. A number of encroachment in the ridge area (Map 2), predominantly by the rich and powerful sections of society, have strangulated the ridge. The Yamuna ood plains cover an area of 161 sq km, extending up to a maximum of 14 km from the river in the north. It has been subdivided into three categories: new Khadar or the current ood plains, old Khadar or the earlier ood plains and Bangar or the upper alluvial plains. Most of the river features have been obliterated by land reclamation as well as land leveling of the urbanisation process. The Najafgarh drain ows in a northeast direction and joins the Yamuna near Wazirabad. A century ago, the Najafgarh drain reportedly covered an area of 22,663 ha and was 4.2 meters deep. Since 1940 onwards it has been drained and cultivated to the extent that it has completely lost its sheen.
km, against the stipulated 33 percent for a healthy environment. However, a more disturbing fact is that only 38 sq km of the area falls under dense forests and is restricted to New Delhi and South Delhi. Eastern, Western and Northern Delhi have less than three percent of their area under trees. In colonies like Seelampur and posh areas like Punjabi Bagh, the number of trees is almost negligible. In East Delhi, much of the green area is under illegal occupation. A major factor contributing to deforestation is the felling of trees for widening of roads. The New Delhi Municipal Corporation (NDMC) has felled thousands of old trees for widening roads. Recently in 2004, NDMC has carried out massive tree felling near the Prime Ministers residence at Race Course Road, for constructing a parking place. As per the ofcials of the Department of Forests and Environment, Government of Delhi, ofcial permission has been granted for the felling of 15,144 trees (more than 50 year old trees) between January 2002 to July 2004. The Public Relations Ofcer of NDMC has stated that the number of trees planted are many times more than the number of trees felled. Every year various agencies of the Delhi Government (NDMC, DDA, Forest Department, Horticulture department, etc.) claim to carry out plantation of 6-7 lakh trees. The Horticulture Departments of these agencies have an annual budget of Rs. 100 crore for this purpose. However, all this money is lining the pockets of the corrupt ofcials as corroborated by the raids of the CBI on the premises of Director, Horticulture Department, in Delhi [2]. Moreover, it is an irony that no department has any record of the survival and growth rate of these trees. According to the Environment Secretary of the Delhi Government, he has recently asked all these agencies to furnish records in this regard, but it is bound to take some time. During this period, the ofcial agencies will continue to take advantage
Delhis Watery Woes
1.3. Green Cover of Delhi

Though it is claimed that Delhi is the third greenest city in the world with 33000 acres of green area within its boundaries (rst being New York with 1,10,000 acres greenery and second London with 55,000 acres, within their city-boundaries), but the reality is far from the truth. According to a recent report [1], only 10.2 percent of Delhis total area is covered under forests, i.e., 111.33 sq
MAP 2
Places of Encroachment on the Ridge
Encroachment on the Ridge
In 1960, 48 percent of the area under the ridge was covered with forests, today it is a mere 8 per cent The MCD is using a part of the Southern Ridge for dumping garbage Majority of the encroachments (as shown in the map above) are by the rich.
Legend: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. Police camp DESU Power Tower Converted into a Park Hindurao Hospital Blasting Site Ravindra Rangshala Gurudwara Nanak Sahib and Petrol Pump Widening of Shankar Road Schools (Manav Sthali, Army Public, Springdales and J. D. Tytler) 10. Talkatora Complex 11. Army Camp 12. Petrol Pump 13. Buddha Jayanti Park 14. Delhi Polo Ground 15. Army School Housing Complex 16. SITE 17. Shooting Range 18. Mahavir Jayanti Park 19. Residential Colonies
Source: Yeh Dilli Kiski Hai, Hazard Centre, November 2003, New Delhi
4 Introduction
of this major administrative and procedural lapse. The impact of rapidly reducing green cover on water availability is discussed later.
1.4. Delhi: Water in the Past

Rivers have been the cradles of civilisation throughout the world and the history of Delhi too is intrinsically intertwined with the Yamuna River. Recently, an attempt has been made to rejuvenate the Yamuna and its surroundings[3]. Ancient and mediaeval cities were built facing the riverfront of Yamuna. Till the reign of Jala-ud-din Khilji (1290-96) very dense forests surrounded Delhi, implying the presence of abundant ground water reserves with a high water table. During the reign of Firoz Shah Tughlaq (1351-1388) hunting reserves and pleasure resorts were constructed along water harvesting dams. Shahjahan used to come from Agra to Delhi by boat. The sandy banks near the Red Fort were used in winter for elephant ghts and kite ying. They were also used for jharokha darshan people coming to see the king on the terrace of the Fort. An underground ight of steps from the Fort would touch the riverbed and people undertook boating during the rainy season. That Delhi had plenty of water in the past is corroborated by a study conducted in 2000, which discovered 15 water harvesting dams which dene a network of 25 water structures along forty miles of the Delhi ridge from Zamrudpur and Tughlaqabad in the south to Wazirabad on the Yamuna. The antique map showing the Environs of Delhi circa 1870, published by the Survey of India, also testies that before the beginning of the British rule, a number of rivers and rivulets originating from the ridge nally culminated in Yamuna (Map 3). In addition to this, there were hundreds of other water-bodies like wells, talabs, babris, kunds and others. Recently, TAPAS, a Delhibased NGO, has prepared a list of more than 700 such water-bodies. Even today, 10 babris of Delhi remain under the exclusive control of the Archaeological Survey of India.
The Yamuna River is basically migrant in nature and has been shifting its course eastward from ancient times. In 1989, the Geological Survey of India redrew the migration pattern of Yamuna in parts of Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh [4], as shown (Map 4). The newspaper ofces at ITO (Income Tax Ofce), Pragati Maidan and the surrounding areas were once the oodplains of Yamuna, before it shifted its course. According to Anupam Mishra, a pioneer in traditional water management practices, Hauz Khas used to be the biggest talab (pond) in Delhi and Talkatora was also a huge talab. There were large ponds in Patparganj, Khureji, Khirki and other parts of Delhi, just 100-130 years back. Two rivers existed at Connaught Place. Humayuns Tomb, Safdarjung and Old Fort were all located along the banks of rivers. Where have all these water-bodies vanished? There is strong evidence to support that massive urbanisation has resulted in the death of rivers including the Yamuna. On comparing Map 3 (1807) with the present map of Delhi (Map 5), one nds that today all the then existing green areas have been covered by extensive concrete structures, courtesy the ever-increasing population of the city. It has virtually killed the natural surface and sub-surface drainage patterns of the area. Massive deforestation has led to gradually reducing run-in, due to which parts of the city get ooded during monsoons. Most of the roads have been built directly on the drainage lines which has further aggravated the problem. There are other aspects of urbanisation too. According to Census 2001, Delhi has a population of 137.8 lakhs and in March 2001 there were 34.56 lakh vehicles registered with the Transport Department of Delhi Government. In March 2001, the total road network in Delhi was 28,508 km. Between 1970-2001, the increase of vehicles in Delhi has been 16 times from 2.14 lakhs to 34.56 lakhs, but the increase in road network during the same period has been a mere three times. In the IX Five Year Plan, 11 yovers were constructed whereas 45 new yovers and 27 bridges have been planned and approved for the coming
Delhis Watery Woes
Water Channels Of Delhi
MAP 3
6 Introduction
MAP 4
Changing Course of Yamuna River
Present boundaries of river Old channels of river ow Locations of archaelogical evidence Change in direction of river ow Boundaries of old river ow channels
Delhis Watery Woes
MAP 5
Present Map of Delhi
8 Introduction
years. In addition to this, massive digging work carried out for the Delhi Metro, covering an area of 52 km, has further affected the remaining natural drainage. All this has played a part in the drying up of Yamuna as the provenance of the river has become barren, coupled with the destruction of upstream. As a result there has been a massive reduction in the availability of water throughout the river stretches in all the states. In the wake of Delhi hosting Asian Games in 2011, a massive concretisation exercise is scheduled to begin.
1.5. Current Sources of Water for Delhi

Till 1955, there was no major outer source of water in Delhi, as by and large, Yamuna was fullling the requirements. As stated earlier, with the settlement of large number of refugees from Pakistan, the water shortage was felt for the rst time in the fties. Around the same time the Bhakra Nangal dam (the rst temple of modem India - Nehru) was also completed and became an important source in providing water to Delhi and it continues to be so even today. Over 86 percent of Delhis water supply comes from surface water through the Yamuna river, whose ows are largely diverted upstream in Punjab and Haryana for canal irrigation. Other sources are Himalayan Rivers, under various inter-state agreements, and subsurface sources like Ranney wells and tubewells, as shown in Table 2.
TABLE 2
Water for Delhi is released from Bhakra Nangal dam to the town Tajewala (near Ambala) and it reaches Munakh (Panipat) 70 km further down. Munakh is the receiving point for the Delhi Jal Board. From Munakh, it is the responsibility of DJB to take this water to Delhi. Delhi Jal Board sends this water to its two water treatment plants - Haidarpur (130 km from Munakh) and Wazirabad (150 km from Munakh). This transportation is facilitated through the old Yamuna Nagar canal and Indira Gandhi canal. This water is eventually supplied to all other water treatment plants of Delhi, except Bhagirathi. The Bhagirathi water treatment plant, since 1990, receives its 270 cusec water from the upper Ganges through the Muradnagar canal covering a distance of 28 km. This water takes care of the complete water requirement of eastern Delhi and most of the water requirement of south Delhi. Thus, the water from two-mega water storage dams, namely Bhakra Nangal, built primarily on the pretext of irrigation, is being supplied to Delhi and soon Tehri will follow suit. It may be recalled here that since the last decade, the farmers from Punjab have been agitating against water shortages. Similarly, farmers from Uttar Pradesh are also against supplying water from Tehri dam to Delhi, as it will adversely affect their share of water availability. Incidentally, 40 percent of the electricity from the Tehri hydroelectric power plant will also be diverted to Delhi. In such a situation one cant escape concluding that the real aim of such mega water projects is mostly to fulll the requirements of urban centers, contrary to the declared project objectives.
Sources of Water for Delhi

S. No. Type Source Quantity
1.
Surface Water
Upper Yamuna River Board
404 mgd (1835 tcmd) 267 mgd (1213 tcmd) 22 mgd (101 tcmd) 41 mgd (187 (tcmd)
2.
Surface Water
Bhakra-Beas Management Board Yamuna River Ranney Wells Tubewells across Delhi
1.6. Present Water Requirements of Delhi

At present the total water requirement of Delhi stands at 3830 mld (million litres per day) and has a shortfall of 880 mld. The total quantum of water received in Delhi is 725 cusec from Haryana and 270 cusec from the Ganges. However, there has never been much demand on Delhis part to increase its share from the Ganges and over the
9
3.
Groundwater
4.
Groundwater
Source: Delhi Jal Board
Delhis Watery Woes
years this share has been, more or less, stabilised. Moreover, this share will also be increased once the Sonia Vihar water treatment plant becomes functional, as it will be fed with the Ganges water. However, the share with Uttar Pradesh too has become a bone of contention, like Haryana. Delhi has six functional water treatment plants (Table 3) with an installed capacity of 560 mgd (million gallons per day) though the total requirement of the city has been estimated to be 800 mgd. In addition to these, Sonia Vihar and Nangloi water treatment plants, though completed, are non-functional owing to lack of water.
TABLE 3
continued throughout 1980. But the Haryana government has expressed its inability to do so as it was facing difculty in fullling its own water requirement for agriculture. During these negotiations Haryana claimed that it could only provide surplus 200 cusec water to Delhi, once it starts getting surplus water from neighbouring Punjab, after the completion of the Satluj-Yamuna Link canal. Thus, the bilateral dispute between Delhi and Haryana, in fact, has been transformed into a trilateral issue between Delhi-Haryana-Punjab. However, the scenario was further compounded and made murkier by the constant stubborn refusal of Punjab to complete its portion of the Satluj-Yamuna Link canal, aimed at providing water to Haryana from Punjab. But Punjab has taken a stand that there is no surplus water to be provided to Haryana and its own farmers are facing water shortage for their agricultural elds. Thus the stalemate has continued for about 20 years. During 1978-1997, there were many demonstrations, rallies and dharnas in Delhi over this issue by farmers of Haryana and Punjab. Different political parties, religious organisations and farmers unions organised these. In both Punjab and Haryana, this has become a major emotive issue and has been a key subject in the electoral politics of these states. In Punjab all the political parties are united in the stand of not providing water to Haryana and in Haryana all political parties are united on getting their share of water from Punjab. Exasperated with the pointless negotiations, Delhi finally filed a case in the Supreme Court in 1994, demanding its increased share of 800cusec from Haryana. Subsequently, before the matter could be decided, Delhi and Haryana alongwith Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan opted for an out of court settlement, signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) under which Delhi was ensured an uninterrupted supply of 725 cusec.
Water Treatment Plants in Delhi

S. No. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. Name Wazirabad Chandrawal Haidarpur Nangloi Okhla Bhagirathi Sonia Vihar Bawana Capacity 120 mgd 95 mgd 200 mgd 40 mgd 12 mgd 100 mgd Lying idle since Dec 1994 Lying idle since Dec 2000
Note: All the first five treatment plants receive water from the Upper Yamuna Canal and Western Yamuna Canal whereas the sixth plant, Bhagirathi receives water from the Ganges and Upper Ganga Canal Source: Delhi Jal Board
1.7. Hydro Politics of Water in Delhi

The water shortages in Delhi were rst witnessed in mid-1950s, after the settlement of refugees in large numbers from Pakistan. At that time the shortage was overcome by the supply of water from the Bhakra Nangal dam. As the population of Delhi continued to swell, the second round of crisis was faced in late 1970s. At that time Delhi was receiving 600 cusec water from Haryana. In late 1970s, negotiations started with Haryana for providing additional 200 cusec water to Delhi and
10 Introduction
On 17 July 2004, the then Chief Minister of Haryana publicly threatened to nullify the Yamuna Agreement in case the Central Government fails to take stern action against Punjab [5]. Immediately after this public pronouncement, the Chief Minister of Delhi, addressing a press conference said that she has approached the Prime Minister to protect the interests of NCT of Delhi while resolving the crisis arising out of the Punjab Assembly passing a law terminating the 1981 trilateral agreement [6]. The Chief Minister of Delhi met with the Chief Minister of Haryana and drew his attention to the water crisis in Delhi. The Chief Minister of
Delhi categorically said to his counterpart that the city needs water for domestic purposes, which is allocated top priority in the national water policy and hence water availability to Delhi must be ensured. The same drama was once again enacted in 2005 over the supply of water to Sonia Vihar plant in Delhi and is covered in the relevant text. To sum up, several factors have played a signicant role in precipitating a water crisis in the everexpanding city of Delhi vanishing forest cover, massive urbanisation, swelling population, utter neglect of river Yamuna, destruction of natural surface and sub-surface drainage network, etc.
References
1. Forest Survey of India (2002). The Forest Mapping of India: 2001-2002. MOEF, Forest Survey of India, Dehradun, Uttaranchal. 2002 2. News Item (2004). CBI raids Director Horticultures Premises in Delhi. Times of India. July 22, 2004 3. Shobha John and Rachna Subramaniam (2004). Finally a river may run through it. Times of India. January 18, 2004 4. Arun Kumar Singh (1990). Yamuna - A Vagabond River. SROTE Science Features, August 1990 5. News Item (2004). Chautala threatens to nullify Yamuna Agreement. The Tribune. July 18, 2004 6. News Item (2004). CM asks PM to protect Delhis water interests. The Tribune. July 19, 2004
* * * * *
Delhis Watery Woes 11
2. Water Rights and Delhi-Haryana Water Dispute
efore delving into the subject of water dispute, it will be relevant here to understand water rights, which is an extremely complex subject involving individual rights, peoples rights, community rights, state rights and is often a bone of contention.
2.1 What are Water Rights?

There are specic questions concerning the nature of rights, like: Is it a natural (customary) right or a legal (positive) right (granted by law)? Is it an individual right or a group right? Is it a positive or negative right? A natural right may arise in at least three ways: granted by law, this would be a legal right, such as forest laws, where people are given usufruct rights by the state to collect forest produce; arising out of contract, such as under family laws, where both parties acquire certain rights, in virtue of entering into a contract with one another; and as a natural right arising out of either the very nature of human nature or society. Traditionally, both individual and group rights over water were recognised in India. In fact, group rights of communities, castes or whole villages over tanks, ponds, wells, streams or riverbanks were very common. In positive rights, legally, there is an obligation on others to do something, and in negative rights there is an obligation to refrain from doing something. Even if right to water is assumed to be a natural right, the question still remains whether it is a positive or negative right? Is it a positive right in which the state and other people (on whom the corresponding duty falls) can be compelled to ensure that an individual is provided with water? Or is it a negative kind of right in which state and other people merely need to keep away so that an individual can enjoy unfettered access to water? The jurisprudential basis of negative rights has traditionally been the assumption:- that over which (or for which) one has a negative right cannot be a subject matter for property. Natural human life, for example, cannot be owned by anyone. In this backdrop, a brief overview of the evolution of rights over water in India would be relevant here.
2.2 Evolution of Water Rights in India

The water law in India can be distinctly placed in four categories: ancient India, British rule, post-independence and post WTO. A brief overview of these four periods
12 Water Rights and Delhi-Haryana Water Dispute
would be helpful in understanding the various dimensions and complexities involved with the water law. Obviously these customs and laws were put in practice keeping the socio-economic realities of the prevailing times in mind during all the four periods.
Water in Ancient India

Any efcient system of management cannot be put in practice without the sound knowledge about the concerned area. Various processes of hydrological cycle (evaporation, condensation, rainfall, streamow etc.), as well as the fact that its conversion from one form to another does not mean loss of water, were well known during the Vedic period. Water intake by plants, division of water into minute particles by sunrays and wind, different types of clouds, their heights, their rainfall capacities etc., along with the prediction of rainfall quantity in advance by observation of natural phenomena are illustrated in the Puranas, Vrahat Samhita (550 AD), Meghmala (900 AD) and other literature. There is reference to rain gauges (varsha mapini) in Arthasastra of Kautilya (also popularly known as Chanakya, 400 BC), and Astadhyayi of Panini (700 BC). Kautilya also knew the quantity of rainfall in various parts of India. Indians were acquainted with the cyclonic and orographic effects on rainfall, radiation and convectional heating of earth. Various other phenomena of inltration, interception, streamow, geomorphology, artesian wells and erosive action of water were well understood. Groundwater development and quality consideration were getting sufcient attention as evidenced by Vrahat Samhita (550 AD). It was this vast knowledge, which formed the pillar of water management, rights and cess system in ancient India. The credit for evolving guidelines for scientic water management and pricing system in ancient India goes to Kautilyas Arthasastra. The Arthasastra in 15 books (adhikaranas) presents 6000 verses (slokas). The treatise also gives a vivid picture of the water management practices of ancient India. The Arthasastra is a treatise on statecraft, attributed
to Kautilya, the mentor of emperor Chandragupta Maurya of India (321-297 BC). He gave considerable importance to water management in his work, since irrigated agriculture was one of the main sources of revenue to the state. A critical study of the Arthasastra brings to light the water law, water pricing and responsibilities of the Irrigation Department prevailing at that time in India. It is evident from Arthasastra that the people of ancient India have been familiar with the rainfall distribution, soil classication and appropriate irrigation practices for different agro-climatic zones. The earliest mention of a rain gauge is found in this work. It gives the details and dimensions of the rain gauge and the locations where it has to be installed. The rainfall data for certain locations of the empire are furnished and depending on the rainfall, the empire is divided into the wetlands and dry lands. Certain principles have been prevalent at that time to classify the land according to land capability and land irrigability. Apart from the traditional sources, man-made structures like tanks, reservoirs and wells were used for irrigation. One of Chandragupta Mauryas notable achievements was the construction of a great irrigation lake called Sudarsana near Junagadh (Gujarat). The Arthasastra brings out certain salient features of the water law of the period. The upstream and downstream water rights were well dened. For example, a tank built downstream of an earlier existing tank should not ood the elds irrigated by the upper tank. A tank constructed upstream should not deprive the downstream users. The law stipulates not only nes but also emptying of tanks for cases of violation. Exemption from tax was given to those involved in the construction and renovation of irrigation works. Fines were imposed on those who let out water from dams out of turn, and on those who obstructed the water allocated to others. Fine was also imposed on those who obstructed a customary watercourse. The responsibilities of the Head of Irrigation Department, according to the Arthasastra, included
construction of irrigation systems and aiding others involved in these activities. In waterless regions, the government superintendents were in charge of constructing wells and other water works. The Arthasastra clearly talks about a water cess over and above the normal land revenue levied by the state on users of irrigation facilities. Even those using their own private waterworks had to pay some cess. The ownership of sh, ducks and green vegetables in the irrigation works should go to the king. It is interesting to note that the ancient Indians had practiced scientic water management. Their concepts pertaining to water law and pricing have relevance even in modern times. Subsequent rulers (from 321 BC-1857 AD), with little alterations, followed the system of water pricing and management devised by Kautilya, proving the scientic basis in which they were rooted.
the government whereas Section 2 (6) of the same act gives full recognition to natural and negative customary rights, both for groups and individuals. This act legitimises customary rights of the people and provides two rules for recognition: by use or prescription (Section 15) and by local customs (Section 18). However, Section 4 of this act denes easements for the rst time as iura in re aliena, i.e., legal rights that can be alienated. Similarly, riparian rights were also recognised under the British law, in spite of these acts mentioned above. The riparian rights as established by the courts are as follows: A riparian owner has a right to use the water of a stream owing over his land equally with other riparian owners, and to have the water come to him undiminished in ow, quantity or quality, and to go beyond his land without obstruction. The existence of the fact that riparian rights are natural rights was recognised by the Privy Council [1] in 1932. The same fact was once again recognised and established even after independence by the Patna Court in 1954 [2]. Though in practice it was difcult to implement uniformly, as not many Indians had resources to approach the Privy Council during the British Rule. But in all fairness, it must be mentioned that the Privy Council upheld no property rights of anyone, in rivers, including the King [3].
Water in British Rule

With the advent of British rulers, however, things began to change, since the very nature of this rule was different to generate revenue for the British Empire rather the welfare of the common masses being ruled. An entire range of legislations over water came into existence, like the Limitation Act of 1859, which was made explicit through easement in water rights in its amendments in 1871, The Bengal Canal Act 1864, The Bengal Ferries Act 1866, The Bombay Inland Vessel Act 1868, The Punjab Canals and Drainage Act 1871, The Northern Indian Canal and Drainage Act 1873, The Bengal Irrigation Act 1876, The Bombay Irrigation Act 1879, Madras Rivers Conservancy Act 1884, and many other similar acts. All these acts drastically curtailed group rights and community rights, to a large extent. The coming of Easement Act 1882, made the rst radical shift in the history of Indian Law, in both, recognising and not recognising water rights as a negative natural right, as it has contradictory provisions. Section 2, for the rst time, gave absolute right over rivers and lakes to
Water in Independent India

India after independence, maintained almost the same enactments, which were generated during British rule. They were only amended or substituted by newer ones, with the sole intention of further strengthening states control over water, if needed. Let us look at the existing provisions. The Constitutional Rights The sovereign powers of the state over natural water resources begin with the Constitution. Entry 17, in the II List of the Seventh Schedule places water at the disposal of the states (state governments in Union of India). This includes water supplies, irrigation, canals, embankments, water storages and hydroelectric
power. This power is limited only by entry 56 of List I, which gives power to the Center (Central Government) for regulation and development of inter-state rivers and river valleys, to the extent to which such regulation and development under the control of the Union is declared by the Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest. Entry 57, List I specically mentions that the Union also has the sole power to regulate shing and sheries beyond territorial waters. This control of the state over water emanates from The Easement Act 1882, which recognises the absolute right of the state and claims that no perspective rights of easement can be claimed against the government. The Preamble to this Act does not explain why it became necessary to vest this absolute right in the government. The subsequent irrigation acts progressively afrmed the states rights over water, be it in British India or independent India. Though technically speaking, water is a state (government) subject and the Center has no role except to intervene through Inter-State Water Dispute Act by appointing a Tribunal in case of a dispute arising between two or more states over the use of water. However, in practical terms, it is the Center, which decides the allocation of development funds to different states under the ve-year plans and hence covertly controls the development of water resources in the states. Such an ambiguity arises primarily because of legal position in this regard. In the face of water crisis in many states, the Ministry of Water Resources came out with a proposal to withdraw water from the concurrent list and bring it under the exclusive fold of Center. However, preliminary discussions with many states witnessed such erce opposition from all states that the proposal has been put in cold storage. Implied Rights There are other enactments involving use of water, such as production of electricity, water-ways, sheries, food, recreation etc. By implication, therefore, they give the
government rights over such use of water. Some of these enactments are: The Obstructing in Fairways Act, 1881 The Indian Ports Act, 1908 The Indian Electricity Act, 1910 The Steam Vessel Act, 1917 The Indian Forest Act [Section 26, 32(F)] The Indian Mines Act, 1952 [Chapter V, Section 19 (1)] The Rajasthan Soil and Water Conservation Act, 1964 In 1954, after the report of States Reorganisation Committee, boundaries of most of the states were redrawn and many new states came into existence. With this, disputes between the riparian states over sharing of water resources, began to surface. Taking this into consideration, The Rivers Board Act 1956 and Inter-State Water Dispute Act 1956 were enacted by the Parliament. The former remained only on paper but the second act has been in operation in resolving various disputes. In addition to this, almost all the states have brought in their own enactment on water resource within their jurisdiction. Summing up, it can be safely concluded that practically all the rights over water for different uses have been vested in the hands of government. The process started with the British rule and continues till today. In this framework, the public declaration by the Irrigation Minister (now former minister) that Every drop of rain belongs to the government! Only the government has the right to collect the rain [4] is merely a reection of the arrogance of the state.
Water in the Era of Globalisation

With the emergence of WTO in 1995, the trade, economic, cultural and intellectual rights have been redened within the framework of WTO legislation. It is mandatory for all WTO members (at present 147) to reframe and re-orient their municipal and national laws, policies and programmes in congruence with WTO legislation. WTO has both judicial and legislative authority, to
call for cancellation of national or municipal laws of any country, which are not in conformity with the WTO legislation and if they can be successfully shown to be trade restrictive. Any failure in compliance on this count, will lead to penalty of cross retaliation through discriminatory trade measures at the hands of the other members. It has its own dispute settling mechanism alongwith an appellate body, whose decision is nal. Thus WTO has emerged as a very powerful body the likes of which world has never seen. Legal foundation of trade in water was laid in 1947, when GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) in its denition of tradable goods clearly lists waters, including natural and articial waters. In an explanatory note, it further adds, Ordinary natural waters of all kinds (other than sea water) is included in this category. Article XI of GATT Rules specically mentioned No country is allowed to prohibit the export of a tradable good. WTO retained these same provisions of water in relation to trade. WTO also included water in its GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services) category and there are various services under this regime covering water, like, fresh water services (read supply), sewer services, wastewater treatment, construction of water pipes, waterways, tankers, groundwater assessment, irrigation, dams, water transport services and many more. This has resulted in opening the gates for foreign companies in these areas, which were hitherto city municipalities responsibilities. Moreover, if water and waterbodies in natural state are explicitly brought under the GATS regime as the recent proposals of EU (2003) have asked, then it would lead to the complete control of MNCs over waterbodies. And this process will be irreversible since under the GATS rules, once a public service has been privatised, it must remain a commercial utility. Still worse, it has also been proposed to bring water under the investment category, and if done so, MNCs will be in a position to demand funds from the government for development activities, like any other government department. A greater
discussion on this issue is not possible here and those interested may refer to the authors published work in this regard [5]. India was one of the rst nations to become a member of the WTO on 31 December 1995 itself, on its rst day of existence. It was therefore mandatory for India to redraft its National Water Policy making it congruent with the WTO legislation. So National Water Policy 2002 was enacted, substituting the earlier NWP 1987, though it has nothing new to offer, except one point. A new para was inserted, as follows: Private Sector Participation. 13. Private sector participation should be encouraged in the various aspects of planning, development and management of the water resource projects for diverse uses, wherever feasible. Private sector participation may help in introducing innovative ideas, generating nancial resources and introducing corporate management in improving service efciency and accountability to users. Depending upon specic situations, various combinations of private sector participation, in building, owning, operating, leasing and transferring of water resource facilities, may be considered. (Emphasis original) There is another angle to the inclusion of water in WTO, where it is considered as a need. United Nations, since its inception has been very clear that water is a human right through its various covenants, protocols, declarations and resolutions. These are: Convention on the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination (1967); Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition (1974), Declaration on the Right to Development (1986), Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), to name a few. It is very concerned over the manner in which water is considered merely as an economic and tradable good, overlooking social and cultural aspects related with water. Recently, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2003) has come out with the most hard-hitting 60-point document [6]
establishing that water is a human right subject. United Nations in many of its reports, from time to time, has been raising its voice against the policies of international nancial institutions for violating these rights. It is in this larger framework that the issue of rights of water should be perceived. It is evident that peoples rights over water, as they stand today, are extremely diluted and the state is the sole custodian of these rights, in the name of the people. This continues in spite of the fact that the Supreme Court has explicitly reinterpreted Article 21 (a fundamental right in Constitution, known as the right to life) to include right to environment and hence right to clean water, as a fundamental right. This has been recorded in the Supreme Court judgment given in Dehradun Valley and pollution cases and others [7, 8]. Another signicant point deserving attention is the issue of rights over groundwater, which assumes greater signicance in times of water crisis.
to groundwater use, resulting in a sharp decline of the water table. This trend was noticed rst in mid-1980s. By 1988, out of 12 total districts in the state, in six districts withdrawals exceeded recharge, namely Amritsar, Sangrur, Jalandhar, Patiala, Kapurthala and Ludhiana [10]. By 1990s, major parts of 11 districts out of 12 fell into the category of dark zones [11]. As per the recent ofcial data situation has gone from bad to worse in 2000, out of a total of 118 Blocks in Punjab, 62 fall under over-exploited category and 8 fall under Dark Zones [12]. Paradoxically, owing to liberal use of water for irrigation 2.86 lakh hectare land is waterlogged in Punjab [13]. The over-exploitation of groundwater throughout the country is manifested by the fact that in 286 districts across 18 states in India, the water table has fallen by four meters in the last two decades [14] and many coastal states like Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra and Gujarat are on the verge of massive saline intrusion owing to indiscriminate extraction of groundwater. Concerned over it, the Central Government has prepared a Model Groundwater (Control and Regulation) Bill and circulated to the states to come with an Act for groundwater development [15] since water is a state subject. The salient features of this bill are: Groundwater has been dened as the water, which exists below the surface of the ground at any particular point. Groundwater Authority should be constituted by the state. The state government, on a report received from the Groundwater Authority may declare areas as notied areas, where extraction and use of groundwater will be regulated in the Publics interest. Any person desiring to sink a well in the notied area for any purpose other than exclusive domestic use, either on personal or community basis, shall apply to the Groundwater Authority for the grant of a permit for the purpose and shall not proceed with any activity connected with the sinking unless a permit has been granted by the Groundwater Authority.
2.3 Groundwater Rights

The importance of groundwater can be gauged from the fact that Groundwater accounts for more than 95 percent of all the fresh water available on Earth at any given moment [9]. Yet there is no groundwater law in India at the national level and consequently groundwater has been exploited beyond all levels of imagination. Groundwater rights in India are attached and linked with land rights, i.e, whoever owns the land, owns the groundwater too. This is a completely unscientic way of dening groundwater right since boundaries of a groundwater aquifer do not follow surface boundaries. Groundwater is one of the most exploited resources in the country and evidence strongly suggests that the phenomenal growth of agriculture has been laid on the foundation of groundwater. It is best corroborated in the case of Punjab where it is a common misconception that the Bhakra dam has ushered in the green revolution but, the fact is that except for the rst decade after the construction of the Bhakra dam, more and more farmers shifted
In granting or refusing a permit the Groundwater Authority shall have regard to: a) The purpose or purposes for which water is to be used; b) The existence of other competitive users; c) The availability of water, and d) Any other relevant factor. Every existing user of groundwater in the notied area shall apply to the Groundwater Authority for the grant of a certicate of registration recognising his existing use in such forms and in such manners as may be prescribed. No person shall himself or by any person on his behalf, carry on the business of sinking wells or any other activity connected with the sinking of wells in any notied area except under and in accordance with a license granted in this behalf. Any person desiring to carry on the business of sinking of wells or any other activity connected with the sinking of wells in any notied area may make an application to the Groundwater Authority for the purpose. The Groundwater Authority or any person authorised by it in writing in this behalf shall have the power to enter any property with the right to investigate and make any measurements concerning the land or the water located on the surface or underground, inspect the well, sunk or being sunk, take specimen of such solid, or other materials or of water extracted from such wells, and obtain such information and record as may be required. Any user of groundwater, who contravenes or fails to comply with any of the provisions of the Act, will be penalised and/or punished according to the provision of the Act.
Experiences of Rajasthan With Model Groundwater Bill

The Rajasthan government introduced a Model Groundwater Bill, drawn on the lines of the Model Bill circulated by Center, more than a decade ago. However the implementation of the bill in the state has been pathetic, to say the least. According to a recent report [16], Rajasthan has 4.8 lakh wells, 9 lakh bore wells, and 20,000 very deep wells in operation. On an average, these 13,80,000 wells are over-drawing annually 950 crore cubic meter water, against an annual recharge capacity of only 715.5 crore cubic meter water. Thus the withdrawals exceed 33 percent more than the recharge capacity. In spite of this, out of 237 total Blocks of Rajasthan, 177 are facing severe water scarcity, out of which 56 Blocks have been declared dark zones. In the last decade, successive governments have tried to bring out legislation to curb these practices but powerful lobbies have thwarted all such efforts. The long-term disastrous consequences of it are easy to visualise. Summing up, there is an urgent need to bring out a national legislation on groundwater as the future scenario looks bleak and there is an even stronger need to reform water laws in the country in congruence with the unfolding water crisis, which is anticipated to worsen in the days to come. The time has come, long overdue in fact, to dene explicitly and legally the enforceable water entitlements, at all levels, including personal. In this background, let us look at the water disputes concerning Delhi.
2.4 Yamuna River and Delhi-HaryanaUttar Pradesh Triangle

The stretch of Yamuna River from its origin to Delhi is called the Upper Yamuna river involving the other basin states of Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, Delhi, Uttaranchal and Rajasthan. However, the states of Haryana and Uttar Pradesh play a crucial role so far as water availability in Delhi is concerned. There have been a series of agreements between the involving states, each newer
However, most of the states have failed to introduce an enactment on groundwater and have rather preferred to draft their own model groundwater bill. Let us look at the experiences of Rajasthan, a perennially parched state, in this regard.
one nullifying the preceding one. The most recent UP-Haryana-Rajasthan-HP-Delhi Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in this regard is the Upper Yamuna Agreement on May 1994 [Annexure 1]. This agreement takes note of maximisation of use of the surface ows of the Yamuna River by a series of identied storage projects on Yamuna, upstream of Tajewala, which are already existing. The Upper Yamuna Board (established under the Yamuna River Agreement) is already fully functional to monitor the implementation of this agreement. An interesting fact regarding this agreement is that the total demands of the basin states is over three times than the quantum of ow available in the river. Obviously, these demands are based on political grounds. The agreement deals with the established irrigation needs of Uttar Pradesh and Haryana and Municipal and Industrial needs of Delhi and Rajasthan. Uttar Pradesh and Haryana can otherwise withdraw all the water upstream of Delhi for irrigation. It will be pertinent to the water related disputes among these three states, namely, Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan since Haryana-Delhi water dispute is intertwined with it.
MAF water from the Satluj and 1.62 MAF from the Ravi-Beas rivers at present. On December 31, 1981, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister, succeeded in bringing out a trilateral Ravi-Beas Agreement between the then Chief Ministers of Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan over sharing of water from Ravi-Beas rivers. The construction of Satluj-Yamuna Link (SYL) was proposed under this contractual obligation of 1981, in order to take water to Haryana. Under this agreement, Bhakra-Beas Management Board was to release 100 mgd of water from Ravi and Bead rivers for Delhi. In July 1985, an agreement between Rajiv Gandhi, the then Prime Minister and H. S. Longowal, the then Chief Minister of Punjab was signed covering the Ravi-Beas waters. It was under this agreement that a Tribunal was set up in April 1986 to adjudicate the claims of these two conicting states. Justice Balakrishna Eradi, then Supreme Court Judge, headed this Tribunal, which after listening to the arguments of both the parties over the claims of Ravi-Beas waters submitted its interim report in January 1987. The nal report of the Tribunal, supposed to be delivered within six months, remains to be delivered till date. According to the interim report of the Eradi Tribunal in 1987, from the Ravi-Beas river systems, 5 MAF (million acre feet) water is allocated to Punjab and 3.83 MAF to Haryana. It further reiterated that water to Haryana will be facilitated by the construction of a 305 km long Satluj-Yamuna Link canal, originally envisaged in the 1981 agreement, out of which 91 km lies in Haryana and 214 km in Punjab.
2.5 The Ravi-Beas Haryana-Punjab
Water
Dispute:
The state of Haryana, bifurcated from Punjab in 1966, mainly has an agrarian economy and its water demands are ever increasing. Haryana, as a part of Punjab till 1966, was already receiving water from the Bhakra dam and after coming into existence as an independent state, it continued to receive the same quantum of water. As the water-needs of Haryana grew, with expansion of agriculture, Haryana started demanding more water from RaviBeas rivers, giving birth to a long-standing watersharing dispute with Punjab. There are claims and counter-claims of Haryana and Punjab over the rights to water from the Bhakra Nangal dam and Ravi-Beas rivers. Even a 20 year long negotiation has failed to nd a satisfactory solution. It will be relevant to mention here that at present Haryana is already getting 4.33
2.6 The Satluj-Yamuna Link (SYL): Haryana-Punjab

After the trilateral agreement of 1981, the construction of the Satluj-Yamuna Link canal (in Punjab) started only in 1982. However, after some time, there was strong opposition to the construction of the Satluj-Yamuna Link canal
in Punjab and it was stopped. Meanwhile, after the award of the Eradi Tribunal, Haryana has completed the construction of the portion of the Satluj-Yamuna Link canal-falling within its territory by 1987. Once again, after a gap of eight years, the construction of the Satluj-Yamuna Link in Punjab was restarted during the 1990-91, for a very brief period, during which militancy was at its peak in the state. The work was once again stopped after the Chief Engineer of the Satluj-Yamuna Link canal was assassinated. It may be recalled that many workers of the Satluj-Yamuna Link canal have been gunned down during the years of militancy. Haryana, exasperated over the long delay in the completion of the Satluj-Yamuna Link by Punjab, in 1989, approached the Supreme Court to expedite the completion of the Satluj-Yamuna Link canal so that it can get water at the earliest. Haryana claims to spend Rs. 820 crores so far on its construction. But Punjab has refused to build the section of the project within its territory and so the Satluj-Yamuna Link canal carries no water. During the past twenty years, not a days work has been done on this. The Supreme Court has given deadlines, seven times to nish the completion of the SatlujYamuna Link canal December 1983, August 1986, December 1987, June 1989, January 1991, January 2002 and nally January 2003. On January 15, 2002 the Supreme Court ordered Punjab to nish the work on the canal within a year, failing which, it said, the Union Government would have to undertake the work. Punjab has ignored all these warnings, so far. In the meantime Punjab again led a legal intervention in this case, giving the argument that it has no surplus water to release to Haryana. It states that the 1985 Rajiv Gandhi-Longowal agreement was intended to end the terrorist activities in the state and this is a key component for the release of water into the Satluj-Yamuna Link canal. And so the deadlock continues.
In this ongoing bitter litigation, the Supreme Court, in 2003, once again, issued a directive to the Punjab government to complete the SatlujYamuna Link canal within one year but this too failed to make any change in Punjabs position. Repeated failure of the Punjab government in complying with the directives of the Supreme Court led to the passing of a stricture against the Punjab Chief Minister by the Supreme Court in 2003 and imposing a ne of Rs. 10,000 on the Punjab Government. In addition, a case of contempt of court is also ongoing against the present Chief Minister of Punjab. In May 2004, the Supreme Court, nally taking note of the repeated failures of the Punjab government to comply with its order, directed the Central government to undertake the completion of the Satluj-Yamuna Link canal and ensure its completion within a year. The Supreme Court specically directed the Punjab government to hand over the section of SYL falling under its territory to the Central Public Works Department (CPWD) of the Central government. The Punjab government publicly declared that it would appeal to the full bench of the Supreme Court against this decision of the 3-member bench. The Punjab government has already made consultations with its lawyers, including the Constitutional expert, Mr. Fali S. Nariman. Once again the farmers of Punjab have taken to the roads against this verdict of the Supreme Court. The main political party in opposition in the state, Akali Dal, accused the ruling Congress government of failing to present its case properly in the Supreme Court, thereby failing to protect the interests of the farmers of Punjab and demanded its resignation. The President of the Akali Dal publicly declared that he would not allow a single drop of water to be diverted from Punjab to Haryana. In response, the Punjab Chief Minister too also made a public declaration that as long as he is in power, not a drop of water will be given to Haryana at the cost of farmers of the state.
It will be relevant to state here that all political parties are united on the issue of not diverting water to Haryana. To counter the directive of the Supreme Court, just two days before the deadline of handing over the Satluj-Yamuna Link section to CPWD, the Punjab Chief Minister called a special session of the state Assembly on July 12, 2004. In this session The Punjab Termination of Agreements Bill, 2004 was passed unanimously, thereby annulling the December 1981 Trilateral Agreement, under which the Satluj-Yamuna Link was planned to be constructed. All other pacts related to Ravi-Beas water, with Haryana and Rajasthan, also stood terminated under this Bill. The Chief Minister, justifying the Bill, stated in the Assembly It is a well-settled law that the legislature is competent to remove, or take away the basis of a judgment by law, and thereby, it does not encroach upon the power of the judiciary. Emphasising the necessity for such a Bill, he stated that the terms of the 1981 Agreement have become onerous, unfair, unreasonable and contrary to the interests of the inhabitants of RaviBeas basin. The Chief Minister of Punjab further stated that Haryana and Rajasthan are neither riparian nor basin states, but have been utilising Ravi-Beas water and Punjab accepted this, as the Clause 5 of the Bill protects the existing usage of water from Ravi-Beas. Moreover, the Bill also has a safeguard as it exclusively mentions - No civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceedings in respect of any matter arising under or connected with this Act. It will be relevant to mention here that Punjab is yet to complete the work in 121 km (out of 214 km in its territory), including Sirsa Aqueduct. Since then, the Chief Ministers of Haryana and Rajasthan have met the incumbent Prime Minister demanding justice in this matter. The Central government, on its part, has also requested the Supreme Court to issue fresh guidelines in the wake of this development. The Members of Parliament from Haryana and Rajasthan have also approached the President of India to intervene in this issue and
the President has also asked for the opinion of the Supreme Court.
2.7 The Constitutional Crisis

The Punjab Termination of Agreements Act, 2004, on a cursory look, appears to be a violation of the constitutional provisions regarding sharing of river waters between the states. The Constitution clearly states that the sole responsibility of resolving all bilateral disputes in sharing water from riparian rivers rests with the Union of India. In such a case any concerned state, be it Punjab, Haryana or Rajasthan, is simply not competent to make an existing agreement null and void unilaterally. In this regard, the role of the Governor of Punjab is also questionable. The Governor, by signing an Act, contrary to the Constitutional provisions has acted in a hurry and it would have been more appropriate for him to send this Bill to the President of India for reference. Incidentally, the then incumbent Governor was an appointee of the earlier BJP led NDA-coalition government. So far as Rajasthans share of water from the rivers of Punjab is concerned, it primarily originates from the Indus Treaty between India and Pakistan wherein, the Indian claim contained water for Rajasthan. Inclusion of Rajasthan in subsequent inter-state water agreements over rivers of Punjab is done on this ground. If the Punjab Termination of Agreements Act, 2004, is made applicable to Rajasthan then it also implies the nullication of the Indus Treaty. In such a situation, is the Punjab Assembly the competent legislative authority to address an international agreement? A similar development in the past with regard to Karnataka-Tamil Nadu dispute over sharing of water from the Cauvery river can be cited here, as it sheds light on the line of reasoning by the Supreme Court. In 1991, the Karnataka government passed a legislation rejecting the award given by the Cauvery Tribunal asking Karnataka to release 205 TMC water to Tamil
Nadu. The Supreme Court rejected this legislation by terming it unconstitutional. The situation in Punjab is quite analogous, as Punjab too has rejected diversion of water to Haryana, as per the award of the Eradi Commission. Only time will tell whether the Supreme Court will apply the same principle to The Punjab Termination of Agreements Act, 2004, held by it 13 years ago. Though there are minority voices of sanity in Punjab, advising the government to comply with the directive of the Supreme Court, by and large the political and general mood remains in favour of non-diversion of water to Haryana. The Punjab Termination of Agreements Act, 2004, rocked the Parliament, in both upper and lower houses. Members of Parliament from Haryana and Rajasthan, demanding immediate intervention of the central government, didnt allow any work in the Parliament, till the Prime Minister himself made a statement on this issue promising to protect the interests of the concerned states. It has been argued that perhaps the legal ambiguity in which water rights exist is responsible for the non-compliance of the Supreme Court order, but it seems unlikely. It appears to be a case of populist policies and appeasement of voters within the state. It is corroborated by the fact that in the wake of electricity reforms, Punjab government has recently declared that it would continue supplying free electricity to farmers and would bear the bill. This would mean a loss of Rs. 1200 crores annually for the Punjab government.
Punjabs rationale
1. Over the last twenty years, there has been a substantial decline in the availability of surplus. The total quantum of water in Ravi Beas has reduced from 17.17 MAF to 14.37 MAF (1985-2004) and this reduction is consistent, continuous and constant. It is corroborated by the river ow data obtained from the BhakraBeas Management Board. 2. Even without the completion of Satluj Yamuna Link canal, Haryana is already getting 2.62 MAF through the Bhakra main line (Haryana was receiving this quantum of water as part of Punjab till 1966, and continued to receive the same quantum after becoming an independent state). 3. Punjab has contested the claim of the Center placing the Indus basin and Yamuna basin as analogous, in terms of being water surplus basins. It has alleged that the Indus basin covering Punjab is a water-decient basin whereas the Yamuna basin covering Haryana is a water surplus basin. Since water can only be transferred from a surplus basin to a decient basin, Punjab cant transfer water to Haryana. 4. In the meantime, Haryana faced with water scarcity has helped itself through several measures. It has signed MOUs with Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and Delhi in May 1994 for the allocation of Yamuna water and received 4.65 MAF out of the 9.73 MAF of Yamuna waters. 5. Haryana will also benet from the ShardaYamuna link for which an agreement has been signed between India and Nepal. 6. If Punjab diverts water to Haryana, about 16 lakh acres of land in Muktsar, Bhatinda and Mansa districts would be rendered barren and infertile. 7. The constant reduction in the quantum of water ow in Ravi-Beas has made the Eradi Tribunal irrelevant and hence it should be scrapped completely. 8. The Punjab-Haryana water dispute should be addressed by appointing a fresh Tribunal under Section 4(1) of the Inter State Water
2.8. Arguments put forth by Punjab and Haryana

It will be relevant here to briey view the arguments given by these two states, which are at loggerheads with each other. The Punjab government led a complaint with the Water Resource Ministry in this regard on January 13 2004, in which it has presented its position. This contains the same points, which Punjab has presented to the Supreme Court, as summarised below.
Dispute Act 1956. Punjab has also pointed out that Section 4(2) of the Act provides that only existing judges of the Supreme Court or the High Court could be nominated on the Tribunal. Therefore this matter could not be referred to the Eradi Tribunal. Moreover, the Eradi Tribunal was formed for a limited purpose for adjucating matters contained in the RajivLongowal Accord of July 24, 1985. 9. In 1984, the Punjab State Assembly declared inter-state agreement, Reorganisation Act 1966, invalid and also approached the Supreme Court challenging the validity of the Reorganisation Act 1966. It may be recalled that it was under this Act that the water of the riparian states were to be divided [However, Punjab withdrew this legal intervention, after a tripartite agreement between Punjab-Haryana-Rajasthan in 1985].
Haryanas rationale
Haryana has its own line of reasoning, as given below. 1. Haryana is legally entitled to get water from Satluj and Beas since the Reorganisation Act 1966 empowers the Center to divide the water of the Satluj and Beas river systems if both the states do not arrive at a mutually acceptable solution. 2. Haryana is diverting 725 cusec water to Delhi, which is affecting its agriculture. This has aggravated since 1997 when Haryana has had to increase its allocation to Delhi from 600 to 725 cusec. This is being done as per the HaryanaDelhi bilateral agreement, as the bulk of water supply for Delhi is received from Haryana (the
related agreements have been discussed latter in this text). 3. The contention that the Yamuna basin is water surplus basin is wrong, as the Yamuna basin too is a water decient basin. 4. Haryana strongly objects to the constitution of any new Tribunal for resolving its dispute with Punjab. It rmly believes that the issue has been satisfactorily resolved and the only bottleneck that remains is in the implementation of the Eradi Tribunals decision to allocate 3.83 MAF at the earliest. Haryana believes that Punjabs plea to appoint a new Tribunal is merely a delaying tactic, especially when the Eradi Tribunal has already given its verdict in this dispute. 5. The Sharda-Yamuna link will take a long time to complete, if at all it is ever completed, taking the acrimonious relations of India and Nepal in the water sharing arrangements into account, whereas the need for water is immediate. Thus, both Haryana and Punjab continue to be at loggerheads over the share of water from the Himalayan rivers, eventually affecting the share of water received by Delhi. [This section on dispute is largely reconstructed on the basis of newspaper reports, specically The Tribune and Punjab Kesari, as well as meetings with lawyers representing Punjab and Haryana Governments in the ongoing Supreme Court litigation. Both the concerned parties have requested that documents not be photocopied, as the case is politically sensitive but had no objection to relevant portions being noted down.]
References
1. Privy Council (1932). Secretary of State versus Sannidhi Raju. AIR 1932 Privy Council 46. 2. Privy Council (1969). Begum versus Khetranath. Records of Privy Council, London. 3. Patna Court (1954). Ram Sewak Kazi versus Ramgiri Chowdhary. AIR 1954. Patna 320 4. Umesh Anand (2001). Drought in reforms, but who owns the rain? Times of India. July 29, 2001 5. Arun Kumar Singh (2004). Privatisation of Rivers in India. Vikas Adhyayan Kendra. Mumbai. 6. United Nations (2003). ECOSOC General Comment No. 15. New York 7. Supreme court (1988). R. L & V versus State of Uttar Pradesh. (SC 2187) 8. Supreme Court (1986). M. C. Mehta versus Union of India. AIR 1986. SC 1115 9. B.B. Vohra (1982). Land and Water Management Problems in India. Department of Personnel, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi 10. Surendra Singh (1992). Groundwater in Punjab Some Aspects. SROTE Feature Service No. 39. Eklavya Bhopal 11. Ibid. 12. Vandana Shiva (1991). Violence of Green Revolution. Third World Network, Goa 13. Ministry of Water Resources (2000). Water Related Statistics. Govt. of India 14. Editorial (2004) Water Woes. Times of India. February 24 , 2004 15. Central Groundwater Board (1993) Model Groundwater Bill. Govt. of India 16. News Report (2001). Exploitation of Groundwater in Rajasthan beyond the critical limits (in Hindi). Jansatta, New Delhi. August 6, 2001 * * * * *
Annexure-1
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN UTTAR PRADESH, HARYANA, RAJASTHAN, HIMACHAL PRADESH AND NATIONAL CAPITAL TERRITORY OF DELHI REGARDING ALLOCATION OF SURFACE FLOW OF YAMUNA.
1. WHEREAS the 75% dependable national virgin ow in the Yamuna river upto Okhla has been assessed as 11.70 billion cubic meters (bcm) and the mean year availability has been assessed as 13.00 bcm. 2. AND WHEREAS the water was being utilised by the Basin States ex-Tajewala and ex-Okhla for meeting the irrigation and drinking water needs without any specic allocation. 3. AND WHEREAS a demand has been made by some Basin States on this account and the need for a specied allocation of the utilisable water resources of river Yamuna has been felt for a long time. 4. AND WHEREAS to maximise the utilisation of the surface ow of river Yamuna a number of storage projects have been identied. 5. AND WHEREAS the States have agreed that a minimum ow in proportion of completion of upstream storages going upto 10 cumec shall be maintained downstream of Tajewala and downstream of Okhla Headworks throughout the year from ecological considerations, as upstream storages are built up progressively in a phased manner. 6. AND WHEREAS it has been assessed that a quantum of 0.68 bcm may not be utilisable due to ood spills. 7. NOW THEREFORE, considering their irrigation and drinking water requirements, the Basin States agree on the following allocation of the utilisable water resources of river Yamuna assessed on mean year availability. Subject to the following : Pending construction of the storages in the Upper reaches of the river, there shall be an interim seasonal allocation of the annual utilisable ow of river Yamuna as follows:1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Haryana Uttar Pradesh Rajasthan Himachal Pradesh Delhi 5.730 bcm 4.032 bcm 1.119 bcm 0.378 bcm 0.724 bcm
States: SEASONAL ALLOCATION OF YAMUNA WATERS (bcm)

July - Oct Haryana Uttar Pradesh Rajasthan Himachal Pradesh Delhi Total 4.107 3.216 0.963 0.190 0.580 9.056 Nov - Feb 0.686 0.343 0.070 0.108 0.068 1.275 March - June 0.937 0.473 0.086 0.080 0.076 1.652 Annual 5.730 4.032 1.119 0.378 0.724 11.983
Provided that the interim seasonal allocations will be distributed on ten daily basis. Provided further that the said interim seasonal allocations shall get progressively modied as storages are constructed, to the nal annual allocations as indicated in para 7 above. ii) Separate agreements will be executed in respect of each identied storage within the framework of overall allocation made under this agreement. iii) The allocation of available ows amongst the beneciary states will be regulated by the Upper Yamuna River Board within the overall framework of this agreement. Provided that in a year when the availability is more
than the assessed quantity, the surplus availability will be distributed amongst the states in proportion to their allocations. Provided that in a year when the availability is less than the assessed quantity, rst the drinking water allocation of Delhi will be met and the balance will be distributed amongst Haryana, U.P., Rajasthan and H.P. in proportion to their allocations. 8. This agreement may be reviewed after the year 2025, if any of the basin states so demand. 9. We place on record and gratefully acknowledge the assistance and advice given by the Union Minister of Water Resources in arriving at this expeditious and amicable settlement.
Dated New Delhi 12th May 1994. Sd/Mulayam Singh Yadav Chief Minister Uttar Pradesh Sd/Virbhadra Singh Chief Minister Himachal Pradesh Sd/Bhajan Lal Chief Minister Haryana Sd/Madan Lal Khurana Chief Minister Delhi Sd/Vidya Charan Shukla Minister (Water Resources) Sd/Bhairon Singh Shekhawat Chief Minister Rajasthan
26 Delhis Watery Woes
3. Bottlenecks in Delhi Water Supply System

JB is the sole authority responsible for the delivery of water to residents within the jurisdiction of the MCD. It carries out this task with a vast network of pipelines measuring more than 9,000 km in length. The DJB, in order to facilitate and streamline its functioning, has divided the whole of Delhi (MCD jurisdiction) into 13 water distribution zones, 9 sewerage zones, 14 drainage divisions, 5 E & M zones for water distribution, 3 E & M zones for sewerage distribution and 31 revenue ZROs (zonal revenue ofcers). The capital city is riddled with a plethora of wide-ranging problems, from mismanagement to systemic. The following text presents an overview of the bottlenecks clogging the water supply of Delhi. These factors can be categorised into three broad categories institutional/policy issues, distributional issues and other technical issues.
I. POLICY/INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
These include the following components.
3.1 Loss of Water during Water Transportation from Haryana

Under the bilateral agreement between Delhi and Haryana, the city receives 725 cusec of water per day from Haryana. The ofcials and trade union leaders of the Delhi Jal Board confess that only 425 cusec of water actually reaches Delhi. This water is released from Haryana into an open canal through which it traverses to the city. The apparent and physical losses exceed more than half of this released water during its journey to Delhi. The factors contributing to this include: evaporation, leakage, seepage, deliberate breach of canal by farmers to irrigate their agricultural elds, etc. There has been talk of constructing an underground tunnel or pipes for transportation of water from Haryana to Delhi since the last two decades but it has been merely lip service, as can be gauged from the ground truth. The work of conduit laying came on oor in April, 2003 with a completion time of two years but till date only 46 percent has been completed. Meanwhile, precious water to the tune of 300 cusec continues to be lost while Delhi reels under water shortages year after year. When the proposal of laying conduits was made, it was planned that the saved raw water from the canal will be used at the following water treatment plants: 1. Bawana Water Treatment Plant 20 mgd 2. Nangloi Water Treatment Plant 40 mgd 3. Dwarka Water Treatment Plant 60 mgd 4. Okhla Water Treatment Plant 40 mgd
The same proposal was approved by the DJB in late 1999 for the construction of the said WTPs, which would be able to meet the demands of rural Delhi as well as West and South Delhi. But the Bawana water treatment plant is lying idle since the last ve years due to non-availability of water and the Nangloi WTP is running under capacity with a production of only 25 mgd as against the installed capacity 40 mgd. Meanwhile, 300 cusec of water is lost because of bureaucratic callousness and apathy. In 1994, Delhi Jal Board proposed to convert this open 102-kms canal into a conduit at a cost of Rs. 80 crores. All the administrative sanctions and consents, including the scal and nancial clearance from Planning Commission, were procured. Yet, the government slept over this matter for seven long years. Suddenly, coming out of its slumber, the government invited tenders for this work in April 2003. Meanwhile, the project cost during this period had escalated from Rs. 80 crores to Rs. 314 crores. Under this plan, the Delhi Jal Board was to provide the nance for this work whereas the government of Haryana would carry out the actual work. Nobody knows how long it will take to complete this conduit though recently the Delhi Government has publicly stated that the conduit would be completed by 2006.
In May 2004, yet another increase was introduced. Let us look at the three increasing cess structures over the last eight years, under which Delhi made payment to Haryana. There has been a substantial increase in the payment being made by Delhi to Haryana towards the purchase of raw water. The total payments due to Haryana so far are not known publicly, and repeated requests by the author to the concerned ofcials in this regard have failed to yield the desired information. A related aspect of this issue is the measurement of water quantity. Haryana claims that it has released water strictly as per the agreement, whereas Delhi claims it is receiving a lower quantum of water than stipulated in the agreement. Due to this Delhi has not made payment to Haryana in lieu of this water since some years. Haryana has often threatened to discontinue the release of water to Delhi. This continues to be a thorny issue between the two states.
3.3 Faulty Site Selection of Water Treatment Plants

Right from the inception, the planning for site selection of the water treatment plants has been faulty, to say the least. All the six major water treatment plants are located in an arch running from west to east (Map 6), whereas the bulk of population to which this treated water is being supplied, is largely concentrated in the south and north a distance of 30-35 km. The only exception is the relatively smaller Okhla water treatment plant. It is evident that the site selection was not done taking cognizance of the future plans for the growth of Delhi, as envisaged by the Town Planning and Urban Development Departments. As a result, the precious treated water is lost during transportation courtesy leakage, seepage and pilferage. Moreover, the cost of laying down the transportation paraphernalia and the associated perennial problem of maintenance and upkeep puts stress on crucial nancial resources, expenses which could have been minimised to a substantial extent had the site selection of these plants been done in sync with the town planning.
3.2 Financial Loss Incurred during Water Transportation from Haryana

As stated earlier, Munakh, in Haryana, is the receiving point for Delhi Jal Board thereon it is the responsibility of the Board to transport this water to Delhi. Since the water losses occur during its transportation from Munakh to Delhi, the government of Delhi has to pay for 725 cusec water, irrespective of the fact that it actually is getting 425 cusec water. Thus payment is being made to Haryana for water which actually does not reach Delhi at all. Over the last decade alone these losses have amounted to crores, and have risen exponentially since 1996, as there has been a sharp increase in the cess being paid by Delhi. In 2002, water use in Delhi was placed under commercial category and charges have skyrocketed since then.
28 Bottlenecks in Delhi Water Supply System
MAP 6
Location of Water Treatment Plants in Delhi
Sonia Vihar WTP Bhagirathi WTP Wazirabad WTP Chandrawal WTP Haiderpur WTP Nangloi WTP Okhla WTP New Yamuna Raw Water Pump House
Today, in many localities especially in south Delhi, 30-40 year old water supply pipelines are in acute need of replacement but the paucity of funds has prevented it. As a result, in many localities the sewer water has entered water pipelines, leading to supply of polluted water to homes.
3.4 Policy of Power Tariff for Delhi Jal Board

Another important factor is the issue of concessional and commercial power tariff, regarding which the priorities of the Delhi government seem to be topsy-turvy. For example, Delhi Metro, essentially a commercial enterprise, enjoys the benet of concessional tariff. But the concessional tariff for the Delhi Jal Board, which is responsible for water supply to the citizens of Delhi, has been withdrawn in 2000 and it has been paying commercial tariff since then. And this too, when the government of India accords top priority to drinking water in its national water policy.
A. June 1996 Unit KV A (kilo watt ampere) Unit fuel charge Additional charge B. 2002 Demand charge Commercial charge Meter rent Electrical tax C. May 2004 Demand charge Commercial + Power charges Energy charges
Source: DJB electric bill
citizens. Recently DDA has come out with a Draft Master Plan Delhi-2021, wherein it has envisioned a requirement of 1800 mgd for 23 million people in year 2021. However, the water augmentation schedule proposed by DJB for the Draft Master Plan Delhi-2021 explicitly mentions that the capacity can be increased only to a maximum of 919 mgd from all possible sources (Table 4). Both the ofcial agencies have overtly held each other responsible for the water crisis prevailing in the city. According to the Commissioner, DDA Giving water is the responsibility of DJB. They should curb their 45 percent losses and groundwater should be developed. The rain water should be harvested to ensure zero runoff (implying not a drop of water ows into Yamuna unused) and the water bodies and riverbed should be protected for groundwater recharge. The CEO DJB, on the other hand, said DDA cannot go on building houses innitely. They should rst tie up a source of water for whatever they plan and then go ahead. Does DDA want more dry Dwarkas? The reference was to the spanking new Dwarka Colony, which is almost a bone-dry area. According to DJB, only long-planned dams in the Himalayas can add to the citys water supply.
TABLE 4
Rs. 1.90 Rs. 0.0297 5% of the total payment Rs. 1.50/unit Rs.3.90/unit Rs. 516/meter 5% of the total payment
Water Augmentation Schedule of DJB for 2021

S. No. Plant-2021 (mgd) Capacity 2001 (mgd) 90 120 200 100 ---------20 ---100 ---630 Capacity 2021 (mgd) 100 130 216 110 140 40 20 40 20 12 91 919
1. Rs. 1.50/unit Rs. 4.25/unit 5% of the total payment 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.
Chandrawat I+II Wazirabad Haidarpur I+II Bhagirathi Sonia Vihar Dwarka Bawana Nangloi Okhla Ranney Wells Okhla Palla groundwater Total
As a consequence of these ill-conceived policy tenets, the annual power bill of DJB has increased from Rs. 56 crore in 1998 to Rs 260 crore in 2005.
3.5 Inter-Departmental Wrangling

DJB is the sole authority responsible for providing water to the citizens of Delhi and DDA is the authority responsible for providing houses for its
Source: Draft Master Plan Delhi-2021, DDA
But going by past experiences, it appears that extrapolation regarding population is far from
the actual ground situation. For instance, DDA estimated a gure of 112 lakh for Delhi in 2001 whereas the actual population was about 140 lakh. The lack of coordination between DDA and DJB has caused immense harassment to citizens. For example, on June 30, 2005, during the peak of the heat wave, Regional Superintendent Engineer of the DJB disconnected hundreds of water connections in E-4, Sector 7, Rohini, given by DDA. The residents said that they had been granted these connections after submitting forms alongwith the mandatory fees with DDA whereas DJB insists that these were illegal connections. The net result is that the citizens continue to suffer.
district metered areas (DMAs). The plan envisages that these colonies be provided water round the clock instead of a restricted time by private companies who will manage the water. It is felt that this would discourage storing and hoarding of water. On paper it appears to be a good idea but the question is how will DJB ensure supply of water to private companies. If Delhi is already facing a shortage of about 160 mgd per day then from where will the water be provided? But the CEO, DJB has a readymade answer There is no need for additional water if we rationalise our water supply. Delhi receives about 200 litres of water per person and that is more than enough. It is true that Delhi gets more water than most cities in India or abroad but it is also equally true that all efforts to rationalise water supply and distribution have not yielded success. Four MNCs have bid for the 24X7 scheme, namely Degremont, SOUR (France), Manila Waters Company and Bechtel (USA) , but the real beneciaries would be the water managers of the MNCs [1, 2]. For example, according to the GKW report, commissioned by DJB, each of the experts will receive a remuneration of US$ 24,000 per month, i.e. Rs. 12 lakh or about Rs. 6 crore per year for four persons. Moreover the consultants are extremely liberal when it comes to bonus based on performances. For instance, the manager can attend to consumers complaints between 5 to 20 days and the manager will get a bonus if 90 percent of the complaints are addressed within 20 days. So even if your complaint is not attended for a fortnight, manager will still be entitled to get a bonus. An analysis of 24x7 scheme has been done [3] and the following text is being reproduced from that study. Even if DJB supplied the promised water, there is still no guarantee that you would get continuous water in your house. Each zone would be divided into several District Metering Areas (DMAs). Performance of the water company will be assessed not on the basis
3.6 Lack of Innovation in Water Supply

The Delhi Jal Board frequently faces resource crunch but it has not thought up any innovation in this regard. For example, the Municipal Corporation of Calcutta has been successfully engaged in twin water supply since the last 70 years. The drinking water is provided as per the strict parameters of safe potable water whereas for other household chores like washing of clothes, cleaning of utensils, cleaning and washing of oors, gardening, washing of cars, etc. relatively less safer water (i.e. water of a lower standard) is provided. It saves the exchequer money spent on water treatment, which is utilised in better maintenance and upkeep of water supply. It is the only city in India, which has adopted this policy. Ofcials in Delhi are now planning to start twin water supply in 5,000 houses of a Dwarka colony, on an experimental basis but no actual plan or schematic drawing and design has been framed till date.
3.7 Mirage of Proposed 24X7 Scheme

Recently, the government has chalked out a plan for 24 hours water supply throughout the week, the 24X7 scheme. The areas selected for this are South Delhi Zone-II and Zone-III. A pilot project will start from December 2005 in selected areas of South Delhi. This will include all colonies between Lodhi Road and Mehrauli-Badarpur road, Okhla and Green Park. These colonies will be divided into
of whether you received 24/7 water in your house or not, but on the basis of whether the water company provided 24/7 water at the input of each DMA or not. Thus, if you are not getting water for the last three months in your street for whatever reasons, it would be assumed that the water company provided water 24/7 to all the houses in the entire DMA, if water was available at the input of that DMA during that period. And the company may get a bonus for good performance! Assessment of performance in this manner also has dangerous implications. It allows the water company to divert water from one area to another within the same DMA. This would neither affect the performance of the company nor be treated as a violation of any of the license conditions. The water company may try to maximise revenues by diverting water to big hotels, industries etc, who would purchase water in bulk at higher revenues. In Puerto Rico, the water company is said to have diverted water from residential areas to hotels and amusement parks. In other countries too, the water companies promised to supply 24 hours water. But the promises were never met. The water company in Nelspurit in South Africa is learnt to be contractually bound to ensure 24-hour water availability to all areas by the end of the rst year of the 30-year contract. However, more than a year later, water was available 3 hours a day or less and for a good portion of the time no water came out of the taps. While water stopped owing from the tap, the new meters installed after privatisation actually led to massive ination in bills as the meters did not stop running after the water stopped owing. The people were literally paying for air. In Manila, the water companies were required to provide uninterrupted 24 hour per day water service within 3 years to all connected consumers. Forget 24 hour water, the negligence of the water companies resulted in outbreaks of cholera and gastroenteritis, which killed six people and severely sickened 725 in Manilas Tondo district. It should be mentioned here, in all fairness, that the CEO, DJB has denied these performance standards by saying that consultants have only
given recommendations and the DJB is not bound to comply with them. It was further added that DJB would appoint an independent auditor who would evaluate the managers and the auditors report would be considered while giving incentives. In a nutshell, the 24X7 scheme, in all probability will remain a pipe dream.
II. DISTRIBUTIONAL/TECHNICAL ISSUES

There are serious problems related with water supply in Delhi, as revealed by the following text.
3.8 Energy and Water: Interdependency and Implications

Delhi continues to reel under a water crisis even in September 2005 (a non-summer month) bringing out yet another facet of it. This time the culprit is power crisis. Delhi has a peak demand of 3005 MW but is facing a shortfall of about 900 MW. Seven power stations supplying electricity to the Northern grid have been shut down. These include three in Delhi Rajghat, Badarpur and Indraprasth and Singrauli, Auraiya, Rihand and Nathpa Jakhri, triggering a power crisis in Delhi. Water puried at the treatment plants is sent to pumping stations and from there it is released to their respective distributaries. According to DJB ofcials, its supplies have been affected due to power cuts at the main water treatment plants during peak hours. As a result, plants cannot pump out treated water in time. Even a 15-minute power cut results in a 45-minute idle time for these huge plants that take time to rouse themselves to full pumping power after an electricity cut. The main water pumping stations that have limped throughout the rst week of September 2005 are Deer Park (supplying water to most of South Delhi), Rajinder Nagar, Patel Nagar and Holambi [4, 5]. Disruption of power at these plants at peak hours 5-9 am and 6-9 pm creates a ripple effect down the line that can delay supplies to distant areas like South Delhi. Consequently, most of the colonies of South Delhi (Chittaranjan Park, South Extension,
Greater Kailash, Hauz Khas, Vasant Kunj, R. K. Puram, Kalkaji, Kailash Colony, East of Kailash, Gulmohar Park, Uday Park, and Malviya Nagar) are getting water for hardly 10 minutes. Parts of East and West Delhi are also facing this problem, namely, Rajinder Nagar, Patel Nagar, Vikaspuri, Shalimar Bagh, Geeta Colony, Laxmi Nagar, Rohini, and Holambi. The crisis would be aggravated further in the coming days since the 1500 MW Nathpa Jakhri hydel power plant will be closed down for three weeks from 6 September 2005 [6]. It is intriguing why private power distributors (discoms) are not treating main water pumps as essential services and maintain uninterrupted power supply to them. Only after the crisis had worsened and a joint front of the Residents Welfare Associations met the DJB ofcials, did the discoms swing into action. Now the discoms have constituted a team to monitor power supply to pumping stations and ensure that they suffer no power cuts [7].
A majority of illegal tapping was found in Okhla and Kalkaji. According to ofcials, residents living in unauthorised colonies and even independent houses have drawn illegal connections from the main water pipeline. South I Zone, where a majority of the leaking and illegal tapping cases were reported in Ambedkar Nagar, occupies the third spot. Here the Greater Kailash main water pipeline has been illegally broken at several places to get water. To check this menace, DJB has started a reward scheme to further strengthen its leakage detection system. Junior engineers, assistant engineers and executive engineers, who are able to detect and plug maximum number of leakages in their zones, will be given cash rewards alongwith citations. At present, 200 employees of DJB and 75 home guards (hired from the Delhi police) are engaged in patrolling the pipelines and detecting and plugging the leakages. According to DJB, leakages are to the tune of 40 percent, i.e., 276 mgd per day out of 690 mgd being supplied, and thus only 414 mgd is actually reaching homes. An interesting point is that the shortfall in water supply is said to be around 150 mgd, so if these leakages are fully checked the supply problem should be solved, or at least largely improved. Another relevant point is that worldwide only 5-10 percent leakages are acceptable. DJB does not have any advanced underground leakage detection system. It is a general complaint that DJB mostly works on the complaints from consumers to repair leakages, rather then detecting leakages on its own. For instance, in 2005 AprilMay, about 3200 complaints were registered with DJB related to leakages and wastages. It is further corroborated by the fact that out of its 25,000 employees only 200 are engaged in leakage detection, alongwith 20 persons drawn from home guards, and they are ill-equipped for the task assigned.
3.9 Faulty Water Supply Network

A substantial quantum of water is getting lost through loose ferrules and cracked pipes of the water supply system. The Delhi Jal Board has conducted a survey in April and May 2005 and detected about 3950 leakages. In 2003-04, DJB had detected 30,311 leakages as compared to 5075 in 2002-03. This year 2163 leakages were detected in April 2005 while the rest 1787 were found in May 2005. DJB has claimed that it saved 1.4 million gallons of water in April and 1.2 million gallons of water in May from this exercise. The maximum number of leakages was found in DJBs Northwest III Zone, which includes Pitampura, Shakurbasti and Peeragarhi. Here water is getting lost due to loose connections near ferrules and cracks in pipelines. Not only this, residents have openly tapped the Haidarpur main water pipe line to get extra water. South II Zone comes a close second in the number of leakages found in the water conveyance system.
3.10 Recycling Water within Treatment Plants

A substantial amount of water is lost within the treatment plants during their functioning and operation. This assumes signicance especially during times of water crisis, which is increasingly becoming an annual feature. It therefore becomes pertinent to reclaim this water and put it to use. Understanding the gravity of the situation, the Delhi Jal Board chalked out a plan to reclaim and recycle the water lost within the treatment plants. Their estimated re-claimable capacity being as follows:
i. ii. iii. iv. Haidarpur Chandrawal Wazirabad Bhagirathi 16 mgd 10 mgd 10 mgd 10 mgd
Thus the plan envisaged reclaiming a total quantum of 46 mgd water. In 1998-99, all the technical and nancial clearances were obtained, the bidding document for tendering was also ready but the government of Delhi is yet to start the actual work. In ofcial circles, the buzz is that sooner than latter, the water supply is to be privatised so why should the government invest its money in this venture. Resultantly, precious water is being allowed to go waste.
3.11 DJBs Sewage Treatment Plants (STPs)

The DJB has come under severe criticism and attack in the 2004-05 annual report of the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB). The report, in its analysis of STPs, records that the DJB has failed to monitor drainage in the Trans-Yamuna area. The DJB has been labeled as an organisation, which completely lacks a professional attitude and an authority that lacks commitment and interest in treating sewage in the city. There are other complaints too, like:
nds its way into storm water drains causing contamination. Areas most likely to be affected by this contaminated drinking water are Mayur Vihar, Vasundhara Enclave, Nandnagari, Ghazipur and Shastri Park. Once the rains start, there is a genuine threat of rainwater getting mixed with sewage from the drains. In this scenario rainwater harvesting seems a distant dream, priority should be accorded to have drainage lines clearly demarcated. The Yamuna Vihar and Kondli STPs, both in Trans-Yamuna, are under-utilised. The sewage pumped to these STPs is 44 mgd though their capacity is 65 mgd. Sludge from the water treatment plant at Bhagirathi is directly being discharged into the drain upstream of the Yamuna Vihar STP. According to CPCB - The DJB has turned a blind eye to the fact that the point where sewage enters the Yamuna Vihar STP coincides with a drain that discharges treated sewage. So all the efforts of treating sewage are being reversed. This is not expected of DJB which has technical experts who know the consequences of such carelessness. After failing two deadlines in 2000 and 2003, no one knows when the sewage pumping station at Ghonda would be ready. DJB has asked for time to attain 135 mgd capacity but has not submitted any status report to CPCB in this matter.
DJB has shown total disregard for the TransYamuna region. In most of these areas sewage
Recently as a pilot project, the United States Asia Environmental Partnership (USAEP) has got the latest technology in sewage water treatment installed at the DJBs sewage water treatment plant in Okhla [8]. It is expected to treat all the sewage the plant receives and the recycled water will be used for non-potable purposes like cooling towers in shopping malls, restaurants, hotels and factories. Under this project, latest membrane bio reactor (MBR) technology has been installed. According to DJB, its performance has been satisfactory and the decision to utilise it in other treatment plants will be taken after exploring viability. DJB plans to install a version of MBR in colonies as well so that
residents use potable water for drinking, cooking and bathing. The MBR has been designed and constructed by the Ion Exchange India Ltd.
3.12 Quality of DJB Supplied Water

Another important aspect of water supply in city is related to the quality of water. Fifteen years back, in 1988, when the population of Delhi was almost half of todays, DJB had ve operational laboratories under its control for testing of water samples, located at Wazirabad, Gokulpuri, Haidarpur, Okhla, and Greater Kailash, which continue even today. But the status of these laboratories is pathetic and hardly 15 samples can be tested in each lab per day. So DJB does its work as a mere formality by testing for residue chlorine or bacteria. There are at least 27 chemical estimations needed for testing the purity of water, to qualify it as of potable standard on a complete range from inorganic substances to heavy metals like copper and nickel. Moreover, DJB does not accept the samples from consumers for testing water. Owing to it, residents of Delhi are compelled to use substandard potable water. It may be relevant here to narrate the High Courts intervention in this matter. On 21 July 2004, in the wake of a cholera epidemic in Delhi, a bench comprising the then Chief Justice B. C. Patel and Justice B. D. Ahmad listening to a PIL, directed MCD to take up testing of water samples. Accordingly, MCD (Delhi Municipal Corporation) collected 681 samples from different localities of Delhi during July 22-August 3, 2004, from various sources like DJB tubewells, government water taps, handpumps, and tankers. MCD tested these samples and submitted its report to High Court on 14 August 2004. As per this report, water in 170 samples (25% of total samples) was found unt for consumption purposes. According to the then Health Ofcer, MCD, Dr. N. K. Tiwari, out of 162 samples of water taken from handpumps 55 (34%) were found not potable whereas out of 368 samples of DJB supplied water, 89 (24%) samples were found unt.
According to the MCD report, this polluted water is the root cause of many water-borne diseases including cholera and it stated that supply of pure water to households should be ensured to control epidemics. Report further stated that DJB should control leakages from the pipelines, illegal connections and regular monitoring of pipelines to overcome this problem. The worst affected areas from the point of view of pollution are JJ clusters and rehabilitation colonies. According to a recent study of Hazards Center Delhi (2005), only one of the 27 water samples collected and tested from 14 JJ clusters and resettlement colonies was found to be safe for human consumption. Out of these 27 samples, 19 were from MCD water supply (including bore wells and tankers). Twelve out of these 19 samples showed faecal contamination in the areas including Kanakdurga, Bhalaswa, Bakkarwala, Hastsal, Vikaspuri, Molarbund and Tigri. Rest of the samples showed high levels of chemicals and dangerous bacterial contamination. The survey has directly linked contaminated water with the prevalence of goitre, gastro-intestinal diseases, typhoid, intestinal worms, cardiovascular problems, excessive thirst, fatigue, muscle weakness, frequent headache and vomiting among users. Higher concentration of iron, nitrate, and uoride were also found in many samples. Moreover, two-third of the population in the area surveyed received less than 37 litres (2-3 buckets) of water for daily requirement. People fulll their water requirement from handpumps and MCD borewells.
3.13 Iniquitous Distribution of Water in Delhi

As per the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS), the average requirement of a Delhi citizen is 160 lpcd. The Planning commission has estimated the average requirement for different income groups 130 lpcd (for lower income group), 150 lpcd (for middle income group) and 200 lpcd (for higher income group) with an average of 160 lpcd. Let us now look at the water availability in Delhi.
The distribution and availability of water in Delhi continues to be highly uneven. Top priority is accorded to the districts of Central Delhi and South Delhi especially the Embassy area in Chanakyapuri. Even within these districts, the palatial houses get more water than the lower income group housing board colonies and the hutment clusters are generally supplied water through one common connection or through tankers. The hutment clusters of Southwest Delhi are in a state of perpetual water crisis. The situation is similar in East Delhi district, which is home to one-third of the citys population. The problem is further compounded as this district has the highest concentration of multi-storied housing complexes in Delhi. Consequently, those who can afford have installed high-power booster pumps directly on the main transportation water lines for personal use. The government has done virtually nothing to rectify this uneven distribution or to check malpractices. Another aspect related to this is the wastage of water in Delhi. According to ofcial sources, about 40 percent of the total water supplied in Delhi is put to wasteful uses. Water used in industrial units falls in this category. There is hardly any existing or operational mechanism for the recovery of secondary and tertiary water and once water enters into the industrial waste it is permanently put out of use. There are plenty of wasteful uses among household activities also, like washing of cars, bathing of dogs, etc. The upkeep and maintenance of the civic water taps is pathetic practically throughout the city, resulting in substantial loss of water. This explains the root cause of the water crisis in Delhi despite the fact that Delhi, as a city, ranks highest in per capita availability of water about 280-300 lpcd. The solution therefore lies not in further augmentation of water, as is being advocated by the politicians, but in better management and conservation of water by promoting general awareness and involving society in public-publicpartnership. For example, the per capita availability of water in the city of Copenhagen (Denmark) is 200 lpcd but the City Council has xed a target to
reduce it to 110 lpcd through better management of water utilisation. According to a recent ofcial publication, the average water availability in different areas of Delhi (Table 5) has been estimated as follows (also see Map 7A and 7B):
TABLE 5
Iniquitous Water Distribution in Delhi

S.No. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. Area Mehrauli Narela Karala-Kanjhawala Najafgarh/Dwarka Vasant Kunj Shahdara New and South Delhi West Delhi Civil Lines and Rohini Old City Karol Bagh NDMC Area Delhi Cantonment Average Water Available (lpcd) 29 31 32 74 74 130 148 202 214 277 337 462 509
Source: Delhi Fact Sheet (2000). NCR Planning Board
On June 4, 2005, the Chief Minister of Delhi announced that 25 percent of water (35 mgd) from 140 mgd Sonia Vihar plant would be allocated to the Cantonment area. This was done after the civilian residents of Cantonment agitated and protested against inadequate supply of water as it was being diverted to army areas. Earlier, 90 mgd of water from Sonia Vihar plant was allocated to South Delhi and 50 mgd to East Delhi but now both these areas will have to share their allocation with Delhi Cantonment. After this, the water availability in Delhi Cantonment would skyrocket to 1000 litres per person per day. According to ofcials, different amounts of water is being provided to different settlements since their standard use is not the same and certain standards have been established in this regard. The standard for planned colonies is 225 lpcd, for resettlement
MAP 7A
Water Zones in Delhi
NARELA 31
CIVIL LINES & ROHINI PAHAR GANJ 274 201 WEST DELHI 202 NAJAF GARH/ DWARKA 74 KAROL BAGH 337
CITY 277 SHAHDARA 130
NDMC 462
CANTONMENT 509 NEW and SOUTH DELHI 148 MEHRAULI 29
MAP 7B
Ward-wise Water Supply
NARELA 31 CIVIL LINES & ROHINI 201 WEST DELHI 202 NAJAF GARH/ DWARKA 74 KAROL BAGH 337
CITY 277 SHAHDARA 130
274 PAHARGANJ
NDMC 462 NEW & SOUTH DELHI 148
CANTONMENT 509
MEHRAULI KEY
NCT Boundary River MCD Zones Note: Figures in lpcd Optimum supply = 150-225 lpcd
29
TABLE 6
Water Supply Structure in Delhi

S. No. 1. 2. 3. Type of Settlement JJ clusters, designed slums & unauthorised colonies (I) JJ clusters, designed slums & unauthorised colonies (I) Planned areas Population (in millions) 1.396 4.080 7.550 Demand (mld) 59.33 173.40 1698.75 Supply (mld) No supply 20.43 990 Shortfall (%) -100% -88% -42%
Source: Status Report for Delhi 21. Delhi Urban Environment & Infrastructure Project, 2004
colonies and urban villages it is 155 lpcd and for JJ clusters it is only 50 lpcd. But the highly skewed water supply goes beyond this rationale. In 1999, Delhi had 1100 slum clusters with an estimated population of 3.2 million. In addition, there were 1500 unauthorised colonies with an estimated population of 3.5 million, 52 resettlement colonies with population of 2 million and 216 urban villages with estimated population of 0.6 million [9]. Thus in 1999, more than 10.3 million people, i.e. 78 percent of the citys population were living in sub-standard settlements. In 2001, this marginally declined to 76 percent [10]. It is this population, which is worst hit so far as water supply is concerned (Table 6). In a classication on the nature of water supply [11], the city of Delhi is classied into ve zones:
3.14 Five Star Hotels and VIP Residences

According to a recent report [12], average water consumption of water in a room of ve star hotels is above one thousand litres. For instance, the average consumption of water of a hotel room at Taj Man Singh is 2000 litres a day while at Oberoi it is 1120 litres per day per room. The average consumption at Taj Hotel is 1400 litres per room while Janpath Hotel, including its banquet halls and restaurants consumes around 67,000 litres per day. On an average each room of a ve star hotel consumes 1600 litres water per day. Apart from ve star hotels, VIP residents too are guzzling water. For instance, the Prime Ministers house at 1 Race Course Road accounts for about 73,300 litres water per day and the Presidential residence, Rashtrapati Bhawan, consumes about 67,000 litres water per day. Similarly, the residential houses of Ministers consume water to the tune of 30,000-45,000 litres per day. Senior ofcials defended it by saying that private water tankers and underground water supplement the supply given to VIP residences and hotels. But it does not alter the fact that water is being misused and abused, especially in hotels which have not taken up measures for recovery of secondary and tertiary water or for recharge of groundwater.
Zone 1 Treated piped water available 24 hours of the day. Zone 2 Rationed water available for a total of six hours per day. Zone 3 As water supply is inadequate, tubewell water is mixed with the municipal supply and supplied for few hours. Zone 4 Areas depending totally on tubewell water, that is not tested, in addition to hand pumps. Zone 5 There is no organised water supply.
3.15 Water Supply Hours per Day

A recent report [13] reveals that the average household water supply in Delhi, in terms of hours per day, is poorest in Delhi. According to the report, Delhi can only compare itself with the parched cities of towns in Rajasthan (Table 7), namely Jaipur (3 hours/day), Udaipur (2.5 hours/
In a nutshell, water supply is inadequate and unsatisfactory for a large section of city dwellers, be it residential or industrial.
day), Jodhpur (2.5 hours/day), Bikaner (1.5 hours/ day) and Bharatpur (1.5 hours/day). The towns of Punjab are ideal places in this regard.
TABLE 7
Average Daily Household Water Supply (hours/day)

S. No. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. City Ahmedabad (Gujarat) Bangalore (Karnataka) Bathinda (Punjab) Bharatpur (Rajasthan) Bikaner (Rajasthan) Chandigarh (Punjab) Chennai (Tamil Nadu) Dasuya (Punjab) Delhi (Delhi) Dera Basti (Punjab) Goa (Goa) Gurudaspur (Punjab) Jaipur (Rajasthan) Jodhpur (Rajasthan) Ludhiana (Punjab) Mumbai (Maharashtra) Patran (Punjab) Udaipur (Rajasthan) Water Supply 2 2.5 8 1.5 1.5 10 1.5 10 4 8 8 10 3 2.5 10 5 10 2.5
Bank [14], the non-revenue losses in Delhi water supply amount to 53 percent. Technically, all these losses are considered as waste. However, there has been no systematic study to make any conclusive assessment of the wastage of water in Delhi or elsewhere in country by any ofcial agency. It is indeed criminal to shut ones eyes to this critical factor, which deserves immediate attention. Moreover, if these losses are indeed wastes, then these should be reected in an increase in groundwater, but the groundwater itself has been declining, clearly pointing that these are no wastes. Operational and Maintenance (0 & M) losses are estimated to be generally between 5-15 percent. The issue of non-revenue water (leakages) from 9000 km long network of water supply lines has often been in the news. First of all, there is a lot of ambiguity about the precise extent of leakages, as different gures have been quoted by different agencies, like:
Delhi Jal Board Price Waterhouse Coopers GKW Vision 2021 36% 48% 59% 40%
Source: Compiled from Times of India, 26 August, 2005
But this average 4 hours water supply in Delhi does not reect the true picture as personal discussions with Residents Welfare Associations in many colonies of Delhi revealed that water hardly comes for 15 minutes in Greater Kailash Part II and Green Park, both in South Delhi. Moreover, the lack of adequate pressure deprives the upper oors of buildings from water. Residents Welfare Associations of New Rajinder Nagar and Meerabagh have repeatedly complained to DJB in this regard but have received nothing more than empty promises, so far. The increasing water consumption in Delhi over the last 30 years is shown in Table 8.
According to German Consultant GKW, it is 59 percent and it has proposed to bring them down in next ve years to 23 percent in a phased manner:
Present level First year Second year Third year Fourth year Fifth year 59% 48% 40% 34% 27% 23%
With such wide divergence in NRW estimates, do these targets really have any signicance? If DJBs estimates of present levels of non-revenue water are correct, then the targets for the rst three years appear to be bogus. GKW has estimated 59 percent NRW for the whole of Delhi. What are the NRW gures for
3.16 The Non-Revenue Water (NRW)

According to a recent report of Asian Development
South II and South III? These have not been separately estimated. The overall Delhi gure of 59 percent has been assumed to apply to these two zones also, which obviously would not be true. In all probability the actual NRW gures for these two zones are below 59 percent. This is a critical parameter to adjudge the performance of water companies and would also have a signicant impact on the revenues of DJB. Therefore, it is wrong to x targets without ascertaining the correct gures of NRW separately for each zone [15]. DJB itself is in the process of making huge investments to the tune of Rs 3500 crores during the 10th Five Year Plan. It is admitted by the consultants that the ongoing projects of DJB would reduce NRW to 22 percent by 2008. If it is so, then the signicant portions of NRW reduction targets are paper targets and the balance would happen automatically due to the ongoing projects of DJB. Further, the DJB data shows that 51 mld water is supplied through standposts in Delhi and this gure has been added erroneously (or deliberately) to non-revenue water in almost all the calculations, whereas in reality it is a social service for the weaker and vulnerable sections of population. In addition, DJB is working with IIT Delhi to nd in-situ solutions for leakage where the binding material will be transported within the pipes to reach the precise point of leakage and automatically seal it.
groundwater legislation. But in most of the states vested interests have blocked the legislation and Delhi has not proved to be an exception. According to the Central Ground Water Commission, Delhi has groundwater potential of 0.29 cubic km/year, out of which net draft (withdrawal) is 0.12 cubic km/year. However the columns detailing balance groundwater potential available for exploitation and level of groundwater development have been left blank in the report, pointing to gross irregularities and permanent damage. A case in point is South Delhi and South West Delhi, where permanent lowering of groundwater has taken place compelling the Central Groundwater Authority to declare it dark zone in 1999, implying a ban on boring. According to the Central Groundwater Authority, in the last decade, on an annual average, groundwater in Lado Sarai dropped by 10 meters or 33 feet. Similarly, in East Delhi groundwater table fell by 20-30 feet, in New Delhi 50-60 feet, and in South Delhi 60-70 feet. This ban was unacceptable to the builders lobby and with the help of political leaders they got permission from a sub-divisional Magistrate to bore. Builders and land maa have ooded South Delhi with indiscriminate construction, which has led to a water crisis. Regularisation of illegal colonies is compounding the problem manifold. The quality of groundwater is also a matter of concern. The Central Ground Water Board has recently compiled a Health Status Report (2005) of groundwater. It has collected and tested 269 groundwater samples from 57 different localities of Delhi. As per the results, 30 percent of Delhi has excessive uoride in drinking water. In Sarai Kale Khan, 1.57 micro grams per litre of mercury was found, which is 1570 times higher than the safe limit (0.001 mg/litre). Consumption of mercury beyond the permissible limit in human body causes nerve destruction, blue-baby syndrome, damage to soft tissues, memory-loss, kidney-failure, acute constipation, anaemia, and depression. Excessive
3.17 Problems Related with Groundwater Exploitation and its Quality

Another dimension to the water crisis in Delhi is the unregulated exploitation of groundwater. Though there is a Central Ground Water Board at the national level, groundwater management has been left to the different states since water is a state subject. In the absence of any national legislation, groundwater exploitation in most of the states has exceeded beyond normal recharge. The Central Government has evolved guidelines for a model groundwater act and sent it to all the states and union territories for framing state level
nitrate content has been recorded in Okhla, West and North West Delhi. Excessive nitrate causes stomach disorders as well as diseases related to bones and teeth. In many localities of South West, Central and East Delhi, excessive bacteria and uoride have been found. Excessive nitrate and uoride have been found in groundwater of Bawana, Kanjhawala, India Gate nursery, Ashram Chowk, Nizamuddin, Vasant Enclave, Mehrauli, Moti Bagh, New Friends Colony, Preeti Vihar and Rajouri Garden. Large parts of the country are suffering from uoride poisoning, which has become fairly prevalent and not many doctors are aware of its symptoms. In 2004, Fluorosis Research and Rural Development Foundation, Delhi approached the National Human Rights Commission with a proposal to include uoride-poisoning education as part of the medical school syllabus. The Commission in its own turn, impressed upon the Union Health Ministry to instruct the Medical Council of India to add uoride poisoning to the syllabus but things have not moved since 2004.
up by 4.5 crore litres which is largely met by the water maa. Water is lled in plastic pouches, jugs, bottles, jars, etc. and sold through vendors. This earns a tidy prot of Rs. 1.5-2 crore every day. These tankers are operating mainly in South Delhi and in rural areas of East and West Delhi. These tankers use groundwater free of cost and sell it for Rs. 1000-2500 per tanker for domestic purposes, while they charge Rs. 500010000 for ceremonies and ice factories. Though it is clearly written on these tankers that This water is not potable water, people are forced to drink it since no other option is available. In East Delhis Jheel, Krishna Nagar and Geeta Colony, there are a number of plants where water is relled in plastic pouches, jugs, bottles, jars, etc. In Rajgarh Colony, Raghuvarpura and Vishwas Nagar, DJB water is being lled in plastic packets under the names of Hero, Barfani and VIP respectively. In the shops of Gandhi Nagar, Ram Nagar and Ashok Market, water jugs are being supplied at a rate of Rs. 10 per litre. Similarly Okhla Industrial Area in South Delhi, and Uttam Nagar, Rajouri Garden and Tilak Nagar in West Delhi too have many plants for lling water in Mayur jugs. Similar plants are openly using DJB water in Mayur jugs and plastic jars in Narela, Bakhtawarpur, Bawana and Najafgarh areas of outer Delhi. In almost all of these cases DJB water is being used, though in a few cases, DJB water is being mixed with groundwater. For this the water maa has established chilling plants in connivance with the police, ofcials of DJB and local administration. DJB is very well aware of this and says that these practices could be curbed with co-operation of people. The DJB has closed down its water-bottling plant at Sadiq Nagar in May 2005 [18] when it discovered that the residual alumina content in the water exceeded the set standards for bottled water. The water to this bottling plant was being supplied from Bhagirathi water treatment plant, through the Greater Kailash main line to eventually reach Sadiq Nagar reservoir. The high alumina content in the water originated from the Bhagirathi plant. According to DJB ofcials, the plant was closed to tackle turbidity in
3.18 Emergence of a Water Maa

All these inadequacies have led to the emergence of a powerful water maa of private tanker operators in the city, thriving on water theft. There are about 1400 water tankers supplying water in the city, out of which half are under private control. The tankers in connivance with local authorities out all rules and indulge in illegal activities including theft and pilferage of water. To control this, DJB recently announced that it would start monitoring the movements of its tankers through satellite. However, it has failed to bring private tankers under this advanced mechanism to check theft and illegal activities, thereby considerably diluting the efcacy of this exercise. Perennial water crisis during the summers and DJBs failure to satisfy its consumers has given birth to a water maa in Delhi, which witnesses a business of Rs. 400 crore, derived largely from DJB water [16, 17]. During summer, water demand in Delhi shoots
water, caused by rains upstream. DJB had to add more alum and hence the water did not meet the standards for bottled water. So the plant was closed till the turbidity settled down. What is amazing is that though the DJBs bottling water was closed down, the same water with high alumina content was being supplied to south and east Delhi. DJB justies this by saying that BIS standards for bottled water (BIS 14543) and drinking water (BIS 10500) supplied through taps are different. For drinking water through taps the alumina content should be in the range of 0.02-0.2 mg per litre. The sheer might of the water maa can be gauged from a recent example. In September 2005, supposedly a month of normal water supply, private water tanker providers have entered into an agreement with the Residents Association of Sector A, Pocket B and C, to supply 1000 litres of water at Rs. 110 and 500 litres at Rs. 60 [19]. This broad agreement also stipulates - There would be no further increase in the price until there is a hike in the diesel price and then also it would be increased only by Rs. 10 per 1000 litres. Though in many posh colonies of South Delhi Greater Kailash I and II, Panchsheel, Pomposh Enclave, Chittaranjan Park, Kalkaji - thousands of families are solely dependent on private water tankers, this is the rst such agreement on a collective basis. This has shown a new way towards assured water supply to colonies and other Residents Associations are seriously thinking on this line.
can be taken by DJB. Tapping the water main and drawing water from it are recognised as water theft in the DJB Act and DJB can lodge an FIR with the local police station in this regard and take the matter to court. Using a booster pump has been termed illegal since it deprives water to people down the supply chain and similar action as mentioned above can be initiated by the DJB. Yet, DJB has refrained from initiating action under these provisions. The last time DJB led FIRs was in 1998 when it initiated action in 19 cases. According to DJB ofcials though FIRs can be led, it takes a lot of time to prove a persons guilt. Obviously there remains a lot to be done in this regard, especially given the extenuating circumstances.
3.20 Water Meters

There are more than 14 lakh domestic and 2 lakh commercial water meter connections in Delhi and most of them need urgent replacement. In this context, DJB announced last year that old meters should be replaced with new magnetic meters by September 30, 2005. One water meter costs about Rs. 600 and the government rules make it mandatory for DJB to stick to L1 and L2 meters. DJB placed an order to purchase 1 lakh meters from the Directorate General of Supplies and Disposals (DGS&S), a government body and plans to purchase 1 lakh meters more. So far DJB has received 50,000 ISI-marked water meters, out of which 50 percent ISI-marked meters were found to be defective [20]. DJB has claimed that even though these meters have been approved and have passed all the tests, they dont function. Due to this problem only 25,000 meters have been replaced so far. This has forced DJB to extend the last date of replacing old meters to September 30, 2006. DJB has now moved the Delhi High Court to seek permission to buy meters other than L1 and L2 types. It has submitted that if this problem is not resolved, there could be a public campaign against the magnetic meters, like the one against electricity meters. DJB has also asked for compensation from
III. OTHER TECHNICAL ISSUES

There are some other issues of technical nature, which also need to be looked at.
3.19 Non-Enforcement of Legal Rights by DJB against Violators

There is a legal dimension also to the water crisis. The DJB Act in Section 19(3), Chapter III, clearly states: Without the Boards permission, no person shall install a booster pump or any other appliance on any water main or service pipe or shall pump water supplied by the Board. Sections 19, 80, 81 and 84 enlist similar offences and the action that
the meter manufacturing and supplying companies, which have provided defective meters.
Monu Chadha of Jangpura got a disconnection notice from DJB though he does not have any water connection. H. C. Bhardwaj of Kailash Colony received a bill of Rs. 8,477 for October 2004-June 2005, whereas his bill for July-October 2004 was Rs. 1,242. Moreover, water is available for hardly 12-15 minutes every two days.
3.21 Water Tariff Hike

While water availability and the quality of water supplied is highly unsatisfactory, the water tariff has skyrocketed over the last few years. DJB has been accused of raising the water tariff from 200 to 600 percent on 1 December 2004. Since April 2005, water charges have been increased surreptitiously. Inated bills are being served on citizens who are already struggling to pay their enhanced electricity bills. The lower and middle class consumers are being forced to pay three times more than the higher income groups and the commercial consumers are being asked to shell out even more. Earlier, consumers had to pay only for the water they consumed. Now with the hike in tariff, the government has also introduced a new xed charge and a surcharge under which is not related to consumption. Due to this surcharge, the water bills have shot up by one and half times. Over and above the xed charge and surcharge, the government has recently introduced a slab system based on the consumption of water. Now, an amount of Rs. 40 to Rs. 120 is being recovered for the consumption of each kilolitre of water. For the non-residential areas the amount is being recovered at a rate of Rs. 600 per kilolitre. Thus, the overall water charges have increased from 5 to 30 times in the capital. Some cases of inated bills and other irregularities are reported below [21]: Lalit Mohan, a resident of Rohini, received a bill of Rs. 12,000 for January-June (2005), whereas earlier his bills never exceeded Rs. 250. R. S. Arora, a resident of Rohini, received a bill of Rs. 3,400 for June-August (2005), whereas his earlier bill for March-May (2005) was just Rs. 700. Rajiv Kapoor of Jangpura paid his bill for November 2004-July 2005, yet he received another bill for the same duration.
3.22 Problems of Rainy Season

If the shortage of water in summers is a painful experience, then the arrival of monsoon brings fresh problems with it. Rains upstream of Delhi, in Himachal Pradesh, Punjab and other Himalayan areas improve the water availability but the water is usually murky, courtesy excessive sediment load, lth and algae. Consequently, functioning of most of the treatment plants in Delhi gets curtailed and the overall quantum of treated water gets reduced. This has also become a regular phenomenon. For example, this year, the week preceding 2 August 2005, Haryana released one lakh cusecs of water, which was highly turbid, exceeding the normal range of 10-50 Jackson Turbidity Units (JTUs). This has to be removed before sending this water to the ltration plants as, otherwise it will choke the pumps and render the plants non-functional. DJB is forced to close the plants for a few hours daily during the rainy season to tackle this problem. Due to this three units of the Wazirabad Plant were shut down. Similarly, one unit in the Chandrawal and the Haidarpur Plants too started malfunctioning. Various colonies of South Delhi were affected because of this closure in the rst week of August 2005, namely, Moti Bagh, Neeti Bagh, Vasant Kunj, Vasant Vihar, Malviya Nagar, Model Town, Kingsway Camp and Delhi University.
3.23 Plight of the Yamuna River

The Yamuna river is one of the most polluted rivers in the country. All rivers in India are unt for human use, barring the upper stretches of the rivers originating from the Himalayas. Under the Yamuna Action Plan, Rs. 200 crore has already
been spent in two phases (YAP-I, Rs. 165 crore and YAP-II, Rs. 35 crore) but the pollution levels remain unchanged [22]. Recently, in January 2004, the Delhi Government has sanctioned Rs. 154.68 crore for the construction of a sewage treatment plant (STP), which promises to clean up Yamuna. And an additional Rs. 35 crore has been earmarked for the beautication of Yamuna in the same plan. At present, 750 mgd of wastewater, including the industrial efuents, ow directly into Yamuna through 18 drains. This situation arises primarily due to the fact that there is not enough water in Yamuna to ush out the pollution as all its water is blocked at Tajewala for treatment and supply to the city of Delhi, making Yamuna into nothing better than a drain. The plight of Yamuna can be best summarised from the category in which it is placed under the classication of rivers. Yamuna, within the city limits of Delhi, Mathura and Agra, falls in the category of D/E, whereas it should fall in the category of B/C. Category D water quality is dened as t for propagation of wildlife and category E means water is suitable for industrial cooling and waste disposal. Category B water is t for outdoor bathing and C refers to drinking water source with conventional treatment followed by disinfections. The entry points of the worst pollutants into Yamuna within Delhi are shown in Map 8. Recently, the Ministry of Tourism, Government of India, has also come up with a project for the beautication of Yamunas banks at a cost of Rs. 45 crore. Already Rs.12 crore has been spent under this plan on the beautication of Red Fort. The most contentious issue under this plan will be the relocation of slum clusters of Gokulpuri, Kanchenpuri and Sanjay Amar Colony from the riverfront, involving a population of more than ve lakhs. As per the plan, this population is a major factor contributing to the pollution in Yamuna and hence needs to be relocated. The Supreme Court has also given its approval in this matter, when the above plan was challenged in 2004. How it will be
achieved remains to be seen though the government claims that alternative land in three different locations of Delhi has been identied and is ready to be handed over to the displaced families. The Supreme Court has recently directed that the task of cleaning up Yamuna should be done through an action plan drawn up on the lines of the British Governments success in cleaning up the river Thames in London. Let us look at both the rivers. In 1957, Londons Natural history Museum declared the Thames biologically dead. It was after this that the cleaning and rehabilitation work of Thames commenced with the British Government improving sewage waste treatment and banning industries discharging pollutants into the river. It took the British government two decades to achieve the goal of bringing back the river to life. Today the Thames, owing through the heart of Europes largest city, is awash with life. According to the Zoological Society of London, more than 130 seals have been spotted in Thames since August 2004. Bottlenose dolphins have also been seen upstream of London Bridge. There are 120 sh species thriving in the Thames, along with hundreds of thousands of birds. Today the river ranks among the cleanest metropolis tideways in the world. The water quality indices of Thames began improving from the 1970s, with dramatic decreases in the levels of heavy metals and pesticides. The Government of India has submitted a four-year action plan to the Supreme Court for cleaning up biologically dead Yamuna, in contrast to 20 years of Thames. Under this plan, sewage treatment plants would be set up at points where all major drains meet the river Yamuna, to ensure that no untreated sewage or industrial efuent gets discharged into the river. The Comptroller and Auditor Generals latest report states that the Delhi Governments plans for curbing water pollution in Yamuna has been a big op and Rs. 872 crores spent on this project has gone down the drain [23]. Obviously, the challenge of cleaning up Yamuna is going to be a Herculean task.
MAP 8 Drains/Nallas meeting River Yamuna in Delhi
Pollution of River Yamuna

Yamuna is no longer a river it is nothing more than a drain. The reason that every day approximately 2.90 bn litres of untreated sewage nds its way into the river. Majority of this is generated in the relatively richer households. The people who suffer are the residents of informal communities located along the river and the towns and settlements located downstream.
Legend: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. Najafgarh Drain Magazine Road Nalla Sweeper Colony Nalla Khyber Pass Nalla Metcalf House Nalla Kudisiya Bagh Nalla Moat Nalla Trans Yamuna MCD Nalla Mori gate Nalla
10. Civil Mill Nalla 11. Power House Nalla 12. Sen Nursing Home Nalla 13. Nalla No. 14 15. Maharani Bagh Nalla 16. Kalkaji Nalla 17. Tughlakabad Nalla
Source: Yeh Dilli Kiski Hai, Hazard Centre, November 2003, New Delhi
It can be safely concluded that the water supply in Delhi is riddled with severe problems and owing to a plethora of factors the situation has worsened at every step. The lack of sufcient amount of water is often used as standard public posture for the
pathetic water supply in the city but the real culprit is complete mismanagement. The widespread groundwater contamination is a matter of grave concern, especially in the wake of government promoting rainwater harvesting on a large scale.
References
1. Himanshi Dhawan (2005). Water managers permanent beneciaries of 24X7 project. Times of India, New Delhi. July 12 2. Sujay Mehdudia (2005). Privatisation a bonanza for water companies. The Hindu, New Delhi. July 13 3. Arvind Kejriwal (2005). Is 24X7 a myth? Unpublished mimeograph. Parivartan, New Delhi. July 26 4. Jagdish Bhatt (2005). Nathpa Jakhris 3-week closure to deepen crisis. Times of India. September 7, 2005 5. News report (2005). Parched City. Times of India. September 7, 2005 6. Neha Lalchandi and Ruhi Bhasin (2005). Its September, but taps are still dry. Times of India. September 7, 2005 7. News Report (2005). BJP demands rebate on water charge. The Hindu. September 11, 2005 8. Ruhi Bhasin (2005). DJBs hi-tech plans to recycle water. Times of India, New Delhi. August 24, 2005 9. Department of Urban Development (2004). Status Report for Delhi 21. Delhi Urban Environment & Infrastructure Project, 2004. Government of Delhi 10. Ibid. 11. Joel Ruet, V. S. Saravanan and Marie Helene Zerah (2002). The water & sanitation scenario in Indian Metropolitan Cities. CSH Occasional Paper No. 6 12. Himanshi Dhawan (2005). There is Plenty of Water on Top of The Heap. Times of India, New Delhi. June 21, 2005 13. News Report (2005). Supplies a pipe dream. Times of India. September 7, 2005 14. Charles T. Andrews and Cesar E. Yniguez (2004). Water in Asian Cities. Asian Development Bank, Manila, Philippines 15. GKW (2001). Project Preparation Report for DWSSP. Germany 16. Rajesh Saroha (2005). Water maa minting money from water (in Hindi). Navbharat Times, New Delhi. June 13 17. Ruhi Bhasin (2005). Tanker business in Bhagwan Das Nagar raises high stink. Times of India, New Delhi. July 27, 2005 18. Nidhi Sharma (2005). DJB shuts down Sadiq Nagar bottling Plant. Times of India, New Delhi. June 25, 2005 19. Dipak Kumar Dash (2005). Paying the price. Times of India (Delhi Plus Supplement), New Delhi. September 17, 2005 20. News Report (2005). 50 percent meters defective, admits DJB. Times of India, New Delhi. September 29, 2005 21. Ruhi Bhasin (2005). Taps run dry, bills shoot sky high. Times of India, New Delhi. October 13, 2005 22. Anil Agarwal, Sunita Narain and Srabani Sen (1999). State of Indias Environment: The Citizens Fifth Report. Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi. 23. Sandeep Joshi (2005). Cleaning up Yamuna will not be an easy task for Centre. The Hindu, New Delhi. 13 September 2005.
Water Consumption in Delhi

Year Number of Connections Metered 1 1976-77 1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2 210931 239854 258307 314763 355157 386167 409184 437251 475009 501174 547000 580000 625000 637914 678461 700923 745029 804190 826624 853807 915974 934170 955721 993939 1031948 Un-Metered Domestic Consumption lgd 4 1174 1414 1529 1519 1542 1556 1648 NA 1929 2524 2918 NA NA 3534 4013 4049 4082 4087 4057 4114 8377 8120 8451 8451 NA Commercial Industrial Consumption lgd 5 387 364 352 364 411 509 490 NA 507 513 483 NA NA 523 527 556 567 424 433 627 1478 1408 1491 1491 NA Total Consumption lgd 6 1561 1778 1881 1883 1953 2065 2138 NA 2436 3037 3401 NA NA 4067 4540 4605 4649 4511 4490 4841 9855 9528 9942 9942 7310 Per Capital Consumption of Water (gallons/day) 7 30.38 33.17 33.65 32.26 32.07 32.24 32.16 NA 33.65 40.22 43.27 NA NA 45.57 49.03 47.66 46.66 43.74 42.04 43.76 80.24 94.11 94.04 91.15 51.04
TABLE 8
3 28673 22633 20159 16131 13143 12620 11396 11185 10457 10054 26000 30000 126000 206850 226960 245451 253977 294174 311262 315687 284917 290217 297182 300100 312000
Lgd - lakh gallons daily Source: Delhi Statistical Abstract, Delhi Statistical Handbook, Dept. of Economics & Statistics, Govt. of NCT of Delhi Economic Survey of Delhi, 2001-2002 243
* * * * *
4. Privatisation of Delhi Jal Board and its Impact
efore delving into any discussion on privatisation of city water supply system in Delhi, it will be relevant here to have a birds eye view of the national scene.
4.1 Current Status of Water Sector Reforms in India

The process of privatisation of water supply systems in major towns in India is a natural corollary of India becoming a member-nation of World Trade Organisation (WTO). A basic national requirement for this, was to induce corresponding changes in the then existing National Water Policy (1988), which was accordingly done by proclaiming yet another National Water Policy in 2002, specically providing a section on Private Sector Participation. It opened the oodgates for privatisation of water supply system in Indian cities. These cities include, so far, Bhopal, Gwalior, Jabalpur, Indore, Dewas, Maksi (all Madhya Pradesh); Hyderabad, Vishakhapatnam (Andhra Pradesh); Borai (Chhattisgarh); Bangalore (Karnataka); Chennai, Tirapur (Tamil Nadu); Rajkot, Ahmedabad (Gujarat); Pune, Sangli-Miraj (Maharashtra); Haldia (West Bengal); Jamshedpur (Jharkhand); Noida (Uttar Pradesh); Delhi and Kakinada. In order to privatise water supply in towns, it becomes mandatory for the concerned states to undertake restructuring of water sector within their territories. Accordingly, many states have entered into loan agreements either with World Bank or Asian Development Bank for water sector reforms/restructuring. These loan agreements traverse beyond the privatisation of water supply and make deeper encroachment in areas like water tariff in irrigation, increasing other municipal tariffs, etc. For justication of sharp increase in water tariff, it is mandatorily enshrined in the loan agreements to increase property tax correspondingly, in some cases as high as 200 percent. In addition to these, new taxes will also be imposed, like, sewer drainage tax, sanitation tax and investment return tax, the last one in reality a payment for installment of loans. The above tenets in loan agreements eventually might prove a death-knell for urban poor as well as small and marginal farmers of rural India. It should be recalled here that 82 percent of the farmers belong to this category, having less than two acres of land. Some of these loan agreements are listed below: 1. Tamil Nadu Water Resource Strengthening Project (1995) 2. Orissa Water Sector Restructuring and Strengthening Project (1996) 3. Mountain Area Watershed Development (1999) 4. Karnataka Watershed Development (2001) 5. Delhi Water Supply and Sewage Project (2001) 6. Karnataka Rural Water Supply and Hygiene (2002) 7. Karnataka Community Based Pond Management (2002)
8. Uttar Pradesh Water Sector Restructuring Project (2002) 9. Madhya Pradesh DPIP (2002) 10. Rajasthan Water Sector Restructuring Project (2002) 11. Hydrology Project-II (2004) 12. Karnataka Urban Water Sector Improvement Project (2004) 13. Madhya Pradesh Water Sector Restructuring Project (2004) 14. Uttaranchal Decentralised Watershed Development (2004) 15. Uttar Pradesh Watershed Development Project (2004) 16. Maharashtra Rural Water Supply and Hygiene Project (2004) 17. Karnataka Coastal Area Water Management Project (2004) 18. Chhattisgarh Water Sector (Irrigation + Agriculture) Project (2005) 19. Uttaranchal Rural Water Supply and Environmental Hygiene Project (Proposed) 20. Maharashtra Water Sector Improvement Project (Proposed) 21. Tamil Nadu Rural Water Supply and Hygiene Project (Proposed) The list is not conclusive as many other agreements are under various stages of negotiations in different states of India, either with World Bank or Asian Development Bank. The total quantum of loans taken in these 18 water sector projects is a staggering US$ 3027.70 million or Rs.16,475.20 crore [barring Karnataka Coastal Area Water Management Project (2004)]. In addition to this, Kerala Urban Water Supply Project has also been signed under which water supply systems in large and medium-sized towns will be privatised. Another project, SWAJAL (with World Bank loan), has been under implementation in Uttaranchal since last few years. The analysis of these agreements reveal that they enshrine identical approach which include: creation of a water regulatory authority, transfer of city water supply to private entities (read MNCs),
50 Privatisation of Delhi Jal Board and its Impact
principle of full cost recovery, elimination of subsidies aimed at poor and marginalised sections of society, massive increase in water tariff, massive retrenchment of workers and so on and so forth. One important condition is that in all these cases is that the government will continue providing nancial resources for necessary expenses. Privatisation of water services is often compared with the privatisation in power sector. However, the nature of the two resources water and electricity is starkly different. Water is a naturally replenishing resource, existing on Earth for 4 billion years and has been instrumental in generating and shaping the life on our planet. Electricity, on the other hand, is a completely man-made resource and has been in existence barely for the last 200 years. It is possible to recreate man-made resources and use it through man-made systems. But water cant be generated for the entire humanity in a laboratory. Mighty civilisations in the past have thrived without electricity but can we survive without water?
4.2 Genesis of Privatisation of DJB

Commonly held belief that the process of privatisation of Delhi Jal Board (DJB) is a recent phenomenon, is hardly true since the groundwork started much earlier in this direction. Let us analyse the situation from the very beginning. In 1926, the rst institutional body for water supply in Delhi named Delhi Water and Sewage Board (DWSB) was constituted under British rule. When India became independent in 1947 there were a number of city municipalities covering specic parts of Delhi. Supply of water in different localities often become a bone of contention due to vague and overlapping boundaries among the various municipalities. In 1957 Delhi Municipal Corporation Act was promulgated to overcome this overlapping and smoothen the water supply system. The Act amalgamated the then existing 12 city municipalities under Delhi Municipal Corporations. Under this DMC Act, DWSB was renamed as Delhi Water Supply and Sewage Undertaking (DWSSU).
On 6 April 1998 Delhi Water Board (DWB) Act came into force and Delhi Jal Board came into existence under its provision. This DWB Act was almost a copy of Chapter 12 of DMC Act 1957 with few new clauses inserted, clearly meant for privatisation, especially Clause 64, as follows: 64. Entrusting of works to any company. The Board may, with the consent of the government or in accordance with the terms of any general or special direction given to it by the Government, and subject to such terms as may be approved by the Government, entrust to any company the construction or operation of any water works, sewage works or billing and revenue collection. This clearly means that the DWB Act was brought into existence merely with the aim of privatisation of DJB eventually. This also caused widespread resentment among 33,000 employees of DJB who went on strike in June 1998 to protest these new provisions. However, government at that time publicly denied any move towards privatisation of DJB. Parallel developments were also going on at the national level. In 1990, the government under late Mr. Narasimha Rao undertook a quantum leap towards liberalisation-privatisation under the then Finance Minister and now Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh. Immediately after the conclusion of new GATS agreement (later to be part of WTO) in 1993, government made biggest ever 1993 Constitutional Amendment, which specifically mentioned that Delhi Energy, Delhi Transport, Delhi Fire Services and Delhi Water Works to be converted into new authorities [1]. This move was specifically intended to facilitate the entry of foreign companies in these sectors. Significantly, Chapter XII of the Delhi Municipal Act 1957, dealing with water supply, was omitted from the newly constituted Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act 1993, pointing towards the scenario which will unfold in future.
But the foreign companies were actually allowed to enter Delhis water sector much earlier. For instance in 1984, an Indo-French Treaty was signed in which cooperation in water management was envisioned between the two countries. Under this treaty, in the garb of study projects, several studies were carried out regarding water in Delhi, like mapping of DJB water supply network, sewage distribution pattern in Delhi, etc. which were conducted by a French company named SAFEG. Subsequently, another UK-based company Severn International, also conducted some studies. Though technology transfer was another aspect enshrined in this treaty, it never came to that level. The higher ofcials of DJB admit that through these studies all the important and sensitive data was transferred to foreign companies. Ironically, as late as March 2005, Mr. Rakesh Mohan, CEO, DJB, denied in writing any move of government towards privatising DJB, in a letter written to RFSTE, a non government organisation opposed to privatisation of DJB [DO. No. CEO/ DJB/P9/2005 dated 19.3.2005, signed by Rakesh Mohan]. At the beginning itself, he has explicitly mentioned - that there is no move to privatise water in Delhi. In the end, the letter notes I thought it t to clarify some of the issues on which the public is being misled. However, this statement is completely incongruent with the ground reality, as a number of works at various units of DJB have actually been transferred to private companies since 1994 onwards (Table 9). In addition to this, various other relatively smaller works of DJB have also been handed over to Delhibased local rms and individuals. For example, a Delhi-based rm Computer Tech was assigned the complete task of billing in 1994 and it is now out of DJB hands. Another Delhi-based rm is operating about 300 booster pumping and sewage pumping stations. Yet another Delhi-based rm is also operating 600 water tankers. Maximum work of rehabilitation and desilting of sewer lines has been contracted to private rms for Operation &
TABLE 9
List of DJB Units Transferred to MNCs

S.No. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Plants Rithala Wastewater Okhla Water Treatment Delhi Gate Nala Wastewater Sen Nursing Home Nala Wastewater Sonia Vihar Water Treatment Pappan Kala Wastewater MNC Degremont Degremont Degremont Degremont Degremont JR Jolly (Delhi) Nature of Work (year of transfer) Operation and Maintenance (1994) Operation and Maintenance (1995) Operation and Maintenance (2000) Operation and Maintenance (2000) Operation and Maintenance (2000) Operation and Maintenance (2003)
Source: Water Workers Alliance, 2003
Maintenance (O&M), like Werm India, Michigan, Kaveri Infrastructure, etc. It is evident who is actually misleading public. The Delhi Government continues to deny privatisation of DJB in public though in 32nd meeting of DJB held in September 2000, under the then CEO Pradip Mehra it passed a resolution on framing policies towards privatisation of water services [2]. This is further corroborated by a recent report of Asian Development Bank, which has admitted that the rate of privatisation in water sector in Delhi is slow and it has accused DJB employees for blocking its acceleration [3]. So far, privatisation was restricted to smaller units of DJB but recently government has come out with another document [4] wherein it proposed to hand over the distribution of water in South Delhi, South Zone 2 and South Zone 3, to private companies. According to the plan enshrined in this document, ve new zones will be handed over to private companies by 2005 and entire water distribution system alongwith DJB will be handed over to private companies by 2015. Thus there is strong documentary evidence to believe that privatisation of DJB actually started much earlier and is going ahead despite repeated denials by the government in public.
4.3 World Banks Loan for Delhi Water Supply and Sewage Project (DWSSP)
In 1998, a World Bank team visited New Delhi between July 20-31 and identied projects for providing sustained water supply and sewerage services. Delhi Jal Board ofcially sought a World Bank loan in 1998 for betterment of its services and a loan of Rs. 1600 crore was approved in 2001. The same year, Delhi Government signed a loan agreement with World Bank for Delhi Water Supply and Sewage Project, enabling it to procure Rs. 1600 crore. However, this loan came with too many strings attached, as World Bank also sent its own plans of Rs. 1200 crore alongwith this loan. This caused a lot of resentment in DJB but owing to political willingness for it nothing could be done. In 1998-99 itself World Bank advised Delhi Jal Board to avail its Project Preparation Facility (PPF) and proposed an amount of US$ 2.5 million for procuring consultation services for the project report. Subsequently, in December 1999 DJB constituted a committee under the chairmanship of the then CEO to select a consultant for PPF and initiated the process. This consultant was supposed to draw a blueprint for sustainable water supply in Delhi.
One crucial aspect of the DWSSP is that for the rst ve years only foreign companies would be allowed to take over DJB, after which Indian companies can take over. Why this specic restrictive clause? The experiences around the globe have shown that in 90 percent of the cases in developing countries where city water supplies were taken over by private companies, they were forced to leave within ve years, in spite of liberal nancial assistance from the concerned governments coupled with sharply increased water tariff be it Africa, Asia or Latin America. Clearly this clause ensures that in early phase of privatisation foreign companies should earn maximum prots and then leave the turf. By that time the situation would have deteriorated to an extent that no Indian private company would prefer to take over from there. It has happened in almost all the cases in developing countries, and there is no reason to believe Delhi will be an exception.
though ranked at No. 10, have been selected to meet the requirement of the World Bank i.e. at least one consultant should be shortlisted from a developing country [Annexure 3]. A summary of evaluation attached with this letter clearly shows that PWC was awarded a score of 68.68 out of a total of 100 and stood at No. 5 [Annexure 4]. Other developments were also going on simultaneously. A series of meetings were held up between the DJB and World Bank to nalise the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the consultant. TOR was eventually nalised on 26 March 1999 but hardly a month later, World Bank wanted to add an annexure to the TOR. Earlier too, World Bank has insisted on constitution of an independent regulator on the lines of power and telecom regulators, to which DJB agreed. Once the process started after xing of TOR, World Bank insisted on inserting a specic instruction for the consultant Produce advice for a regulatory system that insulates the services from any local government or other external interference and ensures its operational, managerial and functional autonomy. It implied that the government would hire a consultant, which will advise government on how to keep itself out of it! DJB didnt have any problem with this insertion except that the reference to local government should be omitted. Both the parties could not reach any consensus over the issue and nally agreed to leave it openended on 6 May 1999. In the meantime, DJB invited technical proposals from these six short-listed companies and constituted an Evaluating Committee for scrutinising these technical proposals. In August 1999, World Bank gave a short training to the DJB Evaluating Committee on how to evaluate the technical proposals of the shortlisted consultants. Members comprised one IAS ofcer and other Chief Engineer level ofcers. Finally on 6 October 1999 DJB sent its report on evaluation of technical proposals for getting a no-objection letter from World Bank. A rm must obtain 75 percent for qualifying.
4.4 Selection of Price Waterhouse Cooper (PWC) as Consultant

Meanwhile, the Expression of Interest (EOI) for the proposed Delhi Water and Sewerage Project were invited upto 31 January 1999 and in response, 35 companies submitted their EOIs. A committee was formed for their evaluation. Rating of rms was completed on the basis of marks allocated on a scale ranging from 4 to 76. A list of six top rms was nalised. PWC stood at 10th place and was not included in the shortlisted rms [Annexure 2]. World Bank then made inquiries about the nationalities of these rms. It now brought its condition that at least one (consultant) from the developing country (be included) unless qualied rms from developing countries are not identiable. World Bank identied Price Waterhouse Cooper, rated 10th in the list nalised by DJB, as an Indian company. PWC, a multinational techno-economic service, had opened its ofce in Calcutta a few years back. After this DJB included PWC in six shortlisted rms. In a letter of DJB dated 15 March 1999 it was put on record Price Waterhouse Cooper
In response, World Bank, in its letter dated 6 December 1999, straightaway refused to grant a no-objection to this evaluation report, on the ground that sub division of points developed by Evaluation Committee are not fully responsive to the requirement of TOR. Further, in this letter, World Bank blatantly suggested a modication of sub-criteria. But that is not all. World Bank also demanded an explanation as to why PWC was awarded such low score? The complete letter is enclosed [Annexure 5]. On 20 December 1999, DJB in a detailed explanatory note to World Bank specically underlined that Committee (Evaluation) had completed the task in accordance with World Bank guidelines on Hiring of Consultants in Bank Financed Projects. The letter gave a detailed point-wise rebuttal to issues raised by World Bank. In the light of facts explained, letter at the end reiterated that: 5. The approach adopted by the Evaluation Committee is comprehensive, integrated and objective. The changes in the sub-criteria in the RFP are thus not necessary particularly when all aspects of the assignment get covered. The existing sub-criteria fully enable determination of the proposals responsiveness to the Terms of Reference (TOR). Changing the subcriteria at this stage when all proposals have been scrutinised is not advisable since any change now may be viewed differently by the rms. 6. In the light of the above, the recommendations of the Evaluation Committee may be considered again for communicating World Banks no objection at the earliest, for further action in the matter. If deemed necessary, a meeting of the Bank ofcers and the members of the Evaluation Committee can be held at an early date in the interest of expeditious completion of the evaluation process. In the meantime, all the six Consultancy Firms have been requested to extend validity of their offers by three months i.e. up to 23 March 2000. The complete Annexure 6. letter is enclosed here as
However, World Bank categorically declined to change its stand and insisted on revision of the subcriteria, which DJB thought was not at all needed at this stage. The then Additional CEO of DJB prepared a background note (No. DJB/ADDL.CEO/F.14 dated 26.1.2000) on this ongoing saga for the DJB meeting scheduled on 27 January 2000, wherein he commented on the motives of World Bank on record, as follow: The comments of the Bank were considered by the DJB and it was felt that changing the sub-criteria at this stage would not be advisable since it is tantamount to an afterthought and militates against the principle of transparency. A deeper analysis of the suggestions of the Bank would reveal that their objective is to ensure qualication of some more rms by making the sub-criteria less stringent. This is evident from their comment on division of points relating to e.g. Educational Qualication and Afliations and Publications under the criteria for the Key Staff and Similar Project under the criteria for the Specic Experience. It would mean that two, three or four rms would qualify which may eventually translate into award of contract to a rm other than any of the two originally recommended by the Committee. This could not only be terribly embarrassing to DJB, but might be questioned by the affected rms. Secondly, the Committee had evolved the sub-criteria by taking into consideration all aspects of the Terms of Reference (TOR) as well as the World Bank guidelines. It had also duly considered the illustrations received from the Bank and modelled the sub-division of points along the lines given. Needless to say, it was less than reasonable on the part of the Bank to insist on revision of the sub-criteria so scrupulously laid down by the Committee. Normally the sub-criteria are nalised before the opening of the bids, which the Committee had also done. In fact, the members of the Evaluation Committee were clearly advised to determine the subcriteria before opening the proposals, during a brief orientation session in the World Bank ofce in Delhi on 24.8.99 (emphasis original).
The last three lines of this background note are truly revealing: Informal discussion was held with Shri Shyamal Sarkar, Senior Sanitary Engineer in World Bank, to apprise him of the concerns of DJB. He has indicated that sub-criteria have been revised in similar circumstances at the Banks suggestion in the past. It appears that the project could be in jeopardy if the suggestion of World Bank were not agreed to. In practical terms this tells us that World Bank has been changing sub-criteria after the technical evaluation in other projects too! On 27 January 2000, DJB passed a resolution (Resolution No.514, Item No. 531) requesting the World Bank to reconsider its position, and if the Bank continues to remain rigid then fresh bids would be invited for award of consultancy. On 10 February, 2000 Delhi Government rushed a high level delegation comprising Secretary, CEO and Financial Director to persuade World Bank to change its stand, but all in vain. The stalemate continued till World Bank in its letter dated 2 May 2000 rejected all pleas of DJB and suggested to reject all bids, return all the proposals and call for fresh proposals. DJB also brought the entire issue to the knowledge of Shri Abhas Jha, Deputy Secretary, Department of Economic Affairs, Government of India. His opinion was that it might not be advisable to forego the project on this issue. The DJB, Delhi Government and Central Government all were equally helpless in front of World Bank. Finally, the submitted proposals were sent back to the rms informing them that fresh bids will be invited and a new Evaluation Committee was constituted in DJB for scrutiny of new proposals. This time DJB took safeguard in advance by procuring World Banks prior approval in everything it did constitution of committee, methodology of evaluation, xing criteria and sub-criteria, procedures. Yet, even in the second round, PWC failed to qualify and only two
rms Montgomery Watson Ltd, UK and Tahal Consulting Engineers Ltd, Israel qualied. DJB informed World Bank about the evaluation of these fresh proposals through letters dated 3 January and 10 January, 2001. This time DJB was extra careful in taking no chances and itself pointed to the dismally low points awarded to PWC by one evaluator Mr. R. K. Jain. In response, World Bank in letter dated 1 February 2001 found technical aws in Mr. R. K. Jains evaluation and directed DJB to recast your technical evaluation report such that evaluator scores and resultant ranking scores are consistent and reasonable [Annexure 7]. Perhaps fed up with the entire sequel of events and utterly frustrated over its helplessness in this matter, DJB nally gave up and wrote to World Bank The matter has been reviewed in view of the observations of the World Bank. Accordingly the summary of the evaluation sheets theme-wise and criteria-wise have been reworked by omitting the evaluation made by Shri R. K. Jain. In case above is accepted, the following rms achieve more than the qualifying marks of 75 percent: 1. M/S Montgomery Watson Ltd, UK 2. M/S Price Waterhouse Cooper, India 3. M/S Tahal Consulting Engineers Ltd, Israel The World Bank may kindly consider the matter for approval. This letter is enclosed as Annexure 8. This time World Bank had nothing to object and eventually PWC was awarded a contract for Project Preparation in March 2001, after 18 months of wrangling. The selection of a consultant for PPF demonstrates that World Bank was micro managing entire process, during which it left no stone unturned to bully Delhi Government and arm-twist DJB, and the Government meekly gave in. It just makes mockery of good governance, may be it is a facet of corporate governance.
4.5 World Bank Price Waterhouse Cooper Linkage

The question that naturally comes to mind is Why was World Bank so obsessed with selecting PWC as a consultant? World Bank on its part denies any interference in project management and states that above is a case of excellent monitoring to ensure fairness and making the process transparent. But there are many questions, which demand answers from World Bank. Why has World Bank not raised objection to the low points awarded by another evaluator Mr. S. K. Chabra to Sogreah? Was it due to the fact that it was not the case with PWC? How come World Bank always nds PWC to be included as a consultant in most of projects funded by it? For example, PWC is a consultant in World Bank funded Tamil Nadu Health Project too. In 2000, PWC also prepared Vision-2010 documents for Chhattisgarh, covering all the sectors agriculture, water, power, mineral, industry where it has suggested action programmes. And Chhattisgarh Water Policy, evolved on the basis of PWC suggestions, was found an appropriate case for a loan by Asian Development Bank (ADB) in March this year. Fact of the matter is that PWC is involved in most of the projects funded by World Bank and ADB, either in the form of consultant or in advisory capacity or technical assistance, or nancial manager, or full-edged management authority, for conducting feasibility studies, project preparedness study, vision document, action for future, project appraisal, mapping of existing water distribution system, technical and nancial reports, management strategy and so on and so forth. In India, out of 22 loans in water sector, either from World Bank or Asian Development Bank, PWC has been hired in at least 12 cases. It will be interesting to nd out whether this relationship exists in Africa and Latin America too. But this World Bank-PWC nexus goes much deeper. According to the information available on the website of World Bank, PWC is also an internal
auditor of World Bank. In early 1998, World Banks internal audit department established a team within its unit with fraud and corruption investigating skills. Currently, the team is managed by Internal Audit staff members and consists of three white collar fraud investigators as consultants, a group of forensic accountants and specialist investigators from PWC and several World Bank staff. In these circumstances, it appears that the staff of World Bank go overboard to get PWC included as a consultant, so that they individually remain in good books of PWC. In case of any adversity, they are bailed out and their interests are protected, in future. Another point is how the PWC can be recognised as an Indian rm? At best it can be categorised as an Indian subsidiary of PWC. This is further corroborated by the fact that almost one-third of the total 1.9 million PWC received, Euro 443,170 were deposited in London HSBC account of PWC Development Associates, London [5]. World Bank has specically asked from DJB about the nationality of rms and Bank sees nothing wrong in depositing this money in London as it was to cover foreign expenses PWC might incur on hiring experts. If it was so then PWCs developing country branch should have received forex component and not the London branch of PWC. Incidentally, PWC as an auditing rm has been engulfed in controversy worldwide. It has fought numerous charges of auditing failures presented by Securities and Exchanges Commission of the USA. In India, last year Reserve Bank of India struck off PWC from its audit panel for lapses in auditing the failed Global Trust Bank, though it was reinstated by the Calcutta High Court [6] in 2004. Obviously there is more to World Bank-PWC nexus than meets the eye. World Bank-PWC association appears to be a symbiotic relationship where both are getting benetted. Otherwise, without the help of World Bank and ADB, the most important task of PWC is to guard the names of Oscar awardees, from
the selection to the culmination of actual award function.
4.6 Suez-Degremont: Sonia Vihar Water Treatment Plant

Suez Degremont, a subsidiary of Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux Water Division, was awarded a contract of US$ 50 million (about Rs. 2 billion) for the design, building and operation of 635 mld (million litres per day) drinking water production plant at Sonia Vihar in New Delhi to cater to 3 million citizens of the capital. It is being built on BOT (build, own, operate) basis for 10 years. The Chief Minister of Delhi inaugurated the Sonia Vihar Treatment Plant on 21 June, 2002. The water for this plant will come from Tehri dam through the Upper Ganga Canal upto Muradnagar in western Uttar Pradesh and then through the giant (3.25 meter-diameter) pipeline to Delhi, covering a distance of 30 km. This pipeline will pass through the following 12 villages in Ghaziabad district: Kushalya, Masoori, Nahal, Kallu Garhi, Dasna, Qazipura, Mehrauli, Vijaynagar, Duraheda, Chhajarsi, Makanpur and Gazipur. Incidentally, it is the second water supply project awarded to Suez Degremont in India, after Mumbai. Government claims that Delhi requires 3324 mld against the available 2634 mld and hence justies the award of contract to Suez Degremont. Farmers whose lands have been acquired for the construction of this pipeline have been agitating not only for the appropriate compensation but also for the canal upto Muradnagar being lined, as the seepage from this canal rejuvenates and recharge groundwater. The canal is being lined to prevent seepage of water into neighbouring agricultural elds. Till date about ten kilometres of pipeline has been laid. Their demand is that the Upper Ganga Canal should be linked to Yamuna Canal through this area to deal with the severe drought prevailing here, rather than stopping the seepage from the canal, which will aggravate the situation. Incidentally, the pipeline is being constructed with public nance but the prots will land up with the Suez Degremont.
The Sonia Vihar plant was scheduled to start in September 2003 after the completion of laying down the 28 kilometre water supply main pipeline. But the agitation by farmers of the affected area has delayed this and was rescheduled to start in July 2004 but it still remains to start operating till this date. Throughout the summer of 2005, when Delhi was suffering from an acute water crisis, another political drama was being played in public. The Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh rst refused to give any water for Sonia Vihar plant and then promised to give some water. He went back on his words but again promised to release water when Prime Minister intervened on the request of Delhi Chief Minister. Opposition parties in Uttar Pradesh ercely opposed any such move by UP and once again the Chief Minister of UP backed away. According to newspaper reports, UP Chief Minister, in the meeting with Prime Minister on 17 June 2005, agreed that UP would divert 270 cusec water to Delhi, provided there is 2500 cusec available in Ganga. But there is only 2100 cusec in Ganga hence it is not possible to release any water for Delhi. He further claried that it would only be possible to release water for Delhi on arrival of monsoon. Let us look at the water availability from Uttar Pradesh. The Upper Ganga Canal has a capacity of 32,000 cusec water but merely 19,800 cusec water was owing in it in June 2005. This canal supplies water for agriculture to 11 districts of western Uttar Pradesh, which account for 140 Assembly seats in UP. The entire agricultural economy of Rs. 4042 crore in western UP is dependent on this canal. If 270 cusec water is diverted from here to Delhi, this region will incur a loss of Rs. 1500 crore, which the state cant afford. A backlash from farmers will be decisive in the next elections in the state. Delhi is now aiming to get water from Tehri Dam, and so is UP it has asked for 4000 cusec water from Tehri Dam, while Uttaranchal has so far refused to divert water to UP for agricultural purpose.
Meanwhile, according to the agreement with Suez Degremont, Delhi government will have to pay a heavy monetary penalty from this year if the water is not made available to it for making Sonia Vihar plant functional.
4.7 Impacts of Privatisation

The complete range of impacts can be extrapolated from the measures suggested by the PWC Project Preparation Report [7] but before that we must look at the objective of reform programme. PWC has unambiguously spelt it out in the following text: The objectives and the guiding principles of the proposed institutional framework for the UWSS (Urban Water Supply and Sewerage) sector are: Separation of ownership (Government), management and regulation: Given the inherent nature of UWSS sector as a natural monopoly with lack of competition in the near future, as well as the inherent conict in DWB mandated to frame its own regulation with respect to tariff and service quality and enforcing them, an independent regulatory mechanism is envisaged to act as the stimulator for an efcient operation of the utility. An enabling and facilitator role is envisaged for the government with the role of provision of services independently handled by the utility. In actual practice it means that people will have no say in such a vital subject like water and will be completely left at the mercy of MNCs. Let us now look at some signicant impacts.
Delhi is relatively slower than elsewhere and strong opposition of a section of workers has been held responsible for this. The massive retrenchment of workers after the takeover of municipal water utilities by private rms has been experienced throughout the world, like Uganda, Mozambique, Philippines, Atlanta City (USA), Bolivia, etc. It also needs to be explored which categories of workers will be sacked and what modus operendi would be used for this purpose. Decentralisation is the rst step of privatisation in Delhi, as elsewhere. Under it, different zones/water treatment plants of Delhi will be transferred to private companies in the name of operational or managerial services. This would have a direct bearing on the administration of DJB, and clerical staff of revenue department, as lower and upper division clerks or head clerks will hardly be required anymore. This is further corroborated by the PWC report, which strongly recommends complete computerisation of DJB. Many departments of DJB like, administrative department or labour welfare department and several others will cease to exist. In Orange Farm area of Johannesburg (South Africa) Degremont and associates invented a new mechanism to get rid of workers engaged in meter reading, billing and revenue collection. They issued pre-paid water cards and the water ows in pipes only after inserting this card in the newly installed meters. In all the plants handed over to private companies in Delhi, there are no clerks anywhere. They subcontract the work of employees to another local rm. For example, Rithala Wastewater Plant has been handed over to Degremont on contract but the employees working there belong to Extra Enterprise. Similarly, nitrication unit of Okhla water treatment plant has employees of Tanwar Company. Let us look at the PWCs prescription in this regard, as given in Chapter 2 of its report. The total sanctioned staff strength is 30,825 (including 4,200 of muster roll workers) in different groups and against this the actual lled-in staff is 26,878
Retrenchment of Workers
This is the most prevailing impact of privatising a city water supply. According to a report of ADB [8] wherever city water supply is transferred to private companies, the number of workers per 1000 connections has drastically shrinked to two. Prior to this it was 20 workers per 1000 connections. At present the number of workers in DJB is 19.9 per 1000 connections. The report categorically states that momentum of privatisation of DJB in
(including 4532 muster roll workers and 440 contract drivers). It has identied 168 categories of employees in four groups in DJB. A break-up of group-wise lled-in staff (excluding muster roll workers and contract drivers) is given in Table 10. In the opinion of PWC, DJB is bottom heavy i.e. the lower staff in C and D groups comprises 97 percent of the total staff. Therefore it has proposed Staff Rationalisation of these overstaffed groups. It has suggested a number of reviews for restructured DJB (post-privatisation) to look into this aspect.
TABLE 10
and there is inverse relationship between number of employees and prot less the number of workers, more is the prot. The public statement of Degremont that it will operate Sonia Vihar water treatment plant with 60-70 workers also corroborates this. All the wastewater plants run by Degremont are functioning with less workers: Rithala with 35 workers, and there are never more than ve workers seen in one shift at Delhi Gate Nala and Sen Nursing Home Nala plants. Similarly, Okhla water treatment plant operated by Degremont hardly has 18 workers. According to a rough estimate, 60-70 percent of the present employees of DJB may lose their jobs once the process of privatising DJB is complete. A case of reforms in power sector in Delhi can be cited which witnessed the similar situation. It would be relevant here to mention that Planning Commissions tenth ve-year plan report has found the power privatisation process nancially unviable. The Planning Commission said - The privatisation programme in Delhi has been able to endure such huge distribution losses because the state government subsidy covered the huge gap and replicating the model across the country would be economically impossible.
Categorisation of DJB Employees

Group A B C D Pay Scale Above Rs. 8000 Rs. 5500-8000 Rs. 3050-5500 Below Rs. 3050 Filled-in-staff 176 550 15,744 21,906
Source: Water Workers Alliance, 2003
PWC has proposed consolidation of employees categories pruning it down from existing 168 to 102 categories. The break-up of some of the redundant categories, i.e. categories that are proposed to be eliminated, is as follows: a. 7 categories where recruitment rules have not been made and no posts have been lled b. 42 categories where recruitment rules exist but the posts have not been lled c. 17 categories where the recruitment rules and roles of functionaries are similar and hence they can be merged in lesser number of categories. It does not mean that only workers of lower categories will be affected. Many of the technical categories can be reframed after reducing their number, where one employee can perform multiple works. Adoption of Skada technique will render PLB and leak detection cell useless. The private companies are driven with the motive of prots
Skyrocketing of Water Tariff

PWC report contains a complete chapter (5) on tariffs. In the very rst page of this chapter, it opines: One indication of the extent to which DWB tariffs are misaligned with the organisations costs is the fact that the tariff is about half of what it needs to be if O & M costs and depreciation is to be covered. On an average DWB collects Rs. 4.63 per KL of water supplied. If O & M and depreciation were to be recovered, the tariff would have to rise to Rs. 8.75 per KL. If interests were included, it would rise to Rs. 13.18 per KL. In a nutshell, this sets the agenda for the whole chapter. It has justied cost recovery by invoking the related sections of National Water Policy (2002) and DWB Act (1998). The Report has raised this issue by stating following (ibid):
Cost Recovery:
Presently, Delhi has the lowest tariff among all metros in India with DJB barely able to recover 40 percent of its operating costs. Despite the fact that the DWB Act mandates the full cost recovery, this philosophy has not been reected in the tariffsetting decisions taken by the DWB. Given the persistent decit on revenue account over the years, there is need for tariff rationalisation accompanied with improved services whilst gradually phasing out the government subsidy, with the objective of achieving full recovery of costs of efcient O&M (emphasis original). The rst two objectives of water pricing policy, according to PWC are revenue sufciency and resource conservation.
TABLE 11
And how would this be implemented and achieved? PWC has recommended a two-part tariff system with both a xed and a variable tariff system to be put in place. Whilst the xed charges would be uniform at monthly fees, the volumetric tariff system would consist of two slabs with the tariff rate being higher for the higher consumption slab. The other key feature of the tariff design include reduction in the cross-subsidy ratio among the other customer categories, increase in the sewerage surcharge from 50 percent to 100 percent, and additional surcharge of 30 percent on connections with non-working meters. The proposed tariff structure is presented in the Table 11. Let us see how this above tariff structure would hit the common man. According to PWC report, total revenue water available in 2005-06 is 330 mgd. The operational expenses (Rs. 830 crore), interest (Rs. 845 crore), and depreciation (Rs. 137 crore) were incurred on it, making the total cost of this water to Rs. 1812 crore. So, the unit cost of water in 2005-06 comes to [18120000000 X 1000/(330000000 X 4.54 X 365)] Rs. 33 per KL. Assuming a consumption of 200 litres of water per capita per day, a family of ve would consume 30 KL of water in a month. If they were charged on the basis of full cost recovery, their monthly water bill would be Rs 990 against Rs 192 at present, and if interest too is added then the monthly water bill will be more than Rs. 1500! Though the PWC report mentioned about Protection of Vulnerable Sections of Society, in the light of discussion contained therein, it appears merely a lip service. First of all, without any proper justication it has drastically reduced the average water requirement of poor to 40 lpcd, bringing down their monthly water requirement to mere 6 KL. Further, PWC has tried to transmogrify that existing positive discrimination towards them is in fact regressive subsidies. It must be borne in mind that ofcially more than 1.06 crore people live in JJ clusters and by invoking such steep water tariff they would be worst hit. The concern of PWC about poor can be taken with a pinch of
PWC-Proposed Water Tariff Structure

Tariff Element Average Fixed Monthly Charge (Rs/Month) Consumption LimitSlab-I (in KL) Consumption LimitSlab-II (in KL) Volumetric ChargeSlab-I (in Rs/KL)* Volumetric ChargeSlab-II (in Rs/KL)* Surcharge for sewerage services (%) Addl. surcharge for non-working meters (%) Flat rate for unmetered consumers per month**
* Surcharge to be applied ** Inclusive of sewer surcharge
Domestic Industrial Commercial
25
125
250
0-30
0-50
0-50
>30
>50
>50
2.30
5.50
10.00
6.00
12.00
17.00
100%
100%
100%
30%
30%
30%
50
580
1500
salt, as it proposes no hike in tariff for NDMC and Cantonment areas, which have maximum average availability of water. It obviously translates into the fact that people living in rest of Delhi would bear the cost of their subsidy.
meter security charge, connection charge, and occupiers security charge, in addition to 100 percent raise in all the existing charges. These have been cited as other modes of generating revenue, irrespective of the paying capacity of consumers. Here the author would have liked to include a discussion on the nancial implications of the existing system and current losses being incurred by the DJB vis--vis the nancial commitments sought by private companies from the government, for a comparative account. But such specic data is not available in public domain and the authors efforts to collect the data have been futile in this regard.
Governments Financial Commitment Towards Privatisation

The common perception is that once a private company takes over it will invest its own money and earn prots. But this has not been the case in water sector reforms anywhere. On the contrary, the private rms after taking over city water supply systems solely depend on receiving massive funds from the concerned governments. The same is the case with Delhi too. PWC report, under the heading summary of cash ow projections has specically sought the year-wise government commitment as shown in Table 12.
TABLE 12
Other Issues of Concern

There are several other issues of concern, which emerge from the experiences of privatisation of city water supply everywhere. These include: excessive work load on workers in post-reform period, violation of labour safety regulations and workers welfare, reduction in average quantum of water availability per family, dilution of potable water indices, apathy to consumer related problems and their redressal, deterioration of sewer line services, increase in frequency and number of plant accidents, and conicts on control over ponds, wells, surface waterbodies with local residents, etc. Since the general framework of privatising city water supply is the same everywhere, it is likely that these problems will also come to fore in Delhi too, in due course of time.
Loan from the Government to Finance the Cash Decit

2002-03 2005-06 2009-10 2011-12 1445 crore 3270 crore 5737 crore 7693 crore
At present it is not in public sphere as to how much commitment government has made or is planning to commit. But the more important question is how this money sought by PWC will be generated? If it is going to be allocated from the regular budgetary provisions, then the entire exercise of reforms itself becomes futile. If the government is willing to incur such mammoth nances to private companies, it can denitely improve the existing set-up of DJB manifold with even one-third of this money. In addition to skyrocketing water tariff, PWC has also suggested to impose various new charges, like development charge, meter maintenance charge,
4.8 Groundwater of Delhi for MNCs?

In June 2005, Delhi Government cleared The Delhi Water Board (Amendment) Bill 2005. The bill was initially prepared by the DJB a few years ago, but the government didnt act on it. The provisions of the bill empower DJB to take control of groundwater and its development in Delhi, hitherto under the Central Ground Water Authority. Under this enactment, it is also proposed to make water harvesting mandatory in case of digging a borewell. The bill will now be sent to Delhi Governments Law Department and Ministry of Water Resources,
GoI, for clearance and nally to Delhi Assembly for legislative clearance. The timing of the bill also raises an alarm bell. Putting the groundwater under the control of DJB at a time when DJB is undergoing privatisation, simply means that eventually these private companies will get control of groundwater. In a related development, on 26 July 2005 CGWA has made it mandatory for all users of groundwater in East, Northeast, Northwest, West and New Delhi to get their tubewells registered with the government. CGWA has already banned boring in South and Southwest Delhi. Signicantly, this task has been assigned to DJB and it is authorised to collect the forms. Though there is no fees for applying, the information collected could be used to ban any drilling for installing a new tubewell. The notice will be soon published that would give the dates for lling this information. Everyone individual households, commercial establishments, industries, institutional complexes, hospitals, and government ofces will have to furnish this information. When the DJB is fully privatised in next few years, this information will be in the possession of private companies. Considering the sensitive nature of provisions enshrined in this bill, its opposition by MLAs of both major political parties in Delhi started gaining momentum. Finally, the government of Delhi agreed in the Delhi Assembly to refer this bill to a select committee of the House. This was done when the ruling partys MLA openly declared that they would not allow the bill to be passed.
lpcd. Yet it continues to stare in the face of water crisis year after year in summer. Plainly, there is an urgent need to put our own house in order, rst and foremost. In this backdrop, some efforts in thwarting the juggernaut of privatisation need to be mentioned here.
Reclamation of Wazirabad Plant from Vivendi

On 22 August 2000, Delhi Government in a cabinet meeting proposed to sign an O & M contract, with Vivendi-Triveni Company, which was accepted (decision number 539). The then Secretary, Urban Development while preparing this cabinet document said that DJB should step up momentum towards privatisation and proposed that through an operation tender Wazirabad can be taken up as a pilot project. The Secretary further said that Vivendi-Triveni Company would operate Wazirabad plant and increase its capacity. The company carried out a Due Diligence Study in which it showed that Wazirabad Plant is functioning at under capacity. Subsequently, DJB also passed the proposal in its meeting on 5 September 2000 (Item No. 708). DJB Workers trade union learnt of this proposal and a series of demonstrations and dharna were organised throughout September-October 2000 at Wazirabad Plant. Meetings with the workers of Wazirabad Plant were also held, in which executive engineers also participated. The cabinet proposal, Secretary Urban Developments letter and DJBs clearance were discussed and analysed threadbare. This revealed that Government and DJB are deliberately underestimating the existing capacity of the Wazirabad Plant in order to justify its handing over to Vivendi. So a powerful argument would be to refute this claim of government. A detailed study was conducted under the leadership of Mr. S. A. Naqvi, a senior ofce bearer of the trade union. This study disclosed that actually Wazirabad Plant was (and continues) functioning beyond its capacity. The detailed study containing irrefutable in-situ data from the plants was prepared, puncturing the hollow claim of Government-DJB-Vivendi.
4.9 Alternatives to Privatisation

Under the prevailing neo-liberal economic model, privatisation and liberalisation have become the mantra in ofcial and mainstream political circles, irrespective of ideological hues, barring the left. In such a situation, even if alternatives exist it is difcult to implement them since the mindset of people who matter is biased. A case in point is DJB. On the basis of per capita availability of water Delhi ranks rst in the country 200-230
Finally, Vivendi left the scene in March 2001 and thus timely action of workers thwarted the attempt of Vivendi to take over Wazirabad Plant.
Nangloi Water Treatment Plant

The Nangloi Water Treatment Plant was constructed by the NBCC in November 1998 and the plant was handed over to them for O & M. In the wake of Wazirabad experience, this plant was a soft target for designs of MNCs as it was outside the purview of DJB. The workers union was also aware of it and was keeping a close eye on the developments related with this plant. In June 2003 workers union decided to launch a movement for bringing Nangloi Plant under the control of DJB since it is not possible to know all the time what new clandestine developments are going on, behind the scene. This was started in July 2003 and sustained till August 2003. Buckling under the pressure of workers, government took the plant from NBCC and handed over to DJB nally. Summing up, the manner in which privatisation is being carried out in DJB, under the agship of World Bank, is highly questionable and should be unacceptable to the civil society since it a direct, blatant intrusion of national sovereignty. If the privatisation is to be buttressed with public exchequer then what is the logic of doing it in the rst place?
The Chief Minister, who is also the Chairperson of DJB, took this decision, after a meeting with citizens representing wide spectrum of Delhis population. Chief Minister told the delegation We are not stupid to accept all the recommendations of the World Bank. We are open to suggestions and other ways to deal with this serious situation in the capital. If people and voluntary groups can do that, it is all the more welcome. Planning Commission Deputy Chairman Montek Singh Ahluwalia has also expressed his opinion by saying that NGOs and social activists on water reforms should be satised before any approval was given to World Banks plans [10]. In a recent development, more than 50 Professors of Indian Institute of Management (IIM) (36 from Ahmedabad and 14 from Bangalore) and several alumni of Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) (Delhi and Kharagpur), have demanded immediate scrapping of Delhi Jal Boards controversial water privatisation scheme, and warned Delhi government against taking a World Bank loan for the project as it would make water costlier and out of reach for the common man [11]. In a letter written to Chief Minister Delhi, they have raised severe concern over the 24X7 water project for South Delhi. They have warned that this would make things worse as water bills would increase manifold and common man would be deprived of this natural resource. Talking to media persons, Prof Trilochan Sastry, IIM Bangalore said Similar projects in other countries show massive increases in water tariffs and the same will be repeated in Delhi too. They demanded that the government seek help of experts from IITs and IIMs besides residents bodies to improve water supply in the city. Prof Sastry said reports clearly say that Delhi has enough water and the only problem is its distribution. With the active cooperation of residents, the problem of distribution can be easily tackled [12]. Dr. C. K. Jain, an alumnus of IIT Delhi, argued that there was no need to take high interest loan from World Bank and the money could be easily raised from within the country.
4.10 World Banks Recommendations put on Hold

The citywide public opposition, debates, and protests over privatisation of water utility have compelled the Delhi government to rethink about the whole exercise of privatisation of DJB. The Delhi Government has recently put the entire package of recommendations on hold for the time being [9] including the 24X7 water scheme, hike in water tariff, splitting of various water zones, and privatisation of entire distribution and billing network. It has also invited suggestions on the recommendations from experts, non-governmental organisations and people.
Finally, bowing to immense public pressure, the government of Delhi withdrew its application for World Bank loan [13]. This has been done after DJB wrote a letter to Delhi Government, which in turn wrote the same to Central Government.
infamy and notoriety in developing countries) as Poverty Reduction Strategic Programme (PRSP), as if in black humour, since there are innite studies linking SAP with increase in poverty and environmental loss. World Banks intrusion in natural resources too has been disastrous it has funded projects involving substantial forest loss and submerged fertile lands throughout the globe. The Ecologist, internationally reputed environmental monthly from UK, brought out several special issues in 1980s and 1990s, focusing on the role of World Bank in environmental destruction globally. In spite of this and stiff opposition from all quarters at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 at Brazil, the newly created Global Environmental Facility (GEF) was allocated to be headquartered at World Bank. A more recent case is the economic crisis of South East Asian nations, where World Banks strategy to overcome it has further deepened it. The involvement of World Bank with water sector has been questioned worldwide, forcing World Bank to withdraw assistance from many water development projects. A recent critique of World Bank water sector strategy is quite eye opening in this regard [14]. At a time when the developed countries have realised the enormous hidden cost of large dams and have started decommissioning their dams [15], World Bank is thrusting it on developing countries in the name of overcoming water crisis. The more recent engagement of World Bank is with the privatisation of city water supply utilities. World Bank has forced countries like Bolivia, Mozambique, Kenya and others to hand over these utilities to MNCs and their subsidies and the results have been disastrous [16]. World Bank has succeeded completely in East Europe where all the new democratic nations have followed World Banks dictates and handed over city water utilities to private companies in their capitals and other major towns. For instance in Poland in 1990s, city water supply was handed over to MNCs in Gdansk,
4.11 World Banks Policies: An Overview

World Bank, as is well known came into existence during the reconstruction and rebuilding of II World War-torn Europe. When this task was accomplished by 1965, it was still left with a huge chunk of money. In a benevolent streak, it was thought that rather than closing down World Bank, this money should be spent on the development activities in the developing countries. Yet, almost six decades of active assistance of World Bank has only destroyed the economies of developing nations, entangling them into a debt cycle, from which they can never come out. In contrast, World Bank coffers are over-owing reverse cash ow to World Bank started in 1986 and continues till date. Reverse cash means that the total sum earned in annual interest is higher then the capital granted as loans. How has it happened? Let us look at one of the pet programmes of World Bank Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). World Bank has vigorously implemented SAP in conjunction with IMF, in Africa, Latin America and Asia. After completion of 30 years of implementation of SAP in 105 countries, World Bank conducted an in-house exercise to study its impacts. This study revealed that out of 105 countries where SAP was implemented, 95 countries showed negative impacts, in ve countries there was practically no change and there have been visible positive results in only ve countries. However, elaborating further on these positive effects, the study specically mentions that in these ve countries, economic policies and scal discipline of these countries are more responsible for this success, rather then the SAP design. Yet, World Bank continued to attach the conditionality of implementing SAP to nations seeking loans. Recently, World Bank has renamed SAP (it had acquired too much
Bielsko Biala, Lodz, Szczecin, Zywiec, Torun, Krakow, and Bydgoszcz towns. For an elaborate treatment on the role of World Bank-WTO-MNCs trinity in privatisation of water services kindly see the reference [17]. Thus the authors opinion on World Bank should not be misconstrued as ideological antipathy and a
suspicion of the motives of World Bank. It would be relevant here to mention that at the completion of 50 years of World Banks existence, a movement 50 years is enough was launched in USA demanding closure of World Bank and IMF, since these twin sisters have played havoc in developing countries and since then it has gained strong momentum in the developed world.
References
1. Acts of Parliament (1993). Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi 2. Delhi Jal Board (2000). Resolution passed at 32nd Meeting, DJB, New Delhi 3. Charles T. Andrews and Cesar E. Yniguez (2004). Water in Asian Cities, Asian Development Bank, Manila, Philippines 4. Government of Delhi (2004). Delhi Urban Water Supply and Sewage Sector Vision (Draft for discussion), Delhi 5. Rajesh Ramchandran (2005). Smell a water rat? The Outlook, New Delhi, 1 August 2005 6. Ibid. 7. Anon (2004). Delhi Water Supply and sewerage Project Project Preparation. Draft Final Report, Price Waterhouse Cooper. July 2004 8. Reference No. 3 9. Sujay Mehdudia (2005). Sheila puts water scheme on hold, The Hindu, New Delhi, August 25, 2005 10. Ibid. 11. News Report (2005). Scrap water privatisation plan IIT, IIM professors speak out against World Bank loan for project, The Hindu, September 20, 2005 12. Ibid. 13. Nidhi Sharma (2005). DJB plays it safe, shelves WB project, The Times of India, New Delhi, 29 September 2005 14. Patrick MuCully (2002). Avoiding Solution Worsening Crisis A Critique of World Bank Water Sector Strategy: Strategic Directions for World Bank Engagement, International Rivers Network, Berkley USA. Also available on website 15. Arun Kumar Singh (2003). Interlinking Of Rivers in India: A Preliminary Assessment, The Other Media, New Delhi 16. Gil Yarron (2000). The Last Frontier: 10 Big Water Corporations and the Privatisation and Corporatisation of the Worlds Last Public Resource. Polaris Institute and Council of Canadians, Canada 17. Arun Kumar Singh (2004). Privatisation of Rivers in India, Vikas Adhyayan Kendra, Mumbai
* * * * *
Annexure-2
Annexure-3
Annexure-4
Annexure-5
Annexure-6
Annexure-7
Annexure-8
5. The Conict Resolution and Other Options for Delhi

t is clear from the above text that the water problem in Delhi is multi-dimensional in nature and augmentation of water is not a long-term solution, especially since the water crisis is likely to accentuate in future everywhere.
5.1 General
Delhi is heavily dependent on neighbouring states like Haryana and Uttar Pradesh for water, while its own mismanagement based on ill-conceived policies, is equally responsible for it. There is a complete lack of any long-term perspective and vision in its planning. Though the recent thrust on rainwater harvesting is a welcome sign, a lot remains to be done, other than lip service. Furthermore, there is no mechanism to trap the rainwater falling on roads and yovers. Given the conicting demands of water on the riparian rivers, it seems unlikely that Delhi will get additional water from Haryana, especially when regional parties are in power in most of the states, mired in populist policies. The Town Planning Department of New York city has initiated an ambitious plan to utilise its green areas for trapping surface water in a billion-dollar project. The primary aim of this project is to recharge groundwater keeping the future growth of the city in mind. The department had a choice of establishing a new multi billion-dollar water treatment plant or to utilise the natural ltration and storage capacity underground. New York city is downstream of Hudson river and water before entering here traverses in upstream areas. The department has enforced the strict compliance of existing legal provisions aimed towards environmental protection in upstream areas coupled with regular monitoring. It ensures that the best quality of water is owing in the river when it approaches New York city. It is then stored underground through the green areas which facilitates run in. Despite the rhetoric of Delhi being the third greenest city in the world, obviously such a plan cannot be applied to Delhi given the ground realities of forest cover, as stated earlier [1]. Let us look at the various suggestions oated to overcome water crisis in Delhi.
5.2 Proposals of Pani Morcha

Pani Morcha, an NGO led a public interest litigation (PIL) in Supreme Court in 1992 to ensure that there was adequate ow in both Yamuna and Ganga and to ensure that no unaltered sewage was dumped into Yamuna. Authorities expressed their inability to change the situation and pleaded that nothing could be done because of the growing population. The Supreme Court told the petitioner to suggest alternative policies or action plan. Subsequently, Pani Morcha submitted a detailed plan to the Supreme
Court suggesting steps to be taken within Delhi to improve water situation in the city. A summary of these suggestions is being given here [2].
Creation of Five Flood Plain Reservoirs within Delhi

Four of these reservoirs could be quite large and one would be the expansion of an existing small lake. In addition, every effort must be made to ll the old tanks, jheels and hauzees with clean monsoon waters. These reservoirs are recommended in areas, which normally get waterlogged in the monsoon months as follows: i. Two reservoirs can be created above the Wazirabad barrage On either bank of the river two reservoirs can be created. The water stored in both these reservoirs would be approximately 39 million cubic metres (mcm). ii. The revival of old horse shoe lake This should be revived and increased in size and capacity by similarly increasing its area and average depth. Water in this reservoir can be lled either through channel from the river or the Western Yamuna Canal Link during the monsoon months. iii. Fourth reservoir could be created below Kalindi Kunj On the right bank of the Yamuna, south of the barrage a reservoir could be built. The average depth could again be four metres below lean season level of the river, making the average storage depth about 5 metres, since the reservoir would be lled up during the monsoon season. The storage capacity of this reservoir is estimated to be about 50 mcm. iv. The fth fresh water storage at Nala Mundela - It could be created in an area southwest of Najafgarh, known as the Nala Mundela. This Nala, extending to a depth of about ten kilometres was a tributary of the Sahibi Nadi (present Najafgarh Drain) and used to ll up regularly during the monsoon season for about three months. This area could now be expanded and deepened to create a reservoir, having an average width of about a kilometre. An agreement may have to be entered into with the Haryana Government to allow some of
82 The Conict Resolution and Other Options for Delhi
the monsoon season share of Delhis allocated waters to be channelised through this canal to the reservoir via the Dulehara Distributory or the Surkhpur Minor. The storage capacity of this reservoir would be about 52 mcm.
Creation of Two Reservoirs in the National Capital Region (NCR)

Details of these are as follows: i. An old broad bed of the Ganga It exists on the Hindon river channel, extending for about 28 kilometres northwards from a point about 15 kilometres due north-east of Wazirabad. The broad bed of the river could be expanded to an average width of 2 kilometres and deepened to an average depth of 5 metres. Flood water from the Ganga could easily be brought here from the nearby Ganga canal, or of the Yamuna from the Eastern Yamuna Canal. These would be stored above a barrage constructed at the southern end of the old Ganga bed on the Hindon, mentioned above. Its capacity is expected to be about 280 mcm, which could be shared with Uttar Pradesh, Delhis suggested share being 150 mcm. ii. The Najafgarh Jheel - It used to exist in a 220 square kilometre area at the upper reaches of Sahibi/Najafgarh Drain. Today a seasonal monsoon lake appears in about 6 square kilometres. The British allowed the lake to be drained out and farmers began to use the lake area for cultivation. It could now be revived on a smaller scale to harvest 40 mcm of water. This could be shared equally with Haryana to supply both Delhi and Gurgaon.
Rain Water Harvesting

Delhi has an area of about 1485 square kilometres with an average rainfall of 61 centimetres. Thus the total precipitation is to the tune of 906 mcm. The efcacy of rain-water harvesting in Delhi has been successfully demonstrated by the Centre for Science and Environment through its own experimentcum-demonstration conducted in some parts of Delhi. In this regard, the results of these rainwater harvesting projects in Delhi can be cited [3].
Data from 11 rainwater harvesting projects spread across Delhi shows an increase of 5 to 10 metres in the groundwater levels over two years. This is particularly important to view against the recent data of the Central Groundwater Board (CGWB), which shows an alarming decline of 2-10 metres in the water table in different parts of the city. But, even while the potential of rainwater harvesting is evident, the issue of access to water for all will require much more effort at the city level, than what is being done today. A summary of these results was presented at a meeting of the network of rainwater harvesters in Delhi. It showed the level of ground water in rainwater harvesting sites developed by CSE during May 2002 to May 2004: The data collected before and after monsoons showed that every site recorded a sharp rise in water table ranging from 5 metres in Shriram School (Vasant Vihar) to roughly 10 metres in Janaki Devi College (Rajinder Nagar) In the Tughlakabad area, where CGWB records an alarming dip of 10 metres in groundwater table in just one year, the Jamia Hamdard University complex showed an increase from 47.5 metres in 2002 to 39.3 metres in 2004. In other words, not only has it checked the decline, it has stabilised and increased its underground water bank. This, when the university is dependent on groundwater to meet its needs. Put together, this is a remarkable gain of 20 metres in 2 years. The gains are evident in the second year, when a denite slowing down of the process of depletion was detected even in the dry season. In all the sites, the pre-monsoon water table in 2004 has remained higher than what was recorded in the same period last year. Through the rainwater harvesting efforts it has been able to ensure that for atleast three months in a year (July to August) the rate of recharge of groundwater is more than the rate of extraction. This process nurtures and replenishes the resource, and stabilises the annual rate of depletion.
This is particularly important, as the city is today very dependent on groundwater to meet its drinking water needs. But even as this effort of individuals and institutions showcases the potential of this technology, it is not enough to ensure a sustained, long-term impact on the capitals groundwater situation, admits CSE. This will require much more deliberate policy and action at the city level. At the meeting, CSE outlined the efforts as follows: Increase the harvesting of rainwater at the city level, by protecting and regenerating tanks and ponds, which were found across the city but are lost today to land developers and to sewage and garbage. According to the Delhi government there are between 700-1,000 ponds in the city, crying for attention. These ponds are the sponges of the city - collecting its rainwater and recharging the groundwater table. Promote individual rainwater harvesting projects at the colony and household level, which improves the local groundwater levels. Ensure by law that all commercial users are required to harvest. Redistribute the water supply across the city to ensure equity. The availability of water in the city is adequate over 200 litres per capita but the problem is that while certain areas (New Delhi and the Cantonment) get over 400-500 litres per person, other areas do not get even 30 litres per person. Treat all the sewage collected in Delhi and recycle the water so that we do not pollute our rivers and destroy the water cycle. All this needs to be done on a war footing. Not capturing the rainwater is a national waste. Delhis endowment of rainwater about 611 mm of rain per year with a total land area of 1,486 sq km means that even with 50 per cent efciency of the rainwater harvesting systems, Delhi still has water harvesting potential of 450 billion litres annually. This equals to about 35 per cent of the total water demand of the city. Hence there is reason to believe that rainwater harvesting can revive Delhis dwindling water
table but only if the government stops paying lip service and gets serious. The city government should work on water on a war footing. An action plan on what needs to be done must be put under formulation and subsequent implementation. Thus there is an urgent need to trap this rainwater through new articial water harvesting structures as well as reviving older natural structures. Some of these are being given below: i. Tilpat Range Lake - Situated north of the eastern Aravallis (south of Sainik Farms) in ravines extending over 7 kilometres in length. This lake can be revived to harvest 6 mcm of water. It will also recharge the groundwater of nearby colonies. ii. Revival of old Tanks and Baolies - Even today, there are 550 tanks and baolies (constructed step wells) and open waterbodies of varying sizes in Delhi and their revival would harvest about 10 mcm of water. iii. New water harvesting structures - Though some steps have been taken in this direction, but the realisation of its full potential will take some time. It will yield 15 mcm of water.
after completion of these plans the total availability of water in Delhi will be about 2011 usable mcm. The detailed engineering maps and plans have been enclosed with the petition and the case is pending with the Supreme Court at present.
Intensive revival of Ridge Forest

The Ridge Forests are the lungs of Delhi but have suffered extensively in the last ve decades, courtesy increasing urbanisation. There have been massive encroachments, illegal tree-felling, construction of roads and other concrete structures etc. All this has resulted in the severe erosion of once dense forests. There is an urgent need to recuperate them back to their health on an urgent basis. A massive drive to get rid of encroachments should be started and then an ambitious re-forestation programme needs to be launched.
5.3 Rejuvenation of Traditional Water Harvesting Structures

The presence of hundreds of unutilised traditional water harvesting structures within the city boundaries points to inherently awed policies. Responding to a petition led by Tapas, an NGO, in High Court in this regard, the Court has directed that all these waterbodies should be revived by 30 June 2004. Yet the situation remains the same. Tapas submitted a list of 749 waterbodies present within Delhi, out of which 214 have vanished owing to encroachment. In its reply to Supreme Court, MCD submitted a list of only 177, which was challenged by Tapas [4]. Subsequently, a committee was formed comprising members from all land owning agencies including NDMC, PWD, DDA, and MCD in 2002. Now according to government records there are at least 580 waterbodies under the control of various departments and agencies (Table 13). Out of these 319 are wet and 261 are dry. This too was challenged in Court as Tapas found 749 waterbodies from Delhis revenue records in 2003. Incidentally, South and Southwest Delhi, reeling under a permanent water crisis, have maximum number of waterbodies around 208. According to Delhi based NGO, INTACH, these waterbodies need to be fenced off, desilted and hyacinths removed.
Revival of Old Streams

Delhi used to have three main streams (and many smaller rivulets) originating from the Aravallis and draining into Yamuna. These are the Sahibi, the Tilpat and the Satpula. The latter two met near Nizamuddin to ow under the Barapula Bridge. Their revival will involve certain essential preliminary steps to be taken. These are, catchment area development, construction of check dams and creation of tanks, and tunnelling or use of articial drains through heavily built-up areas. The combined water yield of all the three streams after revival will be at least 10 mcm.
Adequate Treatment and Recycling of Waste Water

Under this head, various steps have been suggested, like setting up of Eco Parks, Sewage Treatment plants at more than 20 specic localities, treatment of untrapped sewage, and re-treatment of efuents in semieco parks. It has been estimated by the petitioner that
Considering the importance of locally existing unused waterbodies throughout the country, the Central Government has sanctioned Rs. 100 crore for the revival of 300 waterbodies in the country. Meanwhile, Archeological Survey of India (ASI) has also come out with a plan of preserving 9 Baolies in Delhi lying under its control. If the past glory of these waterbodies is rejuvenated water crisis prevailing in Delhi could be signicantly eased.
TABLE 13
lakh households in Delhi. If each household saves 400 litres of water, the total saving may be 1000 million litres or 235 mgd of water in Delhi. This quantum of water is more than the gap in supply and demand (i.e. 160 mgd). If we translate it in monetary terms, average annual water bill of a Delhi family comes to Rs. 1076. If a family recycles 60 percent of grey water, then it would save 60 percent in the water bill. It comes to a saving of Rs. 645 per year. But more than monitoring saving, the critical factor here is that use of grey water substantially decreases dependency on water supplied through pipes. It costs less than Rs. 4000 to construct a recycle plant at family level and its running cost is bare minimum. The plant does not require any expertise or skill to run. It is manageable and designed on conventional technology. In this regard, about seven years back DJB proposed detailed project of grey water to the government and is still gathering dust in les. In the contemporary times of water crisis deepening every year, it is high time that awareness among common masses be generated about grey water and people should be encouraged to establish grey water plants at colony level on a public-public partnership at community level. Resident welfare associations can play a vital role in this scheme of things.
Waterbodies Existing in Delhi

S. No. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Agency Panchayat Dept. DDA MCD IIT ASI PWD/ CPWD Forest Total Waterbodies 454 102 1 1 9 6 7 580 Dry 176 80 0 0 0 1 43 300 316 Wet 278 22 1 1 9 5
Source: Affidavit of Delhi Government to High Court, 2002
5.4 Grey Water Reclamation Project

Grey water is water coming from bathrooms after use from washing machines, bath tubs, bath sinks, and showers and can be effectively employed in mitigating water crisis prevailing in Delhi. This grey water can be put back in low fresh water uses. Grey water treatment in topsoil is highly effective. It is less energy consuming, contains less chemicals, helps in groundwater recharge as well as plant growth. Most importantly it brings back the freshwater which otherwise will join wastewater. Grey water is different from black water, which is contributed by faeces and urine. As per the BIS 1172, requirement of a person in bathroom is 100 litres per day (75 litres for bathing and 25 litres for washing of clothes). Thus an average Indian family of ve persons consumes 500 litres of water every day in bathroom. About 60 percent of this grey water can be reclaimed back and reused. On a most conservative estimate, there are about 25
5.5 Ocean of Groundwater found on Delhis Border

Recently, Central Ground Water Board has found an ocean of groundwater in the belt around the Upper Ganga Canal at depths ranging from 200600 meters [5]. The deep aquifers (underground geological formations that hold water) are located in the Ghaziabad and Meerut districts of Uttar Pradesh. CGWB has proposed to drill 350 tubewells at a depth of 250 metres and experts opinion is that each tubewell will draw 2200-3000 litres of water per minute. Running them for 12 hours every day will yield enough water to run Sonia Vihar water plant, often dubbed as the last
hope of dry Delhi. This water can simply be put into the existing Upper Ganga Canal and taken to Sonia Vihar water plant through the conduit laid from Muradnagar to the plant. It can fulll the plants need for 50 to 100 years. Deep aquifers have never been tapped in India and this water stagnating for thousands of years. Signicantly, unless tapped, the quality of water would deteriorate with passage of time. According to CGWB, chemical reactions are already affecting the quality of this water, making it saline. Tapping this would solve Delhis water problem and also stop the ingress of saline water to upper sub-soil areas.
CGWB has already presented a Water-for-Delhi plan to Ministry of Water Resources, Government of India. Considering the acrimony of the two neighbouring states, Delhi and Uttar Pradesh, it is envisaged to make bulk payment to Uttar Pradesh for purchase of this underground waterbody. If the plan is approved, and Uttar Pradesh, where the aquifer is located agrees to it, then it will be rst instance of groundwater sale and purchase by one state to other in India. However, in the prevailing scenario, this can just be opening of yet another ashpoint of conict between the two states, Delhi and Uttar Pradesh, already at loggerheads.
References
1. Anon (2002). New York Citys New Water Plan. World Resources 2001-02, World Resources Institute, Washington, USA 2. Paani Morcha (2002). Alternative Plan for Delhi Water Supply, Unpublished Mimeograph, New Delhi 3. Press Release (2004). Rise in level of groundwater recorded in rainwater harvesting project sites, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi, 15 June 2004 4. TAPAS (2004). A Comprehensive List of Traditional Water Harvesting Structures in Delhi, Supplementary Afdavit submitted to High Court, New Delhi. Unpublished mimeograph, TAPAS, New Delhi 5. Saurabh Sinha (2005). A 50-year supply for thirsty Delhi? The Times of India, New Delhi, 25 July, 2005
6. Concluding Note
he analysis of water crisis in Delhi is an end product of a series of deciencies at policy and implementation level, buttressed with an inefcient operation and management system. The choice being offered in the name of privatisation of water supply system does not arouse any enthusiasm as the experiences with similar initiatives have failed everywhere on the globe. The message is clear we have to tread this treacherous path ourselves. In terms of water availability (in lpcd), Delhi ranks highest among Indian cities and hence there should not be any water crisis, strongly pointing to the lack of adequate management and operation system. Various other factors have compounded it ill-conceived policies, pathetic distribution system, lack of accountability, corrupt practices, and others. The cost of investment for technical upgradation and maintenance of infrastructure in water services have often been used as a plea for inviting foreign companies, though experiences have shown worldwide that eventually it only deteriorated the situation further Manila (Philippines), Cochabamba (Bolivia), Greenoble (France), Atlanta City (USA), to name a few. In UK the private water companies are pleading the government to buy back city water utilities. The developing nations are struggling with a resource crunch, which is of their own making, courtesy poor quality of governance. Citing the case of India, at the time of independence it had a debt of UK 50,000 Pound Sterling whereas in 2005 it has a debt of US$ 180 billion (both external and internal). This sums up the story of our development. Many factors have contributed to it: lack of transparency and accountability, rampant corruption in political and administrative machinery, non-implementation of existing laws, tax evasion and so on and so forth. The ever-growing black money of Indians can be estimated from the fact that Swiss banks (considered heaven for keeping black money safe) recognised Hindi as a language of transaction in 2000. But we are not inviting foreigners to run our country so why invite foreign companies in other sectors? The solution lies in looking at innovative ways. For instance, the revival and sustainability of about 1,000 traditional waterbodies would play a crucial role in alleviating the water problems of the citys poor section, 1.06 crore persons spread over 2939 jhuggijhompri clusters. In knowledgeable circles, any focus on this is still considered good only for campaigns, totally negating its practical ramications. This bias needs to be re-corrected to avoid any possible social chaos in future.
The approach of policy makers and planners is totally focused on 33 lakh persons living in planned colonies, out of which only half have water meters. Here too it has a myopic vision. Proposal of recycling blue water, which could lead to a considerable reduction in mitigating water shortage, are lying in dustbins for the last many years whereas government continues to be obsessed with illusive schemes like 24X7. What should be the priority: supplying water round the clock in certain selected areas of city or supplying adequate water to the entire city (or for the sake of argument, to all consumers with water meter connections)? The withdrawal of World Bank loan application by Government of Delhi provides an opportunity and
challenge, both. It is an opportunity for Delhi Jal Board to put its house in order and a challenge to demonstrate their capabilities that they are better and efcient than the foreign companies. The loose agglomerate of civil society also has a crucial role to play in the scenario unfolding in the water sector in future. It can keep a vigil on the activities of Delhi Jal Board bringing out the irregularities in public arena. Recently, 35 distinguished IIT and IIM alumni have offered their help to Delhi government in obliterating water crisis through better operation and management and technical measures. Such initiatives need to be strengthened by the civil society.
* * * * *
88 Concluding Note

Delhi&#39;s Watery Woes

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OCCASIONAL PAPER - 1

A Cross-sectoral Analysis of the Water Crisis in Delhi