Analysis

July 22, 2011

Summary: Earlier this month Turkish police detained a total of 37 individuals in the most extensive investigation to-date into football match-fixing in the country. Turkeys football teams pre-date the republic and have more supporters than any political party, so the current scandal is more than just about sports. The June 12 elections in Turkey laid to rest any lingering doubts about the vibrancy of the countrys electoral democracy, but the football scandal has now raised further questions about the depth of Turkeys competitive and democratic transformation beyond elections. In both its electoral and football tradition, Turkey needs to prove it is able to transcend its tradition of democracy without democrats in which one group within the heterogeneous, polarized polity captures the state (or sport) only to enact rules that enable it to monopolize power and govern without compromise.

Competitive and Democratic Depth: Keys for Success in Turkish Football and Politics
by Joshua W. Walker
Politics and football (or soccer for Americans) dominate the news and captivate the attention of almost every society around the world. Corruption and scandal seem to be synonymous in both arenas, and the global push towards more transparent governance has yet to fully take root within the beautiful game. FIFA, the world footballs governing body, is no stranger to controversy as its most recent scandals include alleged bribery and vote-buying in awarding World Cup 2022 hosting rights to Qatar. Looking at football around the world, it is clear that far from being just a sport, there is an important layer of politics to understand in every football match-fixing scandal that has erupted recently, whether it be in Italy, Greece, South Korea, or now Turkey. Earlier this month Turkish police detained a total of 37 individuals in the most extensive investigation to-date into match-fixing in the country, which has shocked football fans and put one of Turkeys most popular clubs under increased scrutiny. In a nation whose newly re-elected popular Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan is a former professional soccer player and lifetime supporter of Fenerbahe the club whose chairman is now under arrest this investigation has become the most important political metaphor and story of the summer. Turkeys football teams pre-date the republic and have more supporters than any political party, so the current scandal is more than just about sports. The Big-Four teams of Besiktas, Fenerbahe, Galatasaray, and Trabzonspor dominate the Turkish Football Federation (TFF) and represent Turkey internationally in the Champions League and UEFA Championships. The damage to Fenerbahes reputation has already been done and new allegations are continuing to surface about other teams that may have been involved. Prime Minister Erdoan has called for a swift end to an affair he says is staining Turkeys international image, while Bulent Arinc, the most powerful deputy prime minister and fan of rival Trabzonspor, has in turn claimed the investigation shows that Turkey is becoming a true state of law. These differing responses based on team loyalty will certainly only continue to be magnified as the investigations continue. The June 12 elections in Turkey laid to rest any lingering doubts about the vibrancy of the countrys elec-

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Analysis
toral democracy, but the football scandal has now raised further questions about the depth of Turkeys competitive and democratic transformation beyond elections. Similar to the ongoing trials of military officers accused of trying to subvert the government and the so-called deep state in Turkey, this is the first time the police have gone after one of Turkeys major football clubs. The parallels between the Ergenekon investigations into alleged coups and the football case extend into the role of the police and judiciary in Turkish politics. The Fenerbahe chairmans treatment as a suspect and the extent to which evidence against him has been leaked caused the prime ministers advisor, Dr. Ibrahim Kalin, to proclaim the entire process a Hannibal opera that is contrary to human dignity. The criticisms leveled about the way in which the suspects were detained and evidence shared with the media before the courts, if true, do not bold well for Turkeys state of law. The ministry of justice has subsequently become involved because of these accusations, and the fallout for the judiciary and police remain to be seen. However the media frenzy that has been compounding and feeding this highprofile case is bound to set precedence for Turkeys future. Optimists praise the courts and police for tackling a culture of impunity and the judiciary for dealing quickly with Fenerbahe, while pessimists point to the lack of professionalism exhibited in addition to the underlying corruption and lack of transparency that led to these investigations in the first place. In both its electoral and football tradition, Turkey needs to prove it is able to transcend its tradition of democracy without democrats in which one group within the heterogeneous, polarized polity captures the state (or sport) only to enact rules that enable it to monopolize power and govern without compromise. Important parallels extend to the respective governing parties. The AKP is a political movement that represented a populist coalition of conservatives and progressives who initially sought to combat corruption and change longstanding political realities in Turkey. Having won three successive elections and improving its popular vote each time, the AKP and the prime minister have beaten every major opponent they have faced, be it the military, the EU, media, or secular opposition parties. Yet the AKP still faces the most daunting of all domestic challenges in the form of the Kurdish problem before it can claim ultimate victory. Fenerbahe, who this year took home its 18th championship the most in Turkey is an integral part of the TFF and Super League that now must face the most daunting challenge of its history not on the field but in the courts. The corruption unearthed thus far is deep and pervasive, and goes far beyond football to a system that allowed this to occur. The AKP has clearly mastered the game of electoral democracy but will only leave a legacy of liberal democracy if it can carry Turkey across a threshold to where leaders and parties can be criticized and transitioned smoothly. Turkish football can only hope to recover if Fenerbahe and the TFF deal swiftly with the cascading scandal through reform and transparency. Competition is what drives democracy and sports. It pushes all parties to higher levels of play, and, in a developed and mature democracy, it does so in a fair and transparent matter. If Fenerbahe is sent to a lower league or temporarily punished, it will not erase the corruption and underlying factors that led to the current scandal. Neither will an electoral victory by any political party overcome a culture of hero worship and political system that stifles competition within parties. Although the full implications of the parties agendas are yet to reveal themselves, both the AKP and Fenerbahe have already shifted the debates in Turkey. The AKP remains dependent on Erdoans charismatic leadership for preserving its identity. How he chooses to transition himself politically and rewrite the Turkish constitution will determine whether the party becomes more than a vehicle for personal rather than national success in a post-Erdoan Turkey. Fenerbahe, by contrast, has been around longer than the republic and, regardless of the eventual outcome, will remain a fixture in Turkey. However, how it deals with the arrests of its chairman and members, along with its cooperation with the investigation, will determine the health and competitiveness of football in Turkey. The AKP, long the leading force behind change in Turkey, opted to promote stability and continuity in the latest elections so as to sustain Turkeys remarkable economic performance under its stewardship, which has seen nominal per capita incomes triple. It also capitalized on the optimism this prosperity has engendered, announcing brash new infrastructural projects like a $10-12 billion self-proclaimed Crazy Project to build a second strait connecting the Marmara and Black Seas among its many future plans. That the ultramodern enterprise conve-

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niently slated for completion at least two elections down the road was characterized as the realization of an old Ottoman dream attests to the AKPs ambitions to hold onto power even at the expense of competition. The outstanding question now is whether the AKP will perpetuate the old pattern of enshrining ones own preferences at the expense of others in Turkeys deeply divided polity. In its first term, the AKP wowed the EU with its accession-oriented discourse of democratization, albeit with populist and majoritarian inflections. But when this failed to convince many in the EU of Turkeys European credentials, it unleashed a volley of Ottomanist referents to bolster domestic pride and Turkeys (multi-)regional profile. This, in turn, led to engagement with wide-ranging actors, including unreconstructed Islamists like Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, with whom the post-Islamist AKP shares certain assumptions and sympathies (e.g. belief in a role for religiously-defined civilizations in world affairs; a tendency to characterize Israel as monolithic and intrinsically violent). The repertoire is rounded out, and arguably underpinned, by a pragmatic sense of realpolitik and a commitment to turning Turkey into Turkey Inc. a cross-regional trade and energy hub and diplomatic and political game-changer. More competition in football or politics is not going to come about overnight in Turkey. Even if the TFF can find an adequate punishment for Fenerbahe this year it will not magically fix the lack of competition and transparency long-term in Turkish football. Even though commentators continually struggle to compare Turkey with its Middle Eastern or Western neighbors, Turkey has every right to be basking in the glow of its own political success and stability in the midst of revolutions sweeping its region. However, the ongoing football scandal is an important cautionary tale of what happens when competition diminishes and a culture of corruption takes hold, even in a stable democracy. As Turkey rises to the challenges of writing a new constitution and cleaning up its football scandal, concerned parties must pursue democratic rather than strategic depth, which is critical to consolidating its domestic/foreign policy nexus and image. Constitutional reform is necessary and must create a new social contract for Turkey. Rather than focusing on the distracting issue of turning Turkey into a presidential rather than a parliamentary system, it must first address the perennial Kurdish issue that has once again flared up in the southeast and then deal with strengthening the countrys competitive depth. This can hopefully begin with a match-fixing-free future for Turkish football before extending to the political arena where a next generation of leaders and parties must begin to be cultivated for the longterm health of Turkey. Rather than demonizing the AKP or Fenerbahe, this message of competitiveness must be forcefully projected by all parties and teams, even the worst of rivals. The AKP has clearly mastered the game of electoral democracy like Turkeys Big-Four in football, but neither will leave a lasting legacy if they cant promote open and fair competition. Only in this way can Turkey represent the best and be a leader in its neighborhood, in both football and politics.
About the Author
Joshua W. Walker is a Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund.

About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a nonpartisan American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated to promoting better understanding and cooperation between North America and Europe on transatlantic and global issues. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy and business communities, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven offices in Europe: Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, and Warsaw. GMF also has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm.

About the On Turkey Series

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