Philip Reynor

9-12-06

The Unconscious and Alienation.

On Existentialist and Psychoanalytic approaches Philip Thomas Reynor

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I
Existential psychoanalysis undoubtedly owes a great debt to Freudian psychoanalysis. However, can the notion of alienation be articulated by both a purely conscious mind as opposed to one that is driven by an unconscious? By pitting the existential psychoanalytic model against that of the Freudian psychoanalytic model, we may discover an answer to this question. For the purposes of this part of the essay, I will utilise Cannons and Isenbergs studies in an attempt document the Freudian approach in opposition to the Sartrean approach to metapsychology. I believe Sartres enhancements on Freuds psychobiological and neurophysiological drives grants them a more real, humanistic and accessible mode of thought as a pursuit of value through a fundamental project of being in the world. Freuds approach is veiled in unconscious modes, such as the Id, the ego and the superego, these modes, being unconscious, are a kind of thing-initself, which is manifest through consciousness in manifold forms, yet, these forms must always be interpreted regressively and without concrete foundations, as they remain inaccessible to the analyst in their pure form. For Freud, we must struggle with the analysand in an attempt to make the unconscious conscious and discover what lies beneath our choices as a motivation for our choices, and also to facilitate change through this knowledge; for Sartre, however, our aim or our fundamental project is manifest in these choices, and change is facilitated in subjecting prereflective

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experience to reflective awareness, thus negating the need for a wrestling match with the patient and simply taking the patients at their word. Regardless of the presupposition that the unconscious manifests itself in our actions or behaviour, in our conscious modes of thought and that, at bottom, every decision in our daily being is determinately thrust upon us by our unknowable, unconscious masters; this so called unconscious is however owned by us and as such must be accessible and malleable in its pure state; and that is what Sartre attempts to facilitate through reflective knowledge. Freuds approach to a discovery of these faculties of the unconscious was a regressive one, in other words, he infers through analysis from certain behaviour patterns which pointed to an underlying drive or instinct as behavioural motivation. Not only does Freud engage in regressive inferences but he also uses the regressively inferred, the unknown, as an explanation of the known. Simply put, the known explains itself by way of an unnecessary unknown. This is simply a blunder in logic, facilitating a formulation of an unconscious; the hypothetical equilibrium for which (Freud says) we strive is not in fact a striving on our part but, conflictingly, a striving on the part of an unknown, unconscious being, or a natural drive. This highlights some bad faith in Freuds fundamental life project manifesting itself reflectively in his need to justify psychoanalysis but reducing it to a natural science (and forces of science). Freud is attempting to unveil psychoanalysis by way of scientific metaphors resulting in a misconstrual of the metaphysical side of psychoanalysis. Sartre, on the other hand, uses a synthetic analysis which is both a reflective and prereflective project for a future being in the world, a movement in two directions, analysis and synthesis; for Sartre there is no unknowable, determinate, natural instinct behind our actions, instead, he grants us a wholly conscious motivation - grounded in the world but not reducible to it through a fundamental project of

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being which the patient, through reflection and projection can radically alter. This incorporation of synthesis, which Freud denied by way of his formulation of the unconscious, is rendered possible by Sartre in his denial of the unconscious motivations we see in Freud; also, this marks a distinct divergence in methodology. However, Sartre does admit of the topographical division of the unified personality (like Freud) but, for Sartre, the division lies in the consciousness of the subject alone and unlike Freud, he disregards the unconscious influence. The instincts or drives, the supposedly synthetic a priori concepts of Freud, the unconscious that breaks forth, with whip in hand, to master the conscious and recede stealthily back into darkness are the concepts that facilitate our knowledge; they mould our consciousness in their own form, hostility to power, with the instinct to pleasure dominating all others. Yet these faculties are all unconscious, known only for their work on conscious thought, the tip of the iceberg, these hypothetical drives if manifest would have an insatiable greed for their own survival, a careless recklessness that cannot be conquered or mastered as these modes of unconscious would determine our own approach to them; we can mould the tip of the iceberg but we cannot attack or change any foundations; leaving Freuds patients open to a hypothetical constant regression. Sartre and Freud both agree that knowledge facilitates change; but how is change possible when the knowledge that facilitates it is undermined and determined by that which gave rise to the knowledge. The existentialist Sartrean formulation, however, does not leave us open to a constant regression as, if we can alter our fundamental project of being we are participating in this new change at a conscious level unhampered by instincts that strive to philosophise for themselves and for their own survival. Sartre thus abandons this type of determinism in favour of a free consciousness, which he mistakenly attempts to define, as a search

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9-12-06

for an objective value that imbibes our conscious choices with meaning. The synthesis which is unavailable to the strict Freudian is just so as a result of his adoption of a deterministic formula, if instead Freud had attributed us with freedom, intentionality and our own free choice, synthesis would have been possible. Finally, in Sartrean reflection there appears to be a cause and effect structure at work, but this is mere appearance and not actuality, prereflection does not have any basis in science and conversely is, for Sartre, based on the world as a motivator (as opposed to a cause) for our prereflective choices. Reflection on our prereflective choices seems to reveal a world of things which consciousness grasps as a nonscientific cause, while the motive lies in prereflective intentional consciousness thus when I reflect consciously on causes I discover motive.

II Now, with this basis of knowledge from Freudian to existentialist psychoanalysis it is time to initiate an argument regarding alienation. For the purposes of this argument, I wish to adopt the Sartrean view of the conscious unity and meaning of self as grounded in the world, simultaneously with his denial of the unconscious and Freuds determinism in order to establish freedom and intentionality. The theory of free will has the charm of refutability, which keeps it afloat, and to which it owes its endurance through time; here I have chosen to accept free will in the Sartrean sense and to utilise this concept to facilitate this discussion on alienation. To begin with, I am going to discuss alienation as arising in something and as alienation from something. At first glance it may

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9-12-06

appear that the in something and from something views of alienation are referring to the same thing i.e. the world, a kind of subjected objective alienation in the world that you are a part of and, as a result, a shrinking from that world receding into self and accepting a kind of paranoia. This however does not do justice to the whole picture. We should look at alienation as a serpents tongue, in that one of those prongs is an objective type of alienation and the other a subjective type, but both are attached to the very same tongue belonging to the one serpent. I wish to assert here that in order for alienation to occur there must be a significant Other, as something from or in which alienation can take place, this Other must be understood as a something (or a nothing which is in fact a something) meaningful or substantial, regardless of whether this meaningfulness or substantiality are just mental attitudes. If the subject believes him or herself to be alienated, what they are alienated from must have significance for the subject if only on a subjective level. The in something and the from something can be either mental or physical phenomena. For instance, the idealist must hold that we are alienated from the physical world completely by our own faculties of attempting to know that physical world. To expand this a little, we are alienated from the world in our minds and our sensory experience. Similarly, the Lacanian psychoanalyst may hold that due to the functioning of the mirror phase in our development the subject may become alienated by the adoption of language thus becoming alienated from the self in language. The influence of the Other leads us to the development of a fundamental life project which motivates our choices, but this Other is an interpretation on our behalf and in that sense is not in any way physical. Furthermore, from the outset, we are alienated from the physical world by our own conditioning and interpretation of it. We interpret this influence as coming from outside of us when in fact

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9-12-06

the influence on us is decided by solely mental processes from within us. In addition, the physical world, which we are alienated from at the outset, is meaningless and insubstantial and alienation occurs from it for this very reason. That which we are alienated from and in has meaning only on a purely subjective mental level. Thus, our alienation from and in the world in itself is valid only on the basis that we presuppose knowledge of this world as inference from the senses and accordingly furnish it with substance and meaning when, in truth it can have no substance or meaning besides that which we subjectively grant it; therefore, we are not alienated from or in it, no, instead we must be separated from it, in totality. It follows that alienation is a purely mental phenomenon, which our consciousness may thrust upon the apparent, if our fundamental life project facilitates it. To digress a little, Sartres mind is made up of consciousness only as a unified (yet divided) personality much like the serpents tongue, the division is between prereflective and reflective consciousness. Now, within this mental mould we seem to be unalienated, unlike in Freuds model where we are distinctly alienated from the driving force of our own minds the unconscious. If we bring in Sartres model of freedom of intentionality at this point, there is in fact no room for alienation; for, if we become alienated it must be from and in something i.e. in our own minds. Thus, we must become alienated from either prereflective or reflective consciousness and if this was the case then the whole of our life project would be compromised to the extent that it could be erased as the benchmark from which we pro-ject and that benchmark would disappear, negating synthesis and returning to Freudian determinism. Therefore, if alienation is an essentially mental phenomenon the mentality requires an unconscious in order to

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facilitate the alienation. Consciousness cannot become alienated in and from itself as the divide is not total and unity remains at bottom implying that to become removed from an aspect of consciousness is to become removed from the whole of consciousness forcing the self into a zombie like state of unconsciousness. Furthermore, since the unconscious has been denied its place in the mind this zombie like state of unconscious alienation must also be denied. Looking at the favourite maxim of Karl Marx we find, summed up in a single sentence, the point at hand: Marx says: Nihil humani a me alienum puto1. So far, we have established that if alienation is possible it must be a subjective human phenomenon. This implies that the alienation must take place within the subject. In the case of alienation from an object the objective alienation is merely apparent and actually takes place on a subjective level. Thus, alienation is a purely human occurrence. Therefore, the validity and applicability of the concept of alienation hinges on what we believe constitutes the subject. If we take the broad sense of Marxs maxim, we can understand the word human as including our mental functioning along with all the other aspects we consider when we think of ourselves and others like us. If this were so, then Marx would have sided with Sartre on this issue agreeing that the unconscious, as alienated from the conscious, is inaccessible and thus he would be agreeing that alienation within a human subject is articulated most successfully within a theory of mind that contains the unconscious. He would have considered, like Sartre, that the hidden deterministic unconscious of Freud had to be exorcised. In his confession, Marx wrote that his idea of misery was submission and that the vice he detests most was servility and the unconscious of Freud necessities both in the human subject. If we consider, like Marx, that nothing about a particular human can be alien to that human we realise that in order to give some credence to the
1

McLellan, D; Karl Marx: His life and Thought; p.457. The maxim reads: I consider that nothing human is alien to me.

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concept of alienation at all it is necessary to propose something in and from which we can be alienated. In the formulation of Marx, like that of Sartre, there can be no alienation in and from the human subject. The manifold ways in which we constitute what it means to be a human strongly affect the outcome of this discussion. The views of Freud, Sartre, Lacan and finally (however briefly) Marx have been forwarded and it has become clear that the concept of alienation is dependent on the concept of a human and can only be applied thereafter. The thinker who leaves the most room for alienation within his formulation of the subject is the one who successfully articulates the notion. This makes it clear that the only place for the concept of mental alienation is within an unconscious mind model. Conscious alienation at this point must be denied its place. Actual alienation can only occur in and from something that is inaccessible to the mind instead of in and from something that is the mind. I would therefore conclude that the traditions which facilitate an unconscious articulate the problem of alienation more distinctly as alienation has no real place in a purely conscious being. We have documented the existentialist attitude towards psychoanalysis however briefly yet concerns arise even from a brief and light comparison such as this one. A simple shift from unconscious determinism to conscious intentionality carries with it a diverse new meaning for ideas such as alienation. Alienation has been transferred to the plane of the in-itself objective world from which, with the advent of the senses followed by language, mathematics, logic and science, etc we misinterpret the real from which we become alienated.

Bibliography:

Philip Reynor

9-12-06

Cannon, B; Sartre and Psychoanalysis: an Existentialist Challenge to Clinical Metatheory; University Press of Kansas (Kansas 1991). Fink, B; The Lacanian Subject; Princeton University Press (Chester 1995). Freud, S; The Ego and the Id; Complete Works, standard ed, Trans: Strachey, J; Volume XIX, Hogarth Press (London 2001). Freud, S; The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex; Complete Works, standard ed, Trans: Strachey, J; Hogarth Press (London 2001). Izenberg, G.N; The Existentialist Critique of Freud: The Crisis of Autonomy; Princeton University Press (Princeton 1976). Lacan, J; Ecrits, Trans: Sheridan, A; Norton (New York 1977). McLellan, D; Karl Marx: His Life and Thought; Paladin, (Herts, 1977). Sartre, J.P; Being and Nothingness; Philosophical Library (New York 1985).