EDGAR JARANTILLA, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE KUAN SING (G.R. No.

80194 March 21, 1989) FACTS: REGALADO, J.: Private respondent Jose Kuan Sing was "side-swiped by a Volkswagon Beetle driven by Edgar Jarantilla in the evening of July 7, 1971 in lznart Street, Iloilo City" towards the direction of the provicional capitol resulting to serious physical injuries thru reckless inprudence. Sing did not reserve his right to institute a separate civil action. acquitted because of reasonable doubt. Jarantilla was eventually

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is hereby DENIED and the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, without costs.

RUBEN MANIAGO vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS HON. RUBEN C. AYSON 104392

G.R. No.

On October 30, 1974, Sing filed a complaint (civil case) against the Jarantilla in the former Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch IV, in which civil action involved the same subject matter and act complained of in the dismissed criminal case. RTC wanted to enrich our jurisprudence. So RTC denies motion to dismiss, grants damages to Sing, proposed that the case be elevated to the SC by certiorari. CA affirmed. ISSUE: Whether Sing, who was the complainant in the dismissed criminal action (grounded on reasonable dobut) for physical injuries and who participated in the prosecution without reserving the civil action can file a separate action for civil liability arising from the same act or omission. HELD: YES, because the civil action here is not based on DELICT, but on QUASI-DELICT. RATIO/DOCTRINES: Well settled is the rule that the same act or omission can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto and civil liability ex quasi delicto. Since the same negligence can give rise either to a delict or crime or to a quasi-delict or tort, either of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the culprit, subject to Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability. Where the offended party elected to claim damages arising from the offense charged in the criminal case through her intervention as a private prosecutor, the final judgment rendered therein constituted a bar to the subsequent civil action based upon the same cause. The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable may still be civilly liable. 'The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist' Another consideration in favor of Sing is the doctrine that the failure of the court to make any pronouncement, favorable or unfavorable, as to the civil liability of the accused amounts to a reservation of the right to have the civil liability litigated and determined in a separate action. The rules nowhere provide that if the court fails to determine the civil liability it becomes no longer enforceable. Furthermore, in the present case the civil liability sought to be recovered through the application of Article 29 is no longer that based on or arising from the criminal offense. There is persuasive logic in the view that, under such circumstances, the acquittal of the accused foreclosed the civil liability based on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which presupposes the existence of criminal liability or requires a conviction of the offense charged. Divested of its penal element by such acquittal, the causative act or omission becomes in effect a quasi-delict, hence only a civil action based thereon may be instituted or prosecuted thereafter, which action can be proved by mere preponderance of evidence. 28 Complementary to such considerations, Article 29 enunciates the rule, as already stated, that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal on reasonable doubt for the same criminal act or omission. Since this action is based on a quasi-delict, the failure of the respondent to reserve his right to file a separate civil case and his intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from filing such separate civil action for damages. 30 The Court has also heretofore ruled in Elcano vs. Hill 31 that The extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (c) of Sec. 3 Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused . . .

FACTS: MENDOZA, J.: Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses which were used in transporting employees of the Texas Instruments, (Phils.), Inc. from Baguio City proper to its plant site at the Export Processing Authority in Loakan, Baguio City. On January 7, 1990, one of his buses figured in a vehicular accident with a passenger jeepney owned by private respondent Alfredo Boado along Loakan Road, Baguio City. As a result of the accident, a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries was filed on March 2, 1990 against petitioner's driver, Herminio Andaya, with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch III. A month later, on April 19, 1990, a civil case for damages was filed by private respondent Boado against petitioner himself. RTC: denied petitioner's motion for suspension of the civil case due to criminal action on the ground that pursuant to the Civil Code, the action could proceed independently of the criminal action, in addition to the fact that the petitioner was not the accused in the criminal case. CA: The civil action could not proceed independently of the criminal case because no reservation of the right to bring it separately had been made in the criminal case. CA dismissed because a civil action for damages is allowed to be filed independently of the criminal action even though no reservation to file the same has been made. ISSUE: Whether despite the absence of such reservation, private respondent may nonetheless bring an action for damages against petitioner under QUASI DELICT and Employers subsidiary liability for civil aspect of criminal cases of their employees. HELD: No. The right to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code must be reserved as required by Rule III, 1, otherwise it should be dismissed. The right of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted with the criminal action, except: (1) when such action arising from the same act or omission, which is the subject of the criminal action, is waived; (2) the right to bring it separately is reserved or (3) such action has been instituted prior to the criminal action. Even if an action has not been reserved or it was brought before the institution of the criminal case, the acquittal of the accused will not bar recovery of civil liability unless the acquittal is based on a finding that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist because of Art. 29 of the Civil Code. There are statements in some cases implying that Rule III, 1 and 3 are beyond the rule making power of the Supreme Court under the Constitution. (Court discusses history of Rule 111. See case). But, the requirement that before a separate civil action may be brought it must be reserved does not impair, diminish or defeat substantive rights, but only regulates their exercise in the general interest of orderly procedure. The requirement is merely procedural in nature. There is a practical reason for requiring that the right to bring an independent civil action under the Civil Code separately must be reserved. It is to avoid the filing of more than one action for the same act or omission against the same party. Any award made against the employer, whether based on his subsidiary civil liability under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code or his primary liability under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, is ultimately recoverable from the accused.23 In the present case, the criminal action was filed against the employee, bus driver. Had the driver been convicted and found insolvent, his employer would have been held subsidiarily liable

for damages. But if the right to bring a separate civil action (whether arising from the crime or from quasi delict) is reserved, there would be no possibility that the employer would be held liable because in such a case there would be no pronouncement as to the civil liability of the accused. In such a case the institution of a separate and independent civil action under the Civil Code would not result in the employee being held liable for the same act or omission.

By the institution of the present civil action for damages, petitioners have in effect abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case, and have opted instead to recover them in the present civil case. Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case, not only when he has waived the civil action or expressly reserved his right to institute, but also when he has actually instituted the civil action. For by either of such actions his interest in the criminal case has disappeared. Some legal writers are of the view that in accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter.

G.R. No. L-35095 August 31, 1973 GERMAN C. GARCIA vs. JUDGE MARIANO M. FLORIDO (MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL) & MARCELINO INESIN et al.
Appeal by certiorari from the decision dated October 21, 1971, dismissing petitioners' action for damages against respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala "without prejudice to refiling the said civil action after conviction of the defendants in the criminal case filed by the Chief of Police of Sindangan Zamboanga del Norte"

We view the institution of the civil action for recovery of damages under quasi-delict by petitioners, petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein, or one where reservation to file the civil action need not be made, for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of the Civil Code) already makes the reservation and the failure of the offended party to do so does not bar him from bringing the action, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, We find no legal justification for respondent court's order of dismissal.

FACTS: ANTONIO, J.: On August 4, 1971, German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital, together with his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of said hospital, hired and boarded a PU car owned and operated by Marcelino Inesin, and driven by Ricardo Vayson, for a round-trip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City, for the purpose of attending a conference of chiefs of government hospitals, hospital administrative officers, and bookkeepers of Regional Health Office No. 7 at Zamboanga City. At about 9:30 a.m., while the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on the national highway at kilometer 21 in Barrio Guisukan, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, said car collided with an oncoming passenger bus (No. 25) owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by Pedro Tumala. As a result of the aforesaid collision, petitioners sustained various physical injuries which necessitated their medical treatment and hospitalization. Petitioners filed both civil action (contract of carriage/cupla aquiliana) for damages and criminal action for double serious and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence (gross negligence and reckless imprudence in gross violation of traffic rules). RTC ruled that the civil action was not based on quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana). ISSUE: Whether or not petioners have cause of action in the civil case provided that they already instituted a criminal action. HELD/DOCTRINE: Yes. Decision of RTC reversed and case remanded to RTC for trial of the civil case. The essential averments for a quasi-delictual action under Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are present, namely: a)act or omission of the private respondents; b)presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of the passenger bus No. 25 by respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus with the passenger car; c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by petitioners as a result of the collision; d)existence of direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of private respondents; and e)the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties. It should be emphasized that the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from a crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under Arts. 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code. In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the said criminal action been terminated either by conviction or acquittal of said accused.