Antonio Valdez Vs. Consuelo Gomez- Valdez GR No.

122749

Facts: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January, 1971. Begotten during the marriage five children. In a petition dated 22 June 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of their marriage. July 29,1994 her petition was granted and annulled their marriage due to the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity. In that decision, the three older children shall choose which parent they would want to stay with while the other two children will be placed under the custody of their mother. Consuelo sought a clarification on the decision that they need to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code and asserted that the same code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in unions without marriage . Issue: Whether or not the property in question should be based on co-ownership?

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. The party who did not participate in the acquisition of property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.

Dorothy Terre Vs. Atty Jordan Terre AM No. 2349 July 3, 1992

Facts: Complainant Dorothy Terre was married to her first cousin while respondent Terre is a member of the Philippine Bar. Notwithstanding his knowledge that she was married he courted her and since she was convinced by his explanation that her prior marriage was void she agreed to marry him. Respondent disappear later complainant found out that Atty Terre married a certain Helina Malicdem. She then filed an administrative case for disbarment who respondent Terre claiming that he had believed in good faith that his prior marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was null and void ab initio and that no action for a judicial declaration of nullity was necessary

Issue: Whether or not judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is necessary?

Held: The court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious defense. In the first place, respondent has not rebutted complainant s evidence as to the basic fact which underscores that bad faith of respondent Jordan Terre. In the second place, the pretended defense is the same argument by which he inveigled complainant into believing that the prior marriage to Merlito Bercinilla being incestuous and void ab initio(Dorothy an Merlito being allegedly first cousins to each other), she was free to contract a second marriage with the respondent. Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of the Supreme court which holds that for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential.

Vincent Mercado Vs. Consuelo Tan GR No. 137110 August 2,2000 Facts: Dr. Vincent Mercado was previously married to Thelma Olivia in 1976 before he contracted marriage with Consuelo Tan in 1991 which the latter claims she did not know. Tan filed bigamy case against Mercado and after a month the latter file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage against Oliva. The decision in 1993 declared the marriage between Mercado and Oliva null and void.

Issue: Whether Vincent Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the declaration of nullity of the previous marriage?

Held: A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as void . In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Oliva right after Tan filed bigamy case. Hence, by then , the crime had already been consummated. He contracted second marriage without the judicial declaration of the nullity. The fact that the marriage is void from the very beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge.

Engrace Ninal Vs. Norma Bayadog GR No. 133778, March 14,2000

Facts: Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26,1974. Out of the marriage were born herein petitioners, Pepito,Jr. and Archie. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito and died on April 24,1985. One year and eight months later, Pepito and respondent Norma got married without any marriage license, however, executing an affidavit of cohabitation for at least five years. In 1997,Pepito died in a car accident. After their father s death, the petioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the previous marriage of Pepito to Norma, alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of marriage license.

Issue: Is the marriage of Pepito to Norma null and void?

Held: The Supreme Court reiterated that a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio. However, there are instances recognized in the law where a marriage license may be dispensed with. One such instance is found in Article 34 of the Family code, which refers to a marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.

Imelda Pilapil Vs. Ibay-Somera GR No. 80116 June 30, 1989

Facts: Imelda Pilapil is a Filipino citizen and Erich Geiling a German national, were married before the Federal Republic of Germany. Out of the marriage they had a daughter, Isabella Pilapil-Geiling. Their marriage started to deteriorate and become separated in fact. After three and half year, Geiling initiated a divorce proceeding in Germany in January, 1983 on the ground that their marriage is a failure and they have been living separately. On the other hand Pilapil filed before RTC a legal separation, support and separation of property. The decree of divorce was given by the German court in January, 1986 and the custody of their child shall be bestowed upon Pilapil. Five months later, Geiling filed two cases of adultery against Pilapil alleging that during their marriage she had an affair to a certain William chia in 1982 and Jesus Chua in 1983.

Issues: Whether or not Geiling may file a case of adultery after the degree of divorce was given?

Held: Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, it specifically provides that in prosecutions of adultery the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offending spouse and nobody else. Since Geiling had validly obtained a divorce in Germany, he had severed the marital status bond between them. In effect he can not sue or file a case of adultery to her because he has no standing and not the appropriate party to file even if the adultery happened during the marriage.

Tenebro Vs. Court of Appeals GR No. 150758 February 18, 2004

Facts: Tenebro contracted a marriage with Ancajas in 1990. The two lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to Nilda Villareyes in 1986. Petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. In 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage with Nilda Villegas. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint of bigamy against petitioner. Villegas countered that his marriage with Villareyes cannot be proven as a fact there being no record of such. He further argued that his second marriage with Ancajas was declared void ab initio due to psychological incapacity. Hence, he cannot be charged for bigamy.

Issue: Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy?

Held: The prosecution was able to establish the validity of the first marriage. As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner s valid marriage to Villareyes, petioner s marriage to Ancajas will be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal code criminalizes any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. A plain reading of the law, therefore would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

Navarro vs. Domagtoy AM No. MTJ- 96-1088 July 19, 1996

Facts: Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao Del Norte, Ropdolfo G. Navarro, file a case charges against Municipal Trial court Judge Hernando Domagtoy for gross misconduct and inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law. He solemnized the wedding of Tagadan and Borga despite knowing that Tagadan(groom) was merely separated from his wife. He presumed that Tagadan s first wife was already dead because Tagadan has not seen her for seven years. Presumption was made without the requisite summry proceeding. Second instance was when he preformed marriage ceremony between Sumaylo and Del Rosario in Dapa, which is outside his jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether or not the judge acted with gross misconduct in these instances?

Held: The court finds the judge guilty of gross misconduct. 1. First marriage is bigamous. Presumption of death for purposes of marriage needs a summary proceeding (Art. 41). Affidavits saying that Tagadan s wife has not been heard of for almost seven years are not sufficient proof. 2. Second marriage is beyond judge s jurisdiction. Marriage can only be held outside judge s chamber or courtroom if: a) at the point of death b) in remote places c) request of both parties in writing and sworn statement (Art 8 Family code). Sumaylo and del Rosario were not in any of these conditions. Only appellate and SC justices have jurisdiction over entire country. Judges with specific jurisdiction can only officiate within those areas.

Republic of the Philippines Vs. Cipriano Orbecido III GR No. 154380 October 5,2005

Facts: Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981. Their marriage was blessed with a son, Kristoffer and a daughter, Kimberly. In 1986, his wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a an innocent Stanley. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Section 2, Aticle 26 of the Family code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Solicitor General sought reconsideration but it was denied.

Issue: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family code?

Held: The Supreme court states: 1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner 2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by an alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. In this case, when Obecido s wife was naturalized as an American citizen , there was still a valid marriage, that has been celebrated between her and Orbecido. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly the twin requisites for the application of paragraph 2 article 26 are both present in this case. Thus, Orbecido, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry. However since Orbecido was not able to prove as fact his wife s naturalization he is still bared to from remarrying.

Susan Nicdao Cario vs. Susan Yee Cario GR No. 132529 February 2, 2001 FACTS: SPO4 Santiago CArio married petitioner Susan Nicdao on June 20, 1969, with whom he had two children, Sahlee and Sandee. On November 10, 1982, SPO4 Cario also married respondent Susan Yee. In 1988, SPO4 Cario became bedridden due to diabetes and tuberculosis, and died on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both Susans filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance from various government agencies pertaining to the deceased. Nicdao was able to collect P146,000 from MBAI, PCCVI, commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig, while Yee received a total of P21,000 from GSIS burial and SSS burial insurance. On December 14, 1993, Yee filed for collection of money against Nicdao, praying that Nicdao be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the P146,000 Nicdao had collected. For failing to file her answer, Nicdao was declared in default. Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and Cario. But she claimed good faith, having no knowledge of the previous marriage until at the funeral where she met Nicdao who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. Yee submitted that Cario s marriage to Nicdao was void because it was solemnized without the required marriage license. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the subsequent marriage is null and void; (2) Whether or not, if yes to above, the wife of the deceased is entitled to collect the death benefits from government agencies despite the nullity of their marriage. HELD: Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.

Under the Civil Code which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. It does not follow, however, that since the marriage of Nicdao and the deceased was void ab initio, the death benefits would now be awarded to Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage; otherwise, the second marriage would also be void. One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses according to the applicable property regime. Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would be not absolute community nor conjugal partnership of property, but governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code, on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage

Van Dorn v. CA 139SCRA139

Facts: The petitioner is a Filipino citizen while respondent Romillo is an American citizen. They married in HongKong in 1972 and after their marriage established a residence in the Philippines. The parties were divorced in Nevada in 1982 and now, petitioner is married to Theodore Van Dorn. Respondent Romillo Jr filed a suit against petitioner in RTC Pasay stating that petitioner ordered to render an accounting of that business and that the private respondent be declared with a right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that case of the action is barred of the judgment in the divorce proceeding in the Nevada Court wherein the respondent had acknowledged that he and the petitioner had no common property.

Issue: Whether there is an effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines

Held : It is not necessary to determine the property relations between petitioner and private respondent after their marriage, whether absolute or relative community property, complete separation of property or any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is that the Nevada divorce of the parties that the Nevada Court obtained jurisdiction over the petitioner and private respondent

Salvador Abunado et al. V. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 159218, 30 March 2004 Facts: The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner s marriage to Narcisa had no hearing upon the determination of petitioner s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required from the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted Thus, under the law, a marriage even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial roceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first arriage was void ab ignition, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. Salvador Abunado married Zenaida Bias on December 24, 1955. In 1966, Salvador separated from Zenaida. On September 18, 1967, Salvador married Narcisa Arcea. Several years later in 1988, Narcisa left the country to work in Japan. On January 10, 1989, Salvador contracted a second marriage with Zenaida. When Narcisa returned in 1992, she discovered that Salvador left their conjugal home and now has an extramarital affair with a certain Fe Corazon Palto. Narcisa also learned of Salvador s marriage to Zenaida in 1989. On January 19, 1995, Salvador filed an annulment case against Narcisa. That same year, on May 18, 1995, Narcisa filed a complaint for bigamy against Salvador and Zenaida. Salvador, however, claimed he cannot be liable for bigamy since Narcisa has consented to his marriage with Zenaida. Salvador moreover, argued that his petition for annulment was a prejudicial question hence, proceedings in the bigamy case should first be suspended to give way to the civil case for annulment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial to the case?

HELD: Subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial, Salvador cannot invoke the benefit of a prejudicial question nor the order of the trial court annulling his marriage with Narcisa since the offense had already been consummated even before he instituted the civil case for annulment which preceded Narcisa s complaint for bigamy. A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based

but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner s assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition. Recent jurisprudence declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that. The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner s marriage to Narcisa had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.