Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No.

172116 October 30, 2006

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ROGER VILLANUEVA, appellant. DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: For review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00975, dated December 20, 2005, affirming in toto the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon City, Branch 72, in Crim. Case No. 27159-MN finding appellant Roger Villanueva y Huelva guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 (2002), otherwise known as theComprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and costs. The Information dated July 11, 2002 against the appellant alleges: That on or about the 9th day of July, 2002 in the Municipality of Navotas, Metro Manila Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being a private person and without authority of law, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver in consideration of the amount of P100.00 to poseur buyer One (1) heatsealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance with net weight 0.21 gram, which substance when subjected to chemistry examination gave positive result for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride otherwise known "shabu", a regulated drug. CONTRARY TO LAW. 3 Appellant pleaded not guilty upon arraignment.4 PO1 Ariosto Rana of the Dangerous Drugs Enforcement Group (DDEG), Northern Police District, testified that at 8:00 p.m. of July 9, 2002, a confidential informant informed them that appellant was selling shabu at Block 8, lot 2, Phase 2, Area 1, Dagat-dagatan, Navotas.5 He immediately composed a team of police operatives to entrap the appellant,6 with him posing as the poseur-buyer. After marking the P100.00 bill and recording in the blotter its serial number, the team proceeded to the place and arrived thereat around 9:30 p.m. He and the informant approached the appellant while the rest strategically positioned themselves. The informant introduced him to the appellant, who asked them if they wanted to buy shabu. Appellant got one plastic sachet from his pocket containing a white crystalline substance. After appellant received the marked money, Rana executed the prearranged signal and the team arrested the appellant. The confiscated substance was submitted to the Northern Police District-Crime Laboratory for examination,7 which yielded the following results: SPECIMEN SUBMITTED: A one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with markings "RVH BB" containing 0.21 gram of white crystalline substance. xxx. xxxx FINDINGS: Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE result to the tests for Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug. x x x8 Denying the accusations against him, appellant testified that on the night of the alleged commission of the crime, he was at home watching television. Thereafter, two policemen knocked at the door looking for a certain person named Roger. When he identified himself as Roger, he was immediately handcuffed and brought to the headquarters without explanation. It was only later that he found out that he was being charged for selling shabu.9 After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Roger Villanueva y Huelva guilty beyond reasonable doubt for drug pushing, penalized under Section 5, Art. II, RA 9165 and he is hereby sentenced, in view of the small quantity of shabu involved, to Life Imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00, and to pay the costs. The decks of shabu subjects of this case are forfeited in favor of the government to be disposed of under the rules governing the same. OIC-Branch Clerk of Court Enriqueta A. Marquez is hereby enjoined to immediately turn over the deck of shabu to the proper authority for final disposition. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.10 Considering the penalty imposed, the case was directly appealed to this Court for automatic review. However, pursuant to our decision in People v. Mateo11 modifying the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court insofar as direct appeals from the Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, this case was referred to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court, thus: IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the challenged decision AFFIRMED in toto. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.12 Hence, this petition. The core issue for resolution is whether error attended the trial courts findings, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II, of R.A. No. 9165. Appellant maintains that there was no entrapment and that he was arrested in his house on the night of the alleged commission of the crime. While he admits that the resolution of the case would boil down to the determination of who between the parties is more credible, he insists that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty alone could not sustain a conviction; and that the selfserving and uncorroborated testimony of PO1 Rana could not prevail over his constitutionally guaranteed presumption of innocence.13 In essence, what appellant puts at issue is the trial courts appreciation of factual details of the buy-bust operation or the entrapment. Suffice it to say that settled is the policy of this Court, founded on reason and experience, to sustain the factual findings of the trial court in criminal cases, on the rational assumption that it is in a better position to assess the evidence before it, having had the opportunity to make an honest determination of the witnesses deportment during the trial.14 In the instant case, we find no basis to disregard the trial courts factual findings. Indeed, in criminal cases, the prosecution bears the onus to prove beyond reasonable doubt not only the commission of the crime but likewise to establish, with the same quantum of proof, the identity of the person or persons responsible therefor. This burden of proof does not shift to the defense but remains in the prosecution throughout the trial. However, when the prosecution has succeeded in discharging the burden of proof by presenting evidence sufficient to convince the court of the truth of the allegations in the information or has established a prima facie case against the accused, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused making it incumbent upon him to adduce evidence in order to meet and nullify, if not to overthrow, that prima facie case.15 To sustain a conviction under a single prosecution witness, such testimony needs only to establish sufficiently: 1) the identity of the buyer, seller, object and consideration; and 2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof. Indeed, what is material is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the substance seized as evidence.16 In this case, PO1 Rana, being the poseur-buyer, was the most competent person to testify on the fact of sale and he did so to the satisfaction of both the trial court and the appellate court. Thus, we agree with the Court of Appeals that: Contrary to appellants assertions, the prosecution has established with moral certainty the presence of all the elements necessary for the prosecution for the illegal sale of shabu. In the case at bar, there is no doubt that appellant was caught in the very act of selling "shabu", a prohibited drug. PO1 Ariosto Rana, the prosecution witness who acted as poseur-buyer, narrated in a clear and straightforward manner the facts of sale. x x x xxxx What is more, the identities of the seller and the buyer together with the corpus delict[i] of selling shabu have also been duly established. Poseur-buyer PO1 Ariosto Rana positively identified accused-appellant Roger Villanueva as the person who sold to him one plastic sachet containing the white crystalline substance. x x x

xxxx Then too, the regulated drug of shabu contained in a plastic sachet which the appellant handed over to the buyer, was also duly proven before the trial court. x x x xxxx Against these strong positive and substantial evidence, appellant could only say that no buy-bust operation was conducted and, instead, insists that he was just a victim of frame-up; that the policemen carried out an illegal search on the premises of his house, planted evidence, and then charged him as a supplier of drugs. The contentions are without merit. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment that is resorted to for trapping and capturing felons in the execution of their criminal plan. The operation is sanctioned by law and has consistently proved to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimonies with respect to the operation deserve full faith and credit. Verily, here, from the evidence adduced, We find no reason to depart from the general rule. We are one with the court a quos conclusion that the prosecution was able to establish that a buy-bust operation actually took place starting from the time the team composed of nine (9) members proceeded to the target area at 9:00 p.m. for the initial negotiation until the perfection of the sale at 9:30 p.m. the same night.17 Moreover, when the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation have no motive to falsely testify against the accused, the courts shall uphold the presumption that they have performed their duties regularly;18 and as held in People v. Pacis,19 bare denials by the accused cannot overcome this presumption. All told, the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly held that the appellant committed the crime charged. What remains to be determined is the correctness of the penalty imposed on the felony committed. Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 reads: Sec. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. In finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, the trial court sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand pesos (P500,000.00). While it correctly imposed the said penalties, we find the reason given therefor, that is, in view of the small quantity of shabu involved, inaccurate. Unlike under the repealed R.A. No. 6425 (1972) or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 where the imposable penalty depends on the quantity of the regulated drug involved, the foregoing provision now imposes the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) for the sale, trade, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and transportation of shabu, a dangerous drug, regardless of the quantity involved.20 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00975, dated December 20, 2005, affirming in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon City, Branch 72, in Crim. Case No. 27159-MN finding appellant Roger Villanueva y Huelva guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and costs, is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 169141 December 6, 2006 [Formerly G.R. Nos. 159854-56] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ROMEO DEL MUNDO y STA. MARIA, appellant.

DECISION

TINGA, J.: Romeo del Mundo y Sta. Maria (appellant) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 135, for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 in two (2) Informations that read: CRIMINAL CASE No. 02-3038 That on or about the 18th of October 2002, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without the corresponding license or prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, give away, distribute and transport Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a regulated drug, weighing ZERO POINT ZERO THREE GRAM (0.03 gram) contained in one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet. CONTRARY TO LAW.1 CRIMINAL CASE No. 02-3039 That on or about the 18th day of October 2002, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise use any dangerous drug and without corresponding license or prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, direct custody and control zero point zero three (0.03) gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), which is a dangerous drug in violation of the above cited law. CONTRARY TO LAW.2 Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges.3 Trial ensued. After trial, his co-accused Susan Pugal was acquitted from a separate charge for violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. No. 9165. However, in a Decision4 dated 8 September 2003, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The RTC disposed as follows: WHEREFORE, it appearing that the guilt of the accused ROMEO DEL MUNDO y STA. MARIA was proven beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. [No.] 9165, as principal, with no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, accused is hereby sentenced: 1. In Criminal Case No. 02-3038, to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00; 2. In Criminal Case No. 02-3039, to suffer imprisonment for a period of twelve [12] years and one [1] day, as minimum, to twenty [20] years and a fine of P300,000.00; and 3. To pay the costs. It appearing that the guilt of accused SUSAN PUGAL y PINGOL in Criminal Case No. 02-3040 was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, she is hereby acquitted of the crime of violation of Section 11 of RA [No.] 9165. Let the zero point zero nine [0.09] gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride be turned over to the PDEA for proper disposition. SO ORDERED.5 Culled from the records and decisions of the courts below, the antecedents follow.

The office of Cluster 2 of the Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC) received a report from a confidential informant that a certain Romy, later identified as appellant, was engaged in the selling of prohibited drugs, particularly shabu. Proceeding from this information, the head of MADAC Cluster 2 formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation and designated MADAC agent Norman A. Bilason (Bilason) as the poseur-buyer, to be provided with two (2) marked P100 bills.67 On 18 October 2002, at around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the informant accompanied Bilason to the place where appellant was reported to be plying his trade. Meantime, the rest of the MADAC and Drug Enforcement Unit (DEU) operatives positioned themselves at a strategic place to monitor the transaction.8 Bilason and the informant approached appellant who was then standing at the corner of Pasong Tirad and Ponte Streets in Tejeros, Makati and talking to his female companion, later identified as Pugal and allegedly a 'scorer' according to the informant. The informant introduced Bilason to appellant as a buyer of shabu. Appellant asked Bilason how much he intended to buy. Bilason replied, "Dos lang, panggamit lang." Then, appellant received the P200.00 marked money from Bilason while handing the latter one (1) plastic sachet9 of shabu which came from the left pocket of his pants. Next, Bilason gave the pre-arranged signal. The rest of the team closed in. Bilason introduced himself as a member of MADAC and, with the team, placed appellant and Pugal under arrest. Two (2) plastic sachets10 and the marked money were recovered from appellant while one (1) plastic sachet11 was confiscated from Pugal. Appellant and Pugal were duly apprised of the nature of their arrest and their constitutional rights.12 Afterwards, appellant and Pugal were brought to the DEU office for proper disposition. Tests conducted on the plastic sachet yielded positive results for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride.13 The parties stipulated that the physical science report14 was duly accomplished after the specimens of shabu had been subjected to laboratory tests. Hence, the prosecution dispensed with the presentation of the Forensic Chemist. The parties likewise stipulated that: (1) MADAC agent Diomedes Camporaso confiscated from Pugal one [1] plastic sachet suspected to containshabu; and (2) SPO2 Wilmer Antonio was the team leader of the buy-bust operation wherein he assisted in the arrest of appellant.15 Appellant, a 63-year old jobless resident of Tejeros, Makati, interposed the defense of denial. He claimed that there was never a time in his life that he sold shabu. He alleged that in the afternoon of 18 October 2002, he was inside his house lying down with his grandchild. He was awakened from sleep when police officers kicked the door open and entered the house. The police officers forced him to reveal the whereabouts of the shabu and the money. Appellant replied that he does not sell shabu. Then, the police officers searched the house but were not able to find anything. Subsequently, appellant was asked to go out of the house and board the police officers' service vehicle for allegedly selling shabu. Appellant entrusted his grandchild to his wife's sibling.16 At the DEU office, appellant was told to escape but he did not as he claimed not to have done anything wrong. Ten (10) minutes after, Pugal arrived. Appellant came to know of the charges against him on the day he was arrested. Allegedly, these are false charges but appellant failed to file any complaint against the arresting officer for lack of money.17 Appellant was found guilty as charged and the judgment of conviction was elevated to the Court for automatic review. In a Resolution18 dated 6 September 2004 of the Court in G.R. Nos. 159854-56,19 the cases were transferred to the Court of Appeals pursuant to the Court's ruling in People v. Mateo.20 Before the Court of Appeals, appellant argued that the trial court erred in: (1) according greater weight to the evidence adduced by the prosecution and disregarding the defense of denial interposed by appellant; and (2) finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses charged.21 The Court of Appeals in a Decision22 dated 27 June 2005, in CA-G.R. CR No. 00232, affirmed with modifications the decision of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Romeo del Mundo y Sta. Maria is hereby ACQUITTED in Crim. Case No. 02-3039. His conviction inCrim. Case No. 02-3038 for violation of Section 5, Article II of RA No. 9165 and all other aspects of the Decision are maintained. SO ORDERED.23 The Court of Appeals held that in Criminal Case No. 02-3038, the details of the sale of shabu between appellant and the MADAC operatives have been clearly and sufficiently shown.24However, the appellate court entertained doubts with respect to appellant's culpability in Criminal Case No. 02-3039 resulting to his acquittal therein. The appellate court observed that the prosecution did not produce evidence to show that appellant was actually in possession of the second sachet supposedly containing 'shabu.'25 Appellant is now before the Court submitting for resolution the same matters argued before the Court of Appeals, though this time he questions only his conviction in Criminal Case No. 02-3038, for the illegal sale of shabu, as he was acquitted of the charge in Criminal Case No. 02-3039 by the appellate court. Through his Manifestation (In Lieu of Supplemental Brief)26 dated 14 November 2005, appellant stated that will not file a Supplemental Brief and in lieu thereof, he will adopt the Appellant's Brief he had filed before the appellate court. The Office of the Solicitor General likewise manifested that it is no longer filing a supplemental brief.27

Appellant principally contends that the non-presentation before the trial court of the informant and witnesses other than MADAC agents Bilason and Camporaso militates against the trustworthiness of the prosecution's theory.28 The Court is not persuaded. The pertinent provision of Article II of R.A. 916529 reads as follows: SEC. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals.- The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.000) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. The elements necessary in every prosecution for the illegal sale of 'shabu' are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.30 What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti. Corpus delicti is the body or substance of the crime, and establishes the fact that a crime has been actually committed. It has two elements, namely: (1) proof of the occurrence of a certain event; and (2) some person's criminal responsibility for the act.31 MADAC agent Bilason, the poseur-buyer, clearly established that an illegal sale of shabu actually took place and that appellant was the author thereof. He testified as follows: Fiscal Moreno to witness: Q: How did you come to know the accused in this case? A: On October 18, 2002, we arrested both accused Romeo del Mundo and Susan Pugal. Q: For what particular offense? A: For violation of Sections 5 and 11. Q: Did you conduct a buy-bust operation against said accused? A: Yes, sir. Q: Was the buy bust operation successful? A: Yes, sir. Q: In connection with the buy-bust operation that you conducted against the accused, do you recall having executed a Joint Affidavit of Arrest? A: Yes, sir. Q: If that affidavit will be shown to you, will you be able to identify the same? A: Yes, sir. Q: I am showing to you a Pinagsanib Na Sinumpaang Salaysay. Please go over this and tell the Court if this is the same affidavit that you executed? A: Yes, sir. Fiscal Moreno: This was previously marked as Exhibits A and A-1. xxxx

Fiscal Moreno: For purposes of expediency and to save the material time of the Honorable Court, we propose for stipulation with the defense that this Pinagsanib na Sinumpaang Salaylay (sic) will form part as the direct testimony of the witness. Atty. Quiambao: We agree, your Honor. x x x x32 In the Pinagsanib na Sinumpaang Salaysay,33 Bilason together with SPO2 Wilmer Antonio and MADAC Agent Camporaso narrated in detail the sale of shabu made by appellant to Bilason. Based on a tip from a confidential informant, a team composed of MADAC and DEU agents was formed to conduct a buy-bust operation. The team proceeded to the place wherein, according to the confidential informant, appellant allegedly conducted his transactions. After introductions were made, Bilason handed the marked money to appellant while the latter in turn handed him one (1) plastic sachet containing shabu. Appellant was thereafter immediately arrested.34 The result of the laboratory examination conducted on the white crystalline substance confiscated from appellant and forwarded to the crime laboratory of the Philippine National Police confirms the testimony that indeed, what was sold by appellant was shabu. The results of the examination states: FINDINGS: Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimens gave POSITIVE result to the tests for the presence of Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drugs. x x x x CONCLUSION: Specimens A to C contains Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drugs. x x x x35 Moreover, Bilason was able to present and identify in court the confiscated drugs and the marked money, which are corroborating pieces of evidence of the corpus delicti, thus: Fiscal Moreno: Q: You likewise stated in your Affidavit that you were able to buy shabu from the accused and confiscated another plastic sachets (sic) containing shabu. If those items will be shown to you, will you be able to identify the same? A: Yes, sir. Q: I am showing to you a white envelope, do you know the contents of this envelope? A: Yes, sir. Three plastic sachets. Q: Will you go over these plastic sachets and tell us which of these plastic sachets you were able to buy from accused Del Mundo? A: This one with marking "RDMS." Fiscal Moreno: We request that this white envelope be marked as Exhibit "E" and this plastic sachet with marking "RDMS" be marked as E[x]hibit "E-1."36 xxxx Fiscal Moreno: Q: You said in your Pinagsanib na Sinumpaang Salaysay that in conducting the buy bust operation against the accused, you used buy bust money consisting of two pieces of One Hundred Peso bills. If that two pieces of One Hundred Peso bills will be shown to you, will you be able to identify the same?

A: Yes, sir. Q: I am showing to you two pieces of One Hundred Peso bills, will you please tell us if these are the same buy bust money which you used in conducting the buy bust operation against the accused? A: This is the photocopy of the buy bust money we used in the operation. x x x x37 A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan.38The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully consummates the buy-bust transaction between the entrapping officers and the accused.39 Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimony on the operation deserves full faith and credit.40 It is very clear from the testimony of Bilason and the other members of the team bear that their narration of events was positive, probable and in accord with human experience. It bears the badges of truth, such that it is difficult for a rational mind not to find it credible. Thus, we find no reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court and the appellate court. In addition, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties has not been controverted; hence, the Court is bound to uphold it. Appellant failed to prove that in testifying against him, Bilason and the other members of the team were motivated by reasons other than the duty to curb the sale of dangerous drugs. There is no proof of any ill motive or odious intent on the part of the police authorities to impute falsely such a serious crime to appellant.41 On the non-presentation of the informant, the rule is that his presentation in an illegal drugs case is not essential for the conviction nor is it indispensable for a successful prosecution because his testimony would merely be corroborative and cumulative. Informants are generally not presented in court because of the need to hide their identity and preserve their invaluable service to the police. Here, the agents directly testified regarding the entrapment, and the testimony of the informant would merely have been corroborative. Appellant's defenses of denial and alibi are unavailing. It bears emphasis that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto in a legitimate entrapment operation conducted by the MADAC and DEU agents. Hence, his identity as the person who sold the dangerous drug to Bilason cannot be doubted anymore. Such positive identification prevails over his weak defenses of denial and alibi. In People v. Isnani,42 we ruled that: The defenses of denial and alibi have been invariably viewed by us with disfavor for it can easily be concocted but difficult to prove, and they are common and standard defense ploys in most prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.43 Appellant's contention that the police authorities intruded his house and that he only failed to file charges against them due to lack of money could neither be believed. Appellant did not bother to present any evidence to support this contention. It likewise bears stressing that the police authorities are presumedto have performed their duty in a regular manner.44 In fine, the trial court and the appellate court correctly held that appellant is guilty of the crime of illegal sale of shabu.' WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 27 June 2005 of the Eighth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR No. 00232 finding appellant Romeo del Mundo y Sta. Maria guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 02-3038 for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

People vs Pringas DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: On appeal before Us is the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00303 dated 31 August 2006 which affirmed in toto the decision[2] dated 16 August 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 154, convicting accusedappellant Alvin Panganiban Pringas of Violation of Sections 5,[3] 11[4] and 12[5]of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

On 25 April 2003, appellant was charged before the RTC of Pasig City with Violation of Sections 5, 11 and 12 of Republic Act No. 9165 under the following informations: Criminal Case No. 12360-D On or about April 22, 2003, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, not being lawfully authorized to sell, possess or otherwise use any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to Police Officer Joselito Esmallaner, a police poseur buyer, one (1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic bag containing white crystalline substance weighing three (3) centigrams (0.03 grams), which was found positive to the test for methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.[6] Criminal Case No. 12361-D On or about April 22, 2003, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his custody and control three (3) small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing white crystalline substance weighing, the following to wit: (a) (b) (c) twenty-five (25) decigrams (0.25 grams); two (2) centigrams (0.02 grams); and two (2) centigrams (0.02 grams).

for a total of twenty-nine (29) decigrams (0.29 grams), which were found positive to the test for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.[7] Criminal Case No. 12362-D On or about April 22, 2003, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess drug paraphernalia, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in is possession, custody and control, the following to wit: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) one (1) small tape-sealed transparent plastic bag containing four (4) smaller unsealed transparent plastic bags each with traces of white crystalline substance; one (1) improvised water pipes containing traces of white crystalline substance; two (2) empty strips of aluminum foil; one (1) pin; one (1) pair of scissors; one (1) improvised bamboo tongs; one (1) pack of empty small transparent plastic bag; one (1) improvised burner; and

(i)

two (2) disposable lighters.

all are fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting any dangerous drug into the body.[8]

On 30 April 2003, appellant, having been charged without the benefit of a preliminary investigation, filed a motion for reinvestigation.[9] On 14 May 2003, the trial court granted the motion and ordered the Pasig City Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation.[10] With the finding of the City Prosecutor that no cogent reason existed to modify or reverse its previous finding of probable cause against accused-appellant, the trial court set the cases for arraignment and trial.[11]

When arraigned on 4 September 2003, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged.[12]

During the pre-trial conference, appellant admitted the existence and the contents of the Request for Laboratory Examination[13] and the Forensic Chemist Report,[14] with the qualification that the subject of the forensic report was not taken from him, and if ever same was taken from him, it was obtained illegally.[15]

With the termination of the pre-trial conference, the cases were heard jointly.

The prosecution presented two witnesses: PO1 Joselito Esmallaner[16] and SPO3 Leneal Matias,[17] both members of the Station Drug Enforcement Unit of the Pasig CityPolice Station.

The version of the prosecution is as follows:

On 22 April 2003, SPO4 Danilo Tuao, Officer-in-Charge of the Station Drug Enforcement Unit of the Pasig City Police Station, designated PO1 Joselito Esmallaner to act as a poseur-buyer in a buy-bust operation to be conducted against appellant along Beverly Street, Barangay Buting, Pasig City. At around 10:30 p.m., the buy-bust team headed by SPO3 Leneal Matias arrived at the target area. PO1 Esmallaner and the informant proceeded to the unnumbered house of appellant, while SPO3 Matias and the other members of the team positioned themselves around ten (10) meters away to serve as back-up.

After the informant knocked on appellants front door, the latter came out. Upon recognizing the informant, appellant asked, Pare, ikaw pala. Bibili ka ba? The informant who was standing next to PO1 Esmallaner replied Oo, itong kasama ko kukuha. Appellant then asked PO1 Esmallaner how much drugs he intended to buy to which PO1 Esmallaner replied, P100 lang. PO1 Esmallaner thereafter gave a one hundred peso (P100.00) bill to the appellant. Thereafter, the appellant went inside the house. Appellant returned and handed to PO1 Esmallaner a plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance later found to be shabu.[18]

Upon receiving the plastic sachet, PO1 Esmallaner grabbed appellants hand and got the P100.00 bill from the right front pocket of appellants pants. He introduced himself as a police officer and informed the appellant of his violation and his constitutional rights. PO1 Esmallaner then marked the plastic sachet[19] and placed his initials JE on the upper right portion of the P100.00[20] bill with serial number FX230133.[21]

After seeing that PO1 Esmallaner tried to grab the hand of appellant, who was able to run inside the house and tried to lock the door, SPO3 Matias and the other members of the team followed PO1 Esmallaner inside appellants house. Matias saw three pieces of

heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets[22] containing a white crystalline substance which turned out to be shabu, two disposable lighters,[23] six strips of aluminum foil with traces of shabu,[24] improvised water pipe used as tooter,[25] improvised burner,[26]wooden sealer, small scissors,[27] 14 pieces of transparent plastic sachets,[28] and one small needle[29] on top of a small chair (bangkito). The items confiscated were marked and turned over to the Investigator who requested laboratory examination on said items.

On 23 April 2003, Chemistry Report No. D-733-03E[30] was issued with the conclusion that the four sachets, together with four other unsealed transparent plastic bags and a water pipe used as tooter, taken from appellant, were positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu). On the same date, poseur-buyer PO1 Esmallaner and team leader SPO3 Matias executed their Joint Affidavit of Arrest.[31]

For the defense, appellant[32] took the witness stand together with his common-law wife, Gina Dean.[33]

Appellant and his common-law wife deny that a buy-bust occurred. Appellant claims that at about 10:00 p.m. of 22 April 2003, he and his common-law wife were with their three children in their house in Beverly Street, Buting, Pasig City, when somebody kicked the door of their house. Appellant was in the comfort room, while his common-law wife was in the bedroom taking care of their children. Thereafter, four persons, later identified as police officers Esmallaner, Mapula, Espares and Familiara, entered without any warrant of arrest or search warrant. He asked them what they wanted and he was told that they were going to arrest him. When he asked for the reason why he was being arrested, he was told that he would just be informed in their office. With his hands on his back, appellant was handcuffed. The policemen subsequently conducted a search in the house, but they neither recovered nor took anything. After that, appellant was brought to the police station, investigated and placed in jail. He added that the violent entry made by the policemen was witnessed by some of his neighbors, namely, Buboy, Macmac and Zaldy, who were then having a drinking session.

On 19 August 2004, the trial court promulgated its decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. It disposed of the cases as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused ALVIN PRINGAS is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165 (illegal sale of shabu) and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. Accused ALVIN PRINGAS is also found GUILTY OF Violation of Section 11 of the same law and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS andONE (1) DAY to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P400,000.00 and also of violation of Section 12 of R.A. 9165, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment from SIX (6) MONTHS (and) ONE (1) DAY as minimum to THREE (3) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as maximum, and to pay a fine of P10,000.00. Considering the penalty imposed, the immediate commitment of the accused to the National Bilibid Prisons is ordered. The Court fully realizes that the penalty prescribed by law for the offense committed by the accused is quite severe. However, the Court will not question the wisdom of the law and of the legislators who passed it. Dura lex, sed lex. The only thing that the Court can do is to recommend that the accused be pardoned after he shall have served the minimum period of the penalty imposed on him.[34]

On 3 September 2004, appellant, through counsel, appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals via a Notice of Appeal.[35] With the filing of the Notice of Appeal, the trial court transmitted[36] the records of the case to the Court of Appeals for review pursuant to People v. Mateo.[37]

In its Decision dated 31 August 2006, the Court of Appeals dismissed appellants appeal and affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.[38]

Unsatisfied, appellant appealed his conviction before this Court by way of a Notice of Appeal.[39]

With the elevation of the records to the Court and the acceptance of the appeal, the parties were required to file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired, within 30 days from notice.[40] The parties manifested that they were not filing supplemental briefs, arguing that the issues of the case had been discussed in their respective briefs.[41]

Appellant makes a lone assignment of error, to wit: THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE OFFENSES CHARGED DESPITE THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE HAVING BEEN OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF SECTIONS 21 AND 86, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165.

Appellant argues that the apprehending police officers failure to comply with the provisions (Sections 21 and 86) of Republic Act No. 9165 casts doubt on the validity of appellants arrest and the admissibility of the evidence allegedly seized from him. He maintains that since the procurement of the evidence, both documentary and testimonial, during the buy-bust operation was violative of said law and of his constitutional right against illegal arrest, the same should not have been received in evidence to prove his guilt they being inadmissible under the law.

Appellant claims that the police officers violated Section 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 when the alleged buy-bust operation that led to the apprehension of appellant was conducted without the involvement of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). It is his contention that nowhere in the Joint Affidavit of Arrest executed by the members of the arresting team was it shown that the buybust operation was conducted with the assistance, coordination, knowledge or consent of the PDEA.

We find this claim untenable.

In the Joint Affidavit of Arrest, it is stated that That, on or about 10:30 PM April 22, 2003, as instructed by SPO4 DANILO TUAO, OIC/SDEU, this Office effected a coordination to (sic) Metro Manila Regional Office of PDEA and formed a team of SDEU operatives with a confidential informant to conduct anti-narcotics/Buy-bust operation against the said person x x x.[42] This portion of the affidavit clearly negates appellants claim that the buy-bust operation subject of the case was not with the involvement of the PDEA. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the aforementioned statement was not contained in the affidavit, appellants claim of lack of involvement of the PDEA will render neither his arrest illegal nor the evidence seized from him inadmissible. Quoting People v. Sta. Maria,[43] we resolved the very same issue in this wise: Appellant would next argue that the evidence against him was obtained in violation of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 because the buy-bust operation was made without any involvement of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). Prescinding therefrom, he concludes that the prosecutions evidence, both testimonial and documentary, was inadmissible having been procured in violation of his constitutional right against illegal arrest. The argument is specious. Section 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 reads: Sec. 86. Transfer, Absorption, and Integration of All Operating Units on Illegal Drugs into the PDEA and Transitory Provisions. The Narcotics Group of the PNP, the Narcotics Division of the NBI and the Customs Narcotics Interdiction Unit are hereby abolished; however they shall continue

with the performance of their task as detail service with the PDEA, subject to screening, until such time that the organizational structure of the Agency is fully operational and the number of graduates of the PDEA Academy is sufficient to do the task themselves: Provided, That such personnel who are affected shall have the option of either being integrated into the PDEA or remain with their original mother agencies and shall, thereafter, be immediately reassigned to other units therein by the head of such agencies. Such personnel who are transferred, absorbed and integrated in the PDEA shall be extended appointments to positions similar in rank, salary, and other emoluments and privileges granted to their respective positions in their original mother agencies. The transfer, absorption and integration of the different offices and units provided for in this Section shall take effect within eighteen (18) months from the effectivity of this Act: Provided, That personnel absorbed and on detail service shall be given until five (5) years to finally decide to joint the PDEA. Nothing in this Act shall mean a diminution of the investigative powers of the NBI and the PNP on all other crimes as provided for in their respective organic laws: Provided, however, That when the investigation being conductetd by the NBI, PNP or any ad hoc anti-drug task force is found to be a violation of any of the provisions of this Act, the PDEA shall be the lead agency. The NBI, PNP or any of the task force shall immediately transfer the same to the PDEA: Provided, further, That the NBI, PNP and the Bureau of Customs shall maintain close coordination with the PDEA on all drug related matters. Cursory read, the foregoing provision is silent as to the consequences of failure on the part of the law enforcers to transfer drug-related cases to the PDEA, in the same way that the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9165 is also silent on the matter. But by no stretch of imagination could this silence be interpreted as a legislative intent to make an arrest without the participation of PDEA illegal nor evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible. It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great public interests would be endangered or sacrificed, or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words. As we see it, Section 86 is explicit only in saying that the PDEA shall be the lead agency in the investigations and prosecutions of drug-related cases. Therefore, other law enforcement bodies still possess authority to perform similar functions as the PDEA as long as illegal drugs cases will eventually be transferred to the latter. Additionally, the same provision states that PDEA, serving as the implementing arm of the Dangerous Drugs Board, :shall be responsible for the efficient and effective law enforcement of all the provisions on any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical as provided in the Act. We find much logic in the Solicitor Generals interpretation that it is only appropriate that drugs cases being handled by other law enforcement authorities be transferred or referred to the PDEA as the lead agency in the campaign against the menace of dangerous drugs. Section 86 is more of an administrative provision. By having a centralized law enforcement body, i.e., the PDEA, the Dangerous Drugs Board can enhance the efficacy of the law against dangerous drugs. To be sure, Section 86(a) of the IRR emphasizes this point by providing: (a) Relationship/Coordination between PDEA and Other Agencies. The PDEA shall be the lead agency in the enforcement of the Act, while the PNP, the NBI and other law enforcement agencies shall continue to conduct anti-drug operations in support of the PDEA x x x. Provided, finally, that nothing in this IRR shall deprive the PNP, the NBI, other law enforcement personnel and the personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from effecting lawful arrests and seizures in consonance with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

As regards the non-participation of PDEA in a buy-bust operation, we said: [T]he challenged buy-bust operation, albeit made without the participation of PDEA, did not violate appellants constitutional right to be protected from illegal arrest. There is nothing in Republic Act No. 9165 which even remotely indicate the intention of the legislature to make an arrest made without the participation of the PDEA illegal and evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible. Moreover, the law did not deprive the PNP of the power to make arrests.[44]

As regards Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, appellant insists there was a violation of said section when pictures, showing him together with the confiscated shabu,were not immediately taken after his arrest. He added that the Joint Affidavit of Arrest of the apprehending team did not indicate if the members thereof physically made an inventory of the illegal drugs in the presence of the appellant or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public

official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and given a copy thereof. In short, appellant insists that noncompliance with Section 21 regarding the custody and disposition of the confiscated/seized dangerous drugs and paraphernalia, i.e., the taking of pictures and the making of an inventory, will make these items inadmissible in evidence.

We do not agree. Section 21 reads: SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items, are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team.[45] Its non-compliance will not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In the case under consideration, we find that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the items involved were safeguarded. The seized/confiscated items were immediately marked for proper identification. Thereafter, they were forwarded to the Crime Laboratory for examination.

Though the justifiable ground for non-compliance with Section 21 was not expressly stated by the arresting/buy-bust team, this does not necessarily mean that appellants arrest was illegal or the items seized/confiscated inadmissible. In the case at bar, as in Sta. Maria, the justifiable ground will remain unknown because appellant did not question during the trial the custody and disposition of the items taken from him. Assuming that Sections 21 and 86 were indeed breached, appellant should have raised these issues before the trial court. This, he did not do. Never did he question the custody and disposition of the items that were supposedly taken from him. It was only on appeal before the Court of Appeals that he raised them. This, he cannot do. We held: The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation in this case from complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant did not question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers alleged violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act 9165 were not raised before the trial court but were raised instead for the first time on appeal. In no instance did appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that affected their integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.[46]

Appellant was charged with violations of Sections 5, 11 and 12 of Republic Act No. 9165. Appellant was charged with violation of Section 5 for selling 0.03 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.[47] What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.[48]

The evidence for the prosecution showed the presence of all these elements. The poseur-buyer and the team leader of the apprehending team narrated how the buy-bust happened, and that the shabu sold was presented and identified in court. The poseurbuyer, PO1 Joselito Esmallaner, identified appellant as the seller of the shabu. Esmallanerstestimony was corroborated by the team leader, SPO3 Leneal Matias. The white crystalline substance weighing 0.03 grams which was bought from appellant for P100.00 was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) per Chemistry Report No. D-733-03E.

In this jurisdiction, the conduct of a buy-bust operation is a common and accepted mode of apprehending those involved in the illegal sale of prohibited or regulated drugs. It has been proven to be an effective way of unveiling the identities of drug dealers and of luring them out of obscurity.[49] Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimonies on the operation deserve full faith and credit.[50]

In the case at bar, we find the testimonies of PO1 Joselito Esmallaner and SPO3 Leneal Matias credible. It is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature and which involve credibility are accorded respects when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts and speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses, having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.[51] The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.[52] Finding no reason to depart from the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, we stand by their findings.

We, likewise, uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. Said presumption was not overcome, as there was no evidence showing that PO1 Joselito Esmallaner and SPO3 Leneal Matias were impelled by improper motive. Appellant and his common-law wife testified that the members of the buy-bust team were complete strangers.[53]

Appellants defense that there was no buy-bust operation deserves scant consideration. Having been caught in flagrante delicto, his identity as seller of the shabu can no longer be doubted. Against the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellants plain denial of the offenses charged, unsubstantiated by any credible and convincing evidence, must simply fail.[54] Being his commonlaw wife, we find Gina Dean not to be a credible witness. Appellant said three of his neighbors witnessed the violent entry made by the policemen in his house, but he failed to present them or any of them to prove his point.

Appellant was, likewise, charged with possession of three sachets of shabu with a total weight of 0.29 gram. In illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the elements are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. [55] All these elements have been established.

SPO3 Leneal Matias narrated how he discovered the three pieces of heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing a white crystalline substance and other drug paraphernalia on top of a small chair (bangkito) in the house of appellant. Q. A. Q. A. Q. After the accused handed something to PO1 Esmallaner, what else happened? I saw PO1 Esmallaner try to grab the hand of the accused, but the accused was able to run inside their house, and tried to close the door, sir. As a member of the back-up team upon seeing this incident, what did you do, if any? We gave support to PO1 Esmallaner, sir. Will you please tell us what kind of support did you give to PO1 Esmallaner?

A. Q. A. Q. A. Q. A.

To arrest the accused, sir. What did you do in particular? PO1 Esmallaner followed the accused inside me and my group followed Esmallaner also inside the house, sir. So, in other words you, and your co-members also went inside the house? Yes, sir. When [you] went inside the house, what did you find out if any? PO1 Esmallaner accosted the accused, while I discovered three (3) pieces of heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing undetermined amount of white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu, and other paraphernalia on top of the small bangkito, sir. Were these three (3) sachet and paraphernalia were scattered on the small bangkito? Yes, sir. And what did you do, if any when you discovered the presence of these items? I confiscated it and then I marked it, sir. When you said it what would this? The drug paraphernalia, and the heat plastic sachet, sir. Could you remember one by one what are those paraphernalia that you confiscated and marked it? The paraphernalia are two (2) disposable lighter colored red and yellow, six (6) pieces of small stripe of aluminum foil with traces of suspected shabu improvised water pipe used as tooter, improvised burner, wooden sealer, and the three (3) pieces heat plastic sachet, fourteen (14) pieces of transparent plastic sachet. That is all I can remember, sir. Did you place markings on that items that you confiscated? Yes, sir.[56]

Q. A. Q. A. Q. A. Q. A.

Q. A.

Appellant was indeed the owner of these items for they were found in his house on top of the bangkito following the buy-bust operation and after his arrest. The substance in the plastic sachets was shabu as confirmed by Chemistry Report No. D-73303E. Finally, the drug paraphernalia seized are sufficient to prove that appellant also violated Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9165.

Reviewing the penalties imposed by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, we find them to be in order.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00303 dated 31 August 2006 which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 154, convicting accused-appellant Alvin Panganiban Pringas of Violation of Sections 5, 11 and 12 of Republic Act No. 9165, is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. EDWIN PARTOZA y EVORA, Appellant. DECISION TINGA, J.: On appeal is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 5 October 2007 affirming the conviction by the Regional Trial Court2 (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal of Edwin Partoza y Evora (appellant) for the crime of possession and sale of dangerous drug. Appellant was charged in two (2) separate Informations before the Regional RTC with possession and sale of shabu, viz: Criminal Case No. 6524 That on or about the 2nd day of November 2002, in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession, direct custody and control one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet of white crystalline substance weighing 0.04 gram, which substance, after confirmatory test, was found positive to the test of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous, popularly known as "shabu" a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law. CONTRARY TO LAW.3 Criminal Case No. 6525 That on or about the 2nd day of November 2002, in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell, deliver and give away to another person one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet weighing 0.04 gram of white crystalline substance which gave positive result to the screening and confirmatory test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous, popularly known as "shabu" a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law. CONTRARY TO LAW.4 Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to both Informations. Trial ensued. PO3 Juanito Tougan (PO3 Tougan) testified for the prosecution and narrated that on 2 November 2002 at around 7:30 p.m., the police received an information from an informant that a certain Parto was selling shabu at Sta. Barbara Subdivision, Brgy. Ampid I, San Mateo, Rizal. Parto had apparently been under surveillance by the police for selling prohibited drugs. They immediately planned a buybust operation, with PO3 Tougan acting as the poseur-buyer. Tougan received a P100.00 bill from the police chief and placed the serial numbers of the bill on the police blotter.5 PO3 Tougan, together with PO2 Pontilla and the civilian informant then proceeded to Sta. Maria Subdivision. However, before the actual buy-bust operation, the group responded to a commotion in the area where they arrested a certain Noel Samaniego.6 Thereafter, they went to Neptune corner Jupiter Street and spotted Parto in the tricycle terminal. The informant initially approached appellant. The latter then went near the tricycle where PO3 Tougan was in and asked him, "How much[?]" PO3 Tougan replied, "Piso lang," which means P100.00. Upon exchange of the money and the plastic sachet containing the white crystalline substance, PO3 Tougan immediately alighted from the tricycle, grabbed Partos hand and introduced himself as a policeman. PO3 Tougan was able to recover another plastic sachet from the hand of Parto.7 At the police station, the two (2) plastic sachets confiscated from Parto were marked. After marking, the police immediately prepared the request for laboratory examination.8 Chemistry Report No. D-2157-02E confirmed that the two (2) plastic sachets seized from appellant were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.9 Appellant denied the charges against him. He claimed that he was driving a female passenger in his tricycle at around 7:00 p.m. on 2 November 2002 going to Sta. Maria. Upon reaching Jupiter Street, appellant turned left and noticed the police officers trying to arrest a person who was then causing trouble. PO2 then Pontilla approached appellant and asked why he was driving drunk. Appellant explained that he had been offered a drink by his friends. He was asked to alight from his tricycle, took his drivers license and invited him to go to the police station.10 On 28 April 2005, the trial court convicted appellant beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession and illegal sale of dangerous drugs. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in these two cases, as follows: 1. In Criminal Case No. 6524 finding accused EDWIN PARTOZA Y EVORA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Possession of Dangerous Drug (Violation of Section 11, 2nd par.[,] No. 3 of Art. II of R.A. [No.] 9165) and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of Twelve (12) years and one (1) day to Twenty (20) years and a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00); 2. In Criminal Case No. 6525 finding accused EDWIN PARTOZA Y EVORA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Sale of Dangerous Drug (Violation of Sec. 5, 1st par.[,] Art. II of R.A. No. 9165) and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P500.000.00. The drugs "shabu" confiscated from accuseds possession are forfeited in favor of the government and is directed to be turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposition. SO ORDERED.11 The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove that appellant had taken the money in exchange for the shabu. It gave full faith and credence to the testimony of PO3 Tougan. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. The appellate court held that the prosecution had successfully adduced evidence which proved beyond reasonable doubt that appellant had sold one (1) sachet of shabu to PO3 Tougan, who had acted as the poseur buyer during a legitimate buy-bust operation. The Court of Appeals held further that appellant, after having been validly arrested and in the course of the subsequent incidental search, had been found with another sachet of shabu in his body.12 Appellant elevated the case to this Court via Notice of Appeal.13 In its Resolution14 dated 30 June 2008, this Court resolved to notify the parties that they may file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire, within thirty (30) days from notice. Both parties adopted their respective appellant's and appellee's briefs, instead of filing supplemental briefs.15 Appellant maintains that the presumption of regularity, upon which his conviction rests, should not take precedence over the presumption of innocence. He challenges PO3 Tougans account of the events that transpired on 2 November 2002 considering that the police were present in the vicinity to respond to a report that Samaniego had been causing trouble and not to conduct a buy-bust operation. Appellant also questions the integrity of the evidence used against him on the grounds of failure to mark the items seized from him immediately and failure to observe the chain of custody as required under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.16 The Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG), on the other hand, insists that the direct testimony of PO3 Tougan sufficiently established the elements of illegal sale and possession of shabu. With respect to the marking, the OSG argues that PO3 Tougan held on to the sachets from the time he confiscated them from appellant until such time that he was able to place his initials on them and submitted the duly accomplished request for examination of said sachets to the crime laboratory. Finally, the OSG avers that Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 which pertains to the chain of custody and disposition of confiscated or seized drugs was not yet applicable at the time appellant committed his crimes. In order to successfully prosecute an accused for illegal sale of drugs, the prosecution must be able to prove the following elements: (1) identities of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.17 What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale or had actually taken place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.18 Otherwise stated, in illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the elements are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.19 Similarly, in this case, the evidence of the corpus delicti must be established beyond doubt. Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165 mandates that the apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. In People v. Obmiranis,20 appellant was acquitted due to the flaws in the conduct of the post-seizure custody of the dangerous drug allegedly recovered from appellant, taken together with the failure of the key persons who handled the same to testify on the whereabouts of the exhibit before it was offered in evidence in court. 21 In Bondad v. People,22 this Court held that the failure to comply with the requirements of the law compromised the identity of the items seized, which is the corpus delicti of each of the crimes charged against

appellant, hence his acquittal is in order.23 And in People v. De la Cruz,24 the apprehending team's omission to observe the procedure outlined by R.A. No. 9165 in the custody and disposition of the seized drugs significantly impairs the prosecution's case. 25 In the instant case, it is indisputable that the procedures for the custody and disposition of confiscated dangerous drugs in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not complied with. PO3 Tougan stated that he marked the two plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance in the police station, thus: Q And after handing to him the P100.00 bill[,] what reaction was there, if any, from this alias Parto? A He immediately handed to me one (1) plastic sachet containing shabu, sir. xxx Q After placing him under arrest what, if any, did you do next? A After holding his hand, I immediately introduced myself as a policeman, sir. Q What else did you do after that? A I was able to recover another plastic sachet from his hand and also the P100.00 bill that I used in buying the shabu with serial number EN-668932, sir. xxx Q And having informed him of his constitutional rights[,] where did you take him, if any? A It did not take long PO2 Pontilla arrived [sic] and we brought him to the police station together with his tricycle, sir. xxx Q At the station[,] what happened to the two (2) plastic sachets, one that was the subject of the sale and one which was the subject of your confiscation? A I placed my initial, sir.26 PO3 Tougan did not mark the seized drugs immediately after he arrested appellant in the latter's presence. Neither did he make an inventory and take a photograph of the confiscated items in the presence of appellant. There was no representative from the media and the Department of Justice, or any elected public official who participated in the operation and who were supposed to sign an inventory of seized items and be given copies thereof. None of these statutory safeguards were observed. While this Court recognizes that non-compliance by the buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is a justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team,27 yet these conditions were not met in the case at bar. No explanation was offered by PO3 Tougan for his failure to observe the rule. Furthermore, while PO3 Tougan admitted to have in his possession the shabu from the time appellant was apprehended at the crime scene to the police station, records are bereft of proof on how the seized items were handled from the time they left the hands of PO3 Tougan. PO3 Tougan mentioned a certain Inspector Manahan as the one who signed the request for laboratory examination. He did not however relate to whom the custody of the drugs was turned over. Furthermore, the evidence of the prosecution did not reveal the identity of the person who had the custody and safekeeping of the drugs after its examination and pending presentation in court. The failure of the prosecution to establish the chain of custody is fatal to its cause. All told, the identity of the corpus delicti in this case was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. The courts below heavily relied on the testimony of PO3 Tougan and in the same breadth, banked on the presumption of regularity. In People v. Garcia,28 we said that the presumption only arises in the absence of contrary details in the case that raise doubt on the regularity in the performance of official duties. Where, as in the present case, the police officers failed to comply with the standard procedures prescribed by law, there is no occasion to apply the presumption.291awphi1 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated 5 October 2007 of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Edwin Partoza y Evora is

ACQUITTED based reasonable doubt and is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for any other lawful cause. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision and to report to this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 124442. July 20, 2001] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ARMANDO COMPACION y SURPOSA, Accused-Appellant. DECISION KAPUNAN, J.: Armando S. Compacion was charged with violating Section 9 of R.A. No. 6425 (known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended by R.A. No. 7659, in an information which reads as follows: The undersigned accuses ARMANDO COMPACION y Surposa, Barangay Captain of Barangay Bagonbon, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, of the crime of VIOLATION OF SECTION 9, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972 AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659 committed as follows: "That on or about 1:30 oclock A.M., July 13, 1995, at Barangay Bagonbon, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any authority of law, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally plant, cultivate or culture two (2) full grown Indian Hemp Plants, otherwise known as Marijuana plants, more or less eleven (11) feet tall, in gross violation of Section 9, Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659." CONTRARY TO LAW.[1 Upon arraignment on August 16, 1995, the accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial ensued. On January 2, 1996, the trial court convicted the accused of the crime charged. The decretal portion of the decision reads as follows: WHEREAS, the Court finds the accused ARMANDO COMPACION Y SURPOSA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Violation of Section 9, R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 whereof he is charged in the information in the instant case and sentences him to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of half a million (P500,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency. The portion of the backyard of his residence in the poblacion proper of Brgy. Bagonbon this City and Province, in which the two (2) marijuana plants, Exh. F, subject-matter of this case, were planted, cultivated and cultured, is hereby ordered confiscated and escheated in favor of the State, pursuant to the aforequoted Sec. 13 R.A. 7659. It would seem that the penalty imposed upon the accused in the instant case for having planted, cultivated and cultured just two (2) marijuana plants is extremely harsh. But there is nothing in the law which allows the Court to impose a lesser penalty in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances in this particular case. Hence, dura lex, sed lex. The law is, indeed, harsh but it is the law. The obvious message of the law is that people should not have a nonchalant or cavalier attitude towards dangerous prohibited drugs. They should not dabble in it as if they were a flippant thing. These dangerous and prohibited drugs are a terrible menace to the minds and morality of our people for their distortive and pervertive effects on them resulting in rampant criminality. That is why the government wants this evil exterminated from our country. It is too bad that the accused instead of helping the government in this drive, in his capacity as barangay captain of his barangay, made a mockery of it by planting, cultivating and culturing said two (2) marijuana plants himself. A word of counsel and hope for the accused. This is a time of reflection forced upon him by the result of his own act in violating the law. It is time for him to humbly submit to the compassion of God and of his only begotten Son, whose birth on earth to become the Saviour of all sinners, we have just celebrated, to change and transform his own life by his coming to Him for the purpose, so that with a changed life, God might be gracious enough to move the heart of His Excellency, the President, of this Country, to pardon and let him walk out of prison a freeman. It would be good for him to read Gods Word daily while in prison for his guidance, comfort and hope. Accused convicted of the crime whereof he is charged in the information in the instant case. SO ORDERED.[2 The accused now appeals from the above judgment of conviction and asks the Court to reverse the same on the following grounds, viz: The lower court erred:

1. In holding that Exhibit F of the prosecution, consisting of two marijuana plants wrapped in plastic, is admissible in evidence against the accused as the corpus delicti in the instant case, inspite of the fact that the prosecution failed to prove that the specimens of marijuana (Exhibit F) examined by the forensic chemist were the ones purportedly planted and cultivated by the accused, and of the fact that the prosecution failed to establish the evidences chain of custody; and 2. In holding that the warrantless search of the residence of the accused at 1:30 oclock in the morning of July 13, 1995 at Barangay Bagonbon, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, and seizure of two eleven feet tall, more or less, full grown suspected Indian Hemp, otherwise known as Marijuana plants, leading to the subsequent arrest of the accused, were valid on the ground that the accused has committed the crime of cultivating the said marijuana plants in violation of Sec. 9, RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended by RA 7659 in open view, inspite of the fact that they had to enter the dwelling of the accused to get to the place where the suspected marijuana plants were planted, and in admitting in evidence the said plants, later marked as Exhibit F, against the accused, inspite of the fact that the said plants were the fruits of the poisonous tree.[3 The relevant facts are as follows: Acting on a confidential tip supplied by a police informant that accused-appellant was growing and cultivating marijuana plants, SPO1 Gilbert L. Linda and SPO2 Basilio Sarong of the 6 th Narcotic Regional Field Unit of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of the Bacolod City Detachment conducted a surveillance of the residence of accused-appellant who was then the barangay captain of barangay Bagonbon, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental on July 9, 1995. During the said surveillance, they saw two (2) tall plants in the backyard of the accused-appellant which they suspected to be marijuana plants. [4 SPO1 Linda and SPO2 Sarong reported the result of their surveillance to SPO4 Ranulfo T. Villamor, Jr., Chief of NARCOM, Bacolod City, who immediately formed a team composed of the members of the Intelligence Division Provincial Command, the Criminal Investigation Command and the Special Action Force. Two members of the media, one from DYWF Radio and another from DYRL Radio, were also included in the composite team. On July 12, 1995, the team applied for a search warrant with the office of Executive Judge Bernardo Ponferrada in Bacolod City. However, Judge Ponferrada informed them that he did not have territorial jurisdiction over the matter. [5 The team then left Bacolod City for San Carlos City. They arrived there around six-thirty in the evening, then went to the house of Executive Judge Roberto S. Javellana to secure a search warrant. They were not able to do so because it was nighttime and office hours were obviously over. They were told by the judge to go back in the morning. [6 Nonetheless, the team proceeded to barangay Bagonbon and arrived at the residence of accused-appellant in the early morning of July 13, 1995. SPO4 Villamor knocked at the gate and called out for the accused-appellant. What happened thereafter is subject to conflicting accounts. The prosecution contends that the accused-appellant opened the gate and permitted them to come in. He was immediately asked by SPO4 Villamor about the suspected marijuana plants and he admitted that he planted and cultivated the same for the use of his wife who was suffering from migraine. SPO4 Villamor then told him that he would be charged for violation of Section 9 of R.A. No. 6425 and informed him of his constitutional rights. The operatives then uprooted the suspected marijuana plants. SPO1 Linda conducted an initial field test of the plants by using the Narcotics Drug Identification Kit. The test yielded a positive result. [7 On July 15, 1995, the plants were turned over to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, Bacolod City Police Command, particularly to Senior Inspector Reah Abastillas Villavicencio. Senior Inspector Villavicencio weighed and measured the plants, one was 125 inches and weighed 700 grams while the other was 130 inches and weighed 900 grams. Three (3) qualitative examinations were conducted, namely: the microscopic test, the chemical test, and the thin layer chromatographic test. All yielded positive results. [8 On his part, accused-appellant maintains that around one-thirty in the early morning of July 13, 1995 while he and his family were sleeping, he heard somebody knocking outside his house. He went down bringing with him a flashlight. After he opened the gate, four (4) persons who he thought were members of the military, entered the premises then went inside the house. It was dark so he could not count the others who entered the house as the same was lit only by a kerosene lamp. One of the four men told him to sit in the living room. Some of the men went upstairs while the others went around the house. None of them asked for his permission to search his house and the premises. [9 After about twenty (20) minutes of searching, the men called him outside and brought him to the backyard. One of the military men said: Captain, you have a (sic) marijuana here at your backyard to which accused-appellant replied: I do not know that they were (sic) marijuana plants but what I know is that they are medicinal plants for my wife who was suffering from migraine. [10 After he was informed that the plants in his backyard were marijuana, the men took pictures of him and themselves. Thereafter, he was brought inside the house where he and the military men spent the night. [11 At around ten oclock that same morning, they brought him with them to the city hall. Accused-appellant saw that one of the two (2) service vehicles they brought was fully loaded with plants. He was later told by the military men that said plants were marijuana. [12Upon arrival at the city hall, the men met with the mayor and then unloaded the alleged marijuana plants. A picture of him together with the arresting team was taken with the alleged marijuana as back drop. Soon thereafter, he was taken to Hda. Socorro at the SAF Headquarters. [13

A criminal complaint for violation of Section 9 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 was filed against accused-appellant. Turning to the legal defenses of accused-appellant, we now consider his allegation that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures had been violated by the police authorities. The relevant constitutional provisions are found in Sections 2 and 3 [2], Article III of the 1987 Constitution which read as follows: Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Sec. 3. xxx (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Said constitutional provisions are safeguards against reckless, malicious and unreasonable invasion of privacy and liberty. The Court, inVillanueva v. Querubin, [14 underscored their importance: It is deference to ones personality that lies at the core of this right, but it could be also looked upon as a recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily ones home, but not necessarily thereto confined. What is sought to be guarded is a mans prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his residence. In that haven of refuge, his individuality can assert itself not only in the choice of who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of objects he wants around him. There the state, however powerful, does not as such have access except under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. In the same vein, Landynski in his authoritative work could fitly characterize this constitutional right as the embodiment of a spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home and person and to afford its constitutional protection against the long reach of government is no less than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then only under stringent procedural safeguards.[15 A search and seizure, therefore, must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure becomes unreasonable within the meaning of the constitutional provision. [16 Evidence secured thereby, i.e., the fruits of the search and seizure, will be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. [17 The requirement that a warrant must be obtained from the proper judicial authority prior to the conduct of a search and seizure is, however, not absolute. There are several instances when the law recognizes exceptions, such as when the owner of the premises consents or voluntarily submits to a search; [18 when the owner of the premises waives his right against such incursion; [19 when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest; [20 when it is made on vessels and aircraft for violation of customs laws; [21 when it is made on automobiles for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws; [22 when it involves prohibited articles in plain view; [23 when it involves a stop and frisk situation; [24 when the search is under exigent and emergency circumstances; [25 or in cases of inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations. [26 In these instances, a search may be validly made even without a warrant. In the instant case, the search and seizure conducted by the composite team in the house of accused-appellant was not authorized by a search warrant. It does not appear either that the situation falls under any of the above mentioned cases. Consequently, accusedappellants right against unreasonable search and seizure was clearly violated. It is extant from the records that accused-appellant did not consent to the warrantless search and seizure conducted. While the right to be secure from unreasonable search and seizure may, like every right, be waived either expressly or impliedly, [27 such waiver must constitute a valid waiver made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The act of the accused-appellant in allowing the members of the military to enter his premises and his consequent silence during the unreasonable search and seizure could not be construed as voluntary submission or an implied acquiescence to warrantless search and seizure especially so when members of the raiding team were intimidatingly numerous and heavily armed. His implied acquiescence, if any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and is, thus, considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Consequently, herein accused-appellants lack of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure. [28 The case of People v. Burgos, [29 is instructive. In Burgos, the Court ruled that the accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search simply because he failed to object. There, we held: xxx To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda. De Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. De Garcia v. Locsin (supra);

xxx xxx xxx x x x As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officers authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. We apply the rule that: courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.[30 Neither could the members of the composite team have justified their search of accused-appellants premises by invoking the necessity and urgency of the situation. It was admitted by the members of the arresting team that the residence of accused-appellant had already been put under surveillance following a tip from a confidential informant. The surveillance was conducted on July 9, 1995 while the alleged marijuana plants were seized four (4) days later or on July 13, 1995. Surely, the raiding team had all the opportunity to have first secured a search warrant before forcing their way into accused-appellants premises. In fact, they earlier had approached then Executive Judge Ponferrada of Bacolod City who declined to issue one on the ground that the matter was outside his territorial jurisdiction. Then, they went to Executive Judge Javellana of San Carlos City in the evening of July 12, 1995 who asked them to come back in the morning as it was already nighttime and outside of office hours. However, in their haste to apprehend the accused-appellant on the pretext that information of his impending arrest may be leaked to him, the team proceeded to go to his residence to arrest him and seize the alleged marijuana plants. The teams apprehension of a tip-off was unfounded. It is far-fetched that one could have gone to accused-appellants place before the following morning to warn him of his impending arrest as barangay Bagonbon is an isolated and difficult to reach mountain barangay. The road leading to it was rough, hilly and eroded by rain and flood. [31 A few hours delay to await the issuance of a warrant in the morning would not have compromised the teams operation. In justifying the validity of the warrantless arrest, search and seizure on July 13, 1995, the trial court ruled that the accused-appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of having planted, grown and cultivated the marijuana plants which was easily visible from outside of the residence of the accused. [32 Thus, the trial court concluded that: xxx (T)he said two (2) marijuana plants, Exh. F, were the very corpus delicti of the crime the accused has been committing since the time he planted them in the backyard of his residence for whatever reason a corpus delicti which the NARCOM agents saw with their very own eyes as the same were in plain view when they made a surveillance in the accuseds place on July 9, 1995. Said corpus delicti has remained on the spots in accuseds backyard where they had been growing since the time they were planted there and, therefore, any peace officer or even private citizen, for that matter, who has seen said plants and recognized them as marijuana, was by law empowered and authorized to arrest the accused even without any warrant of arrest. The accused was caught in flagrante delicto for he was carrying marijuana, hence, committing a crime, at the time of his arrest. The warrantless search which was conducted following a lawful arrest, was valid. - People vs. Bandin (Dec. 10, 1993) 226 SCRA 299, at p. 300 The accused was caught in flagrante delicto growing, cultivating and culturing said two (2) marijuana plants, Exh. F, in the backyard of his residence, which the NARCOM agents uprooted from there at the time they arrested and apprehended him. Under said circumstances, a search warrant and/or warrant of arrest were not legally needed before the NARCOM agents could effect the arrest of the accused.[33 As a general rule, objects in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure without a warrant. [34 It is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. [35 Thus, the following elements must be present before the doctrine may be applied: (a) a prior valid intention based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) plain view justified were seizure of evidence without further search. [36 Here, there was no valid warrantless arrest. They forced their way into accused-appellants premises without the latters consent. It is undisputed that the NARCOM agents conducted a surveillance of the residence of accused-appellant on July 9, 1995 on the suspicion that he was growing and cultivating marijuana when they allegedly came in plain view of the marijuana plants. When the agents entered his premises on July 13, 1995, their intention was to seize the evidence against him. In fact, they initially wanted to secure a search warrant but could not simply wait for one to be issued. The NARCOM agents, therefore, did not come across the marijuana plants inadvertently when they conducted a surveillance and barged into accused-appellants residence. In People v. Musa, [37 the Court held:

The plain view doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendants guilt. The plain view doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. [Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 29 L.Ed. 2d 564 (1971)] Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court stated the following limitations on the application of the doctrine: What the plain view cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the plain view doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. [Id., 29 L.Ed. 2d 583. See also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.G. 730, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1983)] It was not even apparent to the members of the composite team whether the plants involved herein were indeed marijuana plants. After said plants were uprooted, SPO1 Linda had to conduct a field test on said plants by using a Narcotics Drug Identification Kit to determine if the same were indeed marijuana plants. [38 Later, Senior Inspector Villavicencio, a forensic chemist, had to conduct three (3) qualitative examinations to determine if the plants were indeed marijuana. [39 Since the evidence was secured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure, the same is tainted and illegal and should therefore be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. [40 In People v. Aruta, [41 we held that: The exclusion of such evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizure. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary to the letter and spirit of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. While conceding that the officer making the unlawful search and seizure may be held criminally and civilly liable, the Stonehill case observed that most jurisdictions have realized that the exclusionary rule is he only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against abuse. This approach is based on the justification made by Judge Learned Hand that only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed. Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees afford full protection. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it may be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government. Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes declared: I think it is less evil that some criminals escape than that the government should play an ignoble part. It is simply not allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.[42 WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Branch 58 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Armando S. Compacion is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged on ground of reasonable doubt. He is ordered released from confinement unless he is being held for some other legal grounds. The subject marijuana is ordered disposed of in accordance with law. SO ORDERED.