2011

Cultivated or Spotted?

Duisburg 6/29/2011

Conflict Ripeness in the IGAD-led Sudan Peace Process

A Seminar Paper for the Course in Conflict resolution MA Program in Development and Governance Institute of Political Science University of Duisburg Essen

To: Professor Dr. Tobias Debiel

From: Alemayehu Eyasu Tedla

Table of Contents
I. II.

Page Introduction..2 Review of the Ripeness Theory and Its Adaptations4

II.1.Zartmans

Ripeness Theory..4 II.2.Readiness Theory as an adaptation of Ripeness Theory 5

III.

Cultivating Ripeness: The IGAD-Led Peace Process in Sudan...6 Course?..............................................................6

III.1.First Phase (1993-1997): Charting the III.2.Second Phase: Ripeness Coming of

Age?......................................................................11
IV. V.

Reflection on Ripeness Theory and its applicability to the Sudanese Case..14 Conclusion..16

References...19

I.

Introduction

Sudan has endured a protracted and devastating civil war for nearly four decades beginning its independence in 1956. Except for a decade of relative peace following the signing of the Addis Ababa Peace Accord in 1972, the country has been plagued by periods of violent ethno-religious conflict that pitted the predominantly Arab/Arabised-Islam North against the African-Christian and Animist South (Deng, 1997). The Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2004) alone is said to have caused 2 million deaths, more than half a million refugees, and 4 million displaced persons (Wennmann, 2009). A number of mediation efforts have been made by different actors to resolve the conflict prior to the IGAD-led peace process that culminated in the signing of the CPA in 2005. According to Mason (2008), there have been at least 25 third party-mediated or self-initiated talks between 1972 and 2005, including mediation efforts by at least seven different mediators. However, all pre-IGAD mediation efforts in the second civil war could not simply bear fruit. That could explain why Luqman (2008) dubbed the Sudanese conflict to be the most elusive of all internal conflicts in Africa. As rightly observed by Woodward (2004:472), the search for peace in Sudan in the late 1980s and early 1990s appeared a forlorn hope despite sustained engagement by third parties. It is against the backdrop of this dismal scenario that IGAD took up its mediation role, and the disputants agreed once again to come to the negotiating table in 1993. Some scholars believe the why? of the mediation impasse before the IGAD-led process has to do, at least partly, with issues of conflict ripeness. While explaining the reason behind the unsuccessful 1992 and 1993 Abuja Talks mediated by Nigeria, Butler (2009:149) concludes Ripeness was clearly not at hand,. Similarly, Zartman (2001:3) argues the conflict in South Sudan in the 1990s had been less amenable for a mediated settlement because the components of ripeness were not present. In a nut shell, pre-1993 mediation initiatives in the Sudanese second civil war represent interventions whose time had not come. The paper thus mainly seeks to explore the reasons behind IGADs success in initiating a successful mediation intervention in Sudan using the Ripeness theory and its variants. Why was IGADs mediation intervention successful unlike earlier efforts? Why did the GoS and SPLM/A accept IGADs mediation?
The paper argues that ripeness in the Sudan conflict was cultivated as opposed to being a natural outcome of the conflict dynamics. The mainstay of the argument is that IGAD was able to cultivate ripeness in the conflict using its privileged status as a regional power player. The study also posits that the condition of ripeness in the Sudanese conflict cannot be fully explained by Zartmans ripeness theory. The paper is structured as follows. The first section provides a brief conceptual framework. The second part presents the analytical section of the paper. The third concludes.

II.

Review of the Ripeness Theory and Its Adaptations

2.1.Zartmans Ripeness Theory William Zartman has developed, revised and popularized the concept of the ripe moment or the ripeness theory since his first book on the theme in 1985 with a view to provide a tool for the timing of third party mediation interventions in protracted conflicts (Pruitt, 1997; Zartman, 2000). By identifying and analyzing ripe moments, ripeness theory seeks to understand and explain the fundamental decision to enter into negotiations. Zartman stipulates four basic conditions for establishing the ripeness to negotiate. These include:
a) The existence of a Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS), or an impending catastrophe

that causes all parties to conclude that escalation is no longer an option and that deadlock is too costly; b) The existence of Mutually Enticing Opportunities (MEO) that offer rewards for negotiation that are too good to turn down; c) A perceived way out of the conflict that does not sacrifice the parties basic interests; and d) Valid and legitimate spokespersons who can commit their parties to the negotiation path (Zartman, 2000, 2001). Based on their studies on the ripeness theory, Coleman et al. (2008), Hancock (2001) and Pruitt (1997) have come up with the following critique of the ripeness theory.

A state, not a variable. Ripeness theory presents ripeness as a dichotomous stateas ripe or unripeas opposed to a continuous variable, which might be positively associated with a willingness to negotiate (Pruitt, 1997). Assumes joint states. The elements of ripeness are conceived to be joint states that simultaneously affect both parties to a conflict (mutually hurting stalemates and enticing opportunities) (Coleman et al., 2008). Limited to interparty level. Ripeness perceived as an Interparty phenomenon rather than both as an internal political issue as well as an inter-party perception (Hancock, 2001). Limited to phases of entry. Ripeness theory has concentrated primarily on predicting entry into negotiations and has neglected to examine the relationship between entry, commitment, and sustainability of agreements (Pruitt, 1997; Coleman et al., 2008).

Pruitt (1997) has thus sought to incorporate the concept within the goal/expectation model of strategic choice. He questions whether ripeness is a state or a variable, in which there could be degrees of ripeness. He also questions whether ripeness relates only to entering into negotiations or if it suggests the conditions for effective negotiations themselves. To satisfy these issues, Pruitt proposes readiness theory, his extension to ripeness theory. It re-categorizes the ripeness conditions into two categoriesthe motive to achieve mutual cooperation and
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optimism that the other parties will reciprocate cooperative behavior, thus adding perceptual to motivational dynamics in the theory. 2.1.Readiness Theory as an adaptation of Ripeness Theory Readiness theory is related to ripeness theory in that the five components of the latter can be sorted into the two categories specified by the former. Thus, a hurting stalemate, a recent or impending catastrophe, and an enticing opportunity all make conflict seem unattractive and, hence, can be viewed as encouraging the motive to achieve de-escalation (Pruitt, 1997). Likewise, the perception that the other side has a valid spokesperson and the belief that there is a way out can be viewed as fostering optimism about reaching an acceptable agreement. According to Pruitts readiness theory, a party will move toward resolution of a heavily escalated conflict (entering negotiation, making concessions, etc.) to the extent that it is motivated to achieve de-escalation as well as it is optimistic about finding a mutually acceptable agreement that will be binding on the other party. The motivation to achieve de-escalation is the driving force behind conciliatory behavior, but optimism about the outcome of negotiation is also necessary because of the danger that unilateral conciliatory efforts will be exploited by the opponent and viewed as weak or even treasonous by ones supporters. Yet, full readiness for conflict resolution is attained when the situation is symmetrical, such that both parties are motivated to achieve de-escalation and both are optimistic about reaching agreement (Pruitt, 1997:240).
I.

Cultivating Ripeness: The IGAD-Led Peace Process in Sudan

The IGAD Led Peace process in Sudan started in September 1993 and continued until the signing of the CPA in January 2005. As the ripeness theory limits its analytical focus to ripe moments in the pre-negotiation period, however, the paper only covers developments until the Machakol talks in 2002. The entire period is divided in to two phases mainly for analytical purposes based on the signing of the DoP as a landmark event dividing the pre and post-DoP phases.
3.1.First Phase (1993-1997): Charting the Course?

The resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism in Sudan and the end of the cold war completely changed the conflict dynamics as well as the behavior, interaction and alliances of actors in the Sudanese conflict, especially after 1989. In 1989, General Al Bashir held the reins of power in Sudan in a bloodless coup supported by fundamentalists. According to el-Battahani (2006), the military coup was a plot orchestrated by fundamentalists such as al-Turabi and the NIF to thwart the progress of the Addis Ababa talks between the Sadiq al-Mahdis coalition and SPLM/A. Al Bashirs rise to power changed the war calculus from peacemaking to escalation in a manner quintessential to Sudanese internal politics. The establishment of an Islamic militia, the Peoples Defence Forces (PDF) in 1989 by the GoS attests to Al-Bashirs desire to bolster the war efforts and ultimately win it (Young, 2007). This implies that every political group within the Sudanese political establishment, among others, seeks to use the war to advance its strategic interests, and the perception of a hurting
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stalemate depends on the political dynamics, the strength, ideologies and specific objectives of groups at inter as well as intra party levels. This is why some researchers went as far as regarding ripeness as an internal political issue rather than as an inter-party perception (Hancock, 2001). Besides being a major source of intraparty as well as interparty power struggles within the political establishment of the Sudanese state, the war has constituted a critical factor for the survival or demise of successive post-independence Sudanese regimes for long. Most political groups or parties in the North ensure their ascent to power with either a commitment of winning the war against the South or making peace with it. For al-Mahadis coalition government, for instance, de-escalation had been a preferred strategy while escalation constituted a winning formula for al-Bashirs Islamist regime. According to Hancock (2001:198) a change in leadership can lead to a settlement if such a settlement is in the practical political interests of the new leader. As such, the conditions of ripeness come and go with the nature, composition and ideologies of each regime. This specific example raises an important issue relating to the conceptualization of ripe moment and hence of a Hurting Stalemate in ripeness theory. As Zartman mainly approaches ripeness at an interparty level, the pain from a hurting stalemate affects members of a given group or party at a relatively similar degree/level. There is therefore a tendency to homogenize the perception of mutually hurting stalemates within a group despite the variability of perceptions at intraparty level, within the various wings, hierarchies or factions of one group. For Islamist nationalists within the Sudanese government such as al-Mahadi the war became painful and costly. On the contrary, the war constituted a mission to fight for and winnable for Islamic fundamentalists, or those in power with the fundamentalist ticket like Al-Bashir. On the rebel side, a major political development rocked their ranks in 1991. The communist regime of Ethiopia, which has been the major sponsor and sanctuary of the SPLM/A was overthrown by the Khartoum-supported TPLF (Tigray Peoples Liberation Front) and EPLF (Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front) rebels in 1991. Following these incidences, the SPLM/A faced a serious division within its ranks, and severely weakened due to its expulsion from its bases in Ethiopia and the support it lost from the former Ethiopian government (Luqman, 2008). It is against this background that the Nigerian mediation effort failed to bring the desired result, and followed by IGADs mediation initiative. As indicated in the introductory section of the paper, scholars considered this period (early 1990s) to be unripe for mediation mainly due to the rise of fundamentalists in Sudan, power asymmetries between the GoS and SPLM/A as well as the changed regional and international context. Yet, IGAD employed its unique position as a regional club of interested power mediators, to launch a mediation effort in 1993 that essentially departs in approach from earlier initiatives (Young, 2007; Butler, 2009). The departure of IGADs approach lies in three unique traits of the mediation initiative. The first has to do with the institutionalized, process-oriented approach which IGAD employed to cultivate ripeness (i.e institutionalized sustained engagement as opposed to shuttle diplomacy). In the words of Butler (2009:156), the Sudanese case reflects the growing institutionalization of world politics, an institutionalization which has also sipped in to the realm of intra-state conflict management. The second relates to its effort to set the framework of negotiations as a
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regional actor with stakes in the outcome of the process (i.e. its use of leverage). Thyne (2006) noted that IGADs mediation came out bold and facilitated a breakthrough by determining the alternatives for the way forward. The third distinct feature concerns IGADs effort to mobilize and use international support to advance the causes of peace in Sudan (The Internationalization of the peace process). After establishing a permanent committee on peace in Sudan (SCPC) in 1993, one of the strategies used by IGAD to ensure progress in the peace process was the application of sustained pressure on the GoS through continued engagement in an institutionalized mediation effort while member countries endeavored to create stalemates by capacitating the SPLM/A militarily (Young, 2007). Up on realizing SPLM/As military weakness and the desire of the Islamist regime of Al-Bashir to crush SPLM/A militarily, IGAD member states didnt even try to hide their partisanship on critical issues of the conflict affecting their national interests. IGAD members were concerned about the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Sudan and sought to contain it (Ibid.). To the surprise of the GoS, the March 1994 IGAD Peace Talks brought with it the Declaration of Principles (DoP) which IGAD member states proposed to enhance progress in the peace process. The DOP provided for the right of self-determination for the southern Sudanese, maintenance of the unity of Sudan, federalism, and a secular and democratic state (Thyne, 2006). The NIF regime initially declined to accept the DoP which it characterized as antithetical to Sudans interest. Yet, the GoS come to feel the pains of the impending stalemate as subsequent years saw increased military support of the IGAD states of Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda to the SPLM/A, and a number of military victories had been achieved by SPLM/A against government forces in 1995 and 1996 (Wennmann, 2009). The 1995/1996 offensive of SPLM against the Sudanese armed forces led to a military tit-for-tat in consecutive years that led, according to some analysts, to a stalemate. Fractures also appeared within the ranks of fundamentalists in the Sudanese government. The expulsion of Al-Turabi and his Islamist followers finally reduced internal opposition to peace making and facilitated Kahrtoums return to the IGAD process, its endorsement of the DoP in 1997 (Thyne, 2006). Mason (2008:75) described the pre-1998 period as a pre-negotiation phase or as confidencebuilding talks which he regarded to be a preliminary stage with both sides testing the waters, finding out how far each side could go, but also becoming aware of the costs and difficulties involved in serious negotiations. Although no visible progress has yet been made toward peace until the second cycle of IGADs peace process in 2002, this phase of the initiative differed significantly from pre-IGAD ones in clarifying the issues and aiding the process of ripeness (Young, 2007; Thyne, 2006; Butler; 2009). This supports Pruitt (1997) view that ripeness would have more analytical value as a variable. The Sudan peace process indicated that the level of ripeness varies at different stages of the process with intermittent regressions and progressions. And this allows intervention at any point depending on the identity of the third party and the nature of the intervention. An inverse relationship, for instance, has been observed between third party pressure and ripeness: an increase in pressure from IGAD-states resulted in a rise in the level of ripeness and hence degree of progress in the mediation process.

On the SPLM/A side, the DoP is an ideal document that essentially laid out the basics of its negotiation agenda and the principles it upholds. This could explain why the movement happily welcomed and endorsed the DoP from the outset in 1994 unlike the intransigence of the GoS. Despite its broad regional and international support, the movement recognizes its weakness in all fronts compared to the GoS. Militarily, it could continue to fight as a gorilla force but the idea of winning the war appears far from real (Wennmann, 2009). After the overthrow of the socialist regime in Ethiopia, it could not even be able to find and/or establish safe, permanent bases for its operations. The recurrent drought and famine in the South was a constant challenge that often tested the motivation and strength of its fighters apart from affecting its human, material and financial resources. Besides, it is mindful of the ethnic division within the South which often played against its advantage as a legitimate representative of the South. Its recent plight due to internal divisions and infightings would reveal to it nothing but the mastery of Al-Bashirs regime in cooptation, and divide and rule. For, SPLM/A, therefore the purpose of escalation would be no more than forcing the GoS to the negotiating table and maintaining better leverage/bargaining in peace talks. It is thus cogent to conclude that SPLM/A has reached its military stalemate in this period. Yet, military stalemate may not be sufficient to the successful initiation of negotiations as Zartman (2000) and Pruitt (1997) indicated. According to Pruitts (1997:237), progress towards the settlement of conflicts hinges on the existence, on both sides, of: motivational ripeness (motivation to achieve de-escalation) and optimism about finding a mutually acceptable agreement. The DoP thus could be regarded as a document containing the seeds of optimism for SPLM/A as its basic bargaining agenda and principal concerns were incorporated in the DoP. On the other hand, the DoP initially constituted a dangerous pill to swallow for the GoS. It was perceived to run counter to the mainstream view of the North -of its Sudan nationalism which is founded on Islam and Arabism. Young (2007) recounts the views of some North Sudanese elites over IGADs mediation which they considered partial. He, for instance, quoted Professor Abdelwahab, as saying mediators must be at least friendly to the party/parties they seek to deliver to the agreement, a characteristic IGAD lost when its members became unanimously hostile to Khartoum (Young, 2007:12). From the point of view of the position it advances and the interest it seeks to promote, it did not have the optimism that there was a way out of the crisis, a common denominator to reaching an agreement. But, Al Bashirs victory over a powerful faction of fundamentalists within the ranks of NIF, mainly Hasan Al-Turabi and his supporters as well as the unbearable costs of the war in a debtridden, inflation-wrought economy, among others, later tamed him to pragmatism. And, the new found pragmatism might have led to an optimism that a compromised deal benefiting the North could be struck within the framework set by the DoP. However, IGAD failed to exploit this opportunity and achieve progress in the peace process in the next three years. The ripe moment cultivated has simply been squandered. The next part attempts to capture the why of the matter, followed by subsequent developments which contributed to success.
3.2.Second Phase: Ripeness Coming of Age? 8

This second phase of the peace process accommodated two contrasting/divergent developments: regression and revival/rejuvenation in relation to conflict ripeness in Sudan. The first three years (1998-2000) of the process constituted periods of regression while the following two years (2001-2002) were productive times in which important progresses were observed. The critical factors that influenced the course of the peace process include the Ethiopia-Eritrea border war; the exploration and marketing of oil from fields mainly located in the South and the lack of revenue on the SPLM/A side; the 9/11 terrorist attack against the United States and the resultant international campaign on terror, as well as the sagacity and skills of the IGAD chief mediator since 2001. Regression was mainly due to the outbreak of a border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the two militarily powerful IGAD members, in May 1998 which resulted in Ethiopias change of policy Ethiopia towards the GoS while it obliged Eritrea to reduce its engagement. The acceptance of the IGAD-engineered DoP by Al-Bashirs regime in 1997 only ended up in being a symbolic gesture on the part of GoS as the negotiations waned along with the commitment of IGAD-member states, especially after the outbreak of the Ethiopia-Eritrea war (Butler, 2009:150). As a consequence, not only pressure on the GoS by the two governments waned but also Ethiopias policy towards Sudan changed to rapprochement. This attests to the importance of regional and international pressure on the GoS to induce ripeness in the Sudanese conflict. In conflicts where power asymmetries characterize the nature of relationships among conflict parties, the role of power mediators is critical. Before the war, Ethiopia and Eritrea used their reward power and coercive power, as Svensson (2007:232) would put it, to influence the GoSs incentives. While their carrots provided the benefits of good neighborliness to the GoS, their sticks served to strengthen and arm SPLM/A against it. The strong military power of the two states in the sub-region did also give them more leverage to influence action. Thus, pressure from uniquely positioned neighbors, Ethiopia and Eritrea, had proved helpful to foster ripeness in the Sudan conflict without which existing power asymmetries continued to conspire against genuine commitment to settlement, especially on the part of the GoS. Thus, the border war between the two countries served to weaken IGADs position as a power mediator, and affected the progress of the peace process. Revival or reinvigoration of the initiative, on the other hand, was a result of two push variables. The first is new found wealth mainly in the South in the person of oil while the second has to do with the September 11 tragedy and the subsequent global campaign against terror. The exploration of oil from fields in the South and its marketing in 1999 helped to transform the incentive structure of the conflict by raising the opportunity cost of war. In his study on the economics of conflict in Sudan, Wennmann (2009:8) concluded capital-intensive, non-lootable natural resources can provide an opportunity for peace processes because their commercialization depends on a certain level of security, based on his analysis of the Sudanese case. For the GoS, the perception of a military stalemate was on the rise as the government was unable to exploit the full potential of the oil wealth in the context of ongoing conflict. Many oil fields could not be exploited due to security concerns; oil infrastructure would be attacked, which disrupted supplies. Some companies, such as Lundin Petroleum, made the case to all belligerents
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that the end of fighting and a peace process was the best strategy to ensure a sustainable oil production (Batruch, 2004). Even if the GoS wanted to improve its economic operating environment to attract investment and technology in order to explore more oil fields, it was unable to reach or operate many oil fields due to the conflict in the south. The SPLM/A was aware that it had a long term military disadvantage. Using its revenues from petrol as of 1999, the GoS started to modernize its military capacity with Russian and Chinese arms imports as well as develop a domestic arms industry (Wennmann, 2009:19). In 2001, the changing military balance was felt in the battlefield with an increase in conflict intensity (Ibid.). The SPLM/As main military strategy was to attack oil installations and companies as an effort to undermine the oil revenue of the GoS. While the SPLM/A also increased its military capability and was partly able to challenge the GoS, it realized that if it was unable to disrupt oil flows in a comprehensive fashion, it would lose the war in about three or four years (Young, 2007). A second related aspect was that the SPLM/A was unable in the long term to secure a comparable source of revenue in order to respond to the governments escalation of the conflict. Since the loss of its bases in Ethiopia in 1991, the SPLM/A had become aware of its dependence on external support and considered that it could not match the GoSs military developments and sustain an open ended conflict at a higher level of intensity while the GoS uses its oil revenue to strengthen its military capability (Wennmann, 2009). Thus, the SPLM/A based its decision to engage with the peace process on the expected future strength of the adversary and its lack of future revenue sources to participate in a process of conflict escalation. John Garang has posited that the cost of continuing the war was felt by both sides to be much higher than the cost of stopping the war. So, we stopped the war (Young, 2007:31). In this sense, the peace process was the last and best chance for the SPLM/A to win in negotiation what it could no longer be won on the battlefield (Young, 2007:32). Thus, the IGAD process shows that natural resource availability in this case oil and the belligerents need for securing revenue sources can help in engaging armed groups in peace processes. On the basis of the ripeness theory, this constituted a mutually enticing opportunity (MHS) for both parties which informed their motivation to de-escalate [as (Pruitt, 1997) would prefer to put it], or induce a perception of Mutually Hurting Stalemate [as (Zartman, 2000) would have it]. The engagement of the GoS in peace negotiations must also be understood in the context of mounting pressure by the international community and a need on the part of the GoS to improve its international relations, and in particular with the United States. After the September 11th attacks on the United States, the GoS wanted to avoid becoming part of the Axis of Evil and thus a target for regime change (Thyne, 2006). Sudan was targeted by the 2002 Sudan Peace Act of the United States Congress that underlined its international isolation. According to Young (2007), the interest of a number of influential US groups on Sudan and their lobby on the US government has also played a key role in the increased involvement of the US in Sudan conflict. He took note of groups such as the Congressional Black Caucus, the Christian right, liberals, human rights activists, US humanitarian agencies, and especially the oil lobby, which had been upset at being denied entry into the potentially lucrative Sudan market because of American sanctions, as interested parties lobbying for more pressure by the US against the
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GoS. Such strong lobby combined with heightened concerns about international terrorism after 11 September contributed to demands for increased US involvement in Sudan. The GoS thus found ways of accommodation with the United States by engaging in peace negotiations and intelligence exchange (Young, 2007:12). Figure 1: Conflict Ripeness variables and their relationships in the IGAD-Led Peace Process
Independent Variables Dependent Variable Dependent Variable/Gating Variable

Institutionalized Mediation Pressure from IGADIntervention/Appro Members International Pressure Internal Politics/Isolation of Islamic SPLM/Military Victories SPLM/As Peace Dividends Exploration and Marketing of Oil

Mutually Hurting Stalemate Mutually Enticing Opportuni ty Way Out/Optim ism

Ripenes s

As could be observed from the figure, the relationship between conflict variables is complex and interwoven. While an independent variable such as international pressure may trigger a condition of MHS and Pessimism, other causative factors may mainly cause an MEO. Yet, the effect of a variable may not be limited to only one outcome. This creates causal linkages between the three gating variables, viz. MHS, MEO and Way Out, and finally makes a combined effect possible that results in conflict ripeness. The two way arrow at the bottom of the figure indicates ripeness in the Sudanese case was not only progressively cultivated through the course of the peace process but also marked by regressive moments that derailed the process or contributed to unripen the conflict. Contrary to Zartamns assumption, thus, the IGAD-led mediation process reveals ripeness in the Sudan conflict is more an outcome from an extended mediation process, cultivated through sustained engagement than naturally existing phenomenon which must be recognized by third parties. The IGAD peace process represents an iterative mediation effort by a sub-regional organization with legitimacy and backing at sub-regional and international levels. According to Butler (2009), the initiative owes its success largely to its iterative nature that resulted from the incremental fits and starts, as well as significant setbacks over the years preceding it.
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From the early days of the initiative in 1993 through the preparation and signing of the DoP to the institutionalization and internationalization of the effort, the process was able to gradually transform the perceptions, incentive structures and motivations of disputants. In so doing, it cultivated ripeness along the way. According to Pruitt (1997), conditions favoring entry in to negotiations could also encourage elements of readiness from risk taking and commitment through to concessions and compromises by disputants to reach an agreement. The Sudanese peace process could partly support this view point owing to the iterative nature of the process and the approach it employed. Initially, it was the DoP that was agreed. In the course of subsequent sessions, negotiations were conducted piece by piece on the basis of a prioritized list. A prior agreement on a key issue served to develop the confidence of the parties to reach a compromised settlement at the next level, building confidence and bridging psychological and perceptual divides at each step of the process. Hence, the perception of a way out or optimism has also been created along the process, after the start of negotiations. IGADs approach resembles to what (Hancock, 2001:202) refers to as de-escalatory entrapment approach that induces parties to make a series of small, irreversible commitments with the idea of creating a de-escalatory entrapment process, as opposed to the usual escalatory entrapment process. In all, Zartmans ripeness theory, although an important conceptual tool, appears to have more limitations as rightly indicated by Pruitt and others.

I.

Conclusion

The paper attempts to look in to the critical factors behind the successful initiation of the IGADLed Sudan Peace Process based on Zartmans Ripeness Theory and its variants. By so doing, it also makes a brief evaluation of the relevance of the theory to explaining IGADs mediation intervention in the conflict. The starting point of the study is an observation of a number of failed pre-1993 mediation initiatives in the Second Sudan Civil War which were, among others, explained by issues of conflict ripeness as opposed to IGADs post-1993 successful mediation initiative. Per the analytical purview of the Ripeness Theory and its variants, the paper assesses the why? of
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IGADs successful mediation initiative while at the same time making an inverse conceptual scrutiny in to the theory to determine its applicability for explaining IGADs effort. The analysis makes clear that IGADs successful initiation of the talks was made possible by a combination of factors relating to attributes of the mediator as well as the internal and external conflict environment. As a sub regional grouping entrusted with the functions of regional peace and development, IGAD was uniquely positioned to make a successful mediation intervention in Sudan. First, it had the mandate, institutional mechanism and the legitimacy to initiate an institutionalized peace process. Second, it was able to use the leverage of its members for a productive engagement to settle the conflict. Third, it succeeded in internationalizing the peace effort and mobilizing support from the international community. The paper indicates that the changed international context during the post cold war era helped the process of ripening in the Sudanese conflict by allowing IGAD members to advance a unified position on the Sudan conflict and put a combined pressure on the GoS. The post-9/11 context also made the international community to actively engage in the Sudan peace process, incentivize as well as de-incentivize the GoS to come to the negotiating table besides providing critical support to the SPLM/A. The increased US engagement after the September 11 attacks especially served to cultivate the advent of the ripe moment. The internal political condition in Sudan initially slowed down the peace process but later enhanced ripeness. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism initially affected the peace process while its waning influence after the defeat of Al Turabi and his supporters contributed to progress in the peace process. SPLM/As military victories after the mid nineties resulted in the perception of a military stalemate by both belligerents. Besides, the extraction and marketing of oil from Southern oil fields, the high economic cost of the war in a debt ridden and inflation wrecked Sudanese economy as well as the need to secure viable revenue sources such as oil provided an important incentive for both to seek a compromised solution. Overall, the paper revealed that the conditions indicating ripeness, namely the hurting stalemate, and enticing opportunities (as dictated by the Zartmans ripeness theory), or the motivations to de-escalate as well as the optimism for settlement were created, (per the Ripeness theory). The GoS and SPLM/A decided to come to the negotiating table due to the military stalemate created, the huge pressure against the GoS, and due to the influence of domestic political and economic factors mentioned above. Unlike Zartmans seemingly passive stance on conflict ripeness, however, the paper finds out ripeness in Sudan has been cultivated by IGADs mediation intervention as opposed to being a natural outcome of conflict escalation. Ripeness was rather cultivated as the process was able to gradually transform the perceptions, incentive structures and motivations of disputants from the early days of the initiative in 1993 through the preparation and signing of the DoP to the institutionalization and internationalization of the effort. In connection, the paper finds major criticisms raised against Zartmans theory to be valid based on an observation of conceptual gaps that limit the explanatory power of the theory on IGADs mediation effort in the Sudan conflict. These include the view of ripeness as a state as opposed to

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a variable; its narrow perception of ripeness solely as an interparty phenomenon as well as its arguably limited focus on the pre-negotiation stage of a peace process. Most importantly, the conceptual void left by Zartmans theory concerning third party intervention constitutes one of the major drawbacks of the theory as issues relating to the mediators role have been left unattended. Over all, the paper finds the ripeness theory as a theory in the making given its limitations in its analytical and predictive capacity. The best part of it therefore is its ability to invite more research and soul searching!

References
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