POLITICAL LAW REVIEW

VOLUME I
Based on the outlineof JusticeVicenteV. Mendo za
A pril 1996 RevisedEdition ______________ _

Compiled by Jose Salvador Y. Mirasol

Updatedby UP Law Batch 1995

Updatedand Enlargedby RodellA. Molina UP Law Batch 1996

This revised edition is intended to further improve a previous edition of this work. Importantpoints taken from Justice Isagani Cruz's book in Political Law have been summarizedin this work. Specialthanks to Lianne Tan for lendingme her dis kette in PoliticalLaw Reviewas updated by UP Law Batch 1995, Ma. Rosario Bernardofor digestin g some of the cases in volume I, Shirley Alinea for lending me her notes in Political Law, Non L errer, Buddy Carale and TJ Matta for patiently printing this work. This work is dedicatedto UP Law Batch 1996, to which I belong, most speciallyto Section A. May this work help us in passingPoliticalLaw this comin g bar exams in September1996. Let us all pray for a one hundredper cent passingr ate.

"To Him be the glory and honor forever. " RAM ______________ _

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

I. DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS IN PUBLIC LA W A. PoliticalLaw define d

That branch of public law which deals with the organizationand operationof the governmentorgans of the state and defines the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory. (Sinco, Philippine Political La w 1, 1 1th e d., 196 2) Scope of Political Law . The entire field of political law may be subdividedinto (a) the law of public administration,(b) constitutionallaw, (c) administrativelaw, and (d) the law of public corporations. These four subdivisionsmay be briefly describedfor the time being, as follows: The first deals with the organization and m anagem ent the differentbranchesof the governm ent;the second,with the guarantiesof the const of itution to individualrights and the limitationson governmental action; the third, with the exerciseof executivepower in the making of rules and the decision of questions affecting private rights; and the last, with govern mental agenciesfor local governm ent for other specialpurposes. (S inco 1) or Macariolav Asuncio n , 11 4 S C R A 7 7 (1 982 ) Spanish Code of Commerce Provision DisqualifyingJudges from Engaging in Commerce is Part of Spanish F: PoliticalLaw Abrogatedby Changeof Sovereignt y
The complainant alleged that respondent judge of the CFI violated paragraphs 1 and 5, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce (w/c prohibited judges, among others, from engaging in commerce, either in person or in proxy or in the financial intervention in commercial or industrial companies w/in the limits of the districts) when he associated himself w/ the Traders Mftg. & Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and pres., said corp. having been organized to engage in business .

HELD: Althoughthis provisionis incorporatedin the Code of Commercew/c is part of the commercial laws of the Phils, it partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the governmentand certain public officers and employees,like justices and judges. Politicallaw has been defined as that branch of public law w/c deals w/ the organizationand operationof the governmental organsof the State and defines the relations of the state w/ the inhabitants of its territory. Specifically, Art. 14 of the Code of Commercepartakesmore of the nature of an administrativelaw bec. it regulatesthe conductof certain public officersand em ployees respectto engagingin business; w/ hence,politicalin essence . xxx Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to US, and later on from US to the Republic of the Phils., Art. 14 of the said Code must be deemed to have been abrogated bec. where there is change of sovereignty, politicallaws of the formersovereign,whethercompatibleor not w/ those of the new sovereign, the are automatically abrogated,unless they are expresslyreenactedby affirmativeact of the new sovereign.There appearsto be no enablingor affirmativeact. Consequently, 14 of the Code of Commercehas no legal and Art. bindingeffect and cannotapply to respondent Judge. VV.

B. Constitutional Law Define d A constitutionis both a legal documentand a politicalplan. It, therefore,embodieslegal rules as well as political principles. And so when we speak of constitutionallaw in the strict sense of the tern, we refer to the

legal rules of the constitution.xxx xxx In the sense in w/c the conceptis understoodin Americanand PhilippineJurisprudence, constitutional law is a term used to designatethe law embodiedin the constitutionand the legal principlesgrowing out of the interpretationand applicationmade by courts of the provisionsof the constitutionin specific cases. xxx Constitutionallaw forms a distinct branch of jurisprudencedealing w/ the legal principles affecting the nature,adoption,am endm ent, and operationof the constitution. (S inco 67.)

Typesof Constitutional . In general,there are three (3) differenttypes of constitutional Law law, namely , (1) the E nglishtype, characterized the absenceof a w ritten constitution (S inco 67) by An unwritten constitution, and the power of judicial review by the courts. Thus, the courts ca nnot invalidatethe acts of the parliamentas being unconstitutional becauseof "parliamentary supremacy." (Mirasol notes. ) (2) the Europeancontinentaltype, where there is a written constitutionw/c gives the courts no power to declareineffectivestatutescontraryto it (Sinco67.) A written constitution but no power of judicial review by the courts. The socalled Constitutional Courts of France do not exercise real judicial review but only render advisory opinions on constitutional questionsupon the requestof the government, of partiesin actual litigation. (Mirasolnotes. not ) (3) the Americantype where the legal provisionsof the written constitutionare given effect through the power of the courts to declareineffectiveor void ordinarystatutesrepugnantto it. (Sinco 67.) A written constitutionand the exercise of judicial review by the courts, which is the power of the courts to determine the constitutionalvalidity of the acts of legislature and other branches of government. (Mirasol notes. )

C. Constitution Define d It is "a law for the government,safeguardingindividualrights, set down in writing." (Hamilton.) Such a view foundacceptance the work of Tanadaand Fernando in : "It may be more specificallydefined as a written instrumentorganizingthe government,distributingits powersand safeguarding rightsof the People. the " From Malcolm and Laurel: "It is the written instrument by which the fundamentalpowers of governmentare established,limited and defined,and by which those powersare distributedamong the severaldepartments their safe and useful for exercisefor the benefit of the body politic." According to Schwartz, "a constitution is seen as an organic instrument, under which governmental powers are both conferred and circumscribed. Such stress upon both grant and limitation of authority is

fundamental in American theory. 'The office and purpose of the constitution is to shape and fix the limits of governm ental activity.'" (Fernando,The Constitutionof the Philippines,2021, 2nd ed., 1977.)

Typesof C onstitution s C las sifica tio n f C o n s titu tio n:s o Constitutionsare classifiedas follows: (1) written and unwritten,and (2) rigid and flexible. Written and Unwritte when it is adopted. (Classification to as n ) (a) A written constitution is one the provisions of w/c have been reduced to writing and embodied in one or more instruments at a particular time. The US Constitution is a classical example of a written constitution . Writtenconstitutions have been also called conventional enacted bec. they are given definiteform by or , a steadilyconstitutedbody, the constitutional convention,at a particulartime. Written constitutionsare either democraticor monarchical. Democraticconstitutionsessentiallyspring from the authorityof the people. Monarchical constitutions those grantedby a monarchas an act of grace to are his subjects. This class of constitutions also called octroyedconstitutions They belongto the past age. are . (b) An unwritten constitution is one w/c has not been committed to writing at any specific time but is the accumulatedproduct of gradual political and legal development. The English Constitution is the modern exampleof this class. Unwrittenconstitutionshave been known also as cumulativeor evolved bec. they are not formulatedat , any definitetime but are rather the outcomeof a politicalevolutionaryprocess .

Flexibleand Rigid Constitution s . (Classification accordingto amendment process. ) The classification of constitutions into written and unwritten has been considered unscientific and inaccurate bec. no written constitution, after having been applied for a considerable period, can remain substantiallyunchangedin its originalconditionother than by formalamendments. xxx. To classifyconstitutionsinto rigid and flexibleis to use a basis that has to do more w/ their nature rather than their mere form. Rigid. A constitution is classified as rigid when it may not be amended except through a special processdistinctfrom and more involvedthan the methodof changingordinarylaws. It is supposedthat by such a special procedure,the constitutionis rendered difficult to change and thereby acquires a greater degree of stability. Flexible. A constitution is classified as flexible when it may be changed in the same manner and throughthe same body that enacts ordinarylegislation. The British Constitutionis flexible. A constitution'sstability dependsupon other factors than the mere rigidity or flexibilityof the amending process,such as (1) the generaltemperamentof the people and their leaders and (2) the degree of a nation's

politicalmaturityand social homogenity.(Sinco 6870.) The PhilippineConstitutionis both written and rigid (Se e Art. XVII on the Amendmentprocess) .

II. THE BACKGROUND OF THE PRESENT CON STITUTION HistoricalBackgroundof the 1987 Constitutio n The history of the 1987 C onstitutionbegan on 11 April 1899, the date w hen the Treaty of Paris b etween the United and Spain of 10 Decem ber1898 becam e effectiveupon the exchangeof instrum entsof ratifica tion of both countries. But the sourcesof the 1987 Constitu tion are (i) M cK inley'sInstructionsto the Second Phil ippine Commission;(ii) SpoonerAmendment;(iii) PhilippineBil l of 1902; (iv) Jones Law of 1916, otherwiseknown as the Philippine Autonomy Act; (v) 1935 Constitution; (vi ) 1973 Constitution and (vi) Freedom Constitution of 1986 and its implementing orders . Treatyof Paris Under the Treaty of Paris, the Philippineswas c eded by Spain to the United States. Spain relinquished its sovereignty over the Philippine Islands, and with t his, all laws of a political nature were automatically abrogated . The Treaty provided that the civil and political status of all inhabitants of the islands was t o be determined the US Congress by . The Philippinesin turn, was not given the status of an "incorporatedterritory"(as to make it a candidate for statehood) and so ex proprio vigore, the US Const itution did not apply to the Philippines unless the US Congress expressly enactedits provisions . McKinley'sInstruction s President McKinley, legislating as CommanderinChief, issued on 7 April 1900 his "Letter of

, 2 Phil 332 (1903) by

Instructionto the SecondPhilippineCommission" under Taft. It set up a "divided civil and military government " with the existing Military governor as the Executive, and a Philippine Commission, created on 1 Septemb er 1900, as the Legislative, both representing the US Presidentas Commander inChief. It also extended to the Philippines all the right s in the Bill of Rights of the US Federal Constitution, except the right to bear arms (becausethe country was i n rebellion)and the right to a trial by jury (becausethe Americans distrusted the Filipinos capacity to be a j ust judge of his peers). The right to jury trial of an Americanchargedwith a crime in the Philippineswas d enied by the courts in US v Dorr virtue of the Letter of Instruction . This was the first OrganicAct (a law which establishest he structureand limitationsof the government)

of the Philippines. What it lacked, as a constitution, were the ratification by the people, and the right of am en dm ent hich w a s re se rvedsolely to th e U S P resid en t) (w . The judiciary was subsequentlyestablished on 11 June 1901, with a Supreme Court, Courts of First Instance, Justiceof PeaceCourts and . S poonerA m endm en t On 4 July 1901, the Spooner Amendment, which was actually a rider to the "Army and Navy Appropriations Act," changed the then "divided, military and civil government" into a fully civil government, under the US Congress. All acts of the Philippine Commission would now begin: "Be it enacted by t he authorityof the US governm ent," and no longer by authorityof the US P resident . Philippine Bill of 1902 The US Congressnow in controlof the Philippines,ratified all the organic acts of the President,in order to prevent disruption of government,and on 1 July 1900, passed the Philippine Bill of 1902, which was to be organic act of the Philippines from 1902 to 1906. The organic act introduced significant provisions to constitutionalhistory. The PhilippineCommissionwas the upper house. It was under the Governor eneralwho retainedall G the executive power, including the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus upon recommendationof the PhilippineCommission . It establishedan electivelower house called the PhilippineAssembly,composedentirely of Filipinos. It called for the first election in the Philippines to fill up, the membership in the lower house, as soon as the Philippine insurrection stopped and there was a condition of general peace, except in the Moro and Non Christianprovinces . A census was taken and completedon 28 March 1903 and with a certificationof peace and of Filipino acceptanceof the US governmentmade by the PhilippineCommissionon 29 March 1907, the election for the PhilippineAssemblywas conducted 10 July 1907,with Osmenaas speaker on . The Bill also defined for the first time who the citizens of the Philippines were. They were all the inhabitantsof the Philippine islands who were subjects of Spain as of 11 April 1899, who continued to reside therein,and all the childrenborn subsequentthereto. This definitionis still good law today. JonesLaw On 29 August 1916, the US Congress passed the Jones Law, otherwise known as the Philippine AutonomyAct. It established a tripartite government with real separation of powers; this was the prototype of our presentsetup. The executivepower was in the hands of an AmericanGovernor eneral,who was independent G

of the Legislature,and who was given the power to suspendthe writ of habeas corpus and impose martial law without the recom m endation the Legislature. The Legislaturewas com posedof the Senate and the Hou of se of Representatives, composedof Filipinos. The judiciary continuedto be made up of the SupremeCourt, the all CFIs and Justiceof PeaceCourts . Under this setup, while the Filipinoshas all the legislativepower, the Americanshad all the executive power and thus, also the control of the government. Thus, in the Board of Control (NationalCoal Corporation) cases, the U S S uprem eC ourt ruled, despite the dissentof H olm esand B randeis,that the P residentof the S enate and the Speakerof the House could not vote the stocks of the NCC and elect its directorsbecause this was a politicalfunction. O nly the G overnor eneralcould vote the governm entshares, said the court. G The definition of who were citizens of the Philippines first enunciated in the Philippine Bill of 1902, was carriedover by the JonesLaw. TydingsMcDuffie Law Although this was not an organic act, it is important in the constitutional history of the Philippines becauseit was to be the enablingstatute,providingthe mechanismwherebythe constitutionof an independent Philippinescould be adopted. The law, upon its acceptanceby the Senateand House of Representatives the of Philippines,provided for (i) the calling of a ConstitutionalConventionto draft a Constitutionfor the Philippines, (ii) the adoption of a Constitution that established a republican government, with a Bill of Rights, and a separation of church and state, (iii) the submission of the draft to the US President for certification that the Constitutionwas in conformitywith the conditionsset by the TydingsMcDuffie Law, and (iv) its ratificationby the peoplein a plebiscite. Completeindependence was to take place ten (10) years after its effectivity .

1935 Constitutio n Accordingly, on 30 July 1934, an election was held to choose the delegates to the Constitutional Convention. Claro M. Recto was elected President of the Convention. On 8 February 1935, the Concon approvedthe draft. On 23 March 1935, the draft was certified by the President,Franklin Delano Rooseveltas conforming to the TydingsMcDuffie Law. On 14 May 1935, it was ratified by the people in a plebiscite, with the provisionson the qualifications the President,VicePresidentand membersof Congresstaking effect upon of ratification. In September1935, the first election under the 1935 Constitutionwas conductedwith Manuel Luis Q uezonas President SergioOsmenaas Vice President and . On 15 November1935, upon the inaugurationof the Commonwealth, 1935 Constitutiontook effect. the This Constitutionwas to serve as the charter of the Commonwealth, upon withdrawalof US sovereignty,of and the Republic . The Constitution provides for a tripartite government,with the executive lodged in the President who had a sixyear term, the legislativein a unicameralNational Assembly,and the judiciary in a Supreme Court, CFIs and Justiceof PeaceCourtsas before .

In 1940, it was amended to provide for (a) a bicameral Congress with a Senate and a House of Representatives; a term of four years for the President,but with reelection and (c) the establishmentof an (b) independentconstitutional body known as the Com m issionon E lections . War ensued, and the Philippineswas so devastatedthat the declarationof its independence,due 15 November 1945 had to be postponed. At any rate, on 23 April 1946, the election of the first officials of the PhilippineRepublic was held, and on 4 July 1946, the Republic was inauguratedand the Philippinesbecame "politically"independentof the US. Theoretically,to an extent that sovereignty is never granted to a people but is earned by them as they assert their politicalwill, then it is a misnomerto say that 4 July 1946 was the day US granted independence to the Philippines. More appropriately,it was the day when the US withdrew its sovereigntyover the Philippines, thus giving the Filipino people an occasionto assert their ow n independence . But not "economically". On 30 April 1946, one week after the election, the US Congress passed the Bell Trade Act which would grant Philippineprime exports entry to the US free of customsduties from 1946 to 1954, and a gradual increase in duties from 1954 to 1974 (LaurelLangley agreement), provided that the Philippineswould grant US citizens and corporationsthe same privileges,and in addition, the right to explore natural resources of the Philippines in parity with the Filipinos, and to operate public utilities. This must be acceptedby Congress, bodied an ExecutiveAgreement, reflectedas an amendm ent the Constitution em in and in . The Senate approvalof this bill gave rise to the case of Vera v Avelino , 77 Phil 192 (1946). The Senate then had 11 Nacionalistasand 13 Liberals. Three NacionalistaSenatorselect (Vera, Diokno and Romero), known to be againstthe Bell Trade Act, were preventedby the rest of the Senate,in what is known as "exclusion proceedings," groundsthat their electionswere marred with fraud. The politicalmotivationwas clear but the on SC was conned into lifting the injunction it issued for the withholding of the suspension, because of the unfulfilledpromise that the Senate would not carry out the suspension. With the balance of power offset, the Bell Trade Act was passed. Subsequently, SC had to dismissthe petitionon the groundthat the principleof the separation powers,it could not ordera coequalbranchto reinstatea member of . The Senate authorizedPresidentRoxas to enter into an ExecutiveAgreement,which he did on 3 July 1946, the eve of the declarationof PhilippineIndependence . Then came the amendmentof the Constitutionin order to include the Parity Rights Agreement,which gave rise to the case of Mabanagv Lopez Vito , 78 Phil 1 (1947). Under the AmendatoryProvisionsof the 1935 Constitution,Congress,acting as constituentbody, needed 3/4 vote to proposean amendmentto the Constitu tion. But with the three Senatorsstill suspended, only the 21 remainingwere used as the basis for computingthe 3/4 requirement. When this was raised in court, it begged off from ruling on the ground that it was a political question.It also used the EnrolledBill Theory . So with the amendment proposed,it was subsequently ratifiedon 5 March 1947. The third time the Constitutionwas amended(1940, 1947) was in 1967. A Resolutionof both houses provided for (a) the amendmentof the Constitutionby a Convention,(b) the increase of seats in the House of

Representatives make the Conconsufficientlyrepresentative, (c) allowingmembersof the House as dele to and gates withoutforfeitingtheir seats. The first was approved,the secondand third were rejected. This becamethe subjectmatter of Gonzalesv COMELEC . Electionof delegatesto the Concontook place on 10 November1970. Then the ConConmet on 1 June 1971. Before it finishedits work, it came up with a resolutioncalling for an amendmentto the 1935 Constitution reducingthe voting age from 21 to 18, so that a wider base could vote in the ratificationof the Constitutionthen being drafted. A plebiscitewas set by the COMELECfor 8 November1971 but this was enjoinedby the SC in the case of Tolentinov COMELEC,the court ruling that a piecemeal amendmentwas not allowedby the 1935 Constitution since it provided that the amendmentswere to be ratified at "an election" which meant only one election. The Court upheld its jurisdictionover the ConConby arguing that since the Conconderived its power from the Constitution,it was thus limited by the Constitution . But it was subsequently overtakenby MartialLaw. On 30 November1972, the Conventionsubmittedits "draft" to the President,who called on a plebisciteto ratify the Constitution. This was questionedin the case of Planas v COMELEC,49 SCRA 105 (1973) on the ground that there can be no freedom of expression under Martial Law. But the case was renderedmoot and academicwhen the Presidentcancelledthe plebisciteand insteadheld a citizens'assemblyon 10 to 15 January,1973. On 17 January1973, the Presidentcame up with a proclamationthat the Constitution had come to full force and effect after its overwhelmingratification by the peoplein a viva voce vote.

1973 Constitutio n The validityof the ratificationprocesswas questionedin the case of Javellanav ExecutiveSecretar , 50 y SCRA 30 (1973) but the failure of the SC to come up with the necessary votes to declare the act as unconstitutional forced it into the conclusionthat "there are no further obstaclesto consideringthe constitution in force and effect. " The 1973 Constitution was amendedfour times. The first, in 1976, gave the President,legislativepowers even if the Interim Batasang Pambansawas alreadyoperating . The second,in 1980 was not significant. It merely raised the retirementof justicesof the SC from 65 to 70 as to keep Fernandofor five m ore years . The third, in 1980 changedthe form of governmentfrom Parliamentary Presidential to . The fourth,in 1984, respondedto the successionproblemby providingfor a VicePresident . The start of the end of the Marcosyears, of course,could be treatedas early as 21 August1983. But its immediateprecursorwas the Snap Electionwhich the Presidentwas forcedto call and set on 7 February1986 to

respondto the clam or for popularm andat e. The validity of the "Snap Election Law" called by the Batasang Pambansa was raised in the case of Philippine Bar Associa tion v COMELEC , 140 SCRA 455 (1985). The issue was raised because of the conditionalletter of resignationsent by Mr. Marcos to the Batasan,making his resigna tion effective only upon (i) the holding of a Presidentialelection,(ii) the proclamationof a winner, (iii) the assu mption into office by the winning candidate. It was contended that a conditional resignation was not all owed under the 1973 Constitution,for it did not create a vacancy, and without a vacancy,there was no reaso n to call for an election. But the SC failed to issue a preliminaryinju nction to enjoin the COMELECfrom prepari ng for the election,thus making "the initially legal question into a political one." In the meantime, the politi cal parties have started cam paigning and the people were so inv olved in the election that to stop it on leg al groundsw ould frustratetheir very will. And so, failing to come up with t he majority to hold the Snap Election Law unconstitutional,the SC 1, 25 February 1986 (Provisionalgovernment ProclamationNo. ) could not issue the injunctionprayed for. The electionw ent ahead . The rest is history. The results of the election were proclaimedby the Batas an, naming Marcos and Tolentinoas the winners. But the February 2 to 25, 1986, EDSA revolutiontook place. On 25 February,Marcos LawyersLeague v Aquino was proclaimed in Malacanang by Makas in LawyersLeague v Aquino iar, while Aquino was proclaimed in Club Filipino by Teehankee. Later that evening,Marcos fled to Hawaii .

A. The February1986 Revolution and the Proclamation Provisional of Constitution .

FreedomConstitutio n What was the basis of the Aquinog overnment? Did it assumepower pursuant to the 1973 Constitution, or was it a revolutionary government ?

. But Proclamation No. 3 which announcedthe ProvisionalConstitution, see med to suggestthat it was a revolutionary g overnment,since in one of its whereasesit announcedthat the "new governmentwas installed,througha direct exerciseof the power of the Filipino people assistedby units of the New Armed Forces,"referringto the EDSA revolution . The better view is the latter view. T he Aquino governmentwas not an offshoot of the 1973 Constitution for under that Constitution, a procedure w as given for the election of the President proclamation by the Batasan and the candidateBatasanproclai med was Marcos . (GR Nos. 73748, 73972 & 73990, May 22 , 1986). This view was affirmed where the legi timacy of the Aquino governmentis questio ned on the ground that it was not establishedpursuantto the 1973 Constitution.The SC ruled that petitioners had no personalityto sue and their petition states no cause of action. "For the legitimacyof the Aquino governm ent is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment;they have acceptedthe governmentof PresidentAqui no which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure

governm ent. M oreover,the com m unityof nations has recognizedthe legitim acyof the present governm en t. All the eleven members of this Court as reorganized,have sworn to uphold the fundamentallaw of the Republic under her governm ent. " The Aquino governmentwas a result of a "direct state action." It was not as if a small group revolted and succeededin w restingpow er in the end. R ather,the entire state revoltedand overthrewthe governm e nt, so that right from the beginning,the installationw as already law ful and the governmentwas at all times de ju re. In this regard, it must be noted that there is no such thing as a constitutional right of revolution. A revolution,from the point of view of a State, is always lawful since a State can never go wrong; it can chan ge its Proclamation No. 3, March 25, 1986 (Provisional Constitution). governmentin whateverway the sovereignsees fit. But this right of revolution,inherentin sovereignty,cannot be recognizedin a Constitution,for this would be selfdestructive. The nature of a Constitutionis to setup a government and providefor an orderlyway to changethis government.A revolutioncontradictsthis nature . At any rate, the Provisional Constitutionor FreedomConstitutionwas adoptedon 25 March 1986 throughProclamationNo. 3. It abrogated the legislativeprovisionsof the 1973 Constitution,modifiedthe provisionsregardingthe executivedepartment, and totally reorganizedthe government. (Its use of the 1973 Constitution, however,is not be to construedthat it was a continuationthereof.) Then it providedfor the calling of a Constitutional Commission,composedof 30 to 50 members appointed by the President within 60 days. (In our history, all major constitutions Malolos, 1935,1971 were draftedby electeddelegates. ) The Presidentappointed48 Commissioners, who workedon the Constitutionfrom 1 June to 15 October In Re: SaturninoBermude z , the SC 1986. The draft was submittedto the people in a referendumon 2 February1987. On 11 February1987, the , that: President, through Proclamation No. 58, announced its overwhelming ratification by the people and that, therefore,it had come into force and effect. (145 SCRA 160)(1960).In the case of In Re: SaturninoBermude z held, quotingthe previouscase of LawyersLeaguev Aquino
[T]he legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government. All the eleven members of this Court as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government .

B. Adoptionand Effectivityof the presentConstitutio n ProvisionalConstitution,Art. V.

ARTICLE V

ADOPTION OF A NEW CONSTITUTION Section 1. Within sixty days from t he date of this Proclamation, a Commission shall be appointed by the President to draft a New Constitution. The Commission shall be composed of not less than thirty nor more than fifty natural born citizens of the Philippines, of recognized probity, known for their indep endence, nationalism and patriotism. They shall be chosenby the Presi dent after consultationwith varioussectorsof society . Section 2. The Commission shall c omplete its work within as short a period as may be consistent with the need both to hasten the return of normal co nstitutional government and to drat a docu ment truly reflective of the ideals and aspirationsof the Filipino people. Section 3. The Commission shall c onduct public hearings to insure that the p eople will have adequate participation in the formulation of the New C onstitution. Section 4. The plenary sessionsof the Comm ission shall be public and recorded . Section 5. The New Constitution sh all be presented by the Commission to the P , February11, 1987 resident who shall fix the date for the holding of a plebiscite. It shall become ) , 153 SCRA 602 (1987.valid and effective upon ratification by a majority of the votes cast in such plebiscitewhich shall be held wit hin a period of 60 days followingits submissi on to the President .

F: 1987 Constitution,Art. XVIII, sec. 27. Art. XVIII, Sec. 27. This Constit ution shall take effect immediately up on its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebisci

te held for the purpose and shall supe rsede the all previous Constitutions . The foregoing proposed Consti tution of the Republic of the Philippine s was approved by the Constitutional Commissionof 1986 on t he twelfth day of October 1986, and ac cordinglysigned on the fifteenth day of October 1986 at the Pl enary Hall, National Government Cent er, Quezon City, by the Com m issioners whosesignatures her are eunderaffixed . ProclamationNo. 58 (Proclaimingthe Ratifi cation of the 1987 Constitution ) De Leon v Esguerr a The 1987 Constitution took effect on 2 Febr uary 1987.
The case arose due to Art. III, Sec. 2 of Proclamation No. 3, which provided that: " All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Const itution shall continue in office until otherwise p rovided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or app ointment and qualification of their successors, i f such appointment is made within a period of one year from 25 February 1 986." De Leon was a barrio captain in Tayta y, Rizal. On 9 February 1987, he was replaced by the MLG (DLG). So the question arose as to when the 1987 Constitutio n took effect. If it took effect on 2 February, the replacement was no longer

valid, since Proclamation No. 3 would have been superseded. proclamation),the replacementwould have been valid.

But if it took effect on 11 February (the date of

The SC, consulting the proceedings of the Concom, ruled that the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to make it effective on the date of its ratification. Art. XVIII, Sec. 27 clearly provided that "this Constitution shall take effect imme diatel upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in the y plebiscite." The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb. 2, 1987, superseding the Provisional Constitution. Consequently,after that date, respondentOIC Governorcould not designaterespondentsto the electivepositionsoccupiedby petitioners. P etitionersm ust now be held to have acquiredsecurityof tenur e. The dissentingopinion pointed out that by contemporaneous construction,the 1973 Constitutionhad a similar provisionas the present one in issue (Art. XVII, Sec. 16, This Constitutionshall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite), and yet it took effect on the day of the proclamation.The 1981 and 1984 amendments containedsimilar provisions(valid when approved),and yet the practicehas alwaysbeen to make the date of proclamation, date of effectivity the . Furthermore, the effectivitywas 2 February,then the appointments if made by the Presidentto CA posts after that date would be invalid for they were not submittedto the Judicial and Bar Council. On this point, however,Teehankeenoted that the Presidentissuedthe appointments the end in of January. A concurring opinion noted the debate between Davide (date of proclamation) and Bernas (date of ratification),and Davide'scommentthat he was giving up due to tyrannyof numbers . VV: The SC was correct for that was the clear intent of the framers. The ones to be blamed are the framersthemselves. Effectivityshould really be the date of proclamation . One, how can one can be expectedto comply with the provisionsof the Constitution when, prior to its proclamation, there is no way to determineif it has been ratified or not? Should the Directorof Prison continue the scheduledelectrocutionof a death row convict on 3 Februaryin view of the abolition of capital punishment in the 1987 Constitution;if he does, he would technicallybe violating the constitutionunder the above holding. If he does not, he would be in derelictionof duty, in case the constitutionis not ratified . Two, no analogy can be made betweenthe election to office of a public officer who is deemed elected on the day of election),and the effectivityof the constitution,becausea public officer, though deemed elected, does not assumeoffice on the day of his election,not even on the day of his proclamation .

III. THE SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE ROLE OF THE COURTS

A. Theoryof JudicialReview Angara v ElectoralCommissio n , 63 Phil 139 (1936). In 1935, the NationalAssembly

adopted a resolutionthat "all memberselect, with no election protest filed on or before 3 December1935 are deemed elected." The ElectoralCom m ission, constitutional a body, on the other hand set the 9 D ecember 1935 as the deadlinefor the filing of election protest . Ynsua, who lost to Angara, filed a motion of protest (complaint) on 8 December 1935. This was entertainedby the ElectoralC om m ission.A ngara contendedthat the deadlineset by the N ationalA ssem bl y w as controlling. Who prevailed ? The SC, through J. Laurel, ruled for Ynsua, thereby upholding the authority of the Electoral Commission,in view of the constitutionalprovisiongrantingthe ElectoralCommissionjurisdictionover election protests . In justifying the power of judicial review, J. Laurel pointed out that when the court allocated constitutionalboundaries,it neither asserts supremacy,nor annuls the acts of the legislature. It simply carries out the obligationsimposed upon it by the constitutionto determineconflictingclaims and to establish for the partiesthe rights which the constitutiongrants to them. In People v Vera Conditions the Exerciseof JudicialRevie for w , 66 Phil 56 (1937), J. Laurel laid down the doctrine that judicial review can only be exercisedin an actualcase and controversy . This means (1) a party with a personal and substantial interest, (2) an appropriate case, (3) a constitutionalquestion raised at the earliest possible time, and (4) a constitutionalquestion that is the very lis mota of the case,i.e. an unavoidable question . Seven(7) rules of avoidanceof constitutional questions(J. Brandeis): In the following cases, the court must refrain from passing on the issue of constitutionality or from exercisingjudicialreview: case) 1. Friendly,nonadversaryproceedings.(no vital conflict ) 2. Anticipationof a questionof constitutionallaw in advance of the necessityof deciding it. (premature 3. Formulationof a rule broaderthan is requiredby the precisefacts to which it is applied. 4. Existenceof other groundsupon which the case may be disposedof (not the very lis mota) 5. A complaintmade by one who fails to show injury as to its operation.(no standing ) 6. Instanceof one who has availedhimselfof its benefit . 7. Possibility of a construction of the statute which can avoid the resolution of the constitutional question.

Policy of strict necessity(RescueArmy case)

The court must, as much possible,refrain from exercisingjudicial review unless all the requirementsfor its exerciseare fulfilled becauseof : 1. The danger of exercising the function, in view of possible consequencesfor others stemming also from constitutionalroots. 2. C om parative finality of those consequences . 3. Considerationdue to the judgment of the other repositories of constitutionalpower concerning the scope of their authorities . 4. N ecessityfor each to keep w ithin its ow n pow er . 5. Inherentlim itationsof the judicial process its largely negativecharacter,and its lim ited resourcesfor en fo rce m e nt. 6. Withal in paramountimportanceof constitutional adjudication . Thus, the following must be avoided: (i) political questions, (ii) advisory opinions, (iii) moot and academicissues,and (iv) no standing .

PoliticalQuestio n An issue is a political questionwhen it does not deal with the interpretationof a law and its application to a case, but with the very wisdomof the law itself. When a judge attemptsto resolvea politicalquestion,he is not exercisinga judicial function, but is rather supplantinghis conscienceto that of the political branch of the governm ent . Baker v. Carr , 369 US 186 (1962)has attemptedto formulatesome guidelinesfor determining whethera questionis politicalor not.
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government;or an unusual need for unequestioningadherence to a political decision already made, or the potentiality of embarrassment from multafarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.

AdvisoryOpinio n A case becomes an advisory opinion when there is no actual case and controversy that demands constitutionalconstructionfor its resolution. This may take the form of declaratoryrelief. It is not wise for the court to engagein an advisoryopinionbecause : a) This only leads to dialectics, to abstract legal arguments and sterile conclusions (Laurel quoting

Frankfurter ) b) The judicial function is impoverished since it thrives on facts that draw out the m eaningof the law. M ootnes s A case becom esm oot w hen there are facts, injuries and heated argum entsbut for som e reason the legal problem has become stale. When a case is moot and academic,it ceases to be a case and controversy. A ny decisionreachedby the court w ould not be conclusiveon the parties . E xcep tion s m oo tn ess to : 1) If the questionis capableof repetitionand evasiveof review. 2) If there exits a m ere possibilityof collaterallegal consequencesif the court does not act. 3) Voluntarycessationfrom the wrongfulact by the defendant,if he is free to return to his old ways. R ipenes s A constitutionalquestionmay come to the court either too early or prematurely,so that it is still abstra ct (advisory opinion), or too late, so that the court's decision would no longer affect the parties (mootness). Th e court must resolveconstitutional issues only when they come to it at the right time (ripeness) . No Standin g A party has a standingin a case if his interestis such that he standsto be benefitedif the case is resolve in his favor, and he stand to be really injured if it is decidedagainsthim. Standing is established by two nexuses: the party's status and the type of legislative act bei questioned, his status and the precisenatureof the constitutional or infringement .

ng

The test of standing is whether the party has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of t he controversyas to assure such concreteadversenesswhich sharpensthe presentationof issues upon which t he court so largely dependsfor illuminationof difficult constitutionalquestions(Baker v Carr, supra.) (145 SCRA 160, 1986) A personhas standingto challengethe governmental only if he has a personaland substantial act intere st in the case such that he has sustained,or will sustain,direct injury as a result ot its enforcement.(Peoplev. Ve ra, infra.) PhilippinePractic e

In re SaturninaBermude z The action was for declaratory relief to interpret Section 5 of Art. XVIII, which provides that: The s ix year term of the incumbentPresidentand VicePresidentelectedin the 7 February1986 election,is for purposes of synchronization election,herebyextendedto noon of 30 June 1991. The questionwas who the "incumbe of nt

President" referred to in said provision was whether Aquino (the one in office) or Marcos (the one proclaimedby the Batasan). The confusionarose becausein ProclamationNo. 3, Pres. Aquino referredto the "direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by the units of the new AFP" as the cause for the installationof the new government. If PresidentAquino was not elected but came into office as a result of the E DSA R evolution,the she would not be the "incum bent" w ho was elected in the February7 election,refer red to in the provision . The SC ruled that (a) the petitioner had no standing, (b) the SC had no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratoryrelief, c) the suit was against the Presidentwho cannot be sued, d) the petitioner had no cause of action because,reiteratingthe decisionin Lawyer'sLeague for a Better Philippinesv Aquino , the legitimacy of the Aquino governm entis not a justiciablem atter but is a politicalquestion . And yet, the SC ruled that the "incumbent" referred to was President Aquino who was in effective controlof the countryand had been recognizedby the rest of the w orld. (The Court, disregarding the limits of judicial review, felt compelled to render a decision on the legitimacyof the Aquino government so as to avoid any doubt as to its very own legitimacy. It must be noted, thoughthat his case is the entitlement an actualcase and controversy. of ) Dumlao v COMELEC (95 SCRA 392) Section 4 of BP 52 provided that any retired elective local official who had received retirementpay to which he was entitledunder the law and who have been 65 years old at the commencement the term of office of to which he sought to be elected, was not qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he had retired . Dumlao filed for prohibitionto enjoin the enforcementof the law, claiming that this was directed at him as formergovernorof NuevaVizcaya . The SC held that (a) he had no standing,since he had not been injured by the operationof the law, no petition for his disqualification having been filed and (b) the action was a requestfor advisoryopinion. And yet, the SC upheld the validity "because of paramount public interest", declaring that the legislative purpose of infusingyoungerblood in local governmentwas valid. Adapted . Igot v COMELEC (95 SCRA 392)

Sec. 4 of BP 52 also providedin part that any person convictedof subversion,insurrectionor rebellion, or similar offenseswas disqualifiedfrom running for any local position,and the filing of chargesfor such crimes before a civil or military court after preliminaryinvestigationwas prima facie evidenceof such fact. Igot sought to questionthe validity of this provision. The SC held that he had no standingbecause(a) he had never been convictednor chargedof any these crimes,(b) he had not been disqualifiedfrom being a candidate,(c) he had no personalnor substantial interestat stake, and (d) he could not sue as taxpayersince the statute did not directly involve the disbursementof public funds.

And yet, although abstainingfrom ruling on the first part of the provision,the SC held that the second part regardingthe presum ptionof guilt was unconstitutional violatingthe presum ptionof innocence for .

P o litic a lQ u e s tio n s In PBA v COMELEC , 140 SCRA 455, we see a reversal of judicial review. The case was clearly a justiciablecontroversy. Is the resignation submitted by Marcos, which was conditioned on the electi on, proclam ationand assum ptioninto office by the elected President,a valid resignationas to authorizethe B atasan to pass a Snap Election Law? The Court could have validly issued an injunctionto stop the COMELECfrom proceeding with the preparationsfor the election. But it did not, citing its delay in deciding the case and the sentimentsof the people that developedin the meantimeas reason for its inaction. Accordingto the court, what at first was a legalquestionbecamea politicalquestionbecauseit was overtakenby events. VV: A Court which does not issue an injunctionto enjoin an official act when it could have issued one is actually deciding the case in favor of the validity of the act. Failure to issue an injunction is as much an exerciseofRomuloreview In judicial v Yniguez . , infra, we see anothertrend of judicial review. What seems like a legal question when viewed in isolation (namely, whether the rules of the Batasan enabling it to shelf a complaint for impeachmentagainst the President is constitutional.)is really a political question when viewed in a broader context (i.e., that the case was filed against the Speakerof a coequal branch to compel him by mandamusto recall the complaintfrom the archive,and that the ultimate result of the case was to questionthe decisionof the Batasanto shelvethe case,a matter,that is solelycomm itted that department. to ) Yet, despitethe really politicalnature of the question,the SC passedon the validityof the rules to erase doubtsthat may still be entertained .

C. Functions JudicialRevie of w 1. Checking invalidatinga law or an executiveact that is found to be contraryto the Constitution . 2. Legitimating (legitimizing) upholding the validity of the law which results from a mere dismissal of a case challengingthe validity of that law. When the Court exercises this function, it uses the double negative by declaring that the law is "not unconstitutional".This is no mere semantics. The Court cannot declare the law constitutionalfor it enjoys the presumption of constitutionality, so that a declaration to that effect by the court would not make it more constitutional. On the other hand, anyone who challengesthe validity of a law has the burden of proof to show

its invalidity. Declaring that the law is not unconstitutionalis tantamountto saying that the challengerhas not m et th e bu rd enreq uire d .

Legitimatingand CheckingAspects of Judicial Review. Dismissalof Challengeto a Law's Validity Legitimizes it. In Occena v COMELEC , 104 SCRA 1 (1981), which sought an injunction to prohibit the COMELEC from proceedingwith the plebiscitefor the proposed1981 amendments,and in Mitra v COMELE , 104 SCRA C 59 (1981), which sought a mandamus to compel the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite to ratify the 1973 C onstitution, both prayersbased on the prem isethat the 1973 C onstitution had not been ratified,the SC he ld that the failure of the Court in the Javellanav ExecutiveSecretarycase to muster the votes required to declare the 1973 Constitutionas being invalidly ratified, which resulted in the dismissalof the suit questioningthe validity of the ratificationof the Constitution,in effect legitimatedthe ratification. In Occena,the Court ruled that:
"The Supreme Court can check as well as legitimate. In the latter case, there is an affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. That is the meaning of the concluding statement in the Javellana resolution. Since then, the Court has invariably applied the present Constitution. "

3. Symbolic to educate the bench and bar as to the controlling principles and concepts on matters of great public importance . Symbolic Function of Supreme Court to Give Guidelines to Bench and Bar in Cases which are Moot and Academ ic . In Salonga v CruzPano , 134 SCRA 438 (1985), the case against petitioner for subversionwhich was filed by the fiscal on the basis of flimsy testimony given by Victor Lovely was already dismissed without prejudice by the fiscal (upon anticipationof adverse ruling). And yet, the SC noting that as the fiscal said the dismissalof the chargeswas withoutprejudiceto the filing of new ones for the same acts becausethe petitioner has not been arraignedand double jeopardydoes not apply, the case is not entirelymoot, decidedto performits duty to "formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts and doctrines or rules" for the guidanceof the bar and bench. It thus, went on to lecture about its antiquatedunderstanding the incitingtest, of and how it could not be provedby a mere photograph . In Javier v COMELEC , 144 SCRA 194 (1986), the case was already mooted not only by the death of Evelio Javier, but also by the abolition of Batasan,the Antique seat which he and Pacificadorwere contesting for. And yet the SC, claimingto be "not only the highestarbiterof legal questionsbut also the conscienceof the government," decidedthe case anyway"for the guidanceof and as a restraintupon the future. The citizencomes to us in quest of law but we must also give him justice. The 2 are not alwaysthe same. There are times when we cannotgrant the latter bec. the issue has been settledand the decisionis no longerpossibleaccordingto the law. But there are also timeswhenalthoughthe disputehas disappeared, in this case,it nevertheless as cries out to be resolved. Justice demandsthat we act then, not only for the vindicationof the outragedright, though gone, but

also for the guidanceof and as a restraintupon the future." In Demeteriav Alba , 148 S CRA 208, the SC struck down Sec. 44 of PD 1177, authorizingthe P resi dent to transferfunds from one departm entto another,on the ground that it overextended privilegegranted the under Art. VIII, sec. 16(5) of the 1973 Constitution, even if such provision was already abrogated by the Freedom Constitution. Then, citing the Javier case on the need "not only for the vindicationof an outragedright, though gone, but also for the guidanceof and as a restraintupon the future," it lectured on how this law would op en the floodgates for the enactment of unfunded appropriations,uncontrolled executive expenditures, diffusion of accountabilityfor budgetaryperformance,and entrenchmentof the pork barrel system,and on how this would create tem ptationsfor m isappropriation em bezzlem ent and .

A ll c o u rtsca n ex erc iseju d ic ia lrev iew Art. VIII, Sec. 5(2). The Suprem eCourt shall have the follow ingpow ers: xxx (2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Courtmay provide,final judgmentsand ordersof lower courtsin : (a) All cases in which the constitutionalityor validity of any treaty, internationalor executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation,order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question . (b) All cases involvingthe legalityof any tax, impost,assessment, toll, or any penaltyimposed or in relationthereto . (c) All casesin whichthe jurisdiction any lowercourtis in issue of . (d) All crim inalcasesin w hichthe penaltyim posedis reclusion perpetua higher. or (e) All casesin whichonly an erroror questionof law is involved .

The review power of the SC implies that it has appellate jurisdiction over final judgments of lower courts on cases with constitutional issues. If so, inferior courts have original jurisdiction over constitutional cases althoughTuason & Co. v case only at first instance, their decision being always reviewableby the SC. In J.M. they decide the CA Thus, for instancean RTC can rule on the constitutionality the AntiS ubversionLaw. of , 3 SCRA 696 (1961), RA 2616, which provided for the expropriationof the Tatalon Estate, was claimedto be unconstitutional.This issue said the SC, could be resolvedby the CFI in the ejectmentcase filed before it by the evicteesof the estate,since the 1935 Constitutioncontemplated that inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionalityissues, that it spoke of appellate review of "final judgmentof inferior courts" in cases where such constitutionalityhappensto be in issue. The 2/3 vote of the SC requiredv IAC 10 of Art. VII restrictedthe decisionsof that Court only in the exerciseof its appellate In Ynot by Sec. jurisdiction. , 148 SCRA 659, the SC reversedthe RTC's holdingthat it had no authorityto rule on the validity of EO 626A, banning the transporting of carabaos from one province to another. The Court pointed out, that since it has jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm final judgments of lower courts in

constitutional cases, then the low er courts can pass upon the validity of a statute in the first ins tance. The SC then struck down the law for being arbitraryand for unduly delegatinglegislativepow er.

C. E ffect of a D eclarationof Unconstitutionalit y Civil Code, Art. 7. Article 7. xxx W hen the courts declare a law to be inconsistentwith the Constitution, the form er shall be void an d th e latter sh all g o v ern . xxx The effect of a declarationthat a law is unconstitutional to make the law either void or voidable is . It is void if on its face, it does not enjoy any presumption of validity. As such, it produce s no effect example is BP 52 in Igot v COMELEC An whatsoever,creates no right or office, it imposesno duty. Whateverpenalty was paid during the period of its operationmust be remitted . , and case, supra, providingthat anyonewho has been US v New York Times chargedof rebellion, etc. is prima facie presumedto be disqualifiedfrom running for a local post. On its face, it blatantly goes againstthe constitutional presumption innocence of . Anotherexampleis a law imposingprior restraintwhich is, accordingto Sullivan v Bantam Books , presumptively unconstitutional . But a law declared unconstitutional only voidableif, on its face, it enjoys the presumption is of validity. In this case, it court put it inoperative only upon the Baxter State Bank of its invalidity. And e As the becomes in Chicot County District v judicial declaration ven so, the invalidation produces no retroactive effect, since it would be unjust to hold that the law did not p roduce any effect at all prior to its nullification. From the time the law was promulgatedto the time it was declar ed invalid, people would have enteredinto various transactionsand relations,expectingand in fact compelledt o presume that the law is valid. Thus, to now hold that the law never producedany effect would penalizethose who in faith

believed the laws passed by their representatives to be in accordance with their solemn duty under the Constitution . , the past cannotalwaysb e erased,so that statementsof principleof absoluteretroactivity not acceptablein all cases. Said the court, is
"[T]he actual existence of a statute, prior to such determination, is an operative fact, and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official. xxx "

, The case of S erranode A gbayaniv P N38 SCRA 429 (1971)is in point. B In 1939, AgbayaniborrowedP4 50 from PNB secured by a realty mortga ge. In 1944, the loan matured but P N B could not collect becauseit w as at this tim e of the w ar. In 1945, P re s. O sm enaissued the D ebt M orato rium Law (EO #32), suspendingthe pay ment of loans for four years due to the ra vages of war. In 1948, RA 342 extendedthe Debt M oratoriumLaw for anothereight years (up to 1956). In 1 953, however,the S C declaredRA 342 as unconstitutional the case of in Rutter v Esteba n the actio n pre scribe d ? If we take the orthodox view, th e action has prescribed, since the decl aration of RA 342 as uncon stitutionalretroactedto 1945 w hen E O 32 w as first issued.B etw een1944 w he n the loan m aturedand 1959, w hen P N B co lle cte dth e loa n, 1 5 ye ars h ad el ap se d. [The orthodoxview was announ ced by Mr. J. Field, in the case of Norton vs. Shelby County where the court held that:
"xxx. An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duti es; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal co ntemplation, inoperative, as if it had not been passed.]

. In 1959, PNB filed a suit for paymentof the loan. Has

But if we take the unorthodoxvie w, as the SC did, the action could still pr osper. The period from 1945 when the law was promulgated,to 1953 when it was declared unconstitutionals hould not be counted for the purpose of prescriptionsince the Debt MoratoriumLaw was operative during th

is time. In effect, only 7 years had elapsed(1944 1953 45, 59). Indeed, it would be unjust to pun ish the creditor who could not collect pri or to 1953 because the Debt MoratoriumLaw was effective,only to b e told later that his respect for an appar ently valid law made him lose his right to collect. Art. 7 of the Civil Code which pr ovides that, "When the courts declare a l aw to be inconsistentwith the Constitution, formershall be void and the the latter shall govern." seemsto be the orthodoxview on the matter .

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW _______________ _ PART ONE

THE PHILIPPINES AS A STAT E

I. State defined . CIR v CamposRueda , 42 SCRA 23 (1971). A State is a pol itically organized sovereign comm unity, independent of outside control, b ound by ties of nationhood, legall y supreme within its territory, and acting through governm entfunctioning under a regim e of law. A state is a communityof p ersons,more or less numerous,pe rmanentlyoccupyinga fixed territor y and possessed of an independentgov ernment organized for political en ds to which the great body of inha bitants render habitualobedience.(P rof. Samilo Barlongayquoting G arner , Introductionto PoliticalLaw, 41 .) A. Territory The elementsof a state are : territor y, people,sovereignty, government . Peoplerefers simplyto the inhabita nts of the State. Territoryis the fixed portion of the s urface of the earth inhabitedby the people of the State. Government the agency is or instrumentality throughwhich the will of the State is formulated,expr essed and realized . Sovereignty the supremeand unc is ontrollable powerinherentin a State by whichthat State is governed.

II. Components the Philippine of State The Archipelago Concep t Art. I. The nationalterrito ry comprisesthe Philippinearchi pelago,with all the islandsand w aters embracedtherein, and all other territoriesover which the Philip pines has sovereigntyor jurisdi ction, consisting its terrestrial, of fluvial , and aerialdomains, includingits territorial sea, the seabed,the sub soil, the insularshelves,and other su bmarineareas. The watersaroun d, between,and connecting i the slands of the archipelago,regardlesso f their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines. In short, the Philippine ter ritory consists of: (1) the Philippin e archipelago, and (2) all territorie s over which the Philippineshas sovereig nty or jurisdiction . Of all the constitutions in t he world, probably only the Philip pines has a definition of its territor y. At first glance, this is useless since one's territory under International Law is defined not by one's selfserving claims as to what it covers,but by i nternationaltreatiesand customs. Historically,however,this definition had a

valid purpose . The 1 935 Constituti on needed to define Philippi ne territory in order to preve nt its dismemb erment by the US. Since , pursuantto t he Tydings M cDuffieAct, the draft of th e Constitution was to be sub m itted to the US Presidentfor a pproval, defini ng the national territory was a way of making the US ackno wledge its exte nt and (to) respectits integrity . The 19 73 Constitution needed a defin ition of national territoryin orde r to lay claim to Sabah. The cl aim was origin ally made by P residentMaca pagal. Sabah was one of the territoriesbelo nging to the Philippin es by historic right and leg al title. Presi dent Marcos, in 1977 on th e occasion of an ASEAN

betweenthe UnitedStatesand Spain .

Ministerial Me eting in Singa pore announc ed that the Ph ilippines was willing to drop its claims over Sabah; nothingw as d one, how ever to am end the C onstitution. The 19 87 Constitution changedthe p hraseologyinto : "all other territ ories over whic h the Philippine s has sovereignty or jurisdiction." I n so changing, the rationale w as to remove any irritant to our relations w ith the Malaysiabrou ght about by th e 1973 formula tion but without renouncingthe claim at the sa me time. Any way, if the Philippine s has the right over Sabah u nder Internati onal Law, it p ossesses that right with or w ithout a Constitution, th e Constitution being merelya municipallaw which does not bind other stat es.

The 1987 Constit ution, therefo re, contains a definition of n ational territor y so as not to give an impressiontha t the Philippine s is abandonin g its claim over Sabah. Remo ving such a de finition would a mount to droppingthe claim altogethe r, a fact not for the Commissio ners to decide .

1. The Philipp ine Archipela go a. Treaty limit s 1. Treatyof Par is of 10 Decem ber 1898 . Article 3 defines the metes and bo unds of the ar chipelago by l ongitude and l atitude, degre es and seconds. Tech nical descriptio ns are made of the scope of th e archipelago a s this may be f ound on the su rface of the earth.

2. Treaty of W ashingtonof 7 November190 0 CedingCagaya n, Sibutoand S ulu.

3. Treatyof 2 J anuary1930 be tweenthe Unite d Statesand Gr eat Britai n

C ed ingthe T urtle an d M an gseeIslan d s.

b . M e th o do f d eterm in in g e b a se li th n es 1 . R A 3 0 4 6 (1 7 J u n e 1 9 6 1 ) Determineappropriatepoints of the outermostIslands of the archipelago , then connectthem by means of a straightline until all islands are s urroundedor enclosedby the im agina ry straight lines. 2. RA 5446 (8 September 1968). "The baselinesfrom whi ch the territorialsea of the Philippinesis determinedconsist of straight lines joining appropriatepoints of the outerm ostislands of the archipelago." (fifth w hereasclause.)

Sec. 2 of the Act provides that the d efinition of the territorialsea of the PhilippineArchipela go as provided in this Act is without prej udice to the delineationof the baselinesof the territorialsea around th e territory of Sabah, situated in North B orneo, over which the Republic of the Philippineshas acquireddominion and sovereignty . Usesof the baseline : a. Determinewhat is internal w ater (all waters inside the baseline, whe ther or not more than 12 miles from the shore) . b. Determinethe 200 mile EEZ. c. Archipelagic Doctrine

The basic conceptof an archipel ago is that body of water studdedwith isl ands, or the islandssurrounded with water, is viewed as a unity of isla nds and waters together forming one unit. This is in contrast to a continentwhich is a single mass of land. The main purpose of the archip elagic doctrine is to protect the territoria l interests of an archipelago.If we follow the old rule of internationalla w, it is possiblethat betweenislands,e. g. Bohol and Siquijor,due to the more than 24 mile distance betweenthe 2 islands,there may be high seas. Thus, foreignvesselsmay just enter anytimeat will, posing dangerto the sec urity of the State. Accordingto the doctri ne, even these bodiesof water within the baseline, regardless of brea dth, form part of the archipelago and a re thus considered as internal waters . The archipelagic doctine has a twofold purpose: (1) economic reasons; (2) national security. (Barlongay. ) The archipelagicdoctrine is the principle that it is an integratedunit; eve rything within it comprisesthe archipelago. (ibid.)

The Constitutional provisionsembodyingthis doctrineare : 1. "archipelago, with all the island and watersembrace d therein" An archipelagois a body of w ater, studded with islands.

2. "the w aters around,betw een,and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardlessof the breadth and dimensions,form part of internalwater" The followingprovisionsare really superfluous : 1. "terrestrial,fluvial and aerial domains" (b ecau selan d, w ater and a ir spa ce alrea dyfo rm pa rt of a n a rchipelago ) 2. "territorial sea, seabed,subsoil,insularshelves,other subm arine areas " "Territorialsea" meanswater outsidethe baselineextending up to 12 miles. "Internalwater" refers to water within the baseline . "Insular shelf" means the land which is submerged under water which may extend beyond 12 miles as long as it is not more than 300 ft. deep. It is also known as i ntercontinental shelf. (Barlongay. )

2. Otherterritoriesover which the Philippines has sover eigntyor jurisdictio n PD 1596(11 June1978 ) Claims the KalayaanGroup of Islands as part of P hilippine territory on the basis of historic rights and legal title. The claim was made "by reason of history, indispe nsable need, and effective occupationand control PD 1599 (11 June 1978) with international . establishedin accordance law. xxx"

3. The territorial sea, the sea bed, the subsoil,the insular shelvesand othersubmarine areas

4. Exclusive Econom ic Zone There is establishedan e xclusiveeconomiczone extending"to a distanceof two hundrednauticalmiles beyondand from the baselinesfr om which the territorialsea is measured. Provided,

That, where the outer limits of the zone as thus determinedoverlap the exclusiveeconomiczone of an adjacent or neighboringstate, the commonboundariesshall be determinedby agreementwith the state concernedor in accordancewith pertinentgenerallyrecognizedprinciplesor internationallaw on delimitation." (Sec. 1 thereof. ) Other states shall enjoy in the exclusive economic zone freedoms with respect to navigations and overflight,the laying of submarinecables and pipelines,and other internationallylawful uses of the sea relating to navigationand com m unications.(S ec. 4 thereof. )

Purposes : 1. Sovereignrights to explore,exploit, conserveand managethe naturalresources,living or nonliving, renewable nonrenewable the seabed,subsoil,and superadjacent or of waters . Economicexploitationand explorationof the resourcesof the zone such as the productionof energy from the water,currentsand winds. 2. Exclusive rights and jurisdiction with repect to the establishmentand utilization of artificial islands, offshore terminals, installations and structures; the preservation of the marine environment, including the preventionand controlof pollutionand scientificresearch . 3. Such other rights as are recognizedby international law. Otherstates are prohibitedfrom using the zone to: 1. Exploreor exploitany resources ; 2. Carry out any search,excavationor drilling operations ; 3. Conductany research ; 4. Constructor operate any artificialisland, offshore terminal,installation,or other structure; 5. Perform any activity which is contrary to, or in derogation of, the sovereign rights and jurisdiction hereinprovided . O therstatesare allowedto use the zone for: 1. Navigationand overflight ; 2. Laying of submarinecable and pipelines ; 3. Other lawful uses related to navigationand communication.

In case of overlappingof EEZs, the commonboundariesare to be deteminedby (i) agreementand (ii) internationalrules on delimitations .

UN Conventionon the Law of the Sea (30 April 1982.) The exclusive economic zone which shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from baselines from which the breadthof the territorialsea is measured,is recognizedin the UNCLOS,of which the Philippinesis a signatory. Its concept is that although it is not part of the territory, exclusiveeconomicbenefit is reserved for the country .

B . P e o pe l 1. Three meaningsof the word "People " The word "people"is used in at least three sensesin the Constitution : a. "People"as Inhabitant s Art. XIII, Section 1. The Congressshall give highest priority to the enactmentof measuresthat protectand enhancethe right of all the people to human dignity,reduce social, economic,and political inequalities,and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the com m on good. Art. II, Section15. The State shall protectand promotethe right to health of the peopleand instill healthconsciousness ongthem am . Section16. The State shallprotectand advancethe right of the peopleto a balancedand healthful ecologyin accordwith the rhythmand harmonyof nature. Art. III, Section2. The right of the peopleto be securein their persons, houses,papers,and effects againstunreasonable searchesand seizuresof whatevernature and for any purposeshall be inviolable, xxx , 9 SCRA 27 (1963), infra. The right of the an individual to be secure in his person is guaranteedby the Constitution. Under our Constitution,the same is declareda popular right of the people and, of course,indisputablyappliesto both citizensand foreignersin this country. Qua Chee Gan v DeportationBoard

b. Peopleas Citizen s

P ream ble. W e, the sovereignFilipinopeople im ploringthe aid of A lm ightyG od, in order to build a just and humane society and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirati ons, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of independenceand democracy under the rule of law and a regime of t ruth, ju stice ,free d o m ,lo ve , e q u alitya n d p ea ce ,d o o rd ainan d p ro m u lg ate is C o n s titu tio .n th Art. II, Sec. 1. The Philippinesis a democraticand republicanState. Sovereigntyresides in the p eo p lean d a ll g o v ern m en a u th o rityem an a te sfro m th em. t Art. II, Sec. 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The G overnm ent ay call upon the people to defend the S tate an d, in the fulfillm entthereof,all "citizens m " m ay be required to renderpersonalmilitaryor civil service . Art. III, Sec. 7. The right of the people to information mattersof publicconcernshall be recog on nized. Accessto officialrecords,and to documents, and paperspertinentto officialacts, transactions, or decisions, well as to government as researchdata used as basisfor policydevelopment, shallbe afforded the citizenssubjectto lim itations providedby law. xxx.

c. Peopleas Elector s Art. VII, Sec. 4. The Presidentand VicePresidentshall be elected by direct vote of the people

Art. XVI, Sec. 2. The Congressmay, by law, adopt a new name for the country,a nationalanthem, or a nationalseal, which shall all be truly reflectiveand symbolicof the ideals,history,and traditionsof the people. Such law shalltake effectonly upon its ratification the peoplein a nationalreferendum by . Art. XVIII, Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between Republic of the Philippinesand United States of AmericaconcerningMilitary Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilitiesshallnot be allowedin the Philippines exceptundera treatyduly concurred by the Senateand, in when Congressrequires,ratified by a majorityof the votes cast by the people in a nationalreferendum held for that purpose,and recognized a treatyby the othercontracting as party . 2. Citizenshi p a. Who are citizen s Art. IV, Sec. 1. The followingare citizensof the Philippines : 1) Thosewho are citizenof the Philippines the tim e of the adoptionof the Constitution at ;

2) Thosew hosefathersor m othersare citizensof the Philippines ; 3) Those born before January17, 1973, of Filipinomothers,who elect Philippinecitizenshipupon

reachingthe age of m ajority;and 4) Those w ho are naturalizedin accordance ith w law.

These citizens are classifiableinto (i) natural orn citizens b (covering#'s 1, 2, and 3) and (ii) naturalized citizens (covering#4).

b. Electio no f Ph ilippinecitizenshi p
Com. Act No. 625 (June 7, 1941.) AN ACT PROVIDING THE MAN NER IN WHICH THE OPTION TO ELECT PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP SHALL BE DECLARED BY A PERSON WHOSE MOTHER IS A FILIPINO CITIZEN

Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in acc ordance with subsection (4), section 1, Article IV [1935 Constitution: Those whose mothers are citizens of the Phili ppines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship] shall be expressed in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be file d with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegianc e to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines .

Section 2. If the party concerned is absent from the Philippines, he may make the statement herein authorized before any officer of the Government of the United S tates (now officials of Philippine Embassy or Consulate)authorized to administeroaths, and he shall forward suc h statement together with his oath of allegiance, to the Civil Registry of Manila.

, 199 SCRA 692 (1991 ) Note : The right of election permitted under the 1987 Constitut F: is available only to those born to Filipino ion mothers under the 1935 Constitutionwho, had that charter not been changed, would have been able to elect Philippine citizenship upon attaining majority age. That right is retained for them under Article IV, Section 1 (3). Obviously, election is not necessary in the case of the child to a Filipino mother under the present constitutionas she would be considereda Filipinocitizen at birth.

Co v. ElectoralTribunalof the Houseof Representative s

Petitioners Balingit and Co and private respondent Ong were among the candidates who vied for the position of representativein the 2nd legislative district of Northern Samar in the Ma y 1987 election. Ong was proclaimed the winner. Petitioners filed election protest with the House of Representa tives Electoral Tribunal against Ong on the ground that Ong is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines and not a reside nt of the 2nd district of Samar. HRET ruled in favor of Ong.

ISS UE : W /N O ng is a natural born citizen as to entitle him to run as congress m an. RULING:YES, Ong is a natural born citizen. Under the 1987 Constitution : "Sec. 1. The ff. are citizens of the Phil.: xxx ippine 3) Those born before 17 January 1973, of Filipino mothers,who elect Phil citizenshipupon reachingthe age of m ajority;and 4) Those w ho are naturalizedin accordancew ith law.

Sec. 2. Natural born citizens are those who are citizens of the Phil. f rom birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfecttheir citizenship.Those who elect Phil. citizen ship in accordancewith par. 3, Sec. 1 hereofshall be deemednaturalborn citizens. " The Court interprets Sec. 1 par. 3 as applying not only to those who el ect Phil. citizenship after 2 February1987 but also those who, having been born of Filipinomothers,electedcit izenshipbefore that date, as in the case of Ong. This ruling finds support in the deliberations of the Consti tutional Commission. The provisionwas framedto correctthe anomaloussituationwhere one born of a Filipin o father and an alien mother was automaticallygranted the status of a natural born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Phil. citizenship.If one so elected, under earlier la ws, he was not conferred the status of a naturalborn citizen . There is no questionthat Ong's motherwas a naturalborn Filipinaat the ti me of her marriagewith Jose Ong Chuan, a Chinese who filed an applicationfor naturalizationand was granted one. Crucial to this case is whether or not Ong elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen in order to come wit hin the purview of the above quoted constitutionalprovision. To expect Ong to have formally or in writing elected citizenshipwhen he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary for the court is of the opinion that Ong was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a naturalborn citizen but his father had been naturalizedwhen the respond ent was only nine years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987, the Const itution would be amendedto

require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite o f his already having been a citizen since 1957. An election of Philippinecitizenshippresupposesthat the pers on electing is an alien or his status is doubtfulbecause he is a nationalof two countries.There is no doubt in t his case about Ong's Filipino nationalitywhen he turned21. There are cases which define "election"as both a formal and an informal process.In the case of In Re Mallare, the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the partici pation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Phil. citizenship. In this case, Ong did not merely exercise his right of suffrage.He has establishedhis life here in the Phil. Ong was born in the rural town of Samar where there are no alien enclavesand n o racial distinctions.

The resp. has lived the life of a Filipino since birth. His father applied for naturalizationwhen the child was still a small boy. Ong has worked in a sensitive position in a governmentagency. His profession (CPA) requires citizenship for taking the examinations and getting a license. He has participated in political exercises as a Filipino and has always consideredhimself a Filipino.There is nothing to indicate any tinge of alienness. The mass of voters of N. Samar are fully aware of Ong's parentage.They voted by overwhelmingnumbersto have him representthem in C ongress.B ecauseof his acts since childhood,they have consideredhim a Filipino . The HRET had an interestingview as to how Ong elected citizenship.It observedthat "when Ong was only nine years old, his father becamea naturalizedFilipino.Sec. 15 of the RevisedNaturalizationAct squarely applies its benefit to him for he was then a minor residing in the country. Concededly,it was the law itself that had already elected Phil. citizenshipfor O ng by declaringhim as such. The petitionerscontendthat Ong's father was not validly naturalizedbecauseof his prematuretaking of the oath of citizenship.The petitionersquestion the citizenshipof Ong's father through a collateralapproach. This cannot be done. In our jurisdiction,an attack on a person'scitizenshipmay only be done through a direct action for its nullity. MRM. xxx The filing of a sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirementfor those who still have to elect citizenship. FOR THOSE ALREADY FILIPINOS when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberatechoice which cannot be less binding.Any election of Philippinecitizenshipon the part of private re spondentOng would not only have been superfluous would also have resultedin absurdityconsidering but that it was the law itself that had alreadyelectedPhilippinecitizenshipfor him. Dissenting : Ong is not a naturalborn Filipino citizen, he having been born a Chinese citizen by virtue of the Chinese citizenshipof his father at the time of his birth. Under the 1935 Constitutionwhich was in force at the time of Ong's birth, only those whose fathers were citizens of the Philippineswere consideredFilipino citizens. Those whose motherswere citizensof the Philippineshad to elect Philippinecitizenshipupon reachingthe age of majority,in order to be consideredFilipino citizens . c. Natural orn citizen b s Art. IV, Section 2. Natural orn citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippinesfrom birth b without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippinecitizenshipin accordancewith paragraph(3), Section1 hereof shall be deemednatural orn b citizens .

The provision granting naturalb orn status even to those who were born of Filipino mothers before 17 January1973 but electedPhilippinecitizenshipafter that date is meant to correctthe anomaloussituationwhere one born under similar circumstancesbut made the election before 17 January 1973 is granted the status of naturalb orn citizen by the 1973 Constitution.Simply because there was no definition of a naturalb orn citizen under the 1935 Constitution,that one who made the election after the effectivityof the 1973 Constitutionwas

not conferredsuch status. The definitionof a natural orn citizen under the 1973 C onstitution,therefore b m ade a child of Filipino mother and alien father's right depends on the fleeting accident of time, and resulted in two kinds of citizensm ade up of essentiallythe sam e m em bers . At the same tim e, however,those w ho elected prior to 17 January1973 could not be placed in the sam e footing as those who made the electionafter that date, becausethe former already had a "vested right" to their citizenshipw hich could not be dim inishedby the 1973 Constitution . The remedyis to place the latter in the same footing as the former. Thus, under the 1987 Constitution, this accidentalanom alyno longer exists. To illustrate: If X was born and elected before 17 January 1973, his status under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions is that of a naturalborn citizen, because although he had to perform an act to perfect his citi zenship,he could not otherwisebe classifiedsince there was no definitionof natural orn citizens in the 1935 b Constitution . If X was born beforeand electedafter 17 January1973, whetherbefore or after 2 February1987, he was not a natural orn citizen under the 1973 Constitution. If not for the proviso in the 1987 Constitution,he would b not have been deemednatural born citizeneither . In turn the definitionof "natural orn citizen" as one who is such from (not at) birth (continuouslyup to b the time his citizenship is questioned), was raised about the citizenship of Quezon, et. al., under the 1935 Constitution . Having the status of a natural orn citizen is importantfor the purposeof certain politicaland economic b rights open only to such citizens . a) Political: Qualificationto run for the following posts:

Who must be naturalborn citizens : (1) President (2) Vice(4) President Justicesof the SC and lower collegiatecourts (5) Om Congress and (3) Membersof budsman his deputies

Art. VII, Sec. 2 Art. VII, Sec. 3 Art. VI, Secs. 3 and 6

(7) Membersof the Central MonetaryAuthority (6) Constitutional Commission s (8) Membersof the CHR (Commissionon Human Rights) Art. XIII, Sec. 17(2)

Art. VIII, Sec. 7(1) Art. IX, B, Sec. 1 (1) Art. IX, D, Sec. 1(1)

Art. XI, Sec. 8 Art. IX, C, Sec. 1(1) Art, XII, Sec. 20

Form ernatural orn citizensas transfereesof private b lands. b) Economi c Art. XII, Sec. 8 xxx [A]naturalborn citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citize n sh ip ay still b e a tra n sferee f p riva telan d s , m o su b jec tto lim ita tio n s ro v id e db y law . p

The followingare natural orn citizens b : 1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution (as of 2 February1987). a) Thosewho are citizensunder the Treatyof Paris , Under Art. 9 of the Treaty of Paris, the civil and poli tical status of the inhabitantsof the Philippineswas to be determined the US Congress by . Pursuant to this provision in the treaty, the US Congress passed the Philippine Bill of 1 July 1902 Section 4 of which defined who the citizens of the Philippine s were: "The inhabitantsof the Philippinesresiding therein who were subjects of Spain on 11 April 1899, and continuingto reside therein,as well as their childrenborn su bsequentthereto. " The cutoff date of 11 April 1899 was the date of "ex . change of instrumentsof ratification"betweenthe US Senateand Spain,or the date of ratificationof the Treaty In Paris. Commissioner Custom of s of Roa v The peninsulares were given a period of 18 months to indicateif they chooseFilipinoor Spanishcitizen In Paz Chua vtheir electionLaborthe CFI. ship, by filing Secretaryof with This same provisionwas reembodiedin the Jones L aw of 29 August1916.

b) Those declaredcitizensby judicialdeclaratio n applyingthe jus soli principle,before the 1957 case of Tio Tiam v Republi c (1912), during the regime of the PhilippineBill of 1902, Roa, who was born in the Philippinesin 1889 by a Chinesefather an d Filipino mother, was declaredby the court to be a citizen by jus soli. (1939),during the regimeof the 1935 Constitution, Paz Chua who was born in Tarlac in 1914 of Chinese father and Filipino mothe r, was not declared a citizen. The SC held, without alludingto the Roa case, that the jus soli was never adopted in the Philippines .

In Torres v Tan Chim (1940), Tan, who was in the Philippines in 1893 of Chinese father and Filipino mother, was declared a citizen. Accordingto J. Laurel, the principle of jus soli still applied. The 1934 Concon was aware of the Roa ruling and did not intend to overrule it. In Tan Chong v Secretary of Labor and Lam Swee Sang v Secretaryof Labor (1947), a case decided during the regime of the Republicupon a motion for reconsiderationof a prewar decision,Tan, who was born in 1915, and Lam, who was born in 1900, both in the Philippines,of Chinese father and Filipino mother, were not declared citizens. According to J. Padilla, the 1935 Constitution never adopted the jus soli principle; the m ere fact of birth in the Philippinesdoes not confer citizenshipon a person . In Talaroc v Uy (1950), consideringhis service during the war and his having been elected mayor in Misamis,was declaredby the SC a citizen "simply due to birth", withoutmentionof jus soli or jus sanguinis . Finally, in Tio Tam v Republic (1957), the SC tried to resolve the flipflop rulings by stating that we follow only jus sanguinisbut that those who were judiciallydeclaredcitizens on the basis of jus soli prior to this case would be consideredcitizens. This is the final word on the matter . It would be worthy to note that the flipflop in decision can be explained by the date of birth of the applicantin each case. Those born before 11 April 1899 were the ones to whom jus soli was applied,for they very well were citizensunder the Treaty of Paris.

c) Those who were naturalized in accordance with law. (Act. No. 2927 of the Philippine Com mission) .

d) Thosewho were citizensunderthe 1935 Constitution . 1) Those who were citizensat the time of adoptionof the Constitution(15 November1935, the date of the inaugurationof the Commonwealth government) . 2) Those born in the Philippinesof foreign parent,who before the adoptionof the Constitutionhad been elected to public office in the Philippines . This is the socalled "Caram rule in honor of Caram, a Syrian, elected to the 1934 Constitutional Convention.The rule was adoptedto avoid the absurdityof the situation . The rule only appliesto electivepositions,not appointiveones. , the SC held that if one is considered a citizen under the Caram rule, his childrenwould also be consideredcitizens,but underthe third category(those whosefathersare citizens ) 3) Thosewhosefathersare citizensof the Philippines . In Chiongbian v de Leon

4) Those whose mothersare citizens of the Philippinesand, upon, reachingthe age of majority,elected Philippinecitizenship . It was only beginning17 January1973 when childrenof Filipino mothersbecamecitizenswithoutneed of election. Children born before this date of Filipino mother and alien fathers had an "inchoate citizenship" un til th ey e lectedup on rea chin g21 yea rs. 5) Those naturalizedin accordancew ith law. e) T h o sew h o a re c itizen su n d e rth e 19 73 C o n s titu tio .n 1) Those w ho are citizensas of 17 January1973, the date of effectivityof the 1973 C onstitution . 2) Thosewhosefathersor mothersare citizensof the Philippines. That is, those born on or after 17 January1973 of Filipinofather or Filipinomother . 3) Those who electedPhilippinecitizenshippursuantto the 1935 Constitution That is, those born before 17 January 1973 of Filipino mothers but reached the age of majority and electedPhilippinecitizenshipon or after 17 January1973. Note that if one was born, reached the age of majority and elected Philippine citizenship before 17 January 1973, then he would be a citizen under e1 (those who are citizens at the adoption of the 1973 Constitution) . On the other hand, if one was born, reached 21 years, but did not or failed to elect before 17 January 1973, then he lost his citizenshipthen. 4) Thosewho are naturalizedin accordance with law.

2.) Those born of Filipinofathersor Filipinomothers(after 17 January1973) .

3.) Thoseborn before17 January1973 of Filipinomotherswho elect Philippinecitizenshipupon reaching the age of majority . This case arose under the 1935 Constitution,childrenof Filipino mothersdid not automaticallybecome citizens. They had an "inchoate citizenship"during their minority, and became fullpledged citizens only upon electionat the age of majority .

Beginning with the 1973 Constitution, however, children of Filipino mothers automatically became citizens. This provisionthen covers those children born, before the effectivityof the 1973 Constitution . By January 17, 1994, this provision would have no application anymore, since the last of those born be fo re 17 Jan uary1 97 3 w o uld ha ve rea ch edthe a ge o f m ajo rityby th en.

Case A: A Filipino woman married B, an Americanin 1961. The marriagemade A an Americancitizen (which under CA 63, stripped her of her Philippinecitizenship,the marriagehaving been celebratedbefore 17 January 1973). A and B lived in the US since then and in 1962, begot C, who was automaticallyan American citizen by jus soli and jus sanguinis . Republi and Villahermosa v can he elect Philippine citizenship? Yes, according to obiters in c In 1983, when C turns 21, CID uv , in order to elect Philippine citizenship, at least for election purposes, it is enough that (1) the person's mother was a Filipino at the time of her marriage to the alien father, even if she subsequently lose her citizenshipby virtue of the marriageand (2) the person be a child of that marriage,for him to elect Philippinecitizenship . If C wants to run for Congress,is he considereda natural born Filipino? Under the 1973 Constitution, no. But underthe 1987 Constitution, yes. Note that if he were born after 17 January1973,the child would not even be a Filipino. d. NaturalizedCitizens , RevisedNaturalizationLaw (Com. Act No. 473, effective June 17, 1939. ) 4.) Those who are naturalizedin accordancewith law. (namely CA 473, Revised NaturalizationLaw) (Art. IV, Sec.1 (4)) Qualification s Who are qualifiedto be naturalize d A. Age (Sec. 2, CA 473) C

1) He mustnot be less than 21 yearsold at the date of hearing . Barlongay: When the law uses the phase "age of majority,"use 18 years old, but not when it uses the phrase"not less than 21 yearsold. B. Residenc e

2) H e m ust have residedin the P hilippinesfor a continuousperiod of not less than ten years.

C . C ha ra cte r 3.) He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underly ing the Philippine Constitution, and must have conducted himself in an irreproachable conduct during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted governmentas well as wit h the community in which he is living. D. Propert y 4.) He must own real estate in the Philippinesworth not less than P5,000 or must have some known lucrativetrade, professionor law ful occupation . (Test: Can he supporthimselfand his family? ) E. Educatio n off v Republi . c 5.) Must be able to speak and write (not read and write) Filipino or English, and a principal dialect (as pro tanto modified by the 1987 Constitution,since the law itself spoke of English or Spani sh, and a principal dialect). Thus,a deaf and m ute is disqualified,Orest

Art. XIV, Sec. 7. For purposesof communicationand instruction,the official languagesof the Philippinesare Filipino and, until otherwiseprovided by law, English. The regionall anguagesare the auxiliaryofficiallanguages the regionsand shallserveas auxiliarym ediaof instructio in n therein.xxx 6.) He must have enrolled his minor children of school age in any of the public schools or private schools recognizedby the Bureau of Private Schools of the Philippines,where Philippinehi story, government and civics are taught or prescribedas part of the school curriculum,during the entire period of the residencein the Philippinesrequiredof him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalizationas Philippi ne citizen.

W henis the tenyear residencerequirement reducedto five (5) years ? Com. Act No. 473, sec. 3.

Sec. 3. Specialqualifications The Ten years of continuousresidencerequiredunder the . second conditionof the last precedingsection shall be understoodas reduced to five years for any petitionerhaving any of the following qualifications: (1) Having honorably held office under the Government of the Philippines or under that of any of the provinces, cities, municipalities, or political subdivisions. (which was allowed before by the 1 935 Constitution, no distinctionwhetherappointiveor elective posts. ) es. . (2) Having establisheda new industry or introduceda useful invention in the Philippin (3) Being married to a Filipino woman

If it were an alien woman who married a Filipino man, she would only need an administrative proceedingfor the cancellationof her Alien Certificateof Registration,upon proof of marriageand accordingto the holding in Moy Yam Lim, proof of nondisqualification.These are the only requirementsbecauseipso facto, she becam ea Filipino herselfby m arriage .
(4) Having been engaged as a teacher in the Philippines in a public or recognized private school not established for the exclusive instruction of children of persons of a particular nationality or race, in any of the branchesof educationor industry for a period of not less than two years. (5) Having been born in the Philippines .

W ho are disqualifiedto be naturalized ? CA 473, Sec. 4 The applicantmust not only possessthe qualifications, must not have any of the disqualifications he set by law.
Section 4. Who are disqualified The following cannot be naturalizedas Philippinecitizens: . (a) Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrinesopposingall organizedgovernments ; (b) Persons defendingor teaching the necessityor proprietyof violence,personalassault, or assassination for the successand predominanceof their ideas; (c) Polygamists,or believersin the practiceof polygamy; (d) Persons convictedof a crime involvingmoral turpitude .

(Moral turpitude involves dishonesty,depravity. A propensity to break the law, even just traffic laws, constitutemoral depravity. While murder being a crime of passion does not involve moral turpitude,theft and estafado.)
(e) Persons suffering from mental alienationor incurablecontagiousdisease; (f) Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially with Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos; (g) Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the Philippinesis at war, during the period of such war; (h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalizedcitizens or subjects thereof.

Declarationof Intention Com. Act No. 473, sec. 5.

Sec. 5. Declaration of intention. One year prior to the filing of his petition for admission to Philippine citizenship, the applicant for Philippine citizenship shall file with the Office of the SolicitorGeneral, a declaration under oath that it is bona fide his intention to become a citizen of the Philippines. Such declaration shall set forth

the name, age, occupation, personal description, place of birth, last foreign residence and allegiance, the date of arrival, the name of the vessel or aircraft, if any, in which he came to the Philippines, and the place of residence in the Philippines at the time of making the declaration. No declaration shall be valid until lawful entry for permanent residencehas been establishedand a certificateshowing the date, place, and manner of his arrival has been issued. The declarant must also state that he has enrolled his minor children, if any, in any of the public schools or private schools recognized by the Bureau of Private Schools of the Philippines, where Philippine history, government and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen. Each declarant must furnish two photographsfor himself. Section 6. Persons exempt from requirement to make a declaration of intention. Persons born in the Philippines and have received their primary and secondary education in public schools or those recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or nationality, and those who have resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of thirty years or more before filing their application, may be naturalized without having to make a declaration of intention upon complying with the other requirements of this Act. To such requirements shall be added that which establishesthat the applicant has given primary and secondary education to all his children in the public schools or in private schools recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or nationality. The same shall be understoodapplicable with respect to the widow and minor children of an alien who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the Philippines,and dies before he is actually naturalized .

If one who is not exempted, fails to file, or files an invalid declaration of intention, he can be denaturalized anytimethroughdenaturalization proceedings .

Procedure Com. Act. No. 473, Secs.712

Section 7. Petition for citizenship Any person desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship shall file with the . competent court, a petition in triplicate, accompanied by two photographs of the petitioner, setting forth his name and surname; his present and former places of residence; his occupation; the place and date of his birth; whether single or married and the father of children, the name, age, birthplace and residence of the wife and of each of the children; the approximate date of his or her arrival in the Philippines, the name of the port of debarkation, and, if he remembers it, the name of the ship on which he came; a declaration that he has the qualifications required by this Act, specifying the same, and that he is not disqualified for naturalizationunder the provisions of this Act; that he has complied with the requirements of section five of this Act; and that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship. The petition must be signed by the applicant in his own handwriting and be supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons, stating that they are citizens of the Philippinesand personallyknow the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by this Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable,and that said petitioner has in their opinion all the qualificationsnecessary to become citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of this Act. The petition shall also set forth the names and postoffice addresses of such witnesses as the petitioner may desire to introduce at the hearing of the case. The certificate of arrival, and the declarationof intention must be made part of the petition.

Section. 8. Competent court. The Court of First Instance of the province in which the petitioner has resided at least one year immediatelypreceding the filing of the petition shall have exclusive original jurisdictionto hear the petition. Section 9. Notification and appearance. Immediately upon the filing of a petition, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the court to publish the same at petitioner's expense, once a week for three consecutive weeks, in the Official Gazette, and in one of the newspapers of general circulation in the province where the petitioner resides, and to have copies of said petitionand a generalnotice of the hearingposted in a public and conspicuous place in his office or in the building where said office is located, setting forth in such notice the name, birthplace and residence of the petitioner,the date and place of his arrival in the Philippines,the names of the witnesses whom the petitioner proposes to introduce in support of his petition, and the date of the hearing of the petition, which hearing shall not be held within ninety days from the date of the last publication of the notice. The clerk shall, as soon as possible, forward copies of the petition, the sentence, the naturalization certificate, and other pertinent data to the Office of the President, the Office of the SolicitorGeneral, the Provincial Commander of the Philippine National Police of the province and the municipal judge of the municipalitywherein the petitioner resides. Section. 10. Hearing of the petition. No petition shall be heard within the thirty (30) days preceding any election. The hearing shall be public, and the SolicitorGeneral, either himself or through his delegate or the provincial fiscal concerned, shall appear on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines at all the proceedings and at the hearing. If, after the hearing, the court believes, in view of the evidence taken, that the petitioner has all the qualificationsrequired by, and none of the disqualificationsspecified in this Act and has compliedwith all requisites herein established, it shall order the proper naturalization certificate to be issued and the registration of the said naturalization certificate in the proper civil registry as required in section ten of Act Numbered Theree thousand seven hundred fiftythree. Section 11. Appeal. The final sentence may, at the instance of either of the parties, be appealed to the Supreme Court. Section 12. Issuance of the Certificate of Naturalization. If, after the lapse of thirty days from and after the date on which the parties were notified of the decision of the Court, no appeal has been filed, or if, upon appeal, the decision of the court has been confirmed by the Supreme Court, and the said decision has become final, the clerk of the court which heard the petition shall issue to the petitioner a naturalization certificate which shall, among other things, state the following: The file number of the petition, the number of the naturalization certificate, the signature of the person naturalized affixed in the presence of the clerk of the court, the personal circumstancesof the person naturalized,the dates on which his declarationof intention and petition were filed, the date of the decision granting the petition, and the name of the judge who rendered the decision. A photograph of the petitioner with the dry seal affixed thereto of the court which granted the petition, must be affixed to the certificate. Before the naturalizationcertificateis issued, the petitionershall, in open court, take the following oath: "I_________________________________, solemnly swear that I renounce absolutely and forever all allegianc and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate state or sovereignt and particularly to the e , y ___________________________ of which at this time I am a subject or citizen; that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and that I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly

constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservationor purpose of evasion . So help me God."

a. Declarationof intentionfiled with the OSG one year before actual application . b. Filing of petition for naturalization with the RTC of the province in which the applicant is a resident for at leastone year . c. Hearing,except within 30 days before an election. The State is representedby the SolicitorG eneralor by the fiscal in his behalf. Tw o w itnessesto testify on the characterof the applicantare presented . d. Decision. Appeal of the decisionof the RTC may be made to SC, pursuantto RA 530, amendingSec. 17 of the JudiciaryAct of 1948. (UnderBP 129, appealis to the CA). e. Decision becomes final but not executory, thirty (30) days after notice of the decision is received by the parties. The notice of the decisionmust be receivedby the OSG; copy furnishedto the fiscal is not sufficientto start the runningof the 30day period. A favorable decision becomes executory only after 2 years from the finality of the decision. It shall become executoryonly after the period of 2 years during which the petitionershall continue to be under probation,as it were, so the government can be doubly sure he is entitled to be naturalized as a citizen of the Philippines. (RepublicAct 530, Section 1) f. Summaryhearingafter two years, which is really a continuationof the previousproceedings, prove that: to i) He did not leave RP during the 2year period of probation ; ii) He devoted himself to lawful calling; iii) He was not convictedof any offense of violationof governmentrules. iv) He did not commit an act prejudicial to national interest or inimical to a government announced policy. g. Oath beforethe RTC. h. Issuance of a Certificate of Naturalization issued by the Court. (Only a certification is given because the decisiontwo years beforehas grantedhim his citizenship. ) i. Cancellationof ACR before the Commissioner Immigrationand Deportation of . (Sec.15)

"DerivativeNaturalization "

" xxx Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might

herself be lawfully naturalized,shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines. "

Note : In its latest pronouncement this question,the SC held that the c on lause "who might herself be lawfully naturalized"should be interpreted to mean only that the alien woman m ust not be laboring under any of the disqualifications prescribed by law. Moreover, she can esta blish her claim to Philippine citizenship in administrativeproceedingsbefore the immigrationauthoritiesonly and wi ll not have to file a judicial action for this p urpo se. S h e is no long erreq uiredto p ro ve tha t she po sse ssesth e q ua lificatio ns na turaliza tion for . W hen decisionexecutor y RepublicAct N o. 530, sec. 1
Sec. 1. The provisionsof existing laws notwithstanding, petition f no or Philippinecitizenshipshall be heard by the courts until after six months from the publication of the application r equired by law, nor shall any decision granting the application become executory until after two years from its promulgation and after the court, on proper hearing, with the attendance of the Solicitor General or his represe ntative, is satisfied, and so finds, that during the interveningtime the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines,(2) h as dedicated himself continuouslyto a lawful calling or profession, (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules, (4) or committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or co ntrary to any Government announced policies.

Effect on wife and minor children Com. Act No. 473, sec. 15.
Section 15. Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalizedshall be deemed a citizen of the Philippi nes. Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall be consideredcitizensthereof . A foreign born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the ti me of the naturalization of the parent, shall automatically become a Philippine citizen and a foreignborn minor chil d, who is not in the Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only dur ing his minority, unless he begins to

reside permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after becomingof age. A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parents, shall be considered a Philippine citizen, unless within one year after reaching the age of maj ority, he fails to register himself as a Philippine citizen at the Philippine Consulate of the country where he resid es, and to take the necessary oath of allegiance.

Effect of Naturalizationon the Wife If the wife is (i) legally married to the naturalizedhusband, and (ii ) she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications in Sec. 4, she is entitled to be declared a citizen as well. What is required is only an administrativeproceedingbefore the CID for the cancellationof her ACR on the ground that her husband has

be en recen tlyna turalize d . According to Moya Lim Yao (41 SCRA 292) ruling, sh e need not prove the quali fications,but only that she is not disqualified. The proceedingsm ay ev en be with the Departme nt of N aturalResourcesi n relation to a grant of concessionrequi ring citizenship,w here th e w ife proves that her hu sband has becom ea Fili pino.

Effect of Naturalizationon the Children I. If the child is of age, no effect. II. If the child is a minor: A. If born in RP automatic ally becomesa citizen upo n the naturalization t of he father . B. If born abroad 1. If before the naturalizati on of the father . a. If residingin RP at the ti me of naturalization auto maticallybecomesa citize n. b. If not r esiding in RP at the tim e of naturalization consi dered citizen only durin g his minority,unless he takes p ermanentresidencein RP before reachingmajoritya

ge. In other words,he con tinues to be a Filipinoafter reachi ng 18 years old only if he d ecidesto reside here perm anentlybeforereachingth at age. 2. If after the natu ralizationof the father Co nsideredcitizen on the co ndition that upon reaching the age of majority,he takes an oath of allegiancein th e Philippineconsulateof t he place where he may b e. If he fails to register his intent t o continue as Filipino with in one (1) year upon reac hing 21 years, he ceases to be a Filipino citizen. Denaturalization Com.Act No. 473, Sec. 18
Section 18. Cancel lation of naturalizationcerti ficate issued. Upon motion made in the proper proceed ings by the Solicitor General or his representative,or by th e proper provincial fiscal, t he competentjudge may ca ncel the naturalizationcertificate iss ued and its registrationin t he Civil Registry: (a) If it is shown th at said naturalizationcertifi cate was obtained fraudule ntly or illegally; (b) If the person n aturalized shall, within the five years next following t he issuance of said natura lization certificate, return to his na tive country or to some for eign country and establish

his permanent residence t here: Provided, that the fact of t he person naturalized re maining for more than on e year in his native countr y or the country of his former nati onality, or two years in an y other foreign country, s hall be considered as pri ma facie evidence of his intention of taking up permanentreside nce in the same; (c) If the petition w as made on an invalid decla ration of intention; (d) If it is shown that the minor children of the person naturalized fai led to graduate from a pu blic or private high schools reco gnized by the Bureau of P rivate Schools of the Phili ppines, where Philippine history,

government and civics are taught as part of the school curriculum through the fault of their parents either by neglecting to support them or by transferring them to another school or schools. A certified copy of the decree cancelling the naturalization certificate shall be forwarded by the clerk of the Court to the Office of the President and the SolicitorGeneral;

N o t w h en th ey drop pedou t b ecau seo f sch ola s ticperform ane c

(e) If it is shown that the naturalized citizen has allowed himself to be used as a dummy in violation of the Constitutionalor legal provision requiring Philippine citizenship,as a requisite for the exercise, use or enjoymentof a right, franchise or privilege.

Procedure : Filed by the SolicitorGeneralbefore the same RTC that grantedhis naturalization, regardlessof where he may be residingat that time.

BARLONGAY CASE: Republicvs. Li Yao F: (214 SCRA 748)

Fifteen (15) years after Li Yao was conferred with Filipino citizenship by naturalization, the Republic sought the cancellation thereof on the grounds of: 1) not being of good moral character by having amorous relations with women; 2) not having conducted himself in an irreproachable manner in dealing with the duly constituted authorities by using names other than that authorized, by resorting to tax evasion and violating the AntiDummy Law. The trial court relying solely on the ground of evasion of the payment of lawful taxes by underdeclaration of income as reflected in his income tax return for 194651, cancelled his naturalization.Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:W/n the cancellationof Li Yao's naturalizationwas valid. RULING:Yes. A certificateof naturalizationmay be cancelledif it is subsequentlydiscoveredthat the applicant obtained it by misleading the court upon any material fact. Law and jurisprudence even authorize the cancellationof a certificateof naturalizationupon groundsor conditionswhich arise subsequentto the granting of the certificateof naturalization. Moreover,a naturalizationproceedingis not a judicialadversaryproceeding, the decision rendered therein not constituting res judicata as to any matter that would support a judgement cancellinga certificateof naturalizationon the ground of illegal or fraudulentprocurementthereof . The concealment applicant'sincometo evade paymentof lawful taxes shows that his moral character of is not irreproachable, thus disqualifyinghim for naturalization . A tax amnesty only relieves him from any civil, criminal or administrative liability insofar as his tax case is concerned.It does not have the effect of obliteratinghis lack of good moral characterand irreproachable conductwhich are groundsfor denaturalization.MRM.

3. L o s s a n d R eac q u isitio n f C itize n sh o ip Article IV, Sec. 3. P hilippine citizenshipm ay be lost or reacquiredi n the m annerprovidedby law . (referring to CA 63.) A rticle IV , S ec. 4. C itizen sof the P hilippinesw h o m arry aliens shall retain th eir citizensh ip, unless b y th eir ac t o r o m iss io nth e y a re d eem ed , u n d e rth e la w (C A 6 3) to h ave re n o u n ce d it.
CommmonwealthAct 63 Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. A F ilipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events: (1) By naturalization in a foreign cou ntry; (2) By express renunciationof citizen ship or expatriation ; (3) By subscribing to an oath of all egiance to support the Constitution or laws o f a foreign country upon reaching the age of majority; Provided, howe ver, That a Filipino may not divest himself of Philippine citizenship in any manner while the Philippines is at war wi th any country; (4) By rendering service to or acce pting commission in the armed forces of a fo reign country: Provided, That the renderingof service to, or the accept ance of such commissionin, the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident th ereto, with the consent of the Philippines, sh all not divest a Filipino of his Philippinecitizenshipif either of the ff. cir cumstancesis present: (a) The Philippines has a defensive a nd/or offensive pact of alliance with the said foreign country; or (b) The said foreign country mainta ins armed forces in the Philippine territory

with the consent of the Philippines; Provided that th e Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of re ndering said service or acceptance of said commissi on, and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only in connection wi th his service to said foreign country: And provided finally, That any Filipino citizen who is ren dering service to, or is commissioned in, t he armed forces of a foreign country under any of the c ircumstancesmentioned in paragraph (a) or ( b) shall not be permitted to participate nor vote in an y election of the Philippines during the perio d of his service to, or commissionin, the armed force s of said foreign country. Upon his discharge from the service of the said foreign country, he shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyme nt of his civil and political rights as a Filipino citizen; (5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization ; (6) By having been declared by com petent authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, plenary pardon or a amnestyhas been granted ; (7) In case of a woman, upon her ma rriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws i n force in her husband's country, she acquires his nationality.[This is now qualified by Art. IV, Sec. 4. Citizens of th e Philippineswho marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unles s by their act or omission they are deeme d, under the law, to have renounced it.] The provisions of this section notw ithstanding, the acquisition of citizenship b y a natural born Filipino citizen from one of the Iberian and any friend ly democratic IberoAmerican countries or fr om the United Kingdom

shall not produce loss or forfeitureof his Philippinecitizenshipif the law of that country grants the same privilege to its citizens and such had been agreed upon by treaty between the Philippines and the foreign country from which citizenshipis acquired .

a . L o s s o f C itize n s hp i G rounds : (1) Naturalizationin a foreign country [CA 63, Sec. 1(1)]

) Frivaldo v COMELEC(174 SCRA 245) (1989 F:

Frivaldo was elected as governor of Sorsogon. The League of Municipalities filed a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo's election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the US in 1983. He admitted such but raised as a defense that he did so to protect himself from Marcos and that his naturalization as an American citizen was not impressed with voluntariness but was obtained only for reasons of convenience. The League argued that since Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election, he was not qualified to run for governor. Frivaldo countered that his oath in his certificate of candidacy that he was a natural born citizen should be a sufficient act of repatriation. Additionally, his active participation in the 1987 elections had divested him of his US citizenship under the laws of the US.

HELD: Frivaldoclaims he has reacquiredPhilippinecitizenshipby virtue of a valid repatriation. He claims that by actively participatingin the elections,he automaticallyforfeited Americancitizenshipunder US laws. Such laws do not concernus. Such forfeitureis betweenhim and the US as his adoptedcountry. It should be obvious that even if he did lose his naturalizedAmericancitizenship,such forfeituredid not and could not have the effect of automaticallyrestoring his citizenshipin the Philippinesthat he had earlier renounced. At best, what might have happened a resultof the loss of his naturalized as citizenship was that he becam ea statelessindividual . Mere filing of certificate of candidacy is not a sufficient act of repatriation. Repatriation requires an express and equivocalact. Frivaldo'sclaim that he could not have repatriatedhimself under LOI 270 bec. the SpecialCommitteeprovidedfor therein had not yet been constitutedseemsto suggestthat the lack of that body renderedhis repatriationunnecessary. That is farfetched if not specious. Such a conclusionwould open the floodgates, as it were. It would allow all Filipinos who have renounced this country to claim back their abandonedcitizenshipw/o formallyrejectingtheir adoptedstate and reaffirmingtheir allegianceto the Phils. It does not appear that Frivaldohas taken these categoricalacts. He contendsthat by simply filing his certificate of candidacy he had, w/o more, already effectively recovered Phil. citizenship. But that is hardly the formal declarationthe law envisions surely, Phil. citizenshippreviouslydisownedis not that cheaply recovered. If the SpecialCommitteehad not yet been convened,what it meant simply was that the petitionerhad to wait until this was done, or seek naturalization legislativeor judicialproceedings.Adapted by .

Labo vs COMELE C

(176 SCRA 1)

F:

Ramon Labo, Jr. married an Australian citizen in the Phils. He was granted Australian citizenship . He took an oath of allegiance renouncing all other allegiance, etc. Though the marriage was declared void for being bigamous, Labo was, according to the records still an Australian citizen. In the 1988 local elections, Labo ran for mayor of Baguio. His Filipino citizenship was questioned on the ground that he had acquired Australian citizenship through his marriage to an Australian citizen and his taking an oath of allegiance to Australia where he renounced all other allegiance to other countries. Labo claimed that (1) his marriage did not automatically divest him of his Filipino citizenship and that (2) his naturalization in Australia made him at worst only a dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship.

HELD: Labo's first contentionis irrelevant. He becamean Australiancitizen by virtue of naturalizationand not by m arriage . The second argument is specious w/c cannot stand against the clear provisions of CA No. 63, w/c enumeratesthe modes by w/c Phil. citizenshipmay be lost, and among them are (1) naturalizationin a foreign country; (2) express renunciationof citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Consti. or laws of a foreign country, all of w/c are applicable to petitioner. Under Article IV, Section 5, "dual allegianceof citizen is inimicalto the nationalinterestand shall be dealt with by law." xxx Even if it be assumedthat, as petitionerasserts,his naturalizationwas annulled after it was found that his marriagewas bigamous,that circumstancealone did not automaticallyrestore his Phil. citizenship. His divestitureof Australiancitizenshipdoes not concern us here. That is a matter between him and his adopted country. What we must consideris the fact that he voluntarilyand freely rejected Phil. citizenshipand willingly and knowinglyembracedthe citizenshipof anothercountry. The possibilitythat he may have been subsequently rejectedby Australiadoes not meanthat he has been automatically reinstatedas a Phil. citizen Phil. citizenshipmay be reacquiredby direct act of congress,by naturalization by repatriation. It does or not appearthat petitionerhas reacquiredPhil. citizenshipby any of these methods. Adapted .

Labo v. COMELE C (211 SCRA297, July 1992 ) F:

Labo ran for mayor of Baguio in the May 11, 1992 elections. His opponent, Ortega, questioned his citizenship before the Comelec, relying on Labo v. Comelec (179 SCRA 1, 1989) which declared Labo not a citizen of the Philippines.

HELD: 1. Labo, not being a Filipino citizen, lacks the fundamental qualification for the contested office. Philippinecitizenshipis an indispensable requirement holdingan electiveoffice. The fact that he was elected for by the majorityof the electorateis of no moment. As held in Fivaldo vs. COMELEC ,
"xxx The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. xxx "

xxx Petitioner claims that he has reacquired his Filipino citizenship by citing his application for reacquisitionof Phil. citizenship filed before the Office of the SolGen. pursuant to PD 725 and LOI 270. To date, however,the SpecialCommitteeon Naturalization had not yet acted upon said application. In the absence of any official action or approvalby proper authorities,a mere applicationfor repatriationdoes not, and cannot,

amount to an autom aticreacquistionof the applicant'sPhil. citizen ship.

2. The disqualification of Labo does not necessarily entitle Ortega as the candidate with the next highest number of votes to proclamation as mayor. The ineligibility of a candidate receiving m ajority vote does not entitle the eligible candidatereceivingthe next highestnumberof votes to be declaredelected . 3. The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in f act & in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible can didate. In such case, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity a nd efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case, the eli gible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected. Adapted . This overrulesHaw v Governmen t

Expatriationis a constitutionalright (Go Gullian v Governmen t (2) Expressrenunciationor Expatriation[CA 63, Sec 1(2)] Yu v Defensor held that renunciationcould be implied S o , where the SC antiag . F: No one can be compelledto remain a ). Filipino if he does not want to.

(169 SCRA 364)

Yu foregoing a Portuguese passport in 1971, valid an express renunciation of petitioner's Philippine HELD: Thewas issued acts considered together constitutefor five years and renewed for the same period upon In Board of Immigration Commissioner vs Go Gallano citizenship acquired through naturalization. presentment before the proper Portuguese consular officer. Despite his natur alization as a Philippine citizen in 1978, he

applied for and was issued a Portuguese passport in 1981. While still a citizen of the Philippines who had renounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any fore ign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty" and pledged to "maintain true faith and allegiance to the Philippines," he declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercialdocuments he signed.

, express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication. Yu, with full knowledge and legal capacit y, after having renounced Portuguese

citizenshipupon naturalizationas a Philippinecitizen resumed or reac quired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen,applied for a renewalof his Portuguesepassportand represent ed himselfas such in official documents even after he had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resu mption or reacquisitionof Portuguese citizenshipis grossly inconsistentwith his maintenanceof Philippineciti zenship . Dissenting: The mere use of a foreign passport is not ipso facto expr ess renunciation of Filipino citizenship. Whatevermay be the reasonsfor doing so, it must be ascertainedin a c ourt of law where a full trial is conducted insteadof an administrative determination a most summarynature(as of in this case). Adapted .

Aznar v Osmena,COMELE , 185 SCRA 703 (May 1990) C F:

Emelito Osmena ran for Governor of Cebu in the Jan. 18, 1988 elections. Aznar as Cebu Ch airman of LDPLaban filed with COMELEC a petition fo r the disqualification of Osmena on the ground that he is allegedl y not a Filipino citizen, being a US citizen, as evidenced by Osmena's application for alien , his alien certificate of registratio n, permit to reenter the Phils, immigration certificate of clearance etc. Osmena on the other hand maintained that he is a Fil citizen, alleging that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio Osmena, that he is a holder of a valid Phil passport, th at he has been continuously residing in the Phils since birth & has not gone out of t he country for more than 6 month s and that he has been a registeredvoter in the Phils since 1965. The Comelecdecidedf or Osmena .

HELD: 1. In the proceedings before the COMELEC,the pet failed to presentdirect proof th at private resp had lost his Filipino citizenshipby any of the modes provided for under CA #63. Among others , these are: (1) by naturalizationin a foreign cou ntry; (2) by express renunciati on of citizenship;(3) by subsc ribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Con stitution or laws of a foreign c ountry. From the evidence, it i s clear that private respondent Osmenadid not los e his Phil citizenshipby any of t he 3 mentionedhereinabove or by any other mode of losing Phil citizenship .

2. By virtue of his bei ng the son of a Filipino fathe r, the presumption that privat e resp is a Filipino remains. It was incumbent up on the petitioner to prove that priv resp had lost his Phil citiz enship. Pet Aznar failed to positively establish t his fact. Osmena remains a F ilipino & the loss of his Phil ci tizenship cannot be presum ed . 3. Consideringthe fact that admittedlyOsmenawas b oth a Filipino& an American,t he mere fact that he has a Certificatestating he is an Americandoes not mean t hat he is not still a Filipino. In t he case of Osmena, the Certificationthat he is an Americandoes not mean that he is not STILL a Filipino, po ssessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenshi p. There is no express renun ciation here of Phil citizenshi p. There is even no implied renunciationof said citi zenship.When we considerth at the renunciationneeded to l ose Phil citizenship must be EXPRESS,it stands t o reason that there can be no such loss of Phil citizenshipW HEN THERE IS NO RENUNCIATION,EITHER E XPRESS OR IMPLIED. 4. The statement in t he 1987 constitution that "du al allegiance of citizens is ini mical to the national interest& shall be dealt with by law" has no retroactiveeffect. Adapted .

(3) Taking an oath of allegianc e to anothercountryupon reac hing the age of majority . (4) Accepting a com mission and serving in the ar med forces of another countr y, unless there is an offensiveor defensivepact with the country,or its maintainsar med forces in RP with RP's co nsent . (5) Denaturalization . (6) Being found by final judgm ent to be a deserterof the AFP . (7) Marriageby a Filipino w oman to an alien, if by the law s of her husband'scountry,sh e becomesa

citizen thereof . This is deemedrepeal ed by the 1973 and 1987 Const itutions,which mandatethat Fi lipino citizens w ho marry aliens sh all retain their ci tizenship,unles s by their "act" or "omission",t hey are deeme d under the law to have renounce d it. At present, the law (CA 63, Sec. 1 par. 7) o nly providesfor express renunci ation (i.e., act), and so there is no law at the m om ent on "renu nciationby om i ssion." B ut C o ngress m ay pr ovide for such l ater. But Sec. 2 of the 1973 Consti. ( carried over a s Sec. 4 of th e 1987 Consti .) only has a prospective application. Th us, CA 63 conti nues for marria ges celebrated F: before 17 Janu ary 1973. If a F ilipino married a Greek in 1972 and became a

). No one can be compelledto remain a Filipino

, 74 Phil. 721 (1947 )

Greek citizen h erself thereby, then she lost h er Filipino citiz enship. As to her children,howev er, it is enough t hat she was a F ilipina at the tim e of marriageto qualify them to elect Philippine citizenship whe n they reached the age of maj ority (Villaherm osa ruling). Bu t if the children were born after 1973, then u nder the 1987 C onstitution, th ose childrenar e now even nat uralb orn. But if, i n 1961, a Filipin o woman marri ed an alien who se country did n ot make her an automaticcitize n, and so in order to acquirehis ci tizenship,she a pplied for natur alization,and af ter her naturaliz ation she begot C, C could no long er elect Philippi ne citizenship. The ruling in Cu and Villahermo sa applies only to mothers who lost their citiz enship by oper

ation of law and not by their own voluntaryacts. If C wa s born after the applicationbut before the appr oval of the natu ralizationof his mother, he coul d still elect Philip pine citizenship . But for similarmarriage s celebratedaft er 17 January1 973, the mere f act of marriage alone does not strip the Filipino wo man of her Phili ppine citizenshi p. Thus, if a Fil ipina marries a n alien in 1974, even if she gai ns her husband'sc itizenship,lives abroad,does n ot pay her taxes , never returns t o RP, she is still a Filipina under the 1973 and 1 987 Constitutio ns, so long as s he does not cat egoricallyrenou nce her citizens hip. It follows t hat her children are naturalb orn citi zens, being the children of Filipi

no mothers, an d this time with out the need of election .

Expatriationis a constitutional right (Go Gullia n v Governmen t if he does not w ant to. Exception: Com. Act. No. 6 3, Sec. 1(3).
xxx [A] Filipino may not divest himself o f Philippine citiz enship in any m anner while the Republic of the Philippinesis at war with any co untry.

Peoplevs. M ana yao

Manayao was on e of the Makapili s who took part i n the killing of th e residents in bar rio Banaban, mu nicipality of Angat, Bulacan. After the liberatio n, he, among oth ers, was charge d w/ treason and w/ multiple murd er in the People' s

court. In his defense, he argues, among others, he has lost his Philippine citizenship and was therefore not amenable to the Phil. law on treason.

HELD: Appellant'scontentionis repugnantto the most fundamentaland elementaryprinciples governingthe duties of a citizen toward his country under the Consti. The defenseof the State is a prime duty of government and in the fulfillmentof this duty all citizens may be requiredby law to render personal,military or civil service. During a period of stress, under a Consti enshriningsuch tenets, the citizen cannot be consideredfree to cast off his loyalty and obligationstoward his Fatherland. It would shock the conscienceof any enlightenedcitizenry to say that this appellant,by the very fact of com m ittingthe treasonousacts charged against him , divestedhim self of his Phil. citizenshipand thereby placed himself beyond the arm of our treason law. For if this were so, his very crime would be the shield that would protect him from punishment. VV.

Art. XI, Sec. 18. Publicofficersand em ployees owe the Stateand this Constitution allegiance all at times,and any publicofficeror employeewho seeks to changehis citizenship or acquirethe statusof an immigrantof anothercountryduringhis tenureshall be dealt with by law.

BARLONGAY CASE: F: Caasi vs. Court of Appeal s

(191 SCRA 229)

These 2 cases were consolidated bec. they have the same objective: the disqualification under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the private resp., Merito Miguel, for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, to w/c he was elected in the local elections of 1/18/88, on the ground that he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the US, not of Bolinao.

HELD: Despite his vigorousdisclaimer,Miguel'simmigrationto the US in 1984 constitutedan abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Phils. For he did not go to the US merely to visit his children or his doctor there; he entered the US w/ the intention to live there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa. Based on his application, he was issued by the US Govt the requisitegreen card or authorityto reside there permanently . xxx To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Phils., the law (Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code) requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Phils., did not of itself constitutea waiver of his status as a permanentresidentor immigrantof the US. The waiver of his green card should be manifestedby some act of acts independentof and done prior to filing his candidacyfor elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualifiedto run for any elective office." Residencein the municipalitywhere he intends to run for elective office for at least 1 year at the time of the filing of his cert. of candidacy, is one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective public office must possess. Migueldid no possessthat qualificationbec. he was a permanentresidentof the US and he residedin Bolinao for a period of only 3 mos. after his return to the Phils. in Nov. 1987. RAM.

b. R eac q u isitio n f C itize n sh i o p S ecs. 2 5, C om m onw ealth Ac t 63

Sec. 2. How citizenship may be reacquired Citizenshipm . ay be reacquired: (1) By naturalization: Provided, That the appl icant possess none of the disqu alifications prescribed in section two of Act NumberedTw entynine hundred twentyseven ( now Sec. 4 of CA 473.) (2) By repatriation of d eserters of the Army, Navy or Air Corp: Provided, That a wo man who lost her citizenship by reason of her ma rriage to an alien may be repatri ated in accordance with the pro visions of this Act after the termination of the mari tal status; and (3) By direct act of the National Assembly(now Congre ss.) Sec. 3. Procedure inc ident to reacquisition of Philipp ine citizenship. The procedure prescr ibed for naturalization under Act Numb ered Twentynine hundred twentyseven (now CA 473) shall apply to the reacquisition of Philippine citize nship by naturalizationprovided for in the next preceding sectio n: Provided, That the qualifications and special q ualifications prescribed in secti ons 3 and 4 of said Act shall not be required: And Provided,further , (1) That the applicant b e at least twentyone years of ag

xxx

(1) Naturalizatio n

e and shall have resided in the Philippines at least six months before he applies for naturalization ; (2) That he shall have conducted himself in a proper a nd irreproachable manner durin g the entire period of his residencein the Philippine s, in his relations with the constit uted governmentas well as with the communityin which he is living; and (3) That he subscribes to an oath declaring his intentio n to renounce absolutely and p erpetually all faith and allegianceto the foreign auth ority, state or sovereigntyof whic h he was a citizen or subject . Sec. 4. Repatriation sh all be effected by merely taking t he necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippinesand registrationi n the proper civil registry. Sec. 5. The Secretaryof Justice shall issue the necessary regulationsfor the proper enforc ement of this Act. Naturalization blanks and other blanks required for carrying out the provisions of this Act shall be prepared and furnishedby the Solicitor Genera l, subject to approvalof the Secr etary of Justice.

(CA 63 and CA 473) But this is now an abbreviated process,with no need to wait f or three years (one year for de clarationof intent, and two years for the judgment

to becomeexecutory). An appli cant must only possessthe follo wing: a. 21 yearsof age; b. Residentfor 6 months ;

c. G ood m oral character ; d. No disqualification . (2) Repatriatio n (i) W om an who by her marriagelost her citizenship . (This is no Avengoz In People v longer true u a nder the 1973 and 1987 C onstitutions, the loss if w as due only to m arriag e.) In Jao v Republi c

, 119 SCRA 119 (1982 ), it was held that a wo man who lost her citize nship by reason of her m arriaget o a Chinesehusbanda nd her gaining his citize Peoplev. Avengoz a nship, must first judiciall y, prove that she F: was Filipino citizen prior to the m arriage,before she can be repatriated by virtue of the death of her husband .

, 121 SCRA 358 (1983),i t was held that althoughh er citizenshipprior to her marriage to a Chinese husband n eeded judicial confirmati on, the process of repatr iation itself (i.e., of reacq uiringc Jao v. Republithat citizenship)involvesa pur ely administrative procee F: ding. Thus: Filipino cit izenship prior to its loss by virtue of marriage to an alien and gaining his citizenship needs judicial declaratio n. But re acquisition of such citizenship by repa

triation is a purely admi nistrative procedure .

, 119 SCRA119 (1982 )

Go Cham, a Chine se, his wife Anselma Aveng oza, and the latter's mother, Gavina A., were accused of violation of CA 108. It was charged tha t Go Gam and Anselma A. used Gavina A. as dummy i n order to acquire lands in Camarines Sur w/c the couple were not qualified to acquire under th e 1935 Consti. Pending tria l, Gavina A. and Go Cham died. On her motion the trial court all owed Anselma A. to withdra w her previous plea of not g uilty and to file a motion to quash w/c the court later granted. Th e trial court ruled that Anse lma had reacquired her Fili pino citizenship upon the d eath of her husband, Go Cham, and u pon complying w/ CA 63, s ec. 4 by taking an oath of a llegiance to the Republic a nd filing the oath w/ the Civil Registrar. The prosecution appealed.

HELD: Def. Avengoza's sole evidence on record to support her repatriatio n is her oath of allegianc e to the Republic. Def. Avengoza became an alien by reas on of her lawful marriage to a Chinese citizen; how ever this does not necessarilymea n that she was a Filipinoc

itizen previousto such m arriage.Thus, she should first prove her citizenship previous to her marriage and as t here is no conclusive pr oof of this matter on rec ord, this questionmust be judiciall y determinedbeforeshe c an be legally repatriated. VV.

, 121 SCRA 358 (1983)

Petitioner filed in th e CFIDavao a petition for re patriation. She claimed that while her father was a Chin ese and her mother a Filipinio, her parents were not legally m arried, and that although s he lost her Phil. citizenship when she married a Chinese national, her husband died on 9/6/62 . After trial, the court declar ed the petitioner judicially r epatriated. The govt appealed.

HELD: The proceedingstaken in the trial court are a completenullity. There is no law requiring or authorizing that repatriationshould be effectedby a judicial proceeding. All that is requiredfor a female citizen of the Phils. who lost her citizenshipto an alien to reacquire her Phil. citizenshipupon the terminationof her marital status "is for her to take the necessaryoath of allegianceto the R epublicof the P hils. and to registerthe said oath in the proper civil registry." Moreover, the petitioner's claim of Phil. citizenship prior to her marriage for being allegedly an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother may not be established in an action where the other or her heirs are not parties. It is consistentrule that Phil. citizenshipmay not be declaredin a nonadversarysuit where the personswhose rights are affectedby such declarationare not parties,such as an action for declaratoryrelief or a petition for judicial repatriationas an alien. VV.

(ii) Those declared by authorities to be deserters of the Armed Forces. (Only this is applicable to the present. ) (3) LegislativeAct Which is both a mode of acquiringand reacquiringcitizenship.

BARLONGAY CASE: , 232 SCRA 785 Republicvs. Dela Rosa F:

Three (3) petitions involving the same issues and parties were consolidated.Said cases questionedthe readmission of Juan Frivaldo as a Filipino citizen under CA 63 or the Revised Naturalization Law as amended by CA 473. Frivaldo became a US citizen allegedly due to the pressure from the Marcos regime. He came back here, ran for Governor of Sorsogon and won.

RULING:DISQUALIFIED. Frivaldomust vacate his office and surrenderthe same to the ViceGovernor . A former citizen who opts to reacquire Phil. citizenship through naturalization under CA 63 is duty bound to follow the procedureprescribedby said law, and it is not for him to decide and select the requirements which he believes are inconvenient.The law does not distinguish between an applicant who was formerly a Filipinocitizen and one who was never a citizen . (Barlongay:This statement inaccurate is becausethere are indeeddifferences. ) Failure to comply with the publicationand posting requirementsunder the law rendered null and void the proceedingsconducted, the decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken. The TC never acquired jurisdictionto hear the petition for naturalizationof Frivaldo. Under the law, both the petition for naturalization and the order setting it for hearingmust be publishedonce a week for three consecutiveweeks in the OG or in a newspaperof generalcirculation.Moreover,the publicationand the posting must be in its full text for the Court to acquire jurisdiction . The petitionfor naturalization lacks severalallegationsunder Secs. 2 and 6 of the law: (1) that petitioner is of good moral character;(2) he resided continuouslyin the Phil. for at least ten years; (3) that he is able to speak and write English and any one of the principal dialects; (4) he will reside continuouslyin the Phil. from

a. Filing of verified complaint for impeachment of the President or VicePresident, on the ground of culpable violation of the Constitution,treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. b. Inclusionof the com plaintin the O rder of Businesswithin 10 session days. c. Referralof com plaintto the Comm itteeon Justice within 3 session days from its inclusion . d. Hearing,voting, and submissionof report by the Committeewithin 60 days from referral . e. P lacing on calendarof the Com m itteeresolutionw ithin 10 days from subm ission . f. D iscussionon the floor of the report, then a vote by the m em bership the H ouse of R epresentatives of . g. If 1/3 vote to affirm a favorableresolutionor overridea contrary resolution,the case is forwardedto the Senatefor trial. Trial Stageat the Senat e a. The Senatorstake an oath or affirmation. The Chief Justice of the SupremeCourt presidesover the trial, but does not vote. b. After trial, the Senatorsvote to convict or acquit. A vote of 16 (2/3 of all the members)is requiredto convictthe Presidentor VicePresident . Posttrial a. If the Presidentis acquittedby the Senate,he shall continue in office. No impeachmentproceeding can again be initiatedagainsthim within a period of one year. b. If the Presidentis impeached,he shall be removed from office at once, and shall be disqualifiedto hold any office in the Republic. His criminal liability under Art. XI, Sec. 3(7) may be subject to him immunity from suit.

f. Powersand Functionsof the Presiden t (1) ExecutivePower Art. VII, Secs. 1 and 17 Art. VII, Sec. 1. The executive powershallbe vestedin the President the Philippines. of

Id., Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and o ffic e s . H e s h a ll e n s u reth a t th e la w s b e fa ith fu llye x e c u te d .

The executivefunction is essentiallythe duty to implem entthe laws w ithin the standardsimposed by the legislature. Under the Constitution,this power is exercisedby the P resident. Thus, when the Cabinetand other branchesof the E xecutiveD epartm ent plem entthe law , they are acting under the controlof the P residen im t. Marcosvs Manglapu s F: 17 7 S C R A 6 68 , 1 78 S C R A 760
This is a petition for mandamus asking the Court to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and his immediate family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. The issue is whether or not, in the exercise of executive power, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. The Constitution provides that the executive power shall be vested in the President (Art. VII, Sec. 1). However, it does not define what is meant by "executive power" although in the same article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e. the power of control over all executive depts., bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the commander in chief clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations, pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the power to submit the budget to congress and the power to address Congress. (VII, Sec. 1423)

The inevitable question is whether by enumeratingcertain powers of the President,did the framers of the Constitution intendthat the Presidentshall exercisethose specificpowersand no other? Accordingto the SC, that althoughthe 1987 Constitutionimposeslimitationson the exerciseof specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of executive power. Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific power enumeratedin the Constitution. In other words, executivepower is more than the sum of specific powers so enum erated. In this case, the Presidenthas the power to bar the Marcosesfrom returningto the Philippines. She has the obligationto protectthe people,promotetheir welfareand advancethe nationalinterest. She has to balance the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involvedis the President'sresidualpower to protectthe generalwelfare of the people. It is foundedon the duty of the President, stewardof the people. as Resolutionon Motion for Reconsideration : It cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executivepower and which are necessaryfor her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the Presidentare not limited to what are expresslyenumeratedin the article on the ExecutiveDepartmentand in scatteredprovisionsof the Constitution. Adapted .

(2) C o n tro lo f e xe cu tived ep a rtm en t s Art. VII, Sec. 17. The Presidentshall have controlof all the executivedepartm ents, bureau s, and o ffic e s . H e s h all e n s u reth a t th e la w s b e fa ith fu llye x e c u te d .

"Control"is the power to substituteo ne's own judgm entin that of a subor dinate. Under the qualified political ag ency doctrine the differentexecutived , Thus, in Planas v Gil epartmentsare mere adjunctsof the President. The secretaries are the alter ego of the President, men of his bosom confidence whom he In Villena v Secretary of the Interiorto assist him in his otherw designated ise physically impossible multifarious functions, the extension of the President in the particular field in whi The doctrine on the power of control remained unchanged in the jurisprudence under the 1973 ch orkers Union vs Minister of Labor Constitution. Free Telephone Wthey act. Their acts are presumpti vely acts of the "President, until countermanded reprobatedby him". or The Presidentcan substitutehis will ov er those of the secretaries,and they cannot complain. Furthermore,t hey hold their office subject to the disc retion of the President, who can replacethem anytimeonce he loseshis confidence them. in , since the Civil ServiceCommissioner, then not an independent body, was the alter ego of the President, and the Preside nt could investigate local officials, the Commissioner could likewise investigate them.

, the investigationof the Mayor of Mak ati by the Secretary of the

Interiorwas deemedan investigation co nductedby the Presidenthimself .

(108 SCRA 757) had occasion to reemphasizeits continuingvalidity. He re, the power given to the Ministerof La bor to assumejurisdictionover a labor disputeaffectingthe nationalinter est or to certify it for compulsoryarbitrat ion was challengedas an undue delegationof a power which properly b elonged to the President. All that was needed to settle the case was to hark back to the Villena doctrine tha t the heads of ministries are alter eg os of the President. Under the presidentialsystem,all executiveand a dministrativeorganizations adjuncts are of the ExecutiveDepartment, the headsof the variousexecutivedepartme nts are assistants and agentsof the Chie f Executiveand, exceptin cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitutionor the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personall y, the multifarious executive and admi nistrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed and promul gated in the regular course of busine ss, are, unless disapproved or reprobatedby the Chief Executive,pres umptivelythe acts of the Chief Executiv e. Each head of a departmentis, and must be, the President'salter ego in the mattersof that department where th e Presidentis requiredby law to exerciseauthority. The Presidenthas th e constitutional powerof controland dir ection over such dept. headsand cabinetsecretaries .

(3) Generalsupervision local govern of mentsand autonomous region s

A rt. X , S e c . 4. T h e P re s id e n t h a ll e x e rc is eg e n e ra ls u p e rv is io n v e r lo c a l g o v e rn m e n ts . s o xxx

Art. X, Sec. 16. The Presidentshall exercise general supervisionover autonomou s regions to e n su reth a t law s are faith fu llyexe cu ted .

"G eneralsupervision" eans the m ere overseeingof a subordinateto m ake sure that m they do their duties under the law. But this does not include the power to overrule their acts, if these acts are w ithin their discretion . The grant of 200 SCRA 271m ere supervisorypower over local governm entsand autonom ous regions is in line with the policy of the S tate to prom otethe autonom yof local governm ents and autonom ous regions. There can be no real local autonomywhile the NationalGovernment controlsthe local governments . Ganzonvs CA The petitionersquestionthe power of the President,acting through the Secretaryof Local Government, to suspendand/or removelocal officials . It is the consideredopinion of the Court that notwithstandingthe change in the constitutio n, the charter did not intend to divest the legislatureof its right or the Presidentof her prerogativeas conferredby existing legislationto provide administrativesanctionsagainst local officials. The omission of "as may b e provided by law" (Sec. 4, Art. X) signifiesnothingmore than to underscorelocal governments' autonomyfrom C ongressand to break Congress'"control" over local govt. affairs. The Constitutiondid not, however, intend fo r the sake of local autonomy,to deprive the legislatureof all authorityover municipalcorporations,in particular , concerning discipline. Petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers,which supposedlyexcludesthe powerof investigation, deniedher control,which allege and dly embraces disciplinary authority. This is a mistaken impression because legally "supervision" is not inco mpatible with disciplinary authority. "Control" has been defined as the power of an officer to alter, modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinateofficer had done in the performanceof his duties and to substitutethe ju dgmentof the former for that of the latter. "Supervision"on the other hand means overseeingor the power or a uthority of an

officer to see that subordinateofficers perform their duties. Adapted .

(4) Powerof appointmen t Cruz: Appointmentmay be defined as the selection,by the authorityvested w/ the power,of an in dividualwho is to exercisethe functionsof a given office. The power of appointment is, according to the SC in Concepcion v Paredes, the mo st eminently executive power,becauseit is throughhis appointees the President executelaws. that can

The pow er of appointm ent the P residentunder the 1987 C onstitution by has been significantly curbed. It can be classifiedas follow s:

W ith th e co n sen to f th e C o m m iss io n n A p p o in tm en t o s Members of the Regional ConsultativeCouncil in Art. X, Sec. 18 are accordingto Sarmientov Mison, 156 SCRA 547, supra. also subject to confirmation by the CA, because their appointment is vested i n the President by the Constitution. But J. Mendoza disagrees. For unlike the Chairman and members of the ConstitutionalCommissionsand the regular members of the JBC, the Constitutionin Art. X, Sec. 18 does not say that the appointmentis subject to confirmation. Also, the pattern in the Constitutionshows that where the nomineesare already screened either by JBC (for justices and judges) or the multis ectoral bodies (Regional ConsultativeCouncil), then there is no need for CA confirmationto prevent an overkill. It is enough that the Presidentmade the appointmenton the basis of nominations. Otherwise,it would be too rigid, consideringthat the duty of the RCC is only to adviseCongresson the autonom ous to be enacted act . Do bureau directorsneed confirmation? In Sarmientov Mison (Dec. 1987),the SC held that no they did not need to be confirmed.The deliberations the Con Con showedthat a draft similarto of VII, 10 of the 1935 Constitution,which included bureau heads in the list of appointeesrequiring confirmation,was introduced,but upon motion,bureau directorswere omitted expresslyfrom the draft becausethey were consideredof low rank, and so were thought to be better shielded from partisanpolitics. But the SC added that of the 4 categories of public officers requiring confirmation, the 4th must be given a restrictiveconstructionbecauseconfirmationderogatesthe appointingpower of the President. Indeed,it said, only a small class of officersneededconfirmation. In saying so, however, it did not try to explain certain anomalies that may arise from such restrictive interpretation: If a colonelneeded confirmation,why not the Undersecretary NationalDefensewho has a (a) of higher rank as line officer? (b) If an ambassadorneeded confirmation,why not the Undersecretaryof Foreign Affairs who has a higher rank? (c) Why not the CB governor who is so powerful as to plunge the country into bankruptcy ? Bautistavs Salong a 172 SCRA160 F:
Petitioner was appointed Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights on 12/17/88. She took her oath of office on 12/22 and thereafter entered into the discharge of her functions and duties. However, on 1/9/89, she was asked by the Commission on Appointments to submit certain information and documents needed in the confirmation of her appointment. She refused to do so on the ground that her appointment was not subject to confirmation. On 1/14/89, the Pres. submitted petitioner's ad interim appointment to the CA, but, considering petitioner's refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the CA, the CA disapproved her appointment on 1/25. Petitioner, anticipating the action of the CA, filed a petition for certiorari w/ the SC.

ISS UE : W hetheror not the appointm entby the Presidentof the C hairm anof the C om missionon Hum an Rights (CHR) is to be made with or without CA confirmation. HELD: (1) Only those appointmentsexpressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII are to be reviewedby the CA, nam ely,"the heads of the executivedepartm ents, bassadors, am other public m inister s and consuls, other officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointm ents vested in him in this C onstitution." A ll other appointm ents the Pres. are to be m ade are by w/o the participation of the CA." Since the position of Chairman of the CHR, an independent office created by the Constitution,is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII, appointmentsto which are to be made with the confirmationof the CA, it follows that the appointmentby the President of the Chairmanof the CHR is to be made without the review or participationof the CA. They are among the officers of the govt "whom he (the Pres.) may be authorizedby law to appoint." And Sec. 2 (c) of EO 163, May 5, 1987, authorizesthe P res. to appointthe C hairm anand M em bersof the C H R. Quintosxxx. VV. Commissionon Appointment Deles vs. s F: 177 SCRA 259
Petitioner and 3 others were appointed Sectoral Representatives by the President pursuant to Article VII, Section 16, par. 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution. However, petitioner and the 3 other sectoral representatives appointees were not able to take their oaths and discharge their duties as members of Congress due to the opposition of some congressmenmembers of the Commission on Appointments (CA), who insisted that sectoral representatives must first be confirmed by the CA before they can take their oaths and/or assume office as members of the House of Representatives.

ISSUE: Whethe the Constitutio require confirmatio by the CA in the appointmen of sectoral r n s n t representatives the Houseof Representatives., appointthe headsof the executivedepartm ents, bassadors, to Commissionon Appointment the consentof the s am other public ministersand consuls,or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonelor naval captain,and other officerswhose appointments ofvested in him in this Constitutio"The presidentshall nominateand, with are n HELD: YES. Section 16, Article VII the Constitutionprovidesthat:

x x x". In SARMIENTO VS. MISON (1987), the SC construed Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution to mean that only appointments to offices mentioned in the first sentence of the said Section 16, Art. VII require confirmationby the CA. Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in par. 2, Sec. 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointmentby the Presidentby express provisionof Sec. 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution,it is indubitablethat sectoralrepresentatives the House of Representatives among the "other officerswhose appointments to are are vested in the President in this Constitution", referred to in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII whose appointmentsare subject to confirmationby the CA.(SARMIENTOVS. MISON) Implicit in the invocationof par. 2, Section 16, Art. VII as authority for the appointmentof petitioneris, the recognitionby the Presidentas appointingauthority that petitioner'sappointmentrequires confirmationby the CA. Under Par. 2, Sec. 16, Art VII, appointments made by the Presidentpursuantthereto"shall be effective

only until disapproval by the CA or until the next adjournment of the Congress." If indeed appointments of sectoralrepresentatives need no confirmation,the Presidentneed not make any referenceto the constitutional provisionsabovequoted in appointingthe petitioner. As a matterof fact, the Presidenthad expresslysubmitted petitioner'sappointmentfor confirmationby the CA. Consideringthat Congress had adjournedwithout resp. CA having acted on petitioner'sappointment,said appointment/nomination become moot and academic had pursuant to Sec. 23 of the Rules of resp. CA and "unless resubmitted shall not again be considered by the Commission." Adapted .

Calderon v. Caral (208 SCRA 254) e F:

In March 1989, RA 6715 (HerreraVeloso Law), amending the Labor Code, was approved. It provides in Sec. 13 thereof as follows: "xxx The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissionersand other Commissionersshall be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the CA. xxx" Pursuant to said law, President Aquino appointed the Chairman (B. CARALE) and Commissioners of the NLRC. The appointmentsstated that the appointees may qualify and enter upon the performancesof the duties of the office. The present petition for prohibition questions the constitutionality and legality of the permanent appointments extended by the President to the respondents Chairman and Members of the NLRC, without submitting the same to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation pursuant to Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by RA 6715. Petitioners insists on a mandatory compliance w/ RA 6715 which has in its favor the presumption of validity. RA 6715 is not, according to the petitioner, an encroachment on the appointing power of the executive contained in Sec. 16 of Art. VII of the Constitution. The Solicitor General contends, on the other hand, that RA 6715 transgresses Sec. 16, Art. VII by expanding the confirmation powers of the Commission on Appointments without constitutional basis.

ISSUES: (1) W/N Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of appointmentsextendedby the Presidentto governmentofficers additionalto those expresslymentionedin the first sentenceof Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution.(NO) HELD:The controversyin the case is focusedon Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitutionw/c provides : "Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appointthe heads of the executivedepartments, ambassadors, other public ministersand consuls,or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonelor naval captain,and other officerswhose appointments vested are in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Governmentwhose appointmentsare not otherwiseprovidedfor by law, and those whom he may be authorizedby law to appoint.The Congressmay, by law, vest the appointmentof other officers lower in rank in the Presidentalone, in the courts,or in the heads of departments, agencies,commissions, boards." xxx or There are four groupsof officerswhom the Presidentshall appoint. These four groupsare: First, the heads of the executivedepartments, ambassadors, other public ministersand consuls,officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonelor naval captain,and other officerswhose appointments vested are

in him in this Constitution ; Second,all other officers of the G overnm entwhose appointm ents not othe are rwise providedfor law; Third, those whom the P r esident m ay be authorize d by law to appoint ; Fourth,officerslow er in ra nk w hose appointm ents th e C ongressm ay by law ve st in the P residentalone. The second sente nce of Sec. 16, Art. VII re fers to all other officers of the government whose appointmentsare not other wise providedfor by law an d those whom the Presiden t may be authorizedby law to appoint. Indubitably,the NLRC Chairman and Commissio ners fall within the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. V II, more specificallyunder "tho se whom he (the President) may be authorizedby law t o appoint." Undeniably,the Notes: From the rulings in Sarmiento III v. Mison Chairman and Membersn Constitutional Commissioo f the NLRC are not among the officers mentioned in t he first sentence of Sec. 1 6 whose appointments requir es confirmationby the CA. To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirm ation by the CA of the ap pointments of respondent Mison s Chairmanand Membersof t he NLRC,it is unconstitutio nal because :

, 172 S 160, and Deles v.

1. it amends by legisla tion, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Co nstitution by adding theret o appointmentsrequiringconf irmationby the CA; and 2. it amendsby legislatio n, the second sentenceof Sec. 16, Art. VII, by imposin g the confirmationof the C A on appointments are oth w/c erwiseentrustedonly with t he President . Deciding on what l aws to pass is a legislativ e prerogative. Determinin g their constitutionality is a judicial function. SupremeCourt dec isions applyingor interpreti ng the Constitutionshall for m part of the legal system o f the Philippines. No doctrin e or principle of law laid d own by the Court in a deci sion rendered en banc or i n divisionmay be modifiedor reversedexceptby the Cou rt sitting en banc. Adapted .

, 156 S 549), Bautista v. Sa longa , 177 S 259, these doctrines are deducible: 1. Confirmation t by he CA is requiredonly for pr esidentialappointeesas me ntionedin the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII, includ ing, those officers whose a ppointmentsare expressly vested by the Constitutionit self

in the president(like sector al representativesto Congr ess and members of the co nstitutionalcommissionsof Audit, Civil Service and E lection). 2. Confirmation is not required when the Pr esident appoints o ther government officers whose appointments are not othe rwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the Com. on Human Rights). Also, a s observed in Sarmiento v. , when Congress cre ates inferior offices but omi ts to provide for appointme nt thereto, or provides in a n unconstitutional mannerfor such appointments, offic the ers are consideredas amon g those whoseappointment s

are not otherwiseprovidedfor by la w.

(2) W /N legislationcan expand a co nstitutionalprovisionafter the Supr In Endenciaand Jugo v. David eme Court has interpretedit. , 93 Phil. 699, the Court held: "We have already said that th e Legislatureunder our form of gover nment is assignedthe task and the power to m ake and enact laws, but not to interpretthem . This is m ore tr ue with regard to the interpretation of the Constitution,which is not within the sp here of the LegislativeDepartment.If t he Legislaturemay declare what a law means,or what a specific portion of the Constitutionmeans,especially after the courts have in actual case ascertained its meaning by interpreta tion and applied it in a decision, this would surely cause confusion and instabilityin judicial processesand co urt decisions.Under such a system, a final court determinationof a case based on judicial interpretation of th Ramos v. Alvare z e law or of the Constitution may be undermined or even annulled by a F: subsequentand different interpretati on of the law or of the Constitution by the Legislative Department.That would neither be wise nor desirable , besides being clearly violative of t he fundamental principles of our constitutional system of government, p articularlythose governingthe separati on of powers. " The function of the Court in p assing upon an act of Congress is to " lay the article of the Constitution which is invokedbeside the statute whi ch is challengedand to decide whethe r the latter squareswith the former" and to announce considered its judgme nt upon the question. "

It cannot be overlookedthat S ec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitutio n was deliberatelyintendedby the framersto be a departurefrom the sys tem embodiedin the 1935 Constitution where the CA exercisedthe power of confirmation over almost all presid ential appointments,leading to many cases of abuse of such power of confirmation. Adapted.

(97 PHIL. 844) [Comparewith Calder on case]

Before serving his full term as ele cted member of the Provincial Board of Ne gros Occ., Jesus Aritao (LP) resigned his office when he filed his certificate of ca ndidacy for congressman. To fill such vacancy, then Presid ent Quirino, acting on the authority of Se c. 21 (b) of the Revised Election code (REC) appointed Agustin Ramos (LP), who assumed office thereafter. In due ti me, Ramos' interim appointment was submitted to the Commission on Appoint ments (CA) for confirmation. But before it could be confirmed, the new President of the Phil., Hon. R. Magsaysay, nomi nated Rafael Alvarez for the same offi ce. The nomination was unanimously confirmed by the CA after it has rejected R amos' appointment . Alvarez assumed office as mem ber of the Prov'l Board of Negros Occ. de spite vigorous opposition from Ramos, who thereafter filed the present petition t o have himself declared legally entitled to the office and to have Alvarez ousted therefrom. Petitioner contends, among othe rs, that he is still legally entitled to the offi ce because his appointment was not subject to the consent or disapprovalof the CA. Respondenton his part contends othe rwise.

ISSUE: W/N an appointment made by the PresidentunderSec. 21(b) of the R EC is subjectto the consentof the CA. (YES)

S ec. 21(b) of the R E C , under w /c the petitionerw as appointed,provi des: Whenever in any elective local office a vacancy occurs as a result of the death, resignation, rem ovalor cessationof the incum bent,the P residentsh all appointtheretoa suitable person belonging to the political party of the officer whom he is to r eplace, upon the recommendation of said party, save in the case of mayor, which shall be filled by the vice m ayor. " Under Par. 3, of Sec. 10, A rt. VII of the 1935 Constitution,there are four groups of officers that the P residentshall appoint,namely : First, the heads of executivedepartm entsand bureaus, officers of the A rm y from the rank of colonel,of the Navy and air forces from the rank of captain or comm ander ; Second,all other officers of the Governmentwhose appointment s are not otherwiseprovidedfor in the Constitution ; Third, those whom the Presidentmay be authorizedby law to appoint;an d Fourth,inferiorofficerswhoseappointments Congresshas by law vest the ed in the Presidentalone. The Constitutionis explicit that for officers of the first, second an d third groups, the appointmentmade by the Presidentshall be with the consentof the CA. It is only in the cas e of the fourth group, that is, of inferior officerswhoseappointment by law vested"in the Presidentalone"that s is uch consentis not required . On the other hand, examiningthe provisionof Sec. 21(b) of the REC, we find that while it says that ,the SCRA 254) 208 Presidentshall make the appointment, does not say that the appointme it nt is not to be subjectto the consentof the CA that is, that it is to be madeby the Presidentalone.Such being the case,the President's appointment ust m be deemedsubjectto the generalrequirement that the same is to be with the consentof the CA. It would fall then under the third group of officers mentionedin par. 3 of Sec. 10, Art. VII of the 1935 Constitution.Thus, in the United States, under a constitutionalprovisionsimilar to ours, the gener al rule is that "when a statute does not

specifyhow an officeris to be appointed,it must be by the Presidentand with the consentof the Senate. " In view of the foregoing,petitioner'sappointmentas memberof t he ProvincialBoard was subjectto the consentof the CA, so that his right to the office ceased when his appoint ment was rejectedby the Commission. Adapted . (Takenote of the case of Calderonv. Caral e

(a) Headsof the executivedepartments Art. VII, Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the con sent of the Commission on

A ppointm ents, appointthe heads of the executivedepartm ents, bassadors, am other p ublic m inister s and co n s u ls,o r o ffic erso f th e arm e dfo rc esfro m th e ran k o f co lo n e lo r n av al c ap tain ,an d o th e r o ffice rs w h o se appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other offi cers of the Governm entwhose appointmentsare not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom, he ma y be authorizedby law to appoint. The Congressm ay, by law , vest the appointm ent other officerslo of w er in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments,agencies, commissio ns or b o a rd s . T h e P res id en ts h all h a ve th e p o w e rto m a ke ap p o in tm en ts u rin gth e re ce sso f C o n g re ss , d w h eth er voluntar y or compulsory, but such appointment shall be effective only until disapproval by the C o m m is sio n n A p p o in tm e n ts r u n til th e n ex t ad jo u rn m e no f th e C o n g re ss . o o t

(b) Am bassadors, other public m inistersand consuls (Id.)

(c) Officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines with the rank of colonel or navalcaptain(becausethese are officersof a sizeablecommandenoughto stagea coup) (Id.) (d) Other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in the (i) Chairmanand Commissioners the Constitutional of Commission s Art. IX, B, Sec. 1. (2) The Chairman and the Commissioners the Civil ServiceCommission) (of shall be appointe by the Presiden with the consent of the d t Commission on Appointment for a term of seven years withou reappointment Of th os first appointed the t . e , Chairmanshall hold office for seven years,a Commissioner for five years, and another Commissionerfor three years, withoutreappointment.Appointment any vacancyshall to be only for unexpiredterm of the predecessor. In no case shal l be appointe d or designate d in a temporaryor actingcapacity . Id., C, Sec. 1. (2) The Chairmanand the Commissioners the Commissionon Elections)shall (of be appointedby the Presidentwith the consentof the Commissionon Appointment a term of seven for any Member Constitution:

years withoutreappointment.Of those first appointed,three Membersshall hold office for seven years, two Membersfor five years, and the last Membersfor three years, withoutreappointment.Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be

ap p o in tedo r d es ig n ated a tem p o rary r ac tin g c ap a ci in o ty. Id., D, Sec. 1 (2) The Chairmanand the Commissi oners (of the Commissionon Audit) shall be appointedby the Presidentw ith the consentof the C om m issionon A ppointm ent a term of seven years for without reappointm ent. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a C o m m is s io nre for five years, and another Commission er for three years, without reappointmen t. Appointmentto any vacancyshall be only for unexpiredt erm of the predecessor. In no case shall any M em berbe appointedor designatedin a tem poraryor a cting capacity .

(ii) Regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council (composed of the IBP representative, professorof law, retired SC justice, and repres entativeof the private sector. Note the exofficio members:Chief Justice,Secretaryof Justice,and representativ e of Congress)Art. VII, Sec. 8. (2) The regular members of the (Judi cial and Bar) Council shall appointed by the Presidentfor a term of four years with the consentof the C ommission Appointments.Of the Members on first appointed, representative the IntegratedBar sha the of ll serve for four years,the professorof law for three years,the retiredJusticefor two years,and the repres entativeof the privatesectorfor one year .

(iii) Sectoralrepresentatives Art. XVIII, Sec. 7. Until a law is passed, the Pres ident may fill by appointment from a list of nomineesby the respectivesectors the seats reserved fo r sectoral representationin paragraph(2) of Section5 of ArticleVI of this Constitution.

(iv) RegionalConsultativeCommission

Art. X, Sec. 18. The Congressshall enact an orga nic act for each autonomousregion with the as sistanec and participation of the regional consultati ve commissioncompose d of represe ntatives appointed the President by from a list of nom inees from m ul tisectoral bodies. The organicact shalldefine the basic structureof governmentfor the region consistin g of the executivedepartmentand legislative assem bly, both of whichshallbe electiveand representative of the constituent politicalunits. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with pers onal, family, and property law jurisdiction consistent ith the provisions this Constitution natio w of and nal law s. The creationof the autonomous region shall be eff ective when approvedby majorityof the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite calledfor the pur pose,providedthat only provinces, cities,and geographic areasvotingfavorably such plebiscite in shallbe includedin the autonom ous region .

U pon recom m endation the Judicialand B ar C o un of cil

(a) M em bersof the S uprem eC ourt and all other courts Art. VIII, Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointedby the Presidentfrom a list of at least thr ee nom ineespreparedby the Judicialand B ar C oun cil fo r e v e ry v a c a n c y . S u c h a p p o in tm e n ts e ed n o c o n fi n rm a tio n . For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from t he subm ission the list. of (b) O m budsm anand his 5 deputies(for Luzon, V isayas , M indanao,generaland military)

Art. XI, Sec. 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputi es shall be appointedby the Presidentfrom a list of at least six nomineespreparedby the Judicialand B ar Council,and from a list of three nomineesfor every vacancythereafter. Such appointments shall req uire no confirmation.All vacanciesshall be filled withinthree monthsafter they occur .

Appointment VicePresidentas Memberof the Cabin of et Art. VII, Sec. 3. xxx The Vice Presidentmay be appointedas a Mem ber of the Cabinet. Such appointment requiresno confirmatio n Appointm ents solelyby the Presiden t Art. VII, Sec. 16. The Presidentshall xxx also a ppointall other officersof the Government whose appointmentsare not otherwiseprovidedfor by law, a nd those whom, he may be authorizedby law to

appoint. The Congressmay, by law, vest the appointm ent of other officerslower in rank in the President alone,in the courts,or in the headsof departm ents, agen cies,com m issions boards or . The President shallhave the powerto makeapp ointments duringthe recessof Congress, whether voluntar or compulsory, but such appointment s y hall be effective only until disapproval by th e Com m ission Appointm ents until the next adjourn on or m entof the Congress. 1. Those vested by the Constitutionon the Presid ent alone (e.g. appointmentof VicePresidentto the Cabinet) [Art. VII, Sec. 3(2)] 2. Those whoseappointments not otherwiseprovidedb are y law.

3. Those w hom he m ay be authorizedby law to appoi nt. 4. Those other officerslow er in rank w hose appointm ent is vested by law in the P resident(alone) . The meaningof #4 was touchedupon in Sarmientov Mison is . The phraseology m uddled

. In arguingthat even bureau chiefs needed confirmationeven if they are of inferior rank, the argume nt was the phrase,"The Congressmay, by law, vest in the appointmentof other officers lower in rank in the Pr esident alone" meant that until a law is passed giving such appointingpow er to the P residentalone, then s uch appointm ent has to be confirm ed. O nly after suc h law is passed does the necessityfor confirm ationno longer hold. The S C dism issedthis view however,saying t hat the inclusionof the word "alone" was an oversight. Thus, th e Constitutionshould read "The Congressmay, by law, vest the appointment other officerslower in rank in the of President. "

(5) Limitationson appointingpower of the Presiden t Art. VII, Secs. 13 and 15 `Art. VII, Sec. 13. xxx The spouse and relatives by consanguinit y or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the Presidentshall not duringhis tenurebe appointedas Membersof the Constitutional Commissions, the or Office of the Ombudsman, as Secretaries, or Unders ecretaries,chairmenor heads of bureausor offices, includinggovernment ownedor controlled corporation s and their subsidiaries.

Id., Sec. 15. Two monthsimmediately before the next presidential electionsand up to the end of his term, a Presidentor ActingPresidentshall not ma ke appointments, excepttemporaryappointments to

executivepositionswhen continuedvacanciesther ein will prejudicepublic service or endangerpublic safety.

a. The spouse and relativesby consanguinityor affinity within the 4th civil degree of the Presidentshall not, during his "tenure". be appointed as (i) members of the Constitutional Commissions,(ii) member of the Office of Ombudsman, (iii) Secretaries, (iv) Undersecr etaries, (v) Chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, includinggovernment owned or controlledcorporationsa nd their subsidiaries. b. Two monthsimmediatelybefore the next presi dentialelections (2nd Mondayof March),and up to the end of his "term"(June 30), a President(or ActingPresid ent) shall not make appointments. Exception:Temporaryappointments,to executi ve positions,when continuedvacanciestherein will (1) prejudicepublic service (e.g. Postmaster) (ii) endange or r public safety (e.g. Chief of Staff).

This provision seems to have overruled previous pronouncements of the Supreme Court on the valid ity of "midnightappointments" . (Ad interim appointmentscould either be "midnight",if made by the Presidentbefore he steps down from office or recess,if madeby the President whenCongressis not in session. ) In Aytona v Castillo , 4 SCRA 1 (1962), the SC ruled that while "midnightappointments"are not illegal, they should be made in the capacityof a "caretaker" doubly carefuland prudentin making the selection,so as not to defeat the policies of the incom ingadministration.Said the court: After the proclamationof an incomingPresident,the outgoingPresidentis no more than a "caretaker" adm inistrator duty bound to preparefor the orderly transitionto the new President,and he should not do ac ts that would obstructthe policiesof his successor . The filling up of vacanciesin importantposts,if few, and so spacedas to afford some assuranceof delib erate action and carefulconsideration the need for the appointment of and the appointeesqualifications, may be undoubtedlypermitted. But the issuanceof 350 appointments one night, and the plannedinductionof almostall of them a few in hoursbeforethe inauguration the new President ay be regardedas abuseof presidential of m prerogatives . Where the President makes adinterim (i.e., midnight) appointments, he is bound to be "prudent" to insure approval of his selection, either by previous consultation with the CA or by explaininghis reason thereafter. Where the CA that will considerthe appointeesis differentfrom that existingat the time of appointment, wherethe nam esare to be submittedby his successor and who may not wholly approve of his selections, the President should be "doubly careful in extendingsuch appointment . In Jorge v Mayer , 10 SCRA 331 (1964),the Court emphasizedthe rule in Aytona that a prudentlymade midnightappointment spacedas to afford some assuranceof deliberateaction and carefulconsideration the so of need for the appointment and the appointees' qualifications is not prohibited by law. The circumstancesof Jorge'sappointment Directorof Lands in this case, based on his 38 years of faithfulserviceand confirmedby as the CA before its adjournment, were found to be judicious . In Quisumbingv Tajanglangi t , 10 SCRA 446 (1964),the SC emphasized that the Aytonaruling does not declare all midnightappointmentsas invalid, and that the ad interim appointmentof the petitionerchief of police here, whose qualificationand regularity were not disputed,except for the fact that it was made during the last few days of the old administration, thus not invalid is .

Interimor recessappointment s

Art VI, Sec. 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall be co n s titu ted ith in th irty d ay s afte r th e S e n atean d th e H o u seo f R ep rese n tativ es a ll h a ve b e en o rg a w sh n ize d with the election of the Presidentand the Speaker. The Commissionon Appointmentsshall meet only w hile the Congressis in session,at the call of its Chairm anor a m ajorityof all its M em bers,to disc harge s u c h p o w e rsa n d fu n c tio n s s h e re inc o n fe rre d p o n it. a u

Art. VII, Sec. 16. xxx T h e P res id en ts h all h a ve th e p o w e rto m a ke ap p o in tm en ts u rin gth e re ce sso f C o n g re ss , d w h eth er voluntar y or compulsory, but such appointment e effective only until disapproval by the C o m m is sio n n A p p o in tm e n ts r u n til th e n ex t ad jo u rn m e no f th e C o n g re ss . o o t shall b

Regularand recess(adinterim)appointment s The procedur for confirmatio has been discusse above unde Constitutiona Congressional e n d r l Committees.To sketch : Appointments requiring confirmation are of two kinds, (i) regular, if the CA, that is, Congress, is in session, or (ii) during the recess of Congress(because the Commissionshall meet only while Congress is in session[Art. VI, Sec. 19]). Regularappointment require confirmation before the appointee can take his post. The President s nominates,Congressreceives the nominationand forwards this to the CA for confirmation,then the Office of the Presidentissuesa Commission, whichpointthe appointeecan assum ehis office at . TemporaryDesignation s Recess appointments on the other hand, need no confirmationto be effective,albeit temporarily. The , appointment is effective until it is disapproved by the Commission on Appointments, or until the next adjournment Congress(unlessmeantime,it is confirmedby the Commission) of (Art. VII, Sec. 16, par. 2) : Administrative Code of 1987, Book III Sec. 17

The Presidentmay designatean officer already in the govt. service or any other competentperson to performthe functionsof any office in the executivebranch,appointment which is vested in him by law, when: to (a) The officer regularly appointed to the office is unable to perform his duties by reason of illness, absenceor any othercause;or (b) Thereexistsa vacancy ; In no case shall a tem porary designation exceedone (1) year.

(6) Limitationson the appointingpower of the Acting Presiden t

Art. VII, Secs. 1416 Art. VII, Sec. 14. Appointmentsextendedby an Acti ng Presidentshall remain effective unless re v o k e db y th e e le c te dP re s id e n t ith inn in e tyd ay s fro m w h is a s s u m p tio n r re a s s u m p tio n f o ffic e . o o A rt. V II, S ec. 15. Tw o m on thsim m ediately before the next presidential electionsand up to th e end of his term , a P residentor A cting Presidentshall not m a ke appointm ents, excepttem poraryappointm ents to executivepositionsw hen continuedvacanciesth erein w ill prejudicepublic serviceor endangerpublic s a fe t y .

Art. VII, Sec. 16. xxx The Presidentshall have the power to make appoin tments during the recess of the Congress, whethervoluntaryor compulsory, such appointments but sh all be effectiveonly until disapproval the by Com m ission Appointm ents until the next adjournment on or o f the Congress .

UPDATED1/23/96 /RAM

(7) Executiveclemencie s Art. VII, Sec. 19. Exceptin cases of impeachment, or as otherwiseprovidedin this Constitution, the Presidentmay grant reprieves,commutations,and par dons, and remit fines and forfeitures,after convictionby final judgment . It shall also have the power to grant amnesty wit h the concurrence of a majority of all the M em bersof the Congress .

The President may grant (i)reprieves, (ii) commutatio ns, and (iii) pardons, and (iv) remit fines and forfeitures,after convictionby final judgment,except : (a) In casesof impeachment, and (b) As otherwiseprovidedin this Constitution,viz.

Art. IX, C, Sec. 5. No pardon,am nesty,parole or suspensionof sentencefor violationof election law s, rules, and regulationsshall be granted by the Presidentwithout the favorablerecom m endati on by th e C o m m is s io n n E le c tio n s .) (o

Definitions Repriev e is a temporaryrelief from or postponementof executionof criminal penalty or sentence or a , stay of execution. It does not m ore than stay the executionof a sentenceextendedto a prisonerto afford him an infra.) opportunityto procure some ameliorationof the sentenceimposed.(Black.) It is the withholdingof a sentence for an interval of time, a postponementof execution,a temporarysuspensionof execution. (People vs. Vera Commutatio n , infra.) Pardo n is a reduction of sentence. (Black.) It is a remission of a part of the punishment; a substitutionof a less penalty for the one originallyim posed. (People vs. Vera , infra.) is a permanentcancellationof sentence.(Black) It is an act of grace proceedingfrom the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for the crime he has committed. It is a remission of guilt, a forgiveness of the offense. (Peoplev Vera

Cruz: Kinds of Pardon. Pardon may be classified into absolute or conditional and plenary or partial. An absolutepardonis one extendedw/o any stringsattached,so to speak,whereasa conditional pardonis one under w/c the convict is requiredto comply w/ certain requirements. A plenary pardon extinguishesall the penalties imposedupon the offender,includingaccessorydisabilities, whereaspartialpardondoes not. Where the pardon is conditional,the offenderhas the right to reject the same since he may feel that the condition imposed is more onerous than the penalty sought to be remitted. But in the case of an absolute y pardon,Amnest the pardoneehas no option at all and must acceptit whetherhe likes it or not. In this sense,an absolute pardonis similarto commutation, is also not subjectto acceptance the offender w/c by . is a sovereign act of oblivion for past acts, granted by government generally to a class of persons who have been guilty usually of political offenses(treason,sedition,rebellion),and who are subject to n trial but Probatio yet been convicted, and often defendantafter convictionandto obedience and duty withinto have not is a dispositionunder which a conditioned upon their return sentenceis released subject a conditionsimposedby the court and to the supervisionof a probationofficer. [Sec. 3 (a), PD 968.] prescribedtime. (Black;Brown v Walker,161 US 602). Parol e

is the suspension of the sentence of a convict granted by a Parole Board after serving the minimum term of the indeterminatesentence penalty, without granting a pardon, prescribing the terms upon whichthe sentenceshallbe suspended .

(a) Pardon distinguishedfrom probatio n Peoplevs. Vera , 6 5 P 56 (193 7) Probation and Pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same. They are actually distinct an d different from each other, both in origin and nature. In probation, the probation er is in no true sense, as in pardon,a free man. He is not finally and completelyexonerated. He is not exempt from the entire punishment w/c the law inflicts. U nder the Probatio n Act, the probationer'scase is not ter m inated by the m ere fact that he is placed on probation. The probationer,du ring the period of probation,remains in le gal custody subject to the controlof the probationofficer and of the court, he may be rearrestedupon the no nfulfillmentof the conditions of probationand, when rearrested,may b e committedto prison to serve the senten ce originallyimposed upon him.

Notes :

In both cases, there must be a fi nal judgment of conviction, and the conv ict must be exempted from service of sentence. But pardon is grant ed by the Chief Executivefor any crime, while probationis granted by In pardon, the convict becomes a free man; in parole, he is not really free because although he his the court after investigationby a probation releasedfrom the custodyof the law, he officer only for cases where the penalty i Board of Parole must submitto periodicexamination the by . In Tesoro v Directorof Prisons mposeddoes not exceed 6 years and 1 day (prision mayor), where t he crime is not against the security of the State, where there was no previous convictionfor an offense punish ed by arresto mayor, and where there wa s no previous availmentof probation . In absolutepardon,the sentencea nd its effects,includingthe accessory penal

ties, are abolishedupon the grant of pardon. In probation,the restorat ion of the probationerto his civil rights tak es places only after his final dischargeafter the period of his probation. (Secs.14 & 16)

(b) Pardondistinguished from Parol e Pardon may be granted by the C hief Executiveunder the Constitutionand formerlythe Administrative Code, at any time after final judgmentof c onviction,even before service;while parol e is grantedby the Board of Pardonsand Parole under the Indetermin ate SentenceLaw only after the convicth as served the minimumterm of his sentence .

,6 8 Phil 154 (1939),the SC dismissedthe co ntentionthat becauseparole is not mentionedin the Constitution, then t he powerto grant paroleis also deemedr epealed. The Court said that parole is part of the pardoningpower of t he President. Justice Fernando points o ut, however, that this is not accurate. If ever the Presidenthas the po wer to grant parole,it is becausethe law g rants him that power,and not becauseparoleis part of pardon .

, Tesoro vs. D irectorof P rison68 Phil 154 s F:

On Oct. 10, 1934, petiti oner Tesoro was convicted in th e CFI Manila of the crime of falsi fication of a public documentand was sentenced.His penaltywas to expire on Oct. 28, 1 937. On Nov. 14, 1935, the G ov. Gen. granted the petitioner a parole, which the latter accepted, Prisons. subject to certain conditions. One of the condition s was that he will not commit an y other crime and will conduct hi mself in an orderly manner . Dec. 3, 1937, the petr was chargedwith the crime of adultery. However,the case was dismissedf or nonappearance of the complainant, Jose Nagar. Feb. 1938, Nagar lodge d a complaint with the Board of I ndeterminate Sentence, and up on the same facts supporting the crim. action, char ged petitioner with violation of th e conditions of his parole. Later, by virtue of an ord er from the President, the petr wa s arrested and recommitted to th e custody of the Dir. of Petr. contends that sec. 64 (i) of the Rev. Adm. Code, ins ofar as it confers upon the Chief Executive the power to grant and revoke paroles, has be en impliedly repealed by Par. 6, s ec. 11, Art. VII of the Constitution, as the latter omitted to specify such power in connection with the powers granted therein to the President of the Philippines. Sec. 64(1) gives the Gov. Gen the ff. powers and duties: "To grant to convicted persons reprieves or pardons, e ither plenary or partial, conditio nal or

unconditional;to suspend sentenc es without pardon, remit fines, an d order the discharge of any convi cted person upon parole, subject to s uch conditions as he may impos e; and to authorize the arrest an d re incarceration of any such pers on who, in his judgment shall f ail to comply with the conditio n, or conditions, of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence. " The aforementionedConstituti onal provision provides: "The President shall have the power to grant repri eves, commutations,and pardons , and remit fines and forfeitures, after c onviction, for all offenses, except in cases of impeachment, upon s uch conditions and with such restrictio ns and limitations as he may dee m proper to impose. He shall hav e the power to grant amnesty with the c oncurrence of the National Assem bly."

ISSUENO. 1: W/N there has b een a repeal . HELD: NONE. The power to pardon given the President b y the Constitution,"upon suc h conditions and with such restrictions and limitatio ns as he may deem proper to impose," includes the power t o grant and revoke paroles. If the omission of the power of parole in the Constit ution is to be construedas a denial thereof to the President, the effect would be to discharge uncondition

ally parolees, who, before t he adoption of the Constitution, have been releas ed conditionally the Chief E by xecutive . ISSUE NO. 2: W/N the Board has legal authorityto investiga te the conductof the petitioner . HELD: YES. By the terms of hi s parole, petitioneragreed to r eport to the executivesecretar y of the Board once a month during the first year of his parole,and thereafter,onc e every 3 months.By his cons ent to this condition, petitionerhas placed himselfu nder the supervisionof the Bo ard. The duty to report on the part of the petitioner

implies a corresponding power on the part of the Board to inquire into his conduct and a fortiori to make recommendations the Presidentby whose authority it was acting. The power to revoke paroles necessarily to carries with it the power to investigate and to inquire into the conduct of the parolees, if such power of revocationis to be rationaland intelligent.In the exerciseof this incidentalpower, the P residentis not pre cluded by law or by the Constitutionfrom m aking use of any agency of the govt, or even of any individual,to secu re the necessary assistance . ISSUE NO. 3: W/N judicial pronouncement the effect that he has committeda crime is necessarybefore he to can be properlyadjudgedas having violatedhis conditionalparole . HELD: NO. As one of the conditionsof his parole, petitioneragreed that he will not commitany other crime and will conducthimselfin an orderly manner.Thus, the mere commission,not his convictionby court, of any other crime, that was necessaryin order that petitionermay be deemedto have violatedhis parole.And under Sec. 64 (i), the Chief Executive is authorized to order "the arrest and reincarcerationof any such person who, in his judgment shall fail to complywith the condition/sof his pardon,parole,or suspensionof sentence , . ISSUE NO. 4: W/N the courts can review the findings of the Pres. regarding the violation of the conditional parole . HELD: NO. Where the determination of the violation of the conditional parole rests exclusively in the sound judgmentof the Chief Executive,the courts will not interfere,by way of review, with any of his findings . ISSUE NO. 5: W/N upon the expiration of his maximum term of imprisonment, his conditional parole also expires . HELD: NO. When a conditionalpardon is violated,the prisoneris placed in the same state in w/c he was at the time the pardon was granted.He may be rearrestedand recommittedto prison.xxx The rule is wells ettled that, in requiringthe convict to undergo so much of the punishmentimposedby his original sentenceas he had not sufferedat the time of his release,the court should not considerthe time during which the convict was at large by virtue of the pardon as time served on the original sentence.(Pp. v. Tapel) This rule applies by analogy to conditionalparole. Adapted . 152 SCRA272 F: Torresv. G onzale s
Before 1979, Torres was convicted of the crime of estafa (2 counts) and was sentenced to imprisonmentand to pay an indemnity. The maximum sentence would expire on Nov. 2, 2000. On April 18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted the petitioner by the President on condition that petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Phil. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribedby law. Petitioneraccepted the conditionalpardon and was released. On Sept. 8, 1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner upon recommendation of the Board of Pardons. The record before the Board showed that petitioner had been charged with 20 counts of estafa, convicted

of sedition w/c is the subject of an appeal, and a letter report from the NBI showing a long list of charges brought against the petitioner. The petitioner was subsequently arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. Petitioner claims he did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment of the 20 counts of estafa nor of the crime of sedition. He also contends that he was not given an opportunity to be heard before he was arrestedand recommitted prison and thus deprivedof due process to .

ISSUE: W/N convictionof a crime by final judgmentof a court is necessarybefore the petitionercan be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balanceof his originalsentence . HELD: NO. The Court cited 3 cases: Espuelasv. Prov'l Wardenof Bohol; Tesoro v. Dir. of Prisons and Salesv. Dir. of Prisons. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executiveacts which are not subjectto judicialscrutiny . The determination the occurrenceof a breachof a conditionof a pardon,and the properconsequences of of such breach,may be either a purely executiveact, not subjectto judicialscrutinyunder Sec. 64 (i) of the Rev. Adm. Code; or it may be a judicial act consistingof trial for and convictionof violation of a conditionalpardon under Art. 159 of the RPC. Where the President opts to proceed under Sec. 64 (i), RAC, no judicial pronouncement guilt of a subsequentcrime is necessary,much less convictionthereforby final judgmentof a of court, in order that a convictmay be recommended the violationof his conditionalpardon for . Becausedue processis not semperet ubique judicial process,and becausethe conditionallypardoned convicthad already been accordedjudicial due processin his trial and convictionfor the offensefor w/c he was conditionallypardoned,sec. 64 (i), RAC, is not afflicted with a constitutionalvice. In short, in proceeding against a convict who has been conditionallypardoned and who is alleged to have breachedthe conditionsof his pardon,the ExecutiveDept. has 2 options:(i) to proceedagainsthim under Sec. 64 (i), RAC; or (ii) to proceed against him under Art. 159, RPC which imposes the penalty of prision correccional minimum period, upon a convict who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive,shall violate any of the conditionsof such pardon.Here, the Presidenthas chosento proceedagainst the petitionerunder the RAC. That choice is an exerciseof the executiveprerogativeand not subjectto judicial scrutiny. Adapted .

(c) Pardondistinguished from Amnest y 1. Pardonis usuallygrantedfor commoncrimes;amnesty,for politicalcrimes . 2. Pardonis grantedto individuals; amnesty,to a group,class,or communitygenerally .

3. Pardon can only be grantedafter conviction;am nestym ay be grantedeven befor e trial. 4. Pardon looks forward and relievesthe offenderfrom the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted,that is, it abolishesor forgivesthe punishm ent;am nestylooks back infra.) ward and abolishesand puts into oblivion the offense itself, that is, it overlooksand obliteratesthe offense with which the convict is charged that the person releasedstands preciselyas though he had committedno offense. (Barri oquinto v Fernande z

F:

5. P ardonis a private act of the P residentw /c m ust be pleadedand proved by the person bec. the courts do not take judicial notice of it; amnesty is a public act of w/c the courts take judicial noti ce. (Cruz, Philippine 82 Phil 642 PoliticalLaw, 1991 ed.) 6. Pardondoes not requirethe concurrence the Congress; nestyrequiressuch concur of am rence. (id.)

Barrioquintoet al v. Fernande z
Petitioners Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged with murder. Jimenez was senten ced to life imprisonment. Before the period for perfecting an appeal had expired, Jimenez became aware of Procl. No. 8 which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with an act penalized under the RPC in furtherance of re sistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and committed during the period Dec. 8, 194 1 to the date when each particular area of the Phil. where the offense was actually committed was liberated from enemy control and occupation. The petitioners submitted their cases to the Guerrilla Amnesty Commission (GAC). The GAC returned their cases to the CFIZamboanga w/o deciding whether or not they ar e entitled to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, on the ground that inasmuch as neither of the petitioners have ad mitted to committing the offense, they cannot invoke the benefits of the amnesty.

HELD: Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned,becausethe courts take no notice thereof;while Amnesty is by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which t he courts should take judicial notice.

Pardo is granted to one after conviction; while Am nesty is granted to n classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the inst itution of the criminal prosecution and sometimesafter conviction . Pardon looks forward and relieves the offenderfrom the consequencesof an off ense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason i t does "not work the restorationof the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage,unless such rights be expresslyrestoredby the terms of the pardon,"and it "in no case exemptsthe culprit from the paymentof the ci vil indemnityimposed upon him by the sentence"(Art 36 RPC). While Amnestylooks backwardand abolishes and puts into oblivion the offenseitself, it so overlooksand obliteratesthe offensewith which he is chargedthat t he personreleasedby amnestystandsbeforethe law preciselyas thoughhe had comm itted offense no .

ISS UE : W /N in order to entitle a person to the benefitsof the A m nestyP rocl. of Sept. 7, 1946, it is necess ary as a conditionprecedentthat he should admit having committedthe criminalact with w/c he is chargedand allege the am nesty a defense as . HELD: NO. It is sufficientthat the evidence,either of the complainantor of the accused,shows that the offense com m ittedcomes w/n the term s of said A m nestyP rocl. It is not correct to say that "invocation of the benefits of the amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance. Although the accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may be declaredby the courts or the AmnestyCommissionsentitled to the benefitsof the amnesty.For, w/n he admits or confesses having committed the offense w/ w/c he is charged, the Commissions should, if necessary or requestedby the interestedparty, conductsummaryhearing of the witnessesboth for the complainantsand the accused, on whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or against personsaiding in the war efforts of the enemy,and decide whetherhe is entitled to the benefitsof amnestyand to be "regardedas a patriot or hero who has renderedinvaluableservices to the nation," or not, in accordance with the terms of the AmnestyProclamation . ISSUE:W/N the benefitsof amnestymay be waived . HELD: The right to the benefits of amnesty, once established by the evidence presented, either by the prosecution the defense,cannotbe waived,becauseit is of public interestthat a personwho is regardedby the or AmnestyProclamation, which has the force of law, not only as innocent,for he standsin the eyes of the law as if he had never committedany punishableoffense because of the amnesty, but as a patriot or hero, cannot be punishedas a criminal .

DissentingOpinion : Amnestypresupposesthe commissionof a crime. When an accusedsays that he has not committeda crime, he cannothave any use for amnesty.It is also selfevidentthat where the AmnestyProclamation imposes certain conditions,as in this case, it is incumbentupon the accusedto prove the existenceof those conditions.A petition for amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance. The pleader has to confess the allegationsagainsthim beforehe is allowedto set out such facts as, if true, would defeatthe action . o The 4th distinction (pardon is forward looking while amnesty is backward looking) is not accurate on the basisof decidedcases . It can be seen from severalcases,thereforethat the effect of pardonretroactsto the day of the crime. It is not simply forwardlooking. Pardonis still useful,then, even if the convicthas alreadyservedhis full sentence,becausethere may be

acce sso ryp en altie sth at are perpe tua lin exten t. A d ap t ed . Notes :

The fifth distinctionbet. pardon and am nestyis that pardon is a private act of the P resident,and so mu st be im pleadedin court; am nestyis a public act by the P r esidentand C ongress,and so the court is enjoinedto t ake judicial notice of it. (supra) The 5th distinction (pardon is a private act while amnesty is a public act) is not true in Philippine law. The case holds that pardon must be raised as a defense, otherwisethe court cannot take judicial notice of such pardon. But under Art. 89 of the RPC, absolute pardo n extinguishes criminal liability. And under the Constitution,pardon can only be granted after final convict ion. If so, once, a convicthas been granted pardon, this impliesthat he has alreadybeen convicted,and that pr eciselyhe has been exemptedfrom the penaltyarising from conviction.Why would he still have to invoke it? This seems to contemplatea situationwhere he is being charged again of the same crime, and that he needs to i nvoke the pardon as a defense, which is impossible becauseof doublejeopardy . The error in the Barrioquintoruling is that it borro wed this distinctionfrom American law, which allows the President the power to grant pardon even before co nviction (thus, Ford was able to pardon Nixon even without a trial.) Such was our law under the Jones Law of 1916. B ut under the 1935 Constitution, rule was changed: this pardon could only be grantedafter conviction, In 1973, it w In Cristobalv Labrador , 71 Phil 34 (1940),the voter whose right to vote was challengedin an exclusion as made stricter: pardoncould be grantedonly after proceedingbecausehe had been convictedof estafa which carriedthe accessorypenaltyof disqualification from "final" conviction. Then, in 1981, the phrase "after final c the right of suffrage, and in Pellobello v Palatino, onviction" was dropped, thus going back to the rule under the Jones Law and the Presidentcould grant pardon anytime. In 1987, the phrase reads: "after conviction by final judgment. " Aside from extinguishingcriminal liability, pardon also works to remit fines and forfeiturespaid in favor of the Government .

But it does not automaticallyrestore the public offi ce forfeited,nor relieve the pardoneeof civil liability and other claims pertainingto the private offendedparty.

(d) Effectsof Pardon

72 Phil 441 (1941), the mayorelect who was not allowed to take his oath becauseof a previousconviction,for falsifica tion of a private documentwhich likewisecarried the accessorypenaltyof disqualification, were both allowedto exercisetheir politicalright in view of the subsequent pardon granted them. [There would be no problem if the y were pardoned beforehand,for then they would be restoredto their political right(s) right away.]

Cristobalv Labrado , 71 P hil 34 (1940) r F:

On 3/15/30, Teofilo Santos was f ound guilty of estafa and sentenced to 6 months of arresto m ayor. Upon appeal, his conviction was aff irmed. He was confi ned in jail from 3/14/ 9/32 to 8/18/32. Not withstanding his conv iction, Santos continued to be a reg istered elector in Mal abon, Rizal and was municipal pres. from 1934 to 1937. Subse quently, The Election Code was a pproved. Sec. 94, p ar. (b) of said law dis qualifies the resp. fro m voting for having b een declared by final judgment guilty

Pelobellov. Palatin of any crime against o F:

prop." Bec. of this pr ovision, Santos petiti oned the Chief Exec utive for absolute pardon. The Pres. g ranted his petition re storing him to his "ful l civil and political rig hts, except that with respect to the

right to hold public o ffice or employment, he will be appointed for appointments onl HELD: YES. The SC adopts the broad view in Cristobalv. Labrador y to positions w/c ar e clerical or manual in nature an d involving no mone y or prop. responsibil ity. On 11/40, Cristo bal filed a petition for the exclusion of Santos' name in from the list of voters in M alabon on the ground that the latter is disqu

alified under par. (b), Sec. 94 of CA 357. LC denied Cris tobal's petition holdin g that Santos' pardo n had the effect of e xcluding him from th e disqualification created by par. (b) of Sec. 94. Hence, this petition for ceritorari.

HELD: There are 2 limitationsupon t he exercise of the constitutionalprero gative of the Pres. to grant pardon: (1) that the power be exercisedafter c onviction;(2) that s uch power does not extend to cases of i mpeachment. xxx An absolutep ardon not only blot s out the crime co mmittedbut it also removesall disabili ties resultingfrom conviction. In the present case, the d isability is the resul t of convictionw/o w/c there would be no basis for the disqualificationfro m voting. xxx In the pres ent case, while the pardon extended i s conditional in the sense that "he will be eligible for appointment only t o positions w/c ar e clerical or manu al in nature involvi

ng no money or pr op. resp., " it is absoluteinsofar as it "restoresthe resp . to full civil and poli tical rights." Ada pted. 72 Phil 441
Pelobello all eges that Palatino is disqualified from voti ng and being voted u pon. It appears that Palatino was con victed by final judgme nt in 1912 of atentad o contra la autoridad y sus agentes and se ntenced to imprisonm ent. He was later elected mayor of To rrijos, Marinduque in 1940. It is admitted t hat Palatino was gra nted by the Gov. Ge n. a conditional pardon in 1915. It is also proven that on D ec. 25, 1940, the Pre sident granted him a bsolute pardon and r estored him to the enjoyment of full civi l and political rights.

ISSUE: W/N the ab solute pardon had t he effect of removi ng the disqualificati on incidentto crimi nal conviction under the then Elec tion Code, the pard on having been gra nted after the electi on but before the d ate fixed by law for assumingoffice .

that subject to the limitationsimposed by the Constitution,th e pardoningpower cannot be restricte d or controlledby l egislation;an absol ute pardon not only blots out the crime committed b ut removes all dis abilities resulting f rom the conviction ; and that when grantedafter the te rm of imprisonment has expired,absolu te pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction. Thus the better view is n ot to unnecessarily restrict or impair th e power of the Chi ef Executive who, after inquiry i nto the environme ntal facts, should b e at liberty to aton e the rigidity of law to the extent of relieving completel y the party or parti es concerned from the accessory an d resultant disabilit ies of criminal

conviction .

Under the ci rcumstance s of the cas e, it is evide nt that the p In Lacunav Abes urpose in gr anting him absolutepa rdon was to enable h im to assu m e the posi tion in defe rence to th Lacunav. Abes e popularw ill; and the F: pardon w as thus extend ed after the election bu t before the date fixed by the E lec tion Code f or assum in g office. A dapted .

, 24 SCRA 780, the pet itioner was convictedof counterfeiti ng, and so was disqual ified from the rig ht of suffrag e. As a res ult, he was not allowed to file his ca ndidacy,ev en if he was already gra nted

pardon,be cause one of the requi rem entsfor the office w as that the candidateb e a qualifie d voter. Th e S C , after pointing out that the law did not req uire that he be a regist ered voter but only a q ualified vot er at the da y of election,poi nted out tha t, grantinga rguendo pa , rdon retroac ted to the d ay of the cri me. Thus, on the day of the ele ction ,"it is as tho ug h he was a re gisteredv oter e ven if on tha t d ay, he w a s n ot ye t pa rd on ed ."

24 SCRA 7 80

Mayorelect A bes had bee n convicted of the crime of counterfeit ing treasury warrants and

sentenced to prision mayor and a fine. After he had partially served his s entence, he was release d on April 7, 1959 by virtu e of a conditi onal pardon grant ed by the Pr esident, remi tting only the unexpired po rtion of the p rison term an d fine. Witho ut the pardo n, his maximumsen tence would h ave been ser ved on Oct. 1 3, 1961. With the approach of the 1967 e lections, Abe s applied for registration a s a voter but said applicati on was denie d. Despite this, Abes filed hi s certificate of candidac y for the offi ce of mayor and later wo n. On Nov. 16, 1967, he was proclaimed th e fully electe d mayor. Lac una placed s econd. Lacuna filed his petition f or quo warra

nto with preli m. injunction in CFINueva Ecija. On the same day th at the hearing was held on the a pplication for prelim. injunc tion, the Pres ident granted Abes an abs olute and unc onditional par don and restored to him full civ il and politica l rights. CFI dismissed th e petition, de claring Abes' eligibility to t he position o f mayor. Lacuna cont ends that the restoration of Abes' civil an d pol. rights did not retro act to remov e the disqual ification existing anter ior to the gra nt of the pard on.

ISSUE: W/ N a plenary pardon, gra nted after el ection but b efore the da te fixed by l aw for assu ming office, had the effect of removingth e disqualific

ations presc ribed by bot h the crimin al and elect oral codes. HELD: YE S. The vie w consiste ntly adopte d in this jur isdiction is that the pa rdon's effe cts should not be unnecessari ly limited as it would lea d to the imp airmentof t he pardonin g power, wh ich was not contemplat ed in the Constitu tion (Cristob al v. Labrad or; Pelobell o v. Palatin o; Mijares v. Custorio) . As l aid down in the Pelobel lo case, "xx x subject to the limitatio ns imposed by the Con stitution, th e pardoningp ower canno t be restrict ed or contro lled by legis lative action ; that an ab solute pard

on not only blots out the crim e committe d but remo ves all disa bilities resul ting from co nviction; an d that when granted aft er the term of imp risonmenth as expired, absolute pa rdon remov es all that i s left of the consequen ces of conv iction. Thus the be tter view is not to unne cessarilyre strict or imp air the pow er of the Ch ief Executiv e who, after inquiry into the envi ronmentalf acts, should be at liberty to atone the rigidity of la w to the ext ent of reliev ing complet ely the party or parties con cerned fro m the acce ssory and r esultantdis abilities of c riminal con viction. Ad apted.

In Monsanto vs Factora , 170 SCRA 190, where a woman who was convicted of estafa through n falsificationof public documentswas grantedan absolutepardon,and thereafterclaimedshe was entitled as a consequence reinstatem ent assistantcity treasurer,the S C held that a pardon cannot m ask the acts c to as onsti tuting the crime. These are "historicalfacts" which, despite the public manifestationof mercy and forgiveness implicit in pardon, "ordinary, prudent men will take into account in their subsequentdealings with the actor." Pardon granted after convictionfrees the individualfrom all penaltiesand legal disabilitiesand restores him to all his civil rights. But unless expresslygroundedon the person'sinnocence,it cannot bring back lost rep utation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. This must be constantly kept in mind, lest we lose track of th e true character and purpose of the privilege. Thus, pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction, although such pardon undou btedly restoreshis eligibilityfor appointmentto that office. Monsantovs Factora n

, 17 0 S C R A 1 90 F: A PardonedConvictis not Entitledto Reinstatement a Public Office. to

Petitioner Salvacion Monsanto was Asst. Treasurer of Calbayog City. She was convicted of estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced to 4 yrs., 2 mos. and 1 day of prision correcional, as minimum, to 10 yrs. and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum; to pay fine (P3,500) and to indemnify the govt (P4,892.50) in a decision of the SB. While her case was pending appeal in the SC, she was granted absolute pardon and "restored to full civil and political rights" by then Pres. Marcos. The Ministry of Finance agreed to reinstate her w/o necessity of a new appointment provided this was done not earlier than the date of her pardon. However, on 4/15/86, the new administration held that she was not entitled to automatic reinstatementon the basis of the pardon granted her. As her MFR was denied, petitioner brought this action to the SC. Petitioner's theory is that the gen. rule on pardon does not apply to her bec. she was extended clemency while her case was still pending in the SC. She contended that w/o final judgment on conviction, the accessory penalty of forfeiture of office did not attach.

HELD: (1) Petitionerwas grantedpardon under the 1973 Consti.,as amended,w/c, by deletingthe requirement that pardon could be granted only after final conviction, impliedly authorized it to be granted even before conviction. The 1987 Consti. reverted to the former rule, requiring final convictionas a condition for the grant by the Pres. of pardon. However,it is immaterialwhen the pardonwas granted,for the result would be the same. By acceptingthe pardon,the petitioneris deemedto have abondonedher appeal,w/ the result that the judgment of conviction of the SB (w/c entailed her temporary absolute disqualification from holding public office) becamefinal. (2) The modern trend of authoritiesreject the unduly broad languageof Ex Parte Garland,4 Wall. 333 (1867) to the effect that in the eyes of the law, the offender who is pardoned is as innocent as if he had never committedthe offense. While we are preparedto concedethat pardonmay remit all the penal consequences a of criminalindictmentif only to give meaningto the fiat that a pardon,being a presidentialprerogative,should not

be circumscribed by legislative action, we do not subscribe to the view that pardon blots out the guilt of an

ind ividu ala nd tha t once he is a bsolved ,he shou ldb e tre atedas if he w e re in no ce nt. F or w ha teverm ay h ave be en the judicialdicta in the past, we cannot perceivehow pardon can producesuch "moral changes"as to equate a pardoned convict in character and conduct w/ one who has constantly maintained the mark of a good, law abiding citizen. Accordingly,pardon does not ipso facto restore him to public office may have been forfeitedby reason of the conviction,althoughsuch pardon undoubtedlyrestoreshis eligibilityfor appointmentto that office. Petitioner may apply for reappointment but, in considering her qualifications, the facts constituting her convictionshould be taken into accountto determ inew hethershe can again be entrustedw / public funds. (3) Nor can petitionerbe exemptedfrom the paymentof the civil indemnity. It subsistsnotwithstanding serviceof sentence,if for any reason the sentenceis not served by pardon,am nestyor com m utation sen of tence. VV. Notes on the case: "Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties an d legal disabilitiesand restoreshim to all his civil rights. But unless expresslygroundedon the person'sinnocenc e (w /c is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputationfor honesty,integrityand fair dealing. This must be constantlykept in mind lest we lose track of the true characterand purposeof the privilege. xxx" 152 SCRA 272 (e) Sanctionsfor violationsof conditionalpardon Torresvs G onzale s In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breachedthe conditionsof his pardon,the ExecutiveDept. has 2 options:(i) to proceedagainsthim under Sec. 64(i), RAC; or (ii) to proceed against him under Art. 159, RPC which imposes the penalty of prision correc cional minimum period, upon a convict who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon. Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under the RAC. That choice is an exercise of the executive prerogative and not subject to judicial scrutiny . , 202 SCRA 844 (1991 ) (f) Does pardoningpowerapply to administrative cases ?

F: Llamasvs ExecutiveSecretar y "Conviction"may be used in either a criminalcase or in an administrativecase. Pet. Llamas was ViceGov. of Tarlac who assumedthe positionof gov. when Gov. Ocampowas found guilty by DILG of a viol. of RA 3019 and meted a penalty of 90 days suspension. Administrative convictionwas based on complaintfiled by petitionersand others chargingOcampow/ executingloan agreementw/ Lingkod Tarlac Foundation for the amount of P20M, w/c is a nonstock and nonprofit org. headed by the gov. as

chairman and his brotherinlaw as executive director, trustee and secretary. Loan was claimed to be disadvantageousto the govt. MFR by Ocampo was denied by DILG. On 3/19/91, Ocampo issued "admin.

order" wherein he signified intention to continue in office at his residencein the belief that pendencyof appeal to the Exec. Sec. precluded finality as executory of the DILG order. W/o ruling on the MFR, the Exec. Sec. issued a resolution granting executive clemency to Ocampo. Llamas filed petition claiming that exec utive clem en cyco uld o nly be g ra ntedby th e P re s . in crim . ca ses,n ot in ad m in.ca se s. HELD: According to petitioner, "after conviction by final judgment" applies solely to crim. cases." B ut, he him selfdescribesthe governoras one "convictedin an adm in. case" and thus actuallyconcedesthat "convi ction" m ay be used either in a crim . or adm in. case. The C onst. does not distinguishbet. w /c cases executivecle m ency m ay be exercised the Pres.,w/ the sole exclusionof impeachment by cases . If the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executiveclemencyin administrativecases, which are clearly less serious than criminaloffenses However,the power of the Presidentto grant executiveclemencyin . administrative cases refers only to administrative cases in the Executive branch and not in the Judic ial or Legislativebranchesof the govt. Under the doctrineof QualifiedPoliticalAgency,the differentExecutivedepartmentsare mere adjuncts of the President. Their acts are presumptivelythe acts of the Presidentuntil countermandedor reprobatedby her. In this case, the President in the exercise of her power of supervision and control over all executive departments, may substitute her decision for that of her subordinate. It is clearly within the power of the Presidentnot only to grant "executiveclemency"but also to reverse or modify a ruling issued by a subordinate against an erring public official, where a reconsiderationof the facts alleged would support the same. It is in this sensethat the allegedexecutiveclemencywas granted. Adapted .

Sec. 53, Chapter7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V, Administrative Code of 1987 Sec. 53. Removalof Administrative Penaltiesor Disabilities. In meritoriouscases and upon recommendation the (Civil Service)Commission, Presidentmay commuteor removeadministrative of the penaltiesor disabilitiesimposedupon officersor employeesin disciplinarycases,subjectto such terms and conditions he m ay im posein the interestof the servic as e Tolentinovs Catoy (g) ? F: Who may avail of amnesty 82 Phil 300 (1948)
Petitioner was a Hukbalahap who was found guilty of illegal assembly in furtherance of the Hukbalahap designs. After the judgment was promulgated, the President issued Proc. No. 76 granting amnesty to leaders and members of the Hukbalahap. Petitioner who was already serving his sentence, sent a petition to the President for his release under the provisions of the proclamation. No action was taken on his petition. He then went to court and filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus.

HELD : Though some members of the Court question the applicability of Amnesty Proclamation No. 76 to Hukbalahapsalready undergoingsentenceupon the date of its promulgation,the majority of the Court believe

that by its context and pervadingspirit the proclam ationextendsto all m em bersof the H ukbalahap. It m a kes no exception when it announces that the amnesty is proclaimed in favor of the leaders and members o f the associationsknown as the Hukbalahapand PambansangKaisahan ng Magbubukid(PKM). No compelling reason is apparentfor excludingHukbalahapsof any class or conditionfrom its object which is "to forgive and forego the prosecution of the crimes of rebellion, sedition, etc." If total punishment is foregone in fa vor of H ukbalahaps ho succeededin evadingarrest, it stands to reason that those w ho fell into the clutchesof t w he law have a better claim to clem encyfor the rem ainingportion of a punishm entfixed for the sam e offense . The avowed practical objective of the amnesty is to secure pledge of loyalty and obedience to the constitutedauthoritiesand encourageresumptionof lawful pursuits and occupation. This objectivecannot be expectedto meet with full successwithoutthe goodwilland cooperationof the Hukbalahapswho have become m ore em bitteredby their capture,prosecutionand incarceration . M acaga vs Peopl an e Fundamentally and in their utmost effect, pardon and amnesty are synonymous. Pardon in cludes am n e sty. P a rd o na n d a m n e stya re b o th co n stru e dm o st s tric tlya g a in s tth e s ta te . A d a p te d .

152 SCRA 430 Petitioners were charged and convicted of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documentsby the Sandiganbayan.They claimedthat they had been grantedamnestyby PresidentMarcos. The Sandiganbayan claimedthat the benefitsof amnestywere never availableto petitionersunderPD 1182. The SC agreedwith the Sandiganbayan in fact the petitionerswere expresslydisqualified that from amnesty.The acts for which they were convicted were ordinary crimes without any political complexion and consisting only of diversion of public funds to private profit. The amnesty proclamation covered only acts in the furtherance of resistanceto duly constitutedauthoritiesof the Republic . Vera vs. Peopl e

BARLONGAY CASE: F: , 7 SCRA 152 (1963) Amnestycannotbe invoked,wherethe accusedactuallydeniesthe comm ission the offensecharged of .
In the CFIQuezon, petitioners Vera, among others, were charged w/ the complex crime of kidnapping w/ murder of Amadeo Lozanes. Upon petitioners' motion, invoking the benefits of Amnesty Procl. of the Pres, s. of 1946, the case was referred to the Eight Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, w/c actually tried it. During the hearing, none of the petitioners admitted having committed the crime charged. In fact, Vera, the only def. who took the witness stand, instead of admitting the killing of the deceased Lozanes, categorically denied it. Hence, the Commission, in its decision held that it could not take cognizance of the case, on the ground that the benefits of the Amnesty Procl., could be invoked only by defs. in a criminal case who, admitting the commission of the crime, plead that said commission was in pursuance of the resistance movement and perpetrated against persons who aided the enemy during the Japanese occupation. Consequently, the Commission ordered that the case be remanded to the court of origin for trial. A MFR was filed by petitioners but was denied. From this order of the Commission, petitioners appealed to the CA w/c certified the appeal to us, in view of the legal issue involved.

ISSUE: W/n personsinvokingthe benefit of amnestyshould first admit having committedthe crime of w/c they

are accused. Petitioners contend that to be entitled to the benefits of Amnesty Procl. No. 8, it is not necessary for them to admit the commissionof the crime charged, citing in support of their submission,among others, the case of Barrioquinto, al vs. Fernandez,et, al. et. (82 P642.) to the effect that "in order to ent itle a person to the benefitsof A m nesty P rocl., it is not neces sary that he s hould, as a co ndition preced ent, admit hav ing com m itted the criminal ac t or offense w/ w/c he is char ged, and alleg e the amnesty as a defense; i t is sufficient t hat the evidence,eith er of the compl ainant or the a ccused,shows that the offens e committedc omes w/in the terms of said A m nesty P rocl. HELD: B u t sa id cases h a ve be en sup er se de d a nd d e em ed overru le d b y th e su bse qu ent cases o f P e o. vs . Llan it a, et. al. (86 P 2 19), etc. w her ein w e held th at

"It is ra nk inconsistency for appellant to j ustify an act or s eek forgiveness for an act, accor ding to him, he has not committed. Amne sty presuppose s the commissi on of a crime, a nd when an acc used maintains that h e has not comm itted a crime, he cannot have an y use for amnes ty. Where an a mnesty procl. imposes c ertain conditions , as in this case, it is incumbent u pon the accused to prove the exis tence of such conditio ns. The invocat ion of amnesty i s in the nature of a plea of con fession and avo idance, which means t hat the pleader admits the alle gations against him but disclai ms liability ther efor on account of inter vening facts wh ich, if proved, would bring the crime charged within the scop e of the amnesty procla mation." (italics supplied.)

At any rate, the facts

established b ef. the Commi ssion do not b ring the case w/in the terms of the AmnestyProcl. xxx As found by the Commis sion, the killing of the decease d (Lozanes)w as not in furthe rance of the resistanc e movement,b ut due to the ri valry bet. the H unter's Guerrill a, to w/c he bel onged,and the Vera's Guerrilla of pe titioners. RA M.

(8) Powersas commander inchief Art. VI I, Sec. 18. Th e President s hall be the C ommanderin Chief of all ar med forces o f the Philippines, a nd w henever it becom es nece ssary,he m ay call out sucha rm edforcesto preventor sup press lawlessviolen ce, invasiono r rebellion. In

case of invasi on or rebellio n, when the p ublic safetyre quiresit, he may, for a periodnot exc eedingsixty d ays, suspend the privilegeo f the writ of h abeas corpus or place the Philippine s or any part t hereof under martiallaw. Within fortyeight hours fr om the procla mation of martiallaw or the suspensio n of the privil ege of the wri t of habeasc orpus, the Pre sident shall s ubmit a report in per son or in writ ing to the Co ngress. The Congress, vo ting jointly, b y a vote of at least a majorityof all its Membersi n regularor s pecial sessio n, may revoke such proclam ation or susp ension, whichrevocati on shallnot b e set asideby the President. Uponthe initia

tive of the Pre sident,the Co ngress may, in the sa me manner,e xtend such pr oclamationor suspensionfo r a period to b e determined by the Congress, th if e invasionor r ebellionshall persistand pu blic safetyreq uiresit. The C ongress,if no t in session, shall within t wentyfour ho urs following such proclam ation or suspension, c onvenein acc ordance ith it w s rulesw ithout needof a call.

The S uprem eC ourt m ay review ,in an appropriateproceedingfiled by any citizen,the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclam ation m artial law or the suspensionof the privilegeof the w rit of or the ex te n sio nth ereo f,an d m u s t p ro m u lg ate d ec is io nth e reo nw ith in th irty d ay s fro m its filin g. its A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioningof the civil courts or legislativeassem blies,nor authorizethe conferm entof jurisdictio n on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automat ically su s p en dth e p rivileg eo f th e w rit. The suspensionof the privilege shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or o ffe n s e sin h e re n tin o r d ire c tlyc o n n e c te d ith in v a s io n w . During the suspensionof the privilegeof the w rit, any person thus arrestedor detained shall be ju d ic ia llyc h a rg e dw ith inth re e d a y s ,o th e rw is e e s h a ll b e re le a s e d . h

Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, exceptthosechargedwith offensespunishable reclusionperpetua by when the evidenceof guild is strong, shall, before conviction,be bailable by sufficientsureties,or be releasedon recognizance may be providedby law. The right to bail shall not be impairedeven when as the privilege the writ of habeascorpusis suspended. of Excessive shallnot be required. bail Art. VIII, Sec. 1. xxx Judicialpower includesthe duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandableand enforceable,and to determinewhetheror not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality the Government. of

As Commander inChief of all armed forces of the Philippines,the Presidenthas the followingpowers : a. He may call out such armed forces to preventor suppresslawlessviolence,invasionor rebellion . b. He may suspendthe privilegeof the writ of habeascorpus or , c. He may proclaimmartiallaw over the entire Philippinesor any part thereof . Subject to: Art. VIII, Sec. 1 par. 2. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversiesinvolvingrights which are legally demandableand enforceable,and to determinewhetheror not there has been a grave abuse of discretionamountingto lack or excess of jurisdictionon the part of any branch or instrumentalityof the Govt. Call out the AFP to preventlawlessviolenc e

This is merely a police measuremeant to quell disorder.As such, the Constitutiondoes not regulateits

exerciseradicall y

S uspendthe privi lege of the w rit of habeascorpus A "writ of habeas corpus" is an order from the court commandin g a detainingoffic er to inform the co urt (i) if he has the p erson in custody, and (ii) w hat his basis in detainin g that person . The "privil ege of the writ" is that portion of the writ requiring the detaining officer t o show cause wh y he should not be tested. Note that it is the privilege that is suspende d, not the w rit its elf. R e qu isite : s 1. There must be an invasionor reb ellion,and 2. The publicsafet y requiresthe sus pension . Effectsof the susp ension of the privil ege 1. The su spensionof the pr

ivilege of the writ applies only to per sons "judiciallych arged" for rebellio n or offensesinherenti n or directlyconne cted with invasion (Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 5). Such pers ons suspectedof t he abovecrimescan be arrestedand de tainedwithouta w arrantof arrest . "Judicially charged"as used in the Constitution is imprecise. For i f one were alread y judiciallycharge d, his detention wou ld be legal and so he could no long er petition for hab eas corpus. Hab eas corpus precis ely contemplates sit a uation in which a person is being de tained withoutbei ng chargedin cou rt. Thus, the provi sion should read "one who is suspected of complicityin" th e two crimes abov e. As a general rul e, no person coul d be arrested with out a warrant of a rrest (validly issue d upon probable cause t o be determined

personally by th e judge after exa mination under o ath or affirmation of the complainantand the witnesses, (cf . Art. III, Sec. 2), unless (i) the arre st was made in connecti on with a crime c ommitted in the p resence of the de taining officer, or (ii) the privilege of the w rit was suspende d. If the public o fficer arrests him without a warran t, the officer becomes l iable for "arbitrar y detention" und er Art. 124 of the RPC, and a petiti on for habeascorpuscan be filed to seek his release . The susp ension of the privi lege does not ma ke the arrest with out warrant legal. But the military is, in effect, enabled to make the arrest, anyway since, wi th the suspensio n of the privilege, there is no reme dy available against such unlawful arr est (arbitrary det ention). The arr est without warra nt is justified by

the emergencysituati on and the difficul ty in applyingfor a warrantconsideri ng the time and th e numberof perso ns to be arrested . But the crime for which he is arres ted must be one related to rebellio n or the invasion. As to other

crim es,the suspensionof the privilegedoes not apply. 2. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judiciallychargedwithin 3 days, or otherwisehe shall be released.(Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 6). In other w ords, the public officer can detain a person w ithout w arrantof arrest, but he can only do so for 72 hours. Before the lapse of 72 hours, an informationmust have been filed in the proper court charginghim of the offense for which he was arrested. Under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, if the detainee want sa preliminary investigation to be first conducted by the fiscal, he must sign a waiver of the effects of Art. 125. (delay in the deliveryof detainedpersons ) The effect of the suspensionof the privilege,therefore,is only to extend the periods during which he can be detainedwithout a warrant. Under Art. 125, as amendedby EO 272, the public officer can only detain him for 12, 18 or 36 hours dependingon the gravity of the offense of which he is charged;within this time, he must be judiciallycharged,otherwise,he must be released. When the privilegeis suspended, period is extendedto the 72 hours . What happens if he is not judicially charged nor released after 72 hours? The public officer becomes liable under Art. 125 for "delay in the deliveryof detainedpersons." As to the detainee,it is submittedthat he or someoneelse in his behalf can file a petition for habeas corpus For even if the suspensionhas a lifetime of 60 . days in general,as to that person,the suspensiononly has an effectivityof 72 hours, so that after this time, the suspension lifted as to him. is 3. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.(Art. III, Sec. 13) which held the contrary Art. III, Sec. 13. xxx The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the .writ of HC is suspended.Excessivebail shall not be required . This new provisionabrogatesthe ruling in Moralesv Ponce Enrile Proclaim Martial Law Requisites : 1. Theremust be an invasionor rebellion,and 2. Public safety requiresthe proclamation martiallaw all over the Philippinesor any part thereof of .

Effects of the proclamationof martial law The President can: 1. Legislat e

2. O rder the arrest of people who obstructthe war eff ort. But the followingcannot be done (Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 4 ) 1. Suspendthe operationof the C onstitution . 2. Supplantthe functioningof the civil courts and the legislativeassem blies . The principle is that martial law is proclaimed o nly because the courts and other civil institutions like Congresshave been shut down. It should not happe n that m artial law is declaredin order to shut down th e civil institutions . 3. Confer jurisdictionupon military courts and ag encies over civilians, where civil courts are unable to function. This is the "open court" doctrine which holds tha t civilians cannot be tried by military courts if the civil This overrules the holding in Aquino vifPonceEnrile courts are open and functioning. But the civil courts are not functioning, then civilians can be tried by the military courts. Martial laws usually contemplates a ca se where the courts are already closed and the civil institutionshave already crumbled,that is a "theater of w ar." If the courts are still open, the Presidentcan just suspendthe privilegeand achievethe sam eeffect . 4. Automaticallysuspendthe privilegeof the writ of habe as corpus .

, 59 SCRA 183 (1974), that when the President proclaimsmartial law, he also impliedlysuspendsthe pri vilege of the writ. Under the presentrule, the Presidentcan still sus pend the privilegeeven as he proclaimmartiallaw, but he m ustso suspend expressly . The Role of Congres s a. When the Presidentproclaimsmartial law or s uspendsthe privilegeof the writ, such proclamationor

suspension shall be effectivefor a periodof 60 days,unles s soonerrevokedby the Congress . b. Upon such proclamation suspension, or Congr ess shall conveneat once. If it is not in session,it shall convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call within 24 hours following the proclamation or suspension . c. Within 48 hours from the proclamation or th e suspension, the President shall submit a report, in personor in writing,to the Congress(meetingin joint sess ion of the action he has taken) . d. The Congressshall then vote jointly, by an abs olute majority. It has two options : (i) To revokesuch proclamation suspension or .

When it so revokes,the Presidentcannot set aside (or veto) the revocationas he normallywould do in the case of bills. If Congressdoes not do anything,the measurewill expire anywayin 60 days. So the revoca tio n m u st b e m a d e b e fo reth e la p se o f 6 0 d a ys fro m th e d ate th e m e a su rew as ta ke n . (ii) To extend it beyond the 60day period of its validity. C ongresscan only so extend the proclam ation suspensionupon the initiativeof the President. or The period need not be 60 days; it could be more, as Congress would determine,based on the persistenceof the em ergency. If C ongressfails to act before the m easureexpires,it can no longer extend it until the Presidentagain redeclaresthe measure,for how do one extend somethingthat has alreadylapsed ? N ote that C ongresscannot "validate"the proclam ation suspension, or becauseit is alreadyvalid. It is thus restrictedto the 2 measuresabove . If Congress extends the measure,but before the period of extensionlapses, the requirementsfor the proclamation suspension longerexist, Congresscan lift the extension,since the powerto conferimpliesthe or no power to take back. If Congress does not review or lift the order, this can be reviewed by the Supreme Court pursuantto the next section .

The Role of the Suprem eCour t The SupremeCourt may review,in an appropriateproceedingfilled by any citizen,the sufficiencyof the factual basis of (a) the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ, or (b) the extensionthereof. It must promulgateits decision thereon within 30 days from its filing. (Art. VII, Sec. 18 par. 3) This is because judicial power includes the duty to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretionamountingto lack or excess of jurisdictionon the part of any branch or instrumentality the of Government. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1, par. 2) The jurisdictionof the SC may be invoked in a proper case. A petition for habeas corpus is one such case. When a personis arrestedwithouta warrantfor complicityin the rebellionor invasion,he or someoneelse in his behalf has the standingto questionthe validity of the proclamationor suspension. But before the SC can decide on the legalityof his detention,it must first pass upon the validityof the proclamation suspension or . The test to be used by the Supreme Court in so reviewing the act of the President in proclaiming or suspending, or the act of Congress in extending, is the test of arbitrariness which seeks to determine the sufficiencyof the factual basis of the measure. The question is not whether the Presidentor Congress acted correctly,but whetherhe acted arbitrarilyin that the action had no basis in fact. Decidingon whetherthe act was arbitraryamountsto a determination whetheror not there was grave of abuse of discretionamountingto lack or excess of jurisdiction,which is now made part of judicial power by Art.

VIII, Sec. 1, par. 2. This curbs radicallythe applicationof the politicalquestiondoctrine . This test was taken from the case of Lansangv Garci , 42 S C R A 44 6 (1 97 1). T h a e issue the re raise d w a s whetherin suspendingthe privilegeof the writ in 1971, M arcos had a basis for doin g so. The S C, in considering the fact that the P residentbased his decisionon (a) the S enate report on the conditi on in C entralLuzon and (b) a closed door briefing by the military showing the extent of subversion,concludedthat the Presidentdid not act arbitrarily. O ne m ay disagreewith his appreciationof the facts, but one cannot say that it isWith this test and the new provisionsin the 1987 Constitution, case of Garcia without basis. the Padilla v Ponce Enrile, [In this case of Lansangvs. Garcia,the SC held unanimouslythat it has the auth 121 SCRA 472 (1983), is, at last, overruled, and may it be so always. In that case, the SC held that the ority to inquire into the President's proclamation of martial law is beyond judicial review, and that the citizen can only trust that the existenceof the factual basis in order to determinethe constitutionalsufficiencythereof. Presidentacts in good faith. The cases of Barcelonv Baker and Montenegro Castaned v a This holding of the SC is now found in Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 3.]

, which ruled that the validity of the suspension of the privilege was a political question, are likewise buried i n the grave of judicial history .

There are 4 ways,then, for the proclamation suspension be lifted: or to In Aquino vs Military Commission No. 2 , 63 SCRA 546, the SC upheld the power of the Presidentto 1) Lifting by the Presidenthimself 2) Revocation Congres by s create military tribunals authorized to try not only military personnel but also civilians even if at that time civil 3) Nullificationby the SupremeCourt 4) Operationof law after 60 days courts were open and functioning, thus rejecting the "open court" theory. The SC there held: "Martial law creates an exception to the general rule of exclusive subjection to the civil jurisdiction,and renders offenses Military the laws of war, as well as those of Martial Law, If Civil Courtsmilitarytribunals.VI against Trial of Civilians Void Even Under a civil character,triable by Are Open. (Art. Public dangerwarrants I, Sec. 18, par. 5.). the substitution of executive process for judicial process. The immunity of civilians from military jurisdiction, must, however,give way in areas governedby martiallaw. xxx In the case of Olaguer vs Military Commission No. 34

, 150 SCRA 144, th e Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2 decision was reversed. According to the SC, civilians who are pl aced on trial for civil offensesunder general law are entitled to trial by judicial process. Since we are not ene myoccupiedterritory

nor are we under a military govt. and even on the premise that martial law continues in force, the military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for civil offenses committ ed by them which are properly cognizable by the civil courts that have remained open and have been regul arly functioning. The assertionof military authorityover civilians cannot rest on the President'spower as Com mander in Chief or on any theory of martial law. As long as civil courts remain open and are regularly functio ning, military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by them an d which are properly

cognizableby civil courts. To hold otherwiseis a violationof the right to due process . "The presidingofficer at a court m artial is not a judge w hose objectivityand independence prot are ected by tenure and undiminshedsalary and nurtured by the judicial tradition, but is a military officer. Substantially differentrules of evidenceand procedureapply in m ilitary trials. Apart from these differences,the suggest ion of the possibility of influence on the actions of the courtmartial by the officer who convenes it, selects its m em bersand the counselon both sides, and who usually has direct com mandand authorityover its m em bers is a pervasiveone in m ilitary law s, despite strenuousefforts to elim inatethe danger.

(9 ) E m erge ncy w e r po s Art. VI, Sec. 23. xxx (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress, may, by law, authorize the President,for a limited period, and subjectto such restrictionsas it may prescribe,to exercisepowers necessary and properto carry out a declarednationalpolicy. Unlesssoonerwithdrawn by resolutionof the C ongress, suchpow ersshallceaseuponthe nextadjournm ent thereof.

This grant of emergencypower to the Presidentis differentfrom the Commander inChief clause. When the Presidentacts under the Commander inChief clause,he acts under a constitutional grant of military power, which may include the lawmaking power. But when the Presidentacts under the emergencypower, he acts undera Congressional delegationof lawmakingpower . The scope of the grant is such "powers necessaryand proper to carry out a declared national policy." Under the 1935 Constitution, this was construed the power to issue rules and regulations to carry out the declared policy. The 1987 Constitution,it is submitted, does not change the scope. "Power necessary and proper"should mean legislativepower,becauseCongressis only allowedto delegatelegislativepower,being its only inherentpower. Its other powers are only grantedto it by the Constitution,and so it cannot delegatewhat has only been delegated it. to This power is (1) for a limited period,and (2) subjectto such restrictionsas Congressmay provide. The power ceases (a) upon being withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, or, if Congress fails to adopt such resolution,(b) upon the next (voluntary)adjournmentof Congress. For the fact that Congressis able to meet in session uninterruptedlyand adjourn of its own will proves that the emergencyno longer exists is to justify the delegation . This rule or the terminationof the grant of emergencypowers is based on decidedcases, which in turn In Araneta v 15 of the 1973 Constitution , becameArt. VII, Sec.Dinglasan .

84 Phil 368 (1949),the Congressgrantedthe Presidentemergencypowersto fix rentals of houses. After the war, Congressheld a specialsession. The SC held that the emergencypower lasted only until Congressheld its regularsession. The fact that Congresscould now meet meantthat there was

no emergencyanym orethat w ould justify the delegati on. In the cases of Rodriguezv Treasurer , involvingthe law made by Pres. Quirino appropriatingthe sum o of money for the operation of the government; Barredo v COMELEC , involving another law made by Pres. Quirino appropriatingan amountto defray the expensesfor an election,and Guevarrav Collectorof Custom s , involvinga regulationof export, the SC held that the em ergency powervery enabled thethe SC in Rodriguez v Gella At the that least, said Presidentto legislate ceasedthe m om entCongress couldm eetin regularsessio n.

, 92 Phil 603 (1953), it should cease upon the approvalof a resolutionby Congressterm inatingsuc AranetavIn this case, the Congressenacted a bill pre , h grant. Dinglasan cisely F: terminatingthe grant of emergencypower,but this was v etoed by the President. The SC ruled that the vetoed bill should be deem eda resolutionthat term inatesthe grant.

84 Phil 368 (1949)

The petitions challenge the validity of EOs of the Pres . avowedly issued in virtue of CA 671. They rest their case chiefly on the proposition that the Emergency Powers Act (CA 6 71) has ceased to have any force and effect.

HELD: CA 671 becameinoperativewhen Congressmet i n regularsessionon 5/25/46,and the EOs were issued w/o authority of law. CA 671 does not in term fix the duration of its eff ectiveness. The intention of the Act has to be sought for in its nature,the objectto be accomplished, purpos the e to be subserved, and its relationto the Consti. Art. VI of the 1935 Consti. provides that any la w passed by virtue thereof should be "for a limited period." The words "limited period" are beyond question Rodriguezvmean restrictivein duration. Emergency, intendedto Gella in order to justify the delegation of emergency powers F: , "must be temporary or it can not be said to be an emergency." It is to be presumed that CA 671 was approved w/ this limitation in view. The opposite theory would make the law repugnantto the Consti.,and is contraryto t he principlethat the legislatureis deemed to have full

knowledgeof the constitutionalscope of its powers. The assertionthat new legislationis needed to repeal the act would not be in harmony w/ the Consti. either. If a n ew and different law were necessaryto terminatethe delegation,the period for the delegationwould be unlimi ted, indefinite,negative and uncertain;"that w/c was intendedto meet a temporaryemergencymay becomepe rmanentlaw," for Congressmight not enact the repeal, and even if it would,the repealmight not meet w/ the app roval of the Pres., and the Congressmight not be able to override the veto. Further,this would create the ano maly that, while Congressmight delegateits powers by simple majority,it might not be able to recall them except by a 2/3 vote. xxx. RAM.

, 92 Phil 603 (1953)

On 12/16/41, CA 671 was approved declaring a state of total emergency as a result of war involving the Phils. and authorizing the Pres. to promulgate rules and regulations to meet such emergency." In 1949, the SC decided that said emergency powers ceased as early as 1945. Here, the issue again is w/n CA 671 is still effective. It appears that in 1952,

the Pres. issued EOs 545 and 546 (for appropriation of funds for public works and for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, etc.) The Congress passed House Bill 727 declaring that "was has long ended" and that the "need for the grant of such unusualpowersto the Pres. has disappeared," for that reason, Congressrepealedall the EmergencyPowersActs of the and Pres. However,this was vetoedby the Pres. Petitionersseek to invalidate said EOs.

HELD: AlthoughHouse Bill 727, has been vetoed by the Pres. and did not therebybecomea regular statute,it may at least be consideredas a concurrentresolutionof the Congressformallydeclaringthe terminationof the emergencypowers. To contendthat the Bill needed presidentialacquiescence produceeffect, would lead to to the anomalous,if not absurd situation that, "while Congress while delegate its powers by a simple majority, it m ight not be able to recall them except by 2/3 vote. xxx Adapted. Barlongay: Notice the apparentinconsistencybet. the Constitutionand the cases. The Consti.[Art. VI, Sec. 23 (2)] states that the emergency powers shall cease upon the next adjournment of Congress unless sooner withdrawnby resolutionof Congresswhereas the cases tell us that the emergencypowers shall cease upon resumptionof session. To reconcilethe two, I believe that it would not be enough for Congressto just resume sessionin order that the emergencypowersshall cease. It has to pass a resolutionwithdrawing such emergency powers,otherwisesuch powersshall ceaseupon the next adjournment Congress of .

(10) Contractingand guaranteeing foreignloans Art. VII, Sec. 20. The Presidentmay contractor guaranteeforeignloans on behalfof the Republic of the Philippineswith the prior concurrenceof the MonetaryBoard, and subjectto such limitationsas may be providedby law. The MonetaryBoard shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the calendaryear, submitto Congressa completereport of its decisionson applicationsfor loans to be contractedor guaranteedby the Government,or government wned or controlledcorporations,which o wouldhave the effectof increasing foreigndebt,and containing the othermattersprovidedby law.

Art. XII, Sec. 21. Foreignloans may only be incurredin accordance with law and the regulationof the monetaryauthority.Informationon foreignloans obtainedor guaranteedby the Government shall be m adeavailableto the public.

RepublicAct 4860

AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES TO OBTAIN SUCH FOREIGN LOANS AND CREDITS, OR TO INCUR SUCH FOREIGN INDEBTEDNESS, AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO FINANCE APPROVED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PURPOSES OR PROJECTS, AND TO GUARANTEE, IN BEHALF OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPP INES, FOREIGN LOANS OBTAINED OR BONDS ISSUED BY

CORPORATIONS OWNED OR CONTROLLED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PURPOSES INCLUDING THOSE INCURRED FOR PURPOSES OF RE LENDING TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR, APPROPRIATING THE NECESSARY FUNDS THEREFORE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Be it enactedby the Senateand Houseof Representatives the Philippines Congressassembled of in : Sec. 1. The President of the Philippines is hereby authorized in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines to contract such loans, credits and indebtedness with foreign governments, agencies or instrumentalities of such foreign governments,foreign financial institutions,or other internationalorganizations,with whom, or belonging to countries with which, the Philippines has diplomatic relations, as may be necessary and upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon, to enable the Government of the Republic of the Philippines to finance, either directly or through any government office, agency or instrumentality or any governmentowned or controlled corporation, industrial, agricultural or other economic development purposes or projects authorized by law: Provided, That at least seventyfive per cent shall be spent for purposes of projects which are revenueproducing and selfliquidating, such as electrification, irrigation, river control and drainage, telecommunication, housing, constructionand improvementof highways and bridges, airports, ports and harbors, school buildings, water works and artesian wells, air navigation facilities, developmentof fishing industry, and other: Provided, That such foreign loans shall be used to meet the foreign exchange requirements or liabilities incurred in connection with said developmentprojectsto cover the cost of equipment,related technicalservicesand supplies,where the same are not obtainable within the Philippines at competitive prices as well as part of the peso costs, other than working capital and operational expenses not exceeding twenty per cent of the loan: Provided, further, That in the case of roads, bridges, irrigation, portworks, river controls, airports and power, the amount shall not exceed seventy per cent of the loan. The authority of the President of the Philippinesas herein provided shall include the power to issue, for the purposes hereinbefore stated, bonds for sale in the international markets the income from which shall be fully tax exempt in the Philippines . Sec. 2. The total amount of loans, credits and indebtedness,excluding interests, which the President of the Philippinesis authorizedto incur under this Act shall not exceed one billion United States dollars or its equivalentin other foreign currenciesat the exchangerate prevailingat the time the loans, credits and indebtednessare incurred: Provided, however, That the total loans, credits and indebtedness incurred under this Act shall not exceed two hundred fifty million in the fiscal year of the approval of this Act, and two hundred fifty million every fiscal year thereafter, all in United States dollars or its equivalent in other currencies . All loans, credits and indebtedness under the preceding section shall be incurred only for particular projects in accordance with the approved economic program of the Government and after the plans for such projects shall have been prepared by the offices or agencies concerned, recommended by the National Economic Council and the Monetary Board of the Central Bank of the Philippines, and approved by the President of the Philippines . Sec. 3. The President of the Philippines is, likewise, hereby authorized, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, to guarantee, upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon, foreign loans extended directly to, or bonds for sale in internationalmarkets issued by, corporationsowned or controlled by the Governmentof the Philippinesfor industrial,agriculturalor other economic developmentpurposes or projects authorized by law, such

as those mentioned in Section one of this Act, including the rehabilitation and modernization of the Philippine National Railways, the cash capital requirements of the Land Bank , electrification, irrigation, river control and drainage,telecommunication, housing,constructionand/or improvementof highways,housing,constructionand/ or improvement of highways, airports, ports and harbors, school buildings, waterworks and artesian wells, air navigation, development of the fishing industry, iron and nickel exploitation and development, and others: Provided, That at least seventy five per cent shall be spent for purposes or projects which are revenueproducing and selfliquidating. The loans/ or bonded indebtedness of governmentowned or controlled corporations which may be guaranteedby the President under this Act shall include those incurred by government wned or controlled o financial institutions for the purpose of relending to the private sector and the total amount thereof shall not be more than five hundred million United States dollars or its equivalent in other foreign currencies at the exchange rate prevailing at the time the guarantee is made: Provided, That the governmentowned or controlled financial institutionsshall relend the proceedsof such loans and/ or bonded indebtednessto Filipinos or to Filipinoowned or controlled corporations and partnerships,at least sixtysix and twothirds per centum of the outstanding and paid up capital of which is held by Filipinos at the time the loan is incurred, such proportion to be maintained until such time as the loan is fully paid: Provided, however, That during anytime that any amount of the loan remains outstanding, failure to meet with the capital ownership requirement shall make the entire loan immediately due and demandable, together with all penalties and interests, plus an additional special penalty of two per centum on the total amount due. Sec. 4. The implementation of this Act shall be subject to, and governed by, the provisions of Executive Order 236, dated February 13, 1957, prescribingproceduresfor the planning of developmentfinances, the issuance of governmentsecurities,and the disbursementof proceedsand creating the Fiscal Policy Council and the Technical Committeeon DevelopmentFinance, as amended by Executive Order No. 236, dated May 26, 1966, not inconsistent with this Act, which are hereby adopted by reference and made an integral part of this Act. Sec. 5. It shall be the duty of the President, within thirty days after the opening of every regular session, to report to the Congressthe amountof loans, credits and indebtednesscontracted,as well as the guaranteesextended, and the purposes and projects for which the loans, credits and indebtedness were incurred, and the guarantees extended, as well as such loans which may be reloaned to Filipinoowned or controlled corporations and similar purposes . Sec. 6. The Congress shall appropriate the necessary amount of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwiseappropriated,to cover the paymentof the principaland interest on such loans, credits or indebtednessas and when they shall becomedue. Sec. 7. This Act shall take effect upon its approval . Approved,September8, 1966.

Does Congresshave to be consultedby the Presidentwhen he contractsor guaranteesforeignloans that increasethe foreigndebt of the country ? The affirmative view cites Art. VI, Sec. 24 which holds that all bills authorizing increase of the public debt must originateexclusivelyfrom the House of Representatives, althoughthe Senatemay proposeor concur

w ith am endm ents . The negative,and stro nger view , is that t he P residentdoes not need prior app roval by C ongress because the Constitutionpla ces the power to c heck the President' s power on the Mo netary Board and n ot on Congress. Congressm ay, of course, provide g uidelinesfor contr acting or guarante eing foreign loans , and have these r ules enforcedthrough the M onetaryBoa rd. But that Congr ess has prior appr oval is a totally dif ferent issue. At any rate , the present powe r, which was first i ntroducedin the 1 973 Constitution, was based on RA 4860 or the Foreig n Loan Act. What that treaties are formal documents which require ratification with approval of the Senate, In holding used executiveagreementsbecomebinding through executiveaction without need of a vote by the Senate,the while to be a statut ory in Commissioner Customsv EasternSea Trading SC grant of power of is now a constituti onal grant which Congress cannotta ke away,but only re gulate .

(11) Powersover f oreignaffairs (a) Treaty makingp ower

Art. VII, Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effe ctive unless concurred by at in least twothirdsof all the m em bersof the Senate.

By reason of the President's unique position as head of state, he i s the logical choic e as the nation's spokesmanin forei gn relations. The Senate,on the oth er hand, is granted the right to share in the treatymaking power of the Presi dent by concurring with him with the ri ght to amend .

Treatydistinguishe d from executiveag reement s Executive agreementsentere d into by the Presid ent need no concur rence. The reason is that although executiveagreeme nts are a kind of int ernationalagreeme nts, when the Cons titution intendsto in clude executive agreements, says it so specifically,as i n Art. VIII, Sec. 5, par. 2, when it spe

aks of the power of the SC to review final judgments of lower courts in cas es in which the co nstitutionalityor va lidity of any treaty, internationalor executiveagreeme nt, is in question .

, 3 SCRA 351 (196 1), said that the diff erence betweena treaty and an exec utive agreement is that a treaty is an internationalagree ment involving poli tical issues or changes of nation al policy and those involving internatio nal arrangements of a permanentch aracter, while an executiveagreeme nt is an internationa l agreementembod ying adjustments of detail carryingout welle stablished nationalpoliciesan d traditions,and th ose involvingarran gementsof a more or less temporaryn ature. Examples of treatiesare an a greementon tax, e xtradition,alliance. Examplesof execu tive agreements are agreements rel ating to postalconv entions,tariff rates, copyright,most-

favorednation clau se.

C o m m issio ner f C ustom svs. E a ste rnS e a T rad,i 3 SCRA 351 o ng F: Resp. Eastern was the consignee of several shipme
nt of onion and garlic w/c arrived at the port of Mla. from 8/5 to 9/7/54. Some shipments came from Japan and others from HK. Inasmuch as none of the shipments had the certificate required by CB Circulars Nos. 44 and 45 for the release thereof, the goods thus imported were seized and subje cted to forfeiture proceedings for alleged violations of Sec. 136 3 (f) of the Rev. Adm. Code, in relation to the said circu lars. Said goods were then declared forfeited in favor of the govt by the Commissioner of Customs the goods having be en, in the meantime, released to the consignees on surety bonds. On review, the Court of Tax Appeals reversed the Commi ssioner of Customs and ordered the aforementioned bonds to be cancelled and withdrawn. According to the CTA, the s eizure and 105 Phil 1030 forfeiture of the goods imported from Japan cannot be j ustified under EO 238, not only bec. the same seeks to F: implement an Executive Agreement extending the effectivity of ou r Trade and Financial Agreements w/ Japan w/c agree ment, is of dubious validity xxx owing to the fact that our Senate h ad not concurred in the making of said Executive Agree ment.

HELD: The concurrenceof said House of Congre ss is required by the Consti. in the making of "treat ies", w/c are, however, distinct and different from "executiv e agreements,"which may be validly entered into w/o such concurrence. [The court went on to distinguisha treaty fr om an executiveagreement. ] The agreemen in question, being merel t y an executive agreement, there is no requir ement of concurrence. RAM.

USAFFEVeteransAssn.vs Treasure r

The central issue in this case concerns the va lidity of the RomuloSnyder Agreement (1950) whereby the Phil. Govt. undertook to return to the US Govt. in ten annual installments, a total of $35 M dollars advanced by the US to, but unexpendedby, the National Defense Forces of the Philip pines. The USAFFE Veterans contended that the money delivered by the US were straight payments for military services an d that therefore there was nothing to return to the US an d nothing to consider as a loan. They also contended that the RomuloSynder Agreement was void for lack of authority of the officers who concluded the same.

HELD:The fundsinvolvedhave been consistently re gardedas fundsadvancedand to be subsequently a ccounted for. Such arrangement thereforeincludesthe obligati on to returnthe unexpended ounts am . In this case, Pres. Quirino approved the n egotiations. He had power to contract loans under RA 213 amendingRA 16. As to the contentionthat the agr eement lacks ratificationby the Senate, it was held that the yearly appropriations Congressof funds as com by pliance with the agreementconstitutedratification. But even if there was no ratification, the agreement would s till be valid. The agreement is not a "treaty" as th e term is used in the Constitution. The agreementwas neve r submittedto the Senate for concurrence. It must be noted that a treaty is not the only form that an internation al agreementmay assume. For the grant of treaty making power to the Executive and the Senate does not exhaust the power of the govt. over internationalr elations. Consequently,executiveagreementsmay be ente red into with other states and are effectiveeven wit hout the concurrenceof the Senate.From the point of view of internationallaw, there is no differencebetween treaties

and executiveagreementsin their binding effect up on states concernedas long as the negotiatingfun ctionaries

have remained within their powers. The distinctionbetween an executiveagreementand a treaty is purely a constitutional one and has no international legal significance . In the case of Altman vs US, it was held that an international compact negotiated between the representativesof two sovereign nations and made in the name and or behalf of the contracting parties and dealing with importantcommercialrelationsbetweenthe two countries,is a treaty internationallyalthoughas an executiveagreem ent,it is not technicallya treaty requiringthe advice and consentof the S enate . Nature of ExecutiveAgreements: There are 2 classes: (1) agreementsmade purely as executiveacts affecting external relations and independent of or without legislative authorization, which may be termed as presidentialagreements,and (2) agreementsenteredinto in pursuanceof acts of Congress,or Congressional E xecutiveA greem ents.The R om ulo nyderA greem entm ay fall under any of these tw o classes,for S preciselyon Sept. 18, 1946, Congressspecificallyauthorizedthe Presidentto obtain such indebtednessw/ the Govt of the US, its agenciesor instrumentalities.Even assuming,arguendo that there was no legislativeauthorization, is , it hereby maintainedthat the RomuloSnyder Agreementwas legally and validly entered into to conform to the secondcategory. This 2nd categoryusuallyincludesmoneyagreementsrelatingto the settlementof pecuniary claims of citizens. Adapted . CIR vs Gotamc o 148 SCRA 36 F:
The World Health Organization (WHO) is an international organization which has a regional office in Manila. It enjoys privileges and immunities which are defined in the Host Agreement entered into between the Philippines and the said organization. One of the provisions is that WHO shall be exempt from all direct and indirect taxes. When it decided to construct a building to house its own offices, it entered into a further agreement with the govt. exempting it from paying duties on any importation of materials and fixtures required for the construction. WHO informed the bidders that it was exempt from the payment of all fees, licenses and taxes and that their bids should not include such items. However, the CIR demanded from its contractor, Gotamco, the payment of 3% contractor's tax. The CIR questions the entitlement of the WHO to tax exemption, contending that the Host Agreement is null and void, not having been ratified by the Philippine Senate .

HELD : While treaties are required to be ratified by the Senate, less formal types of internationalagreements may be enteredinto by the Chief Executiveand becomebindingwithoutthe concurrenceof the legislativebody. The Host Agreementcomes within the latter category. It is a valid and binding internationalagreementeven withoutthe concurrenceof the PhilippineSenate. Adapted .

(b) Deportationof undesirablealiens In Qua Chee Gan v DeportationBoard , 9 SCRA 27 (1959),the SC declaredthat while the Deportation Board has no power to issue a warrantof arrest issued upon the filing of formalchargesagainstcertain alien for the purpose of taking him in custody to answer those charges,it has the power delegatedby the President,to issue a warrantto carry out a final order based on a finding of guilt.

In Go Tek v Deportation Board, 79 SCRA 17 (1976),the SC upheld the President'spower to order the deportationof an alien under S ec. 69 of the R evisedAdm inistrative ode. H e need not w ait for the pendin C g case to end in conviction. He may, even during the pendency of the case, order the deportation if he thinks he is undesirableto nationalinterest. This decisionto deport,said the C ourt, is an act of State. Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board , 9 SC RA 27 (1963) F:
On 5/12/52, Sp Pros. Galang charged petitioners bef. the Deportation Board w/ having purchased dollars in the total sum of $130,000, w/o having the necessary license from the CB, and of having clandestinely remitted the same to HK; and petitioners w/ having attempted to bribe officers of the Phil. and US Governments in order to evade prosecution for said unauthorized purchase of US dollars. Following the filing of said deportation charges, a warrant for the arrest of said aliens was issued by the presiding officers of the Deportation Bd. xxx Petitioners contest the power of the Pres. to deport aliens and, consequently, the delegation to the Deportation Bd. of the ancillary power to investigate, on the ground that such power is vested in the Legislature. It is claimed that for the power to deport aliens be exercised,there must be a legislation authorizingthe same.

HELD: Under CA 613, the Commissionerof Immigrationwas empoweredto effect the arrest and expulsionof an alien, after previous determination by the Bd. of the existence of ground or grounds therefor. W/ the enactmentof this law, however,the legislaturedid not intend to delimit or concentratethe exerciseof the power to deport on the ImmigrationCommissioner alone. While it may really be contendedthat Sec. 52 of CA 613 did not expressly confer on the Pres. the authority to deport undesirable aliens, xxx but merely lays down the procedureto be observedshould there be deportationproceedings, fact that such a procedurewas provided the for bef. the Pres. can deportan alien w/c provisionwas expresslydeclaredexemptedfrom the repealingeffect of Immigration Act of 1940 is a clear indication of the recognition, and inferentially a ratification, by the legislatureof the existenceof such powerin the Executive. Under the presentand existinglaws, therefore,deportationof an undesirablealien may be effectedin 2 ways: (1) by order of the Pres., after due investigation, pursuant to Sec. 69 of RAC, and (2) by the Commissioner Immigration, of upon recommendation the Bd. of Commissioners, of under Sec. 37 of CA 613. President'spower of investigationmay be delegatedto the DeportationBoard. The President'spower of investigationmay be delegated. This is clear from a reading of Sec. 69 of the RAC w/c providesfor "a prior investigation, conducted by said Executive or his authorizedagent xxx the Deportation Board has been conductingthe investigation the authorizedagent of the Pres. xxx as Power to arrest aliens. Sec. 69 of the RAC does not provide for the exercise of the power to arrest. The contentionxxx that the arrest of a foreigneris necessaryto carry into effect the power of deportationis valid only when there is alreadyan order of deportation. To carry out the order of deportation,the Pres. obviouslyhas the power to order the arrest of the deportee. But, certainly,during the investigation,it is not indispensablethat the alien be arrested . Power to order arrest of alien may not be delegatedto DeportationBoard by President. Conceding w/o decidingthat the Pres. can personallyorder the arrest of alien, yet such powercannotbe delegatedby him to the DeportationBoard. The exerciseof the power to order the arrest of an individualdemandsthe exercise of

discretionby the one issuing the sam e, to determ inew hetherunder specificcircum stances, curtailm ent the of the liberty of such person is warranted. xxx And authorities are to the effect that while ministerial duties may be delegated, official functions requiring the exercised of discretion and judgement may not be so deleg ated. RAM. , 79 SCRA 17 (1977 ) G o Tek vs. DeportationBoard F:
Petitioner was arrested for possession of fake dollars and prosecuted under Art. 168 RPC. At the same time, deportation proceedings were brought against him. He filed a petition for prohibition against the Deportation Board, contending that he could only be deported on grounds enumerated in Sec. 37 (3) of the Immigration Law (of w/c possession of fake dollars is not) and only after conviction. The CFIMla sustained his contention.

HELD: The President'spower to deport aliens derivesfrom Sec. 69 of the Rev. Adm. Code w/c does not specify the groundsfor deportationof aliens but only providesthat it be orderedafter due investigation.The intentionis to give the Chief Executive full discretion to determine whether an alien's residence in the country is so undesirable to affect or inure the security,welfare,or interestof the State. The Chief Executiveis the sole and as exclusivejudge of the existenceof facts w/c warrant the deportationof aliens as disclosedin an investigation. VV.

(12) Powerover legislatio n (a) M essage C ongres to s Art. VII, Sec. 23. The Presidentshall addressthe Congressat the openingof its regularsession. He may also appearbeforeit at any other time.

Every 4th Monday of July, the President delivers the State of the Nation Address, which contains his proposalsfor legislation. Throughthis speech,he can influencethe course of legislationthat Congresscan take duringthe regularsession .

(b) Prepareand submitthe budge t Art. VII, Sec. 22. The Presidentshall submit to Congresswithin thirty days from the opening of everyregularsession, the basisof the generalappropriations a budgetof expenditures sources as bill, and of financing, including receiptsfrom existingand proposed revenuem easures.

The budget is the plan indicating the (a) expenditures of the government, (b) sources of financing, and (c) receipts from revenueraising measures. This budget is the upper limit of the

appropriationsbill to be passed by Congress.Throughthe budget, therefore,the Presidentreveals the prioritiesof the government .

(c) V eto pow er A rt. V I, S ec. 27 (1) E very bill passedby the C ongressshall, before it becom esa law , be presented to the P resident. If he approvesthe sam e, he shall sign it; otherw ise,he shall veto it and ret urn the sam e w ith his objectionto the H o use w here it originated,w hich shall enter the objectionsat large i n its Journ al and proceedto reconsiderit. If, after such reconsideration, otw thirds of all the M em bersof such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, togetherwith the objections,to the other House by w hich it shall likewise be reconsidered,and if approvedby twothirds of all the Membersof that House, it shall becom ea law. In suchcases,the votesof each Houseshallbe determ ined yeas or nays and the n by , am es of the Membersvotingfor or againstshall be enteredin its Journal. The Presidentshall communica te his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt the reof, otherwise, shallbecom ea law as if he had signedit. it (2) The Presidentshall have the power to veto any particularitem or items in an appropri ation, revenue,or tariff bill, but the veto shallnot affectthe item or itemsto whichhe does not object . As a general rule, all bills must be approvedby the Presidentbefore they become law, except w hen (i) the veto of the Presidentis overriddenby 2/3 vote, and (ii) the bill passedis the speciallaw to elect the Pr esident and VicePresident. This gives the Presidentan actual hand in legislation. However,his course of action i s only to approveit or veto it as a whole. (See LegislativePowerof Congress )

(d) Emergency Powe r Art. VI, Sec. 23. xxx (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress, may, by law, authoriz e the President,for a limited period, and subjectto such restrictionsas it may prescribe,to exercisep owers necessary and properto carry out a declarednationalpolicy. Unlesssoonerwithdrawn by resoluti on of the Congress, suchpow ersshallceaseuponthe nextadjournm ent thereof. (See PreviousNotes )

(e) Fixing of tariff rates Art. VI, Sec. 28. xxx The Congressmay, by law, authorizethe Presidentto fix within specifiedlimits, and subj ect to such limitationsand restrictionsas it may impose,tariff rates, import and export quotas,tonnag e and wharfagedues, and other dutiesor impostswithinthe frameworkof the nationaldevelopment progr am of

the G overnm ent.

The reason for the delegationi s the highly technic al nature of internat ional commerce,a nd the need to co nstan tlyan d w it h relativee ase ad The SC p r ap t the ra te s to has affirmed time and again the doctrine of the President'simmunityfrom suit. In a resolution in Carillo v m m erci (April 1981) and in the latest case of In re Bermude z evailingco Marcos, al stan dards .

(13) Immunity fro d m suit A related doctrine is the President's"immunityfrom liability". In the US case of Nixon v Fitzgeral

(October1986), th e Court said that it is "elementarythat incumbentPreside nts are immunefro m suit or from bein g broughtto court during the period of their incumbency and tenure. " In Harlow v Fitzgeral d

, an employee of the A ir Force was laid o ff due to an adver se decision of a S enate Committee made upon the insistenceof Pres. Nixon, but which d ecision was later f Carillo vs. Marcos ound to be baseles s, the SC ruled tha t the President, whether in office or not, is absolutelyi

mmune from liabilit y for his official act s. The Court gave three reasons for such immunity : 1. The singularimp ortanceof the Pres idency and his high visibility . 2. The dis traction that sui ts would bri ng to such an important official laden wi th enormous responsibility . 3. The con sequencethat the Presidentmight he sitate at the mome nt of greatest peril to the nation if he knows that he woul d be held liable late r on.

, however,the SC r uled that Cabinetm embersand senior aides sued for the s ame act as in Nixon v F itzgerald only enjo y "qualified immun ity." This immunit y is less than abso lute, and yet it would enable the m to defeat unsub stantiated claims without resorting t o trial. They are all owed to show in a preliminarymanner

that the claim is un substantial .

Barlongay : Q: Does the Presid ent's immunityfrom suit extend to his al ter egos? A: No.

, Res. of April 4, 19 81

The Presidentas such cannot be sued, enjoying as he does immunity from suit, but the validity of his acts can be testedby an actionagainstthe otherexecutiveofficialsor such independent constitutional agenciesas the Commissionon Electionsand the Commissionon Audit. VV.

,z In re: SaturninoV. Berm ude145 SCRA160 F:

In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents, petitioner, as a lawyer, quotes the first par. of Sec. 5 of Art. VIII of the proposed 1986 Consti., w/c provides: "Sec. 5. The sixyear term of the incumbent President and VicePresident elected in the February 7, 1986 election, is for purposes of synchronizationof elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992. xxx" Claiming that the said provision is not clear as to whom it refers, he then asks the Court "to declare and answer the question of the construction and definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent Pres. Aquino and VicePres. Laurel and elected Pres. Marcos and VicePres. Tolentino being referred to under the said provision.

HELD: This petition is dismissedoutright for lack of jurisdictionand lack of cause of action. Prescinding from the petitioner's lack of capacity to sue, it is elementary that this Court assumes no jurisdictionover petitionsfor declaratoryrelief. More importantly,the petition amountsin effect to a suit against the incumbent Pres. Aquino and it is equally elementary that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being broughtto court during the period of their incumbencyand tenure. RAM.

Solivenvs Makasia r ; Beltranvs Makasia r F:

167 SCRA 393

This is the libel case involving Beltran's allegations that President Aquino was hiding under her bed. One of the issues was whether the President may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint affidavit. According to Beltran, the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit. He contended that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the TC's jurisdiction. This would be an indirect way of defeating her privilege of immunity from suit, since by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.

HELD: The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidentialduties and functionsfree from any hindranceor distraction,consideringthat being the Chief Executive is a job that, aside from requiring all of the officeholder's time, also demands undivided attention. But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invokedonly by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President'sbehalf. Thus, an accusedin a criminalcase where the Presidentis a complainant cannotraise the presidential privilegeas a defenseto prevent the case from proceeding againstthe accused. Moreover,there is nothing in our laws that would preventthe Presidentfrom waiving the privilege. The Presidentmay shed the protectionaffordedby the privilegeand submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of

w hetherto exercisethe privilegeor to w aive it is solely the P resident'sprerogative. It is a decisionthat can not be assu m edan d im po se db y a no therpe rso n. R A M.

Barlongay: Q : D oes the P resident'sim m unityfrom suit extend even beyondhis term? A : Y es. So long as the act w as done during his term.

(14) ExecutivePrivileg e , PresidentNixon refused to release informationconcerningthe Watergate scandal,claimingwhat he called "executiveprivilege."The US SC held his refusalinvalid, declaringthat neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of highlevel communications,without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances.The President'sneed for completecandorand objectivityfrom adviserscalls for great deference from the courts. However, when the privilege depends solely on the broad, undifferentiatedclaim of public interest in the confidentialityof such conversations,a confrontationwith other values arise. Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets, it is difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminishedby productionof such material for inspectionwith all the protectionthat the court will be obliged to provide . In the case of US vs Nixon

2. Vice Presiden t a. Qualifications, election,term and oath Art. VII, Sec. 3. There shall be a VicePresidentwho shall have the same qualifications and term of office and be electedwith and in the same manneras the President. He may be removedfrom office in the sam em anneras the President . The VicePresidentmay be appointedas a Memberof the Cabinet. Such appointment requiresno confirmation .

Id., Sec. 4. The Presidentand the VicePresidentshall be electedby directvote of the peoplefor a term of six years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the electionand shallend at noon of the sam edate six yearsthereafter.The President shallnot be eligiblefor any reelection. No person who has succeededas Presidentand has served as such for more than four yearsshallbe qualifiedfor electionto the sameofficeat any time. No VicePresidentshall serve for more than two successiveterms. Voluntaryrenunciation the of office for any length of time shall not be consideredas an interruptionin the continuityof the servicefor

th e fu ll term fo r w h ic h h e w a s elec te d . Unless otherw iseprovidedby law, the regular election for Presidentand VicePresident shall be h eld o n th e s ec o n dM o n d ayo f M a y. The returns of every election for President and Vice President, duly certified by the board of ca n va sse rs f eac h p ro vin c eso r city, sh a ll b e tran s m itte d th e C o n g re ss, ire ctedto th e P re sid en t o to d o f th e S en ate. U pon receiptof the certificates canvass,the P residentof the S enate shall, not later than of thirty days after the day of election(w /c is the 2nd Tuesd ayof June), open all the certificatesin the prese nce of th e S e n atean d H o u s eo f R e p res en tative in jo in t p u b licses sio n ,an d th e C o n g re ss u p o n d e te rm in a ti s , on of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass (i.e., tall y the certificates canvass) votes of the . The personshaving the highestnum berof votes shall be proclaim edelected,but in case tw o or more shall have an equaland highestnumberof votes (tie), one of them shall forth with be chosenby the vote of a m ajorityof all the m em bers Congress, of votingseparately . The Congress shallprom ulgate rules for the canvassing the certificates its of . The SupremeCourt,sittingen banc, shall be the sole judge of all contestsrelatingto the election, returns, and qualificationsof the President, or VicePresident, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose .

Id., Sec. 5. Beforethey enter on the executionof their office,the President,the VicePresidentor the ActingPresidentshall take the followingoath or affirmation : "I do solemnlyswear (or affirm) that I will faithfullyand conscientiously fulfill my dutiesas President VicePresident ActingPresident) the Philippines, (or or of preserveand defendits Constitution, executeits laws,do justiceto everyman,and consecrate myself to to the service of the Nation. So help me God." (In case of affirmation,last sentencewill be omitted.)

b. Privilegeand salary Art. VII, Sec. 6. The Presidentshall have an officialresidence. The salariesof the Presidentand VicePresidentshall be determined law and shall not be decreasedduringtheir tenure. No increasein by said compensation shall take effect until after the expirationof the term of the incumbentduring which such increasedwas approved. They shall not receivedduringtheir tenureany other emolument from the Governm ent any othersource or .

c. Prohibition s

Art. VII, Sec. 13. The President,VicePresident,the Membersof the Cabinet,and their deputies o r a s s is ta n ts h a ll n o t, u n le s so th e rw is e ro v id e din th is C o n s titu tio nh o ld a n y o th e r o ffic eo r e m p lo y s p , m ent during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or i n any franchise,or special privilegegranted by the Governm entor any subdivision,agency or instrum en tality thereof,includinggovernm ent ow ned or controlledcorporations their subsidiaries. They shall strictly or av o id co n flicto f in te res tin th e co n d u c to f th eir o ffic e . The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the P residentshall not during his tenure be appointedas M em bersof the C onstitutional om m issions, C or the O ffice of the O m budsm an, as Secretaries, ndersecretaries, or U chairm enor heads of bureausor off ices, in c lu d in gg o ve rn m en t w n edo r co n tro lledco rp o ratio n s n d th e ir s u b sid ia ries . o a

Art. VII, Sec. 3. xxx The VicePresidentmay be appointedas memberof the Cabinet. Such appointment requiresno confirmation .

d. Successio n

Art. VI, Sec. 9. Wheneverthere is a vacancyin the Office of the Vice Presidentduring the term for which he was elected,the Presidentshall nominatea VicePresidentfrom amongthe membersof the Senateand the Houseof Representatives, shallassum eofficeupon confirmation a m ajorityvote of who by all the m em bers both houses, of votingseparately.

Note that in case the vacancy occurs in both the offices of President and VicePresident, there is no Acting VicePresidentspoken of. The reason is that the VicePresidentdoes not have real functionswhen the President around is . When a vacancy occurs in both offices, the VicePresident is elected in a special election. If the vacancyoccurs only in the VicePresidency,the successoris not elected anymore,but merely chosen from the Congress .

e. Remova l Art. XI, Secs. 23

Art. XI, Sec. 2. The President, the VicePresident, the Members of the Supreme Court, the

Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from offic e, on impeachmentfor, and convictionof, culpable violation of the Constitution,treason, bribery, graft and corruption, ther high crim es,or betrayalor public trust. A ll other public officersand em ployeesm o ay be rem o ve dfro m o ffice as p ro v id e db y la w , b u t n o t b y im p ea ch m en t.

Art. XI, Sec. 3. (1) The House of Representativesshall have the exclusivepower to initiate all casesof im peachm ent . (2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of R epresentatives by any citizen upon resolutionof endorsem ent any M em berthereof,w hich sh or by all be includedin the Order of Businesswithin ten session days, and referred to the proper Com m itteew ithin three session days thereafter. The Committee,after hearing,and by a majorityvote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolutionshall be calendaredfor consideration the House within ten by sessiondaysfrom receiptthereof . (3) A vote of at least onethird of all the Membersof the Houseshall be necessaryeitherto affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution.The vote of each Mem bershallbe recorded . (4) In case the verifiedcomplaintor resolutionof impeachment filed by at least onethird of all is the Membersof the House,the same shall constitutethe Articlesof Impeachment, trial by the Senate and shall forthwithproceed . (5) No impeachment proceedings shallbe initiatedagainstthe sameofficialmore than once within a periodof one year. (6) The Senateshallhave the sole powerto try and decideall casesof impeachment. hensitting W for that purpose,the Senatorsshall be on oath or affirmation.When the Presidentof the Philippines on is trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted withoutthe concurrence twothirdsof all the M em bersof the Senate of . (7) Judgment in cases of impeachmentshall not extend further than removal from office and disqualificationto hold any office under the Republicof the Philippines,but the party convictedshall nevertheless liableand subjectto prosecution, be trial,and punishm ent according law . to

f. Function s (1) Right of successio n

Art. VII, Secs. 8 and 11 Art. VII, Sec. 8. In case of death, permanentdisability,removalfrom office, or resignationof the President,the VicePresidentshall becomethe Presidentto serve the unexpiredterm. In case of death,

permanentdisability,removalfrom office, or resignationof both the Presidentand VicePresident,the P residentof th e S enate or, in case of his inability,the S peakerof the H ouse o f R epresentatives, sha ll then ac t a s P res id en tu n til th e P re sid en t r V ic eP resid e n t h all h av e b een elec te dan d q u a lified o s . The Congressshall, by law, provide who shall serve as Presidentin case of death, permanent disability,or resignationof the Acting President. He shall serve until the Presidentor the VicePresident sh al h a ve been electe a nd qualified l d , a nd be subjec t to the re s tric tio s n of pow er s a n d d is q u a lific atio na s th e A c tin gP re s id e n t. s s a me

Art. VII, Sec. 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the S peakerof the H ouse of R epresentatives w rittendeclarationthat he is unable to dischargethe p his ow ers and duties of his office,and until he transmitsto them a writtendeclarationto the contrary,such powers and dutiesshallbe discharged the VicePresident ActingPresident by as . Whenevera majority of all the Membersof the Cabinet transmitto the Presidentof the Senate and to the Speakerof the House of Representatives their writtendeclarationthat the Presidentis unable to dischargethe powersand dutiesof his office,the VicePresidentshall immediately assumethe powers and dutiesof the officeas ActingPresident . Thereafter,when the Presidenttransmitsto the Presidentof the Senateand to the Speakerof the Houseof Representatives writtendeclaration his that no inabilityexists,he shallreassum e powersand the duties of his office. Meanwhile,should a majorityof all the Membersof the Cabinettransmitwithin five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representativestheir written declaration that the President unableto discharge powersand dutiesof his office,the Congress is the shall decide the issue. For that purpose,the Congressshall convene,if it is not in session,within fortyeight hours,in accordance with its rules and withoutneed of call. If the Congress,within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration,or if not in session, withintwelvedays after it is requiredto assemble,determines a twothirds vote of both Houses,voting by separately, that the President unableto discharge powersand dutiesof his office,the VicePresident is the shall act as President;otherwise,the Presidentshall continueexercisingthe powers and duties of his office .

(2) Membershipin Cabine t Art. VII, Sec. 3. xxx The VicePresidentmay be appointedas memberof the Cabinet. Such appointment requiresno confirmation .

UPDATED1/24/96 RAM

C. The JudicialDe partm en t Barlongay: Of the three departments of government, two de partments (Executi ve and Legislative) are consideredas active . On the other hand, the Judiciaryis consi dered as passive. It is passivein the sen se that it has to wait for a cas e to be filed beforeit can act. Sec.6.) Cruz: To maintain t he independence o f the Judiciary, the f ollowing safeguard s have been embo died in the Consti : (1) The SC is a constitutional bo dy. It cannotbe abo lished nor may its m

embershipor the ma nner of its meetingsbe change d by mere legislatio n. [Art. VIII, Sec. 4 ( 1)] (2) The me mbers of the judiciar y are not subjectto confirmationby the CA. (3) The me mbers of the SC ma y not be removedex cept by impeachmen t. (Art. IX, Sec. 2.) (4) The SC may not be deprive d of its minimumori ginal and appellatej urisdictionas prescr ibed in Art. X, Sec. 5 of the Con sti. (Art. VIII, Sec. 2 .) (5) The app ellate jurisdictionof the SC may not be i ncreased by law w/ o its advice and con currence. (Art. VI, Sec. 30.) (6) The SC now has administra tive supervision ov er all lower courts a nd their personnel. (Art. VIII, (7) The SC has exclusivepower to disciplinejudges of lower courts. (Art. VIII, Sec. 11.) (8) The me

mbers of the SC and all lower courts have securityof tenure,w/ c cannotbe undermi ned by a law reorganizingthe judiciary. (Id.) (9) They sh all not be designate d to any agency per forming quasijudicial or administr ative functions. (Art. VIII, Sec. 12.) (10) The sa laries of judges may not be reducedduri ng their continuance in office. (Art. VIII, Sec. 10.) (11) The ju diciary shall enjoy fi scal autonomy. (Art . VIII, Sec. 3.)

(12) The SC alone may initiate rules of court. [Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (5).] (13) Only the SC may order the temporarydetail of judges. [Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (3)] (14) The SC can appoint all officials and employeesof the judiciary. [Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (6)] 1. T h e S u prem eC o urt a. Com positio n Art. VIII, Sec. 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen A sso ciateJustices. It m ay sit en banc or its discretion,in divisio nsof three, five , or seven M em bers. A ny vac an c ys h all b e fille d w ith in n in etyd a ys fro m th e o c cu rren c e e reo . th f (2) All cases involvingthe constitutionality a treaty, internationalor execu of tive agreement,or law , w hich shall be heard by the Suprem eCourt, en banc, includingthose involv ing the constitutionality, application,or operationof presidentialdecrees,proclamations, orders, instructions , ordinances,and other regulations, shall be decidedwith the concurrence a majorityof the Members of who actuallytook part in the deliberations the issuesin the case and votedthereon. on (3) Cases or mattersheard by a divisionshall be decidedor resolvedwith the concurrenceof a majorityof the Memberswho actuallytook part in the deliberations the issues in t on he case and voted thereon,and in no case, withoutthe concurrenceof at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained,the case shall be decided en banc: Provided,that no doctri ne or principle or principleof law laid down by the court in a decisionrendereden banc or in division may be modifiedor reversed exceptby the courtsittingen banc .

Creatio n The judicialpowershall be vestedin one SupremeCourt and in such lower courts as may be established by law. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1, par. 1.) The Supreme Court is a constitutionalbody. As such it cannot be abolished by t he Congress for the powerto destroyonly residesin the one who has the powerto create . The lower courts (Court of Appeals, Regional Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts , MetropolitanTrial Courts,MunicipalCircuit Trial Courts),on the other hand, are establishedby law, and so co uld be abolishedby law, providedthe securityof tenure is not undermined .

4(1)]

Compositio n

The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and 14 Associate Justices. [Ar t. VIII, Sec.

Under the 1935 Constitution,the SupremeCourt was composedof eleven (11) justices in all; in 1973,

fifteen (15) Justices .

Mode of Sitting It may sit en banc, or in its discre tion, in divisions of 3 , 5 or 7 members (o r 5, 3 or 2 divisions). [Art. VIII, Sec. 4(1)] In 1935, the rule was that the SC may sit en banc or in 2 divisions,"unless o therwiseprovidedby law." Congress decided a gainst allowing the SC to sit in 2 divisio sits in divisions, it does not violate the concept of a "one Supreme Court" because, When the SC ns on the theory tha S tates v Limsiongco accordingthe United t there is only one S upreme Court. And so, it pro vided in the Judiciary Act of 1948 the rule t hat the SC may only sit en banc. But the reality was that the docke ts were crowded. This prompted the framers to eliminat In Vargas v Rilloraza e one phrase "unle ss otherwise providedby law" in 1 956, and in effect lea ve the decisionto the Vargasv Rilloraz sit SC on whethertoa en banc or in 2 divisi ons, if it sat on divisions . In 1987, not only was the discretio n retained,but also th e divisionswere incre ased. There may be

5, 3 or 2 divisionsmade up of 3, 5 or 7 members, respectively.At pres ent, the SC sits either en banc or in 3 divisi ons.

One SupremeCour t

, 41 Phil 94 (1920), the divisions of the SC do not diminish its authority,becausealt houghit sits in divisio ns, it remainsand cofunctionsas one bod y. This "one Su preme Court" doctrin e is strengthenedby the provisionthat "w hen the requirednu mber (in a division)is not obt ained, the case shall be decided en banc: provided,that no doc trine or principle of la w laid down by the court in a decisionrendered en banc or in division may be modifiedor r eversedexceptby th e court sitting en banc. [Art. VIII, Sec. 4(3)]

Strict Compositio n

, 80 Phil 297 (1948), the SC held that the

temporarydesignati on of judges of the CFI and the Court of Appealsin the Supre me Court to constitut e a quorumdue to di squalification som of e of the justices,is unconstitu tional. There is but o ne SupremeCourt w hose membership ap pointmentsare perm anent .

, 80 Phil 297 (1948) F: Pet. Vargas filed a

motion assailing the c onstitutionality of Peop le's Court Act w/c provi des that any justice of the SC who held any office or position under the Phil Exec. Commission or under the govt called Phil. Republic, may no t sit and vote in any case broug ht to that court under s ec. 13 hereof in w/c th e accused is a person who held any office or position under either both the Phil. Exec. Commissio n and the Phil. Republi c or any branch, instru mentality or agency th ereof. If

on account of such disqualification, or bec. of any of the grounds of disqualification of judges, in R 126, sec. 1 of the ROC, or on account of illness, absence of temporary disability, the requisite number of justices necessary to constitute a quorom in any case is not present, the Pres. may designate such no. of judges of the CFI, judges at large of CFI, cadastral judges, having none of the disqualification set forth in the above law, as may be necessary to sit temporarily as justice of the SC in order to form a quorom.

HELD: (1) Congressdoes not have the power to add to the existing grounds for disqualificationof a justice of the SC. To disqualifyany of these constitutionalcomponentmemberof the court especiallyas in this case, a majorityof them in a treasoncase, is nothing short of deprivingthe court itself of its jurisdictionas established by the fundamentallaw. Disqualification a judge is a deprivationof his judicial power. It would seem evident of that if Congress could disqualify members of SC in taking part in the hearing and determination of c ertain "collaboration" cases, it could extend the disqualification other cases. to (2) The designationprovided (a CFIjudge to sit as a SC justice if the SC does not have the required quorum )is repugnantto the constitutional requirem ent that m em bersbe appointedby the Pres. w / the cons ent of the CA. (This was under the 1935 Constitution w/c required confirmation from the Commission on Appointments.)It will result in a situation wherein 6 members sitting will not be appointed and confirmed in accordance the Consti w/ . (3) However brief or temporary may be the action or participationof a judge designated,there is no escapingthe fact that he would be participatingin the deliberationsand acts of the SC and if allowed to do so, his vote would count as much as any regularjustice. xxx Adapted .

b. Appointmentand qualification s Art. VIII, Sec. 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiatecourt unless he is a natural orn citizen of the Philippines. A memberof the SupremeCourt b must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteenyears or m ore a judge of a lower court or engagedin the practiceof law in the Philippines.

Judicialand Bar Counci l Id., Sec. 8. (5) The (Judicialand Bar) Councilshall have the principalfunctionof recommending appointeesto the Judiciary. It may exercisesuch other functionsand duties as the SupremeCourt may assignto it.

Id., Sec. 9. The Membersof the SupremeCourt and judgesof lower courts shall be appointedby the Presidentfrom a list of at least three nomineespreparedby the Judicialand Bar Councilfor every vacancy.Suchappointm ents need no confirm ation . For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointmentswithin ninety days from the subm ission the list. of

Qualification s

(1) Naturalborn citizen [A rt. VIII, Sec. 7( 1)] (2) At least 4 0 years of age (id.) (3) At least 1 5 years of exp erience as a j udge of lower court, or pract ice of law in t he Philippines (id.) (4) Of proven c ompetence,int egrity, probity and independe nce [Art. VIII, S ec. 7(3)] c. S alary Art. VI II, Sec. 10. Th e salary of th e Chief Justic e and of the A ssociate Justi ces of the Su preme court and of j udges of lowe r courts shall In Perfectov Meer be fixed by la w. During thei r continuance in office, their salary shallnot be de creased .

Unless the Congress provides other wise, the CJ s hall receive an annual salary of P 240,000 a nd the AssociateJusti ces shall receiv e P 204,000ea ch. (Art. XVIII, Sec. 17.) The salary of l ower court jud ges is not initia lly fixed by the Constitutionbu t by the law. During their co ntinuancein of fice, their salar y shall not be d ecreased.(Art. VIII, Sec. 10.) But it may be increa sed by law, to take effect at once. Reason s are: [one] th e Constitution does not prohibitit; [two] the Judiciarypl ays no part in t he passageof the law increas ing their salary unlike the Con gress and the Execut ive, and so the re can be no c onflict of intere st; and [three] t his will promot

e the independ ence of the Judiciary. Is the i mpositionof in come tax on th e salary of the Justicesand J udges a dimin ution of their s alary as prohibitedby t he Constitution ? Under the 1935 Cons titution (Art. VII I, Sec. 9), it wa s provided that the memberso f the Judiciary "shall receive such c ompensationa s may be fixed by law, which shall not be di minished durin g their continu ance in office."

, 85 Phil 552 (1 950), the SC r uled that salari es of judges w ere not subject to income tax, for such w ould be a dimi nution of their salary, in contr avention of th e Constitution. This happene d after

JusticePerfect o refusedto pa y the assessme nt of incometa x madeupon hi m by the Collec tor.

Responding to this, Congress passed a law providing that the constitutional provision against the diminutionof salariesof membersof the judiciaryshould not be interpretedto mean an exemptionfrom income tax. (Sec. 13, RA 590.) But the Court struck this statute down as unconstitutional when as in the previouscase, Judge Endencia refused to pay his taxes; thereby giving the SC an opportunity to make the pronouncement in the case of Endenciav David , 93 Phil 696 (1953). The SC ruling invalidatingthe statute was based on the reason that the legislaturehad no power to interpret the Constitution,such power being lodged in the judicial branch, and so when it did, it violated the separationof powers under the Constitution .

Com parethe 1973 Constitution,A rt. XV, Sec. 6 Aware of this ruling, the framersof the 1973 Constitutionclearly providedin Art. XV, Sec. 6 that: Art., Sec. 6. No salary or any form of emolumentof any public officer or employee,including constitutional officers,shallbe exem ptfrom the paymentof incom etax. therebyavoidinga SC contrary,selfdefensiveruling. This provisionin the 1973 Constitution,however,is not found in the 1987 Constitution,promptingsome judges includingNitafan,to contendthat the old ruling in Perfectoand Endenciais therebydeemedrevived. But the SC this time did not uphold the old ruling. Not exemptfrom incometax In Nitafan v Commissionerof Internal R evenu e , (July 1987), the Court ruled that under the 1987 Constitution, salariesof membersof the Judiciaryare not exemptfrom taxes. It anchoredits decisionon the the deliberationof the Constitutional Commission,that is, on the legislativehistory of the presentArt. VIII, Sec. 10. A draft of the present Art. VIII, Sec. 10 when originallypresentedto the body, expresslyexemptedthe salary of judgesfrom taxation. But when this draft was discussedon secondreading,the sentimentwas against the exemption, reasonbeing that like any other citizen,judgesand justicesmust pay their share in the burden the of maintaining the government. So this express exemption was deleted from Art. VIII, Sec. 10 and so it was whenthe draft was adoptedby the body. There was a plan to insert a similar provision as that found in Art. XV, Sec. 6 of 1973, but through oversight,the constitutional commission failed to insert one. Yet, the intent was clear to have one, and so it must be read into the Constitution, SC concluded the . Tenur e d. S ecurity of Art. VIII, Sec. 11. The members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold

office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitate d to dischargethe duties of their office. The S uprem eC ourt en banc shall have the pow er to disciplineju dges of low er courts,or order their dism issalby a vote of a m ajorityof the M em bersw ho actuallytook p art in the deliberations the issuesin the caseand votedthereon. on

Id ., S e c. 2 . x xx N o law shall be passedreorganizing Judiciaryw hen it underm ines e securityof tenure the th of its M e m b e rs . R eorganizatio n It is highly doubtful if this provision applies to the SC. The power to reorganizeinvolves the power to create and destroy. S ince the S C is a creationof the C onstitutionand not of C ongress,it m ay not be creat ed la Lallana vs. Alba De nor destroyed, ultimatelyreorganized Congress and by . F: , 112 SCRA 294 (1982 )
Sec. 144 of BP 129 replaced the existing court system, w/ the exception of the SC and the SB, w/ a new one and provided that upon the completion of the reorganization by the Pres., the courts affected "shall be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office." Petitioner, judge of the city court of Olangapo, and 7 members of the Bar questioned the validity of the Act in an action for prohibition, on the ground that it contravened the security of tenure of judges. They sought to bolster their claim by imputing lack of GF in the enactment of the Act and by characterizing it as an undue delegation of legislative power bec. of Sec. 41, w/c authorizes the Pres. to fix the compensation of those who would be appointed under it "along the guidelines set forth in LOI No. 93, pursuant to PD 985, as amendedby PD 1597."

HELD: The imputation of lack of GF disregards the fact that the Act was the product of careful study and deliberationnot only by the BP but also by a Presidentialstudy committee(composedof the Chief Justice and Ministerof Justice as cochairmen,w/ membersdrawn from the SC and Ministry of Justice.) The study group called attention to the clogged dockets of the courts and the possible worseningof the situation as a result of populationgrowth and rising expectations, and the adverseeffect of this on the developmental programsof the govt. It was this problem w/c the Act seeks to solve. xxx [T]he abolitionof an office is w/in the competenceof a legislative body if done in GF. The test is whether the abolition is in GF. As that element is present in the enactmentof BP 129, the lack of merit of the petitionbecomesapparent . (2) However,while there can be no claim to securityof tenure where the office no longer exists, in their effect there is no differencebet. removaland the abolition of office. In either case, the effect on the incumbent is one of separation. Accordingly,in the implementationof the law it would be in keeping w/ the spirit of the Consti. that, as far as incumbentjustices and judges are concerned,the SC be consultedand that its view be accordedfullest consideration. This is not renderingadvisoryopinion bec. there is no questionof law involved. Neitheris there intrusioninto the appointingprocessbec. only incumbentsare involved . (3) As to the charge of undue delegation, the provisions of Sec. 41 that the Pres. should fix the compensationof those who will be appointed to the new courts "along the guidelines set forth in LOI No. 93,

pursuantto P D 985, as am endedby PD 1597" constitutesa sufficientground. V V.

e . R e m o va l Art. VIII, Sec. 11. The members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to dischargethe duties of their office. The S uprem eC ourt en banc shall have the pow er to disciplinejudges of low er courts,or order their dism issalby a vote of a m ajorityof the M em bers w ho actuallytook part in the deliberations the issuesin the caseand votedthereon. on

Art. XI, Sec. 2. The xxx Members of the Supreme Court xxx may be removed from office, on impeachmentfor, and convictionof, culpable violation of the Constitution,tre ason, bribery, graft and corruption,other high crimes,or betrayalof public trust. All other public officer s and employeesmay be rem ovedfrom officeas providedby law, but not by im peachm ent .

See procedure impeachment for underOtherPowersof Congress . Mem bersof the SC cannotbe removedexceptby impeachment. Thus,a SC ju stice cannotbe chargedin a criminal case or a disbarmentproceeding,because the ultimate effect of either is t o remove him from office, and thus circumvent provisionon impeachment the .

f. Fiscal Autonom y Art. VIII, Sec. 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropri ations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislaturebelow the amount appropriatedfor the previousyear and, after approval, shallbe autom atically regularlyreleased and .

g. Jurisdictio n (1) The Power of JudicialReview

Art. VIII, Sec. 5. xxx (2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorarias the law or the Rules of Courtmay provide,final judgmentsand ordersof lower courtsin: (a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executiveagreement,law, presidentialdecree, proclamation,order, instructio n, ordinance,or

re g u la tio n in q u e s tio n is .

The judicial pow er shall be vested in one S uprem eC ourt and i n such low er courts as m ay be established by law. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1, p ar. 1.) S cope of the JudicialP o w er Judicialpower includesthe duty of the courts of justice to: (Art. VIII, Sec. 1, par. 2) 1 . S e ttleac tu a lc o n tro v e rs ie s ,in v o lv in grig h tsw h ic h a re le g a llyd e m a n d As le a n d e n fo rc e a b lea n a b early as Angara v ElectoralTribunal ; d This is the classic al definitionof judicial pow er that contemplatesa cas e where the partyplaintiff h as a cause of action against Angara v ElectoralCommissio th n e partydefendant, that is, t he plaintiff has a right corr F: esponding to the defenda nt's obligation,which right was violatedby the defendant,t hereby resultingin injury. 2. Determine wh ether or not there has b een a grave abuse of dis cretion amounting to lac k or excessof jurisdiction on the part of any branchor instrumentality the Go of vernment .

, the SC held that when it performshis checkingfunc tion of the coequal branches,it is merel y performinga duty impos ed upon it by the Constituti on; that it acts as the mech a nism that implements the "supremacy of the Consti tution." The extent to whi ch it exercises this functi on, however,has been limited by the politicalquestiondo ctrine. (1) Powerof JudicialRevi ew

, 63 Phil 139 (1936).

In 1935, the Nationa l Assembly adopted a resolut ion that "all memberselect, w ith no election protest filed o n or before 3 December 1935 are deemed elected." The Elector al Commission,a constitution al body, on the other hand set the 9 December 1935 as the deadli ne for the filing of election pro test. Ynsua, who lost to Angara, filed a motion of prot est (complaint) on 8 Decemb er 1935. This was entertaine d by the Electoral Commission. Angara contended that the deadline set by the National Assembly was controlling. Who prevailed ?

HELD: The SC, through J. Laurel, ruled for Yns ua, thereby upholding t he authority of the Elec toral

Commission,in view of the constitutionalprovisiongra nting the electoralCommis sion jurisdictionover electi on protests . In justifying the power of judicial review , J. Laurel pointed out t hat when the court allocated constitutionalboundaries, it neither asserts suprema cy, nor annuls the acts of t he legislature. It simply ca rries out the solemn and sacred obligationsimposedupon i t by the constitutionto det ermine conflictingclaims a nd to establish for the parties th e rights which the constitu tion grants to them. This i s in truth all that is involve d in

what is termed "judicialsupremacy"which properlyis the power of judicial review under the Constitution . Even then, this power of judicial review is lim ited to actual cases and controversies be exercised to after full opportunityof argumentby the parties, and limited further to the constitutionalquestion raised or the very lis mota presented.Any attempt at abstractioncould only lead to dialectics and barren legal questionsand to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questionsof wisdom ,justice or expediencyof legislation.xxx A dapted. a. Conditionsfor the Exerciseof JudicialReview In People v Vera , 66 Phil 56 (1937), J. Laurel laid down the doctrine that judicial review can only be exercised an actualcase and controversy in . This means (1) a party with a personal and substantial interest, (2) an appropriate case, (3) a constitutionalquestion raised at the earliest possible time, and (4) a constitutionalquestion that is the very lis mota of the case,i.e. an unavoidable question .

PoliticalQuestion s In PBA v COMELEC , 140 SCRA 455, we see a reversal of judicial review. The case was clearly a justiciablecontroversy. Is the resignation submitted by Marcos, which was conditioned on the election, proclamation and assumption into office by the elected President, a valid resignation as to authorized the Batasanto pass a Snap ElectionLaw? The Court could have validly issued an injunctionto stop the COMELEC from proceedingwith the preparationsfor the election. But it did not, citing its delay in deciding the case and the sentimentsof the people that developedin the meantimeas reason for its inaction. Accordingto the court, what at first was a legal questionbecamea politicalquestionbecauseit was overtakenby events. [In this case, no 7 Justices voted to dismiss the petitions, and 5 Justices voted to declare the statute unconstitutional. In accordancew/ Javellanavs. Exec. Sec., J. Teehankeewas of the view that as there were less than ten votes for declaringBP 883 unconstitutional, petitionsshould be dismissed.) the VV: A Court which does not issue an injunctionto enjoin an official act when it could have issued one is actually deciding the case in favor of the validity of the act. Failure to issue an injunction is as much an exerciseof judicialreview . In Romulo v Yniguez , infra, we see anothertrend of judicial review. What seems like a legal question when viewed in isolation (namely, whether the rules of the Batasan enabling it to shelve a complaint for impeachmentagainst the President is constitutional.)is really a political question when viewed in a broader context (i.e., that the case was filed against the Speakerof a coequal branch to compel him by mandamusto recall the complaintfrom the archive,and that the ultimate result of the case was to questionthe decisionof the Batasanto shelvethe case,a matter,that is solelycomm itted that department. to ) Said the SC: By denying Mitra's motion to recall the resolution of impeachment, the BP in effect confirmedthe action of its committeedismissingthe resolution. This places the matter beyond review by this Court. While the petition is directed at the Committeeon Justice, Human Rights and Good Govt., it is actually directedat the BP bec. the committee'saction, dismissingthe resolutionof impeachment, was approvedby the

BP. Indeed,an interferenceby the judicial dept. w/ the work of a legislativecommitteewould be tantamountto an intereferencew/ the work of the legislatureitself. Yet, despite the really politicalnature of the question,the SC passed on the validity of the rules to doubts that m ay still be entertained .

erase

Dumlao v COMELEC (95 SCRA 392) F:

Section 4 of BP 52 provided that any retired elective local official who had received retirement pay to which he was entitled under the law and who have been 65 years old at the commencement of the term of office to which he sought to be elected, was not qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he had retired. Dumlao filed for prohibition to enjoin the enforcement of the law, claiming that this was directed at him as former governor of Nueva Vizcaya.

HELD: The SC held that (a) he had no standing,since he had not been injured by the operationof the law, no petition for his disqualification having been filed and (b) the action was a requestfor advisoryopinion. And yet, the SC upheld the validity "because of paramount public interest", declaring that the legislative purpose of infusingyoungerblood in local governmentwas valid. Adapted .

Barlongay: Q: What are the two aspectsof politicalquestions ? A: (1) those questionsthat are left to the peoplein their sovereigncapacit y (2) mattersw/c are lodgedin the other branchesof govt. Q: What is the effect of the expandedjurisdictionon the politicalquestiondoctrine? A: The doctrinestill exists but has been reducedin scope .

b. All courts can exercisejudicial review The review power of the SC implies that it has appellate jurisdiction over final judgments of lower courts on cases with constitutional issues. If so, inferior courts have original jurisdiction over constitutional cases although they decide the case only at first instance, their decision being always reviewableby the SC. Thus, for instancean RTC can rule on the constitutionality the AntiS ubversionLaw. of 3 SCRA 696 (1961), RA 2616, which providedfor the expropriationof the Tatalon Estate, was claimedto be unconstitutional.This issue said the SC, could be resolvedby the CFI in the ejectmentcase filed before it by the evicteesof the estate,since the 1935 Constitutioncontemplated that inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionalityissues, that it spoke of appellate review of "final judgmentof inferior courts" in cases where such constitutionalityhappensto be in issue. The 2/3 vote of the SC required by Sec. 10 of Art. VII restrictedthe decisionsof that Court only in the exerciseof its appellate In J.M. Tuason & Co. v CA,

jurisdiction. Said the court: The Consti. contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving the constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of the final judgm ent of inferior courts, in cases where such constitutionality happensto be in issue. The 2/3 vote of the SC, requi red by Sec. 10, Art. VIII, IAC 1935 Consti., conditions only decisions of that court in the exercise of its appellate In Ynot v of the jurisdiction. 148 SCRA 659, the SC reversedthe RTC's holding that it had no authorityto rule on the validity of EO 626A, banning the transporting of carabaos from one province to another. The Court pointed out, that since it has jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm final judgments of lower courts in constitutional cases, then the low er courts can pass upon the validity of a statute in the first instance . The Ynot vs. IACSC then struck down the law for being arbitraryand for unduly delegatinglegislativepower. F: , 148 SCRA 659 (1987)
Petitioners' 6 carabaos were confiscated by the police for having been transported from Masbate to Iloilo in violation of EO 626A. He brought an action for replevin, challenging the consitutionality of the EO. The trial court sustained the confiscation of the animals and declined to rule on the validity of the law on the ground that it lacked authority to do so. Its decision was affirmed by the IAC. Hence this petition for review.

HELD: (1) Under the provision granting the SC jurisdiction to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide final judgments of lower courts" in all cases involvingthe constitutionality certain measures,lower courts can pass upon the validityof a statute in the first of instance . (2) There is no doubt that by banningthe slaughterof these animals(exceptwhere there at least 7 yrs. old if male and 11 yrs old if female upon the issuanceof the necessarypermit) the EO will be conservingthose still fit for farm work or breedingand preventingtheir improvidentdepletion. We do not see, however,how the prohibitionof the interprovincialtransport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminateslaughter,considering that they can be killed any where, w/ no less difficulty in on province than in another. Obviously,retaining the carabao in one province will not prevent their slaughterthere, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef,the prohibitionis made to apply to it as otherwise,so says the EO, it could be easily circumsbcribed by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movementof the live animals for the purposeof preventingtheir slaughtercannot be prohibited,it should follow that there is no reasoneither to prohibittheir transferas, not to be flippant,dead meat. (3) In the instantcase, the carabaoswere arbitrarilyconfiscatedby the police station commander, were returnedto the petitioneronly after he had filed a complaintfor recoveryand given a supersedeas bond w/c was ordered him elementaryfair play. xxx VV. denyingconfiscatedupon his failure to producethe carabaoswhen ordered by the trial court. The EO defined the prohibition,convictedthe petitionerand immediatelyimposed punishment,w/c was carried out forthright. The measuresstruck him at once and pounced upon the petitionerw/o giving him a chance to be heard, thus (2) JudicialReviewand politicalquestions . Art. VIII, Sec. 1. Judicialpowershall be vestedin one SupremeCourtand in such lowercourtsas

m ay be established law. by Judicialpower includesthe duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally dem andableand enforceable,and to determ inew hetheror not there has b een a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branc h or instrum entality the G overnm ent of . The second aspect of the definition of judicial power modifies the political question doctrine. As enunciatedin Tanada v Cuenco , a political question is one to be decided by the people in their sovere ign capacity,one in respectto w hich full discretionary capacityis given to the other branchesof the governm en t. Padilla v PonceEnrile It does not mean, however, that the political question doctrine has been completelyabrogatedby the Constitution,such that if those cases where the SC invoked the doctrine were decided now it would have to decide the case on its merits. It is submitted that what the Constitutionoverrules is only the ruling in Garcia , supra, where the SC held that the questionon the validity of the proclamationof martial law is beyond judicial review, so that when the Presidentsays that there is a need for such proclamation,his words are bindingon the Courts,and all that the citizen can do is trust in the good faith of the President . Indeed, as already noted in the CommandernChief power of the President above, Art. VII, Sec. 18 i authorizesthe SC to review,in an appropriateproceeding(like a habeascorpuspetition),filed by a citizen (who, under the Rules of Court, could be the detainee himself, or anyone else in his behalf), the sufficiency of the factualbasis of the proclamation suspension or . Garcia vs BOI this, the politicalquestiondoctrineis not a dead issue. In fact, the SupremeCourt continuesto Beyond invoke it as in Lawyers'Leaguefor a Better Philippinesv Aquino,In re Bermudezand Marcosvs Manglapus.

, 191 SCRA288 In this case, the court ruled that it has a constitutionalduty to step into the controversyand determine the paramountissue. Said the court, "[t]hereis before us an actual controversywhetherthe petrochemical plant should remain in Bataan or should be transferredto Batangas,and whetherits feedstockoriginallyof naphtha only should be changedto naphthaand/ or liquified petroleumgas as the approvedamendedapplicationof the BPC, now Luzon PetrochemicalCorp. (LPC), shows. And in the light of the categoricaladmissionof the BOI that it is the investor who has the final choice of the site and the decision on the feedstock, whether or not it constitutes a grave abuse of discretion for the BOI to yield to the wishes of the investor, national interest notwithstanding. The SupremeCourt held that the BOI committeda grave abuse of discretionin approvingthe transferof the petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangasand authorizingthe change of feedstockfrom naphthaonly to naphtha and/or LPG for the main reason that the final say is in the investor all other circumstances to the contrarynotwithstanding.No cogent advantageto the governmenthas been shown by this transfer. This is a repudiationof the independent policy of the governmentexpressedin numerouslaws and the Constitutionto run

its ow n affairs and the w ay it deem s best for the nationalinter est. Dissenting : The decision of the BOI may be extremely unwise and inadvisable,but the SC may not, for that reason annul the BOI's action or prohibit it from acting on the manner that lies within its particular sphere of competence,for the Court is not a judge of the wisdom and soun dness of the actions of the two other coequal (3) Jurisdictionover criminalcases where penaltyimposedis branchesof the G overnm ent, only of their legality and co but nstitutionality. Adapted .

reclusionperpetu a Art. VIII, Sec. 5. The S uprem eCourt shall have the follow ingpow ers : xxx (2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on ap , peal or In People vas the , 86 SCRA 511 (1978)and as affirmedin Peoplev Ramos certiorari Daniellaw or the Rules of Courtmay provide,final judgmentsand ordersof lower court s in: (d) All crim inalcasesin whichthe penaltyim posedis reclusion perpetua higher or .

88 SCRA 466 (1979),both being rape cases where the trial court imposed lesser penalties because of misappreciation the aggravating of and qualifyingcircumstances and on appeal the penalty was incr eased. The majorityopinion held that "hence forth, should the CA be of the opinion that the penalty of death or reclusionperpetuashould be imposedin any criminalcase appealedto it where the penaltyimposedby the tria l court is less than reclusionperpetua the said , Court, with comprehensivewritten analysisof the evidenceand discussionof the law involved (should)render judgmen expressly and explicitly imposing the penalty of t either death or reclusio n perpetua as t he circumstanceswarrant, refrain from entering judgment, and for thwith certify the case and elevate the entire record thereto to this Court for review." Chief Justice Castro, for the majority,explained: Art. X, Sec. 5 (2) (d) [now Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (2) (d)] provides that the SC shall have ap pellate jurisdictionover "final judgementsand

decrees of inferior courts" in criminal in w/c the "penalty impos ed is death or life imprisonment." Unless the CA renders judgmentand imposesthe penalty of death or reclu sion perpetua there would be no judgmentfor , SC to review. Indeed, Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 an d the present Rule 124, Sec. 13 provide that, whenever the CA should be of the opinion that the penalty of d eath or life imprisonmentshould be imposed, "the said court shall refrain from enteringjudgmentthereon,and shall forthwith certify the case broughtbefore it on appeal," which that it is not prohibitedfrom rendering judg ment. In other words, the CA is not prohibited from renderingjudgmentbut from "enteringjudgment." The disti nction bet. the two is well established. The phrase "entering judgment" is not to be equated w/ an "entry of judgment" as the latter is understoodin R36 in relation to Sec. 8, R 121 and Sec. 16, R 1 24, ROC. "Entry of judgment"presupposesa final judgment final in the sense that no appeal was taken fro m the decision of the trial court or appellate court w/in the reglamentaryperiod. A judgmentin a crim. case becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the def. has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal. It is only then th at there is a judgment w/c is to be entered or recordedin the book of entriesof judgments.

R u le 12 4, S e c. 1 3. xxx W heneverthe Court of A ppealsshould be of the opinionthat the penalty of reclusion perpetuaor higher should be im p osedin a case, the C ourt after discussionof the evidenceand the law involved , shall render judgmentimposingthe penalty of reclusion perpetua or higher as the circumstanceswarrant, refrain from enteringjudgm entand forthw ithcertify the case and elevate the entire record thereof t o the S up rem eC ourt for review .

(4) Article VII, Sec. 18, par. 3 Art. VII, Sec. 18. xxx xxx The SupremeCourt may review,in an appropriateproceedingfiled by any citizen,the sufficiency of the factualbasis of the proclamation martiallaw or the suspensionof the privilegeof the writ or the of extension thereof,and mustpromulgate decisionthereonwithinthirty days from its filing. its

(5) Article VII, Sec. 4, par. 7 Art. VII, Sec. 4. xxx xxx The SupremeCourt,sittingen banc, shall be the sole judge of all contestsrelatingto the election, returns,and qualifications the President,VicePresident,and may promulgate rule for the purpose of its . Lopezvs. Roxa s F: SCRA 756 (1966) , 17
In 1965, the 2 Houses of Congress in joint session proclaimed petitioner Fernando Lopez elected to the Office of the VicePresident of the Philippines. His closest opponent, resp. Gerardo Roxas, then filed with the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) an election protest contesting the election of petitioner herein as VP upon the ground that it was not he, but said resp., who had obtained the largest number of votes for said office. Petitioner Lopez then instituted this Original Action to prevent the PET from hearing and deciding the aforementioned election contest, upon the ground that R.A. No. 1793, creating said Tribunal, is "unconstitutional" and that, "all proceedings taken by it are a nullity".

ISSUE: WhetherR.A. 1793 is unconstitutiona l HELD: NO. Section 1, Art. VIII of the Constitutionvests in the judicial branch of the government,not merely some specified or limited judicial power, but the entirety or "all" of said power, except, only, so much as the Constitutionconfers upon some other agency,such as the power to "judge all contests relating to the election, returnsand qualifications' membersof the Senateand those of the House of Representatives, of which is vested by the Constitutionsolely in the SenateElectoralTribunaland the House ElectoralTribunal,respectively . R.A 1793, creating the PET, has the effect of giving a defeated candidate the legal right to contest

judicially the election of the President lect or the VPelect. By providing that the PET "shall be composedof e the Chief Justice and the other 10 M em bersof the S C", R.A. 1793 has conferred upon such court an add itional exclusiveoriginaljurisdiction. It has not created a new and separatecourt. It has m erely conferredupon t he SC the functions of a PET. The PET is not inferior to the SC since it is the same court, although the functions peculiarto said Tribunalare m ore limited in scope than those of the SC in the exerciseof its ordinaryfunc tions. The authorityof the PET to declare who has the better right to office does not abridge constitutionaltenure. If the evidenceintroducedin the election protestshows that the person really elected is the protestant,not the person declaredelectedby C ongress,then the latter had legally no constitutional tenure w hatsoever, and, hence, he can claim no abridgmentthereof. Moreover,in the impositionof new duties upon the SC, the Congresshas not, through R.A. 1793, encroached upon the appointing power of the Executive. It constitutes neithe r the creationof an office, nor the appointmentof an officer. Said law is constitutional. Adapted .

(6) Article IX, A, Sec. 7 Art. IX, A, Sec. 7. Each Commission shall decideby a majorityvote of all its Membersany case or matter broughtbefore it within sixty days from the date of its submissionfor decisionor resolution. A case or matteris deemedsubmittedfor decisionor resolutionupon the filing of the last pleading,brief, or memorandumrequiredby the rules of the Commissionor by the Commissionitself. Unless otherwise providedby this Constitution by law, any decision, or orderor rulingof each Comm ission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of the copy thereof .

h. Congressional Powerover Jurisdictionof the SupremeCourt Art. VIII, Sec. 2. The Congress shall have the power the define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated Section5 hereof in . xxx But while the jurisdictionof courts is a matter of legislativeapportionment, Constitutionsets certain the limitationson this prerogative : 1. It cannotdecreasethe constitutionally jurisdictionof the SupremeCourt. set (It may not deprivethe SupremeCourt of its jurisdictionover cases enumerated Section5 hereof. in ) 2. It cannotincreasethe constitutionally appellatejurisdictionof the SupremeCourt. set

Art. VI, Sec. 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Courtas providedin this Constitution withoutits adviceand concurrence .

3. It can increasethe original jurisdictionof the SC (pursuantto its generalpo wer). 4. It can m ake the jurisdictionof the S C concurrentwith lower courts (pursuan t to its generalpower) . Thus, under the Rules of Court, the originaljurisdictionof the SC is concurr ent with the RTC and in the case of the specialcivil actions,with the CA. 5. It cannot pass a law reorganizing the judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its m em bers.(Art. VI, Sec. 2, par. 2) F: M antrusteS ystem s,Inc. vs CA
Mantruste (MSI) entered into an interim lease agreement w/ DBP, owner of Bayview Plaza Hotel wherein the former would operate the hotel for a minimum of 3 mos. or until such time that the said prop erties are sold to MSI or other third parties by DBP. Subsequently, the Pres. issued Procl. 50 w/c sought to the expeditio us privatization of government assets. The Bayview Hotel properties were among the govt assets identified for privati zation and were consequently transferred from DBP to the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) for disposition. xxx. The properties were subsequently awarded to the MakatiAgro Trading and La Filipina Corp. MSI filed a complaint for the issuance of a restrainin g order enjoining APT from approving the winning bid and awarding the Bayview property to privat e petitioners and from ejecting MSI from the property or from terminating the contract of lease. The CA nullified the l ower court's decision for being violative of Sec. 31 of Procl. 50A.

HELD: Section 31 of Proclamation No. 5A prohibited courts and administrative agencies from issuing any restraining order or injunction against the Asset PrivatizationTrust in connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it, nor against any purchaser of assets sold by the Trust to prevent such purchaserfrom taking possessionof any assets purchasedby him. Said Sectiondo es not infringeany provision of the Constitution. It does not impair the inherentpower of the courts "to settle act ual controversieswhich are legally demandableand enforceableand to determinewhetheror not there has bee n a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instru mentality of the govt." The President,in the exerciseof her legislativepower under the FreedomConstitution, issued said Proclamationto

prevent courts from interfering in the discharge of the Executive Department of its task of carrying out the expeditiousdispositionand privatization certaingovt. corporations of and/orthe asse ts thereof,absentany grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on its part. Thi s proclamation, not being inconsistent with the Constitution not havingbeen repealedor revokedby Congre and ss, has remainedoperative . While the judicial power may appear to be pervasive,the truth is that under the system of separationor powers,the powers of the courts over the other branchesand instrumentalities of governmentis limited to the determination of whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion am ounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the exercise of their authority and in the performanceof their assig ned tasks. Courts may not substitutetheir judgmentfor that of the APT, nor block, by an injunction,the disch arge of its functionsand the implementation its decisionsin connectionwith the acquisition,sale, or dispositio of n of assets transferredto it. Adapted .

The SupremeC ourt's Jurisdictio n A) Original jurisdiction [Art. VI II, Sec. 5(1)] (1) Casesaffectingam bassadors, other publicministersand consuls . (2) Petitionsfor certiorari prohibiti , on, mandamus,quo warrantoand habeas corpus . (3) Sufficiencyof factual basis of proclamationof martial law and s uspensionof privilege of writ of H C Note that the SC does no t have jurisdictionover declarator y relief cases, which must be filed with the R T C (In R e B erm ud ezsa id so to o, a nd yet g ave due co urseto th e p etitio n. ) The first case (ambassad ors, etc.) is made concurrentwith RTCs by law (Judiciary Act of 19 48). The secondcase (specialcivil actions) is concurrentwith the CA and the RTC, with respectto inferiorbodie s. B) AppellateJurisdictio n The Supreme Court shall have the power to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on (i) o rdinary appeal, or (ii) petition for review o n certiorari,as the law or the Rule s of Court may provide,final judg ment and orders of lower courts in the follow ing cases: (1) Cases questioning th e constitutionalityor validity of an

y (a) treaty, (b) internationaland executive agreement,(c) law or statute,(d) p residentialdecree,(e) proclamatio n, (f) order, (g) instruction,(h) ordi nance,or (i) regulation . (2) Cases questioningthe legality of an (a) tax, (b) impost,(c ) assessment,or (d) toll, or (e) an y penalty imposedin relationthereto . (3) Cases in which the jurisdiction of lower courts is in issue. (4) Criminalcases in which the pe nalty imposedis reclusionperpetu a or higher . (5) Cases in w/c only an error or q uestionof law is involved . (6) Ordersof the Constitutional C ommissions .

Appellatejurisdictionmay be exer cised in two ways: 1. Ordinaryappea l This is obligatoryon the c ourts, so the appellantpossesses this "as a matter of right". Under t his mode, the SC can pass on both questions of fact and law.

Ordinary appeal to the SC is allowed by law in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetuaor higher, includingthose involving other offenseswhich, althoughnot so punished,arose out of the sam e occurrenceor w hich m ay have been com m ittedby the accusedon the sam e occasion(to ensure unif orm ity of decision). (Sec. 17, JudiciaryAct of 1948). The other case is the automaticreview by the S C of crim inalcases where the death penalty is im posed. This is unlike the ordinary appeal taken where the penalty is reclusion perpetua or higher, for in this case, the review is automatic. The reason why it is not automaticin the first case (reclusionperpetua is that on appeal, ) the appellatecourt may increasethe penalty imposedby the trial court (to death) so that the convict must first w aive his right againstdouble jeopardy,preciselyby voluntarilym aking the appeal,before the SC can reop en the case on appeal. But the case is different when death is imposed because the worst that could happ en on automaticappeal is that the judgm entis affirmed . Naturalizationand denaturalization cases under the JudiciaryAct of 1948 (Sec. 17) used to be directly appealableto the SC. But this is deemedto have been amendedby the JudiciaryReorganization of 1980 Act (BP 129) which, in Sec. 5(3), makes all cases decided by the RTC, appealableto the CA, except those made directly appealableto the SC by (i) the Constitution,(ii) BP 129 and (iii) Sec. 17 [3(i)] and Sec. 17 [4(4)]of the JudiciaryAct of 1948. Naturalization denaturalization and cases do not fall under any of the exceptions . 2. Petition for review on certiorar i This is not discretionary on the SC. It has the authority not to give due course to the petition, if the petition shows no merit on its face. Thus, mode providedfor in Rule 45, is limited to pure questionsof law. All othercasescan be appealedto the SC usingthis m ode. The Constitutionnow providesthat "no petition for review or motion for reconsideration a decisionof of the court shall be refuseddue course or denied withoutstating the legal basis therefor." (Art. VIII, Sec. 14, par. 2) The four other cases falling under the appellate jurisdiction of the SC (viz, constitutionality, tax, jurisdictionand pure questionsof law), are appealableto the SC by petition for review on certiorari However, . in cases involving constitutionality, tax, or jurisdiction, when the resolution of the main issue depends on a controvertedquestion of fact, the case must be appealedto the CA on both, questionsof fact and law, and the decisionof the CA is then raised to the SC by petitionfor review on certiorarion pure questionsof law. (Sec. 17 of the JudiciaryAct of 1948) Certiorari The certiorari referred to in 5(1) (when the SC exercisesoriginal jurisdiction)is the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, where the question raised is a "jurisdictional question," that is, (a) lack of jurisdiction,(b) excess of jurisdiction,or (c) grave abuse of discretionamountingto lack of jurisdiction . The certiorari referred to in 5(2) (when the SC exercises appellate jurisdiction) is certiorari as an ordinarymode of appeal,where the issue raised is "error of judgment"or error of law.

i. Administrative powers

(1) Supervisionof lower c ourts Art. VIII, Sec. 6. The Suprem eCourt s hall have adm inistrativ e supervisionover all In Noblejasv Teehanke e courts and the p e rs o n n e th e re o f. l

, the SC held that althoug h the Commissioner La of nd Registrationis given th e rank of judge of the CFI, he is still an administrativ e official, hence outside t he jurisdictionof the SC a nd cannot be investigatedby it as if he were a lower court jud ge. Otherwise,the SC w ould be performinga no njudicial work. (2) Temporarily assignju dges to other stationsin th e public interes t Art. VIII, Sec. 5. The SupremeCourt sha ll have the xxx power (t o) xxx (3) Assign temp orarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may r equire. Suchtem porary assignm ent shallnot exceedsix m onthswithoutthe cons

ent of the judgeconcern ed.

(3) Order a change of ven ue or place of trial to avoi d miscarriageof justice [A rt. VIII, Sec. 5 (4)]

(4) Disciplineof lower co urt judges Art. VIII, Sec. 11 . xxx The SupremeC ourt en banc shall have the power to disciplinej udges of lowercourts,or order th eir dismissal, a vote by of a majorityof the mem bers who actuallytook p art in the deliberations the issu on es in the caseand votedt hereon.

(5) Appointmentof official s and employeesof entir e judiciar y Art. VIII, Sec. 5. The Su preme Court shall have the xxx power (to) xxx (6) Appointall officials and employees the Ju of diciaryin accordance wi th the Civil ServiceLaw.

j. Rule making

Art. VIII, Sec. 5. The Su preme Court shall have the followingpowers :

xxx (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,practice,and procedurein all courts, the adm issionto the practiceof law , the Integrated B ar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexp ensive procedurefor the sp eedydispo sitionof cases,shall be uniformfor all courts of the sam e grade,and shall not diminish,increase,or modify substantiverights. Rights of procedureof special courts and quasi ju d icia lb o d ie ss h all rem aineffectiveu n le ssd isa p p ro v ed y th e S u p rem eC o u rt b .

P ow er of C ongressto repeal R ules of C ourt Article XVIII, Sec. 10. All courts existing at the time of the ratificationof this Constitutionshall continueto exercisetheir jurisdiction,until otherwiseprovidedby law. The provisionsof the existing Rules of Court, judiciaryacts, and procedurallaws not inconsistentwith this Constitutionshall remain operativeunlessam endedor repealedby the SupremeCourtor the Congress.

(not in VV's revised outline) CoJudicialpower s Aside from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court mentioned above the following are its other powers 5(4)] to, though not exactly constituting,its judicial function related : 1. Order a change of venue or place of trial, in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice. Art. VIII, Sec.

2. Rule making Promulgate rules concerning (a) the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, (b) pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, (c) the administration to the practice of law, (d) the IntegratedBar, and (e) legalassistance the underprivileged to . Limitations to this power: Such rules shall (i) provide simplified and inexpensive procedure, for the speedy dispositionof cases, (ii) be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and (iii) not diminish,increase or modify substantiverights. Rules of procedureof specialcourts and quasijudicialbodies shall remain effectiveunless disapproved by the SC. [Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5)] It is on the basis of this power,that the Rules of Court, the Bar, IBP, Legal Aid Office were adopted .

In 1935, as affirmedin the case of In re Cunana , the C on gressw as give n the p ow erto alte r, su pplem e n nt or m odify the Rules of Court. Thus, if the S C set the passing grade in the bar at 75% , Congresscould low er it to 70% , providedthis has no retroactiveeffect. This is no longer true in 1987. Rulemaking power and the corollary power of amendingthe rules are now lodged exclusivelyon the S C.

Practiceof Profession s Art. XII, Sec. 14. xxx The practiceof all professions the Philippinesshall be lim ited to Filipinocitizens,save in in cases prescribed law. by Martial Law Art. VII, Sec. 18. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiencyof the factual basis of the proclamationof Martial Law or the suspensionof the privilegeof the writ or the extensionthereof,and must promulgateits decisionthereonwithin thirty days form its filing. (par. 3 thereof. )

k. No quasijudicial and administrative work of judges Generally:No nonjudicial work for judges;No quasi judicial and administrative work for judges. As a generalrule, membersof the judiciaryshall only have judicial functions,in line with the separation of powers principleof the Constitution. Thus: Art. VIII, Sec. 12. The members of the Supreme Court and of other courts establishedby law Thus, in Meralco any agencyperform ing shallnot be designatedv Pasay TransportationCo., judicialor adm inistrative to quasi function.

57 Phil 600 (1932), the SC held that justices of the SC could not be constituted into a Board of Arbitration to determine reasonable compensation for the use of a Meralcov Pasay Transportation Co., bridge, for this is a nonjudicial work.

57 Phil 600 (1932) The issue concerns the legal right of the members of the SC, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decisionof a majorityof whom shall be final, to act in that capacity .

H E LD : The S C and its m em bersshould not and cannotbe requiredto exerciseany pow er or to perform an y trust or to assumeany duty not pertainingto or connectedw/ the administeringof judicial functions.RAM.

In Garcia v Macarai , 39 SCRA 106 (1971), the SC said that it did not look with favor at the practice of g long standingof judges being detailed w ith the Departm entof Justice to assist the Secretary,even if it w er e only in connection with his work of exercising administrative authority over courts. The basis of this rule i s the separationof powers. In this case, resp. Macaraigwas appointedto one of the newlycreatedCFI branchesw/ station at Calamba Laguna. At the time of his appointment,resp. was the chief of TechnicalStaff of the DOJ and concurrently em berof the Board of P ardonsand P arole. xxx m In Re : RodolfoManzan o 166 S C R A 246 F:
EO No. 856 created the Provincial/City Committees on Justice to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees, particularly those involving the poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and improving local jail conditions. Among the functions of said committee are to receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail warden, fiscal or judge who may be found to have committed abuses in the discharge of his duties and refer the same to proper authority for proper action, to recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed prejudicial to the proper administration of criminal justice. Judge Manzano, Executive Judge Of Ilocos Norte was appointed as member of said Committee. Before accepting the appointment, it sought the opinion of the SC as to the propriety of such appointment .

HELD: Such committee performs administrativefunctions. Administrativefunctions are those which involve the regulationand control over the conductand affairs of individualsfor their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agencyby the organiclaw of its existence . Under the Constitution,the members of the courts shall not be designated to any agency performing quasijudicial or administrativefunctions. Consideringthat membershipof Judge Manzanoin such committee, will violate the Constitution,the Supreme Court is constrainedto deny his request that he be allowed to serve therein. He can only render assistance to such committee to help promote the laudable purposes of said committee,but only when such assistancemay be reasonablyincidentalto the fulfillmentof his judicial duties. Adapted . Exceptions: Constitutionally appointednonjudicial functionsof the SupremeCourt a. Act as Presidential ElectoralTribuna l While Congressacts as the National Board of Canvassersfor the Presidentialelection, the Supreme Court acts as the ElectoralTribunal for such election. The Constitutionprovides:"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contestsrelating to election,returns,and qualificationsof the Presidentor VicePresident,and may promulgateits rules for the purpose." (Art. Art. VII, Sec. 4, last par.)

This means that before the proclamationby the Congress of the winner, Congress is the judge of any electoralissue, but the proclamation,when there is an electoralcontestalready,then the SC becomesthe sole jud ge . The 1935 Constitutiondid not provide this power. And so RA 1793 gave the SC the power to act as judge in presidentialelectoralcontests. It was challengedin the case of Lopez v Roxas , 17 SCRA 756 (1966), but the SC upheld the law, reasoningthat it did not constitutethe SC as a separatebody but only added to its po w e rsthe p ow e rto be the judg e of e lectio nco nte sts . W ith the expressprovisionin A rt. VII, Sec. 4, par. 7, this is no longer a problem. b. Chief Justice as presidingofficer in impeachmenttrial of the President.[Art. XI, Sec. 3(6)] c. Chief Justice as Chairmanof the Judicialand Bar Council .

l. Report on the judiciar y Art. VIII, Sec. 16. The SupremeCourt shall, within thirty days from the opening of each regular sessionof the Congress, submitto the President and the Congress annualreporton the operations an and activitiesof the Judiciary.

m. Mannerof sitting and votes require d Art. VIII, Sec. 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen AssociateJustices. It may sit en banc or its discretion, divisionsof three,five, or seven Members. Any in vacancyshallbe filled withinninetydays from the occurrence thereof . (2) All cases involvingthe constitutionality a treaty, internationalor executiveagreement,or of law, which shall be heard by the SupremeCourt,en banc, includingthose involvingthe constitutionality, application,or operationof presidentialdecrees,proclamations, orders, instructions,ordinances,and other regulations, shall be decidedwith the concurrence a majorityof the Memberswho actuallytook of part in the deliberations the issuesin the case and votedthereon. on (3) Cases or mattersheard by a divisionshall be decidedor resolvedwith the concurrenceof a majorityof the Memberswho actuallytook part in the deliberations the issues in the case and voted on thereon,and in no case, withoutthe concurrenceof at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained,the case shall be decided en banc: Provided,that no doctrine or principleor principleof law laid down by the court in a decisionrendereden banc or in divisionmay be modifiedor reversed exceptby the courtsittingen banc .

The Supreme Court may sit en banc or in its discretion, in divisions of 3, 5, or 7 members. [Art. VIII,

Sec. 4(1)] T he follow ing ca ses sh all be h ea rd by th 4(2)] e n b e SC an c: 1. Cases i nvolvingt he constit utionality 4(2)]treaty of a , internati onal or ex ecutive ag reem ento r law. [Id., Sec.

2. Cases inv olving the (a) constit utionality, (b) applic ation, or ( c) operati on of pres idential de crees, proclam ati ons, order s, instructi ons, ordin ances and other regu lations.[I d., S ec. 4( 2)] 3. All oth er cases which und er the Rul es of C our t are requi red to be heard by t he SC en banc. [Id., Sec.

4. Cases or matters he ard by a di vision whe re the req uired num ber of vote s to decid e or resolv e (the majorityof those who took part i n the delib erationso n the issue s in the ca se and vot ed thereon , and in no case less than 3 members) is not met. [Id., Sec. 4 (3)] 5. To modify or reverse a doctrine or principl e of law lai d down by the court i n a decisio n rendere d en banc or in division.[I d., Sec. 4( 3)] 6. Admini strativedis ciplinaryc ases invol ving judge s of lower courts.(Id. , Sec. 11.)

7. Actions in stituted by citizen to t est the vali dity of a pr oclamatio n of martia l law or su spension of the privilege o f the writ. ( Art. VII, S ec. 18.) 8. The cou rt sitting as Presidenti al Electora l Tribunal. (Art. VII, S ec. 4, par. 7.)

Rule 56, S ec. 11

Sec. 11. Procedur e if opinio n is equal ly divided . Where t he court e n banc is equallydi vided in opinion, or the ne cessary majority c annot be had, the c ase shall be reheard, an d if on re

hearing n o decisioni s reached, the action shallbe di smissedif originally com m enc ed in the c ourt; in ap pealedca ses, the judge ment or o rder appe aled from shall stan d affirmed ; and on a ll incident al matters , the petiti on or m otionsh all be deni ed. Rule 125, Sec.3

Sec.3. De cisionif o pinionis e quallydivi ded. When the court n banc e

is

equall y

divide d in opinion, or the ne cessary majority c annot be had, the c ase shall be reheard, an d if on re hearing n o decision i s reached , the judg ment of c onviction of the low er court s hall be re versed an d the acc used acquitted.

n . R equ irem enas to d ecision t s Art. VIII, Secs. 1314 Deliberation s A rt. VIII, Sec. 13. The conclusionsof the Sup rem e Court in any case sub m itted to it for decision en banc or in division shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a m em berfor the w ritin go f th e o p in io no f th e C o u rt. A c ertificatio n th is to e ffec ts ig n edb y th e C h ie f J u s tic e sh all b e is su e d and a copy thereofattached to the record of the case an d served upo n the parties. A ny M em berw ho took n o p a rt, o r d isse n ted o r ab s , tain e dfro m a d ec isio no r res o lu tio nm u s t state th e rea so n th erefo r. T h e s am e re q u ire m e n ts h a ll b e o b s e r s v e d b y a ll lo w e r c o lle g ia te c o u rts .

Consing V CA

Voting

The reason for the requ irementthat the decisionmust b e reached"in consulta"(i.e., aft er deliberations by the group) is to emphasizeth at the SC is one body, albeit coll egiate,so that the decisionof th e case is by the court itself and not the ponente . The writer of the opinionis mere ly the spokesmanof the body.

177 SCRA14 (1989 )

ISSUE: W/N absenceof certific ation by the Court of Appealsre nders that decisioninvalid. HELD: NO. The certificati on requirement imposed by t he 1987 constitution was me ant to ensure the implementation of the constitu tional requirement that decisio ns of the Supreme Court and l ower collegiate courts, such as the CA, Sandig anbayanand CTA, are reached after consultationwith the mem bers of the court sitting en banc or in a divisionb efore the case is assignedto a memberthereoffor decisionwrit ing. The absencewould not necessarilymean that the case submittedfor decisionhad not b een reachedin consultationbefore being assig ned to one member for the writi ng of the opinion of the court si nce the regular performanceof official duty is p resumed. The lack of certificati on serves as an evidence of fai lure to observe the certificationrequirementbut it would not have the effect of in validatingthe decision .

Art. VIII, Sec. 14. No d ecision shall be renderedby any court withoutexpressing therein clearly and distinctly factsand the the law on w hichit is based . No petitionfor review or motionfor reconsideration of a decisionof the court shall be refuseddue

courseor deniedwithoutstati ng the legalbasistherefor.

Votes requiredto "render a decisionor resoluti on" A) En banc Concurrence of a majority of the members who (i) actually took part in the de liberations (i.e., the consultation) the issues in the case, and (ii) on voted thereon.[A rt. VIII, Sec. 4(2) and Sec. 11. ] a. The lowest possiblevotes needed to render a decisionis 5, since quorum of 15 is 8, and m ajorityof 8 is 5. This numbermay increaseas the num berof ju sticespresentincrease ; b. One who abstainedis deemedto have voted for the purposeof computingthe majorityvo te needed. For an abstentionis really a form of casting a v ote w ith its ow n repercussions the outcom e on of the case. c. One who was present but kept silent d uring the deliberationsand did not vote is still incl uded in the counting for the purpose of determiningthe majori ty. For it may happen that he has already made u p his mind on how to decideand influencethe outcomeof the case. d. But one who expresslyinhibitedor is dis qualifiedfrom taking part (for instancebecauseof conflictof interest)is not included . e. There must be a quorum before a valid decision can be made. Without a quorum, there can be no valid businessto begin with. f. In case, the necessarymajoritycannotb e mustered,then there is no decisionrendered. (S ee effect of failure to reach a majoritybelow. ) This provision thus, overrules the require ment of (a) 10 votes (2/3) to declare a law uncon

stitutional under 1973 (a constitutionalrequirement),and (b) 10 votes to impose or affirm the death penalty (by internal rules of the SC, although constitutionally8 votes were enough). The presumptionof constitutional ity of laws underthe JudiciaryAct of 1948, however,remains valid. B) In divisions Cases or mattersheard by a division shall be decidedor resolved(a) with the concurrenceof a majority of the memberswho actuallytook part in the deliber ations on the issuesin the case and voted thereon, and (b) in no case withoutthe concurrenceof at least 3 of su ch members. When the requirednumberis not ob tained, the case shall be decideden banc. No doctrineor pri nciple of law laid by the court in a decisionrendere d en banc or in division may be modifiedor reversedexcept by the court sitting en banc. [Art. VIII, Sec. 4(3)] a. In a division of 7 members,the majority if all are present is 4. If only 6 are present,4. If o nly 5 or 4, 3. If only 3, no quorum. b. In a divisionof 5 mem bers, votesare neededre 3 gardlessof whether5, 4, or 3 are present .

c. In divisionof 3 m em bers,3 votes are need ed. d. In any of thesecases,whenthe votescannotb e mustered, case mustbe raisedto the courte the n banc.

Effect of failure to muster the necessarym ajo rity: If the necessarym ajoritycannot be had, the case is again reheard. If upon rehe aring, no m ajorityis still had, the followingare the effects: a. If a case is o n a pp ea l,th e ju dgm e ntap pe al ed fro m is d ee m eda ffirm e dexcept : (i) Criminalcases where the jud gment is that of conviction:the convictionis rev ersed, and the accusedis acquitted . (ii) Cases where the lower court declareda law, etc. unconstitutional: judgme the nt is reversed, and the validity of the law is deemedsustained, pursuantto the presumptionof constitutionality under Sec. 9 of the JudiciaryAct of 1948. (If the lower court de clared the law as not unconstitutional, judg this ment is deemed affirmedpursuantto the generalrule above.) (Thus, if 12 are present, 5 voted the law unconstitutional, 4 voted for it s validity, and 3 abstained, there is no decisionand so the law rem ains valid. ) b. If the case is an originalpetition,then the case is deemeddismissed . a. In Valladolid v Inciong, Writing of the decision No decisionshall be renderedby any co urt withoutexpressingtherein clearly and distinct

ly the facts and the law on which it is based. (Art. VIII, Sec. 14.) In the case of the SC and lower collegiat e court, this rule is addressedto the one to who m the writing of the opinion was assigned after consultation, t hat is, the ponente. In the case by other cour ts, this rule is addressed the judge to . Decisionson the merit. The rule requiring statement of the rele vant facts, the issues, the ruling, and the reaso ned opinion in support of the ruling, applies only to decisionso n the merit by a court of record, based on the fo llowing rulings of the SC: 121 SCRA 2 05 (1983), it was held that the Order of the Dep uty Minister of Labor did not contain a statement of facts a nd conclusions of law is not covered by the constitutional requirement because it is not a decision of a c ourt of record, the Ministry of Labor being an administrative

agency with quasijudicial functions,with rules of proceduremandatedto be nonlitigious, summaryand non technical . Section 14, Chapter3, Book VII, Administrative Code of 1987 Section14. D ecision. Every decisionrenderedby the agency in a contestedcase shall be in w ritin gan d s h all s tate c le arlya n d d istin ctlyth e fa cts a n d th e law o n w h ic h it is b a sed .xxx

Air Manila vs. Balatbat , 38 S C R A 489 (1971) Administrative proceedings are not exempt from the operation of certain basic and fundamental procedure principles, such as the due process requirementsin investigationsand trials. Administrativedue processincludes : (a) The right to notice, be it actual or constructive,of the institutionof the proceedingsthat may affect a person'slegal rights; (b) Reasonableopportunityto appearand defend his rights, introducewitnessesand relevantevidence in his favor; (c) A tribunalso constitutedas to give him reasonableassuranceof honestyand impartiality,and one of competentjurisdiction;and (d) A finding or decisionby that tribunalsupportedby substantialevidencepresentedat the hearing,or at least containedin the recordsor disclosedto the partiesaffected . b. In Bacolod Murcia Milling Co. v Henares , 107 Phil. 560 (1960),the SC ruled that orders of a court on an incidental matter(in this case,the orderimposingthe paymentof attorney'sfees) need not state the legalbasis of the ruling.

Cruz: Resolutio the socalled minute resolution,the SC said in Borromeov. CA Minute In justifying n , 186 SCRA 1:
"The SC disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as where a case is patently w/o merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord w/ the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petitions were filed merely to forsetall the early execution of judgment and for noncompliance w/ the rules. The x x x x resolution denying due course or dismissing a petition always gives the legal basis.

The Court is not duty bound to render signed decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate decisions and/ or minute resolutions,provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case."

And neither does the rule apply to administrativecases decidedby the SC itself, as it held in Prudentia l Bank v. Castr S CR A 646, thus: o , 158 "No constitutional provision is disregarded in the SC's Minute Resolution denying a motio n for reconsideration lack of merit, the issues raised therein having been previouslyduly consideredand p 'for assed upon. In an administrativecase, the constitutionalmandatethat 'no *** motion for reconsideration a d of ecision of the court shall be *** denied without stating the legal basis therefor is inapplicable. And even if it wer e, said resolutionstated the legal basis for the denial, and, therefore,adheredfaithfullyto the constitution al requirem ent. 'Lack of merit,' as a ground for denial is legal basis.

Petitionsfor review and m otionsfor reconsideratio n This rule appliesto a dismissalof a motion for reconsideration a "decisionon the merits",said the SC of No in Mendoza v CFI petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refus ed due course or denied,withoutstating the legal basis therefor.(Art. VIII, Sec. 14, par. 2.)

, 51 SCRA 369 (1973). It does not apply, as in this case, to a dismissal of a mot ion for reconsideration a previousdismissalof a petitionfor habeascorpus (The dismissalof the petitionfor of . habeas corpus is not a decision on the merits, but is similar to a dismissalof a petition for review, which is a de cision not to give due courseto the petition. ) The past practiceused to be that when the appellatecourt denieda petitionfor review,or denieda MFR, it simply did so in a Minute Resolution,stating that the case was dismissed for lack of basis. This ag grieved many a lawyer, specially those who would spend days preparing pages of briefs, only to find out that al l their effort was answeredby a oneliner "Dismissedfor lack of basis" . This prompted the framers of the 1987 Constitutionto force the Court to at least write down the legal basis for the denial. This means that while a fully detaileddecisionis not required,neither is a skimpy on eliner is allowed. The legal reasonfor the dismissalmust be written . Dissenters Abstainer and s In the case of a decision on the merits, if a member(a) took no part, or (b) dissented,or (c) abst from a decisionor resolution,he must state his reason therefor.(Art. VIII, Sec. 13.)

ained

Before,only those who dissentedwere requiredto write an opinion. Now, even those who took no part in the deliberationsbut were present,and those who abstainedare requiredto write their reasonsfor the se are really forms of castingtheir vote. Those who inhibitedthemselvesare, of course,not requiredto vote, sin ce they did not really participate . Procedurally,the purposeis to enable the party to find out the reason for the action taken. For courts lower than the SC, and even the SC itself, this is importantfor appealor motion for reconsideration purpo ses, as

the ba sis for the a ssig nm en of erro t r. Theoretically, since the SC is not an elective branch it must explain the reason being its ultimatesource y o. Mandator of authority. C ongressneed not ex plain its action since it has been de legatedthe legislativepow er by the people. period for decidingcases Art. VIII, Sec. 15. (1) All c ases or matters filed after the effe ctivity of this Constitutionmust b e decidedor resolvedw ithin tw ent yfour m onths from the date of subm issionfor the Suprem eCo urt, and, unless reducedby th e S uprem e C ourt, tw elve m onthsfor all low e r collegiatecourts,and three m o nths for all o th e r lo w e r c o u rts . (2) A case or m atter shall be deem ed subm ittedfor d ecision or resolutionupon the fi ling of the last pleading,brief or m em orand um requiredby the R ules of C ou rt or by the court itself. (3) Upon the expirationof the correspondingperiod, a certifi cation to this effect signed by the ChiefJusticeor the presidingjudg e shall forthwithbe issuedand a c opy thereofattachedto the record of the case or matter,and servedupo n the parties. The certification shal l state why a decisionor resolution has not been renderedor issued w ithinsaid period . (4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory peri od, the court, without prejudice t o

such responsibility m ay have be as en incurredin consequence thereof , shalldecideor resolvethe case or mattersubmittedtheretofor deter mination,withoutfurtherdelay.

Art. VII, Sec. 18. xxx xxx The SupremeCourtmay re view, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen,the sufficiency of the factualbasis of the procla mationof martiallaw or the suspe nsion of the privilegeof the writ or the extension thereof,and mustpromul gate its decisionthereonwithinthir ty days from its filing. xxx (par. 3 thereof. )

Art. XVIII, Secs. 1214 Art. XVIII, Sec. 12. The Supreme Court shall, within one year after the ratification of this Constitution, adopta system atic pl an to expeditethe decisionor resol ution of casesor matterspendingi n the SupremeCourt or the lower co urts prior to the effectivityof this C onstitution. A similarplan shall be adoptedfor all specialcourtsand quasiudicialbodies j . Id., Sec. 13. The legal eff ect of the lapse, before the ratific ation of this Constitution, of the applicableperiodfor the decision or resolutionof the cases or matte rs submittedfor adjudication th by e courts,shallbe determ ined the S by uprem eCourtas soonas practicabl e.

Id., Sec. 14. The provisions of paragraphs (3) and (4), Section 15 of Article VIII of this Constitutionshall apply to cases or matters filed before the ratificationof this Constitution,when the ap p lic ab le e rio dla p se safter su ch ratific atio n . p A ) Cases filed after February2, 1987 All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided within twentyfour months counted from the date of submission."[Art. VIII, Sec. 15(1)] A case or matter is deemedsubmittedfor decisionor resolutionupon the filing of the last pleading,brief or memorandumrequired by the Rules of Court or by the court itself. [Art. VIII, Sec. 15(2)] Mandatoryperiod in the SupremeCourt: 24 months [Art. VIII, Sec. 15(1)] : A proper case questioningthe sufficiencyof the factual basis of the proclamationof martial law or suspensionof the privilegewhich must be decided30 days from filing. (Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 1.) Excep t

But what happensif the judge or court fails to meet the deadlineanyway? The Constitutionprovides : Upon the expirationof the corresponding period, a certificationto this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presidingJudge shall forthwithbe issued,and a copy thereofattachedto the record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or resolution has been rendered or issued within said period. [Art. VIII, Sec. 15 (3)] Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such responsibility(administrative disciplinaryaction againstthe judge or justices)shall decide or resolve the case or matter submittedthereto for determinationwithout further delay. [Art. VIII, Sec. 15(4)] In other words, failure to decide the case [for reasons other than the inability to reach the necessary majority]has no consequence the case. Thus,a certification requiredthat the periodhas lapsedwithoutany on is decisionbeing made, stating the reason for such inaction. Then the court must decide withoutany furtherdelay. The consequencesare on the judge: (a) he could not draw out his salary, since he would not be able to certify that he has resolvedall casessubmittedto him in 90 days and (b) he is subjectto administrative sanctions . B) Casesfiled beforeFebruary2, 1987 but expire after this date The provisionsof Art. VIII, Sec, 15(3) (4) shall apply to cases or matters filed before the ratificationof this Constitution,when the applicableperiod lapses after such ratification.(Art. XVIII, Sec. 14) In other words,it is as if these cases were filed after February2, 1987. C) Casesthat expiredbeforeFebruary2, 1987

The legal effect of the lapse, before the ratificationof this Constitution,of the applicableperiod for the decisionor resolutionof the cases or m atterssubm ittedfor adjudication the courts, shall be determ ined by by the S C as soon as practicable.(Art. XVIII, Sec. 13.) The SupremeCourt shall, within 1 year from February2, 1987 adopt a systematicplan to expedite the decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in the SC or lower courts prior to the effectivity of this Constitution. A similar plan shall be adopted for all special courts and quasijudicial bodies. (Art. XVIII, Sec. 12 .)

2. Lower courts a. Q ualifications and appointmen t Art. VIII, Sec. 7 (1) (2) Art. VIII, Sec. 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiatecourt unless he is a natural orn citizen of the Philippines. A memberof the SupremeCourt b must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more a judge of a lower court or engagedin the practiceof law in the Philippines. (2) the Congress shallprescribethe qualifications judgesof lowercourts,but no personm ay be of appointed judgethereofunlesshe is a citizenof the Philippines and a memberof the Philippine Bar.

Id., Sec. 8. (5) The (Judicialand Bar) Councilshall have the principalfunctionof recommending appointeesto the Judiciary. It may exercisesuch other functionsand duties as the SupremeCourt may assignto it. Id., Sec. 9. The Membersof the SupremeCourt and judgesof lower courts shall be appointedby the President from a list of at list three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.Suchappointm ents need no confirm ation . For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointment within ninety days from the subm ission the list. of

Compositio n The compositionof lower courts shall be provided by law. The laws are the JudiciaryAct of 1948 and BP 129. Qualification s

Lower CollegiateCourt (Court of Appeals ) (1) No person shall be appointedmember of any lower collegiatecourt unless he is a natural orn citizen. [Art. b VIII, Sec. 7(1)] and a memberof Philippine Bar. (2) The Congressshall prescribequalificati ons of judges of lower courts.[Art. VIII, Sec. 7(2)] (3) A member of the judiciary must be a p erson of proven competence,integrity, pro bity, and independence. [Art. VIII, Sec. 7(3)] Lower Courts (1) The Congressshall prescribequalific ations of judges of lower courts, but no p erson m ay be appointedjudge thereofunless he is a citizen of the Philippin es and a memberof the Philippinebar. [Art. VIII, Sec. 7(2)] (2) He must be a person of proven compete nce, integrity,probityand independence.[A rt. VIII, Sec. 7(3)]

b. Salary Art. VIII, Sec. 10. The salary of t he Chief Justice and of the AssociateJ ustices of the Supreme court and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuanc e in office, their salary shallnot be decreased . . c. Congressional powerto reorganizeand s ecurityof tenure In Ocampo v Secretaryof Justice, Art. VIII, Sec. 11. The members of the Supreme Court and judges of lo wer courts shall hold

office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years, or bec ome incapacitated to dischargethe dutiesof their office.The S upremeCourten banc shall have the pow er to disciplinejudges of lower courts,or order their dismissal by a vote of a majorityof the Membersw ho actuallytook part in the deliberations the issuesin the case on and votedthereon.

Id., Sec. 2. xxx No law shall be passedreorganizi ng the Judiciarywhen it undermines the securityof tenureof its Members.

The powerof Congressto reorganize lowerc ourts has been upheldby the SC prior to 198 7. 51 OG 147 (1955), the SC by failing to mu ster the 2/3 vote

required then to declare a law unconstitutionalin effect sustained the validity of the law passed by Congress abolishingthe offices of "judges atlarge" and "cadastraljudges" and the consequentremovalof judges occu pying these posts. Noting that the purpose of the law was to promote the independenceof the judiciary (by avoiding forumshopping), it held that an abolition of an office made in good faith does not violate security of tenure. Security of tenure presupposesthe continuedexistenceof the office from which one was removednot rem ovalfrom an office that has been abolishedin good faith and not m erely partisanpoliticalreasons . In De La Llana v Alba , 112 SCRA 294 (1982), the SC again upheld the ReorganizationAct of 1980 (BP 129), on the ground that the abolition of an office, is within the competenceof the legislatureif done in good faith. That there was good faith was show n by the fact that the Act was the productof careful stud y and deliberationby the B atasanand the P residential study com m ittee,the m em bershipof w hich includesS C ju stices, and was the means to upgradethe administration justice in the Philippines. The SC reiteratedthat there can of be no claim for security of tenure where the office no longer exists, and that the abolition of office i s not removal,althoughtheir effectsmay be the same . It is doubtfulwhetherthese rulings remain valid in toto in view of the new express provisionprohibiting a reorganization that underminesthe securityof tenure of the Judiciary. law One compromiseview is that Congresshas the power to pass a reorganization concerningthe lower law courts,but it can only take effect until the post has been vacatedby the incumbentjudge.

d. Remova l Art. VIII, Sec. 11. The members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to dischargethe dutiesof their office.The SupremeCourten banc shall have the powerto disciplinejudges of lower courts,or order their dismissalby a vote of a majorityof the Memberswho actuallytook part in the deliberations the issuesin the caseand votedthereon. on Cruz: "Judgesof lower court,"as here used, includesjusticesof the Sandiganbayan.This rule casts much doubt on the legality of the presidentialdecree making them removableonly by the legislaturethroughthe processof impeachment .

e. Jurisdictio n Art. VIII, Sec. 1. Judicialpowershall be vestedin one SupremeCourtand in such lowercourtsas m ay be established law. by Judicialpower includesthe duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandableand enforceable,and to determinewhetheror not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality the Government of .

As ruled in J.M. Tuason & Co. v CA and in Ynot v IAC, supra, there is in effect a " constitutional conferment of original jurisdiction on the lower courts in those five cases for which the Supreme Co urt is granted appellatejurisdictionin 5(2)." Under the provisiongranting the SC jurisdiction"to review, revise, reverse,modify or affirm on appeal or certiorarias the law or Rules of Court may provide,judgmentsof lower courts," lower courts can pass upon the validity of a statute in the first instance .

f. R equ irem en ts to prep aratio n d ecision as of s A rt. VIII, Sec. 14. No decisionshall be renderedby any court without expressingtherein clearly a n d d is tin c tlyth e fa c ts a n d th e la w o n w h ic hit is b a s e d . No petitionfor reviewor motionfor reconsideration a decisionof the court shall be refuseddue of courseor deniedwithoutstatingthe legalbasistherefor.

Manner of sitting The Court of Appealssits in divisionswhen it hears cases; the only time it convenesas one body is to take up mattersof administration . The trial and inferiorcourts,of course,do not have this problemsince there is only one judge.

Deliberation s 13) same requirements(for consulta shall be observed by all lower collegiate courts. (Art. VIII, Sec. The )

For obviousreasons,this requirement does not apply to the trial and inferiorcourts . Voting

For collegiate courts, like the Court of Appeals, the law provides that it sits only in divisions when decidingcases. For trial and inferiorcourts,no problemarises since only one judge is involved .

Effect of failure to musterthe necessarymajorit y

C ou rt of A p pe als. T he sa m e rules a pply,e xcep tth at the decisio ncan no w b e ap pe ale dto th e S C. Inferior Courts. Failure to decide has no consequenceon the decisionof the court. The Court is not ousted of its jurisdiction,but the judge suffers adm inistrative consequences .

g. Mandatoryperiod for decidin g

Art. VIII, Sec. 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivityof this Constitutionmust be decidedor resolvedw ithin tw enty four m onths from the date of subm issionfor the S uprem eC ourt, and, unless reducedby th e S uprem eC o urt, tw elve m onthsfor all low er collegiatecourts,and three m ont hs for all o th e r lo w e r c o u rts . (2) A case or matter shall be deemedsubmittedfor decisionor resolutionupon the filing of the last pleading,brief or memorandum requiredby the Rulesof Courtor by the court itself. (3) Upon the expirationof the correspondingperiod, a certificationto this effect signed by the ChiefJusticeor the presidingjudge shall forthwithbe issuedand a copy thereofattachedto the recordof the case or matter,and servedupon the parties. The certification shall state why a decisionor resolution has not been rendered issuedwithinsaid period or . (4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such responsibility m ay have been incurredin consequence as thereof,shalldecideor resolvethe case or mattersubmittedtheretofor determination, withoutfurtherdelay. Art. XVIII, Secs. 1214

Art. XVIII, Sec. 12. The Supreme Court shall, within one year after the ratification of this Constitution, adopta system atic plan to expeditethe decisionor resolution casesor matterspendingin of the SupremeCourt or the lower courts prior to the effectivityof this Constitution.A similarplan shall be adoptedfor all specialcourtsand quasiudicialbodies j . Id., Sec. 13. The legal effect of the lapse, before the ratification of this Constitution, of the applicableperiodfor the decisionor resolutionof the cases or matterssubmittedfor adjudication the by courts,shallbe determ ined the Suprem e by Courtas soonas practicable . Id., Sec. 14. The provisions of paragraphs (3) and (4), Section 15 of Article VIII of this Constitutionshall apply to cases or matters filed before the ratificationof this Constitution,when the applicable periodlapsesafter such ratification.

MandatoryPeriod

Low er collegiatecourts: 12 m onths,unless reducedby the SC O the r lo w e r cou rts :3 m o nths,un lessredu cedby the SC

Overruled: , 121 SCRA 51 (1983), The Constitutionnow explicitlyprovidesin Sec. 15 (1) which held that the periodsin the 1973 Constitutionwere only directory,is thus now, overruled . that the periods are mandatory,aside from using the word "must" (not "shall" as in 1973) in Sec. 15 (1). The case of Marcelino v Cruz

Cruz: It should be noted that, althoughdecision within the m aximum period is now mandatory,failure to arrive at the same will not divest the court of jurisdiction,withoutprej udice to any responsibilitythat may attach to the judge. The court must still resolve the case w/o further delay , unlike the old rule when the decision appealed , 121 SCRA51 was deemed automaticallyaffirmed and the petition was de emed automaticallydismissed as a result of the F: inaction of the court. xxx

Marcelinovs. Cruz
Judgement in a criminal case was rendered before the cler k of court within 85 days after the case was concluded. But judgement was promulgatedafter lapse of 90 days from the day t he case was submitted for decision.

ISSUE: W/N trial court lost jurisdiction over the case for f ailure to decide the same within 90 days from submissionthereof . W/N constitutionalprovisionis mandatory . 152 SCRA 205 HELD: No to both. The constitutional provision refers to re ndition of judgement which refers to the filing of the signed decisionwith the clerk of court. By the phrase "unless reducedby the SupremeCourt, " it is evidentthat the period prescribedis subject to modificationby the SC under its prerogativepower to pro mulgate rules concerningprocedurein all courts. Constitutionalprovisionsare directory,where they refer to m atters merely procedural. But failure to decide a case within 90 days constitutea groundfor administrative sanct ion againstthe defaultingjudge. Adapted .

De Roma vs CA The CA decided the case beyond the 12 month per iod prescribed by the 1973 Constitution. Said provision in the Constitution was merely directory and fa ilure to decide on time would not deprive the corresponding courts of jurisdictionor render their decisionsin valid.

3. The Judicialand Bar Counci l Art. VIII, Sec. 8. A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the s upervision of the SupremeCourt composedof t he Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman,the Secretaryof Ju stice, and a representative the Congre of ss as ex officio M em bers,a r epresentative the Integrat of ed B ar, a professor of law , a retired M em b erof th e S uprem eC ourt, and a repre sentativeof the privatesecto r. (2) The regular memb ers of the Council shall be ap pointed by the Presidentfor a Exofficio member s term of four years with the consent of th e Commission on Appointm ents. Of the Members first appointed, the representativeof the Integrate d Bar shall serve for four year s, the professorof law for thre e years, the retiredJ u sticefo r tw o yea rs , a n d th e re p res en tative f th e o p riva tes ec to rfo r o n e ye ar. (3) The C lerk of the S uprem eC ou rt shall be the S ecretaryex officio of the C ou ncil and shall keep a recordof its proceedings. (4) The regularMembe rs of the Councilshall receive such emoluments may be d as eterminedby the SupremeCourt. The Supr eme Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriati ons for the

Council . (5) The Councilshall h ave the principalfunctionof re commending appointees the to Judiciary. It m ay exercisesuch otherfunctio n and dutiesas the Suprem e Co urt m ay assignto it.

[Art. VIII, Sec. 8(1)] (1) Chief Justice as exofficio Cha irman (2) Secretaryof Justice (3) Representative Congres of s Regularmembers[Art. VIII, Sec. 8(1)] (4) Representative the Integrat of ed Bar (5) Professorof Law (6) Retiredmemberof the SC (7) Representative privatesect of or Secretary exofficio [Art. VIII, Se c. 8(3)] Clerk of the SC, who shall keep a recordof its proceeding s

Appointment, Tenure,Salary Exofficio member s

For obvious reasonsthis does not apply since the position in the Councilis good only w hile the person is the occupantof the office. Regularmembers[Art. VIII, Sec. 8(2)] The regular members shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments . The term of the regularm em bersis 4 years. But the term of those initially appointed shall be staggered in the following way so as to create continuity in the council: IB P rep re senta tive4 ye ars Law professor 3 years Retiredjustice 2 years Privatesector 1 year

Regularmembersshall receivesuch emoluments may be determined the SC. The SC shall provide as by in its annual budget the appropriationsfor the Council.[Art. VIII, Sec. 8(4)]

Function s 1. Recommendappointeesto the Judiciary[Art. VIII, Sec. 8(5)] 2. Recommend appointeesto the Office of the Ombudsman and his 5 deputies.(Art. XI, Sec. 9) 3. Such other functionsand duties as the SC may assign [Art. VIII, Sec. 8(5)]

4. Automaticreleaseof appropriationfor the judiciar y Art. VIII, Sec. 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriationsfor the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislaturebelow the amount appropriatedfor the previousyear and, after approval, shallbe autom atically regularlyreleased and .

UPDATED1/27/96 REVISED4/13/96 RAM