Abakada vs.

purisima No, Congress, thus, uses its oversight power to make sure that the administrative agencies perform their functions within the authority delegated to them. In Macalintal v. Comelec further discusses that legislative supervision under the oversight power connotes a continuing and informed awareness on the part of Congress regarding executive operations in a given administrative area. Because the power to legislate includes the power to ensure that the laws are enforced, this monitoring power has been granted by the Constitution to the legislature. In cases of executive non-implementation of statutes, the courts cannot justify the use of continuing mandamus, as it would by its very definition overlap with The Resolution does not only encroach upon the general supervisory function of the Executive, it also diminished and arrogated unto itself the power of congressional oversight.the monitoring power under congressional oversight. Funa vs. bautista Facts: A quick rundown of the facts shows that Bautista was appointed as DOTC Undersecretary in October 2006 and was designated as OIC Administrator of MARINA on September 1, 2008. On January 5, 2009, she was appointed as Administrator of MARINA, the duties and responsibilities of which position she assumed on February 2, 2009 following her relinquishment of the position of DOTC Undersecretary. Issue: was the designation of Bautista as oic of marina, concurrent with the position of DOTC Undersectary for maritime transport violative sec. 1, art. VI? Ruling: No. The Civil Liberties Union formulation rendering the public officer ineligible for the second position comes into play, since Bautista was a department undersecretary, a position covered by the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution. This principle underscores the primacy of the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants as a class by itself, necessitating the disallowance of any implied vacancy in such offices. The Pubic Interest Center rule of implied resignation does not apply since it speaks of incompatibility of office which is irrelevant in determining a violation of Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution. It has also been observed that the rule of ipso facto vacancy of a public office by acceptance of a second public office does not apply where, under applicable constitutional or statutory provisions, the holder of a public office is rendered ineligible for a specified time for a second public office; under such circumstances it is the second office which is considered vacant rather than the first office I, therefore, vote to GRANT the petition and further declare that Bautista was a de facto officer during her brief stint as MARINA OIC Administrator and a de jure DOTC Undersecretary during her entire tenure as such. In re: appointment of Valenzuela
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. Since the exception applies only to executive positions, the prohibition covers appointments to the judiciary.305 During this period [2 months immediately before the next presidential elections], the President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so. Section 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that the President is required by law to fill up vacancies in the courts within the same time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Section 15 of Article VII. While the filing up of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in

the public interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the ban. Ruling: Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so.

The SC also ruled that Section 15, Article VII does not apply as well to all other appointments in the Judiciary. Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we have no doubt that the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department. Sec. 9, Article VIII says: xxx. The Members of the Supreme Court xxx shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for any vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. xxx

The provision clearly refers to an appointee coming into the Supreme Court from the outside, that is, a non-member of the Court aspiring to become one. It speaks of candidates for the Supreme Court, not of those who are already members or sitting justices of the Court, all of whom have previously been vetted by the JBC.
David vs. arroyo without congressional authority can the president declare a state of emergency and execise emergency powers? The President has the power to declare a state of national emergency even without authorization from Congress. The exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress. Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads: SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war. (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus: (1) There must be a war or other emergency. (2) The delegation must be for a limited period only. (3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe. (4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
AMPATUAN VS. PUNO was there a factual basis for the issuance of presidential proclamation no. 1946? Despite all these, on 4 December 2009, the President, through respondent Ermita, issued Proclamation No. 1959. Clearly, therefore, th e re is n o s u ffic ie n t fa c tu a l b a s is fo r th e im p o s itio n o f m a rtia l la w a n d hence this petition.

2008 bar: The President alone without the concurrence of the Senate abrogated a treaty. Assume that the other country-party to the treaty is agreeable to the abrogation provided it complies with the Philippine Constitution. If a case involving the validity of the treaty abrogation is brought to the Supreme Court, how should it be resolved? (6%)

A.

The Supreme Court should sustain the validity of the treaty abrogation. While the Constitution is express as to the manner in which the Senate shall participate in the ratification of a treaty, it is silent as to that body's participation in the abrogation of a treaty. In light of the absence of any constitutional provision governing the termination of a treaty, and the fact that different termination procedures may be appropriate for different treaties, the case must surely be controlled by political standards, even more so because it involves the conduct of foreign relations.

Bayan muna vs. Romulo

the Court found the Agreement valid by virtue of the inherent independence of the executive branch of the government to conclude the same and the complementary nature of the Agreement with existing Philippine laws.