Fir st Pun ic War.

Rome finally won the long war with a naval victory at the Aegates Islands in 241. In the Pea ce of Lutatius that ended the war Cartha ge lost Sicily and had to pay an enormous indemnity, but retained control of Sardinia and Corsica. The Rape of Sardinia The end of the First Pun ic War brough t no relief to Carthage. Hard on the heels of this war came the revolt of the mercenaries, the Tru celess War, 240-238 (featured in C3i Nr. 7). While this brutal war rag ed in Africa, the contag ion of reb ellion spread to Cartha ge's mercenary garrison on Sardin ia in 239. Thes e sold iers of fortune rose up, and slew their Carthaginian commander Bostar and his office rs. In response, Cartha ge sent an exp edit ion und er (anoth er) Hanno to punish the reb els, but his troops des erted and joined the mutineers. The rebels crucified Hanno, then ran rampant over the island, slaying all the Carthaginian settl ers. Once the euphor ia of the initial uprising had worn off, the se mercenari es began to dre ad retribution from Cartha ge. So the y sent an offer to Rome to surrender Sardin ia to them. The Roman Sen ate refused the offer. The senator s decided to honor the ter ms of the Peace of Lutatius, whi ch expressly forbid taking as an ally any ally of the oth er power. Meanwhile, on Sardinia the muti nou s mercenaries turned on the local popula ce. Their depred ations at len gth dro ve the native tribes to rise up and attack the m. The mercenaries were expelled fro m the isl and in 238 , and Sar din ia was bri efly ind ependent. Carthage, as soon as the rebel mercenaries in Africa had been suppressed, began preparing an expedition to re -conquer the isl and. In Rome, however, there was a change of heart. The senate revers ed itself and pro clai med the annexation

Rome Threatens Sardini a in the Fir st Punic War 'The First Pun ic War began in 264 as a contest between Rome, Syracuse and Cartha ge for control of eastern Sicily. Rome defeated Syracuse early on, and the war expanded as a clash bet ween the Cartha ginian and Roman empires. However, as long as Rome lac ked a fleet, she could threaten only Sicily. Sardinia, and Africa, were safe behind the patrols of the Cartha ginian navy. Punic raids were launch ed from Sardinia against the Italian coast, while the Pun ic navy brough t support to beleaguered cities on the Sicili an coast. Within the Roman Senate, the realization came that this war could never be won unless Cartha ge was challenged at sea. So, in 260 Rome built her fir st battle fleet, and with ingenio us boarding ramps (th e corvus) defeat ed the Pun ic navy at Mvlae. In 259 the consul Lucius Cornel ius Scipio led the first Roman expedition

against Corsica and Sardinia . He had some success against the garrisons, before being driven off by a reinforc ing fleet Under H annibal, son of Gisgo. In the following year, the consul Gaius Sulpiciou s Palerculus campaigned with a Roman fleet in Sardin ian waters, defeating Hannibal and capturing or destroy ing all his ships. Hannibal was crucified by his own officers for his rep eated failures. Another Punic Fleet und er Hanno arrived to restore the situ ation, and the Romans departed. As the long war dragged on, Roman interest in Sardin ia waned. The immediate objective of ending nav al raids on Italy had been acco mplished. Rome turned to a more dir ect strategy of invadin g Africa. When this effort was foiled by dis aster on land (the Battle of the Bagradas featur ed in SPQR) and sea (256- 55), Rome revert ed to a strategy of attrition on Sicily. Sardinia was never again threatened during the

of Sardin ia and Corsica, in flagrant dis regard of the Treaty of Lut atius. When Carthage compla ined, Rome thr eatened war and inc reased the ind emnity Carthage had to pay to keep the pea ce. This aggression became known as the Rape of Sardin ia. Rome may hav e gain ed a valuable pro vin ce, but she also earned the und ying hatred of Hami lcar Barca and his sons (Hannibal , Hasd rubal and Mago), a matt er of no small consequen ce. The Roman Provin ce Victor y in the Fir st Punic War brough t Rome her first two overse as pro vin ces, Sicily and Sardin ia. The highly civi liz ed isl and of Sic ily became a pro fitable and peaceful posses sion. Wild, unt amed Sardin ia was another story. Cartha ge had nev er conquered the enti re isl and, content with coastal enclav es and dip lomati c, commercial and cultural domination of the isl and. Roman ways were different. A series of exp edit ions were sent to the island to pacify it comple tel y. Both consuls fou ght on the isl and in 238, and after a bri ef interlude consular armies were dispat ched every year for five years, fro m 235 -231. The first of the se exp edit ions was led by the consul Titus Manlius Torq uatus, of whom more wil l be heard anon .

Findin g the admini stration of overse as pro vinces a burden on the limited office rs of the Roman govern ment, the number of praetors was exp anded from two to four in 227. The first pra etor of Sardin ia in that year was Gains Fla mini us, destined to meet his end at Hannib al's hands by Lake Trasimene. In 225 the consul Gaius Atilius Regulu s was dispat ched with his arm' to quell another uprising on Sardin ia. His coll eague, Lucius Anielius Papus remain ed in Italy to guard against an expected Celtic inv asion. Atilius Regu lus suppre ssed the Sardin ian revolt and return ed to Italy in tine to tak e par t in the Battle of Telamon (featur ed in C3i Nr. 6). On the eve of the Second

Pun ic War Sardin ia was a pro vince bar ely pacified. A generation of Roman comman der s and legionnai res had the ir chief battle experience from campai gns on this island. The Second Pun ic War Sardin ia did not figure pro minently in the openin g campai gns of the Second Pun ic War. The isl and was held for Rome onl y by a garrison of allied troops, probab ly no more than 5,000 men. Hannib al's surprise cro ssing of the Alps, and his first major victor y at Trebbi a, convin ced the Romans that this war would be neithe r easy nor short. The Roma n senators knew that Carthage would attempt to regain Sardin ia at the first opportuni ty. Therefore, early in 217 the praetor Aulus Cornelius Mammu la was sent to reinforce the isl and's garrison with Legion V, a full-str ength double legion with some 1 ),000 foot and 800 horse. Cornelius Mammul a main tained a tenuous control of Sardin ia over the next two years, as Hann ibal's continuin g string of victori es over Rome excited the anti-Roman pas sion s of the native tribes. The pra etor had to exact ever inc reasing taxes and tribute from his pro vin ce to suppor t the war, which contribut ed greatl y to the rising dis content. The counci l in Carthage also too k more dir ect action to break Sardinia

away fro m Rome's grasp. A general , Hanno, infiltrated ont o the isl and as an agent pro vocateur, to fome nt reb ellion. Hanno soon made conl 111011 cause with Hallipsicora, tile leadin g Sardin ian chieftain, to prepar e a massive isl and -wide insurr ection . Cornelius Mammlula, however, was a wary and circum spe ct govern or. Even aft er the Bat tle of Cannae, when much of sou thern Italy rebelled, Hanno and Hamp sicora bid ed the ir time. They awaited a more favorable moment to raise the cry of 'freedom from Rome!' . The opportuni ty the y sought came soon enough. At the end of 216, the propraetor Cornelius Mammul a was rec alled to Rome, pendin g the arrival of his successor. The pra etor Quintu s Mucius Sca evola arrived early in 215, and imme diatel y came down with a seriou s, incapacitating illness. Cornelius Mammul a, alarmed by the turn of even ts, hur ried back to Rome to make his report. Leader less, the Roman garrison was unable to rea ct as Hanno and Hampsi cora now unl eashed the lon g simmering reb ellion. The insurr ection qui ckl y spr ead across the isl and. Legion V hunk ered down in its bases and waited. Hanno and Corneli us Plea for Rei nforcement The opposing generals, Hanno and Cornelius Mammu la, both hurried to get urgent ple as for reinforcing exp edit ions to the ir home govern ments. Cornel ius Mamm ula report ed in per son to the senate on the imp ending revolt and the incapacita tion of Mucius Sca evola. Rome, unfortunatel y, had jus t about scraped the bot tom of her manpower bar rel. After Cann ae in the fall of 216, Rome had bar ely managed to conscript one new consular army of two legions. Additional armi es were formed from the sur vivo rs of Cann ae and a force a sla ve and convict volunteers, the volones. Then another dis aster befell Rome in the winter of 216- 215 . The praetorian artily of two legion, in Cisalpine Gaul lea s ambushed and annihilated in the Litani forest by Celtic tribes, instigated by Hannibal. This brought to ten the number of

legion s comple tely destroyed so far in the war. The senate had reluctantly con clud ed in early 216 that no additional forces could be raised, and that the Litani ambush must go un avenged for now. It was in this situation tha t Cornelius Mammula made his ple a for reinforce ment s. Despit e their many difficulties, the senate ordered a lev y to be raised. Somehow, the urb an pra etor, Quintu s Ful vius Fla ccus, managed to scrape up a reinforced Roman leg ion, the XIV. Its strength was 5,0 00 foot and 400 hor se. It was most likely com pos ed of teen-agers, old men and tho se earlier rej ected as unfit for ser vice. But Legi on XIV would have to do. Hanno' s message met an entirely different respon se in Cartha ge, The way had been paved by Mago Bar ca's mission to the council following Cannae in the autu mn of 216. Mago had pou red a bushel basket of gold rin gs cut from the fingers of dead Roman nob les and knights ont o the council chamber floor. Mago's request for 20,000 infant ry and 4,0 00 cavalry was readil y approved. When Hanno s emergency dispat ch arrived, Mago Barca was on the point of sailin g for Italy with the first contingent of this lev y, 12, 000 foot, 1,500 hor se and 20 elephants . Arriving at nearly the same time as Hanno's ple a to re-conquer Sardin ia came news of HasdrubaI Barca's disastrous defeat at Dertosa in Spain (featured in C3i Nr. 4). The council was forced to allocate resour ces amongst three competing theaters - Italy, Spain and Sardin ia. The councilors' decision revealed their strategic priorities. Mago and his army were div erted to protect Spain. A mere 4,000 cavalr y and 40 e lephants were sent with Bomilcar and the home fleet to reinforce Hannibal in Italy. (It was the onl y reinforcement lie ever rec eived.) A new army of 12,000 infantry, 1,500 cavalry and 20 elephants was prepared for an exp edit ion to Sardin ia. The expeditionar y army was pro b abl y formed of a core of sonic six thousand soli d Libyan spearme n, supported by over 1,0 00 superb Numidi an light cavalry and heavy

Cartha ginian horse. There was also available a force of 13,850 Iberian infantry and 1,200 cavalr y from the The rsitae, Mastiani, Oretes and Olc ades trib es. ']'his uni t had been posted to Africa in 218 by Hannibal, in keep ing with his policy of defending Spain with African troops and Africa with Iberians. Probably about six thousand of these Ibe rian foot, with suppor ting cavalry were ass igned to the Sardinia bound army. This Iberian contingent was by now well dri lled, after three years of gar rison dut y in Africa. The Commanders So bot h Cartha ge and Rome prepar ed exp edit ions for Sardinia in the spr ing of 215. But these armies needed commander s, and this pos ed a problem for both empires. The Roman Senate habituall y turned to exp erienc ed consulares (former consul s) to lead her armies in emerge nci es of this nature , however, few were available . Fives consulares had alread y been slain in the first thr ee years of this war: Gaius Fla minius (Tr asimene); Lucius Aemi liu s Pau llus, Mar cus Minucius and Gnaeus Ser vilius Gemi nus (Cannae); and Lucius Postumius Albinus (Litani). Tiberias Semproniu s Longus (Tr ebbia) and Gains Terentius Varro (Canna e) were in dis grace. Quintu s Fabius Maximu s and Tiberias Semproniu s Gracchus as consul s, and Mar cus Claudius Mar cellus as pro consul faced Hannib al, while Gnaeus and Public s Cornelius Scipio were in distant Spain. There were few tri ed leader s left. The pra etor Fulvius Fla ccu s, charged with des ignating a temporary commander for Sardin ia, chose Titus Manlius Torquatus. Manlius was one of the elder states man of Rome, a stern, har sh man kno wn for his conservative, traditional views. His intran sigence pla yed a key role in the rejection of Hannibal's offer to ran som the 8,000 Roman pri soners tak en at Cannae, condemnin g the se men to a life of sla very. He was probably already over 60 years of age, and like Marcellus, he had probably served as a jun ior office r against Hamilcar Bar ca in Sicily. His first consulship

had been served in Sardin ia in 235. His seco nd consulship had been in 224, leadin g a puniti ve expedit ion against the Celts after the inv asion of Tel amon. 'tradition dictat ed that no man serve more than two consul ships. Even though Fab ius, Mar cellus and oth ers ignored this pro vision and ser ved multiple consulships dur ing the Second Pun ic War, Manlius would have non e of it. Later, in 210 , aft er the leadin g century had elected him, he forced the m to annul the vote and begin anew. Again in 207 lie wou ld refuse to stand for the consul ship when it was offered. But in this cas e he agreed to serve temporarily as the deputy of the strick en pra etor Mucius, probably as a propra etor . Manlius would return to Sardin ia a full two decades sin ce hi, firs t comman d on the island. Cartha ge had as yet los t no senior comman ders in this war. Nevertheles s, Cartha ge was also short of exp erienc ed generals. The veteran comman ders of the Iberian conquest had all acco mpanied Hannib al. Hasdrubal, his chief of staff, Hanno, son of Bomilcar, Mah arbal, Mago Saunites, Hamilcar and Carthalo were all with the army in Italy. Hasdrubal Barca, his deputy Himilco and his brother Mago were engaged in Spain. With the best commander s already commit ted, the council in Cartha ge selected Hasdrubal the Bald to lead the Sardinian expedition. He does not see m to hav e been a veteran of the Iberian campai gns, but Hasdrubal may hav e camp aign ed against the tribes on Cartha ge's Africa n frontier. The council as signed Hasdru bal a deputy commander, Mago. This general was said to be a clo se relati ve of Hannibal, probab ly a cousin. Hasdrub al could also rely on the suppor t of the gen eral Hanno, already in Sardinia. The Race is On Cartha ginian and Roman expeditions were both prepar ed for Sardin ia in the spring of 215. The question was, whi ch would arrive first? Hasdrubal set out first from Cartha ge, his army of 13,500 escorted by 60 quinqu eremes. If he could arrive first, he could join the rebel Sar dinian army to his own

and besiege the leader less Roma n troops in their bases. But fate too k a hand. When in the open sea between Cartha ge and Sardinia, Hasdrubal 's fleet was caught by a savage stor m and hur led some 300 miles west onto the Baleari c Islands. Loss of life was not severe, but Hasd rubal found he had to rep air many of his ships before continuin g the journe y. Hasdrubal too k advantage of this une xpected diversion to reinforce his army with a strong bod y of the reno wned Balearic slinge rs. While the Carthaginian s cooled their heels in the Balearics, Manlius set out with his 5,400 men escorted by some 40 quinquer emes. The Roman voyage to Sardin ia was une ventful, and Manlius put in at the pro vincial capitol, Caralis (modern Cagliari) . The Romans had won the rac e, with a helpin g hand from Neptune. But Manlius still faced a seriou s situation , with the island in full revolt and the gar rison disheartened and demora lized. Manlius too k command of Mucius ' Legion V and added the

ori ginal garr ison allied troops to his gre en Roman Legi on XIV to form a second double legion . This gave him a full consular army of about 18,000 infantry, but with onl y 1,200 cavalry. Manlius was not satisfied. To swell his ran ks, he grou nded his fleet and pre ssed the marines and rowers into ser vice as infantry. The crews of 40 quinquereme s would pro vide over 1,500 mari nes and 8,000 rowers. Manlius formed the marine s into cohorts, and selected some 2,500 of the most capable rowers to serve as lightl y armed veli tes. This added 4,000 men to his army, bringing his for ce up to 22,000 foot and 1,2 00 horse. Manlius undoubtedly would have appreciated some time to drill his for ce and develo p more cohesion amongst his V and XIV Legions, gar rison troops and naval infant ry, but there was no time to spare. Manlius had to suppre ss the Sardin ian rebellion , before the rumored Cartha gini an expedition

arrived. So Manlius led his dis jointed army out of Caralis, seekin g the main rebel concentratio n. As fate would lav e it, when Manlius came upon the rai n reb el hos t, Hamp sicora was away, recruitin g amongs t the Goatskin tribes of the mountains. He had left his son Hostus in command of the army, which may have numbered 15,000 men. Hostus was young and rec kless and imme diatel y attacked the larger Roman army when it approa ched. Manliu s predic tably rou ted the rebel army. Its losses were onl y 3,000 killed and 800 taken pri soner, indicating that most of the rebels fled before the figh ting got too hot . Hasdrubal and Company Arrive Hampsi cora established a new base at Cornus with his Goatskin light infantry and began collecting the sca ttered remn ants of his army. Manlius, as soon as lie learned of Hampsi cora's location, advanced on Cornus to finish off the insurr ection . The war in Sar dinia would have been over, but just then word came that a Cartha ginian fleet had landed on the Western coast. Hasdrubal the Bald qui ckly dis embarked his force of over 14,000 men, then dis missed his fleet. Manlius chose a cautious course, abandoned the field and withdrew bac k to his base at Caralis. Hasdru bal joined with Hampsicora, who by now had rallied an army of over 12,000 Sar dinian trib esmen to reinforce the Cartha gini an expedi tion. The combin ed armies now number ed nearly 27,000 men. Manlius' hasty retreat seems a hit pre mature in retrospect. A more aggressiv e commander could have held the field and possibly prevented the jun ctur e of Hasd rub al and Hampsi cora. Manlius, however, was not chosen for his aggressiveness. It was his steady, cautious nature that the Roman sen ate counted on. Manlius knew well that ten Roma n legions had already been lost in this war. He wasn 't about to los e two mor e. A younger noble, in his first pra etorship or consulship, migh t have felt compelled to ris k battle to est abli sh his reputation. Manliu s already had his share of glor y, and

could freely put the interest of Rome ahead of his own. Beside s, the Pun ic superiority in cavalry mean t that he could have had little int elligen ce on the size or intention s of Hasdrubal 's army. The pruden t course was to fall bac k on his secure base, develo p the situation, and engage in battle onl y und er clearer, safer circumstances. Hasdrubal, with an army sli ghtl y lar ger than the Roman force, followed Manlius, loo ting and pillaging the villag es of any pro -Roman tribes along the way. Manlius fell back all the way to Carali s, grad ually pie cin g tog ether a clearer pictur e of the inv adin g army he faced. Thou gh the for ce was large, a great portion of its str ength was from the often beaten irregular Sardinian s. Hasdrub al's hard cor e of pro fessional mercen aries was much smalle r than the Roma n army. In any case, Manlius could not allow the pillage of Rome's loyal subjects to continue ind efinitely. Manlius too k the field just out side, Car alis. Hasdrubal acc epted the challenge of battle with no reluct anc e. The Battle of Caralis Unfortun ately, Livy 's account of the battle (Book XXIII, Chapter 40) is typically vague and muddled, but it is the onl y one we have. Hasd rubal had about 25, 000 foot, 2,0 00 horse and 20 elephants. Some 2,000 of his infantry would have been left behind to guard his camp. Manlius had 22,000 infantry and 1,2 00 cavalry, and would have det ail ed a camp guard of similar size. All we know for sure about the deployment is that Hasdrubal the Bald deplo yed his army in two wings - the Carthagin ian exp edit ionary force on one side and the Sardin ian levies on the oth er. This would have been similar to Hasdrubal Barca's later deployment at the Battle of the Metaurus. Like his namesake, the bald Hasdrubal may hav e tri ed to reinforce his weaker (Sa rdinian) wing with a secu re flank, defensible terrain and his elephants. Manlius most likely deployed his army in standard formation - two Roman legion s in the center, with Italian allies and the marine s and rowers on the flanks.

Aftermath The war for Sardin ia was ove r. The remnants of Hasdrubal's army were hunted down. The captured mercenar ies may well have been taken into Roman service, as happen ed later in Sicily. Manlius, when the campai gn was comple te, gather ed up his sailors and re- mann ed his fleet. The wizened Manlius then laid down his command in Sardinia, and sailed hack to Rome. The senate kept a full consul ar army of two legion s in Sardin ia for most of the remainder of the war, to guard against the threat fro m Cartha ge. In the event, Cartha ge nev er mounted another attack on this island province. The failur e of Hasdrubal the Bald's exp edit ion was one of a number of dis appoin tments that ruined the only chance Carthage had to win the war, during the campai gn of 215. First Hasdrubal Barca had been defeat ed at Dertosa, then Hasd rubal the Bald lost this bat tle in Sardin ia and finall y the ambassadors negotiating the treaty bet ween Hannibal and Ki ng Phi lip V were captur ed by Roma n nav al pat rols, del aying the Mac edonian entry into the war for a whole year. The momentum of victor y, painstakingly generated at Trebia, Trasimene and Cannae, was squandered on the fields of Dertos a and Caralis. Notes on the Sce nario Legion s probably did n't have per man ent number s at this time, so the designat ions V and XIV are not historical, but rather chosen to match the uni ts in the SPQ R counter- mix . The dep loyment for both armies is only an educated guess, and players may Wish to use free deploymen t. If using this opt ion, allow the Roma n pla yer to select the map and deploy first. The Cartha ginian pla yer may observ e the Roman dispositions and then dep loy his forces, the advant age of a superior mounte d force.

The bat tle was hotly contested, the fighting report edly lastin g four hours. The Cartha ginian wing was having the bes t of it on its side, while the Romans gradually gained the upp er hand over Hamp sicora's levies. Finally, the Sardin ians were routed. The Roman legion which overpo wered the Sardin ians next swung around to fall on the flan k and rea r of the Cartha ginian wing. The Africa n and Ibe rian mercenaries were trapped and pra ctically annihilated. The Romans counted 12,000 slain on the battlefield, and too k 3,700 pri soners. Hos tus had died fighting. His father , Hampsi cora, fled with a few hor se men. When he learned of the magnitude of the defeat, and the death of his son, Hampsi cora fell on his sword that night. Hasdru bal, Mago and Hanno were all captured ali ve, an unu sual occurr enc e perhap s brough t about by the envelop ment of the Carthaginian wing. Captivity was surely a cruel fate, but certainly better than the crucifixion that awaited so many ear lier unsuccess ful Cartha ginian commanders in Sardin ia.