Uberas vs CFI The late Juan Ubreras and Dominga Mendoza owned a parcel of land.

They have five children, namely, Segundo, Albino, francisca, Alejandra and Pedro. Sometime on 1964, Alejandra and Pedro (predecessors in interest of herein respondents) executed a declaration of heirship fraudulently stating that they are the only successors of Juan and Dominga. They adjudicated to themselves the whole property to the prejudice and the exclusion of the two brothers-Albino and Segundo (predecessors-in-interest of herein petitioners). To continue their malicious scheme, a contract of sale was made by Alejandra to Pedro with regard to her share on the whole property. The aforementioned personages already died leaving with them their heirs. The heirs of the four children exempting francisca who died without issue were living as co-owners of the now contested property. It has been such until the surviving spouse of pedro and the heirs claimed sole ownership over the inherited property. It was only during that time that they knew about the malicious and fraudulent acts of Alejandra and Pedro. As a result, they filed an action to quite title, recovery of possession and ownership, partition and reconveyance plus damages. The Trial Court and the CA, however, rendered an adverse ruling. The lower courts held that the action filed by the petitioners is not quieting of title but for reconveyance. In consequence, they are now barred by prescription for bringing the action only in 1978. The petitioners averred that they and respondents were co-owners and possessors of the land and they only knew about the fraud when the latter claimed sole ownership. Their motion being denied, they now seek a review in this court. Issue: whether or not the lower courts erroneously ruled out the issue of prescription Held: The court ruled in the affirmative. Respondent court manifestly failed to take into account the averments of petitioners' complaint that they "and defendants are co-owners and possessors of the property" and that "the malicious and illegal acts committed by defendants were known to the plaintiffs only during this year 1977, after Soledad Rapiz and her children were already claiming full ownership and possession of the whole of the property," as set forth specifically in paragraph 20 of their complaint below. 1 Respondent court could not peremptorily disregard this averment without trial and receiving the parties' proofs. It is obvious that if such averment be duly established at the trial by petitioners-plaintiffs, the period for prescription, even under respondent court's theory of the case in its order, would only have commenced in 1977 and prescription could not lie. The teaching of Faja vs. Court of Appeals 2 that an action to quiet title to property in the possession of plaintiff is imprescriptible and that where there are material facts to be inquired into and resolved on the basis of evidence adduced by the parties which will determine the legal precepts to be applied, as in this case, the complaining party should be given full opportunity to prove his case is fully applicable here, mutatis mutandis although in Faja the court peremptorily dismissed the complaint by summary judgment, while respondent court herein likewise summarily dismissed the complaint on the alleged ground of prescription notwithstanding contrary factual averments in the complaint which would clearly rule out prescription.

Sapto vs Fabiana Apolinario Fabiana bought a parcel of land from Samuel and Constancio Sapto. Although unregistered, the possession of the land was already conveyed to the former. Upon the death of Samuel and Constancio, the surviving spouse and heirs of the latter for the recovery of the parcel of land sold on the ground that the sale was unregistered. After trial, the lower court held that although the sale was never registered, it was valid and binding upon the parties and the vendors heirs, and ordered the plaintiffs to execute the necessary deed of conveyance in defendant's favor and its annotation in the certificate of title. Issue: whether the deed of sale executed by appellants' predecessors, although never registered, is valid and binding on appellants and operated to convey title and ownership to the Apolinario. The court ruled in the affirmative. the purpose of registration is merely to notify and protect the interests of strangers to a given transaction, who may be ignorant thereof, and the non-registration of the deed evidencing said transaction does not relieve the parties thereto of their obligations thereunder". No right of innocent third persons or subsequent transferees of the property in question is involved herein. The property has remained and still is in the possession of the vendee of appellants' predecessors, herein appellee. It is, therefore, clear that the conveyance between appellee and his vendors and valid and binding upon the latter, and is equally binding and effective against the heirs of the vendors, herein appellants. To hold otherwise would make of the Torrens system a shield for the commission of fraud by the vendors or his heirs, who would then be able to reconvey the same property to other persons. Actually the action for conveyance was one to quiet title, i.e., to remove the cloud cast upon appellee's ownership by the refusal of the appellants to recognize the sale made by their predecessors. This action accrued only when

appellant, initiated their suit to recover the land in 1954. Furthermore, actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible. The prevailing rule is that the right of a plaintiff to have his title to land quieted, as against one who is asserting some adverse claim or lien thereon, is not barred while the plaintiff or his grantors remain in actual possession of the land, claiming to be owners thereof, the reason for this rule being that while the owner in fee continues liable to an action, proceeding, or suit upon the adverse claim, he has a continuing right to the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of such claim and its effect on his title, or to assert any superior equity in his favor. He may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. But the rule that the statute of limitations is not available as a defense to an action to remove a cloud from title can only be invoked by a complaint when he is in possession. One who claims property which is in the possession of another must, it seems, invoke his remedy within the statutory period. (44 Am. Jur., p. 47)

Sps benito vs Saquitan-ruiz Horacio and Felisa Benito sold a parcel of land to herein respondent. However, despite repeated demands, the spouses failed to cause the issuance of and/or deliver a new title under plaintiffs name by virtue of the parties deed of absolute sale. Instead of issuing and/or delivering to the her certificate of title over the above-described parcel of land, in gross bad faith and with fraudulent intent, re-subdivided the whole parcel of land and with fraudulent intent in caused the issuance of certificate of title under Horacio Benitos name As a result, the respondent filed a case for specific performance with declaration of nullity of titles and damages. RTC On June 28, 1999, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed respondents Complaint on grounds of prescription and/or laches.5 It held that from the moment the contract was perfected, the parties could reciprocally demand performance of their obligations. There was a breach of obligation when, despite repeated demands, petitioners failed to deliver to respondent the corresponding certificate of title to the lot. She, however, failed to file any action to compel performance until April 16, 1999, or 20 years from the time of the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale on April 17, 1979. Moreover, the assailed Certificates of Title had been issued March 25, 1996, or more than one year before the Complaint was filed. An action to invalidate title certificates on the ground of fraud prescribes upon the expiration of one year from the entry of the decree of registration. CA Reversing the RTC, the CA held that respondents second cause of action was for reconveyance, not for the invalidation of certificates of title. As long as the property was still in the name of the person who had caused the wrongful registration, and as long as it had not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value, an action for reconveyance was still available. Such cause of action prescribes in ten (10) years, counted from the date of the issuance of the assailed certificate of title. Since the Complaint alleged that the questioned titles had been issued on March 25, 1996, the cause of action for reconveyance has not prescribed. Issue: whether or not the action of the respondent is an action for rconveyance Held: the court ruled in the affirmative. While a review of the decree of registration can no longer be done after the expiration of one year from the entry of the decree, those wrongfully deprived of their property may still initiate an action for its reconveyance.10 In this suit, the purpose is the transfer of property, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another persons name, to its rightful and legal owner or to one who has a better right.11 Though the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible, the reconveyance suit may still be pursued so that a wrongfully registered property may be placed under the name of its rightful owner or of one with a better right thereto.12 Furthermore, we note that the Complaint was seasonably filed on April 16, 1999, when the ownership of Dela Cruz had not yet been confirmed. As the third party purchaser, she allegedly acquired it through a judicial execution sale. This means that her right to its conveyance and possession was subject to the 12-month redemption period provided under Section 33,13 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The Certificate of Sale14 was issued on May 26, 1998; the Certificate of Final Deed of Sale,15 only on May 27, 1999. Section 1616 of the same Rule also provides that nothing shall prevent the vindication of any third persons claim to a property subjected to execution in a separate action. Finally, we note that respondent is in possession of the disputed property.17 If a person claiming to be the owner of a wrongfully registered parcel of land is in actual possession, the right to seek reconveyance does not prescribe.18 A

petition for the quieting of title, although essentially an action for reconveyance, should not be dismissed on the ground of prescription, if it is alleged that the plaintiff is in possession of the property. Metropolitan Bank vs Alejo Spouses Acampado obtained a loan from petiotioner. As security thereof, they mortgage a parcel of land purportedly owned by them. On June 3, 1996, a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of TCT No. V-41319 was filed by Respondent Sy Tan Se against Spouses Acampado. Despite being the registered mortgagee of the real property covered by the title sought to be annulled, petitioner was not made a party thereto, nor was she notified of its existence. Because the spouses defaulted in the payment of their loan, extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings over the mortgaged property were initiated on April 19, 1997. On June 17, 1997, the sheriff of Valenzuela conducted an auction sale of the property, during which petitioner submitted the highest and winning bid. On July 15, 1997, a Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor. This sale was entered in the Registry of Deeds of Valenzuela on July 28, 1997. When the redemption period lapsed exactly a year after, on July 28, 1998, petitioner executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership to enable the Registry of Deeds of Valenzuela to issue a new TCT in its name. Upon presentation to the Register of Deeds of the Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, petitioner was informed of the existence of the August 12, 1998 RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 4930-V-96, annulling TCT No. V-41319. On January 27, 1999, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of the RTC Decision. Ruling of the Court of Appeals For being insufficient in form and substance, the Petition for Annulment was outrightly dismissed by the CA. It ruled that petitioner ought to have filed, instead, a petition for relief from judgment or an action for quieting of title. Issue: whether or not quieting of title is the proper remedy in this case Held: dili oi..pataka.. It should be stressed that this case was instituted to ask for relief from the peremptory declaration of nullity of TCT No. V-41319, which had been issued without first giving petitioner an opportunity to be heard. Petitioner focused on the judgment in Civil Case No. 4930-V-96 which adversely affected it, and which it therefore sought to annul. Filing an action for quieting of title will not remedy what it perceived as a disregard of due process; it is therefore not an appropriate remedy. Equally important, an action for quieting of title is filed only when there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein. As defined, a cloud on title is a semblance of title which appears in some legal form but which is in fact unfounded. In this case, the subject judgment cannot be considered as a cloud on petitioners title or interest over the real property covered by TCT No. V-41319, which does not even have a semblance of being a title. It would not be proper to consider the subject judgment as a cloud that would warrant the filing of an action for quieting of title, because to do so would require the court hearing the action to modify or interfere with the judgment or order of another co-equal court. Well-entrenched in our jurisdiction is the doctrine that a court has no power to do so, as that action may lead to confusion and seriously hinder the administration of justice. Clearly, an action for quieting of title is not an appropriate remedy in this case. Robles vs CA