Introduction

The recent spate of terrorism and the pattern with which it is unfolding whole over the world makes this issue one of the top concerns of states and requires equally resilient efforts to counter it. This deep rooted menace today presents unique challenge with a global network of clandestine cells linked with each other. The complexity involved and lack of a comprehensive and holistic approach to effectively counter it further aggravates the situation. From the offensive military operation to the consequence management after any disastrous terrorist attack the tool which seems to be neglected, if not out rightly ignored, is of intelligence. Counter terrorism, as the word denotes, is to take offensive action against terrorist organizations, personnel and facilities. Essentially an offensive action against a clandestine phenomenon requires highly effective and accurate intelligence. If a RAND study, titled How Terrorist Groups End, is to be believed then effective police and intelligence work, rather than the use of military force, deliver better counterterrorism results.1 It is the intelligence which can make sure the preemptive neutralization of terrorists. However intelligence in the struggle against terrorism poses some new and difficult demands. Acquiring information about the composition, location, capabilities, plans, and ambitions of terrorist groups is an enormous challenge for intelligence agencies, meeting this challenge requires different skills than were needed to keep informed about the capabilities and intentions of conventional enemies that were usually governments. Observers point to several major challenges that the Intelligence Community will likely encounter in supporting the counter terrorist effort.2 First is a renewed emphasis on human agents. Signals intelligence and imagery satellites have their uses in the counterterrorism mission, but intelligence to counter terrorism depends more on human intelligence (HUMINT) such as spies and informers. Any renewed emphasis on human intelligence necessarily will involve a willingness to accept risks of complicated and dangerous missions, and likely ties to disreputable individuals
1

How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qaida (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG741-1, 2008). Available at: www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf. 2 Ken Adelman. Facing the Enemy, Washingtonian, November 2001, 33.

who may be in positions to provide valuable information. Time and patience will be needed to train analysts in difficult skills and languages. Second, terrorist activities pose significant analytical challenges. In addition to acquiring analysts with esoteric language skills, intelligence agencies must develop expertise in many backward areas that had been of peripheral concern in recent past. Much of the data available will be in open, unclassified sources that intelligence agencies have often neglected. Third is the closer relationship between intelligence and law enforcement agencies. In counterterrorism efforts, intelligence agencies have to work alongside law enforcement agencies that have far different approaches to gathering evidence, developing leads, and maintaining databases. Laws and policies should be modified to facilitate a closer relationship between the two sets of agencies. Finally, military operations against terrorists will reinforce requirements for collecting and transmitting precise intelligence to military commanders or operators. It is this importance of and challenges to intelligence community in counter terrorism which stimulated this research. Lets first comprehend the nature of terrorism.

Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 1. Terrorism

Defining Terrorism and Understanding its Nature
Terrorism is notoriously difficult to define, because the term has evolved and because it is associated with an activity that is designed to be subjective. The targets of a terrorist act are not the victims, who are killed or maimed in the attack, but rather the governments or public among whom the terrorists hope to engender a reaction such as fear, repulsion, intimidation, overreaction, or radicalization. Although one can disagree over whether particular actions constitute terrorism, there are six basic components to all terrorism.3
3

Thomas Mockaitis, The New Terrorism Myths and Reality (London: Pentagon Press, 2007), 1.

Terrorism is (1) an intentional and (2) rational (3) act of violence to (4) cause fear (5) in the target audience or society (6) for the purpose of changing behavior in that audience or society. Terrorism is a political act, the goal of which is to make a change. The terrorist is not driven by personal desires or ambitions. Further more terrorism is about impact on society. There are three types of terrorist attacks:4 (1) Attacks that involve weapons of mass destruction, (2) Weapons of mass casualty and (3) Weapons of mass disruption. While terrorism is goal centered in creating fear in a society to achieve a political goal, a terrorist act can be placed in one of two general groupings. The act is either objective driven or terror driven.5 (1) Object Driven An objective driven act of terrorism is committed in order for the terrorist group to get certain demands met by a government. Hostage taking is an example. (2) Terror driven Terror driven acts are committed as retaliation for a perceived wrong or as a warning of future acts of terror if the government does not change its policies.

2. Combating Terrorism Intelligence

Effective counterterrorism requires good intelligence, but counterterrorism intelligence differs in many ways from the intelligence support that was needed for conventional threat from states for which intelligence services remained organized. The major challenges and problems for intelligence reside with human and signals intelligence collection, analysis, cooperation with law enforcement agencies and the sharing of intelligence, ensuring that real time intelligence about terrorist activities reaches those who can most effectively counter it.

4
5

Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (New York: Random House, 2002), 103. Ibid.

Counterterrorism intelligence is of three categories:6 1. Strategic 2. Tactical 3. Psychological Strategic: Intelligence about the organization of the terrorist organizations, leadership, intentions, aims, modus operandi, sources of funds, weapons and means at their disposal, contacts with external elements, including foreign intelligence agencies, etc. Tactical: Intelligence which relates to the specific plans of terrorist action, also called preventive and indications-and-warning intelligence, which would enable the state to preempt terrorist action, prevent attacks, and frustrate terrorist plans. Psychological: Intelligence which covers details of psychological warfare propaganda of the terrorists against the state that need to be countered, and data relating to the terrorists, which enable the state to mount its own psychological warfare against them. Indicators of discontent against the leadership in terrorist organizations, coercive methods in the recruitment of volunteers, and misuse of children and women for terrorist operations are examples of such data. While the coverage of strategic and psychological intelligence by the intelligence services in general seems to be satisfactory, the collection of tactical, preventive, and indications and warning intelligence has left much to be desired. This is due largely to the difficulties in penetrating terrorist organizations for collection of human intelligence and their communications for the collection of signals intelligence. While strategic and psychological intelligence can be collected from open sources, peripheral secret sources, interrogation of captured or surrendered terrorists, analysis and exploitation of captured documents, IT hardware and software, precise preventive and indications and warning intelligence can generally be obtained only from moles in key positions in the terrorist organizations and through interception of communications.
6

James W. Harris, Building Leverage in the Long War, Policy Analysis, no. 439 (Washington D.C: Cato Institute, May 2002), 14.

Elements of Combating Terrorism

Elements of combating terrorism can be identified as:8 1. Anti-terrorism to protect important installations and places from terrorist attack. 2. Consequence management to mitigate the effects of an actual terrorist attack. 3. Counterterrorism to take offensive action against terrorist organizations, personnel, and facilities. Anti terrorism includes the specific objectives to secure places from attack, consequence management consists of all measures taken to local, state, and national levels to prepare for and, when necessary, respond to an actual terrorist attack. Counterterrorism refers to offensive military and law enforcement operations against terrorist organizations, networks, and individuals along with economic, social, and diplomatic measures to attack the root causes of unrest that encourage terrorist activity. Intelligence, the difficult task of gathering, analyzing, and sharing information, lies at the center of all three and helps tie them together.

7 8

Pictorial placement of intelligence in elements of combating terrorism Thomas Mockaitis, The New Terrorism Myths and Reality (London: Pentagon Press, 2007), 91-93.

Significance of Intelligence in Combating Terrorism

The significance of intelligence in counter-terrorism stems from three main drivers:9 1. Its role in pre-emption and disruption of terrorist activity. 2. Its role in post-incident investigations. 3. Its contribution to preventive/protective security measures. Effective counter terrorism intelligence should focus on four areas:10 1. Prevention 2. Pursuit 3. Protection 4. Preparedness Prevention addressing underlying causes of terrorism. That means, among other things, ensuring that every citizen enjoy the full protection of the law and are able to participate to the full in society. Pursuit using intelligence effectively to disrupt and apprehend the terrorists. It should include joint working and intelligence-sharing between governments and law enforcement agencies. It aims to make borders more secure, to make identity theft harder and to curb terrorist access to financial sources. Protection ensuring that reasonable security precautions are in place. Preparedness making sure that one has the people and resources in place to respond effectively to the consequences of a terrorist attack. Most intelligence services obviously have key roles under Pursuit and Prevention. However, the limitations on the role of intelligence in counter-terrorism need to be carefully understood. With regard to 9/11, US intelligence agencies had received some relevant information pre 9/11 but either failed to appreciate its significance or failed to share it.11 When the British government deployed 400 troops to Heathrow, in an alert in February 2003, because of intelligence indicating a possible attack, Prime Minister Tony
9

Kleanthis Kyriakidis, 21st Century Terrorism: Wrong Diagnosis, Inadequate Remedy (Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, June 2005), 17 10 (James W. Harris 2002, 17)

Blair was later to comment over the deployment of troops that to this day we dont know if it was correct and we foiled it or if it was wrong. 12 However, the intelligence source was regarded as a strong one and the counter-terrorism policy priority was to protect the public. The attack on Madrid in March 2004 was a large scale multi-location attack without any apparent prior signs of terrorist activity but with some relevant intelligence available but not fully shared. One expert has commented on terrorism intelligence that the bulls eye of this intelligence target an individual terrorist plot lacks the size and signatures of most other targets, from nuclear weapons programs to political instability and that intelligence specific to terrorist plots is often unattainable.13 It would appear that the quote above can also be applied to the London bombings of 7 July 2005. Those attacks are a stark reminder of the inherent problems of counterterrorism intelligence. For any kind of pre-emptive or prevention action there must exist at least one of the following: some form of target or time-specific threat, a person or persons whose activity has suspicious characteristics (perhaps purchases of explosives related components) or communications intercept data. One of the key factors affecting the ability to effectively prosecute counter terrorism operations is the linkages between and among the different security, military and intelligence agencies involved. Often equal partners and stakeholders in the same fight, each agency will nevertheless carry its own legacy of operating procedures, cultural biases and bureaucratic inertia that can make an inter-agency operation difficult and frustrating. The disadvantage is of course is that each unique agency has its particular strengths, distinct specializations and core skills that bring a huge amount of added value to the operation. The trick is to leverage these advantages in a framework that retains the distinct talents and strengths of each partner and minimizes disruption to the mission goal.14

11

James Risen, In Hindsight, C.I.A. See Flaws that Hindered Efforts on Terror. New York Times, October 7, 2001. 12 The Times, March 29, 2004. 13 Paul R. Pillar, Intelligence, in A.K. Cronin and J.M. Lendes, eds., Attacking Terrorism Elements of a Grand Strategy (Washington, DC.: Georgetown UP, 2004) , 115-139. 14 The Road to Sept. 11, Newsweek, October 1, 2001, 38.

3. Predictive Tools & Analysis

The primary objective of counter terrorism intelligence research and analysis is to provide predictive analysis. The goal of predictive analysis is to identify threats and warn leaders of threat actions in time to defeat or mitigate them. Predictive analysis techniques identify the level of probability of an event based on combinations of indicators, trends, patterns, and historical events. The ability to perform predictive analysis is equally especially important but it is extremely hard to achieve given the Tremendous amount of information available. Complexity of interpreting the reliability of sources. Evolving modus operandi of terrorists. Open nature of certain societies etc.

An important role for intelligence in counterterrorism is acquiring information concerning the terrorists plans, that is, where they are likely to strike next.15 Unlike in conventional operations where discerning enemy plans amounts to evaluating alternative courses of action, discerning enemy plans in terrorism can be almost impossible at times because the enemy generally seizes opportunities to strike as they occur and because decisions occur at low levels and operations involve relatively few people and pieces of equipment. Predictive analysis aims at forecasting where, and sometimes when the enemy will strike next. In the absence of data on friendly behavior, these techniques invariably depend on some statistical analysis of past behavior. The predictions are therefore based solely on what the terrorists have done in the past. Most assume an underlying randomness associated with terrorists behavior. For example, an examination of past terrorists attacks might reveal that the interarrival time of the attacks is exponentially distributed, leading to a Poisson distribution of the number of attacks per time interval. This is also true of the location of the attack. Thus we get an underlying bivariate Poisson distribution for the time and location of attacks.16
15

Richard K. Betts, Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable, World Politics (October 1978). 34 16 (James Risen, October 7, 2001)

To be effective, predictive methods should possess the following characteristics: 1. They should recognize that terrorists attacks are nonrandom. Terrorist attacks are anything but random in time and location. Terrorists attack where forces, civilians or static targets are, or will be located and when they anticipate they will be at that location. For example terrorists emplace IEDs along roadways where it is anticipated that forces will travel. Consequently any algorithm or mathematical process that purports to examine inter-arrival times or spacing of attacks is more likely to fail. The reason is that these lead to Poisson processes that are inherently random, even if they are described by a known distribution. 2. They must account for an enemy that adapts. If forces are successful at predicting where the terrorists will strike next and they act on that intelligence, we would expect the enemy to react in some way so as to blunt the adverse effects of the friendly action. One way to counter this likely phenomenon is to examine more-recent historical events. Typically, analysts like to examine all the data possible to support whatever study they are conducting. When examining insurgent attacks, this means looking at all attacks that have taken place. However, what occurred six months ago may have no relevance to what will occur tomorrow. By shortening the time horizon, we are much more likely to capture enemy adaptations.

Intelligence Analysis and Terrorism

Actionable intelligence is essential for preventing acts of terrorism. The timely and thorough analysis and dissemination of information about terrorists and their activities will improve governments ability to disrupt and prevent terrorist acts, and to provide useful warning to the population. Terrorist activities present intelligence analysts with major challenges. The prerequisite is an awareness of the social, ideological, and political environment in which terrorist movements develop. Such awareness requires detailed knowledge of geographic, ethnic, religious, economic, and political situations in obscure regions. There is no ready supply of analysts with command of such skills. And there is the scarcity of needed language skills for translation, interpretation, and analysis which is 9

both a matter of quality and quantity. Technology, seen by some as the panacea for translation, is not highly regarded by real linguists or analysts who need high-end translations. Language is an art as well as a science, and the current needs, with respect to terrorism, require an elusive mix of formal language, slang, codes, and multilingual capabilities.17 Al Qaeda, for example, contains many nonnative speakers of Arabic, poorly educated South Asians, and Muslims of very different countries; attention to perfect grammar is not the issue. And there remains the problem of how language skilled employees and the broader regional knowledge they often possess is used in the intelligence process. Some elements of intelligence services know how to treat language officers as a vital part of the organization. In other parts of the intelligence community, language is more often considered a secondary skill, and is not valued sufficiently in recruitment or promotion of regional experts. Linguists should also not be physically separated from all-source analysts, and should be integrated to the maximum extent possible into the career development track of analysts. In the case of the classical battlefield, knowledge of enemy capabilities is the focal point of interest at the tactical level, while knowledge of the enemys intentions is paramount at the strategic level. The need for this knowledge has been translated into criteria and procedures aimed at producing essential elements of information, other intelligence requirements, and, more comprehensively and systematically, order of battle intelligence. With regard, in particular, to the imminence of aggression and the avoidance of surprise, indications and warning intelligence criteria and procedures have likewise been developed. These are not entirely or indiscriminately applicable to the counterterrorist effort. Nevertheless, if domestic as well as international terrorism is to be countered, it is precisely the capabilities and intentions of the various terrorist groups and their supporting networks that must be identified and dissected early on from an intelligence perspective. The skillful adaptation, as opposed to the direct adoption, of time tested classical intelligence methods, foremost indications and warning intelligence, constitutes and essential step in this direction.

17

(Risen, October 7 2001)

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What follows is a frame of reference for developing a specific set of indicators for terrorist threat assessment in terms of both terrorist strengths and weaknesses, in other words indications and warning intelligence.18 If properly adapted to the different geopolitical settings, it may serve as a substantive element in planning terrorist counteraction. Both components of terrorist counteraction, antiterrorism and counterterrorism, are predicated upon the collection, evaluation, and analysis of timely and accurate intelligence. Though this collection evaluation analysis process is the main task of intelligence services, it should also be conducted by other government agencies and the private sector. Identify exploitable societal conditions. These are historical, political, economic, social, and religious. Terrorism does not develop in isolation but feeds upon and exploits a wide variety of societal conditions present in a given community, country, or broader geographical area. Determine the presence of one or more radical subculture. While societal conditions strongly influence the birth and viability of domestic as well as transnational terrorist groups, particular attention should be devoted to a dominant factor, the presence of one or more radical subcultures. These draw their inspiration from well-defined or even hazy ideologies corresponding to leftist, rightist, ethnic, theocratic, or mixed schools of thought. Subversive agitation is the offspring of a environment directly traceable to a radical subculture. Monitor subversive agitation, revolutionary publications and propaganda as well as anti institutional demonstrations and activities. Because subversive agitation constitutes the operational cradle of terrorism, it is imperative that it be closely monitored. Subversive agitators typically recruit additional subversive cohorts, incite the population to disobey the laws, create civil disorders, and resort to street violence. Since groups of subversive agitators who have not reached the terrorist stage often coexist with ideologically kindred terrorist groups, the former can provide recruitment and support pools for the latter, thus reinforcing the terrorist ranks. In turn, the presence of subversive agitators belonging to different radical subcultures increases the potential emergence of

18

Richard K. Betts, Fixing Intelligence, Foreign Affairs (January/February 2002), 58.

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terrorist groups with contrasting ideological or political orientations, thus producing more sources of terrorism. Analyze terrorist ideological tracts and responsibility claims to identify ultimate goals and intermediate objectives. Terrorist literary production, though often untruthful or based upon an ideologically biased perception of society, furnishes nonetheless valuable insights regarding the mindset, self-image, aims, and preferential targets of a given terrorist group. Terrorist manifestoes and declarations can also indirectly provide data to assess a given groups organization and capabilities. Record systematically all terrorist incidents to establish modus operandi and to understand behaviors. Modus operandi, whose sophistication varies according to group, includes recruitment, training, and employment of personnel, targeting, (selective or indiscriminate); tactics (weaponry selection, ambushes, attacks, raids, abductions, hijackings, hostage taking); patterns (time element, coordination, target clusters, major and complementary actions); internal security and communications; logistics and finances, responsibility claims; and captivity rules. Modus operandi reflects both current and potential capabilities of specific groups. The fact that two or more groups issue from the same radical subculture is not necessarily indicative of shared operational methods and practices. Modus operandi is also subject to modifications over time. Track and analyze group behaviors for early detection of potential threats. Determine the structure of terrorist groups to assess capabilities. Identify relationships by uncovering interactions and relationships between terrorist groups and their members, link group members to understand formal and informal organizational structures. The structure is indicative of immediate as well as longer-term potential. Unicellular or multi cellular and compartmentalized terrorist groups are rigidly or loosely structured with centralized or decentralized leadership. In some cases they can also serve as an umbrella for lesser aggregations. Militants are part-timers, full-timers, or mixed. Structure and size will affect not only security, discipline, training, command & control, communications, planning, operations, and logistics, but also a groups life span. Groups belonging to the same radical subculture do not necessarily, and in fact often do not, adopt the same structure.

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Identify support organizations, movements, and networks. Connect networks to expose connections between group members, other organizations, outside individuals, locations, facilities and communication networks. These aggregations of external supporters facilitate terrorist propaganda, recruitment, logistics, and intelligence. Some of them are institution based: in schools, factories, labor unions, unemployed societal strata, extra-parliamentary political circles, refugee camps, or extremist religious congregations. Others may be area-based, particularly where ethnic or separatist terrorism is active. In some cases, terrorist groups are flanked by political parties, usually extra parliamentary but with certain notable exceptions. Some groups are further supported by unlawful finance gathering networks and charities totally dedicated to the terrorist cause. Verify the presence of possible international linkages with kindred foreign groups and/or sponsor states. Expose group operations by showing shared assets, materials, and supplies for carrying out terrorist missions. When present, these linkages are precarious, generally range from ideological solidarity to logistical cooperation, and occasionally entail operations. Nonetheless, they constitute a clear threat since they broaden the terrorist support base and sphere of action. State sponsorship, which is a notable exception and not the rule, is more readily available to terrorist groups having a dual structure: an overt one for sociopolitical action and a covert one for terrorism itself. State sponsorship for sub-national terrorist groups is generally self-serving and predicated upon plausible denial. Probe exploitable terrorist structural and operational weaknesses and failures. Assess vulnerabilities by evaluating funding resources, recruiting methods, communication networks, storage facilities and other resources to uncover potential vulnerabilities. Terrorist groups thrive primarily on the elements of initiative and surprise, both highly dependent upon clandestine structures and dynamics. At the same time, these groups are subject to constraints exploitable by terrorism counteraction agencies. The necessarily clandestine nature of terrorist aggregations is a double-edged sword. Living hidden requires discipline, commitment, and the ability to cope with stress. The application of security rules, particularly compartmentalization, must be constant: there is no room for exceptions or relaxation. Terrorist groups must also foreclose internal dissent and schisms. Indiscriminate recruitment can also constitute a fatal flaw. 13

Personnel renewal is a challenge. Finally, failure to achieve its ultimate radical or revolutionary goal within the expected time frame can prove to be devastating to any terrorist group. Terrorism counteraction agencies must be prepared to exploit all of these factors. Although conceptually sequential, the above outlined steps in practice usually require nearly concurrent application, particularly if multiple and separate actors account for subversive agitation, terrorism, or both. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that even after the emergence of terrorism, when prevention has obviously failed for political or technical reasons, indications and warning intelligence can still play a major role in the containment and repression phases of terrorist counteraction.

4. Terrorism, Information Warfare and Intelligence

Information warfare refers to activities undertaken by governments, groups, or individuals to gain electronic access to information systems either for the purpose of obtaining the data in such systems, manipulating or fabricating the data, or perhaps even bringing the systems down, as well as activities undertaken to protect against such activities. Intelligence agencies have been involved in aspects of information warfare, both offensive and defensive, for many years. New impetus has recently been given to these roles, however, by the explosion in information systems and information systems technology.19 Government and public communications, financial, energy, and other industrial systems have become critically dependent on a complex set of interconnected automated information and control systems. Many of these systems are potentially vulnerable to computer based disruption, manipulation, or corruption by terrorist groups. There should not be lack of an effective governmental structure to coordinate efforts to protect computer networks in the public and private sector from electronic attack. While several such efforts are underway in several countries, many believe they are not fully coordinated and do not sufficiently involve the private sector. While these concerns may
19

Gregory F. Treverton, Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 152-157.

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be justified, the scope of the actions required to deal with the problem, especially the protection of computer networks in the private sector, would necessarily exceed the roles and capabilities of intelligence agencies. Collecting information about information warfare threats posed by terrorists organizations to systems is, however, a legitimate mission for the intelligence community. Indeed, it is a mission that has grown and will become increasingly important.

Surprise and Intelligence Failure

Terrorists employ strategy of denial and deception. Surprise is their main tool. The events of September 11, 2001 proved especially shocking both because they were so destructive and because they were so unexpected. Yet, both the fact that the attack occurred and even the form it took should not have taken the United States completely unawares. Familiarity with terrorist methods, repeated attacks against U.S. facilities overseas, combined with indications that the continental United States was at the top of the terrorist target list might have alerted that they were in peril of a significant attack. And yet, for reasons those who study intelligence failure will find familiar, 9/11 fits very much into the norm of surprise caused by a breakdown of intelligence warning. 9/11 was especially traumatic because the "surprise" of the attack was linked to an extraordinarily destructive act of terrorism. Terrorists invariably seek out targets whose destruction will result in maximum psychological impact for at least two reasons. First, they believe that attacks on symbolic targets will have an influence far beyond their actual physical impact. Nineteenth century anarchists assassinated Russian czars and other high government officials in the belief that this would collapse the social structure and produce revolution. In 1954, Algerian revolutionaries believed erroneously that a few bombs placed in police stations and public buildings would ignite a Muslim insurrection against French colonialism. It is difficult to know exactly what those Al Qaeda militants who flew airplanes into the Trade Towers and the Pentagon had in mind. At a minimum, the hijackers were carrying

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out the edicts of Osama bin Laden and his call to kill Americans. But the magnitude of the target and the destruction sought by the attackers suggest broader objectives.20 Second, terrorists go after high profile targets because of their groups relative weakness. Although terrorists assume that large numbers of people share their righteous anger and aspirations, in fact, they usually command few resources and even fewer followers. And in the wake of extraordinarily deadly terrorist attacks, they often lose the tacit support of silent people as people recoil from the loss of innocent life and what appears to be a senseless political agenda.

Factors in Intelligence Failure

The 9/11 attack on the Trade Towers has often been compared to that of the Japanese against Pearl Harbor as another infamous case of intelligence failure. On both occasions, there was ample evidence that the enemy might be pushed to undertake a desperate act. But the signs leading up to 9/11 were ignored for at least three of the same reasons that the Japanese were able to catch the U.S. Pacific fleet at anchor on the morning of 7 December, 1941, good intelligence indicators lost in the "noise" of disinformation; a belief that the enemy lacked the technical capacity to undertake the action; finally, mirror imaging, the assumption on the part of the intelligence consumer that the action undertaken was unlikely because it was "illogical."21 A second factor in intelligence surprise occurs when the technological capabilities of the enemy are underestimated. The United States discounted the ability of the Japanese Navy to project a fleet across the Pacific to launch an air attack with aerial torpedoes against U.S. ships. Ironically, although the 9/11 conspirators demonstrated an organizational capacity to coordinate the simultaneously hijacking of four airliners, no one suspected that the hijackers weapon of choice would be the box cutter. The final cause of intelligence surprise is "mirror-imaging"the belief that the perpetrators will not carry out a particular act because the defender, in their place, would not do it. It seemed inconceivable to the U.S. planners in 1941 that the Japanese would be so foolish to attack a power whose resources so exceeded those of Japan, thus virtually
20 21

James Wirtz, Surprise and Intelligence Failure, Strategic Insight (September 2006). Ibid.

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guaranteeing defeat. Likewise, the notion of "suicide bombing" is so alien to the American, indeed the Western, outlook that they find it difficult to fathom the mindset of enemies prepared to conceive of an operation of such horrific proportions.

17