Persons and Family Relations

Civil Law I

TAN, Abegail L.
PUP College of Law

Title: RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent

Case: The complainant submitted evidence in relation to two acts committed by the respondent, asserting the exhibition of gross misconduct, inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.

Facts: The first of two acts was on September 24, 1994 when Judge Domagtoy solemnized the marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga having the knowledge that Tagadan was merely separated from his wife. The respondent judge contended that he relied on the affidavit issues by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar confirming that Judge Domagtoy has not seen his wife for almost seven years. The second was when he performed a marriage between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario at the respondents resident in the municipality of Dapa.

Issue: (1) Whether or not a subsequent marriage, with only an affidavit stating that they have not seen each other and has been separated for seven years valid. (2) Whether or not a marriage held outside the jurisdiction of the judge but in his residence makes it void.

Ruling: (1) Article 41 of the Family Code provides that A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

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For a subsequent marriage to be valid, it is not enough that the married parties have not seen each other for seven years, the spouse present should institute

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a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. The affidavit presented to the Judge does not suffice. The Respondent Judge manifested an error to have accepted the affidavit. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous therefore void marriage.

(2) Article 8 of the Family Code provides that, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chamber or courtroom only in the following instances: 1) at the point of death, 2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or 3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario.

More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the solemnizing officer. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer". Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.

Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.

Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the Municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law.

RESPONDENT JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY SUSPENDED FOR SIX (6) MONTHS WITH STERN WARNING AGAINST REPETITION OF SIMILAR ACTS.

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Title: ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL, JR., petitioners, vs. NORMA BAYADOG, respondent. Case: Petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code. Facts: Teodulfa Bellones, the wife of Pepito Nial was killed by Pepito on April 24, 1985. After 1 year and 8 months, December 11, 1986, Pepito Nial and respondent Norma Bayadog got married witout marriage license. Executing an affidavit on the said date stating that they have lived together as husband and wife for at lease five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. Issue: (1) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs deceased father with defendant is null and void ab initio. Ruling: The second marriage is void ab initio. The marriage is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license as stated in Article 34 of the Family Code, for the reasons that (1) it cannot be said that Pepito and respondents have lived for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepitos first marriage has been dissolve and he cohabitated with respondent, only twenty months elapsed. (2) Even though they have cohabitated for five years, their five year period of cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by the law.

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Title: ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents. Case: Petitioner moved to dismiss the case regarding the petitioners business in Manila as a conjugal property contending that the cause of action is barred by the judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court. Facts: Petitioner Alice Reyes is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States; they were married in Hongkong. Thereafter, they established their residence in the Philippines and begot two children. Subsequently, they were divorced in Nevada, United States, and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn. The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community property nor community obligations. Private respondent filed suit against petitioner, stating that petitioners business in Manila is their conjugal property; that petitioner he ordered to render accounting of the business and that private respondent be declared to manage the conjugal property. Issue: Whether or not the divorce obtained by the parties is binding only to the alien spouse. Ruling: CIVIL LAW I (Persons and Family Relations) Page 6

Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American Law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the decision of his own countrys court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is stopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

Title: IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner, vs. HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents. Case: The petitioner filed this special civil action seeking annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to squash. Facts: On September 7, 1979, Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipina and Erich Geiling were married at Friedenweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, Geiling initiated a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany, on the ground that their marriage is a failure and they have been living separately. Pilapil, petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before RTC of Manila on January 23, 1983 where it is still pending as a civil case. On January 15, 1986, the local Court of Germany promulgated a divorce decree on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. Five months later, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery alleging that, while still married to respondent, petitioner had an affair with a certain William Chua as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983. The respondent city fiscal approved a resolution directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against petitioner. Petitioner filed a motion in both criminal cases to suspend proceedings. A motion to squash was also filed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction which was denied. Issue: CIVIL LAW I (Persons and Family Relations) Page 7

Whether or not the case for adultery should prosper. Ruling: The petition entered dismissing the complaint in criminal case was upheld for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case was made permanent. The law provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse. The fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, is admitted. The divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality principle in our civil law (Art. 15 Civil Code) Private respondent, being no longer married to petitioner has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the posture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

Title: DOROTHY B. TERRE, complainant, vs. ATTY. JORDAN TERRE, respondent. Case: Complainant, Dorothy Terre charged respondent. Atty. Jordan Terre with grossly immoral conduct consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with another woman while his marriage with complainant is still subsisting. Facts: Complainant was married to her first cousin while respondent was courting her. Having this knowledge, he convinced her that considering that she was married to her first cousin, her first marriage was void, therefore she is free to marry the respondent. Jordan Terre disappeared in 1981 but Dorothy Terre, continued on supporting him, she was unaware that respondent married a certain Helina Malicdem. She then filed against the respondent for bigamy and abandonment of minor. Respondent in defense, filed an answer that he believed that the child she was carrying was not his, and he believed in good faith that the marriage to the complainant was null and void ab initio. Issue: Whether or not it is necessary for a judicial declaration of nullity of firstmarriage before contracting a second marriage. Ruling:

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]The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious defense. In the first place, respondent has not rebutted complainant's evidence as to the basic fact which underscores that bad faith of respondent Terre. In the second place, the pretended defense is the same argument by which he inveigled complainant into believing that her prior marriage or Merlito A. Bercenilla being incestuous and void ab initio (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first cousins to each other), she was free to contract a second marriage with the respondent. Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of the supreme Court which holds that for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that respondent held that mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For it we are to hold Jordan Terre to his argument, his first marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result th at his second marriage to Heline Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in character. THE RESPONDENT WAS DISBARRED.

Title: ANTONIO S. VALDEZ, petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDEZ, respondents. Case: Petitioner avers that the court a quo has failed to apply the law that should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a situation where a marriage is declared void ab initio because of psychological incapacity on the part of either or both parties in contract. Facts: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married January 5, 1971. Begotten during the marriage were five children. In a petition, dated June 22, 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of marriage pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The trial court granted the petition, thereby delaring their marriage null and void on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin was placed in the custody of their mother and the older children chose which parent they want to stay with. The petitioner and respondent are also directed to start proceedings in the CIVIL LAW I (Persons and Family Relations) Page 9

liquidation of their property as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code and to comply to Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code. Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation of common property in unions without marriage. During the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father. Issue: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership. Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on coownership (Art 147 Family Code). Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said partys efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.

Title: VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent. Case: Veronico Tenebro filed an instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors: (1)The Court of Appeals gravely erred when the accused was convicted for bigamy despite the non existence of the first marriage and insufficient evidence; and (2) convicting the accused of bigamy despite proof that the marriage between the petitioner and complainant had been declared null and void. Facts: Tenebro married Ancajas in 1990, they lived together continuously until the latter part of 1991. It was when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been married to Hilda Villareyes in 1986. Petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he CIVIL LAW I (Persons and Family Relations) Page 10

shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. In 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage with a certain Nilda Villegas. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Villegas countered that his marriage with Villareyes cannot be proven as a fact there being no record of such. He further argued that his second marriage, with Ancajas, has been declared void ab initio due to psychological incapacity. Hence he cannot be charged for bigamy. Issue: Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy. Ruling: The prosecution was able to establish the validity and existence of the first marriage upon the presentation of sufficient evidence. As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioners psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

) Title: SUSAN NICDAO CARINO, petitioner, vs. SUSAN YEE CARINO, respondent. Facts: In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Carino married Susan Nicdao Carino. They had two children. In 1992, SPO4 contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan Yee Carino. In 1988, prior to his second marriage, SPO4 is already bedridden and he was under the care of Yee. He died 13 days after his marriage with Yee. Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim the benefits of SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim a total of P140,000.00 while Yee was able to collect a total of P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of CIVIL LAW I (Persons and Family Relations) Page 11

the P140,000. Yee admitted that her marriage with SPO4 was solemnized during the subsistence of the marriage between SPO4 and Nicdao but the said marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to the absence of a valid marriage license as certified by the local civil registrar. Yee also claimed that she only found out about the previous marriage on SPO4s funeral. Issue: Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim presumptive legitimes. Ruling: The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a valid marriage license. The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a policeman for their marriage is void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money, etc. owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by each party shall belong to him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the full benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage is likewise void. This is because the two were capacitated to marry each other for there were no impediments but their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license; in their situation, their property relations is governed by Art 147 of the FC which provides that everything they earned during their cohabitation is presumed to have been equally contributed by each party this includes salaries and wages earned by each party notwithstanding the fact that the other may not have contributed at all.

Title: VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a VINCENT G. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. CONSUELO TAN, Respondent Case: CIVIL LAW I (Persons and Family Relations) Page 12

A petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the July 14, 1998 decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CR No. 19830 and its January 4, 1999 Resolution denying reconsideration. The assailed Decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City in Criminal Case No. 13848 which convicted petitioner, Vincent Mercado of bigamy. Facts: Accused Dr. Vincent Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan married on June 27, 1991, which a marriage contract was duly executed and signed by the parties. In the said document, the status of the accused was single. There is no dispute either that at the time of the celebration of the wedding with the complainant, accused was actually a married man, having been in a lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976. On October 5, 1992 a letter of complaint for bigamy was filed by the complainant against the accused. More than a month later, on November of the same year, accused filed an action for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva, and was declared null and void on a Decision dated May 6, 1993. While acknowledging the existence of the two marriages, accused posited the defense that his previous marriage had been judicially declared null and void and that the private complainant had knowledge of the first marriage of accused. Petitioner contends that he obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage, thereby rendering it void ab initio. He argues that a void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Issue: Whether or not a marriage rendered void ab initio, is deemed never to have taken place at all, therefore, there is no need for a declaration of nullity before a subsequent marriage. Ruling: The petition was denied. The fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not defense in a bigamy charge. As with voidable marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage before contracting the second marriage. The Code Commission believes that the parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void, even if such is the fact, but first must secure a judicial declaration of nullity before they should be allowed to marry again.

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Title: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, respondent. Facts: On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter. In 1986, the respondents wife left for the United States bringing along their son and was naturalized as an American citizen a few years later. On 2000, his wife obtained a divorce decree and married Innocent Stanley. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to that instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage, that is, the marriage is celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. Issue: Whether or not respondent can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code, provided that both parties are Filipino upon marriage and one has been naturalized with different citizenship. Ruling: Taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 25 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties, who at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. The rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

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Title: SALVADOR S. ABUNADO and ZENAIDA BINAS ABUNADO, Petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent Case: A petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R No. 26135which affirmed with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, San Mateo, Rizal, in Criminal Case No. 2803 convicting petitioner Salvador S. Abunado of bigamy. Facts: On September 18, 1967, Salvador married Narcisa Arceno at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Pedro Tiangco. In 1988, Narcisa left for Japan to work but returned to the Philippines in 1992, when she learned that her husband was having an extramarital affair and has left their conjugal home. Narcisa found Salvador cohabitating with Fe Corazon Plato in Quezon City and later on discovered that Salvador contracted a second marriage with Zenaida Binas on January 1989. Salvador was convicted for bigamy on May 18, 2001. Petitioner filed a review, arguing that (first) the information was defective, (second) Narcisa consented to his marriage to Zenaida and (third)the penalty imposed to him was improper. Issue: Whether or not the condonation given by the petitioners first wife extinguish criminal action. Ruling: While the petitioner claims that there was a condonation on the part of that complainant, when he entered into a bigamous marriage, the same was likewise not established by clear and convincing evidence. But then, a pardon by the offended party do not extinguish criminal action considering that a crime is committed against the State and the crime of Bigamy is a public offense which can be denounced not only by the person affected thereby but even by civic-spirited citizen who may come to know the same. Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. CIVIL LAW I (Persons and Family Relations) Page 15

The penalty imposed to the petitioner is proper, in light of the fact that petitioner is more that 70 years of age, which is a mitigating circumstance under Article 13 Paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

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