L.

Klippenstein THE SELBSTSCHUTZ: A MENNONITE ARMY IN UKRAINE 1918-1919

. .

On 3 March 1918 Trotskii and his fellow delegates at Brest Litovsk negotiated a treaty between the new Lenin government and the Central powers which would cede Ukraine to its nationalist claimants and their GermanAustrian allies who controlled the key portions of the region by now. Viewed as hated foreign invaders by most Ukrainians, the Austro GermanforcesarrivedindiesouthUkrainianMennonitecoloniesaslibera torsfromtheirBolshevikoverlords,andmuchneededforcefororderand stability1.By5AprilEkaterinoslavwasintheirhands,Alexandrovskfellon die15,andMelitopoltwodayslater.On19Aprilat1:30p.m.twoofficers, Lindemeier and Hoer, entered Halbstadt in the Molotschna colony to an nouncethatacompanyofGermansoldierswouldbearrivingbytrainmo mentarily2. Largecrowdshadgatheredatthetrainstationtogreetthenewarri vals,delayedforseveralhours,theylearned,byatumultuouswelcomeand amealofabundanceinthevillageofLichtenau.Whenthetraindidarrive in Halbstadt at 5:30 p.m., cheering onlookers waved an overjoyed wel come. As one reporter put it, The greeting at the arrival itself is hard to describe.Onehadtobepresentthere3.Severalhundredsoldiersandtheir officers remained to be lodged in Halbstadt, as well as Neuhalbstadt and Muntau. Two hundred horses were brought to Halbstadt, presumably for theuseoftheGermansduringtheirstayinthecolony4. ArmingtheColonies Surprised and almost overwhelmed by such a heartwarming and supportive reception, the German forces determined nevertheless to rid theareaofanyRedswhomightresisttheirpresence5.Quicklytheygained die assistance of a number of German and Mennonite colonists, some of whom had already gone to Melitopol to obtain weapons for selfdefense andprotection6.EvenbeforethearrivaloftheGermanoccupationtroops

KlippensteinL.,2007

someMennonites,youngermenmostly,hadbeenplanningmilitarymeas urestodealwiththepillaginganddaylightrobberywhichhadbecomeso commonplace throughout the region7. Welltodo property owners had encouragedthemove.Villageresidentsonthewhole,hadhighhopesnow ofrecoveringlostpropertyandgoods,andlookedtotheirnewprotectors torestorethepreRevolutioncommunitypatternsas completelyaspossi ble8. Collaboration of Mennonite villagers with the German troops oc curred in other settlements as well. When, early on in the invasion, the Germans discovered through advance scouts that several Mennonite vil lagesoftheBaratovSchlakhtincolonyfacedimminentattacksfromnearby Russianvillagers,theGermanlieutenantenteredthevillage,capturedthe president and had him shot. Russians who had participated in gaining goodsthroughlocalconfiscationswerepunishedalso.TheMennoniteshad offeredtoserveasguidesandprovidedwagonsforthispenalexpedition. The Russian peasants would later recall these actions. Revenge for such deedsnodoubtplayedapartintheirlaterraids. Mennoniteyoungmenwereinvitedfromtheoutsettoassistinpolic ingthearea,andtoacceptGermanmilitarytrainingtoaidthearmyinits longerrangeoccupationduties9.IntheJasykovosettlementnorthofChor titzaGermanofficersconscriptedallmenbetweentheageof1Sand35to serveinlocalunitsofdefense.Acavalryunitof1012menandamachine gununitstoodonguardineveryvillage,withtheGermanssupplyingguns and ammunition. Each local village commander became a subordinate to the selfdefense commander in charge of die entire area. When the Molotschna volost zemstvo committee met on 23 April under the chair manship of H.H.Schroeder, delegates agreed that a selfdefense organiza tion for the colony had become an absolute necessity. A proposal by the GermanCaptainMuellerfoundunanimoussupport,andleadershipofsuch a unit was placed in the hands of J.F.Sudermann and two assistants, M.J.SekerinskyandA.K.Tichonov10. Religiousandotherleadersviewedwithsomealarmthespiritofal mosteagercollaborationwiththeearlierBolsheviktakeoveronthepartof some, and much more so now with the German occupation. However ef fortstoresistsuchtrends,wereonlypartlysuccessful.Overzealousyoung men who wanted to appoint themselves to policing functions were ex horted by ministers, teachers and others to desist. The teachers of the HalbstadtKommerzschulealsoforbadetheirstudentstotakepartinhouse searchesalongwithGermansoldiers11.Afewcourageousministerssuchas thetentmissionaryJacobDyck,ateacher,BenjaminB.Janz,andpeoplelike JacobH.Janzen(boththelatterfromTiege)openlycalledforstrictnonre sistantrefusaltotakeuparmsinanyform12.AtGrigorievkaamajorityof

menledbypersonslikeJacobKrahnandtheministerJacobBergsuccess fullywithstoodtheeffortsofthelocalGermancommandertocreateself defenseunitsforsettlement,andtheyhaddonesodespitethreatsofbeat ingsforthosewhorefused13. In actual fact, a few such units had been in the process of forming evenbeforetheGermansarrived.InthevillageofTiegeintheSagradowka colony,theregularwatchmenhadarmedthemselveswithrodsandclubs. WhentheGermanscamecloser,severalmenwereaskedtogoandaskfor guns,whichweregiven,andwhichmadeitpossibletoplananofficialself defense unit for the village14. Several other units which had grouped in secrecy at this time however heeded the counsel of Benjamin Unruh and otherstorefrainfromcleaningoutthenestofhostileneighboursasthey hadthreatenedtodo15. By early summer regular defense units had been established in the Mennonite villages of Gnadenfeld, Tiegenhagen and others, as well as in theGermanLutherancommunityofPrischib.Militaryexercisescontinued throughoutJulyandAugustunderthedirectionofLieutenantLerouxofthe 182nd Saxon Infantry Regiment headquartered at Halbstadt. Some of the Mennonite units performed gymnastic feats at the soldiers celebrations known as Ludendorffeste held in Halbstadt and other centres during the timeoftheGermanpresence16. MilitaryCollaborationChallenged Thequestionofnonresistanceasapointofdoctrine,andthepractical issueofwhetherornottoarmforprotectingtheircommunities,surfaced asaspecialconcernattheconferenceofMennonitecongregationsheldat Lichtenauon30Juneto2July191817.Duringtheafternoonsessionofthe first day David H.Epp announced that the assembly must address itself specificallytoadirectivefromtheBerdianskofficeoftheGermanmilitary commander requesting that a selfdefense militia be formally established in all German colonies of south Russia. A reply from the Mennonite com munitieswouldbeawaitedbyJuly4,andwithitthenamesofallcongrega tionswhichopposedthismilitarymeasureinanyway18. TofocusdiscussionJacobJanzenreadapaperentitledOurNonresis tance,maintainingattheoutsetthatthereligiouswarsoftheMiddleAges andlaterhadnotservedtheKingdomofGod.Infact,theAnabaptists,fore runnersoftheMennonitesduringtheReformation,hadrejectedtheuseof all weapons. These congregations, said Janzen, based their position on many Scriptures, although there seemed to be no biblical injunction di rectlyforbiddingmilitaryservice.WhileMennoniteshadbeenblessedfor their nonresistantstand, Janzen contended thattheyhad nowas a whole abandoned this position. By rejecting warfare, some had hoped to rescue

theprinciple,butifitdidnotextendtoselfdefense,suchapositioncould notbeauthentic,orjustified.Therefore,hestated:Wemusteitherrepent and become nonresistant again, or else, divided into the armed and the unarmed,continuetoworshiptogether,andallowthematterofnonresis tancelobecomeamatteroftheindividualconscience19. Anensuingdebate,extendedwellintothesecondday,dramaticallyil lustrated the shredded consensus in the Russian Mennonite community. WhilefewoftheMennonitespresentatthemeetingreallywantedtodrop theprincipleofnonresistanceassuch,severaldelegatesdidcallforreal ismtoacknowledgethatthecurrentsituationmightrequireauniqueap plicationoftraditionalpacifismwhichwouldcountenanceselfdefenseasa civicandChristianresponsibilityforthecommunityasawhole. It was thus argued by Heinrich Janz and Aron Toews, for example, thatonemuchdifferentiatebetweentheprinciplesoftheKingdomofGod, and the principles of this worldly kingdom. In matters of the former one must remain nonresistant, of course, but with respectto the latter one is also obligated to support law and order20. Missionary John Wiens added thatonemustrecognizetheviewsofthosewhofindtheirduty todefend thefatherlandsupportedbytheScripturesalso,asforexampleinRomans 15whichstatesthatallauthorityisinstitutedbyGod21. Alongstandingappreciationoftraditionalprivilegesunderaprotec tivestateconfrontedtherealitiesofaveryriskyfuturethroughoutthedis cussions.SomeobviouslyfearedthelossofGermansupportandgoodwillif theMennoniteswouldrefuseallformsofresistancetoacommonenemy. Asoneadvocateofresistance,B.Wiens,statedit:Wehaveoccupiedour selvestillnowwithidealsandhavelostsightofreality.Wemustconsider that we are irretrievably abandoned to robbing murderers if we lose our (German)militaryprotectionanddispensewithselfdefense22. Both J.Janzen and B.B.Janz recalled the wellknown Mennonite will ingnesstoservethestateinhonourable,evendangerous,butnonmilitary ways(asduringtheCrimeanWar). Janzreminded the audiencethat non resistantMennoniteswerehighlyregardedinanystate,evenGermany23. What could have become a fruitful point of consideration was G.Rempelsobservationthatonecouldreallynotconceiveofnonresistance withoutprivileges,i.e.withoutobtainingtheprotectionofthestateinthe legalization of a nonviolent peace position. What few Mennonites had thought throughthoroughly thus far wasthe notionofsuffering, perhaps eventhevoluntarylossoflifeforthesakeofthepeacewitness.Thebrief Bolshevik period of government had undoubtedly brought such thoughts tomind,butthepossibilitiesofreturningtothischallengeofmartyrdom, shouldtheGermansleaves,ortheirdefensesfail,werenotpleasanttocon templateforanyoneattheconferencedebates24.

A call for tolerance touched on periodically became the dominant themeoftheclosingmomentsoftheLichtenaunonresistancediscussions. AwareperhapsthatMennonitecommunitieshadalreadysurrenderedthe principleinvariousaspectsoftheirdailylivesandrealizingthatdeepfis suresexistedintheirmidst,theConferencedelegatessawfitnottopunish those who might take up arms in the current struggle. The resolution whichpassed,andclosedthediscussion,readasfollows:TheMennonite General Conference holds to its established confession of nonresistance. TheConferencefindsthisbasedonthebehaviourofJesusChristduringHis early life, and alsoHis Word. It recommends howeverthat congregations allowthosewhothinkotherwiseinthismattertodosowithoutviolation ofconscience25. Ambiguityremainedinthefinalpartoftheresolution.JacobH.Janzen and Johann Cornies nevertheless undertook to forward the resolution to the German headquarters at Melitopol, in Janzens words, to bear the wrathoftheGermanHighCommandofthedistrict. Gains and losses owed to the Lichtenau Conference would become apparentinduetime.Withunderstandablelatitudethedelegateshadside stepped a headon confrontation over the issue of arming the colonies, whilestillinsistingthatintheessentialsoftheirfaithnothinghadchanged. Militants and volunteers of the training units had undoubtedly gained a reprieve. Though not officially sanctioned in their intentions and actions, they would at least suffer no severe recriminations from their churches andfamilies.WhenJanzenlaterrecalledtheevents,heremarked,Itseems weprotestedtothewrongpeople(meaningtheGermanHighCommand), atthewrongplace26. Mennonite recruits saw little action while the Germans remained in thecoloniesduringthesummerandearlyfalloftheyear.Duringthispe riodofrelativecalmthosewhohadbeendrivenfromtheirhomesandes tates during the winter and spring returned to repair their houses and moveinagain.Peoplewerebackatwork;theharvestturnedoutwell,and factories became operational once more. Rail transportation between the colonieshadsufferedfromdestructionofthebridgeatEinlagebythere treating Bolsheviks, but ferries and private boats sought to fill the gap. Everywhereitseemedthatthingswouldbebacktonormalsoonifnothing happenedtoundothenewlystabilizedsituationagain27. TheFightwithNestorMakhno Therewerethose,ofcourse,whowonderediftheGermanoccupation could last long, and especially what the Russians might do to avenge the German punitive raids, as well as their drain on Ukrainian foodstuffs, shouldtheoccupationforceshavetoleave.Inactualfactthatmomentwas

now only weeks away. The temporary calm of the summer and early fall would vanish almost overnight, and the formerly peaceable Mennonites communitieswouldbethemselvesengulfedinwar. ThedepartureoftheGermantroopsbecamerealityinlateNovember and early December after the signing of the WWI peace armistice on 11 NovembercalledforthewithdrawalofGermantroopsfromallareasoccu piedinEasternEurope28.BeforeeithertheBolsheviksortheWhiteArmy couldmoveintothevacatedsectionsofNorthernTaurideorEkaterinoslav, they lay open to occupancy by the Ukrainian partisan forces of Batjko Nestor Makhno who had led a guerilla war against the AustroGermans since his return to the region in early July, 191829. Recalling the brief as cendanceofBolshevikandlocalpeasantterrorismthewinterbefore,Men nonite communities viewed the prospects of their immediate future with alarmanddeepfear. Makhnos initial attacks against the GermanAustrian army units shifted to include local Mennonite farms and villages at least as early as October,1918.Outlyingestatesfeltthefirstblowsoftheraidingbands30. Some families fled almost immediately, if they could escape, but others, hoping for better times again, remained with their farmsteads and homes31.AnassemblyatSchoenfeld,acentrefortheMennonitesettlement tothenorthwestofGulaiPole,plannedtocountertheMakhnoincursions withanarmeddefense.Thepoorlyorganizedbandofabout120menofthe area along with about fifteen Russian landowners equipped only with small arms, was quickly routed, offering little prospect of countering the peasantattackssuccessfully32. MennonitesAttacked On a Sunday morning in late October the worshipping Mennonite communityat Schoenfeld heardthe news ofanapproaching band. A par ticipant later described the moment: It was clear to everyone what this meantmurder,lootingandraping.ThereuponRev.Dyckaskedtheassem bledforadviceastowhatthecommunityshoulddointheimminenceofa possibleearlyarrivalofthebrigands.Irecallamanpossiblyintheforties, gettingupandsuggestingthatsincemanyoftheinhabitantshadplentyof riflesandammunitionintheirhomes,thebestprocedurewouldbetohave everyonegohome,pickuptheweaponsandreturntoSchoenfeld,andbe preparedforselfdefense.Idonotrecallwhethertherewasmuchdiscus siononthisrecommendation,butthepastoraskedforthoseinfavorofthe suggestiontorise.Themajorityofthemendidtherewerealsovoicesof opposition, particularly from members of our Bible study and prayer group,andtherewasoldMrs.Warkentin,motherofoneofthedeaconsof the church, who advised that we stay in the church and pray. Her advice

went unheeded. The meeting was closed without any attempt to hold a service.Themenwenthome,andsoonreturnedwiththeirguns33 No contact with the enemy materialized, however. Next day the vil lagers were asked to turn in their weapons at a specified place and told thattheywouldremainunharmed.Whenthecommunitycomplied,nofur thertroubleoccurredduringthatperiod. Fleeing families of the Schoenfeld district brought thenews of Mak hnos aggression, and die resultant plight of the villagers, to the Molotschnaareawheremanyoftherefugeestookuptemporaryresidence withrelativesorfriends.Theapparentgrowthinnumbersandinfluences of the Makhnovtsy caused great consternation in all the Molotschna and evenmoredistantvillages.Lefttotheirownresourcesnow,withtheGer mans gone, the Whites still far away, and no government help available, Mennoniteleadersmetinseverallocalassembliestoassesstheoptionsfor actioninthecrisisoftheday34. OrganizingforDefense Somenightwatchdetachmentshadalreadybeenreorganized.When even before the German departure, the Gnadenfeld volost Schod ordered armed units to be appointed in every villages of its jurisdiction. Some communities resisted. German soldiers, they felt, should serve as guards. AnothermeetingcalledatMariawohltopersuadethereluctanthadatfirst nodifferentresults.Tohirefourarmedguards,saidsomeofthemembers present,meanthavingsoldiers.Whatdidthatdototheprincipleoffaith? C.M.,ateacheroftheGnadenfeldKommerzschule,challengedthegroupto rethinkthisposition:WhenIlookatyourvillagewithitsbeautifuldevel opedfarmyards,surroundedbyorchardsandadjoiningbuildingsisntit true that you wish to stay here and end your days here, like your forefa thers?Nowthebanditswishtodestroyyou,andithasbeendecidedtohire fourmountedwatchmenineveryvillage.Whenthebanditscomeatnight theywillshootintotheair,andthebanditswilldisappearsothatyoumay remainpeacefullyinyourhomes35. The argument seemed to convince the majority and the resolution carried. At a general representatives meeting convened in Rueckenau, MolotschnaaftertheGermansweregone,manypersonswantedtoretali ateforthetheftoftheirproperty,anddeterminedtogetbacktheirstolen goods.Aproposaltoarmalldiemenbetween30and37camebeforethe audience. Again the response varied, and the procedures becamestormy. In fact, as one observer viewed it, all resistance to the idea was beaten down. When a Rosenort representative, Peter Bergmann, appealed to Mennonite tradition and reliance on the help of God, chairman Henry

Schroeder shouted at him: Get out! When the protestcontinuedhe was ledoutbyforce,againatthedirectionofSchroeder.Whenayoungmanof Blumenort appealed to his conscience, he was told to hang it over a hedge,andbeatenuptomakehimwillingtoserve36. At another gathering, David Janzen, a minister from the church at Rudnerweide. calledfor reassertion ofthe traditionalMennonite position of nonresistance. Highly agitated, the chairman shouted: Spit in his face. Myfingerwillpullthetriggeraslongasithasthepowertodoso.Would besupportersoftheministerseemedhelplessinthefaceofsuchtirades. Compulsorymobilizationcouldnotbeavoidedhereeither37.Justtwodays before,atalargevillagemeetingatAlexandertalwhereselfdefensewould be discussed, the minister spoke on Sunday morning about a God who would help His people in all circumstances. When the meeting convened, themembersfoundthataWhiteofficerhadbeeninvitedbytheadvocates of defense. As chairman, he shouted: You farmers destroy the weeds among your gain, without pangs of conscience. Who is Makhno? A weed thatisworsethanweeds,andhemustbedestroyed.Furthermoreifarab bit destroys a young tree in your garden, you shoot without further con sideration.WhoisMakhno?Ananimal,worsethanananimalwhomustbe shotdown.Iftheresomeoneherewhoforconsciencesakedoesnotwish totakeagunandshootMakhno,pleaseidentifyyourself38. The courageous speaker of the Sunday before though unsupported, would not be cowed. I am one who on the basis of Gods Word will not takeagun,hereplied.Harshlytheofficerretorted:Wewillplaceyoube foreacourtofWhiteofficersandshootyoudownlikeadog39. While such and other forms of intimidation seemed to bring the at least some compliance, there were villages which resisted these self defense conscription measures. For a time, the nonconformists in the Halbstadt volost included strong elements in Fischau as well as Rudner weide,andPastwaintheGnadenfeldvolost.Somevillagerslateragreedto joinasmedicalcorpsmenorother noncombatantsinthedefensesystem whichnowemergedinthecolonies40. In late November supporters of a Mennonite selfdefense organiza tionintheMolotschnacolonymetforaformalorganizationalmeetingheld in Tiegerweide, where the volosts of Prischib (nonMennonite Germans) and significant sectors of Halbstadt and Gnadenfeld agreed to combine their resources for armed resistance to the Makhnovite attacks if they should come41. Each volost appointed a small coordinating boady known as the Management (Wirtschafts) Committee. Task directors were chosen to establish telephone and transport arrangements, to build fortifications andtrenches,organizeinfantry,supplymaterialsforneedyfamiliesofim poverishedrecruits,establishastafffordisciplineandcourtmarshal,and

tosetupamedicalcorps.Specialstaffmembersundertooktomakecontact withtheWhiteArmyinordertosecureweaponsandammunition42. Aninterestingperspectiveoftheorganizationalprocesscomesfrom aneyewitnessaccountofwhathappened. WhoactuallyelectedtheSelbstschutzcommittee?...Nooneelectedit. The Mennonite instinct, group consciousness and feeling of belonging to getherbroughthintoexistence.Thisisnotthevoiceofthemajorityorthe voiceofthepeople...itcametopass43.Thereseemed,moreover,tobelit tlecontinuitybetweentheearlierselfdefensepreparations,establishedby the German forces, and the new organization set up essentially by the Mennonitesthemselves.Intheexistingsourcesthemembersofthenewly formedManagementCommitteefortheHalbstadtandGnadenfeldvolosts were listed as follows: Halbstadt: J.Neufeld (Schoensee), Plett (Tieger weide),Friesen(Blumstein)andH.Schroeder(Halbstadt):forGnadenfeld: A.Rempel (Gnadenfeld), P.Toews (Waldheim), C.Warkentin (Waldheim), N.Esau (Friedensruh), Richert (Gnadenfeld), Jacob Epp (Elizabethal). This committeehaddirectlinkswith theMennozentrum andtheadministrative organsofthecongregations44. A 300man cavalry force, divided into five sections, carefully de ployed its strength to protect the northern and western borders of the MolotschnaPrischibregion.Theysupportedabout20companiesofinfan try, possibly 2700 men in all. Thirteen of the companies came from the HalbstadtandGnadenfeldvolosts,andtherestfromPrischib.Leadingoffi cers included personnel which had remained behind when the German army, persons life Sergeant Major Sonntag, Lieutenant Bischler, Goebbel, Muellerandothers45.TherewasconsiderableparticipationfromMennon itesatthedetachmentandcompanylevels;G.Toews,H.FriesenandH.Dyck led cavalry units, J.H.Nikkei commanded a unit, there was platoon leader D.Friesen,andJ.SudermannledtheSwabianSelbstschutzatPrischib46. Khortitza,theOldColony,didnotmanifestthevigorandeffortofself protection ofits sister colony on the Molotschna. There may have been a hundredmenormorewhoweremobilizedasaselfdefenseunit.Thevil lageofNeuendorfrefusedtocooperateinthedraft,butsuppliedavolun teercorpsof1718yearolds,agroupthatsoonvanishedfromthescene. IntheEichenfeldarea,centreoftheJasykovosettlementtothenorth,Peter vanKampenhadearliergivenleadershiptoabodyofabout250men.They wereallMennoniteswiththeexceptionofthreewhowereCossacks.Noth ingmorehadbeendonewhiletheGermansoccupiedthearea.Whenthey left, the ages 2035 were drafted, and two men, Jacob Niebuhr and Jakob MartinDueckplacedattheirhead.Oftheiractivitylittleisknownsofar47. TheMennonitesReturnFire

Althoughrelativelypoorlyarmed,theMolotschnacontingentsproved theircapabilitiesalreadyinthefirstmilitaryencounterswiththeMakhno attackers. One participant summarized the first weeks thus: When Mak hnobegantoattackourvillageshemetwithstiffresistance.Allofhisat tacks were beaten off. Not a single encounter ended in his favor. We had been welltrained by our German officers in shooting, bayoneting, the throwingofhandgrenades,thequickdiggingoftrenches,etc.Allofthiswe weretomakeuseofinnotimeatall48. InitialcolonistvictoriesnorthofPrischibseemedtojustifythestrate giesofthedefenders.Onlyafewliveswerelost,andtheprospectsofaid from the Allies and the advancing Whites, along with the prayers of con cernedfamilies,encouragedthefighterstoholdandprotecttheirlines49. TchernigovkaandBlumenfeldespeciallyaddedlustretothevictors record.Ontheweekendof5December1918,Molotschnaunitsgotanur gentcalltomeetattheNeuhalbstadtdistrictofficeandpreparetomeetthe MakhnovtsywhohadoccupiedTchernigovkainthenortheastsectorofthe settlement, with the villages of Hamburg and Sparrau in greatest danger. TheWhiteretreatinthatareabroughtthecallforMolotschnamentohold thefront,andrepulsetheenemyifpossible.TheHalbstadtcompanytook thebruntofthebattle.WithaquickattacktheMakhnomenwererouted andfledtoPologie.Makhnohimselfbarelyescapedcapture.Thedefenders lost only two men, Johann Martens and NCO Henshel; both were buried withmilitaryhonoursinaMennonitecemeteryseveraldayslater50. FacingthebruntofMakhnosfuryathisearlydefeats,Blumenfeldof theSchoenfeldvolostfacedhisreprisalsheadoninJanuary,1919.Thevil lagers looked, in vain it seemed, for any opportunity to flee to the Molotschna sanctuaries as others had done a few months before. The se cret arrival of 300 mounted Selbstschutz cavalry men during the night of 1819 January gave them a chance to escape. Hastily gathering up a few goods,theywereescortedquicklythroughenemyterritoryundercoverof darkness,sothat100ormorepersonscouldnowsharetheprotectionof theregularSelbstschutzcorpsmeninthecolonies51. ProblemswiththeWhiteArmy OnedimensionoftheTchernigovkaencounterhadneverthelesscre atedanelementofconcern,whenthecolonistunitscameunderthedirec tionoftheretreatingWhitearmyinthearea.Somewhatundetected,Rus sian officers had infiltrated the Selbstschutz organization, in an effort to integrate the units with the total movement of the Volunteer Army in southern Ukraine52. A regimental colonel, Malakov, set himself as chief commandantoftheHalbstadtandGnadenfeldcompanies,andareorgani

zation was initiated by which various villages would be placed in groups underthesupervisionofaRussianofficer. When the potential problems of collaboration with the White forces dawnedontheMennonitemilitarydirectors,seriousdeliberationfollowed between Halbstadt and Gnadenfeld Selbstschutz committees who feared the consequences of this collusion. Jacob Epp agreed to contact Colonel MalakovandwithHeinrichSchroederattemptedtoformulatetheposition of the Mennonites with respect to White involvement in the selfdefense operations.Aresolutionsignedbyallcommitteemembersandsubmitted totheWhiteofficerssoughttoclarifythesituation:WeMennonitesofthe Halbsladt and Gnadenfeld volosts united, armed, and organized during times of stress when we were molested, subjected to burnings, robbed, rapedandmurderedbyvariousrovingbands.Thisselfdefenseisnomili tary organization of aggression or war, but designed to protect our lives andpossessionsandfamiliesagainstrobberbands.WeMennonitesareno revolutionary party set up to exercise military power. If organized gov ernment should emerge in Russia, above all in Ukraine, we solemnly de clarethatwewilllaydownourarmsandsubmittothisgovernmentfully, regardlessofitspoliticalpersuasion53. Malakovreluctantlyacceptedthisposition,andpresentedittohisfel lowofficersintheregion54. Forthree months or more, from late November, 1918, to the endof Februarythefollowingyear,GermancolonistsoftheMolotschnaandPris chibmanagedeffectivelytodeflectordefeattheMakhnooffensivesouthof GulaiPole.Thefrontwithneighbouringattackershadstabilizedinthere gion of the German villages of Blumenthal, Tiefenbrunn and Waldorf somewhatnorthofHalbstadtandPrischib.On2March1919,furtherheavy fighting occurred at Gruenthal and the area of Andreasburg where about 100ofMakhnosmenlosttheirlives.NorthernvillagesoftheMolotschna colony, such as Ladekopp, had received fresh supplies of weapons and ammunition. Some hoped that the Germans might return from Nikolaev wherethelastremainingdetachmentwaswaitingtoleaveforhome.Prep arationsforpossibleevacuationwerebegunaswell55. TheLastBattle Then,aboutaweeklater,theBlumentaldefendersthemselvesbegan a forced retreat under heavy cannon fire. For several days they had held back enemy forces numbering about 3000 men. After the main defensive wallhadbeenbreached,allhopewaslost.OneoftheMennonitesoldiers, Jacob Thiessen summed up the situation thus: When the enemy forces began to advance we saw with consternation that we were now dealing

withanarmyofabout10,000men,andalldressedintheuniformsofthe RedArmyoftheNorth56. At this moment of truth, all attempts to hold the Homeyer line at Tiefenbrunn crumbled quickly, and a last ditch effort at Durlach a short time later failed as well. The German cavalry commanders, Heinrich von HomeyerandSonntag,dissolvedthefrontandurgedalltheirmentopull backinordertosavethemselvesasbesttheycould.Manyboardedawait ing train at Waldrof and returned to their homes at Prischib or in the Molotschnavillages.Thevillagers,whohadlearnedofthecomingcollapse, were moving southward with their loaded wagons, enroute to the Cri mea57.Agreatmanyofthesoldiersjoinedtheminflight.Othersgathered for prayer meetings in the churches. When the fleeing crowds were told thatthesouthwardroutewascutoff,manyreturned,alongwithsomeof the foremost leaders, to await further developments under the oncoming Reds. German losses in the fighting had been slight, but what vengeance theRedsmighttakefortheirs,muchheavierbyfar,wasnowanominous questionthatremained58. BetweentheRedsandWhites A Mennonite delegation including B.H.Unruh and several ministers sought at once to explain to the Red military leaders of the occupying forcesthattheyhadhadnointentionoffightingtheRedArmy,thattheir armed efforts had been strictly nonpolitical, intended only to ward off robbersandbanditattacks.CommissarMalarenkopromisedimmunityto the Mennonites, but ordered the selfdefense units disarmed and dis banded within three days59. Villagers loaded their weapons on wagons, andbroughtthemtothevolostcentres.AtGnadenfeldtwomen,C.Martens and G.T.Derksen of Gnadenfeld and Alexandertal respectively, pled with General Dybenko to spare the community, and to forgive them for their misdeeds. Enraged, Dybenko replied: You cursed betrayers of your fadiers faith. For 400 years you did not bear arms, but now on behalf of Kaiser Wilhelm... I will not destroy you, but my soldiers may plunder the village for three days; any members of the selfdefense units which are found,willbeexecuted60. With the Reds now in power, and the possibilities of terrorization once more a reality, the villages could only hope for the return of the Whites.Theydidnothavetowaitlong. Although crushed by the BolshevikMakhno forces, German colonist selfdefense units may have aided a buildup of the White forces under GeneralDenikinsohecouldbeginanalloutoffensiveinearlyJune61.Dur ingtheinterveningmonths,theBolsheviksandtheMakhnovtsyoncemore reappearedintheMennoniteandGermanLutheranvillagesoftheMolot

schnaregion.Theseattacksseemedmorejustifiablenowthatthecolonists collaborationwiththeGermanoccupationarmyearlier,andmorerecently thenresistanceassubunitsoftheWhitearmy,madeiteasiertoconsider thevillagerscounterrevolutionaries,i.e.,enemiesoftheRedregime. AharshRedArmytribunalatMelitopolcalledtoaccountallthosebe lievedtohaveopposedtheBolsheviksinanyway.Morethan100persons met death by execution each week during this period. Among them were manyMennoniteswhohadtakenpartinthemilitarydefenseofthecolo nies. Special mention is made in various sources of the death of Peter Wiens, secretary of Mennozentrum, who was arrested as a spy, and later shot down by a group of drunken soldiers. The endless requisitioning of goodsintheHalbstadtvolostalonemeantalossofseveralmillionrubles, and the forced care of a body of more than 10,000 refugees from the southeast further aggravated the situation. In the Old Colony, where the Bolsheviks had taken over early, conditions were equally bad or even worse62. TheWhitesReturn Respite came with the arrival of the White Armies in the northern Molotschna villages in midJune, 1919. However, the usual requests for feedingandquarteringsoldiers,therequisitioningofhorsesandteamsfor transportation, and the call for Mennonite volunteers to join the Whites continuedtodrainthecommunitywithoutletup63.Studentswereimmedi ately drafted,althoughageneral mobilization scheduled to begin abouta week later, did not materialize immediately. In fact, some modifications couldbesecuredbytheprotestsofpotentialdrafteeswhorefusedtojoin theWhites,eventhoughtheyhadbeeninvolvedintheactivedefenseofthe coloniesonlymonthsbefore.Itwasnottheirintentiontobecomepartof thecivilwar,theymaintained,eventhoughtheyhadbeenpreparedwitha free conscience to provide armed protection for their families and their own homes64. Local Whites recruiting officers not infrequently ignored appeals for noncombatant service consideration and proceeded with regular mobilization. Your men, they said to the parents, fight well in deed65. Voluntarily and otherwise, a sizable number of Mennonites did re spond to Denikins call, not only as drivers, but as gunners and infantry menaswell.SeveralfoundassignmentsintheDmitriiDonskoiarmoured train. A diarist of the period, Anna Baerg, noted the taking over of Gross Tokmakby300Mennonitesand200Cossackswithtwotanks66.Asone volunteer of a Red Cross unit viewed the situation, some were politically naive in their actions, some went for adventure, and others had no way out. Individuals who had been in the selfdefense units, or being sons of

wealthyfarmerswhofearreprisals,foundsafetyintheWhiteArmyatleast foratime67. Meanwhile in the Chortitza settlement White officers proceeded to organize a number of Mennonite men for defending the villages and the railroad from the Dnieper to Nikopol. The Chortitza Otrjad as it was called,hadabout100menwhoweresupportedbythevolost68.Conscience pangs were frequent among the men. One Mennonite soldier said it for manyothers:Ihadahardstruggletoreachthisdecision,alsolaterwhenI hadtostandwatch at night all alone ata dangerouspost of whena fight wasragingandIsawmencollapsinganddying.Ihadaninnerstrugglebut therewasnoonetheretotellmewhatwasright.MyconvictionwasthatI was doing this to subdue the robber bands who brought destruction to us69. UnderGeneralKolchak,ontheeasternSiberianfront,someMennon ites had earlier requested and obtained placement in noncombatant as signments70. When Aaron Langemann, with about 40 others, was mobi lized in May, 1919, he accepted a term of medical duty with six weeks trainingwhichhedescribedasgruelingtotheextreme.Afteraperiodof secretarialworkinahospitalwestoftheUrals,hewasfurtherassignedto lookaftersupplies71.Anotherrecruit,KorneliusLangemann,tookupsimi lar duties at Tcheljabinsk in the Urals. Poorly clothed and fed, he volun teeredtojointhefrontasanorderly,butfellillandwasofferedtheprivi lege of staying in the barracks if he would take up arms. Since this was close to home, and he might assume that no shooting would take place, Langemannagreedsothathealeanddressedwellforfourmonths.Finally hehadtoleaveagaintoserveasamedicinthefrontlinessincehecontin uedtorejectthecarryingofarms.Aregimentalretreatpreventedhisarri valathisdestination,sothathewithseveralothersagreedtodesertand returnhome72. MakhnoReprisals KolchaksfateseemedtosymbolizetheWhitemovementasawhole. A rather impressive 1919 summer initiative by the Volunteer Army, scheduledinDenikinsmindtoreachMoscowbywintertime,oweditsfall collapse to internal problems, steppedup attacks by Makhnos partisan units and the Red Army, and an overextended front which the Whites would have found difficult to hold even under better circumstances73. By 21SeptembertheMakhnovtsyhadreachedKhortitzaandRosental,anda few days later the Molotschna communities as well74. Their advent this timeledtothelongestandmostcatastrophicperiodofdestructionwhich theUkrainianMennoniteswouldexperienceduringtheentireCivilWar.

Masskillings at Eichenfeld (Dubovka) in the Jazykovo settlement,at Blumenort and the neighbouring villages of the Molotschna, and six vil lagesoftheSagradowkacolonywouldnowhighlighttheanarchicbrutality andwantondestructivenessofthesemonths.Thesporadicmilitaryactivi ties of the Mennonite selfprotection units and more even the occupation policies of the White Armies had helped to heighten peasant hatred, and whipuppassionsforrevenge.WhattheMakhnopartisans,victoriousand at peak strength, would do now that they were unresisted by Reds or Whites,timewouldtellsoonenough75. TheJazykovosettlementtowhichEichenfeldbelongedhadbeenthe centre of rather successful resistance to the earlier attacks of Makhnov tsy76.Inthefinalbattleoftheirorganizedexistence,theselfdefenseunits oftheNikolaipolareahadfoughtoffanattackonEichenfelditselfaslateas the summer of 1919. When the Soviets moved into the Ekaterinoslav re gion,theyheardNikolaipoldescribedasafortress.Besidethattheassas sination of the Soviet Snissarenko, along with two other officials, placed thecityundersuspicion,andlaterservedtheMakhnovtsyasapretextfor wipingoutanumberofcommunitiesintheregion77. On2526October,aband,includingmanypeasantsfromnearbyRus sianvillagespouredintothestreetsofEichenfeld,screaming,Wewillkill allGermans.Duringthetwentyfourhourperiodofpillaginganddestruc tionwhichensued,thevolostlost109persons,mostofthemmenandin cluding over 80 victims in Eichenfeld alone78. Many farmyards were burned to the ground, others completely ransacked, with the lumber re movedtoneighbouringRussianvillagesaftertheresidentshadfled.Asone person described the final scene, Gerhardstal, Eichenfeld, Neuhorst and Neuendorf had vanished; Reinfeld, Petersdorf and Paulheim had only standingwallsremaining79. Duringtheseverydays,notmanymilesawayintheMolotschnacol ony, Blumenort and several nearby communities had to suffer a similar fate,theirmostviolentexperiencesintheentirehistoryofthesettlement. AgroupoffleeingWhitesoldiers,amongthemapparentlyseveralMennon itesandaGermanofficer,Gloeckler,hadtakenshelteratWaldheim.While waiting there they were encouraged to drive out the enemy Makhnovtsy police unit in nearby Ohrloff so that local harassments would diminish. Gloeckler,onhiswaytoLichtenau,begantorecruitlocalMennonitemen who had been with the selfdefense corps earlier. They set out from TiegerweideonSunday,27October(OS),aforceoftwentytwomenintwo wagons.AtBlumenorttheyhaltedtohidetheirvehiclesandfirmuptheir plansfortheattack80. Whiletakingcoveronthefarmyardofthevillagemanager,JacobRe gehr,whotriedtodissuadethemfromtheirrecklessenterprise,theyheard

theshoutofawoman,Nowtheyaretakingmybrother!FiveMakhnovtsy, justarrivedfromOhrloff,wereattemptingtoarrestJacobEpp.Caughtoff guard,andprobablyfearingdetection,Gloecklersmendashedtothestone fence, shot down three of the five (another one died in hiding) and fled, leavingtheBlumenortresidentstofacetheworstinreprisals81. WhentheOhrloffOkhranaarrivedearlythenextmorning,itassumed thatthenightwatchmenmustberesponsibleandquicklyarrestedRegehr widitwoofhissons,aswellastwoministers,PeterSchmidtandJacobSu dermannandnineothermenofthevillage.Allfourteenwereimprisoned inacellar.Returningseveralhourslaterwithasmalldetachmentofdieso called Asiastic Otrjad (Asiatic Regiment) stationed in Lichtenau, they passed briefly to hear the protests of Jacob Epp that not Blumenort but outsiderswereresponsiblefortheattackontheMakhnovtsytheprevious night. At a cry of derision from a Russian woman, he was cut down and shot while trying to escape, and in the next moments all the imprisoned menwerehackedtopiecesaswell. On Wednesday the Asiatic Otrjad from Melitopol arrived in larger numbers,withaninvitationfromtheMakhnomentoputdownthecolo nistrevolt.InaswiftandbrutalattacktheysweptthroughAltonau,killing elevenandabusingmanywomen,struckdownsixmoremeninOhrloff,as wellasPeterMandtlerinTiege,andthenslewanadditionalfiveorsixoth ers in Blumenort. Here also nine farmyards were totally destroyed and otherspartiallyburned.Thoseleftwereplunderedsincealltheresidents hadfled.Halbstadtinhabitantsweresavedfromasimilarfatethenextday bytheprotestsoffactoryworkerswhowerenotsympathetictoMakhnos rule. Several days later General Schkuros Cossack cavalrymen appeared, andalargenumberoftheBlumenortavengerswerethemselvesputtothe sword82. Neither the Eichenfeld nor Blumenort disasters quite compared in magnitude,atleastwithrespecttoliveslost,towhathappenedintheZa gradovkaregionafewweekslater83.Hatredsgeneratedbytheproblemsof landdistribution,andmoredirectlytheexecutionofRussianpeasantsby theWhiteguardsatKronauhadinflamedtheRussiansofthisarea84.Ina threedaysavagecampaignofdevastation,thebanditraidsof29Novem ber to 1 December (OS) laid waste a total of six villages with resultant deathsof214persons85.AdescriptionofeventsatOhrloffessentiallymir rorstheexperiencesoftheothercommunities. In no time the forty one farmsteads were beset and the street exits blockedbyriders.Noonewaspermittedtoleave.Theydemandedweap ons,money,food,andfinallylives.Likesavagestheywouldenterahouse andwithoututteringawordstarthackingatthefatherofthehousewith sabers. They raped women and girls, not even sparing the thirteenyear

olds. If a girl resisted she was simply killed. Furniture was upended and smashed,andinsomecasesusedaskindlinginsettingfires.Men,women and children fled into the gardens and fields pursued by sadistic riders who huntedthem down like wild game. When the bandits left the village aftertwohours,fortyfourdeadpeopleandmanywoundedoneslayabout thehousesandyards86. TheattackonMuensterbergtookonadditionallyviciousdimensions. Whereas in other villages women and children had for the most part es caped with their lives, here everyone was killed as a matter of course, in thewordsofonesource;fromthechildinthecradletotheoldestman,a total of 98 in all. Persons who fled to nearby Russian villages were be trayedandmercilesslycutdown.Onlyoneofabout30farmsteadsescaped beingburned down;itwasfinallyalsodraggedaway,boardbyboard,by Russian neighbours who laid claim as well to thecollective farm landsof thevillage.Physicalmutilationsandvenerealdiseaselefttheir markfora longtimetocomeaspatheticfurtherevidenceofthefatefulvisitations87. Why the rest of the villagers remained untouched is not completely clear. One report intimated that a searchlight of the Whites served as a warning of their presence, putting the bandits to a hasty flight. Later ob servers added that most of them lost their lives at the hands of pursuing Whites88. NoendseemedinsighttothecivilconflictsofRussiaas1919drewto aclose.ByearlyNovembertheWhiteshadtakenovertheMolotschnater ritory once again89. Several weeks later a regional district meeting dis cussedmilitarysupport,andthesendingofadelegationtoDenikintoask for more protection. Selfdefense measures came under consideration as well.SoonafterthattheWhitesmobilizedallstudentsofages17and18,as wellasteachersuptotheageof35.AunitledbyJohannWarkentin,took 25oftheKommerzschulestudentstoreporttoBrockmanatTiegenhagen. On14/27DecemberhetookhisdetachmenttoTiegerweidewheremobili zationwasbeingresisted.Agroupofthirtyreturnedthefollowingdayto guardthebridgeatLichtenau90. TheepisodeoftheSelbstschutzwasamomentoftruthwhich,whileit could have been considered hypothetically before it actually occurred, struckwithaforcewhichreallydumbfoundedtheMennonitecommunity ofsouthRussia.Ontheonehand,itcouldbeconsideredanelemental,one might even say, primitive, meaning natural, response to violence perpe tratedagainstthecommunityonascaleneverseenbefore.OtherRussians hadcome across it morethan once in their history. On the other hand, it diddirectlycontradictwhatMennoniteshadthoughttheybelieveddeeply uptothatmoment.

There were significant voices which challenged the Selbstschutz ini tiative,buttheoptionofacceptingwithoutphysicalresistancethesuffer ingwhichthecivilwarbroughton,hadnotbeenthoughtthroughcarefully, nortrainedforinanyway.ThearmingofMennonitesforresistanceloout sideforceswouldcauseaheartsearching,andareexaminationoffaiththat wouldcontinueforyearstocome.TheRussiansthemselveswouldfindit difficulttounderstandthesubsequentMennonitecontinuingaffirmations of nonresistance .As long as the evidence of willingness to take up arms whenitcamerightdowntoamatteroflifeordeathcalledultimateinteg rityandauthenticfaithintoquestion,nonMennonitesandotherswhodid not claim to be nonresistant would continue to question Mennonite claims,astheyhavetothisday.
Notes 1 On the German occupationof Ukraine, see Oleh S. Fedyshyn, Germanys Drive to theEastandtheUkrainianRevolution19171918(NewBrunswick,NJ:RutgersUni versity Press, 1971), 60 ff.; Xenia Joukoff Eudin, The German Occupation of the Ukrainein1918RussianReviewI(November1941),91ff.ThenewRadaandits variantformsarediscussedintheessaysandliteraturecitedinTarasHunczak,ed., TheUkraine,19171921.AStudyinRevolution(Cambridge,MA.:HarvardUkrainian ResearchInstitute,1977),461. 2AfirsthandaccountofthereceptionoftheGermansamongtheMennoniteswas given in Erste Ankunft der deutschen Truppen in Halbstadt, Volksfreund (Vfrd). 20.April1918,1.SeealsoJ.G.DyckslettertoB.B.Janz,dated15September1956in theB.B.Janzpapers,CentreforMennoniteBrethrenStudiesArchives(CMBSA)File l,d.SeealsoGerhardP.Schroeder,MiraclesofGraceandJudgment:AFamilyStrives forSurvivalintheRussianRevolution(Lodi,CA:bytheauthor,1974),28ff.andthe PeterDyckdiaryentryfor19.April1918inJohnP.Dycked.,TroublesandTriumphs 19141924: Excerpts from the Diary of Peter J Dyck, Ladekapp, Molotschna Colony, Ukraine(Springstein,MB:by theeditor,1981),46.AllentriesinthisdiaryareNew Styledates. 3Kroeker,ErsteAnkunft,1. 4 B.H.Unruh, Tatsachen, Der Bote (DB), 15. September 1937, 2. See also a letter from Neuhalbstadt dated 21. April 1918, printed in Mennonitische Rundschau (MennRund),9.Oktober1918,1112.Itmentionsagroupof700800Germansol diersappearinginthefirstcontingentatHalbstadt. 5AtNikolaipol,forexample,theGermansexecuted11Sovietofficials.SeeGerhard Regier,Reisebericht,MennRund,28.November1933,4.Anumberofimmediate executionsarenotedalsobyPeterDyckinhisdiaryentryfor20April.SomeMen nonites who were in the village Soviets (councils) were also arrested, and later some were shot. See Wieder drei Bolshewiki erschossen, Vfrd, 31. Mai 1918, 7. The three were a Jew, Dr. Tobin from Alexanderwohl, Gerhard Friesen from Gnadenheim, and Johann Wiebe of Lichtfeld. The story of Tobins and Friesens repentance is told by Isaak Wall in A.A.Toews, ed., Mennonitische Maertyrer der

juengstenVergangenheitundtierGegenwart.VolumeII(Clearbrook,BC:bytheedi tor,1954),297.ThreeMennonitesoldiershadbroughttwomenbackfromMariu polwheretheyhadfledtoescapetheGermans. 6AdolfReimer,WieesKam,RundschauKalender1930,36ff. 7Theconcernofpropertyownerstorecoverproperty,andthereadinesstoprotect with force if need be, what they still possessed, is freely admitted by Mennonite observersoftheeventsofAprilMay,1918.Seeforinstance,B.J.DickinKurzetwas ueberdenSelbstschutz,4,anunpublishedpaperintheauthorsfiles.Soviethisto rians frequently noted the role of wealthy property owners in supporting and sponsoring selfdefense measures in the colonies. See A.Reinmarus, AntiMenno, BeitraegezurGeschichtederMennoniteninRussland(Moskau;ZentralVoelkerVer lag,1930),100ff.,andA.N.Ipatov,WerSinddieMennonilen?(AlmaAta,Kazakhstan; VerlagKazakhstan,1977),73ff.,forearlierandlaterexamples. 8 Restoring the older patterns included for the colonists the reinstitution of the familiar village and district administration which took place under the Germans. A.Kroeker,InHalbstadt,Vfrd,20.April1918,1. 9TheGermanorderwasthatallmenbetweentheagesof19and25shouldreport for drilling exercises. However, in some areas most men up to 40 volunteered. Whenresistanceoccurred,theauthoritieswouldbringconsiderablepressure,psy chological and emotional, to bear on the colonists. Many Mennonites felt that it simplywouldnotdotorefusethecalltomilitaryexercises,sincetheymustshow gratitude to the liberators. Some found reassurance in the fact that most drilling didnotinvolveweapons,anddidnotleadtoactivemilitarydutyatthetime.Others wereproudtoseetheirsonsinuniform.Foraglimpseofdrillingexperiences,see PeterFast,ErinnerungenausderZeitdesRussischenBuergerkrieges19181920, 5ff.,unpublishedmanuscriptintheauthorsfiles.A.KroekerfeltthatifMennonite leadershadprotestedthedrillingmorevigorously,theymighthavefounditeasier toupholdthenonresistanceprinciplelateron.SeeA.KroekerDierussischenMen nonitenunddieWehrlosigkeit,MennRund,l.August1923,10. 10SeeSitzungderMolotschanskWolostsemstvoversammlungam23.April1918, Vfrd,27.April1918,6.WhenTochonovandSekerinskyleftthecommitteetheygot 200 rubles each, and were thanked for their services. W.A.Hausknecht and J.H.Schroeder were elected to replace them. Aus den Beschluessen der Wolost semstvoversammlungvom16.Mai1918,Vfrd,31.Mai1918,7.Thesecurityforce ofthevolost(Okhrana)wassetat32menduringthissamemeeting.Fastidentified the military leaders of the selfdefense program as the German District Com mander of Halbstadt Herr Freiherr von Staufenberg, and thedirectorsoftheself defense forces, Lieutenant Leroux with his assistant, Sergeant Mueller, Training districtVIII,inErinnerungem,6. 11SeeB.H.Unruh,UnsereKoloniepolitik,MennRund,12.Juli1932,2. 12SeeH.Kornelsen,Eswardochanders,MennRund,18.April1936,47.Thisob servernotedthattherewerenonresistantindividualsineveryvillage,andthen describedtheconflictswithinthecommunityovertheissue.SeealsoAdolfReimer, WieesKam,36ff. 13GeorgeF.Loewen,ed.,ErinnerungenausdemDorfGrigorewkaS8891926(n.p.:by theauthor,1975),22.SeealsothearticleonRudnerweidenonresistanceelsewhere inthisvolumeandthememoirsofAntonSawatzkyintheauthorsfiles.

14 A.A.Wiens to B.B.Janz, Anfang des mennonitischen Selbstschutzes wie ich ihn

miterlebte,B.B.Janzpapers,CMBSA.Wiensnotedthatallministersofthiscom munityrecognizedthedefenseunitsaslegitimate.TheTiegeunitwasoriginallyset up to defend the village against thieves. (Note: All items cited from the B.B.Janz papersareinFileI,d). 15B.H.Unruh,UnsereKoloniepolitik,MennRund,12.Juli1939,2. 16SeealsoH.H.SchroederinUnserKampfgegendieBandenMakhnos19181919, Deutsche Post aus dem Osten (Maerz, 1938), 6, and Dycks diary entries for 3 July and8August1918.OnoneoccasionamockbattlewasfoughtbetweenMennonite contingents from Muntau and Tiegenhagen, and the Swabian units of Prischib Durlach.TheLudendorffesteseemedtodrawtheMennonitestoastrongeridentifi cationwiththeirGermanculturalbackground,andalsoheightenedenthusiasmfor militarydrills.Dyck,withmanyothervillages,viewedthetotalcelebrationasbeing mainlyadrinkingpartywhichwiththedancinginvolved,couldonlyhaveademor alizingeffectonMennoniteyouth.Seehisdiaryentryfor4July1918. 17 The two hundred and eighty persons present did not include representatives fromthechurchesoftheCaucasus,Samara,Orenburg,Turkestan,andSiberiadue todifficultiesoftravelandcommunication. 18 See the minutes of these proceedings reprinted in John B.Toews, ed., Selected Documents: The Mennonites in Russia from 19171930 (Winnipeg. MB: Christian Press, 1975), 406. Typed copies of these minutes were found in the A.A.Friesen papers, Mennonite Library and Archives (MLA), North Newton, Kansas (cited be lowasLichtenauMinutes).Amicrofilmcopyofthesepapersisalsofoundatthe MennoniteHeritageCentreArchives(MHCA). 19Ibid.,407. 20Ibid.,412.JanzheldthepositionofpresidentoftheForestryCampadministra tion committee at this time. His justification for the taking up of arms later ap pearedinH.B.Janz,DerMolotschnaerSelbstschutz,DB,27.Februar1935,23.He basedhissupportforselfdefensiveactiononthefactthatJesusalsogaveHisdis ciples permission to arm when they were faced by the enemies in the Garden of Gethsemanejustpriortohistrial. 21SeeLichtenauMinutes,415. 22Ibid.,411. 23Thefactwas,thatduringWWIMennoniteswereservingintheGermanmilitary forcesbythehundreds,andthatfewoftheirconscriptshadoptedforanalterna tive noncombatant assignment, even though technically that possibility still did exist. Note the lists of Mennonites killed in action published in Christlicher Ge meindekalender, published by the South German Mennonites. The column Zum dankbarenGedaechtnislistedMennonitecasualtiesas67for1917(137152),36 in1918(117124),55in1919(125136),and62for1920(101114). 24LichtenauMinutes,412.SeePeterH.Rempel,NonresistancewithoutPrivilege. TheDilemmaofRussianMennonites19171927,unpublishedpaper,Universityof Waterloo,Waterloo,ON,1976,1421.Intheauthorsfile. 25LichtenauMinutes,415. 26SeeJacobH.Janzen,AlternativeserviceandtheCessationofNonresistanceofthe Mennonites in Russia after 1914, unpublished paper in the authors files, 4, for remarksofJanzeninthissection.

27SeeRoland,ZurZeitdesBuergerkriegesinderAltkolonie,MennRund,3.August

1921, 13. Some persons decried the trends to exploitationandindulgenceamong Mennonites during the period of German occupation. Prices went skyhigh, busi ness boomed, as if to get back what was lost, and the young went for entertain ment, May festivals, dancing at weddings and Ludendorffeste. Adolf Reimer,Wie es Kam, 36., and Was du saest das wirst du ernten, Friedensstimme (Frdst), 1. September1918,7. 28TheFourteenPointsofWoodrowWilson,setforthinJanuary,1918,andusedas the basis for the armistice agreement, emerged in Articles XII through XV of the armistice,withademandtoevacuateallRussian/Ukrainianterritory.Anaccountof the German evacuation, fully completed only in late winter of 1919, is given in G.Frantz, Die Rueckfuehrung des deutschen Besatzungsheeres aus der Ukraine 1918/19,WissenundWehrXV(July1934),445464. 29Arevolutionarywithanarchistviews,Makhnohadrecentlyreturnedtohishome communityofGulaiPoleaftervisitingwithPeterKropotkinandLenininMoscow, andhisappointmentaspresidentofthePeasantsandWorkersSovietatGulaiPole inthespringof1917.HehadjustbeenreleasedfromtheButyrkiprisonatMoscow at the time. On the early life and activities of Makhno, see Peter Arshinov, Isloria Makhnovskovo Dvizheniia, 19181921 (Zaporozhe: Dikoe Pole, 1995), and its Eng lish translation, History of the Makhnovist Movement 19181921 (Detroit: Black & Red,1974),51,54,aswellasMichaelPalij,TheAnarchismofNestorMakhno,1918 1921:AspectsoftheUkrainianRevolution(Seattle;UniversityofWashingtonPress, 1976),6774. 30 One source mentions that a Mennonite farmer, Jacob Neufeld, was among the firstlandownerstohostMakhnoatakhutoratEbenfeldnearGulaiPole.SeeVic tor Peters, Nestor Makhno. The Life of an Anarchist (Winnipeg, MB: Echo Verlag, 1970),32.Thatencounterappearstohavebeenfriendly. 31OnthetacticsofMakhnoseePalij,10ff.,andPeters,44ff.Thecrucialencounter of Makhnos band with the AustroGermans at Dibrovka, in which the peasant leaderShchujoinedupwithMakhno,andwhichledtothealmosttotaldestruction ofthelargecommunitybytheoccupationforces,isdescribedbyPeters,41ff.,and Palij,110111. 32IntheKasnopolervolost,whereSchoenfeldwaslocated,someoftheMennonite estateslikeEbenfeld,SilberfeldandBergfeldwerethefirsttobeplundered.SeeIs. Enns,DieErrettungderBlumenfelderdurchdenMolotschnaerSelbstschutzverein anno 1919, Mennonitische Volkswarte (MVW) II (Mai 1936), 153155, for an ac count of the flight of refugees in these attacks. Gerhard Toews, one of the self defense leaders at Schoenfeld described the activities of his units in Schoenfeld. Opfer und Werdegang einer deutschen Siedlung in der Ukraine (Winnipeg, MB: by theauthor,1939),90ff.Thiswriterhadearlierdepictedtheterrorsanddestructi onofthisperiodintwonovels,DieHeimalinFlammen:DeutscheSchicksaleimRuss landderAnarchie (Regina, SK: Der Courier, 1933), andDieHeimatinTruemmern: DeutscheSchicksaleimRusslandderAnarchie(Steinbach,MB:bytheauthor,1936). 33TheSundayepisodeintheSchoenfeldchurchisrecalledinSchroeder,Miracles, 4446.ThiswriterwentontodetailthemannerinwhichasubordinateofMakhno, BatjkoPravda,ruledtheSchoenfeldareaduringaperiodofsomemonthsbegin ninginNovember,1918,tilltheBolsheviksoverrantheareaseveralmonthslater.

See also Abraham Berg, My Life My Story, MHCA, Vol. 1083, Folder 10. Berg recallsdieslayingofhismothersuncle,AbramSchroeder,aswellasaMr.Bergen indiefallof1918andtheflightofhisfamilytoAlexanderkroneintheMolotschna. OftakinguparmsBergwrote,Ineverbelievedinselfdefenseasweweretoofew, andinthelongrunwewouldlose,andrevengewouldbeallthemoresevere. 34TheBolsheviks,headedbytheirmilitarycommissar,Trotskii,andarmygeneral, Vladmir AntonovOvseenko, planned their second major offensive in Ukraine as soon as they learned of the German withdrawal. At about this same time Simon Petliura placed himself at the head of the Ukrainian liberation movement, and as selfdesignatedSupremeCommandercalledonUkrainianstohelphimdriveout the German Hetman supporters. Among the Whites, General Krasnovs Don Cos sacks and General Denikins Volunteeer Army determined also to take over Ukraine.BeforethesevariousforcescouldmaketheirwaytothecentresofMak hno strength, the latter would rule in the locality of Gulai Pole, and direct affairs theretohisownadvantage.SeeArthurE.Adams,BolsheviksintheUkraine.TheSec ond Campaign 19181919 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1963), 24ff. 35SeeB.B.Janzpapers,CMBSA,H.Goossen,UnseregrosseVaterlandsliebe,34.See alsotheDyckdiaryentryfor12November,wheretherequirementforLadekoppis described as four watchmen on foot and 12 mounted men. It will be difficult to keepupthisheighteneddefense,hewrote. 36B.B.Janzpapers,H.Goossen,UnseregrosseVaterlandsliebe,45.Themilitaristic spirit of Schroeder, who later became a strong supporter of Adolf Hitler in the 1930s,standsoutintheleadershipcadresoftheselfdefenseprogramofthecolo nies. He was however, supported by other hardly less vocal proponents, who led therecruitmentdriveofthesedays. 37H.Goossen,EinigeErlebnisseunseresVolkesinSuedRusslandindenJahrendes erstenWellkriegesbiszurerstenAuswanderung,unpublishedmanuscriptquoted in John B.Toews, The Origins and Activities of the Mennonite Selbstschutz in the Ukraine(19181919),MennoniteQuarterlyReport(MQR)XLVI(January1972),20. Toews essay, while inaccurate in some details, remains the most comprehensive studyoftheselfdefenseepisodeinprinttillnow(citedbelowasToews,Origins and Activities). The Rudnerweide village communitys views on Mennonite self defensearediscussedfurtherelsewhereinthisvolume. 38H.Goossen,EinigeErlebnisse,inToews,OriginsandActivities,21. 39H.Goossen,UnseregrosseVaterlandsliebe,5.Anothertypicalargumentusedby the selfdefense proponents against unwilling volunteers was the question, If they come to attack your home, and rape your wife, what will you do?. see P.P.Kroeker,MeineLebensgeschichte(Saskatoon,SK:bytheauthor,1964),40ff. 40SeeH.H.Schroeder,UnserKampf,6andB.B.Janz,HerzlicheBitte,DB,2.Maerz, 1938,12.Theargumentsforandagainstarming,discussedatthefall,1918,meet ingwereoutlinedbyAdolfReimerin,WieesKam,anarticlewhichfirstappeared inwarningstyleintheFriedensstimme,andlaterasareprintintheRundschauKal ender,1930,43ff.Thiswriter,aparticipant,summarizedtheentiredevelopmentas follows:Wemustalsonotethatitwasnocommunitydeliberationthatledtothis... was rather an instinct for survival, an elemental urge for selfpreservation fear. TheSelbstschutzwasafaitaccompli,andallthatremainedwastodecideonesatti

tude towards it, 46. See also H.Kornelsen, Es war doch anders, Menn Rund, 8. April1936,47. 41 The Makhno threat seemed at first to concentrate at the north and northeast sectors of the Molotschna settlement region, Dycks diary makes a reference to a Tiegerweidemeetingon21November.Themaintopicwasselfdefense.AsIsee it,hewrote,itismostunfortunatethatwedidnotbegintoorganizemuchsooner, becauseinafewdaysitmaybetoolate.Seetheentryfor23November1918. 42B.B.Janzpapers,CMBSA,J.Epp,DieEnstehungdesSelbstschutzes,publishedas TheMennoniteSelbstschutzintheUkraine.AnEyewitnessAccount,inMennonite LifeXXVI(July1971),138142,translatedandeditedbyJohnB.Toews(citedbelow asTheMennoniteSelbstschutz). 43Ibid.,141.Thiseyewitnessrepresentsonepointofviewonthewayinwhichself defenseactivitieswereorganized.Actuallythereseemstohavebeenmoreration ality to these plans than some thought, although it was not done through the as sembled church community. More information is needed to clarify the way in whichthecommitteewasbroughtintobeing. 44Ibid.,Whetherthesemenwereallinstalledattheoutset,orwhethersomejoined laterisnotclear.KorneliusWiensofMargenauwasmentionedasamemberofthe Gnadenfeldcommitteeatonepointalso.Theevidencesuggestsstrongagreement between the Selbstschutz leaders such as Schroeder and men like B.H.Unruh and Mennonite leaders generally as to the need of armed protection at that point in time, or at least hesitance to oppose it openly. See George Thielman, 5758, and Jacob A.Loewen and Wesley J.Prieb, Only the Sword of the Spirit (Winnipeg, MB: KindredProductions,1997),135ff. 45Toews,Schoenfeld,90100.Aphoto,sofartheonlyoneknowntohavesurvived, ofaMennonitearmedunitwithitsGermanofficerswasfirstpublishedinLawrence Klippenstein,RememberingAlternativeServiceinRussia,MennoniteReporter,16 February1981,6. 46 See Toews, Origins and Activities, 17. Jacob Warkentinwas a spirited cavalry leader, according to some reports. There is no list of name of the Red executions thatfollowedlater,butonemayassumethatsomeoftheleadingmenwereamong them. 47 Diedrich Neufeld, A Russian Dance of Death: Revolution and Civil War in the Ukraine,trans,anded.byAlReimer(Winnipeg,MB:HyperionPress,1977),24.For theorganizationoftheseforces,seeJ.Dyck,EinerderDabeiwar,B.B.Janzpapers, 18, and Anton Sawatzky, Wer das Schwert Nimmt, Mennoblatt, 1 Mai 1958, 6, and more details in his handwritten protest against Mennonite atrocities, Erin nerungenausmeinemLeben,intheauthorsfiles.Theexploitsandfateofanother Old Colony Selbstschutz leader, Abram Loewen, from Nieder Chortitza, have been noted in David G.Rempel with Cornelia Rempel Carlson, A Mennonite Family in TsaristRussiaandtheSovietUnion,17891923(TorontoBuffaloLondon;University ofTorontoPress,2002),199,210217,229,248. 48JacobThiessen,astudentattheKommersschuleinthosedays,recalledtheseex periencesinhismemoirs,WearePilgrims(Aberdeen,SK:bytheauthor,1974),47. Weaponsconsistedmainlyofrifles,sincetheSelbstschutzhadonlyafewmachine guns,andone1inchcannonwhichhadlittleammunition.Th.Block,DerSelbst

schutzderKolonistenTauriens(1919u.1920),MennonitischeBlaetter(MBI),(No vember1921),91(citedbelowasDerSelbstschutz). 49ThiessenreferredtoGruenthalinthePrischibvolostasthefirstvillagetocallfor help.We arePilgrims, 47.Blumentallayonthekeyrouteoftheinvadersintothe German colonist communities. See Ein Selbstschuetzler erzaehlt, in the B.B.Janz papers.ThisanonymouswritermentionsthestoriesofMakhnoatrocitiesasapri mary motivation for joining the defense units. The battle atBlumentaltook place on2425December(OS).SeeDycksdiaryentryfor8January1919. 50ThedateoftheTchernigovkabattleisvariouslygivenas6and10December,and one participant refers to it as being in October, obviously an error. Diarist Dyck referstotheeventasbeingon19December(NS)whichwouldmakeit6December (OS) which is also the date mentioned by a colonist in H.Goossen, Einige Erleb nisse, 11, as in Toews, Origins and Activities, 21. See Dycks diary entry for 20 December1918.DetailsofthebattleareofferedbyHeinrichSchroeder,Russland deutsche Friesen (DoellstaedtLangensalza: by the author, 1936), 5254. See also therecentretellingofthisfinalbattleinRayRempel,Selbstschutz:TheRoleofthe MennoniteMilitiaintheRussianCivilWar",unpublishedpaperintheauthorsfiles. 51TheBlumenfeldrescuewasdescribedindetailinIsaacEnns,153155.Forlocal views,seeDycksdiaryentryfor1February1919whichsuggeststhat20mounted menhadguidedtherescue.Itmaybethattheotherswerepartofathrusttoscat tertheMakhnoforcesaroundOrechov. 52TheWhiteshaddevelopedamajorcentreofresistancearoundtheCossackcen treofEkatrinodarintheKuban,andatKievinUkraineunderGeneralDenikin.The majorforcesofthenorthernCaucasusoffensivedidnotreachUkrainetillthelate springof1919.Howeveralreadyinthefallof1918someoftheDonCossacksand WhiteofficershadmadetheirwaytoSevastopolandYaltabyboatviaNovorossisk. Towardstheendof1918asegmentofthearmyunderGeneralTillohadthenad vanced as far as Dzhankoi and Melitopol, and some of the Russian officers then penetrated the Mennonite colonies. See Epp and Toews, The Mennonite Selbstschutz" 138 ff, and also Kenez, 150 ff, for an account of White Army move mentsinUkraine. 53Ontheonehand,theRussiansmayhavemovedintotheareaattheinvitationof some of the selfdefense leaders in the colonies. It may also have been the price theyhadtopayforhavingtheWhitesprovidearmsandammunitiontotheMen nonitecolonies.EppandToews,TheMennoniteSelbstschutz,140. 54Theresolutionwillhavespokennotonlytothegeneralprincipleandobjectives ofthedefensiveoperationsofthevillages,butconsideredincidentsoflocalaggres sion in which Mennonites and Whites collaborated. Epp mentioned at least one casewhereseveralRussianvillageswereoverrunandsearched,andintheprocess ofwhichfivebanditswerecapturedandshotbyRussianofficersintheGnadenfeld cemetery. On another occasion groups from several Mennonite villages, attacked Tchernigovka to requisition a good deal of liquor and other goods. Eight persons capturedtherewerereleasedbyorderofJacobEpp.EppandToews,TheMennon iteSelbstschutz,140.SelbstschutzleadersandotherMennonitesdeploredthebru talityoftheRussians,andalsotheirineptmethods(cowardlyattimes)ofconduct ingthewar.SeeThiessen,WearePilgrims,50;Th.Block,DerSelbstschutz,13,and theDyckdiaryentriesfor28Januaryand1February1919.

55SeetheDyckdiaryentriesfor28Februaryand2March.ThereasonforMakhnos

failuretooverruntheareamayhavebeenrelatedinparttothefactthathedevoted considerableenergyatthistimetoorganizinghisgovernmentofthearea.Hewas also directing thousands of men against the armies of the Ukrainian Directory on theonehand,andworryingaboutthepresenceoftheadvancingBolshevikforces ontheother.On26January1919,heofficiallyagreedtounitehisforceswiththe Bolsheviks in a common struggle against the Whites and the intervening Allies. Twoconferencestoplandefencesfortheareawereheldon23Januaryand12Feb ruary 1919, at Dibrovka and Gulai Pole respectively. Palij, 117159. The French forceshadoccupiedOdessainDecember,1918. 56 Thiessen, We are Pilgrims, 51. The final days of the collapse of the Selbstschutz recounted by Thiessen in his memoirs, werealso depicted in Walter Burow, Der Selbstschutz,anunpublishedessayintheauthorsfiles,andinahistoricalnovelby H.vonHomeyer,DiebrennendeHalbinsel.EinRingenumHeimalundEhre(Berlin Schoenberg: Landmann Verlag, 1938), in which the author depicts his role in the finalphaseoftheselfdefenseactivitiesinthecolonies.Accordingtothestory,he wasinvitedtoHalbstadttoreplacetheWhiteofficers.MembersoftheMennozen trum,includingapparently,B.H.Unruh,wereinchargeofnegotiations.Toews,Ori ginsandActivities,2526. 57 For accounts of the flight plans and activities, see Wie die Kolonisten aus der MolotschnanachderKrimFluechteten,MennRund,21.Juli1920,7,10,Th.Block, DieFluchtderMolotschnaerKolonien(10./11.Maerz1919),MBI(Oktober,1921), 7677, and the 12 March entry of the Dyck diary. A resident of the area later re marked that fleeing was a big mistake because those fleeing were viewed as the realenemiesoftheRedsiftheydidnotcomeback,andweretreatedaccordingly. Personsfoundfleeingwereoftenexecuted,andtheirgoodconfiscated.J.A.Toews, AutobiographyofJ.A.Toews,unpublishedmanuscriptinCMBSA,BookII,75. 58 According to one observer the selfdefense units lost less than a dozen men, whiletheenemy(RedsandMakhnovtsy)atotalofabout750.A.Lepp,Copieeines BriefesausRussland,MennRund,19.Mai1920,7.ItisquitepossiblethatMennon itelosseswereactuallyhigher. 59EppandToews,TheMennoniteSelbstschutz,141.Anotherparticipantinthese negotiationsseemstohavebeenJacobH.JanzenwhomentionedthatheandA.Dyck were sent by the church of Ohrloff to try and ameliorate the Soviets so that they would be lenient. Janzen also mentions the rage of General Frunze, who later re placedTrotzkiiintheCommissariatofWar,whenhelearnedabouttheserequests from people who had opposed his forces at Blumental. See Jacob H.Janzen, The ActivitiesoftheKfKinRussiafromtheyear1922to1924A.D.,unpublishedpaper, intheauthorsfiles. 60H.Goossen,UnseregrosseVaterlandsliebe,7. 61ForplacinghisforcesundertheBolshevikHighCommand,anagreementmadein January, 1919, Makhno got supplies and munitions while retaining autonomous controlofhisforces.SeeArshinov,94ff.,foranaccountofhowthisunioncame about.SeealsoPalij.148,foraninterpretationwhichoffersamoreobjectiveper spectiveandaclearerunderstandingofhowtheBolshevikshopedtousethismove tobringtheMakhnovistmovementmoreundertheircontrol.

62

See Die Mennoniten Gemeinden in Russland waehrend der Kriegsund Revolulionsjahre 19141920, (C.B. Heilbronn a. Neckar: Kommissionsverlag der Mennonitischen Fluechtlingefuersorge, 1921), 74 ff., which first appeared as T.O.Hylkema,DeGeschiedenisvandeDoopsgezindeGemeenteninRuslandindeoor logsen revolutiejaren 1914 tot 1920 (Steenwijk, 1921), and was then revised and edited by Benjamin H.Unruh, for a summary of the experiences by Mennonites at thetimeofMakhnoBolshevikcontrolintheperiodofMarchJune,1919.Seealso DavidG.Rempel,AMennoniteFamily,208ff. 63Denikinssuccessesatthistimemayhaveowedmuchtothefactthatthethreat ofSiberiancounterrevolutionunderKolchakapparentlyseemedmorethreatening toMoscowatthetime.Kenez,36ff. 64N.N.,DieWehrlosigkeitunterdenMennonitenRusslands,MennonitischesJahr buch(MeinJahrb),1952,37.SeealsoClaraDyck,ed.,TheDiaryofAnnaBaerg(Win nipeg,MB:MCC(Canada),1977),80,andtheDyckdiaryentryfor5July.Thestory ofagroupofnonresistantMennoniteswhoweresenttotheTerekregionwiththe WhiteArmyistoldinGerdAesche,Jawohl,HerrLeutnant,DB,24.Februar1970, 11, and 3. Maerz, 11, Noncombatant work under the Whites is also mentioned in H.Wiens,ZurUmfrage,DB,31.Mai1966,1011. 65TheauthorofDirWehrlosigkeitbelievedtobePeterF.Froese,foratimewith theMennoniteofficeinMoscow,claimedthattheselfdefenseexperiencebroughta renewed opposition to military service,sothatrelativelyfewmenactuallyjoined theDenikinandWrangelarmies,37. 66SeetheAnnaBaergdiaryentryfor13/26June1919,79.Onthearmouredtrain volunteers,seeThiessen,WearePilgrims,58ff. 67GerhardLohrenz,Stormtossed:ThePersonalStoryofaCanadianMennonitefrom Russia(Winnipeg,MB:bytheauthor,1976),9697.Lohrenzdescribedhisdecision tojointheRedCrossunit,insteadoftheregularWhiteArmy,asonewhichhisfa ther regarded as the lesser of two evils. Assigned to a unit at Kherson, Lohrenz wasputinchargeofsecuringfoodandclothingforthemen,andaccordingtohis recollections,metMennonitesinmanymilitaryunitsoftheDenikinarmy. 68TheoccupationofthisareabytheWhitesisdescribedbrieflyinRoland,ZurZeit desBuergerkriegesinderAltkolonie,"MennRund.10.August1921,7,10.Anemi gre from the Khortitza colony, David G.Rempel, later recalled the number of men from the KhortitzaRosenthal community who were serving in the White Army duringthefallof1919asnumbering12to15.Neufeld,24. 69 Peter D.Froese, Recollections of my Time of Service in the DenikinWrangel Army,andmyStayinTurkey,unpublishedmanuscriptintheauthorsfiles. 70 For the initiatives of the Kolchak forces in Siberia, see Peter Fleming, The Fate of'AdmiralKolchak(NewYork:Harcourt,BraceandWorld,1963).Kolchakslead ership lasted from the time of the coup which destroyed the Omsk Directory in early November, 1918, till his imprisonment and execution in January. 1920. The high point of his military successes had come in March and April of the previous year.AlsoseeJ.J.Hildebrand,Sibirien:AllgemeineUebersichtueberSibirienundder BruendungderMennonitensiedlungeninSibirien.ErsterTeil(Winnipeg,MB:bythe author,1952),80.Thisauthorclaimedthathehadbeengivenawrittenstatement ofexemptionprivilegesbytheKolchakauthorities.

71SeeHansRempelandGeorgeK.Epp,comps.andeds.,WaffenderWehrlosen:Er

satzdienstderMennoniteninderUdSSR(Winnipeg,MB:CMBCPublications,1980), 3032.TheharassmentsofsomeMennonitecommunitiesunderKolchaksruleare depictedinH.P.Isaak,OurLifeStoryandEscape:FromRussiatoChinatoJapanand toAmerica(Dinuba,CA:bytheauthor,1977),32ff. 72 Kornelius Langemann, Meine Lebensbeschreibung, unpublished manuscript, MLA.SAII,363,49.WhenothereligiblemenlikeJohnDyckwenttovisitrelatives inMillerovoin1918,hehadtoreporttothedraftcentreatKamenslietofindthat claimsforconscientiousobjectors'alternativeservicehadnovalidity,andthathe mustaccepttrainingtojointheCossackcavalry.OtherMennonitesjoinedhisunit later on. See Sylvia Murray Dyck, Add One Cossack and Stir: The Life Story of John JohnDyck(Philadelphia,P.A:DoranceandCo.,1972),24ff.RecruitmentintheMen nonitecommunitiesofBorisovandIgnatievintheBachmutregionwasmentioned inJohnD.Buhr,EineWocheKriegumdenBesitzZweierMennonitenDoerfer,DB, 29.Maerz1966,56. 73 See Palij, 13 ff. for an account of the fighting between DenikinandtheMakhno armies during this northward march, and then retreat. General Denikin analyzed thereasonsforthisdefeatinAntonI.Denikin,TheWhiteArmy,trans,byCatherine Zvegintzov(GulfBreeze,FL:InternationalPress,1973),291ff. 74AgrippingfirsthandreportonthisreturnoftheMakhnovtsytotheOldColony has survived in Diedrich Neufeld, Tagebuch aus dem Reiche des Totentanzes (Em den:bytheauthor,1921).Seeespeciallythecommentson11ff.NotealsoDycks diaryentriesfor5and7October1919,andD.D.Rempel,Erinnerungen(Saskatoon, SK:bytheauthor,1973).40ff.,forcommentsontheappearanceoftheRedsand theirMakhnoallies. 75 See Palij, 186 ff., on the antiUkrainian policies of Denikin. Under these condi tionstheadditionofmanynewpeasantrecruitsraisedthesizeofMakhnosarmy toabout25,000menduringthisperiod. 76Onthesuccessfuldefensivestrategiesofthesecommunities,seeLoewen,Jazyk ovo,4243;HeinrichToews,EichenfeldDubovka.EinTatsachenberichtamderTra goediedesDeutschtumsinderUkraine(Karlsruhe:VerlagHeinrichSchneider,n.d), 15 ff (cited below as Eichenfeld). See also related information in the account of Gerhard Regehr and J.Dyck, Einer der Dabei War, B.B.Janz papers, 18. The five villagesofJazykovoweresitutatedaboutthirtykilometresnorthofKhortitza,and aboutsixtykilometressouthofEkaterinoslav.Thesevillages,Nikolaifeld(Nikolai pol), Adelsheim (Dolinovka), Hochfeld (Morozovo), Franzfeld (Varvarovka), and Eichenfeld(Dubovka),withseveralhamletsandnumerousindividualestatessuch asPetersdorf,Reinfeld,PaulsheimandFriedensdorfmadeuptheMennonitevolost ofNikolaipol. 77 According to one accountof this assassination, this was the action of SS leader PetervonKampenwithaunitofmen,whohadsetouttodestroythenewsoviet (workerscouncil)inNikolaipol.Thesurvivalofonepersonintheiroffice,afterthe attack, made it possible to identify the aggressors later on. Allegedly these key Selbstschutz men lived in the village of Eichenfeld. See Anton Sawatzky, Wer das Schwertnimmt,Mennoblatt,1.Mai1958,6,andahandwrittennarrativerecalling these events in the authors files. See as well comments on this account by O.Klassen,alsointheauthorsfile.

78AnaccountoftheseattacksisfoundinHeinrichToews,Eichenfeld,24ff.Amapof

thearea,showingsurroundingRussianvillages,isfoundinNeufeld,RussianDance ofDeath,6.Loewenlistedthelossesoftheindividualvillatesasfollows:Paulheim, 3; Petersdorf, 7; Nikolaipol, 1; Franzfeld, 7; Hochfeld, 18; and Eichenfeld, 73. In Eichenfeld the objective had been to kill all males aged 16 and over. Among the deadwerealsosixmembersofanevangelisticteam,theTentMissionstaff,ledby Jacob J.Dyck. The team was holding meetings there at the time. See Schroeder, Miracles,116ff.,andKatharinaEdiger,UnderHisWings:EventsintheLivesofElder Alexander Ediger and His Family (Kitchener, ON: Bachman Communications Inc., 1994),175ff. 79G.Regehr,Reisebericht,MennRund,23.Januar1924,3.Thiswriternotedthat 37ofthoseslainhadbeenrelativesofhiswife,mostlymen,andrelatedtobetter todofamilies. 80ThedatingoftheBlumenortdisasterisimprecise.MostaccountsrefertoSunday andMondayofthelastweekendinOctoberwhichwouldbe2728October(OS)or 89 November (NS). For a general outline of the events see B.B.Janz, Wir haben gesuendigt,B.B.Janzpapers,andpersonallettertoAbramBergmanninSteinbach, dated25September1960,inwhichitisobservedthataformerBlurnenortsecre tarylaterresidentinCanadaclaimedthatGloecklerandhismenhadbeeninvited bysomeoneinOhrloff,andalsoJacobEppofBlumenort,tomaketheraid.B.B.Janz regarded this Mennonite conspiracy as the basic causal factor for the tragedy which followed. Janz lived in Tiege at the time. For the story as such see also G.G.Hiebert, Die suedrussischen Mennoniten, 1314, and Die Schreckenswoche imDorfeBlumenort,MennonitischeMaertyrerVol.II,246250.Thelatteraccount datestheperiodofterror27Octoberto2November,i.e.lastinganentireweek. 81ApparentlytheMakhnovtsyhadbeenlookingforHeinrichEpp,auniversitystu dent,andwhenhecouldntbefoundtheysoughthisolderbrother,Jacob.Oneob serveridentifiedtheOkhranaasaunitfromHalbstadtcommandedbyLjachov,who had gone to Ohrloff and then returned via Blumenort, where the Volunteers had shot at them. According to this accound, Ljachov and two others escaped, though onediedofhiswounds.SeeJacobNeufeld,DieSchreckenstageinBlumenort,Halb staedterWol.,MBI,19.Juni1920,910. 82 The eleven men slain in Altonau were listed in the B.B.Janz papers, Etliche HauptmomentevondemMordtaginAltonauimOkt.,1919,2,and twenty of the Blumenortvictims,inalettertomydearfriendbyB.B.Janzdated20June1963,3. 83 Zagradovka, a daughter settlement of the Old Colony founded in 1871, had 16 villagesinall.Itformedanindependentadministrativeunitwithamunicipaloffice atTiege.Thesettlementhadthreechurchesandatotalpopulationofabout5000at thetimeoftheCivilWar.ThevolostofKronaulayjusttotheeastofthesettlement, withtheRussianvillagesofNovoKurskoje,Shesternja,SagradovkaandNatalinoto thenorth,andeastoftheInguletzRiver.Thevillagesthatcameunderattackwere mostly those along the eastern part of the settlement adjacent tothe Russian vil lagesoftheriverregion.TheyincludedGnadenfeld,Reinfeld,Ohrloff,Tiege,Muen sterbergandSchoenau,inthatorder. 84 See Diedrich Neufeld, Mennonitentum in der Ukraine. Schicksalsgeschichte Sagradowkas(Emden:bytheauthor,1922),916(citedbelowasMennonitentum}. Neufeldwasbitinglycriticalofthesecommunitiesfortakinguparmsearlier,and

especially for allying themselves with the White forces, a move which, he con tended,hadbeensupportedbyyoungandoldalike.Thesituationisalsodescribed in a more recent book on the subject, Gerhard Lohrenz. Fire Over Sagradowka (Winnipeg,MB;bytheauthor,1983). 85 Personal accounts of the raids are found in Gerhard Lohrenz, Sagradowka. Die GeschichteeinerMennonitischenAnsiedlungimSuedenRusslands(Rosthern,SK:by the author, 1947), 90 ff (cited below as Sagradowka), and others in Bernhard B.Fast, Die Schreckenstage in der Ohrloffer (Kotschubejewer) Wolost, Gouv. und KreisChersonam29.und30.Nov.und1.Dez.,1919(Sagradowka),Vlfd,19.Sep tember 1920, 34 and preceding issues. Fasts report was dated 15. Januar 1920 andexcerptedinLohrenzabove. 86SeeNeufeld,Mennonitentum,18. 87 lbid., 19. Neufeld suggested that the Muensterberg attack had been especially brutalbecauseofthegeneralresistanceoftheMennonitestolanddistribution,and theparticulararrangementswhichhadfinallybeenworkedoutforthearea.Here thelandgiventotheRussian peasantswasgivennotinsolidblocks, but in allot mentsfromeachofthesixteenvillages.ThismeansthattheRussianshadtotravel longdistancesintothesettlementtoreachtheirnewacquisitions.Thepresenceof the Makhnovtsy, Neufeld felt, gave the Russian villagers the opportunity to alter thissystemoflandholding,hencetheircooperationintheraids.Ibid.,2223.Neu feld may have been especially bitter about the Zagradovka tragedy and possible Mennonite responsibility for it, because his father and two brothers, Henry and John,werealsokilledintheattacks. 88 Lohrenz, Sagradowka, 98, and Neufeld, Mennonitentum, 21. The latter doubted reportsofWhiteassistance,notingthatDenikinsofficers,whoasardentnational ists during the War had been bitterly hostile towards the alien colonists, had watchedwithmalicioussatisfactionastheterroristsragedamongtheMennonites. 89ThepresenceoftheWhiteswasapartofthegeneralretreatfromOrelwhichhad begunsomemonthsbefore.DuringthisperiodGeneralWrangelbecamethecom manderfortheVolunteerArmyintheTaurideregion,butduetodifficulties,was soonshiftedbacktotheKuban.SeeWilliamH.Chamberlin.TheRussianRevolution 19171921.Vol.II(NewYork:Macmillan,1952)279281;Kenez,182183,214215. 90 See Dyck diary entries for December, 1919. Helpful parallel accounts of events covered inthis study includethe following:Abram H.Neufeld, trans, and ed., Her manandKatharina:TheAutobiographyofElderHermanA.andKatharinaNeufeldin Russia and in Canada (Winnipeg, MB: Centre for MB Studies, 1984), David P.Heidebrecht, ein holperiger lebensweg (Abbotsford: by the author, n.d.), John P.Nickel,trans,anded.,HopeSpringsEternal:ALegacyofServiceandLoveinRussia During Difficult Times (Nanaimo, BC: Nickel Publishers, 198SJ, 169 ff., N.J.Kroeker andDavidG.Rempel,FirstMennoniteVillagesinRussia17891943(Vancouver,BC: bytheauthor,1981)andothers. 10.09.2007