DRAFT 9/28/2010 Three Scenes of Sovereignty and Power Etel Solingen University of California Irvine Paper presented at the

e conference in honor of Stephen D. Krasner (Princeton, October 1-2, 2010). For inclusion in Back to Basics: Rethinking Power in the Contemporary World, edited by Martha Finnemore and Judith Goldstein

The concepts of sovereignty and power provide a leitmotif in Krasners contributions to international relations. The incisive and original insights of sovereignty as organized hypocrisy have helped illuminate important dilemmas in world politics.1 Power influences the repertoire of responses to dilemmas of sovereignty. 2 In turn, how states manage dilemmas of sovereignty also hold important implications for power. I explore the reciprocal relationship between sovereignty compromises and power by Note: Preliminary versions of this paper were presented at a conference organized by Judith Goldstein and Martha Finnemore (Stanford University) and at the 2010 APSA meeting. I would like to acknowledge the editors, discussants John Meyer and Ron Hassner, and conference and panel participants for helpful comments. The discussion of Chinas sovereignty dilemmas benefited from personal interviews in Shanghai (September 2009, December 2009) and Beijing (September 2009 and July 2010).
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Krasner (2009:180) defines interdependence sovereignty as the ability of public authorities to regulate the flow of information, ideas, goods, people, pollutants, or capital across the borders of their state. This sovereignty category is exclusively concerned with control and not authority, with capacity to regulate trans-border flows and their domestic impact, a capacity arguably diminished under globalization. Elsewhere Krasner (2009:15) subsumes interdependence sovereignty under domestic sovereignty, or the ability of political authorities to control a states authority structure and legitimacy within and across its borders effectively. Westphalian/Vattelian sovereignty accepts states as juridically independent, autonomous, not subject to external authority (2009:15), a concept that negates the right of states to intervene in the internal affairs of other states. Westphalian sovereignty is the exclusion of external actors from authority structures within a given territory (2009:179). 2 Krasner (1976) defines power as a resource or attribute, more specifically as economic capabilities (size, per capita income, shares of world trade and investment flows). Krasners (1999) book on sovereignty commonly refers to power asymmetries as a relational concept--getting others to do something they would otherwise not do--or the ability to determine outcomes, to coerce and control.

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zooming in and out of three different scenes of contemporary international relations: the ascent of China as a great power, variations in regionalism, and the evolving non-proliferation regime. These three realms are particularly suitable for a volume addressing Krasners contributions: they offer fruitful arenas for investigating two master variables in his work; they are crucial themes in the contemporary study and praxis of international relations, in line with Krasners own interest in both theory and policy; and they address various levels of analysis--domestic structures, rulers, states, entire regions, and international regimes--relevant to his own contributions.3 Scene 1 focuses on a single state, Chinas shifting sovereignty compromises in tandem with its ascent to power. Scene 2 turns to the regional level to illuminate divergent sovereignty compromises in the Middle East and East Asia, with attendant consequences for aggregate regional power. Scene 3 explores how both vastly compromised sovereignty and power asymmetries have influenced the evolution of the international non-proliferation regime. Dilemmas stemming from sovereignty as an organizing principle of international relations can lead states to compromises that are sometimes inherently contradictory or hard to reconcile; in Krasners terms, hypocritical. Organized hypocrisy is characteristic of the international environment because of asymmetries in state power and because rulers must be responsive to domestic norms that are not always fully compatible with international ones (1999:3, 2009:211). The analytical point of departure in this chapter centers on incentives of ruling coalitions to assert or compromise different forms of sovereignty. Those incentives and corresponding compromises stem from ruling coalitions favored models of political survival no less than from international power considerations.4 In turn, different sovereignty compromises can enhance or diminish international power as well as the domestic power of ruling coalitions. It is not merely that different states vary in their relative power at time t, when a given hypocritical behavior might be observed (this might be labeled spatial or horizontal power differentials among states). It is also the case that states power can vary dramatically from t to t+1 (leading to temporal or longitudinal power differentials for the same state), influencing leaders incentives to alter sovereignty compromises. As the three scenes below Regions per se may not have been central to Krasners work but the political economy of industrializing regions and their relationship to the industrialized core has been and remains one of his core themes (Krasner 1985). Middle Eastern oil economies were also a special focus in Krasner (1978). 4 Internationalizing models rely on growth and economic performance via integration into the global economy whereas inward-looking models rely on autonomous self-sufficiency (Solingen 1998). The two ideal-types also differ in the extent to which states replace or enhance markets. The relationship between states and markets, and economic openness versus closure, have been central to Krasners work.
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DRAFT 9/28/2010 suggest, sovereignty compromises both reflect and transform the power of leaders, states, regions, and global order. Transform does not imply uniform effects. The reciprocal relationship between sovereignty and power is complex.

Scene 1: The ascent of China As with other rising hegemons, Chinas ascent to power was accompanied by shifting dilemmas regarding interdependence and Westphalian/Vattelian sovereignty. Maos autarchic model of political survival--congruent with high Westphalian and interdependence sovereignty--condemned China to lower levels of international power at time t (1950s-1960s) than it might have otherwise accrued.5 Subsequent efforts to integrate China in the global political economy--the road to WTO membership--introduced greater strain into that coherence.6 Chinas internationalizing ruling coalition--departing from Maos model of political survival--was now becoming bound by global rules and felt compelled to reconceptualize sovereignty to reconcile it with domestic expectations. Self-reliance and autonomy--Westphalian sovereigntys core (Krasner 2009:183)--could no longer provide a coherent motto for an economy increasingly dependent on external (including Japanese) markets, capital, investment, technology, and expertise. In an effort to reconcile this dilution of sovereignty with the concepts continued domestic appeal, Deng Xiaoping and his successors unleashed the (synergistic) dual promise of individual wealth (xianfuqilai) and national power. In Premier Wen Jiabaos words, development is the last word; it is not only the basis for resolving all internal problems but is also the basis for boosting our diplomatic power. The basis of competition between states lies in power (Medeiros 2009:15). Those compromises indeed made China more powerful at t+1 (2000s) but also increased tensions between praxis and continued rhetorical support for sovereignty norms. Without challenging their legitimacy, Chinas internationalizing leaders violated those norms in a much deeper way. Yet, in terms of Krasners modalities of sovereignty compromises, these were concessions by invitationconventions, contracts, international economic Maos autarchic model--reacting to 100 years of shame and humiliation by the West and Japan--denounced external coercion and infringements on sovereignty (Medeiros 2009). The model was less congruent when it came to other countries sovereignty, endorsing revolutions throughout the developing world. Another inconvenient incongruence were secret protocols (1950) giving the Soviet Union extraterritorial economic privileges in China (Johnston 2008:206). 6 Sovereignty compromises, in China as elsewhere, evolved over time, sometimes cyclically. Organized hypocrisy was typical of imperial China, where behavior inconsistent with Confucian norms was reinterpreted for domestic audiences (Krasner 2009:222). Late 20th century compromises, though of a different kind, were nothing new for China.
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institutions--rather than coercion. Conveniently, compromising sovereignty to capitalist international institutions also raised the costs of future defections by domestic opponents of internationalization and private enterprise (Johnston 2008:209). Sovereignty compromises, in other words, strengthened the leadership domestically as well. Those compromises were not circumscribed to the economic arena. Chinas aversion to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as hypocritical, unfair, and discriminatory (Gill 2010:5) was congruent with Maos energetic defense of self-reliance and autonomy. Preventing other states from following Chinas own development of nuclear weapons would have entailed extreme hypocrisy for a regime self-identified with disenfranchised developing states seeking to redress discriminatory practices. Thus, Maos China recognized the sovereign right of states to acquire nuclear weapons and its own right to share nuclear technology even with potential proliferators. The road to WTO membership, however, subordinated sovereignty claims to international expectations of behavior compatible with an internationalizing model. Whereas Maos model considered the Biological Weapons Convention a fraud of sham disarmament in the early 1970s, China acceded to this convention by 1984 (Kent 2007). In 1985 it unilaterally accepted IAEA safeguards on part of its civilian nuclear program and conditioned its nuclear exports on recipients acceptance of IAEA safeguards. By the early 1990s it began complying with obligations to report nuclear exports to the IAEA and accepting CWC and IAEA verification, including on-site inspections. Progressive compliance was not linear. Yet securing economic aid from Japan, restoring international legitimacy after Tiananmen Square, demands from the scientific community, among others, led China to sign the NPT in 1992. While China had once shared sensitive nuclear technology with Pakistan, in 1998 it joined other UNSC permanent members in condemning Pakistans (and Indias) nuclear tests.7 In 2004 China joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group--which some developing countries consider an international cartel--and supported UNSC Resolution 1540 strengthening domestic export controls. Chinas ascent to power, steered by its leaders internationalizing model, imposed new responsibilities and compromises but did not require sacrificing sovereignty all around. Indeed Chinas assertion of sovereignty over its own nuclear arsenal arguably grew stronger as it rose in power. Testing nuclear weapons at t (1964) was congruent with Maos strong assertions of sovereignty; and minimal deterrence--forged under the economic hardships of autarchy--did the job. At t+1, however, far greater material resources (power as attribute?) led China to uphold its sovereign right to upgrade nuclear capabilities and deflect demands for transparency in nuclear and conventional modernization, arguing that weaker powers must keep stronger powers guessing (Gill 2010). Nuclear Zero proposals could A more recent agreement with Pakistan followed other states bending of nuclear export rules on behalf of India.
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limit nuclear sovereignty and raise the political costs of modernizing nuclear arsenals, particularly for a global power asserting its peaceful rise. China thus became more deeply implicated in differential adherence to sovereignty principles across issue-areas. The sovereign right to nuclear weapons (self-defense) and the sovereign right to economic self-reliance were more in synch at t, under Mao. The sovereign right to upgrade nuclear arsenals at t+1 appears less compatible with charm offensives within and beyond the region, and with budding leadership positions in regional and international forums, from the G-20 to the BRICs. Nor do sovereignty compromises vis--vis international economic institutions carry over to those advancing democracy and human rights. Tensions in sovereignty compromises are evident across and within issue-areas. The sovereign right of others to develop nuclear weapons was endorsed at t but disparaged at t+1. Even the means to dampen horizontal proliferation evolved in tandem with Chinas ascent to power. While continuing to extol sovereignty rhetorically, Chinas policies regarding sanctions on proliferating states reveal mounting fissures. Sanctions were once deemed serious violations of non-interference under Maos Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, reacting to hegemonistic Soviet and Western dictates to China (ICG 2009:13). Yet China began endorsing UNSC resolutions sanctioning North Korea and Iran since 2006, not once but seven times. Even if they were less biting than others might have preferred, they nonetheless signaled relaxation of sovereignty norms. Growing tension between rhetoric and action emanate, here as well, from dilemmas internationalizing leaders face from within and without. Oil and natural resources are crucial to breakneck economic growth and, hence, to Chinese leaders own political survival. Upholding Irans sovereignty over the full nuclear fuel cycle--including enrichment--helps trade and investment in Irans oil and gas but also creates tensions with Saudi Arabia, Chinas top oil supplier, Arab Gulf partners, the US and Europe. Nor can China benefit from Irans threatened destabilization of strategic maritime lanes that provide it with crucial inputs for continued growth.8 Chinas support for limited sanctions on North Korea following its 2006 first nuclear test also depart from previous practice even if compliance has been selective, reluctant, and intermittent, reflecting another multifaceted challenge. A destabilizing (sovereign) nuclear North Korea is not Chinas preferred outcome, but neither is it the least preferred. North Koreas collapse; an assertive unified and sovereign Korean peninsula; or an even more intrusive US presence in Northeast Asia are all worse than the statusquo.9 Thus, policies vis--vis North Korea--a crucial test of Chinas adherence to sovereignty--reveal inconsistencies. In 2003 officials described Chinas As expressed by Ambassador Wang Guangya after endorsing UNSC sanctions against Iran in 2006 <http://www.chinaun.org/eng/tpxw/morefotos/2006/t284890.htm#>.
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positions as consistently opposing sanctions and coercion.10 However, following North Koreas first nuclear test, China approved UNSC resolution 1718 invoking Chapter VII (though barring the use of force under Article 41), while opposing cargo inspections. After North Koreas 2009 second nuclear test, China endorsed UNSC resolution 1874 calling to inspect and destroy all banned cargo, financial sanctions, asset freezes, targeted travel bans (a rare concession), and blocking trade in nuclear and missile components. Chinas representative called this a balanced reaction of the Security Council while urging respect for North Koreas sovereignty, territorial integrity and legitimate security concerns. Only after it returned to the NPT, Chinese officials now argued, would North Korea enjoy the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy. Meanwhile China would implement the resolution earnestly.11 Increased instability in North Korea related to Kim dynastic succession led China to water down UN sanctions following the sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonang. These linguistic and behavioral contortions reveal new compromises aimed at aligning rhetoric of sovereignty with endorsement of sanctions, at least de jure. Chinas leaders viewed this shift as reflecting responsibilities of an emerging global power (ICG 2009:13). Furthermore, while opposing forceful regime change, they sought to persuade Kim Jong-Il to transform North Koreas authority structures and basis of legitimacy through Chinastyle reforms and international economic openness. This was by any other name another departure from Westphalian sovereignty, one that might conveniently redress reputational losses incurred by Chinas leaders every time North Korea reneges on promises to denuclearize through Chinasponsored Six-Party Talks. Reputational costs--international and domestic-led an influential group of Chinese experts to strongly endorse sanctions, countering constituencies adamantly guarding North Koreas sovereign right to nuclear weapons (ICG 2009:5). These competing demands explain Chinas tortuous efforts to square the sovereignty circle; its tentative application--and lax implementation--of sanctions; its stated agreement with the Proliferation Security Initiatives mission, even as it refuses to join it; and its contested interpretation of UNSC resolutions as compatible with enhanced trade, investments and aid to North Korea and Iran (Shen 2009). In Krasners (2009:211) familiar formulation, the logic of consequences--maximizing leaders political survival--has thus far gained ground over the logic of appropriateness (non-intervention) in both the Iranian and North Korean theaters. Even mild interventionist steps reveal that political expediency trumps normative consistency as China urges Iran Solingen (EAI, 2010). China perceives the influx of North Korean refugees into Yanbian as fueling Korean irredentism. 10 <http://www.china-un.org/eng/hyyfy/t29000.htm>. 11 < http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9679.doc.htm>; NTI, Global security Newswire, U.S. Says North Korean Blast "Probably" Nuclear, June 16, 2009
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to provide unimpeded access to IAEA inspectors, ratify the Additional Protocol, and suspend enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water-related activities; and urges North Korea to reform its economy and abandon nuclear weapons while publicly acknowledging that the dual track [carrot-and-stick] strategy is the right one.12 On sanctions, as with sovereignty norms more generally, Chinas rise has compelled compromises intended to signal its new reputation as a responsible major power (fuzeren de daguo).13 Reputational considerations may derive from norms, instrumentalities or both, and as Keohane (2009:10) argues, it can be difficult to identify which is endogenous to the other (observational equivalence). Leaders may be paying lip service to norms they dont necessarily believe in, using them as rationalization for ulterior preferences, but they may also be acting in response to role expectations--at home and abroad--of an emerging superpower. In sum, Chinas ascent to power provides a window into evolving shifts in magnitude and forms of compromised Westphalian sovereignty. It illuminates evolving solutions to tensions induced by sovereignty norms across the domestic-international divide, across issue-areas, across different norms in the same issue-area, within the same norm over time, across successive ruling coalitions, and across domestic constituencies. Sovereignty norms conflicted with other norms and interests contemporaneously (spatially) and over time (longitudinally), as the power transition from t to t+1 confronted Chinese leaders with new norms, expectations, and interests. These continue to exert pressures for new sovereignty compromises. While navigating through dilemmas of a fledging superpower, rhetorical allegiance to sovereignty remains deeply engrained among some domestic constituencies. As Krasner (2009:213) argued, leaders may heed to constituents normative concerns for the (consequential) purpose of staying in power. This explains Chinese leaders uncompromising response to Japan over the maritime incident in September 2010 and their line-in-the sand when it comes to protecting every bit of domestic sovereignty from centrifugal tendencies (Taiwan, Tibet , Xinjiang) and external intrusion into fundamental domestic authority structures (democracy and human rights).14 Chinese Foreign Minister Hopes Iran, IAEA 'Step Up' Consultation, AFP December 5, 2007, World News Connection). 13 On Chinese leaders concern with Chinas reputation as underlying its shift toward CTBT endorsement, see Johnston (2008:113). Both expected material benefits (access to trade, aid, technology, and investment) and symbolic reasons drive Chinas concern with reputation according to Medeiros (2009:17). 14 Krasner (2001:28) suggests that Chinese and Tibetans might be better off if Tibet regains some of the autonomy it had as a tributary state under Chinas empire, yet domestic resistance pivoted on sovereignty norms has prevented that outcome. On the connection between losing Taiwan and losing power, see Johnston (2008:210).
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Of all dilemmas of sovereignty posed by Chinas rise, perceived threats to domestic sovereignty are second to none in the leaderships struggle for political survival. Scene 2: Sovereignty Constructs: Within and Cross-Regional Variation Variations in sovereignty compromises can also be observed at the regional level, with attendant consequences for aggregate regional power. International legal sovereignty was challenged both in East Asia and the Middle East circa the mid-20th century (t). Exception for Taiwan, legal recognition of states became the norm in East Asia by t+1 but remained more challenged in the Middle East, particularly vis--vis Israel but also in the inter-Arab and Arab-Iranian arenas. Domestic and interdependence sovereignty also endured comparable challenges in both regions at t but remained more challenged at t+1 in the Middle East. Cross-regional variation can also be detected with respect to Westphalian sovereignty compromises incurred through participation in the global political economy, and those incurred through participation in regional institutional frameworks. In Europe the two kinds--global and regional-evolved if not in complete synchrony at least in the same general direction: toward progressive acceptance of greater external intrusion on domestic authority structures. East Asia reveals growing acquiescence with sovereignty losses vis--vis global institutions over time, accrued in connection with outward-oriented economic models. These were largely voluntary losses, or in Krasners terms, by invitation. Yet East Asian states were both far more reluctant to bear sovereignty losses to regional institutions, and far more sensitive to neighboring intervention in each others domestic affairs, keeping such intrusions at relatively low levels. Middle East states, conversely, exhibited far lower tolerance for sovereignty losses stemming both from participation in the global political economy and in regional institutions. Uninvited intervention in neighbors domestic affairs, however, was rampant. The contrast between the two regions is particularly intriguing because they shared many common initial conditions as industrializing regions at t: colonialism, state-building challenges, economic crises, stagnation, collapse, low per-capita GNPs, heavy-handed authoritarianism, widespread poverty, human rights violations, vast gender inequities, high illiteracy and unemployment, ethnic clashes and civil wars, low intra and extra-regional economic interdependence, weak or non-existing regional institutions, and long coastal lines suitable for trade. Its much higher share of land dominated by temperate climate would have predicted higher growth potential for the Middle East. Elbadawi (2005:319) suggests that the subsequent divergent evolution of the two regions confirms that economic growth requires deliberate and strategic intervention by states. Endowments not always materialize in greater power, as Finnemore and Goldstein suggest. Both regions also shared norms emphasizing family, literacy and community. Some imputed East Asias rapid development to those norms but why they would lack comparable effects in the Middle East remains unclear. Both

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regions also exhibited high intra-regional diversity although East Asia seemed more internally diverse in language, ethnicity, religion, levels of development and regime type (democratic or authoritarian). Much of the Middle East shared Arabic language and culture, entrenched authoritarianism, and an overwhelmingly Islamic character despite ethnic, tribal, and communal diversity. Yet, counterintuitively, East Asias higher intra-regional diversity did not preclude much higher levels of regional cooperation and restraint in cross-border interventions over time than in a less diverse Middle East. How can the puzzle of differential sovereignty compromises at the regional and global levels be explained? And what were the implications of those compromises for aggregate regional power? In line with the argument developed above for China, East Asian internationalizing leaders made significant sovereignty concessions as they deepened ties to the global political economy. The typical model of political survival--incepted by Japan and emulated by tigers and cubs even before China--hinged on economic performance and growth fueled by export-led manufacturing and promotion of private enterprise. This pioneering model, adopted while much of the industrializing world remained steeped in dependency models (Krasner 1981), required sovereignty compromises to facilitate access to international capital, technology, markets, and investments. It thus enabled greater intrusion such as conditionality arrangements by international institutions, foreign powers (including erstwhile colonial power Japan), and private banks and corporations. By contrast, the reigning Middle East model following Egypts 1952 revolution and its equivalents elsewhere hinged on inwardlooking self-sufficiency, nationalism, and state and military entrepreneurship, buttressed by oil rents where available. This model required--from the standpoint of domestic political survival--minimal sovereignty losses vis-a-vis international institutions, foreign powers, and private corporations (high Westphalian autonomy). Different domestic ruling coalitions linking state and private actors underwrote models in each region.15 Politically stronger beneficiaries of relative closure, import-substitution, militarization, and natural resource monopolies--mostly within the state itself--could veto alternative models in the Middle East for decades. Furthermore, sovereignty losses to extraregional actors (state or private) were particularly sensitive because ruling coalitions relied heavily on anti-colonial rhetoric and pan-Arab norms of autonomy as sources of legitimacy.16 Neither model characterized all cases On permissive and catalytic conditions explaining the origins of these models, see Solingen (2007b and 2009a). 16 Anti-colonialism cannot easily explain differential approaches to the global economy because both regions were subjected to colonial domination, occupation, and exploitation. Chinas yoke under colonial powers, Japans colonial violence in its region and its own occupation by the US, and Vietnams repeated victimization are only some instances of colonial
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in its region but each captures Weberian ideal-types. Most East Asian states evolved into market-friendly developmental states emphasizing performance in international markets as yardsticks for success (Stiglitz 1996; Haggard 2004; McIntyre and Naughton 2005). The contrast with the typical Middle East predatory state is clear, over and beyond differences in natural resource endowments and authoritarian forms (praetorian versus monarchic).17 High tariffs and non-tariff barriers, import-substitution, extensive state and military entrepreneurship, and weakened private sector transcended those differences.18 Both regional models became self-reinforcing via path-dependent mechanisms that strengthened beneficiaries in each case. Path-dependency implies lasting legacies that reproduce political forces invested in extant institutional arrangements and increasing returns whereby actors reinforce the models logic, alternatives are dismissed, and institutions magnify existing patterns of power distribution (Krasner 1999:61-2; Thelen 1999; Pierson 2000). Chatelus (1987:111) emphasizes overwhelming incentives by Middle East dominant groups to retain rents and disincentives to shift to productive activities. Beblawi and Luciani (1987:16) describe the perception of a lack of any politically accepted alternative. Although rejection of exportled growth may not have been unusual for the 1960s, Middle East states also resisted subsequent opportunities: the 1970s oil windfalls featuring prominently in Krasners work, the 1980s crises, the global transformations of the 1990s and consequent dramatic expansion of capital flows (Owen and Pamuk 1998; Henry and Springborg 2001:44-5; Halliday 2005:264,295). The share of FDI to all developing countries captured by Middle East states declined from 11.6 (1990) to 2.1 (mid-1990s) and 1 percent (2001) (Hakimian 2001:89; AHDR 2002:87). Recent reforms might reverse this trend but trade liberalization has not yet transformed deep seated anti-export biases with some exceptions (Galal and Hoekman 2003; Hoekman and Sekkat 2009). Different sovereignty compromises are also evident in intra-regional relations. State sovereignty became far more problematic in the Middle East under the pincer movement of inward-looking, self-sufficiency politicaleconomy models and transnational pan-Arab allegiances. Both influenced regional institutional arrangements and the high incidence of interventions in each others domestic affairs. Middle East leaders launched importsubstitution to achieve rapid industrialization via robust entrepreneurial states, decreased reliance on international markets, and redistribution. Yet oppression in East Asia. 17 Developmental states usher in industrial transformation; predatory states undercut it even in the narrow sense of capital accumulation (Evans 1995). On MENAs common features and the strong case for treating the region as a unit, see Abed and Davoodi (2003). 18 Hakimian (2001); AHD Reports (2002-2009); Galal and Hoekman (2003); Elbadawi (2005); Noland and Pack (2005).

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this model unintentionally depleted states resources and ossified the political machinery--often the military--that controlled them. As chief beneficiaries of import-substitution and state entrepreneurship, militaryindustrial complexes perpetuated their rents under the aura of military prowess, nationalist myths, and pan-Arab symbols (Bill and Springborg 2000; Dawisha 2003). Drained and entropic states could not deliver resources to constituencies previously mobilized through revolutionary nationalist fervor. Thus external conflict, nationalist rhetoric and intervention in neighboring states became effective substitutes for deflecting coups and enhancing domestic legitimacy. As Halliday (2005:291), following Tilly, contends Middle Eastern states are in essencebased on the use and threat of force, prone to deploy violence at home and abroad (Dodge 2002:177).19 Inward-looking Middle East models had an inherent tendency toward competitive-outbidding among truer versions of the ideal-type. Reinforced by pan-Arab rhetoric, they fuelled mutual assaults on sovereignty.20 Individual Arab states were not the highest locus of political identification and legitimacy; colonialism was blamed not for incorrect border demarcation but for conceiving of borders at all (Gause 1992). Pan-Arab (qawmiyyah) and pan-Islamic norms weakened the legitimacy of sovereign statehood (watanyyiah), stimulating mutual challenges to sovereignty, subversion of neighbouring rulers, cross-border militarized conflicts, political unification schemes, and violent campaigns for ideological homogenization across states.21 Such challenges became rarer in East Asia as internationalizing models took hold. Noble (1991:75) notes that Arab governments relied primarily on unconventional coercive techniquesstrong attacks on the leadership of other states, propaganda campaigns to mobilize opposition, and intense subversive pressures, including cross-frontier alliances with dissatisfied individuals and groups to destabilize and overthrow opposing governments. Sovereignty was little else but organized hypocrisy in a regional environment where competing claims--kawmiya/ watanyia--could hardly co-exist easily together. Nassers junta benefited from external confrontations, diverting attention from severe domestic economic crisis by attacking Yemen and targeting oil-rich monarchies (Halliday 2005); challenging Arab leaders to endorse an Arab Collective Security Pact and unified army; threatening to suspend relations with duplicitous Arab states favoring the Baghdad Pact; The same mechanisms--delegitimized mukhabarat (secret police) authoritarian states with mammoth military-industrial complexes--afflicted both inter-Arab and ArabIsraeli relations even prior to the Six Day War (Kerr 1971). 20 Solingen (2009b). Pan-Arab rhetoric camouflaged ethnic minority control by Alawi (Syria), Sudairi (Saudi Arabia), Hashemite (Jordan), and Tikriti (Iraq) tribes, to deflect internal opposition. 21 Halliday (2005: 35) considered those norms epiphenomenal, invoked primarily for political calculation.
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proposing counter-pacts with Syria and Saudi Arabia; and intervening in others domestic affairs by mobilizing protests, forcing replacement of prime ministers and confining Jordans King Hussein. Nassers regional designs resembled Hirschmans (1945) imperial commercial strategies, using trade to induce maximum dependence by neighbors, turning them into raw materials suppliers, diverting Egypts trade to weaker partners for whom trade utility was higher, and de-industrializing weaker competitors for export markets.22 His proposed United Arab Republic with Syria (and later Iraq) entailed no seepage of sovereignty toward a supranational authority. Rather, it forced Syria to import industrial goods exclusively from Egypt, paralyzing SyrianLebanese trade and restricting Lebanese exports to Egypt. Syrian agricultural and commercial interests and even the military resisted it, leading to Syrias secession (Hasou 1985; Macdonald 1965). Lebanons open trading entrept model based on extensive extra-regional trade, commercial and banking interests was particularly threatened by protectionism, state entrepreneurship, import-substitution and highly militarized economies. Though Nassers record may be better known it was far from an anomaly. Hafiz el-Asad intervened in Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon; Saddam Hussein, Muammar Qhadafi, and others in various other countries. This pattern attenuated over time but never disappeared; Lebanese Premier Rafiq Hariri (a Saudi protg) was putatively assassinated by Syrian agents. Though aligned with pan-Arab rhetoric, most interventions contradicted the 1945 Arab Leagues Charter. Article 8 proscribed intrusion in domestic arrangements, committing members to respect others forms of government, a truly Westphalian-compliant document.23 Article 5 prohibited the use of force to settle disputes, allowing the Council to consider only disputes unrelated to independence, sovereignty or territorial integrity. The Charter foreclosed even the mildest forms of intervention in crucial categories of conflict. In reality, however, public behavior favoring wataniya-consistent with the Charter--was bad form and bad politics. Pan-Arab kawmiyah was an important source of domestic and trans-regional legitimacy; leaders could neither live with it nor without it, forcing them to embrace the rhetoric while circumventing high sovereignty costs in practice. The Leagues design was not an unintended outcome but an accurate reflection of converging preferences for an institution that would not achieve unity. These push-pull pressures for unity led to extreme rhetoric but limited achievements; centrifugal regional relations; and baroque compromises over--assaults on--sovereignty. Failing to tame competitive outbidding, the League unintendedly provided a stage for that competition. Summits were Hitlers Germany was the textbook imperial strategy. Arab nationalists considered European fascism a virile politico-economic system superior to other Western models (Macdonald 1965). 23 The League denied Iraqs Governing Council the right to represent Iraq (2003) for lacking sovereign legitimacy, a particularly poignant justification given the Leagues autocratic membership.
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not designed to enhance information and transparency about true sovereignty preferences but instead revealed the depth of rivalries and mutual attacks on domestic legitimacy. Al-Jazeera became another arena for mutual subversion with far greater reach than League meetings. A shared identity did not necessarily help Arab states overcome collective action problems; it may have even exacerbated them (Barnett and Solingen 2007). Fears of sovereignty loss also explain the prevalence of war (Dodge and Higgott 2002:2425). Weak acceptance of sovereign non-interference and of borders themselves fuelled inter-Arab, ArabIsraeli, and Arab-Iranian conflicts. Israel, Turkey and Iran were drawn into a regional system with tenuous deference to sovereignty norms (Halliday 2005). Krasner (2009:xiii) argues that most rationalist approaches would predict that if rules were violated they would change. Most sociological approaches would predict that if rules and norms were violated they would wither away. But the rules of sovereignty persisted even though they were violated. The Middle East experience is emblematic of this apparent paradox. Violations of sovereignty persist to this day. Syria hosts terrorists reportedly implicated in attacks in Baghdad, resisting extradition and leading to ambassadorial recalls by Syria and Iraq, and to Iraqi warnings of retaliation in kind. Their bilateral diplomatic ties--symbols of mutual recognition of legal sovereignty--had barely been resumed in 2006 after 24 years of interruption. Saudi Arabias air force attacked Zaydi Shia Houthi rebels in Yemen in retaliation for violation of Saudi sovereignty. And so on. Sovereignty norms took hold in East Asia only during the late twentieth century (Chan 1999:200) although others find them rooted in much earlier periods for China (Hui 2005). Embraced with a vengeance at the regional level, these norms led to strong reluctance to cede sovereignty to regional institutions. ASEAN, APEC, ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Treaty on Amity and Cooperation, and other regional arrangements are all sovereigntypreserving, emphasizing non-interference in others internal affairs and respect for territorial integrity (Solingen 2008). This features enabled China to transcend erstwhile reluctance and endorse sovereignty-upholding regionalism enthusiastically (Johnston 2008). In contrast to the Middle East, violent and subversive efforts to undermine other states authority structures declined dramatically in East Asia in recent decades. This pattern cannot be separated from East Asian leaders acceptance of Westphalian and interdependence sovereignty losses at the global level to facilitate economic growth and enhance their own political survival. These models required macroeconomic and regional stability and predictability, conditions propitious for attracting foreign investment, capital, technology, and expertise. Common resilience, a widely affirmed concept particularly in Southeast Asia, was instrumental for export-led growth. Incentives to signal cooperation to neighbors and foreign investors alike dampened interventionist impulses in others domestic affairs. Collective rhetorical support for sovereignty was aligned with a praxis of restraint on territorial, maritime, transboundary and other conflicts. This moderation is especially

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notable given many unresolved competing claims over sovereignty in the Korean peninsula, Taiwan Straits, Spratly Islands, Senkaku/Diaoyutai, Takeshima/Dokdo, and among various Southeast Asian dyads, and given incomplete domestic sovereignty over territories in Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, and others (Ganesan 2010). A further contrast with the Middle East is East Asias near universality in diplomatic relations, extending mutual recognition of legal sovereignty even to adversarial states such as North Korea.24 In terms of Krasners (2009:198) modalities of sovereignty compromises, challenges to sovereignty in intra-regional relations were more frequently of the coercive non-Pareto type in the Middle East than in East Asia. In sum, the two regions shared many features at t (1940s-1950s), when their respective inward-looking models underpinned similar patterns of regional conflict and sovereignty violations. Their eventual evolution into competing models of political survival led them in dramatically different directions and contrasting approaches to sovereignty at t+1 (1960s onward). A preference for regional stability, restraint, and compliance with sovereignty and non-intervention helped sustain nearly three decades of peace in continental Southeast Asia; over four decades in maritime Southeast Asia, and over five decades in Northeast Asia. Higher receptivity to sovereignty losses vis--vis the global political economy, and low receptivity to sovereignty violations among East Asian states, jointly contributed to a dramatic rise in collective regional power. At t+2, roughly five decades removed from t, East Asia is now ground zero of the 21st century global economy, the center of economic and financial power, a region nimble and resilient despite the 1997 Asian and 2008 global crises. Conversely, lower receptivity to sovereignty losses vis--vis the global economy, and higher receptivity to sovereignty violations at the regional level, jointly relegated much of the Middle East to significantly lower rankings in industrial prowess and resilience. Whereas East Asian economies are increasingly vital to each other and to the world (EAR 2008), the same cannot be said about the Middle East. East Asian economies export over 50 percent of their total exports to each other; Middle East economies only about 14 percent.25 East Asian economies collectively account for nearly 25 percent of world exports in goods and services; Middle Eastern ones for less than 5 percent. East Asia contributes nearly 30 percent of the worlds manufacturing exports; the Middle East less Taiwan is the exception whereas inexistent or interrupted diplomatic ties have been far more frequent in the Middle East (Syria/Lebanon, Iraq/Syria, Egypt/Iran, Morocco/Iran, Mauritania/Morocco, Libya/Egypt, Egypt/Sudan, Arab states/Israel, etc.). Egypt recalled its ambassador to Algeria following mutual attacks on soccer fans during a playoff game for the 2010 World Cup. 25 Averages for 2000-2008 (See Solingen 2009b for further sources, including for GCC countries discussed below). Intra-Arab trade accounted for 7-10 percent of their total since the 1950s (AHDR 2002:126).
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than 2 percent. East Asia accounts for nearly 18 percent of global commercial service exports; the Middle East less than 4 percent. East Asia contributes over 41 percent of the worlds high technology exports; the Middle East less than percent. Whereas both regions attracted comparable shares of FDI inflows in the early 1980s--about 10 percent of the worlds total--East Asia averaged 10-20 percent since 1985 (25 percent in the mid1990s) and the Middle East 1-2 percent (5 percent in 2003-2004). East Asia accounted for at least 10 percent of total world FDI outflows (1981-1997); 15 percent for all but one year; 20 percent in four of those years; and 12 percent average during the 2000s. The Middle East accounted for 1-2 percent of world FDI outflows (1980s), virtually nil (1990-2003), and about 2 percent (2003-2007). Middle East information and technology links are among the weakest in the world, in contrast with East Asia (Abed and Davoodi 2003). Among the top 10 ranking states in foreign exchange reserves (2009), East Asian states controlled about $4 trillion to the Middle East $400 billion. The G-20 includes five East Asian countries (China, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, and Australia,) and two Middle East ones (Saudi Arabia and Turkey). OECD members include four East Asian but only two Middle East states (Turkey and Israel). The one exception in these indicators relates to fuel exports, where the Middle East contributes about 22 percent of the worlds total, to Asias 13 percent. Oil and gas reserves have rescued the Middle East from even lower economic power rankings but have also kept it ever more vulnerable to global trends, precisely the kind of vulnerability (sovereignty threats?) that Middle East models sought to avoid for many decades. The region would rank much lower without the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, an intriguing partial and relatively recent departure from the standard Middle East model.26 Despite their heavy oil and gas export dependence, efforts to internationalize the economy have deepened, moving GCC states closer to East Asian models. Their combined nominal GDP represented over that of all Middle East countries (2003) and they accounted for over 1/2 of all FDI inflows into the 22 Arab countries since 2004. Three of the top six sovereign wealth funds are GCC-owned. All GCC states are WTO members but only 12 of 22 Arab states. GCC states are busily negotiating FTAs with major and middle powers. GCC reliance on external powers for security--a crucial compromise over sovereignty--also resembles East Asias extra-regional alliances, reflecting an even more extreme case of contracting out security. Such contracts, though rhetorically affirming GCC sovereignty, violate Westphalian sovereignty in practice by subjecting domestic military institutions and personnel to external authority (Krasner 2009:2002). A relatively more relaxed approach to sovereignty vis--vis external powers contrasts with deep reluctance to incur sovereignty losses at the intra-GCC level, The GCC includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE, accounting for only 1.4 of world GDP (2005).
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particularly given perceived Saudi hegemonic ambitions.27 This pattern too resembles East Asian compromises, informal institutions, and wariness of regional arrangements that exclude the US while China rises. Though both East Asia and the GCC remain averse to sovereignty losses to regional institutions they have made important steps in financial coordination. GCC progress on labor mobility, unified passport controls, joint investments, diversification, and unification of standards have not removed concerns with sovereignty, impeding a full customs and monetary union and a proposed common currency. Latent intra-GCC territorial sovereignty disputes have been significantly restrained, as in East Asia, an important condition for attracting FDI. As a federation, the United Arab Emirates (UAE)--a GCC member-seems an anomaly for Middle East sovereignty compromises.28 The Emirates regretted British-imposed independence in 1971, another unusual pattern for the broader Middle East. Theirs was a peculiar transition from colonial nonsovereignty to federal UAE sovereignty. Though doubting it would ever function as an effective unit, the British hoped that UAE recognition as a unified international entity would help protect it from external intervention by Iran, Egypt or Saudi Arabia (Legrenzi 2008). Todays UAE seems far more consolidated than various other Middle East states, transcending, albeit in a limited sense, the penchant for individual sovereignty (watanyia) so strictly guarded in this region. A Central Bank replaced old currencies with a common dirham and helped establish a thriving banking system. Emirates manage their own sovereign wealth funds independently but conduct a unified foreign policy, largely run by Abu Dhabi, with some sovereignty leakage where individual sheikhdoms agendas diverge, as on Iran. Scene 3: Sovereignty, Power and Hypocrisy in the Global NonProliferation Regime (NPR) If states seek power, why would most renounce their sovereign right to nuclear weapons? The NPR operates in the thorniest domain of national security, where the emergence and functioning of international institutions should be most difficult.29 One could easily conceive of the nuclear realm as Sovereignty was traditionally exercised over peoples and not over territory in the Arabian peninsula (Legrenzi 2008:195). As oil concessions became important, so did territorially-based disputes. 28 The emirates are Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Quwain, Ras al-Khaimah and Fujairah. 29 Revisiting his 1982 definition of international regimes, Krasner (2009:12) argues that theoretically neutral definitions of regimes are impossible. In a constructivist world regimes are sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area. For realism regimes entail rules and norms reflecting the interests of most powerful states. For neoliberal institutionalism regimes are principles, rules, norms that mitigate market
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the last bastion of sovereignty, where states would be expected to reject all restraints, limits, or prohibitions imposed by external authority structures. Yet the heart of the NPR, the NPT, won ratification by 189 states and is the most widely subscribed international treaty even though it is arguably the most constraining security regime of all insofar as it proscribes what some regard as the ultimate guarantee of security, the absolute weapon. Despite its severe deficiencies, it would be difficult to argue that the NPR is neither institutionalized nor important. If one can conclude without doubt that all states joined voluntarily rather than through coercion or imposition, the NPR arguably does not violate legal sovereignty (Krasner 2009:15). Expert views vary regarding such assessment. There might be broader agreement on the NPR as an international authority structure that violates Westphalian sovereignty, subverting member states control over nuclear activities within their territory, severely reducing their autonomy, and compromising their de jure and de facto authority to develop nuclear weapons; dictating specific authority structures that must regulate domestic nuclear matters;30 and endowing external authorities (IAEA) with expanding rights to inspect and secure compliance. The NPR also overrides states authority to regulate cross-border flows of nuclear materials, equipment and weapons; states must subordinate their regulations to the NPR and cannot assist, encourage, or induce NNWS to acquire nuclear weapons. UNSC 1540 takes the erosion of sovereignty a step further, compelling UN members to adopt national legislation to prevent proliferation of materials, weapons and delivery systems.31 This story of dramatic acquiescence with sovereignty loss is largely correct for most of the 184 (189 - 5) NNWS states that have genuinely abdicated their right to develop nuclear weapons. It is less relevant to three other groups. First, five states are recognized as de jure nuclear weapons states (NWS) under the NPT (the US, USSR/Russia, China, UK, and France), conforming to Krasners recognition of relative power as an important source failures. The NPR can be understood through these different lenses focusing on norms, power, and institutions respectively but all three have distinct limitations (Solingen 2007a). 30 For instance, prohibiting links between civilian and military programs in non-nuclear-weapons (NNWS) states, institutionally sanitizing the nuclear fuel cycle. 31 States must develop and maintain: appropriate physical protection measures; border controls and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat illicit trafficking; establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective national export and trans-shipment controls over export, transit, trans-shipment, re-export, financing, and transporting that might contribute to proliferation; establish end-user controls and enforce appropriate criminal or civil penalties for violations of such export control laws and regulations <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8076.doc.htm>.

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of violations of sovereign equality norms. Second, some states signed the NPT but had no qualms violating it, including Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria and Iran (the latter two found in violation of reporting commitments to the IAEA). Organized hypocrisy is a particularly apt term for these cases insofar as their rhetorical commitments to nonproliferation norms were flouted in practice, sometimes with (unintended) assistance from the IAEA. Third, India, Pakistan, and Israel abstained from signing the NPT and proceeded to develop nuclear weapons, the former two testing them and the latter neither testing nor acknowledging weapons. By not signing the NPT these three exhibited greater consistency than the previous group, neither compromising sovereignty nor technically violating the NPT. The NPRs recognition of a two-tier system of NWS and non-NWS recalls Krasners dominant modalities of deviation from sovereign equality, whether the regime operated through coercive, imposed or contractual power asymmetries, and whether or not it yielded Pareto-improving results. The contractual account builds on the NPT bargain that stipulated the right of NNWS to obtain civilian nuclear technology in exchange for renouncing sovereign rights to nuclear weapons. This is a story of Pareto optimality. Betts (2000:69), however, concluded that if the NPT...prevented proliferation, one should be able to name at least one specific country that would have sought nuclear weapons or tested them, but refrained from doing so, or was stopped, because of [this] treaty. None comes to mind. Furthermore, it is possible that the very conditions leading states to sign and ratify the NPT, although not always directly observable (or measurable), can also explain subsequent compliance better than would the NPT itself (i.e., selection bias can overstate the effect of treaty commitments). But it is also plausible that the NPR as a cluster of institutions has, in Krasners (2009:xiii) formulation, moved states closer to their most preferred outcomes. The coercive account dwells on superpower efforts, particularly by the US and USSR/Russia but also others, to deny nuclear capabilities to nonNWS, with the 2003 war in Iraq providing the most forceful instance of coercion to ensure denial. This is a story of the strongest powers imposing their own favored solution along the Pareto frontier. Coercion by powerful states, however, did not preclude North Korea, India, Pakistan, Israel (or China itself for that matter) from acquiring nuclear weapons or Iran from reaching threshold nuclear status. As Waltz (2003:38) argued, in the past half-century, no country has been able to prevent other countries from going nuclear if they were determined to do so. Krasners discussion of modalities of deviation from sovereignty does not include a persuasion account, but his recurrent attention to the logic of appropriateness draws attention to the possibility that some 180 states were persuaded to forego nuclear weapons because the latter arguably enjoyed low moral standing, at least among some states. The idea of a universal anti-nuclear acquisition norm, however, clashes with a reality of competing norms endowing nuclear weapons with redemptive anti-colonial, ethnic, religious or civic-nationalist features. There is no systematic empirical evidence one way or another for

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all 180 cases that could help adjudicate unequivocally among competing acccounts credited with this feat of sovereignty trimming by the NPR (Solingen 2007). The extent to which this feat can be traced to international power asymmetries alone or primarily--or to norms alone or primarily-remains subject to contestation. Indeed political-economy models are as apt in elucidating patterns of nuclear weapons abstention/acquisition since the NPTs inception. Whatever its main source, the NPR has raised the reputational costs of pursuing nuclear weapons for NNWS. There is a common perception that granting NWS status to the Five has had the effect of freezing the international power hierarchy in existence in the 1960s, when the NPT was negotiated. States that did not limit their nuclear sovereignty presumably gained or preserved power whereas states that renounced the sovereign right to develop nuclear weapons somehow detracted from their potential power. A simplistic power as resource perspective may perhaps suit this line of thinking. However, a relational perspective that looks at international power as the ability to affect outcomes might find possession of nuclear weapons a more questionable source of power. Nuclear weapons did little for the US and the USSR in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Nuclear weapons programs may have arguably brought Pakistan and North Korea closer to failed state destiny than to regional hegemony by, among other things, breaking their economic back. As Finnemore and Goldstein suggest, some traditional trappings of power may be poor predictors of outcomes, and nuclear weapons may be particularly so in the 21st century, given asymmetrical warfare and elusive terrorist networks. At the other end, its unclear that states that abdicated sovereign rights to nuclear weapons in fact became less powerful. Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, Germany, Brazil and others have enhanced their power quite dramatically through internationalizing models, avoiding material, reputational, and high opportunity costs of nuclear weapons and delivery systems (and no, they are not cheap as an old conventional wisdom affirms). Chinas real ascent to power--as ability to affect international outcomes--can similarly be traced to its internationalizing model much more so than to the power resource it acquired in 1964. Recent pressures by NNWS have resulted in declaratory commitments by NWS that they would strive to achieve a nuclear-weapons free world. Those pressures emanated chiefly from article VI of the NPT urging NWS to achieve nuclear disarmament, a concession extracted from NWS at the time of NPT negotiations. Whether or not NWS considered article VI a serious commitment or a symbolic gesture to engineer the perception of a Paretooptimal treaty is a subject of intense debate. Yet Article VIs commitment to pursue nuclear disarmament negotiations in good faith entailed a selfbinding of nuclear sovereignty by the most powerful actors. For much of the treatys lifespan Article VI remained in the background of the NPR, as powerbased perspectives of international relations would have expected. That the less powerful (NNWS) states would succeed in curtailing the sovereign right

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of more powerful NWS to retain nuclear weapons might turn theories of international power on their head. This outcome seems unlikely any time soon (if ever) but NWS have already been pressed into verbal and written commitments that can hardly be explained by notions of relative power. Though initially favoring the most powerful states that created it, the NPR could well end up canceling those states prerogatives. The road to that elusive outcome is likely to be plagued by resistance from domestic audiences in NWS (including newcomers) as well as structural difficulties inherent in getting to zero in a multilateral nuclear world. And even if such difficulties were to be surmounted, hypocrisy could well remain a feature of a Nuclear Zero world: latent differential power capabilities (nuclear, industrial) among unequal sovereign states might continue to foil stable Pareto-optimal nuclear-free outcomes. Conclusions Our brief excursion into three scenes of contemporary international relations confirms that Krasners four sovereignty forms do not necessarily co-vary, and that the sovereignty bundle is a continuously evolving construct. Chinas reduced sphere of interdependence and Westphalian sovereignty in the wake of its internationalization has been accompanied by a rise in recognition of its international legal sovereignty (buttressed by UN membership) and perhaps a strengthening of its domestic sovereignty. Indeed, Westphalian sovereignty losses to international economic markets and institutions may have arguably strengthened Chinas ability to withstand external intervention in authority structures relevant to democracy and human rights. Some of the same sovereignty tradeoffs can be observed with respect to East Asia as a region: greater acceptance of interdependence sovereignty losses and heightened levels of domestic sovereignty. Taiwan was able to endure minimal legal sovereignty--the very prospect of state death--through extensive compromises in interdependence and Westphalian sovereignty. By contrast, greater resistance to interdependence and Westphalian sovereignty losses by most Middle East states did not entail strengthened domestic sovereignty, or effective state control over activities within their borders (Yemen is only an extreme example but similar tribal, ethnic, and political challenges afflict other states, from Morocco to Iran and Pakistan). Some of the states most resistant to interdependence sovereignty losses have also been keenest on retaining sovereign rights to develop nuclear weapons. Ironically, the high opportunity costs of both these efforts brought diminished domestic sovereignty, from Pakistan to Iraq, Syria and Libya (and perhaps Iran and even North Korea). The three scenes also illuminate the reciprocal and complex relationship between sovereignty compromises and power. Such compromises, stemming from both domestic incentives and international power considerations, in turn have the potential for altering the power of leaders, states, regions, and global order. But it is not necessarily the case that demands for greater interdependence and Westphalia sovereignty lead

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to greater power capabilities, at home or abroad. On the one hand strong demands for undiluted sovereignty by Chinas Maoist leadership may have enhanced Westphalian autonomy from external and internal forces but also stifled Chinas ascent in global resources and influence, and weakened Maos power. Similarly, rigid interdependence and Westphalia sovereignty claims by Middle East rulers sapped their own power resources at home and shackled their ability to enhance the regions international power, a pattern that GCC leaders superseded only recently. Finally, resistance to sovereignty compromises embedded in NPT membership (including Additional Protocols) did not entail heightened power capabilities for North Korea, pre-2004 Libya, Iraq, Iran, Cuba or Pakistan (and Brazils acceptance of NPT commitments preceded--did not preclude-- its dramatic ascent to power). On the other hand, compromises that curtailed interdependence and Westphalian sovereignty have been instrumental in enhancing the power of Chinas internationalizing rulers domestically and overseas. Even as China became more bound by international conventions and external markets (for natural resources and technology, among others), its power to affect outcomes also rose within and beyond governance structures such as the G20 and the UNSC. Similarly, self-imposed limitations of interdependence and Westphalian sovereignty by East Asian states helped propel their region to higher levels of international power (as both resource and ability to influence outcomes). The renunciation of nuclear weapons by Japan, Germany, South Korea and others did not necessarily diminish their power; indeed it is quite possible that nuclear abstention helped consolidate it (though the counterfactual that nuclear weapons might have made them even more powerful cannot be completely ruled out). Our conclusions thus far suggest that maximizing sovereignty/autonomy does not necessarily entail maximizing power, and reductions in sovereignty dont automatically lead to reductions in power. But does greater power inevitably lead to greater demand for sovereignty? The answer to that question is highly contingent on, first, the nature of the international system at a particularly world-time. Our brief zoom into scene 1 suggests that greater power in contemporary international relations can paradoxically require greater receptivity to sovereignty compromises and reduced autonomy. Whereas China might have preferred a freer hand and much lower profile on the sanctions debate vis--vis North Korea and Iran, its own evolving interests and international expectations leave it less room for autonomous behavior. Whether greater power leads to greater demands for sovereignty is also contingent on competing domestic models of political survival, the relative strength of which is partially affected by international structure. In sum, as Finnemore and Goldstein suggest, power does not translate tidily into political outcomes. Neither does sovereignty. Nor do power and sovereignty map unto each other in self-evident ways. Any research agenda on these relationships is indebted to Krasners efforts to problematize power and sovereignty as central concepts of international relations.

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