Aristotle: Ontological structure of philosophy.

Aristotle divided philosophy into first philosophy and second philosophy (Aristotle, 1924, 1026a27-31 and 1037a14f). First philosophy comprises theology, the study of all that is divine and eternal, of being qua being, of first causes and the principles of things (1.1, 1026a27-30) The eternal objects that first philosophy treats exist before all sense-perceptible objects, for from the eternal principles emanate all manifestations in the world of sense-experience. The latter, all that we know of the outer or natural world, is thus for Aristotle the concern of second philosophy. Citing Plato, Aristotle (1924) suggested further that mathematics is a third ontological domain, situated between the eternal and originating essences and the conditioned external appearances. Mathematics principles are also eternal, yet not hidden, but rather revealed in the world of appearances; it thus unites the aspects of first and second philosophy (1.6, 987b15-20).

Aristotles first epistemological structure of philosophy: physics and metaphysics.

Aristotle also makes a distinction between natural and divine entities on the grounds of epistemological priority. It is first necessary to study the appearances of nature, or physis, he suggests, before attempting to understand the eternal principles underlying these appearances. Since he termed the epistemologically prior understanding physics, we have come to refer to the epistemologically secondary study, that concerning eternal principles, metaphysics (Cohen, 2009). For Aristotle, the epistemological sequence, in which we must first explore sensory experience before arriving at the deeper nature of the world, thus reverses the ontological order,

in which the deeper nature of the world is primary and original, its appearances merely secondary manifestations. The distinction between physics and metaphysics reflects the necessary path of progress for human understanding, while that between first and second philosophy reflects the domains transcendent ontological relationship.

Aristotles second epistemological structure of philosophy: theoria, poiesis, praxis.

Aristotle then subsumes the fields of physics, mathematics, and theology under the single heading of theoretical or contemplative knowledge. He contrasts this with practical knowledge (praxis) concerned with how to conduct ones life (Bodnr & Pellegrin, 2009, p. 270). Theoretical philosophy is concerned with understanding rightly, practical philosophy with acting rightly in the world. Between the practical and theoretical modes he describes a third, productive mode, poiesis, concerned with the ways we creatively transform the world (Pilario, 2005, p. 2). Productive knowledge relates to creating objective entities distinct from the action itself, as is true of all artistic activities and the crafts, while practical knowledge relates to actions accomplished for the sake of the action itself, that is, actions understood from an ethical standpoint. Insofar as the division between theoria, poiesis, and praxis bears on the ways in which we relate to the world in order to gain knowledge, theoretically, productively, or practically, it is also primarily epistemological in nature. Peirce, a great systematizer, considered philosophy to be one of three major realms of human knowledge, the other two being the empirical sciences and mathematics, a division that clearly echoes Aristotles division of philosophy into metaphysics, physics, and mathematics (Aristotle, 1924,987b15-20, 1026a27-31, 1037a14f). (What Peirce meant by phenomenology was

simply an exploration of the nature of experience.) Curiously, Peirce classified logic as a normative science.