Philosophy, Ethics and Animal Law It would take far more than the space allotted here to comprehensively

describe the philosophical and ethical debates that have contributed to the foundation of animal law. Suffice to say that although in the law animals are regarded as the property of human animals, yet in being accorded some protection against mistreatment and cruelty, it could be said that animal law has an ethical, or moral, cornerstone that other property law does not have. If there is such a cornerstone, it would be due at least in part to a recognition that animals are sentient beings, just as human animals are. In fact, the Australian government has as its blueprint for the development of animal law in Australia a statement that it is concerned with humane treatment of sentient animals, and a recognition that [a]ll animals have intrinsic value (at the time of writing this article, it is unknown whether we are referring here to the present or past government). Thats all well and good, one might think. As a result, a range of animals are being protected against cruelty and increasingly harsh penalties are being imposed on those that break that law. Our domestic animals are given today the protection that humans like slaves, women and children have been deprived of at various times in history (as they too were considered property and denied legal personhood). However, there are far, far more sentient animals being denied protection against cruelty than those that are protected; in fact, the extent of suffering deliberately imposed on some animals by humans, and their sheer numbers, makes that moral cornerstone appear very shaky indeed. Animals continue to suffer acutely in puppy or kitten mills, in battery cages, pig pens and other factory farming situations, on live transportation ships, on the recreational hunting grounds, and in research laboratories. From a legal point of view, where the animals in the arenas mentioned above are concerned, there is a balancing act occurring. The law states that imposing suffering on such an animal is prohibited unless it is reasonable or necessary. This of course entails an examination of the purpose of the practice which is causing suffering to the animal. Inevitably, those purposes are potential benefits of some kind to humans, whether they be economic, health or recreational. Clearly then the philosophy behind a vast expanse of existing animal law is still that animals are our property and are here for our use and enjoyment. Yet there is an increasing groundswell of influential movement advocating for a law change in the areas of farming practices, live animal transport, recreational hunting and research, on the basis that the suffering to animals in those areas cannot and will no longer be tolerated. It is interesting to consider the philosophies behind that movement, in particular the philosophies of the Australian Peter Singer, arguably the father of animal liberation, not just in Australia but worldwide. Singer argued that if we are to accord humans full and equal moral status, as we do, then humans must

possess something that grounds that status that no other animal has. Having human DNA is not a reason for granting that status. Humans can of course behave rationally, autonomously and morally perhaps then, that is the reason for the status; however, clearly not all humans are able to behave rationally, autonomously or morally (for example, children and some mentally ill), and what is more, there are some non-human animals that are able to behave in that way for example, the great apes, and increasingly more animals are being recognized scientifically as sharing those qualities with us. Yet, children and the mentally ill are granted the same moral status as other humans, so why therefore should not the great apes at least be considered of the same standing? This reasoning has seen the banning of the use of great apes in research laboratories in New Zealand. Other lawyers have gone further with Singer: if we must choose something that all humans have to justify that equal moral status, we arrive at notions of sentience, or being able to experience pleasure and pain. However, animals are sentient and able to experience pleasure and pain. Thus, to animal lawyers, the conclusion is profoundly straightforward and logical, like the simplest mathematical sum animals should be granted an equal moral status to humans, and therefore law should protect them exactly as it does humans. The above of necessity simplifies the animal law movement to a minute degree, however it perhaps provides justification for what may to some seem like an esoteric or pointless pursuit, and hopefully indicates instead that the present animal law movement has a cornerstone that is not only moral but rational. anime