NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

The Norm of Self-Sacrifice

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS

for the degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Field of Psychology

By Sonya Sachdeva

EVANSTON, ILLINOIS December 2010

2 ABSTRACT The Norm of Self-Sacrifice Sonya Sachdeva Recent work in moral psychology has begun to acknowledge that culture may play a large role in shaping peoples moral values. For instance, how an individual construes of herself in relation to her social group can affect her broader orientation toward moral concepts (Shweder, Mahapatra & Miller, 1997; Miller, 1993; Moghaddam, Slocum, Finkel, Mor & Harr, 2002). Specifically, the two orientations toward morality that I explore in this work distinguish between rights-based systems and duty-based systems of morality. As a result of these culturallyspecific systems of morality and particular types of practices, the norm of self-sacrifice may evolve to be an important virtue among certain cultural groups and social classes. The focus of the current work is to investigate how the norm of self-sacrifice affects the formation of moral judgments. Study 1 uses cultural folktales from India and the United States to demonstrate a link between the presence of duties and self-sacrifice. In Study 2, field experiments with several different populations in India and the United States show that self-sacrifice is valued more among some social classes than others. The final two studies show that the norm of self-sacrifice is embedded within a rich cultural fabric which dictates when self-sacrifice is laudable. Study 3 shows that participants are sensitive to the role of the agent carrying out an act of self-sacrifice. In Study 4, groups who seemed to value self-sacrifice the most devalued it when it was done for mundane causes. Evidence for cultural differences in how the act of self-sacrifice is construed also emerged in Study 4 as participants from some groups but not others seemed to be more sensitive to the likelihood of a self-sacrifices success indicating a less romanticized ideal of an act of self-sacrifice. Conclusions are that both culturally-specific systems of morality and certain

3 types of life experiences may foster an environment where sacrificing oneself may become an important part of the moral sphere. These results have implications for behavioral scientists understanding of individual motivations of engaging in social action and that perhaps, selfinterest may not be the right framework across all cultures and social contexts.

4 Table of Contents Introduction......1 Current Work in Cultural Influences on Moral Cognition...................3 Independent and Interdependent Construals of the Self..9 Bringing Self-Construals to the Moral Domain.....13 The Norm of Self-Sacrifice....18 The Present Research.24 Study 1...27 Methods..28 Results....30 Discussion..34 Study 2...37 Methods.38 Participants. 38 Materials41 Results....41 Judgments of Praise.......... 41 Judgments of Purity of Intentions......45 Discussion......47 Study 3a.........49 Participants.....51 Procedure...54 Results....55

5 Discussion......56 Study 3b.........59 Participants.....60 Materials and Procedure....60 Results................64 Group Differences..65 Participant Gender Differences..67 Discussion..................68 Study 4...................69 Methods..70 Participants.....70 Procedure...71 Results....73 Discussion......77 General Discussion....78 References..........89 Appendices.........98

6 List of Tables Table 1.Study 1: Means for variables of interest, broken down be moral content in stories .......32 Table 2. Study 1: Correlation Matrix for Folktale Coding ...........................................................34 Table 3. Study 2: Demographic Information for Participants in Experiment 2.........................40 Table 4. Study 2: Means of Reward/Loss Conditions by Group ...................................................43 Table 5. Study 2: Participants preferences for agent suffering loss or neutral outcome ........44 Table 6. Study 2: Means and Standard Errors Summary of Participants Judgments of Actors Purity of Intentions........................................................................................................................45 Table 7. Study 3a: Demographic Information for Participants in Study 3a..................53 Table 8. Study 3a: Means by Outcome and Order Condition for All Groups...............................56 Table 9. Study 3b: Demographic Information for Participants in Study 3b..................................62 Table 10. Study 3b: Means by Outcome Condition and Gendered Sacrifice for All Groups........66 Table 11. Study 3b: Means by Gender of Participants and Condition..........................................67

7 List of Figures Figure 1. Study 2: Judgments of Praise for Agent who Received Less Positive Outcome............43 Figure 2. Study 2: Judgments of Intentionality of Agent who Received Less Positive Outcome...47 Figure 3. Study 4: Rural, Urban Indian and American Participants Approval of Self-Sacrifice by Type and Purpose..........................................................................................................................75 Figure 4. Study 4: Participants Sensitivity to the Likelihood of a Sacrifices Success by Type and Purpose of Sacrifice.......................................................................................................................76

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 8 INTRODUCTION There has been a long-standing debate over the role of culture in moral psychology. Morality, as defined by most influential, classical philosophers, consists of the principles surrounding the domains of harm and justice (Gert, 2002; Kant, 1996; Rawls, 1971). Some of the earliest descriptive accounts of moral psychology also claim that these are the principles that are most salient when forming moral judgments across all cultures. Arguably the most influential theory of moral reasoning is by Lawrence Kohlberg (1976, 1984). In his model of moral development, Kohlberg proposed that the most basic level of moral reasoning relies on culturally relative moral norms. However, one only reaches moral maturity upon recognizing (or at least expressing) that ethical principles are universal and independent of social systems. In addition, Kohlbergs model has an added level of universality such that not only must participants realize that certain moral principles are larger than any social norms, but also that morally mature individuals across all cultures recognize that moral principles transcend culturally-specific practices and traditions. Thus Kohlberg believed that moral reasoning within the most morally developed minds happens in the same way across all cultural groups though it may not necessarily rely on the same principles, the underlying reasoning must be the same. Though Carol Gilligan and others have argued against Kohlbergs approach (Gilligan, 1982), this assumption that moral reasoning does not depend on culture, was taken forward by Eliot Turiels work. Turiel proposed that children were able to learn about moral norms at a very young age and distinguish them from other, conventional norms (Turiel, 1983, 1997; Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987). In Turiels view children reason about moral norms very differently from how they reason about other conventional norms. Moral norms, in contrast to conventional norms, were assumed to be authority-independent, universally applicable (not culturally

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 9 determined) and always involve harm, rights or justice violations. This is a departure from Kohlbergs model because not only does it specify a universal pattern of reasoning about moral issues but also culturally-independent moral principles. However, more recent work in moral psychology has begun to acknowledge the influential role culture may play in moral reasoning. Culture can affect moral reasoning in several ways. Some work shows that certain moral principles tend to be expressed more often within some cultures than others (Shweder, Much, Mahapatra & Park, 1997; Haidt, Koller & Dias, 1993). Researchers have also proposed that, depending on how one construes of oneself in relation to the environment or social group, affects ones construal of morality (Miller, 1993; Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh & Hepp, 2009). One of the most interesting distinctions, for the purpose of the current work, has been drawn between duty and rights-based systems of morality (Shweder, Mahapatra & Miller, 1997; Miller, 1993; Moghaddam, Slocum, Finkel, Mor & Harr, 2002). In a similar vein to the distinction between interdependent and independent selfconstruals (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, a duty-based construal of morality is assumed to have a more collective focus, i.e. favoring the needs of a social group over an individuals. Little work, however, has tested the implications of these different construals on moral cognition. I propose that one understudied facet of a duty-based construal of morality is the value people might place on the norm of self-sacrifice. In a series of studies using cultural products, field interviews and lab experiments, I try to show that self-sacrifice is more meaningful among some cultural and social groups than others. Study 1 tries to establish a link between the salience of duties and self-sacrifice. Study 2 shows that self-sacrifice is more valued among some social classes than others and also suggests that though the norm of self-sacrifice appears to be strongest among groups that have been shown to have a more interdependent or duty-based

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 10 outlook, self-sacrifice may develop as an important part of ones system of morality through particular types of life experiences and practices. Studies 3 and 4 aim to delve deeper into the norm of self-sacrifice by assessing its relation to social role expectations and the contexts in which self-sacrifice becomes unacceptable. But I begin first by reviewing the current work on the role of cultural influences in moral cognition followed by a brief overview of the differences between inter-dependent and independent self-construals to guide the discussion on duty and rights orientations to morality. CURRENT WORK IN CULTURAL INFLUENCES ON MORAL COGNITION More recently, Marc Hausers model has gained influence as an account of moral reasoning (Hauser, 2006). Using Chomskys model of grammar as an analogy for the moral module, Hauser proposes that all humans have an innate capability to perceive rights and wrongs a universal moral sense. Unlike Turiel, Hausers framework does not necessarily mandate specific values. Instead, he claims that individuals are born with a set of tools and parameters for constructing morality. These, however, are only the very basic elements of morality. How the actual content of our moral sense is realized is fairly situationally-dependent. The culture or environment that an individual develops within assigns values to her moral parameters, thereby producing specified moral values and principles responsible for guiding behavior. So a basic parameter may be something like how sensitive a person is to physical contact in moral action. If the environment is structured in a way that this parameter is activated, then an individual in that environment will be sensitive to the role of physical contact in harm situations. But even if an individual does not hold this particular moral value (i.e. physical contact in harm is worse than no physical contact), Hauser et al would claim that the ability to have it is universal, because there is a basic parameter which corresponds to physical contact. Although this model provides

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 11 a lot of opportunity for culture specific moral values (e.g. just as languages vary widely across the world), some parameters are thought to be expressed cross-culturally (e.g. just as basic linguistic syntactical structures are preserved in most languages). Perhaps unsurprisingly, the most culturally-specific approaches to moral reasoning have been proposed by an anthropologist, Richard Shweder (Shweder, 1982, 1990, 1991, 2002; Shweder, Jensen, & Goldstein, 1995). Though he believes that there are some good candidates for universal moral values (for example principles such as justice, fairness, purity, and moral emotions like anger, guilt, shame), Shweder proposes that there are three distinct ethics that cultures use to classify and resolve moral issues: the ethics of autonomy, of community, and of divinity. Each ethic is based on a different conceptualization of the person: in an ethic of autonomy, the individual is the core for the structure of morality with his or her own rights, goals and desires. In an ethic of community, a person is a unit within a larger social structure, e.g., in a family or a tribe, and therefore shares the burden of responsibility for that unit. Thirdly, in an ethic of divinity, an individual is a divine entity, with sacred value within himself or herself. Here, issues of purity and spiritual defilement are most critical. Depending on which of these ethics is most salient within a culture, a different set of moral values and norms is created and upheld as a good. For example, in a culture which heavily emphasizes an ethic of divinity, disgust is a more salient moral emotion and women may be ostracized during menstruation because of purity concerns (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999). Although Shweder and his colleagues provide an overarching model of how cross-cultural variation in morality may be structure they do not elaborate on which specific moral codes or rules might be affected by embodying one structure of morality over another (Shweder, Mahapatra, & J. G. Miller, 1997; Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997). To make this idea a bit more concrete, imagine that

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 12 a person of Japanese descent places the greatest emphasis on the ethic of community. How do her values differ from those of someone whose culture emphasizes an ethic of autonomy? This remains unspecified. Some work by Jonathan Haidt shows that relying on different moral principles (or ethics as in Shweders model) can lead people to value different behaviors and rules. Haidt et al (1993) gave participants several vignettes describing people behaving in some socially offensive manner. The participants were either from rural or urban, low or high socioeconomic status (SES) in Brazil or Philadelphia. Some of the scenarios were typical moral violations like one person hitting another, while others were specifically designed to show disrespect or disobedience. The disrespectful or disobedient acts were not caused by harmful intentions and did not have an (apparently) harmful consequence, e.g., a person using the national flag to clean his toilet. Haidt et al (1993) found that participants belonging to either Philadelphia or the very richest and most educated groups in Brazil treated the morally offensive behavior stories notably differently than the stories involving disrespect. The low SES participants from Brazil and even those from Philadelphia thought that the disrespectful/disobedient behaviors were just as immoral as the morally offensive ones. On all measures assessing the extent to which participants moralized certain issues, low SES participants did not distinguish between what Haidt et al classified as morally offensive and disrespectful behaviors. Haidt et al (1993) used these findings to suggest that middle-class participants had a narrower perspective on what constitutes morality. So, while participants from high SES regions in Philadelphia or Brazil said that it is not necessary to prevent someone from using the flag to clean his bathroom, low SES participants thought that it was morally imperative to do so. This finding, at the very least, suggests that

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 13 respect or obedience is a moral value for low SES participants in Haidt et als study. No doubt the urban, high SES participants would have thought that cleaning ones toilet with the American flag in front of a World War II veteran was morally reprehensible, but in that case it is easy to see that it is causing harm to someones sentiments. The notable result from this study is that Brazilians and low SES Philadelphians treat respect as a moral value even when there is no apparent harm involved. Note also that the low SES participants from Philadelphia define morality more like Brazilian participants and differently from the high SES participants, indicating that social class is an important factor in shaping ones moral intuitions. Haidt et als model of moral reasoning is similar to Shweders in that both models assume that there are several chief psychological principles that compose moral concepts (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). Haidt and Joseph define their four principles as concern for suffering/compassion, reciprocity/fairness, hierarchy/respect and purity. But, of the four, Haidt and his colleagues believe only the first three are good candidates for universally recognized moral intuitions. These, they believe, evoke flashes of feeling independent of cultural membership, implying that there are some universal moral principles. Haidt also believes that the selection of these principles is constrained by the social environment. He claims that the striking differences in the very definitions of what constitutes morality are the root of many social ideological differences within a country. For example, in the study described above lowSES participants might rely on principles of respect and loyalty when making moral judgments and seem to have very different moral values than high-SES participants. Moral intuitions develop within a rich cultural context with children learning through trial and error what a society considers to be permissible or impermissible. However, through a process of socialization either through one's lifetime or through changing cultural mores (Paul

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 14 Rozin, Markwith, & Stoess, 1997; Paul Rozin & Singh, 1999), these moral norms become so engrained within an individual's being that they are perceived to be apparent truths. Moral intuitions may also be viewed as self-evident because, within a particular closed cultural context, there are few occasions for these norms to be questioned. Instead, they may be continually reinforced, generation after generation, until a psychologist comes along with a cleverly designed scenario. The social intuitionist model of moral reasoning (Haidt, 2001) has several other explicitly culturally-specific facets. For instance, some emotions, like contempt or disgust, are more likely to be expressed in a particular culture in response to a moral violation than others. In addition, there may be variation in the types of moral intuitions, the situations which violate particular intuitions and the emotional consequences of those violations. But the fundamental process through which moral judgment is formed is consistent across cultures. Haidts model seems to reach the brink of cultural relativity in moral reasoning, but it may not go far enough. Specifically, it does not seem like a big leap to claim that if there are differences in situations evoking the moral response, then there may also be cross-cultural variation in the processing of those situations. In addition, Haidt et als (1993) work shows that participants from different social classes may also classify different domains as moral. It may be possible to extrapolate from these findings that social class may affect other facets of moral reasoning as well. For example, some previous work suggests that participants of a lower socioeconomic status are more likely to externally reinforce moral norms than those from a higher socioeconomic status (Aronfreed, 1961). In interviews conducted with working class children and their parents, Aronfreed found that children from a lower SES level were more likely to behave morally in anticipation of external punishment relative to their middle class

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 15 counterparts. In addition, when responding to a scenario about someone engaging in sociallyprohibited violent behavior, lower SES children were more sensitive to external mitigating or contextual factors than middle class children. These findings suggest that social class may have a much more profound effect on orientations toward morality than has been previously assumed. So far, we see that the work exploring cultural influences on moral cognition does not stray from some very basic assumptions of morality. First, most theories assume that there are at least some principles that all moral systems across the world must include. For example, they must involve impermissibility of harm, however that is defined, and perhaps also require justice. Second, all of the influential theories of moral reasoning seem to claim that the moral domain is reasoned about in the same way across all cultural groups and social classes. However, I would like to argue that not only can the very structure of a basic moral concept like harm differ across populations, but it might also be reasoned about very differently. For example, though it has been acknowledged that the situations seen as causing harm can vary across cultures, there has been relatively less work on how people might differ in terms of how sensitive they are to mitigating contexts surrounding the harmful act or how abstractly or concretely they reason about harm in general. The fact that research on moral cognition has not yet paid enough attention to culturallyspecific construals of moral concepts shows that it lags behind other work in culture and other sub-domains of cognition (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Bang, Medin & Atran, 2007). So, before I can begin to explore how different systems of morality can affect moral cognition, I try to draw on other theories of cultural specificity in cognition to show how these models might be used to expand moral reasoning to include flexibility in cognitive processes across cultures.

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 16

INDEPENDENT AND INTERDEPENDENT CONSTRUALS OF THE SELF In order to understand how culturally-shaped psychological processes can affect moral reasoning, a broad system of different orientations toward the external world may be useful as a case study and a framework to understand moral cognition. The orientation that has received a lot of attention in the work on cultural influences on cognition is the dimension of individualism and collectivism. Although this dimension was discussed on the group level (as compared to the level of the individual) at its inception (Hofstede, 1983; Triandis, 1989), it soon evolved to be thought of as a psychological construct. Generally, it was presumed that cultures that were classified broadly as individualistic value personal goals over the goals of collectives and were more concerned with achievement. Collectivist cultures tend to emphasize the in-group and show less of a distinction between the goals of the group and the individual. In addition, collectivist cultures are more sensitive to power relationships, group membership, and role relationships. However, this broad construal of individualistic cultures versus collectivistic cultures ran into problems because there appeared to be a lot of intra-cultural variation (Fernandez, Paez & Gonzalez, 2005). But, if the individualism-collectivism dimension is viewed as an individuallevel construct, it can elucidate how one views the self in relation to ones environment. In their seminal work, Markus and Kitayama (1991; see also Shweder & Bourne, 1984) describe two aspects of the self which map closely on to individualism and collectivism. In an independent construal of the self, the individuals goal is one of defining the uniqueness and wholeness of the self. The behavior which results from independent construals is supposed to be self-referential. Specific attention is paid to ones own thoughts, feelings and action (as opposed to others), essentially making the private components of the self the most salient. In contrast, an

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 17 interdependent self-construal leads an individual to view the self as connected to and defined by others in various interpersonal relationships. Behavior within this construal is dependent to a large degree on what the individual perceives as the desires and goals of others. Accordingly, the most significant components of the self with an interdependent construal are those in the public sphere 1 . How one construes the self is an immensely powerful factor to consider when studying any type of cognition because its impacts can be wide-ranging. As orientations toward the world external to the self, having a relatively independent versus interdependent construal can change the conceptualization, meaning and interpretation of many different psychological variables. For example, one of the interpretations of this construct is to assume that with an interdependent selfconstrual, the goals of the individual are valued less than the goals of the collective (Singelis, 1994). In actuality, the goals of the self with an interdependent construal cannot be understood without taking into consideration the goals of the collective. The desires of the self and the desires of others are less likely to be perceived as conflicting when one has an interdependent self-view because personal and interpersonal goals seem to converge (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). So, it is not a simple matter of whether an independent self-construal leads a person to be selfish and an interdependent self-construal leads one to be selfless. Rather, these orientations change what is valued and desired on both an individual and group level.

The construct of varying views of the self is not impervious to the type of cultural insensitivity we have observed within the field of moral cognition. In fact, a lot of the scales that have been used to measure an individuals level of interdependence are culturally-insensitive at best and misleading at worst, portraying cultural values in an outdated and inflexible manner (see Kitayama, 2002 for a critique of the scales used to measure self-construals).

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 18 Another psychological variable that these different orientations of the self have been shown to influence is how the concept of self-esteem is defined. Without the orientations toward the self perspective, self-esteem was purported to be not only a more important concept in individualistic cultures but also reported to be higher overall. However, Markus and Kitayama (1991) claim that this is only because having different orientations to the relationship between the in-group and the self leads to different components of self-esteem. In other words, what makes an interdependently oriented person feel good about himself is different from an independently oriented person feel good. And in fact, when this perspective is taken into account, it seems that the need for a high positive self-regard is just as high in Japanese individuals (with a higher proportion of interdependent self-construals) as with American individuals (Heine, Lehman, Markus & Kitayama, 1999). It appears as though different orientations toward the self and its relationship to others, can influence many aspects of reasoning. However, it is also true that independent versus interdependent orientations themselves can vary within a culture and differ across contexts (Oyserman, Sorensen, Reber, & Chen, 2009; Miller, 2002). Additionally, independent/interdependent orientations toward the self are not necessarily a chronic pattern of reasoning. For example, it has been proposed that people from collectivistic cultures have a less coherent view of the self as compared to those from individualistic cultures presumably because the self is de-emphasized in such cultures. However, lacking a coherent self-view appears to be task-dependent to a good extent. Cousins (1989) found that though Japanese participants were less likely to have a coherent view of the self than American participants, this was only true when they were given a task that was decontextualized. So, when they were asked to define themselves in a particular social context, they had just as clearly defined view of themselves as

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 19 Americans in the decontextualized task. American participants, however, seemed to think of the self in more concrete and variable terms when the social context was provided. It is certainly true that independent/interdependent orientations do seem to vary systematically across cultures such that interdependent self-construals are more prevalent in Eastern cultures than in Western cultures (Oyserman, Coon & Kimmelmeier, 2002). However, independent and interdependent construals of the self have been primed in the lab with some success, providing support for the claim that self-construals are flexible to a certain extent (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 1999; Lee, Aaker, & Gardner, 2000). In each study, participants whose primary orientation towards the self was an independent one were influenced to behaving in a manner consistent with an interdependent self-construal. For example, in one study, both students from Hong Kong and the United States, favored culturally atypical values when primed with inconsistent self-construals, e.g., independent self prime for Hong Kong students and interdependent self prime for US students (Gardner, Gabriel & Lee, 1999). These studies provide further proof that independent/interdependent orientations are habitual patterns learned within a particular cultural system. Independent and interdependent construals of the self can also vary across social classes (Freeman, 1997; Fernandez, Paez & Gonzalez, 2005). High socioeconomic status groups have been shown to value individualism more and have independent self-construals than low socioeconomic status groups. Fernandez et al surveyed thousands of participants in 29 countries and found that interdependence was more closely related to lower SES groups than high SES groups. Interestingly, this pattern held constant across several countries indicating that a working class lifestyle is related to fostering a social environment which encourages an interdependent self, independent of other cultural practices.

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 20

Bringing Self-Construals to the Moral Domain The different types of orientations toward the self and how they relate to ones community described above teach some important lessons about how culture may have a different sort of influence on moral reasoning than has thus far been proposed. In this dissertation I propose that moral principles, judgments and overall cognition occur while embedded within a particular system of morality. Every aspect of morality gets colored by whichever system of morality a particular individual is operating within. Systems of morality, in the way they are discussed here, are analogous to self-construal as described above. Just as an interdependent self-construal affects a whole host of different cognitive processes and behaviors, so also can having a particular system or orientation toward morality affect a number of different values and behaviors. The particular orientation I will focus on is the distinction between a rights or duties based system of morality. Rights can be broadly construed as a something that is owed by others to an individual who has them. Duties, on the other hand, are something that is owed by an individual to others (Moghaddam, Slocum, Finkel, Mor, & Harre, 2000). Moghaddam et al (2000) propose that the division between a culture of rights and duties can have important implications for how different cultures represent morality and engage in moral behaviors. Duties have traditionally seemed to constitute an important part of morality in India, and especially Hindu India (Brown, 1972; Mulatti, 1995). The concept of dharma applies to all agents living in a society and creates a system of morally required giving that enforces particular types of roles and identities. So, gods and kings have various types of duties and mothers and merchants another type. More specifically, this system of dharma was instituted to

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 21 constrict and sustain a social structure, in which the self and its actions were given less precedence than the needs of the community (Appadurai, 1995). There is some evidence from psychological work to suggest that the particular system of morality in ones environment (i.e., rights-based morality versus duties-based morality) might be directly related to independent/interdependent self-construals. Firstly, it is interesting to note that awareness of ones duties is a component of scales used to measure individualism/collectivism with a greater emphasis on duties signifying a more collective orientation (Oyserman, Coon & Kemmelmeier, 2002). Additionally, Joan Miller (1994) suggests that a framework of morality based on rights is associated with individualistic self-construal where an individual can be in opposition to her social environment. However, a psychology of duties might lead to a more monistic view of morality in which ones moral responsibilities are in concordance with ones social environment and are often socially enforceable obligations. In this latter system, the self or an individual is not the unit of consideration, rather the focus is on a collective or a group of individuals. This may sound very similar to the interdependent versus independent orientation of the self and in terms of conceptualizing the self, these two orientations may map on very closely to each other. Fathali Moghaddam and his colleagues (Moghaddam, Slocum, Finkel, Mor, & Harre, 2000; Bhatia, 2000) have argued that within the past century the psychology of duties has been completely ignored in Western societies. As a result, a Western psychologist might find the distinction between moral and conventional rules to be salient because he is construing of morality as a rights-based system, as in Turiels work. That same distinction may become irrelevant when a person conceives of morality as something that is socially determined, as in a

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 22 duty-based system, because both moral and conventional rules will be dictated by the adaptive role they play within the society. More specifically, in this dissertation, I examine how having a rights- versus duties-based orientation toward moral concepts can have implications for even the most basic domains of morality. The domain of harm is present in every model of morality. Yet, harm itself, or the object of a harmful act could be perceived very differently depending on whether a person is operating in a rights-based or duties-based system of morality. As discussed earlier, the trolley car problem is a typical problem used to assess peoples notions of harm. In the footbridge version, a person could either value the life of the man on the footbridge or the lives of the people in the path of the trolley. In a rights-based system, it is conceivable that the needs of the few may sometimes outweigh the needs of the many. However, in a duty-based system, the needs of the many should be emphasized more than the needs of the few because the relevant unit of consideration is the social group. There is some empirical evidence to support this claim. We ran a version of the trolley car problem 2 in rural villages in India and found that participants were highly approving (modal response was five on a six-point scale) of sacrificing the man on the footbridge to save the lives of the five people on the track. Contrast this with most studies conducted with American, middle-class populations which show that people are usually disapproving of this action (Cushman & Young, 2009; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Mikhail, 2007; but see also Hauser, Cushman, Young, Kang-xing Jin, &

2Thetrolleycarproblemisanoftenusedexampletodemonstratetheexistenceofthedoctrineofdouble

effect.Theversionthatweusedisaslightvariantofthenormalfootbridgeproblem:

You are standing on a footbridge over the train tracks. You see a train coming down the tracks toward the bridge running out of control. The only way to stop the train is to drop a heavy weight in its path. The only object available that is heavy enough is a man who is standing next to you on the footbridge. What do you do? 1. Push the man over the footbridge, resulting in his death 2. Do nothing, which will result in the death of five people.

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 23 Mikhail, 2007). Furthermore, rights and duty-based systems may differ in the degree to which they emphasize hierarchical social structures (Triandis, 1989). A greater emphasis on maintaining hierarchy versus maintaining egalitarian norms may promote different types of duties or rights, e.g. duties owed by low power individuals to high power individuals may become more important than those owed from high power to low power individuals. Thus, in a duty-based system, harming many for the sake of a few on the top of the social hierarchy might be a common occurrence. Hong et al (Hong, Ip, Chiu, Morris, & Menon, 2001) have shown that whether one construes morality as being based on rights or duties seems to be flexible to a certain extent. They found that when Chinese-Americans are primed with a Chinese identity, they were more likely to mention duties than when their American identities were primed. It was not the case that Chinese-Americans forgot about duties when their American identities were made more salient. In that case, they were just as likely to mention rights as they were to mention duties. If thinking of rights versus duties as ways of construing oneself in relation to ones society is accurate, then we can certainly imagine that people embody both systems. However, one system might be more available in a particular group than in another such that for middle-class, white undergraduates, the most efficient way of forming moral judgments is to think of rights but for a similar population in India, the reasoning is based on duties. There appear to be many instances of when politicians or religious leaders might try to alter the default construal. For example, it seems as though President Kennedy was trying to reformulate Americans relationships with their society in his famous statement ask not what your country can do for you - ask what you can do for your country because he recognized that having one system over the other can affect interpersonal relationships and subsequently ones conception of morality.

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 24 Another demonstrated influence of the duty-based view of morality is that endogenous motivation for a moral action is not diagnostic of the actions moral value unlike what seems to be the case in rights-based cultures (Miller & Bersoff, 1994). So, in judging whether an individual acted morally or not in helping a neighbor, participants from India (a duty-based culture) did not weigh whether the individual acted out of his own volition or as a result of a help prompt, relative to participants from the United States (a rights-based culture). It was more important for American participants to know that the individual in a scenario decided to help on his own initiative, whereas this fact did not make a difference for Indians. Again, this shows the emphasis a rights-based framework puts on an individual rather than the net result of an individuals action on his or her society. As alluded to earlier, it is important to note that the rights-based versus duties-based framework is not simply an artifact of geographical location and does not map on neatly to individualistic versus collectivistic cultures (Hofstede, 1983; Nisbett, 2003). In other words, it seems reasonable to expect within-culture differences. So, for example, rights versus duties orientations may even be linked to ones religious beliefs. Cohen and Rozin (2001) show that while American Protestant subjects emphasize personal agency in moral acts, American Jewish participants do not. These results are found to be independent of individualistic or collectivistic orientations. But perhaps, in light of previous work on personal agency, they could be partially explained by reliance on rights or duties-based systems of morality. As we have previously observed (Miller & Bersoff, 1994), duty-based orientations tend to be related to a more externalized way of perceiving morality than rights-based orientations so it seems plausible that effects of different religious values could also be related to the salience of duties versus rights.

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 25 Differences in valuing endogenous motivation in duties versus rights-based cultures may also be related to motivational differences in fulfilling social obligations. For example, Latino students perceive more social obligations than Caucasian students toward distant relatives and friends, as should be expected for a duty-based culture (Miller, Bersoff & Harwood, 1994). But, they also find it more desirable and satisfying to fulfill social obligations than Caucasian students. Even when controlling for how much personal desires and goals contribute to life satisfaction, Latinos showed a positive correlation between fulfilling social obligations and life satisfaction while Caucasians showed a negative correlation (Janoff-Bulman & Leggatt, 2002). So, it appears that fulfilling social obligations actually holds more utility for individuals belonging to duty-based cultures, making them more motivated to engage in such behaviors. Furthermore, socioeconomic status may play an important role in shaping an individuals orientation to moral concepts. Lower SES participants tend to embody some characteristics of duty-based systems (Aronfreed, 1961). For instance, they tend to rely on more extrinsic motivation like praise or fear of punishment for engaging in moral behavior compared to middle class participants. There is also some evidence to suggest that middle class adolescents are less sensitive to the identity of the person they are interacting with when deciding to engage in cooperative behavior (Berkowitz, 1968) relative to working-class adolescents. Working-class adolescents were more sensitive to their partners reputation and the amount of help he had previously provided when deciding to cooperate. Miller (1994) has also found that participants from duty-based cultures in India are more likely to take into account the identity of a person when deciding to engage in moral behavior, i.e. more willing to make sacrifices for their best friend than a stranger. These results, taken in conjunction with characteristics of interdependent

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 26 self-construal, indicate that personal relationships tend to be more important in duty-based orientations to morality (Hofstede, 1998; Oyserman et al, 2002). The Norm of Self-Sacrifice Thus far, however, one important aspect of a duty-based system of morality has been under-explored. There might be certain moral values or norms that get expressed more often in duty-based systems of morality than right-based systems of morality. One of these might be the value of self-sacrifice. Previous work suggests that the needs of the self are seen as being in opposition to needs of the group in right-based cultures whereas the two are seen as congruent in duty-based cultures (Miller, 1994; Balagangadhara, 1988). This already suggest that in situations where the needs or interests of the self are pitted against the needs of the collective, the needs of the self will be given less weight when one holds a duty-based rather than a right-based orientation. In Durkheims (1897/1965) groundbreaking study of suicide, he identified that altruistic forms of suicide were more likely to occur in close-knit and hierarchical communities, e.g. soldiers sacrificing for their platoons. In addition, previous work also suggests that having different conceptualizations of morality does affect the value of self-sacrifice. As mentioned above, Carol Gilligan has argued against the Kohlbergian model of moral reasoning. Gilligan claims that women possess certain unique moral principles and modes of reasoning which are inaccessible to men. Holding these unique moral ideals leads women to have different perspectives on ethical dilemmas (Gilligan, 1982). Gilligan highlights the difference between these perspectives by stating that while males evaluate themselves and others around them on the basis of abstract principles such as justice or equality, women measure themselves on particular instances of care. Women have a more contextualized view of morality which focuses more on interpersonal relationships. There is also

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 27 some evidence that womens conceptualization of morality is primarily focused on others than on the self. Gilligan also claims that women have a conception of goodness as sacrifice (p.68) meaning that they equate morality with sacrificing their own wants and needs 3 . This sentiment suggests self-sacrifice may in fact be an important part of morality in some cultures. There is some evidence to suggest that Asian-Americans value self-sacrifice more than European-Americans at the cost of attaining personal goals (Suzuki & Greenfield, 2002). Notably, though the participants in this particular study were all Americans, the authors found that acculturation with American society decreased Asian-Americans sacrifice. Self-sacrifice also seems to play a very important role in Indian, and more specifically, Hindu traditions. The Hindu creation story is centered on the symbolic notion of sacrifice and a focal act of selfsacrifice is believed to be responsible for the creation of all of the worlds living things (McClymond, 2008) 4 . The practice of sati (widow-burning) has also gained notoriety in the West as the epitome of self-sacrifice. In communities where sati was still performed, it was seen as the ultimate act of nobility for a woman to willingly jump into her deceased husbands funeral pyre (Hawley, 1994). And, as recently as Indias struggle for independence from British rule, the virtue of self-sacrifice was again called on by great luminaries such as Mahatma Gandhi as an important tool in this fight (Salgado, 1996). So, it appears that self-sacrifice as a moral concept deserves closer inspection. For one thing, it seems to be virtually ignored concept in the field of moral psychology. A quick search

3Itiscertainlypossiblethatmenandwomenhaveverydifferentdomainsinwhichtheyareexpectedto

sacrificethemselves.AsGilligansuggests,womenmayfeelthesalienceofselfsacrificemorewhentheyarein afamilialorinterpersonalcontext.However,Durkheimsconceptofaltruisticsuicidesuggestthatthereare domainsinwhichmenaremorelikelytovalueselfsacrificeaswell(Blake,1968).Study3battemptsto addressthisissuebystudyingtheapprovalofselfsacrificeasafunctionofgenderroleexpectations. 4NotetoothattheChristiantraditionwasalsobornofastoryofselfsacrificeprovidingfurtherevidencethat selfsacrificeisanimportantmoralconceptinothersystemsofthought,notjustHinduorIndian.

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 28 on Google Scholar reveals almost six times as many articles on self-interest than on selfsacrifice, even though these concepts seem to be directly related to one another. Furthermore, a fairly influential theme in the study of what motivates social action is the claim that people act based on the norm of self-interest (Miller and Ratner, 2001). It has been reported that respondents often go to great lengths to participate in social actions that benefit themselves and are actively opposed to those that do not. The norm of self-interest also appears to be more prevalent in Western societies because it is based in part on the value of not meddling in others affairs (Miller, 1999). This is a noteworthy prediction which serves to highlight the link between self-sacrifice and a duty-based system of morality. As seen above, one feature of dutybased social groups (whether in terms of socioeconomic status or culture) is that they seem to be more close-knit and collectivist than rights-based systems (typically found in Western society). So, as one might imagine, not meddling in others affairs is not really a resilient norm in dutybased cultures. Perhaps, as Miller (1999) suggests, the concern with attuning ones self with others is the gateway through which self-sacrifice is related to particular orientations toward morality. Just as the norm of self-interest may develop in part because of day to day practices, including an aversion to meddle in others affairs, the norm of self-sacrifice may also be embedded in everyday routines. As discussed earlier, groups from low socioeconomic statuses or rural environments may differ dramatically from those residing in wealthier, urban communities. One of the major differences is that low-SES and people from rural communities tend to live in close-knit social systems. Being confronted with the needs of ones social collective, may make sacrificing ones own desires to fulfill others a more common practice than living in a relatively isolated environment (Stack, 2004; Leenaars, 2004). In addition, the salience of scarcity itself

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 29 may force people to deal with sacrifice on a more practical level. When resources are limited, by necessity, one is forced to give more up than when resources are plentiful. So, it seems fairly obvious that lower socioeconomic status groups will have more day to day experience in dealing with self-sacrifice, which may, in turn, affect their attitudes toward it more than abstract orientations toward morality. The concept of self-sacrifice becomes even more challenging when considering that the meaning of self-sacrifice may vary across communities. In other words, what may be conceptualized as self-sacrifice in right-based or individualistic cultures may not be felt as a great sacrifice in duty-based or collectivist groups at all because the self and social group are relatively less at odds. Remember from above, that duty-based conceptions of morality often link the interests of the self with those of the community. This is a complicated issue in itself and it cannot be fully addressed here. However, I propose that even though the act of self-sacrifice could be objectively less painful when ones needs are not in conflict with the needs of those for whom the sacrifice is carried out, there is still something special about this type of act in some cultures relative to others. It may confer additional moral status to the individual who carries out such an act. Individuals who are known to self-sacrifice may even be seen as paragons of virtue in some cultures as a result of the purity of self-sacrifice (Fields & Owens, 2004; Sharma, 1988) It appears that the norm of self-sacrifice is more prevalent and more expected within some societies than in others (McCormack, 2002). Yet, while noting this important caveat (i.e. that self-sacrifice might objectively be more or less effortful in some cultures), for the purposes of the current work, we will use self-sacrifice in its most straightforward form. An act of self-sacrifice will be defined as something which results in a great cost to the self but a benefit to some other

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 30 person or group. This is the definition most often used in the little work that examines this concept (Overvold, 1980) 5 . So what might it mean if self-sacrifice is a vital component of a particular cultures system of morality, while anothers is almost orthogonal to this concept? We believe it will have certain ramifications on even the most basic assumptions of morality. There is already some work that suggests that causing harm to ones own self is better in most circumstances than causing harm to another (Haidt, 2007). Self-sacrifice, in cultures where it is more salient, might even serve as a signal to indicate the presence of a morally sanctioned action (Olivola & Shafir). And most fundamentally, perhaps, the norm of self-sacrifice is contrary to most utilitarian theories of morally motivated action. Although in a lot of cases deciding to sacrifice oneself for someone else may appear to be the result of a simple cost-benefit analysis (e.g. valuing the lives of five people over one in the trolley car problem), acts of self-sacrifice may actually be based in deontological concepts. And thus, if a psychologist approaches this field of study with a selfinterested perspective of moral behavior, she might lose out on important insights into diverse, culturally-specific organizations of moral concepts (Majumdar, 2002). In fact, recent work from Huebner and Hauser (in press) suggests that moral researchers might really be missing out on lay intuitions of self-sacrifice. As mentioned above, trolley car problems are being used with greater frequency in understanding folk moral intuitions. Though in most cases, participants are not given an opportunity to justify their responses, Huebner and Hauser (in press) report that participants in their study sometimes spontaneously offered up a third solution not present in the original footbridge version of the problem. Participants
5Awholechunkofliteratureinpsychologydoesaddressaltruism,whichisoftenequatedwithselfsacrifice.

However,thisworkisnotdirectlyrelevanttothecurrentworkbecausethestudyofaltruismwasmore directedatthemotivationforselfsacrificialaction,whereasIfocusprimarilyontherepercussionsor consequencesofselfsacrifice(Batson&Shaw,1991;Krebs,1991).

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 31 suggested that they should perhaps jump themselves instead of pushing an innocent man off the bridge. In addition, when Huebner and Hauser (in press) actually tested the norm of self-sacrifice in the switch version of the trolley problem, they were surprised to observe that about a third of participants believed that the normative response in such a situation is to redirect the trolley toward yourself. Pilot studies conducted by our group incorporating the idea of self-sacrifice in the trolley car problem shows that participants are more disapproving of self-sacrifice in the switch version relative to redirecting the trolley toward someone else (consistent with Huebner and Hauser). However, in the footbridge version, self-sacrifice is significantly preferable to murder. This raises a question about when self-sacrifice is appropriate but it also suggests that self-sacrifice is not only morally relevant but laudable in a vast majority of cases.

CURRENT STUDIES The goal of this dissertation will be to show that the norm of self-sacrifice may differ across different social and cultural groups. I will also provide some evidence showing that this may be due to these groups reliance on different systems of morality. These broad systems can be responsible for instituting different moral principles and shaping moral cognition in specific ways. The major difference in the organization of moral concepts that I will focus on is one of a duty-based system of morality and contrast that with a right-based system of morality. I claim that an important part of a duty-based system of morality is the concept of self-sacrifice. Thus, when one embodies this system of reasoning, it leads to the glorification of self-sacrifice and to the development of self-sacrifice as a virtue. Through a variety of methodologies and several different experiments, I show that in groups where the prevalent system of moral reasoning is based on duties, self-sacrifice is more likely to be considered a virtue than where rights are

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 32 predominantly used in thinking about moral concepts. One important disclaimer to consider before describing any of the studies in detail is that thought I believe that duty or rights-based system underlie the salience of the norm of self-sacrifice, I do not have an independent measure of duties or rights in this dissertation. So, it is difficult to make any causal claims about the link between these orientations and the norm of self-sacrifice. But the hope here is to provide some indirect evidence of this link and more importantly to show that the norm of self-sacrifice does, in fact, carry moral relevance within some cultural and social groups. In the first study, cultural folktales helped to provide support of the hypothesis that rights and duties are differently distributed across different cultures and that these constructs relate to the value of self-sacrifice. The next study shows that outcomes which occur as a result of self-sacrificing behavior are valued more than outcomes which have a smaller cost or even benefit to the self. In the next several experiments, I extended the results of the first study and began to uncover the means through which self-sacrifice is more likely to be valued in duty-based cultures. One possible explanation is that an individual who is operating with a duty-based system of morality is always aware of her various roles and the responsibilities those roles entail toward others. Therefore, participants moral judgments might change as a function of whether an actor made a role-consistent or role-inconsistent self-sacrifice. In addition, this study examined what the acceptable scope of self-sacrifice is in different cultures. Namely, when are acts of self-sacrifice warranted and when they are frowned upon? I predicted that in cultures with a more fine-tuned sense of self-sacrifice, participants would be more sensitive to the differences in contexts than in cultures where self-sacrifice was not a salient norm. An important point of distinction is that most of the cross-cultural comparisons that are described here are not cross-national as is the case in most of the other cultural psychological

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 33 work. Here, I focus primarily on intracultural differences within India, by recruiting participants from several different communities. One type of intergroup comparison that we were interested in was the difference between rural and Indian If culture is defined as a shared system of values and beliefs, constrained in some cases by geographical location, then it seems that the rural Indian community is by definition a different cultural group than the urban communities. These groups definitely seem to differ on certain psychological dimensions. For instance, participants from rural India are more interdependent while participants from urban India are more autonomous and more likely to value traits like uniqueness and independence (Snarey, 1985; Lamm & Keller, 2007). Though this is not evidence for the supposition that rural and urban Indians rely on different systems of morality, it at least shows that there is some reason to expect cultural variation between rural and urban Indians. From my own observations in doing fieldwork in these areas, it appears that the rural Indian villages that I visited have been unchanged in terms of farming practices and even in how some household chores are carried out for several decades. Most of the houses did not have running water or electricity. The villages were usually connected to a main highway by a long dirt road which cut through several farms. In sum, rural and urban India seemed to me to be different worlds. Another intracultural group comparison we were interested in pursuing was the difference between low and high SES participants from urban India. Previous work has shown that significant differences exist in reasoning across several different domains between socioeconomic classes even within the same city (Haidt et al, 1993; Snibbe & Markus). Additionally, as described above, broad worldviews towards the self and moral domains seem to vary with socioeconomic status as well (Fernandez et al, 2003; Aronfreed, 1961). Participants

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 34 from different classes have also been shown to differ on a variety of factors such as perceptions of agency, valuations of choice and attitudes toward family (Stephens, Markus & Townsend, 2007; Bock, Beeghley & Mixon, 1983; Jost & Burgess, 2000; Cicerelli, 1993). Though the rural participants in our studies were quite a bit poorer than the low-SES participants from urban India, they also varied on a host of other factors. Therefore, we sought to include a low-SES urban population that was more directly comparable to high-SES urban participants on factors such as access to running water, electricity and food. However, the high-SES urban population in our study was very unrepresentative of the vast majority of Indians living in urban environments. These participants tended to live in gated communities. Most of the jobs they held were executive positions at multi-national corporations. Basically, the high-SES group was part of the sector of the Indian economy that benefitted from (and in some cases, helped to bring) the culture of outsourcing. Although all of our participants were born in India, some of them had spent significant amount of time abroad and had recently (within a couple of years) returned to India to become part of the booming economy. On the other hand, the low-SES urban community, though significantly less well-off than the high-SES urban community, might be described as more typically middle-class in India. A lot of participants were clerks and held other such administrative positions. But, a good percentage of them did have a college education (numbers given below) and they lived in permanent housing, unlike some of the rural participants. They still suffered from a lot of the ails that the high-SES population never saw, e.g. power outages for 6 to 8 hours a day, public transportation strikes, sporadic water availability, in short, the common urban Indian experience. Moreover, if the value of self-sacrifice is embedded within certain Hindu religious practices, then there is additional reason to expect that SES might play an important role in valuations of

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 35 self-sacrifice. Previous studies have found that low-SES participants in the U.S. tend to more religious than high-SES participants(Jost & Burgess, 2000). Experiment 1 Analysis of Cultural Products The first test of the relationship between duties and self-sacrifice was conducted by using cultural artifacts. Indian and American folktales were analyzed to study the relationship between culturally-specific systems of morality and self-sacrifice. The use of personal narratives has been extensively studied in the socialization of societal norms (P. J. Miller, Wiley, Fung, & Liang, 1997; P. J. Miller & Moore, 1989; Wang & Leichtman, 2000). Psychologists have argued that narratives are given special attention in processing and are perceived as having greater relevance than other types of stimuli. They also serve a critical function in helping children learn moral principles (Vitz, 1990). However, cultural stories have been given significantly less attention. This is unfortunate because cultural stories, such as childrens picture books or folklore, are a valuable source of information about what a particular culture values. Not only are these stories a repository of cultural values but they also serve an important function of diffusing and maintaining some level of homogeneity within a cultural group. These are the sources to which people return when they try to make sense of their history and group identity. Furthermore, historians studying the concept of dharma (duty) in India have explicitly mentioned that folktales and fables were an important medium through which a system of duties was passed down through generations and enforced in villages (OFlaherty & Derrett, 1978). As such, in this experiment, we hoped to show that folktales from traditionally duty-based or right-based cultures can show differences in how salient the norm of self-sacrifice is within a particular culture and the role it might play in shaping moral concepts.

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 36 Methods Indian and American folktales were arbitrarily selected from collections of folktales 6 . A total of 49 Indian folktales were selected from three collections. Fifty-seven American folktales were selected from four collections. Indian folktales on average were much easier to procure. There was a ready availability at Indian train stations, local book sellers and stationary shops. However, American folktales were much more difficult to find. First, a lot of the stories seemed to have origins other than what can be described as purely American which is to be expected given the fairly recent history of the United States. As such, a lot of stories from the various collections of North American tales like those inspired by Native American, Mexican or clearly European stories were excluded. This fact indicates one of the biggest limitations of this study that North American folktales are less likely to be representative of American cultural beliefs than Indian folktales are to Indian cultural beliefs. Indian folktales are still widely available and therefore relatively more relevant to popular culture. American folktales on the other hand are largely reserved for didactic purposes. However, as a piece of corroboratory evidence in the larger puzzle of the relationship between cultural orientations to morality and the value of self-sacrifice, this study might still be a reasonable means of exploration. With this goal in mind, four coders were recruited to rate the stories on a number of dimensions. Two of the coders were undergraduates recruited from Northwestern University and the other two coders were graduate students from the Indian Institute of Technology in New Delhi. Coders were selected from two different populations to get a broader perspective on the stories and to extrapolate any cultural differences in how stories might be perceived by Indian versus American readers. Of course, two

6Byarbitrarilyselection,ImeanthatIselectedstoriesfornoparticularreasonfromthetableofcontentsof

thevariouscollectionsafterexcludingtheonesdescribedbelow.SeeAppendixBforfulllistofstories.

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 37 raters from each sample is not nearly enough a large enough group to generalize to a broader cultural sample. However, I anticipated that any obvious sources disagreement between Indian and American readings of the stories would be apparent between the two sets of coders. All coders read both Indian and American stories (Indian stories translated in English by authors of the collections) and rated the stories in two rounds of coding. The first coding scheme was designed to assess whether the stories contained any moral content. Coders were asked to code a story as having moral content in a very general way. Some general suggested guidelines for a story with moral content were: o If it discussed what it means to engage in right or wrong conduct o If there was a sense that a particular character in a story was clearly the good guy and the other was clearly a bad guy and that it taught someone reading or hearing the story what the moral action was. o If the story described some really immoral actions which might have served as a cautionary tale. o A person might be conflicted between choosing a right or wrong action, i.e. cases of moral dilemmas.

The second round of coding addressed some of the more specific variables of interest. Coders rated the story on whether it contained instances of rights, instances of duties, whether acts of self-interest and self-sacrificing occurred in the story and whether these actions were portrayed as a positive, negative or neutral occurrence (please see Appendix A for general instructions for all variables listed above).

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 38 Results Inter-coder Reliability Inter-coder reliability was quite high for most of the variables of interest. For all variables, except for instances of rights, Cronbachs > .60. Instances of rights had an intercoder reliability of .47. For this particular variable, the major source of divergence was one of the American coders the remaining three coders were in high agreement. Analysis of Major Variables Overall Means Means of all the key variables of interest were computed for Indian and American stories (see Table 3 for details). Surprisingly, even though the stories were selected randomly, about half of both Indian and American stories contained moral content. The only two variables of interest that the American and Indian stories differed on were whether duties were mentioned in the stories and what the value of acting in ones own self-interest was described as being (i.e. positive, negative or neutral). As predicted, Indian stories mentioned duties more often than American stories (57% of stories versus 38%, t(104)=1.95, p < .05). This corroborates previous research showing that duties tend to be a more salient feature in Indian society. In addition, acting in self-interested manner was described more negatively in Indian stories than in American stories (-.45 vs. 08, t(87) = 3.54, p < .05) Acts of self-sacrifice were more prevalent in Indian stories relative to American stories (32% versus 21%) though this difference was unreliable. However, contrary to the hypothesis, rights were not mentioned more frequently in American stories.

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 39 Table 1. Means for variables of interest, broken down by moral content in stories American Stories Indian Stories Total Not Not Not Moral Total Moral Total Moral Moral Moral Moral Total 0.27 0.29 0.28 0.3 0.38 0.35 0.28 0.34 0.31 -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.25 0.54 0.38a 0.51 0.61 0.57b 0.36 0.58 0.47 -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 -0.08 -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 0.17 -0.04 0.67 -0.22 0.5 -0.07 0.25 -0.14 0.27 -0.08 0.8 -0.2 0.7 -0.08 -0.09 -0.18 0.21 -0.04 0.73 -0.12 0.59 -0.05 0.08a -0.12 0.2 -0.08 0.75 -0.17 0.45 -0.1 -0.23 -0.2 0.39 -0.08 0.69 -0.17 0.75 -0.06 -0.55 -0.14 0.32 -0.06 0.7 -0.13 0.63 -0.06 -0.45b -0.12 0.18 -0.04 0.69 -0.11 0.48 -0.06 0.06 -0.12 0.34 -0.05 0.73 -0.13 0.73 -0.05 -0.35 -0.12 0.26 -0.03 0.72 -0.09 0.61 -0.04 -0.18 -0.09

Mention of Rights Mention of Duties Presence of SelfSacrifice Value of SelfSacrifice Presence of SelfInterest Value of SelfInterest

Note. Standard errors of the means provided in italics. Cells with different letters in the same row are significantly different at p<.05.

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 40 Correlations Across both sets of Indian and American stories, moral stories were more likely to mention duties than non-moral stories. Surprisingly, given the fact that Indian stories contained more mentions of duties overall, this correlation was stronger for American than Indian stories. Probing further into this unexpected result, it appears that Indian stories mentioned duties about 61% of the time when they contained moral content and 51% of the time when they did not. But, American stories mentioned duties more often when they contained moral content (54%) than when they did not (25%). Taken at first glance, this may seem to indicate that duties are more reflective of morality in American stories. However, an alternative explanation could be that the concept of duties is more pervasive in Indian society. Consistent with expectations, duties were positively correlated with the presence of selfsacrifice in both Indian and American stories, r(106) = .50, p < .01. However, only Indian stories were more likely to make mention of self-sacrifice if they contained moral content (r(49) = .35, p <.05) American stories did not show this relationship between morality and self-sacrifice 7 . Indian stories also differed from American stories in that when they contained moral content, they were more likely to mention acts of self-interest. Self-interest was almost always described negatively (r (42) = -.60, p <.001) which indicates that moral Indian stories were actually more likely to forbid self-interest than advocate it. There was no relationship between moral content and instances of self-interest in American stories. Self-interest here, too, was mostly described

7Thisrelationshipisnotapparentfromthemeansreportedabovebecausethecorrelationsreportedinthis

sectionarethespecificrelationshipsbetweeneachstorysmoralcontentandwhetherornotitmentioned selfsacrificeascodedbyeachresearchassistant.Themethodreportedearlier,i.e.themeansonthebasisof thedichotomoussplitofmoralcontent,isabitcruderbecausethestorieswereassignedasmoralornotasa functionofconsensusbetweenthecoders.Withthecorrelations,Iwasabletolookatthedatainamore accurateway.

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 41 negatively, r(47) = -.37, p < .05. Another noteworthy relationship was found to exist between mention of rights and acts of self-interest in American stories. Stories that discussed peoples rights were also more likely to describe acts of self-interest, r (57) = .40, p <.01. This relationship was not found in Indian stories. Table 2. Correlation Matrix
1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Moral Content Mention of Rights Mention of Duties Presence of Self-Sacrifice Value of Self-Sacrifice Presence of Self-Interest Value of Self-Interest 0.11 0.34 0.29 0.09 0.27 -0.25 2 3 4 5 6

0.01 0.02 0.06 0.29 -0.05

0.50 0.31 -0.13 0.12

0.21 -0.14 -0.00

-0.28 0.24

-0.49

Discussion The aim of this study was to make us of cultural products, namely Indian and American folktales, to demonstrate that certain moral values were more salient in one culture than another. Though this work was primarily exploratory in nature, there were some specific hypotheses that were addressed. Previous work has shown that Indians have a more duty-based orientation toward morality than Americans. Independent coding by four research assistants showed that duties were, in fact, more prevalent and mentioned more frequently in Indian folktales than American folktales. However, contrary to what was predicted it was not the case the rights were more frequently mentioned in American folktales. Another variable assessed in this study was the salience of the act of self-sacrifice. Indian stories were somewhat more likely to mention self-sacrifice than American stories. Moreover, the presence of moral content was positively related to the presence of self-sacrifice

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 42 in Indian stories but not in American stories. This indicates that self-sacrifice might be an important part of the Indian moral concept but perhaps less indicative of American moral norms. Among the other variables that were coded, it was found that Indian stories were more likely than American stories to portray acts of self-interest in a negative light. This is also consistent with the larger claim of this work because if self-sacrifice is seen as a signal or gauge for moral behavior then it does not seem like a conceptual leap to contend that acting in ones own self-interest is seen as an immoral act. Finally, another intriguing finding from this study concerns the relation between rights and duties themselves. Note that while in this project we coded for rights and duties in a very specific way, this coding scheme was actually just a proxy (and a very limited one) for a more general orientation toward morality. One characteristic of a duty-based system of morality is that duties are more prevalent, but that is not in itself a defining trait. As stated earlier, duty-based orientations are related to several different cultural dimensions such as how one views oneself in relation to ones community, how far-reaching ones moral circle is and the importance of different types of motivations in moral actions (Miller, 1993; Miller, Bersoff & Harwood, 1994). Similarly, rights-based systems are not just expected to have more mentions of rights. However, it is interesting that even with this simple way of operationalizing duties and rights, we find, from the correlational analyses, that they seem to be independent from one another. This is a very important theoretical point because unlike other dichotomous variables (i.e. individualism/collectivism), this shows that rights and duties are not mutually exclusive. The biggest strength of this study is that it provided independent evidence of the relationship between duties and self-sacrifice. It also establishes that duties do, in fact, seem to be more prevalent in Indian cultural folktales than in American folktales. However, it was

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 43 limited in several ways. One, as mentioned previously, folktales are still very pervasive in modern Indian households but perhaps less so in American households. A quick informal survey amongst friends revealed that at least 70 to 80% of Indian folktales were recognizable by Indian students studying at Northwestern University. American stories, on the other hand, were unheard of for the most part by the American coders. Though several of the stories were about recognizable characters, e.g. Jack of Jack and the Giant Beanstalk fame and Brer Rabbit, the content of the stories was unfamiliar to our coders. These stories, in modern day American society, seem to be used primarily for didactic purposes while Indian stories are still read by and read out loud to Indian children. Thus, if we are going to be making any inferences about moral cognition from the content of folktales, it should be kept in mind that American folktales tell us less about what or how Americans think than Indian folktales do about Indians. Another limitation of the current approach is that it is unable to tap into cultural differences in how the stories are comprehended. Though this was part of the original goal of this project, only two research assistants from each cultural group were recruited which precluded any meaningful comparisons. It seems likely that all the variables assessed above will be affected by the surrounding context in which they appear, i.e. Indian or American stories, but also that the relative familiarity of the context to the coders will affect, at a very basic level, even the mere recognition of these variables. For example, as claimed earlier, imagine that self-sacrifice carries a different meaning when it appears in a moral context than when it appears in an amoral context. Somehow, it signifies an act of purity in the former and in the latter, it almost seems foolishly superfluous. Further imagine that in an American story, while the act of self-sacrifice still is recognizable to Indian coders, it is somehow altered perhaps because of the unfamiliar

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 44 surrounding context or the person conducting the act of self-sacrifice, thereby diminishing its significance. The broader point here is that acts of self-sacrifice or orientations toward morality are not isolatable variables and in studying culturally-based variables, changing one factor oftentimes has the unwanted effect of altering a whole network of factors. So, this is actually a twofold critique. One, when studying, for example, how rights are mentioned in American stories versus Indian stories, it is not clear if rights behave in similar ways in the two cultures. And second, even assuming that rights in Indian stories serve the same function (or apply in the same domain, etc.) as in American stories, it is not clear that both Indian and American purveyors of these stories perceive them as such. However, this analysis of cultural folktales at the very least provides some support for they hypothesis that self-sacrifice is an important element of moral systems in duty-based cultures. Experiment 2 The purpose of Experiment 2 was to show that the norm of self-sacrifice is valued differently across social groups. Moreover, we also wanted to show that even when the consequences of a non-self-sacrificing action yield the same benefits as a self-sacrificing action, the latter will be more morally lauded in duty-based than right-based systems of morality. This study compared three personal outcomes that resulted from achieving a particular prosocial outcome: positive, negative or neutral. We predicted that all participants would be less laudatory of an agent who personally gained while achieving a moral good especially when he was compared to an agent who suffered a personal loss. However, only participants with duty-based orientations (as a function of their social and cultural environment) would praise the agent suffering a personal loss even more than an agent who suffered no gain or loss. So, groups with

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 45 more traditional practices, i.e. rural Indian participants and low-SES urban Indians who are presumed to have a more duty-based system of morality and would value and approve of selfsacrifice more than high-SES urban Indian or American participants. Methods Participants The five groups of participants recruited for this study were rural Indians, high SES urban Indians, low SES urban Indians, urban Indian college students and urban American college students. Unless otherwise noted, participants were recruited by going door-to-door and through references from previous participants. All participants recruited in this way were offered a small token of appreciation (usually a box of chocolates or cookies) as compensation for participating in the study. Rural Indians Participants were sampled from villages surrounding the town of Indore in the state of Madhya Pradesh. These villages are primarily agricultural villages where people usually own and work their own lands. Those who do not own their own farms usually work as day laborers either in the city or as farm hands. A small minority consists of shopkeepers and government employees. Of the 39 rural participants in this study, only five were women. All participants identified themselves as Hindu except one who identified herself as Muslim. The age range within this particular rural sample was narrower than in the other studies presented here (17 through 26). These participants tended to be a bit more educated than rural participants from my other studies. Approximately 80% of the sample had at least completed high school (see Table 1 for more details). High-SES Urban Indians This sample was recruited from a wealthy area of South Delhi approximately 36% of the sample earned more than $10,000 annually (Rs. 5,00,000). The data

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 46 were predominantly collected during the day when a majority of the men were working so most of this sample was female (25 females, 11 males). Most participants were Hindu in this sample as well (29 out of 36) but the sample did include four Christian participants and one Muslim participant. Low-SES Urban Indians Participants were sampled from East Delhi neighborhoods. They tended to have lower incomes than the South Delhi participants only 15% of the sample earned more than $10,000 annually. The low-SES participants did not differ significantly in their education level from the high SES participants. Whereas most of the high-SES participants worked in the private sector, most of this sample worked for the government sector and especially in fields related to the judicial system (e.g. court transcriptionists). This was because the particular residential buildings that granted me permission to conduct interviews officially housed the court workers; though a lot of condominiums in these buildings had been sold to people from other professions since they were officially allotted. Interestingly, though the average household size of the low-SES urban Indians did not differ from the high-SES urban Indians, the size of the houses for this group was smaller by a factor of at least five. Sixteen of the 29 participants in the sample were male. Again, the sample was overwhelmingly Hindu (27 of the 29 participants). Urban Indian College Students Sixty-six participants were recruited from a college of pharmacy in Indore, India. Indore is a large metropolitan center and the largest city in Madhya Pradesh. Students were either in either the bachelors or masters program in Pharmacology. The sample consisted of 38 males and ranged in age from 18 to 26. Participants were not compensated in any way for their participation.

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 47 Urban American College Students Twenty-four participants were recruited from the Northwestern University Psychology subject pool. The sample consisted of 11 males and ranged in age from 18 to 22. Participants received partial course credit for being part of the study.

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 48 Table 4. Demographic Information for Participants in Experiment 2 Education Religion (Median) Household Income Level (Median)
Less than Rs.50,000/year (approx. $1000) Rs. 2,00,000 to 5,00,000/year (approx. $4,000 to $10,000) Rs. 5,00,000 to 10,00,000/year (approx. $10,000 to $20,000)

Gender

Age
Mean = 20.5 years Age range = 17 26 Mean = 46.4 years Age nge = 20 76 Mean = 39.4 years Age range = 16 75 Mean = 21.9 years Age range = 18 26 Mean = 18.8 years Age range = 18 22

Size of Marital Religiosity Caste/Race Household Status (Distribution) (mean)

OBC: 16.7% General: 83.3%

Rural Indian

34 males, 5 females

38 Hindus, 1 Muslim

Some High School

38% married

6.1 people

Not available

39

Low-SES Urban Indian

16 males, 13 females

27 Hindus, 1 Muslim

Some college

86% married

General: 100%

4.0 people

17% less religious than average 66% about average 17% above 28% less religious than average 61% about average 8% above 14% less religious than average 71% about average 10% above Median response = 5 on a 7-point Likert scale

29

High-SES Urban Indians

11 males, 25 females

29 Hindus, 4 Christians, 1 Muslim

Completed college and/or some graduate school Some college, i.e. mix of Bachelors and Masters students

81% married

General:100%

4.3 people

36

Indian College Students (Urban)

38 males, 25 females

60 Hindus, 1 Jain

Not available

Not available

OBC: 9.1% General: 90.9%

5.4 people

63

11 males, American 13 undergraduates females

Not available

Some college

$120,000 to $170,000/ year

Not available

Not available

Not available

24

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 49 Materials and Procedure The procedure for each group differed slightly. Urban and rural Indian participants completed this experiment as part of a one-on-one interview. In some cases this task was presented with other related tasks; but, the order of presentation of all the tasks was always randomized as to control for order effects. The Indian college students completed this task in a mass session. The American college students completed the task in sessions of three or four students. The basic procedure, however, was the same across all participants. Each participant was presented with two stories that were said to be newspaper articles describing two very similar incidents. Participants were asked to read through both stories and to answer some questions comparing the two incidents. Each story told of an instance in which a man jumped in front of an oncoming truck to save a child at great risk to himself. However, the personal outcome for the man was different in each of the stories. In one story, the man received a reward from the childs parents for saving her life (gain). In another, he lost his leg while saving the child (loss). And in the third story, the man neither received a reward nor suffered a personal loss while saving the child (neutral). Each participant randomly received two of these stories to make a total of three between-subject conditions: Gain/Loss, Gain/Neutral, Loss/Neutral. The order of presentation of the stories was counterbalanced. After reading through each story, participants were asked for their judgment of which of the two actors deserved more praise and whose intentions were purer (see Appendix C). Results Judgments of Praise The first dependent variable assessed was participants estimation of which of the two actors was more praiseworthy for saving the childs life. Participants marked their responses on a

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 50 six-point Likert scale (0 to 5). The scale was transformed for each participant such that higher numbers indicated more appreciation for the person whose outcomes were less good after saving the childs life. For example, higher numbers in the Gain/Neutral condition indicate more praise for the agent in the neutral story and similarly, higher numbers in the Loss/Neutral condition indicate more praise for the agent in the loss story. The data were first analyzed with a 3 (Story Condition) X 5(Group) ANOVA. The highest judgments of praise for an actor who suffered a personal loss or at least, no net gain, were in the condition where personal gain was contrasted with personal loss (M=3.34, SD = 1.15), followed by the Loss/Neutral condition (M = 3.09, SD = 1.39) and the Gain/Neutral condition (M = 2.68, SD = 1.18; see Figure 1). This indicates that the presence of a personal loss made an actor more morally laudable than when he received a small personal gain and even when he did not benefit in any way from the action. A main effect of Story Condition (F(2,174) = 3.25, p <.05) and a marginally significant effect of Group (F (3, 174) = 2.13, p <.08) was observed. There were no group differences in praising the actor who suffered a personal loss in either the Gain/Loss or Gain/Neutral conditions (see Table 3). However, group membership did become a statistically significant factor in determining praise when participants compared the Loss and Neutral stories. Both the rural and low-SES urban populations thought that the actor suffering the personal loss was more praiseworthy (M=3.84, SD = 1.17) while the high-SES urban Indians, and both groups of college students clustered together toward the midpoint of the scale (M = 2.71, SD = 1.35, F(4, 52) = 2.81, p < .05).

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 51 Table 5. Means of Condition by Group and Gender of Participants (2.50 represents equal credit). Groups Rural Indians Low-SES Urban Indians High-SES Urban Indians Urban Indian College Students American Undergraduate Students Reward vs. Loss 3.27 (0.48) 3.46 (0.24) 3.23 (0.24) 3.44 (0.25) 3.13 (0.13) Reward vs. Neutral 2.62 (0.40) 3.06 (0.55) 2.82 (0.12) 2.32 (0.32) 3.00 (0.00) Loss vs. Neutral 3.73 (0.36) 4.00 (0.42) 2.73 (0.54) 2.50 (0.28) 3.19 (0.33)

Note. Standard error of the mean provided in parentheses

Figure 1. Judgments of praise of agent who received less positive outcome Judgments of Praise

5 4.5 4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 Reward vs. Loss Reward vs. Neutral Loss vs. Neutral

Rural Low SES Urban High SES Urban Indian College Students American undergraduate students

Preference for Negative Outcome

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 52 The data were also analyzed by breaking the continuous praise measure into a dichotomous choice between the agent who underwent a loss versus no gain or loss. Examining participants responses in this way confirmed that the latter group of participants (i.e. high-SES urban Indians and Indian college students) was almost evenly split in who they perceived as being most praiseworthy.
Table 6. Participants preferences for agent suffering loss or neutral outcome. Agent Neutral Agent Loss No Difference (No Gain or Loss) 2 0 9 Rural Indians 1 0 7 Low-SES Urban Indians 5 0 6 High-SES Urban Indians Urban Indian College 7 1 11 1 1 6 American College Students 16 2 39 Total

Total 11 8 11 19 8 57

Note. Table indicates number of people preferring either the agent who underwent loss, did not gain or lose or showed no difference In addition, the data were analyzed for whether certain demographic variables such as education, income or religiosity correlated with preference for the agent who underwent a preference loss. Though there were no overall effects of any of these demographic variables, comparing just the low-SES urban participants with the high-SES urban participants revealed that income level was marginally negatively correlated with praising the agent who suffered more negative consequences, r(57)= -.23, p<.09. In addition, gender of the participant seemed to matter in the gain versus neutral condition. Female participants were more likely to prefer the man in the neutral story to the reward story (M = 3.02, SD = 1.05) than were male participants (M = 2.45, SD = 1.23) indicating a marginal preference for self-sacrifice (see Figure 2), at least in this particular condition, t(60)=1.91,p <.06. No gender differences were found in either of the other conditions.

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 53

Judgments of Purity of Intentions Across all cultural groups, judgments of which agents intentions were more pure were highly correlated with who participants deemed as most praiseworthy, r(187)=.53, p<.001. The order of these two questions, i.e. judgments of praise and intentionality, were not counterbalanced so it is likely that the praise question influenced responses to the intentionality question. Participants reported their evaluations of agents intentionality on a four point Likert scale (0 to 3). This scale, like the praise scale reported above, was transformed such that higher numbers indicated purer intentions on the part of the agent who became worse off by saving the childs life. Participants ascribed purer intentions to the agent who suffered a personal loss both in the condition where this was contrasted with a personal gain and in the neutral story (M=2.08, SD= .92 and M=1.79, SD = .93, respectively; see Table .. for details). Again, these means were corroborated by examining participants frequencies of selecting the agent who lost versus gained or had a neutral outcome. In the Gain/Neutral condition, participants were at the midpoint of the scale (M=1.56, SD = .87). The frequency of responses showed that participants were evenly split between ascribing purer intentions to the man who received a personal gain and the man who had a neutral outcome (see Figure 3).

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 54

Table 7. Means and standard errors summary of participants judgments of purity of intentions Gain vs. Loss vs. Gain vs. Loss Neutral Neutral 2.00 1.92 1.95 Rural Indians (0.33) (0.24) (0.30) 2.73 1.75 2.36 Low-SES Urban Indians (0.15) (0.35) (0.32) 1.82 1.68 1.41 High-SES Urban Indians (0.14) (0.13) (0.20) 1.98 1.13 1.71 Urban Indian College Students (0.22) (0.24) (0.26) 1.81 1.56 1.75 American College Students (0.19) (0.18) (0.09)
Note. Standard error of the mean provided in parentheses

Both the rural Indian and the high-SES urban participants did not perceive differences in the intentionality of the actor between conditions. Rural participants, nonetheless, did think the person who suffered worse personal consequences had purer intentions (M = 1.96, SD = 1.01) than the high-SES urban participants (M=1.64, SD =.56) across all conditions, t(56) = 1.69, p< .10. The remaining groups showed a very consistent pattern in assessing the purity of the actors intentions. Participants from the low-SES urban community and both sets of college students valued the actors intentions most when he suffered a loss in contrast to when the other actor gained (M=2.17, SD = .92) followed by when the loss occurred in contrast to no net gain or loss (M = 1.85, SD = .97) and the neutral outcome in contrast to the personal gain (M = 1.37, SD = .96). Out of these three cultural groups, low-SES urban participants were most likely to perceive the agent with worse personal consequences as having the purest intentions (M = 2.36, SD = .85 versus M = 1.64, SD = 1.12 and M = 1.71, SD = .44 for Indian and American college students, respectively). A 3 (Story Condition) X 5(Cultural group) ANOVA revealed a main effect of both factors (give stats).

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 55

Judgments of Intentionality Figure 2. Judgments of intentionality of agent who suffered relative personal loss
More purity of intentions for negative outcome

3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 Reward vs. Loss Reward vs. Neutral Loss vs. Neutral

Rural Low SES Urban High SES Urban Indian College Students American undergraduate students

Of all the demographic variables assessed, two seemed to play an important role in predicting who participants perceived as having nobler intentions across all groups. Income level was significantly negatively correlated with ascribing purer intentions to the person with a more negative personal outcome, r(114)= -.19, p<.05. This indicates that richer participants were less likely to think that the person who underwent a personal loss had purer intentions than a person who gained or remained neutral. In addition, participants with higher levels of education ascribed purer intentions to the agent who experienced worse personal outcomes, r(186) = .16, p < .05. This was a surprising finding given that income and education were positively correlated, r(117) = .26, p< .01.

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 56 Discussion The purpose of this study was to probe further into the hypothesis that participants are more likely to value an individual and her action if he sacrificed his self in some way in order to achieve that end. This study was designed to directly compare achieving a particular prosocial outcome through self-sacrificial versus self-beneficial means. I used a story about a man risking his own life to save that of a child. In the three variants of the story, the man either a) received a reward for his action, b) lost his leg while saving the child or c) did not experience a personal gain or loss while engaging in the moral behavior. The results showed that participants did assign more praise to a person who suffered a loss while saving the child than a man who gained because of it. This was true for participants across all groups, especially when participants had to directly compare a personal loss with a personal gain rather than a neutral outcome. Rural and low-SES urban participants were most likely to praise the man who underwent a personal loss as opposed to a neutral outcome. This suggests that an act of self-sacrifice is more meaningful for these groups of participants, in terms of signifying the presence of a moral act or individual, than for the other groups. These findings are further corroborated by participants judgments of actors motivation in acting morally. Though, the rural and high-SES urban participants did not infer agents purity in acting on the basis of personal outcome, low-SES urban participants believed that the agent who suffered a personal loss had the purest intentions. These data are especially striking in light of the fact that it was made clear in the gain scenario that the actor had no way of knowing that he would be rewarded for his behavior. In addition, the personal gain that the actor received was a very small gift from the parents of the child. However, even this small token made the actors intentions

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 57 seem more impure. Participants believed that the man who lost his leg had purer intentions than the man who received the gift and this was especially the case for low-SES participants. This study provided additional evidence that there is something special about sacrificing oneself for a cause. It seems to confer additional moral status and even reflects on how pure ones intentions are in deciding to engage in a particular action. Moreover, there do seem to be some cultural components in valuing self-sacrifice as rural and low-SES urban Indians seemed to be more sensitive to the personal outcomes for an agent than other groups.

Experiment 3a The first couple of studies reported in this dissertation provided support for the hypothesis that self-sacrifice is an important part of moral systems and perhaps a more salient feature of morality in duty-based cultures than rights-based cultures. The remaining studies were designed to probe the limits of the value of self-sacrifice. That is, under what conditions is selfsacrifice actually valued? One aspect of duty-based systems of morality is that they are, by definition, more othercentric than right-based systems of morality. One has a different set of obligations based on who one is interacting with (e.g. a daughters duties are different from a mothers) and therefore people are more likely to be sensitive to their various role obligations. This might be a critical factor in the salience of self-sacrifice as a virtue. Imagine, as we have claimed, that a person begins to be focused on the demands that others place on her in a duty-based system of morality. Then, the well-being of others becomes intermingled with the well-being of the self and selfsacrifice does not seem as subjectively painful as when the focus of morality is on the self. This, I believe, may increase peoples willingness and approval of engaging in self-sacrificial

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 58 behavior. There is some work that already suggests that ones level of commitment in a romantic relationship is a positive predictor of ones willingness to sacrifice (Powell & Vugt, 2003). One of the definitions of commitment in this work was the extent to which a person believed what is good for my partner is good for me. This shows that the more intertwined ones goals are with others or in other words, the more self-other overlap there is, the more self-sacrifice is accepted. In summary, in the next couple of studies, we can begin to assess how closely related the value of self-sacrifice is to ones role obligations. For example, might an act of self-sacrifice be valued more if it is in accordance with what is expected of ones role in life? Or do role-inconsistent self-sacrifices hold more value because they go beyond the call of duty? Secondly, it is important to examine whether the norm of self-sacrifice is inherently embedded within role expectations or whether it holds weight on its own. If it is the latter, then role-inconsistent self-sacrifice, that is, sacrifices which do not follow from social expectations of a particular role, should be regarded just as highly as role-consistent sacrifices. However, if the value of self-sacrifice is linked to ones duties in a particular role, then only the role-consistent self-sacrifice should be valued. This experiment probed further into the relationship between role obligations and selfsacrifice. It examined whether the value of self-sacrifice is embedded in being part of ones role obligations or whether it serves as an independent moral principle, unaffected by contextual factors such as the identity of who is performing the self-sacrifice. In this experiment, crosscultural differences in how strongly linked self-sacrifice is perceived to be to role obligations were also assessed. Previous work suggests that both self-sacrifice and ones obligations to others are more important within duty-based systems than right-based systems. However, it could be the case that each system interacts differently with these two factors. So, in a right-

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 59 based culture, it could be the case that self-sacrifice is valued but only insofar as it is consistent with ones roles. In a duty-based system, it could be valued across the board. These are the types of questions addressed in this experiment. Our biggest challenge with this experiment was that roles often have very different connotations across cultures and certain roles are more important in one community but not another. In addition, there are some roles which are explicitly specified such as those that come from ones occupation and others which are more implicit in a society. These rules are never clearly specified but are often taken for granted as making up a social fabric. A brief anecdote from my fieldwork in India might help to clarify this point. Often times as I was conducting my interviews in the urban areas, I would have to cover large distances in a particular subdivision, going from house to house. Because this particular subdivision housed wealthy people, I rarely saw anyone walking outside. On occasion, however, I would see someones maid heading in the same directions as me and I would try to strike up a conversation as we walked. Eventually, though, I could tell that this was more awkward than I had previously thought because she would try to walk behind me or carry my bag. I learned that it was abnormal to walk with people of a different status (in terms of both socioeconomic status and caste) than oneself. No one explained this norm to me but I learned as I became acculturated to this area. Thus, two different but closely related experiments were designed to assess values toward various types of rules. In the Experiment 3a, occupation-based roles were used while in Experiment 3b, gender-based roles were utilized to study more implicit types of social expectations. Participants Three groups of participants were sampled for this study. Sixty-three participants were recruited from an urban Indian university, 38 from a rural Indian university and 30 from Northwestern

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 60 University for a total of 132 participants (see Table 3). The median ages of the participants were 20, 21 and 19 years, respectively. Both the American and urban Indian university samples had a fairly even split of gender (57% and 63% male, respectively). The rural Indian university sample was heavily dominated by males (83%). Indian samples were recruited by faculty collaborators at the various universities and from a wide range of disciplines and levels of education (e.g. engineering, pharmacy, bachelors, masters degrees). Northwestern University students were recruited through the Introductory Psychology subject pool. None of the participants received any monetary compensation though the American students did receive partial course credit.

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 61

Table 8. Demographic Information for Participants in Study 3a

Size of Age Groups Gender (Mean) (Median) (Median) (Mean) Rural Indian College Students Urban Indian College Students American Undergraduate College Students 29 males, 9 females 41 males, 22 females 17 males, 13 females Attaining Bachelors degree Attaining Masters degree Attaining Bachelors degree 2 (4-point Likert Scale) 2 (4-point Likert Scale) 4.5 (6-point Likert Scale) Education Religiosity Household N

20.5 years 21.9 years 18.8 years

6 people 5 people 4 people

38 63 30

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 62 Procedure As in previous studies, Indian participants were run differently than American participants. Sessions for the students at Indian universities took place in large classrooms with at least 15 to 20 students in them. Sessions at the American university took place in groups of 3 to 4 individuals. Participants received a story in which a person risked his life to intervene on a mugging that was occurring. This person could either have a role that was consistent with intervening on the mugging (i.e. police officer) or inconsistent with intervention (i.e. ordinary civilian). After reading through this paragraph, participants were asked to contrast it with the other role. For example, participants in the Police Officer First condition would read a story like the one given below: One night, an off-duty policeman is returning home. On the way, he sees some goons beating up and robbing an old man. The policeman jumps in to try to save the old man. He fights bravely but is killed and unable to save the old man. The next paragraph would ask them to contrast that with a case in which the role-inconsistent actor intervened: Now, imagine that instead of an off-duty policeman, it was just an ordinary civilian that saw the same thing happening and jumped in to save the old man. He, too, fights courageously but is killed along with old man. Finally, participants were asked who deserved more blame for the death of the old man. They marked their responses on a 4 point scale with responses toward the lower end of the scale indicating more blame to the policeman and the higher end of the scale indicating greater blame to the civilian for intervening. Though not marked on the scale, participants were given the option to make a note on the page if they believed that both the policeman and the civilian

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 63 deserved equal blame. The outcome of the intervention was manipulated in another betweensubjects condition. In the Live Condition, the intervention resulted in the old man being saved: One night, an off-duty policeman is returning home. On the way, he sees some goons beating up and robbing an old man. The policeman jumps in to try to save the old man. He fights bravely and saves the old man but is killed himself. Now, imagine that instead of an off-duty policeman, it was just an ordinary civilian that saw the same thing happening and jumped in to save the old man. He, too, fights courageously and saves the old man but dies in the process. Participants in this condition were asked who they believed deserved more credit for saving the old mans life the policeman or the civilian. Again, participants were given the option to write in a response. In both conditions, the police officer and the civilian died while intervening on the mugging. Results The data were first analyzed across all participants. Participants were sensitive to the outcome of the intervention (i.e. whether the old man lived or died) when assigning responsibility to the policeman or civilian. Across both Outcome conditions, only nine participants out of 132 saw the policeman and civilian as having equal responsibility and these were marked as 2.5 on the 4 point scale for the purpose of this analysis. Participants gave greater credit to the civilian when the old man lived (M = 2.88, SD = .90) but attributed more blame to the police officer when the old man died (M = 2.13, SD = .91). Though the effect of blaming the police man more when the intervention failed and crediting the civilian more when it succeeded held true for all three groups of participants, F(1, 113) = 25.75, p < .01, the order of comparison

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 64 seemed to matter more for some groups than others, F(2, 113) = 3.09, p < .05, as revealed by a significant Group X Order interaction 8 . Other demographic variables such as religiosity, household size and education were not related with participants judgments of blame or praise. Table 9. Means for Experiment 3a by Outcome and Order Condition for All Groups Outcome Condition Order Condition
police (consistent) first man (inconsistent) first police (consistent) first man (inconsistent) first

Urban Indian College Students

2.42 (1.00) 2.07 (1.00) 2.42 (0.84) 3.10 (1.07)

Rural Indian College Students

2.22 (1.09) 1.57 (0.79) 3.38 (0.74) 2.60 (1.17)

American Undergraduate Students

1.88 (0.35) 2.14 (0.69) 2.88 (0.23) 3.07 (0.45)

Old Man Dies

Old Man Lives

Note. Standard error of the mean provided in parentheses

Discussion In this experiment, we assessed whether the value of self-sacrifice was dependant on the obligations that a particular role entails. It was expected that consistency with the social expectations of a role would be a factor in determining the value of a self-sacrificial act. Additionally, we expected that blame/credit attribution to the different roles would be affected by what the outcome of the self-sacrifice was. For example, a role-consistent sacrifice might receive less credit for success because it might be perceived as less effortful. We found that participants
8

Please see Appendix D for detailed description of the order effects.

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 65 were more likely to blame a police officer (role-consistent sacrifice) than an ordinary civilian (role-inconsistent sacrifice) who lost his life in a (failed) attempt to save an old man from being robbed and killed. Furthermore, when the self-sacrifice was successful, i.e. when the policeman or civilian died but were able to save the old man in the process, the policeman received less credit than the civilian. Consistent with our predictions, participants open-ended responses indicated that the policeman was less praiseworthy in this instance because he was simply doing his job whereas the civilian was doing something above and beyond his social expectations. This experiment shows that the value of a self-sacrificial act is embedded to a certain extent in what a persons is expected to do by virtue of what role he or she occupies. A role consistent sacrifice is seen as less noteworthy when it produces its intended consequences. At the same time when a role-consistent sacrifice fails, it reflects worse on the agent from whom it was expected than from whom it was not. This indicates that self-sacrifice is a context-dependent moral value and more of an obligation for some people than others Moreover, contrary to our predictions, we observed that participants from all three cultural groups sampled perceived a similar difference between role consistent and inconsistent self-sacrifices. This was surprising because we had expected that participants from duty-based cultures would be more sensitive to whether an act of self-sacrifice was consistent with an agents role obligations. However, all participants blamed the consistent sacrifice more when it failed and credited the inconsistent sacrifice more when it succeeded. Interestingly, the urban Indian sample seemed to be the most affected by the order of presentation of the role consistent and inconsistent sacrifices. When the role consistent sacrifice, i.e. the police officers sacrifice was described first, participants not only did not differentiate between whether the sacrifice resulted in a positive or negative outcome, but they also seemed divided about whether the police

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 66 officer or civilian was more deserving of blame or praise. It is unclear how this finding should be interpreted. One reasonable post-hoc explanation could be that when urban participants read about the role inconsistent sacrifice first, the police mans actions seemed less remarkable in either case and therefore the predicted pattern was observed (i.e. more blame and less credit). However, if the role consistent sacrifice was seen first, seeing the inconsistent sacrifice did not do anything to diminish or reduce the policemans sacrifice. This is an unsatisfactory explanation for several reasons including the fact that if this was the case, then we might expect to find similar order effects in other populations. There is some indication that the rural Indians results could be interpreted in a similar manner. The rural participants blamed the police officer more when they read about his action after they read about the civilians so it is possible that seeing the role inconsistent sacrifice led to increased expectations from the person whose role entailed that type of sacrifice. There were several weaknesses in this study. One, a lot of participants indicated that blame was not the right word to use when talking about the failed self-sacrifice because the agent did not really cause the old mans death. Possible ways that we might try to address this serious concern is by giving participants a chance to provide open-ended responses. Participants could also be asked the same question in both outcome conditions, e.g. whose actions do you think were more heroic? Future studies might even use participants discomfort with using the word blame as a covariate to the approval of self-sacrifice. It seems plausible, for example, that participants who perceive the act of self-sacrifice as not at all blame-worthy might be more approving of self-sacrifice in general. Another limitation of this study is that the definition of role obligations is very narrow. There are many different types of roles that a person may occupy in her lifetimes some that

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 67 entail more rigid or explicit obligations than others. Here, we used only a specific type of occupation-based role and it is very possible that the clear effects observed of role-consistent versus inconsistent sacrifice could be due to the well-specified nature of a policemans duty. Other types of roles embody more subtle and culturally-dependant expectations. For example, the role expectations of a police man can differ across contexts, cultures and times (e.g. the meaning of a police officer in the south side of Chicago is probably very different from the police officer portrayed in this experiment). It is also much easier to justify behavior which defies the expectations carried by these types of roles because they are so complex and so deeply embedded within cultural systems. This could have several implications for peoples moral judgments of role-consistent or inconsistent behavior. When the role is clearly well-defined (and if that role requires self-sacrifice in specific contexts), people might be less accepting of failure as was observed in the case of the police officer. However, when the role requirements are more opaque, then we are more likely to observe greater cultural differences in the acceptability of sacrifice which reflect cultural mores related to that particular role. Using the types of roles which carry more implicit expectations will also be another test of the hypothesis that the value of self-sacrifice is affected by the type of person carrying it out.

Experiment 3b The goal of this experiment was to examine further the relationship between self-sacrifice and the agent who carries it out. Though the previous experiment showed that the value of selfsacrifice is moderated by the expectations people have from the person carrying it out, this experiment extended these findings by using a more subtle type of role relationship. This study explored gender role expectations and how they might influence the value of self-sacrifice in the

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 68 domain of education. The scenario used in this experiment was designed on the basis of conversations with rural and urban Indian participants. These conversations assured me that education attainment is an issue which suffers from gender disparity and therefore would be an adequate test bed to manipulate role consistency with gender. Participants A total of 160 participants from four samples took part in this study. Each of these is discussed in more detail below. Rural Indians Participants were recruited from the same villages as described in Study 2. The ages of the participants ranged from 15 to 76 with a mean age of 39. Of the 32 rural participants interviewed, 14 were women. The average household consisted of 7 to 8 people. Besides the majority Hindu participants, the sample consisted of three Muslim participants and four Buddhist participants. 84.4% of the sample had not completed high school and 100% earned less than Rs.2,00,000 ($4000) per year with a majority earning Rs.1,00,000 or less. Low-SES and High-SES Urban Indian Participants were sampled from locations in East and South Delhi as described earlier. American Undergraduates 63 participants were recruited from Northwestern Universitys Psychology subject pool. They ranged in age from 18 to 23. 36% of the sample was male. All Indian participants were offered either boxes of cookies or chocolates as compensation for their time and effort. Northwestern undergraduates received partial course credit. Materials and Procedure The procedure was slightly different for Indian and American participants. All Indian participants were run individually, except in some rural villages where this was nearly impossible. Stories and subsequent questions were presented out loud. In their responses,

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 69 participants were encouraged to also be as vocal as possible. American undergraduates were run in a lab with three to four other students. Participants read through the survey on their own. To mimic the open-ended nature of the Indian interviews as closely as possible, students were urged to provide justifications or rationales for their opinions whenever they felt the need to do so. Most participants were quite willing to write a couple of sentences describing their choice. Two factors were varied between subjects. Participants either saw a daughter sacrifice her education (role-consistent) or a son sacrifice his (inconsistent sacrifice) and either a positive or negative outcome of the sacrifice. Gender of the sacrificing agent was assigned as a betweensubjects factor in this study because of the particular type of role manipulated. In this study, I was interested to look at the expectations gender roles entail specifically, what it means to be a daughter versus what it means to be a son.

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 70 Table 10. Demographic Information for Participants in Study 3b Marital Status Size of Education Household (median) Household Income (median)
Less than Rs. 50,000 ($1000)/ year

Gender

Age

Religion

Religiosity
13% less religious than average 56% about average 27% above average 17% less religious than average 66% about average 17% above average 28% less religious than average 61% about average 8% above average

Caste
56.3% General 15.6% OBC 28.1% Unreported

Rural Indian

18 males, 14 females

Mean = 39.1 years Range = 15 76

25 Hindus,3 Muslims, 4 Buddhists

84% married

7.1 people

Some elementary education

32

Low-SES Urban Indian

16 males, 13 females

Mean = 46.4 years Range = 20 76 Mean = 39.4 years Age range = 16 75 Mean = 18.8 years Age range = 18 23

27 Hindus, 1 Muslim

86% married

4.0 people

Some college

Rs. 2,00,000 to 5,00,000/year (approx. $4,000 to $10,000) Rs. 5,00,000 to 10,00,000/year (approx. $10,000 to $20,000)

29 69% General 31% Unreported

High-SES Urban Indian

11 males, 25 females

29 Hindus, 4 Christians, 1 Muslim

81% married

4.3 people

Completed college and/or some graduate school

44.4% General 55.6% Unreported

36

30 males, American 33 Undergraduates females

Not available

Mostly unmarried

Not available

Some college

$120,000 to $170,000/ year

Median = 3 on a 7-point Likert scale

Not Applicable

63

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 71 This is a much subtler difference in role than a police officer versus a civilian even within rural societies in India which have more nuanced perspectives on types of roles. As a result of this subtlety, and the historical discrimination against women in various spheres of life, participants could not be asked to directly compare between a man and woman making the same sacrifice. Presumably, participants would be aware of the social taboos in differentiating between the same action done by a man and a woman and therefore hesitate to favor one action over the other. Thus, in order to get a valid measurement of peoples perspectives on the obligations that being a son or a daughter, role consistency was manipulated between-subjects 9 . All participants received a scenario describing a family which was facing hard times. The only way described in the scenario to ease the suffering of the family was for the eldest child to give up his or her education to save money on school tuition 10 . From preliminary interviews with people in these areas, it appeared that this was a fairly ecologically valid domain with which to assess gender-specific self-sacrifice. Education is traditionally seen as being a more important achievement for men than for women and this is reflected in the enrollment rates in schools for boys versus girls (Filmer, 2000). As such, when a family hits upon hard times, it is usually the daughters of the household whose education is cutoff first and therefore it may be seen as a more role-consistent self-sacrifice for a woman to voluntarily end her education than for a man to do

genderdisparitiesineducationweremorepronouncedatsomepointinAmericanhistory(Jacobs,1996)than theyarecurrently. 10ThesituationwaschangedslightlyforAmericanparticipantsbecausepublicschoolsareusuallyfreeinthe U.S.whereasallschoolsrequiresomefeesinIndia.ThesituationforAmericanparticipantsstatedthatthe eldestchildwouldgiveuphisorhercollegeeducation.

9Thisisroleconsistency,asdefinedpresentlyfortheIndiancontext.Although,thereissomeevidencethat

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 72 so especially within rural and low-SES Indian communities 11,12 . An example of the story with a role-consistent sacrifice and positive outcome is given below:

A man has been ill for several months. He is the sole supporter of his family so there has been no income in the family during this time. Consequently, the whole family has been suffering and there has been nothing to eat. The mans eldest daughter sees the distress of her family. She decides to leave her school so at least her school fees can be used to buy food. Because the girl sacrificed her studies which helped the family buy food, the father eventually recovers; however, the daughter is never able to return to school.

After reading through one of the four versions of the scenario (i.e. daughters sacrifice vs. sons sacrifice, positive vs. negative outcome), participants were asked to make a judgment about the protagonists act of sacrifice on a four point Likert scale. Just as in the previous experiment, in the negative outcome condition, participants were asked for how much blame the actor deserved for the death of his her father and in the positive outcome condition, they were asked for how praiseworthy they believed the actor to be. Results Overall, participants were highly approving of the act of self-sacrifice described in the scenario. In the positive outcome condition, they though the act was very praiseworthy (M = 2.25, SD = .81) and in the negative outcome condition participants did not think that the action was deserving of blame (M = .62, SD = .94). A 4 (Group: Rural, Low-SES, High-SES Indians and American undergraduates) X 2(Daughters, Sons Self-Sacrifice) X 2(Positive vs. Negative

IndianversusruralIndianversusAmericanuniversitieswithinoursamplescollectedabove.Thesesamples werefairlyrandomandtheruralIndianuniversityhadthelowestpercentageoffemales,followedbythe urbanIndianuniversityandtheAmericanuniversity. 12Notethathadthescenariobeendesignedinanotherway,e.g.awomandecidestogetajobversusaman decidestogetajobtohelptheirfamilies,theroleconsistencywouldbetheotherwayaround.Thisisan importantstudythatshouldbeconductedinthefuturetoensurethattheresultsseenhereareduetotherole consistencyofthesacrificeandnottotheparticulardomainofeducation.

11Additionalconvergingevidenceforthisisprovidedbylookingattheratioofmalestofemalesinurban

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 73 Outcome) ANOVA revealed that approval of the sacrifice was moderated by the role of the actor carrying it out and by Group, F(3, 144) = 2.98, p < .05. As in the previous experiment (assuming that role approprateness favors the daughter sacrificing), participants were slightly more disapproving of failure of the daughters sacrifice than of the sons sacrifice (M = .72 versus .53, SD = 1.02 and .85, respectively). However, this difference was unreliable, F(1, 144) = 2.56, p = .11). Group Differences Looking more closely at all the sub-groups revealed some significant differences. To probe further into these, the interaction between role-sacrifice and group was analyzed separately for the positive and negative outcome condition. The data were split in this way because the measures used in the positive and negative conditions did not seem directly comparable, i.e. more praise is not necessarily equivalent to less blame. The negative outcome condition revealed some overall group differences in the approval of the sacrifice. Both rural and low-SES urban Indians blamed the womans sacrifice more when her father died (M = 1.63 and 1.00, SD = 1.41 and 1.15) than the mans sacrifice (M = .63 and .71, SD = 1.19, 1.11) with the same outcome. The difference between the two types of sacrifice was much smaller with low-SES urban Indians, F(3, 71) = 3.20, p < .05. High-SES urban Indians did not differentiate between the sons and daughters sacrifice in assigning blame (M = .44 in both). Finally, American participants showed a slight reversal of the pattern found with rural and low-SES Indians. They disapproved less of the womans sacrifice (M = .27, SD = .46) than of the mans sacrifice (M = .44, SD = .63) when it resulted in a negative outcome. Note also that rural and low-SES Indians were more disapproving of sacrifice when it resulted in the fathers death overall as compared to the other two populations. Participants open-ended responses in

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 74 the negative outcome condition indicated that participants were more likely to think that a sacrifice was wasted if the father had died. Some participants responses in the case where the father died as compared to participants in the condition where the father lived seemed to indicate that the fathers death was inevitable and neither the son nor daughter should sacrifice themselves for a futile cause.
Table 11. Means for Experiment 3b Across Outcome Condition and Gendered Sacrifice for All Groups

Groups

Outcome Condition Father Lives

Sons Sacrifice

Daughters Sacrifice

Rural Father Dies Father Lives Low-SES Father Dies Father Lives High-SES Father Dies Father Lives American Father Dies

2.44 0.22 0.63 0.42 2.67 0.21 0.71 0.42 2.20 0.29 0.44 0.24 2.07 0.12 0.44 0.16

2.38 0.38 1.63 0.50 1.67 0.44 1.00 0.44 2.13 0.23 0.44 0.24 2.53 0.15 0.27 0.12

Note. Italicized numbers are standard errors of the means.

In the positive outcome condition, the differences between the various groups were much less clear. The rural and high-SES Indians did not seem to be sensitive to the role consistency of the sacrifice. However, rural Indians were more approving of the sacrifice in general (M = 2.41 versus 2.17 for high-SES Indians, SD = .84 and .79). The low-SES urban Indians and American participants were very sensitive to the role consistency of the sacrifice when judging how praiseworthy the sacrifice was. But they seemed to have opposing intuitions. Low-SES Indians

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 75 approved more of the sacrifice when it was carried out by the son, i.e. role-inconsistent sacrifice, than the daughter (M = 2.67 versus 1.67, SD = .52 and 1.32). American participants approved more of the daughters sacrifice (M = 2.53, SD = .62) than of the sons sacrifice (M = 2.07, SD = .46). Participant Gender Differences The gender of the participants may affect how sensitive (and in which direction) participants were to the particular role expectations of this type of sacrifice. We found that gender played a different role in the positive and negative outcome conditions. When the outcome of the sacrifice was negative, male participants were more disapproving of the sacrifice (M = .78, SD = 1.05), in both the role consistent and inconsistent cases, than female participants (M = .53, SD = .86).Is this difference reliable? In the positive outcome condition, females and males did not differ in how much praise they assigned the role-inconsistent sacrifice (M = 2.20 and 2.43, SD = .63 and .76) but relative to a sacrifice made by the son, females were more approving of the role-consistent sacrifice made by the daughter than were male participants (M = 2.63 versus 1.95, SD = 1.10 and .99). The overall interaction between the gender of the participant and the outcome of the sacrifice was reliable, F(1, 118) = 4.96, p<.05.
Table 11. Means for Experiment 3b by Gender of Participants and Condition

Outcome Male Female Condition participants Participants Father Lives Father Dies 2.15 (.17) .87 (.21) 2.40 (.10) .50 (.11)

Note. Standard Errors of the Mean provided in parantheses

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 76 Some noteworthy group differences were also found. For example, in the low-SES urban and rural Indian samples, women were generally more approving of the daughters sacrifice in the positive outcome condition (M = 3.00 and 2.67, SD = .00 and .58) than the men (M = 1.00 and 2.20, SD = 1.10 and 3.30). Participant gender differences were almost nonexistent within the high-SES urban Indian and American participants. The gender differences within the groups should be accepted cautiously, however, because the sample size was too limited to draw any large conclusions. None of the other demographic variables appeared to play a role in participants judgments 13 . Discussion In this experiment, we investigated further how the value of self-sacrifice changes with respect to social role expectations and obligations. Consistency with role expectations was manipulated by varying the gender of an agent sacrificing further education for the good of her or his family. In addition, the outcome of the sacrifice was also varied in one case, the selfsacrifice brought about the intended result (the fathers life was saved) and in the other case, the self-sacrifice failed to help the family. As expected, there were strong group differences in the sensitivity to role expectations when deciding the value of the sacrifice. American and high-SES participants were least sensitive to the role consistency of the sacrifice. This effect cannot simply be attributed to an ineffectual manipulation because several of the high-SES Indian participants claimed that similar stories as the one described in the scenario had transpired in their own families. Rural and lowSES participants disapproved more of the role-consistent self-sacrifice when the sacrifice did not result in the intended outcome. This is consistent with what was found in the previous
13Includingcaste,religiosity,income,educationandhouseholdsize.

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 77 experiment with the occupation-based roles. The findings in the positive outcome condition were more difficult to interpret. The most interesting contrast was between the low-SES Indian and American samples. The former approved more of the sons sacrifice whereas the American groups approved more of the daughters sacrifice. In addition, women in the rural and low-SES communities were more approving of sacrifices made by women than men. Women in high-SES urban India were more disapproving of the daughters self-sacrifice. This is quite interesting because certain women in our sample were involved in non-profit organizations which promote education for low-caste children and especially low-caste girls. Though unsurprising that this would affect the womens approval of sacrificing education, it would be useful in future studies to employ different domains to test what the effect of role consistency is for particular populations by manipulating different types of roles and culture/group-specific expectations. Another point worth noting is that rural participants were most approving when the sacrifice resulted in a positive outcome but interestingly, they were also the most disapproving when the sacrifice failed to achieve success. This parallels the findings reported in the first experiment which show that rural Indians were most sensitive to the probability of outcome as well. This is further evidence that the value of self-sacrifice in this community is not simply an abstract notion but rather embedded in many contextual factors such as outcomes, social expectations and purposes. Experiment 4 The final study in this dissertation further explores the limit of self-sacrifice as a moral value. If self-sacrifice is perceived as a significant act, then there should be certain contexts in which it is acceptable and other in which it seen as superfluous. Additionally, we believe the context or purpose of the sacrifice should interact with the type of self-sacrifice it is. For

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 78 example, if the context is one with high stakes, then an appropriate self-sacrifice might also entail a high cost to the self. This implies that it might not be appropriate to give up ones own life for a mundane cause but acceptable and morally lauded only in the case when it is given up for a meaningful purpose. Study 4 also examined the effect of the expected outcome of a particular act of self-sacrifice on how much it is valued. One of the basic distinctions in studying the psychology of moral values has been whether or not people are sensitive to the outcomes of their actions (Baron & Spranca, 1997). Varying the probability of the success of a self-sacrificial action allowed us to verify whether this basic property of certain types of moral values applies to the value of self-sacrifice as well. Specifically, we expected that if participants viewed the value of self-sacrifice as a deontological norm, or as a moral value unaffected by the outcomes it produces, then they would not be sensitive to the likelihood of the success of the sacrifice. If however, sacrifice was seen as embedded within certain practical constraints, then perhaps participants would be more approving of self-sacrifice when it had a high chance of success than when it had a low chance of success. This experiment was designed to test the various conditions under which self-sacrifice is valued. We varied three factors in a field experiment. First, we examined whether there is a difference in how much self-sacrifice is valued in different groups whether the mere presence of a self-sacrificial act, in cultures where this norm is more salient, would activate a moral schema. Second, we predicted that because self-sacrifice is a meaningful act, people would only be approving of it in cases where it is being done for a noble cause rather than a mundane cause. Finally, we also varied the probability of success of the sacrifice to examine whether the norm of self-sacrifice is subject to the same non-utilitarian principles as other strongly held moral values. Note, too, that self-sacrifice could be seen as a moral value both within rural and urban

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 79 communities but it could show a very different profile (as assessed by these factors) in each culture. To test for possible within and across-cultural differences in the scope and limiting factors of self-sacrifice, this study was run with three separate samples. Methods Participants. The study was conducted with populations in rural India, urban India and an American university. The Indian sample was very diverse and though we only focus on the difference between urban and rural, there were a lot of other factors that varied between the two groups as well. The rural Indian sample was recruited from farming communities in Central India near the city of Bhopal. These participants tended to be of lower socioeconomic status, lower caste and less educated than the urban sample. The rural Indian participants also had larger families, more people per household and a lot of them tended to lands which had been in their families for several generations. All of these factors were collapsed to a single dimension of urban and rural. We had 60 rural Indian participants (38 females), 60 urban Indian participants (26 females) and 75 Northwestern undergraduates. Procedure. This experiment was conducted as the first task as part of a structured interview in India. It was administered verbally. In the United States, the task was presented to participants as a questionnaire. We varied two factors between participants. One was the type of sacrifice (low-cost self-sacrifice versus high-cost self-sacrifice) and the other was the purpose of the sacrifice (mundane/instrumental cause versus special/sacred cause). The third factor, the likelihood of success of the sacrifice, was varied within-subjects. There were four levels of probability (most likely not succeed, 50-50 chance of succeeding, most likely succeed and definitely succeed). We did not use percentages because we were afraid that this might not be a meaningful way of getting probabilities across to some of our participants. However, if

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 80 participants asked for clarification or exact percentages, they were told the probabilities were 25, 50, 75 and 100, respectively. Participants were assigned to one of the four between-subject conditions and given four scenarios that followed the same structure. For example, a participant assigned to a condition with low-cost self-sacrifice for a mundane cause would read four scenarios with this kind of action. All four scenarios were comparable in content across the different conditions; they differed only in the type of sacrificial action and the purpose of the sacrifice. Examples of each condition of each scenario can be found in Appendix E, but a version of each scenario is provided below (names were changed for American participants): All examples are of high-cost self-sacrifice for serious causes: Radha is a final year college student at a good university. She is a good student but her marks in Chemistry are quite low. One night she is studying for her Chemistry final to take place the next day and her friend comes into her room. The friend is distraught because one of her relatives has just died. Radha knows that if she consoles her friend she will definitely make her friend feel better but she will probably fail the class and delay her graduation. Radha decides to help her friend and fail the class. Vijay has a serious disease and is in desperate need of a heart transplant to survive. His name has been next in line on the list of people to receive a heart for many months. Finally, one day, a hospital calls and he is told that a suitable heart has just become available. He is overjoyed. When he arrives at the hospital, he sees that the highly respected local police commissioner has been in a car accident and also requires a heart transplant. Vijay knows that if the commissioner is saved, he will bring many criminals to justice and make the town safer for everyone. He is a good and just man and criminals are scared of him. He remembers how people suffered before the commissioner arrived. With the heart transplant, the commissioner will definitely live. He decides to forego his heart transplant so that the commissioner receives it. Ravi is a single man in his twenties. He works for a large company. Recently he has been working very dilligently on a project that will mean a promotion for him if it succeeds. However, one day he comes into the office and finds that overnight all of the work that he has done for the project has accidentally been destroyed. The person who is responsible for the damage is an old co-worker. The co-worker begs Ravi not to turn him in because he will lose his job. Ravi knows that his co-worker has a large family and that he is the only financial support for the entire family. Ravi can assume responsibility for the mess and the co-worker will definitely not lose his job. Ravi decides to take on the blame and he gets fired from the job.

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 81 Mehra saab is the mayor of a small town. One day he learns that terrorists have come into his town and kidnapped twenty children. The terrorists demand that Mehra saab turn himself into them in exchange for the children. Mehra saab knows that it is difficult to negotiate with the terrorists because they are not trustworthy but in this case he knows that if he gives up himself, he will definitely be able to save the children. Mehra saab decides to give himself up and probably lose his life. All scenarios were read out loud to participants as many times as participants wanted. Participants could also ask clarification questions if they desired though I tried not to give them any information that was not in the scenarios. My prediction was that, because the practices that highlight the virtues of self-sacrifice are most pervasive in rural India, these participants would be most approving of self-sacrificial acts. However, because the act of self-sacrifice is supposed to be an act of purity, I also predicted that participants would be less approving of a self-sacrifice carried out for a mundane cause than for a serious cause. Additionally, we again wanted to examine whether self-sacrifice was valued for the consequences it produced and whether participants would be sensitive to the probability of success of a particular act of self-sacrifice. Results The variables of interest in this study were participants judgments of the rightness of the action (scale of 1 to 6, with 6 being most approving), judgments of the actor was and moral approvability of the act. All three of these variables were highly correlated (Cronbachs > .75). Thus, for further analyses, we combined the three variables. Rural participants were most willing to sacrifice across all conditions, followed by urban participants and American undergraduates who did not differ significantly from one another (M = 4.58, SD = 1.15; M = 3.77, SD = 1.22; M= 3.32, SD = 1.21). All participants were more approving of self-sacrifice when it occurred for a serious cause than for a mundane cause. A 2 (Type of Self-sacrifice: High-cost versus Low-

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 82 cost) X (Purpose: Mundane versus Serious) X 3 (Group: Rural, Urban, Northwestern Undergraduates) ANOVA revealed significant main effects of both Type of Self-Sacrifice and Purpose of Sacrifice. However, a reliable Group by Type interaction showed that both urban Indians and American participants still preferred a low-cost self-sacrifice to a high-cost selfsacrifice for both mundane causes and serious causes whereas the rural Indians only showed this preference for sacrifices carried out for mundane purposes (see Figure 3). Low-cost and Highcost sacrifices were valued equally for serious causes with rural participants. Next, we looked at the effect of the probability manipulation. Recall that each participant was given all four levels of the probability manipulation (in a Latin-square design). We then computed each participants approval of sacrifice at each probability level. The results did not show an effect of the likelihood of success of the sacrifice on urban Indian and American participants approval of sacrifice. However, there was a significant interaction between the type, purpose and likelihood of success of the sacrifice among the rural participants (F (1, 54) = 6.73, p < .05). Rural participants approval of sacrifice closely tracked the probability of success of the sacrifice, unlike the American or urban participants, but primarily for the case of a high-cost sacrifice. Rural participants who read about a low-cost self-sacrifice were sensitive to the probability of success only if the sacrifice was being done for a serious cause. The other condition in which rural participants were fairly sensitive to the likelihood of success was when they read about a high-cost self-sacrifice done for a mundane cause. In both the cases where a low-cost self-sacrifice was done for a mundane cause and a high-cost self-sacrifice was done for a serious cause, rural participants were insensitive to the likelihood of success of the sacrifice (see Figure 4). These results become more interesting when we recall that self-sacrifices made for mundane causes were always rated lower than those made for serious causes.

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 83

Figure 3. Rural, Urban Indian and American participants approval of self-sacrifice by type and purpose of sacrifice

Mundane

Serious

Mundane

Serious

Mundane

Serious

Purpose of Sacrifice

Purpose of Sacrifice

Purpose of Sacrifice

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 84

Figure 4 Participants Sensitivity to the Likelihood of a Sacrifices Success by Type and Purpose of Sacrifice
Low -cost Self-Sacrifice (rural participants) High-cost Self-Sacrifice (rural participants)

6 5.5 5 Approval of Self- Sacrifice 4.5 4 3.5 3 2.5 2 Approval of Self-Sacrifice

6 5.5 5 4.5 Mundane 4 Serious 3.5 3 2.5

High-cost Self-Sacrifice (urban participants)

Mundane Serious

Low -Cost Self-Sacrifice (urban participants)

2 Definitely Succeed Most Likely Succeed 50-50 Most Likely Not Succeed
6 5.5 5 Approval of Self-Sacrifice 4.5 Mundane 4 Serious 3.5 3 2.5 2 Definitely Succeed Most Likely Succeed 50-50 Most Likely Not Succeed Definitely Succeed Most Likely Succeed 50-50 Most Likely Not Succeed Mundane Serious

5.5

Definitely Succeed

Most Likely Succeed

50-50

Most Likely Not Succeed

Probability of Success of Self-Sacrifice

5 Approval of Self-Sacrifice 4.5

Probability of Success of Self-Sacrifice

4 3.5 3

2.5 2

Probability of Success of Self-Sacrifice

Low -cost Self-Sacrifice (Am erican participants)

Probability of Success of Self-Sacrifice

High-cost Self-Sacrifice (Am erican Participants)

5.5

5.5

5 Approval of Self-Sacrifice Approval of Self-Sacrifice

4.5

4.5 Mundane Serious 4 Mundane Serious

3.5

3.5

3 2.5 2.5 2 Definitely Succeed Most Likely Succeed 50-50 Most Likely Not Succeed 2 Definitely Succeed Most Likely Succeed 50-50 Most Likely Not Succeed

Probability of Success of Self-Sacrifice

Probability of Success of Self-Sacrifice

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 85 Discussion This study compared participants moral judgments of a self-sacrificial act to a sacrificial act which did not entail a high cost to the self. We found that while urban Indians and American participants were more approving of the low-cost self-sacrifice than the high-cost self-sacrifice, rural Indians were equally approving of both. However, when the sacrifice was done for a mundane cause as compared to a serious cause, e.g., in order to help someone save some money versus to save someones life, rural Indians behaved like the other two groups and approved more of the low-cost sacrifice to the high-cost sacrifice. As predicted, this data suggests that the norm of self-sacrifice is more salient and significant for rural Indians. Surprisingly, however, rural Indians were also the only group to be sensitive to the probability of success of sacrifice. As the probability of success was systematically varied from 100% to 25%, rural Indians became less and less approving of self-sacrifice but this, too, was affected by the purpose of the sacrifice. Urban Indians and American participants were insensitive to probability in both cases. These data suggest that urban Indian and American participants may have a more idealized or romanticized notion of self-sacrifice whereas the rural group has a more practical conception of acts of sacrifice perhaps due to more day-to-day experiences in dealing with scarcity and balancing the needs of large households. Sacrificing personal benefit in order to help a larger group is a key characteristic of moral behavior. However, large sacrifices such as sacrificing oneself (but only in the right contexts) may be seen as an even greater moral act particularly in some cultures where the norm of selfsacrifice is highly salient. In this field experiment, we found that rural Indians were more approving of self-sacrifice than urban Indians or Americans. More importantly, self-sacrifice was only acceptable for noble causes and in mundane cases, weak sacrifices were preferred

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 86 demonstrating the symbolic nature of self-sacrifice. Urban Indians and Americans disapproved more of self- than other forms of sacrifice. This work shows us that there are some clear group differences in the saliency of the norm of self-sacrifice.

GENERAL DISCUSSION The present research examined the effect of culturally-based orientations to morality on the value of self-sacrifice. The first study demonstrated that self-sacrifice is more related to the presence of duties than of rights. Several different methodologies were employed to provide converging evidence for this hypothesis. The first study in this dissertation elucidated the link between duty and rights-based systems of morality and the value of self-sacrifice without relying on participants self-reported moral judgments. Rather, it was assumed that folktales are an important source of cultural knowledge and therefore, a valuable tool for understanding cultural orientations toward morality. A content analysis of over a hundred American and Indian folktales showed that Indian folktales were more likely to mention duties than American folktales suggesting that duties are a more dominant feature in Indian culture. Across both types of folktales, it was also observed that the presence of duties was highly predictive of self-sacrifice while the presence of rights predicted acting in ones self-interest. Again, corroboratory evidence was found that self-sacrifice seemed to be a more important part of the structure of morality described in Indian folktales and American folktales. However, as discussed previously, it is likely that the American folktales were simply less representative of American cultural mores than the Indian folktales were of Indian culture. If this is the case, then the folktale analysis presented here was just that comparisons of folktales from different cultures and not indicative of any current cultural differences. Even so, it is

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 87 interesting to observe that most of the hypotheses tested in other paradigms in this dissertation were validated by this project as well. In addition, an important point that emerged from this content analysis was that rights and duties appear to be independent constructs. Throughout this dissertation, it is possible that rights and duties may appear to be antitheses of one another and especially that having a particular orientation toward morality precludes the other type of orientation. However, it seems that individuals can be motivated by both rights and duties orientations. Though Study 1 hinted at the link between particular systems of morality and selfsacrifice as a moral value, we conducted a follow-up study to make this connection more explicit by priming a duty or rights-based orientation toward morality. Follow-up Study This study was conducted in the lab with American undergraduates who were assumed to predominantly view morality from the perspective of individual rights. However, by asking participants to think about their various duties and obligations, it was found that American participants approval of self-sacrifice increased relative to the control condition (please see Appendix F for complete Methods and Results sections). Furthermore, when participants attention was focused on their rights, the value of self-sacrifice was actually diminished. Though this experiment was more limited in scope and generalizability than most of the other studies reported here, it served to show that rights and duties-based orientations have a causal influence in shaping the value of self-sacrifice. It is still unclear what the nature of that influence is, i.e. what psychological mechanisms are involved but there does seem to be a link between the salience of duties and willingness to self-sacrifice. Another contribution of this follow-up study was that it demonstrated that having a duty or rights based orientation toward morality is flexible to a certain extent. It is possible that certain cultural groups are more likely to have a particular

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 88 dominant orientation of thinking about moral systems. However, it also appears that not only is there individual variation within the cultures but that people from predominantly rights-based cultures can shift perspectives toward morality which can affect their moral values. This has some really interesting implications for work in moral psychology which for the most part assumes that moral values are immutable once instilled whether by cultural practices or innate moral parameters embedded in the mind. So, recall that some recent work by Jon Haidt suggests that conservatives and liberals rely on different moral principles liberals rely on principles of justice and harm while conservatives make use of principles such as loyalty and purity as well (Haidt & Graham, 2007). If these moral principles are formed in part because of a more general, overarching orientation towards morality, then the current work implies that it may be possible to find common ground between liberals and conservatives by shifting individuals perspectives toward morality. Of course, it is still true that while certain values may be activated by shifting perspectives toward morality, the values could still apply in different domains for liberals and conservatives. The scenario used in the current experiment was one that was fairly affectively impoverished and it is possible that the simple primed used would not affect participants moral judgments on a more strongly held issue. But the finding that rights and duties-based orientations can be primed, combined with the result that they also appear to be independent of one another drives home the point that these constructs are not opposite ends of a dichotomy 14 . Though it is beyond the scope of the current work to discuss how rights and duties-based orientations evolve within a cultural context (see Moghaddam et al, 2002 and Bhatia, 2002 for a more in-depth discussion), it seems fairly certain that these general systems do not get entrenched as a result of one parameter either being
14Thesameisalsotruefortheconceptsofselfinterestandselfsacrifice.

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 89 switched on or off. Rather, each of these systems probably develops as a result of complex interactions with many other environmental and cultural factors (and again, probably not the same sorts of interactions). As a case in point, one of the most important distinction across the majority of our cross-cultural studies appeared to be differences in socioeconomic status not in cross-national differences. Though this was not wholly unexpected because we did foresee traditional cultural and religious practices as affecting the norm of self-sacrifice, it was interesting to observe how similar the low-SES and rural Indian participants were to one another and how distinct they were from urban high-SES participants. It appears that researchers have not yet systematically studied differences in rights or duty-based orientations in different social groups. However, on the basis of the current studies and prior work showing that low SES groups are more interdependent than high SES groups, I would not be surprised to see a greater prevalence of duty-based orientations to morality in low SES communities. Experiment 2 was a field study which showed that when participants compared a prosocial action which resulted in either an unforeseen positive, negative or neutral outcome for the actor, they believed the action to be more praiseworthy when the actor suffered a personal loss. Participants directly compared each of these three options and it was found that even when a personal loss was compared to the neutral condition, a negative personal outcome was more indicative of a virtuous person. Cultural differences in the valuation of self-sacrifice were also observed. Participants from rural India and low-SES participants from urban India were more approving of the actor when he suffered a personal loss than either urban Indian or American populations. This suggests that more traditional societies in India, which were expected to have a more duty-based orientation to morality, did, in fact, value self-sacrifice more than societies which purportedly have a primarily rights-based orientation.

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 90 Another notable finding from Experiment 2 is that participants judgments of the actors intentionality were affected by the personal outcome he experienced as a result of engaging in a particular prosocial action. Participants reported that an actor who suffered a personal loss as a result of helping someone had purer intentions than an actor who received a reward. From participants moral judgments of the two acts, it is clear that they also believed that the selfsacrificial action was more praiseworthy. However, it is somewhat counterintuitive that judgments of intentionality should be affected by the personal outcome for the agent. The scenario that participants received strongly implied that the motivation for each agent to engage in the prosocial action was concern for the childs life. In other words, the personal outcome that each agent faced was completely unforeseen yet it still affected participants judgments of the agents intentions in deciding to help the child. A similar effect has been reported by Joshua Knobe and colleagues (Knobe, 2003, 2004, 2006). In what has been termed the side-effect effect by some, Knobe and colleagues find that participants often use their moral evaluations of side-effects of agents actions to make inferences about intentionality. So, for example, a CEO who means to increase profits for his company, but causes damage to the environment as a sideeffect is seen as more intentionally bringing about that side effect than a CEO who helps the environment. The case in the present research indicates that participants use their moral evaluations of even an unforeseen side effect to make inferences about the intentionality for the main goal. An unforeseen and unintentional act of self-sacrifice led participants to view saving a childs life as a more pure act. The final two studies focused more deeply on the idea of self-sacrifice. An important part of duty-based cultures appears to be increased sensitivity to how an individual is part of a particular community and the role she occupies within that community. Therefore, it seemed

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 91 likely that the value of self-sacrifice would be affected by the role expectations of the people performing it. Two different types of role expectations were tested in Experiments 3a and 3b in this study. Experiment 3a looked at participants sensitivity to self-sacrifice as a function of what is expected of a specific occupation. It was found that participants valued a self-sacrifice more when it went against social expectations. So, participants thought that an ordinary civilian was more praiseworthy when he swooped in to save an old mans life than an off-duty policeman. This finding (more praise to a role-inconsistent sacrifice) was replicated in Experiment 3b with a very different type of role expectation. Here, the role in question was based in cultural mores of who should sacrifice ones education (males or females) for the sake of a social group. It was found, once again, that the most valued sacrifice was the one that went against cultural expectations of who should be the one to give up his or her education. At first glance, these findings may seem counterintuitive. If the prediction is that participants from duty-based cultures and value self-sacrifice are more sensitive to who is performing the sacrifice, then it seems reasonable to suggest that they should prefer the role consistent sacrifice. However, if participants are attuned to the amount of personal cost someone undergoes to bring about an outcome, then it is understood that the role inconsistent sacrifice requires more effort and therefore should be more highly valued. Experiment 2 suggests that this is, in fact, the case. A policeman jumping in to save someone from being mugged is not as significant an action as an ordinary civilian doing the same and therefore is not as highly valued. The findings also tell us something about how participants define self-sacrifice. It appears that an act is defined as a self-sacrifice when it is effortful and something that is remarkable or distinct from everyday occurrences.

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 92 Finally, the last experiment presented in this dissertation was an extensive examination of when self-sacrifice is considered to be an appropriate action. As the previous data indicates, selfsacrifice is regarded as a meaningful or extraordinary act in most cases. Accordingly, it was found that participants value self-sacrifice more when it is done for serious causes rather than for trivial or mundane causes. For participants from rural Indian villages, a serious cause was reason enough for even a high-cost self-sacrifice. However, mundane causes did not warrant selfsacrifice for anyone. Likewise, as reported earlier, American undergraduates actually disapproved more of self-sacrifice in the switch version of the trolley car problem while concurrently preferring self-sacrifice in the footbridge version. These findings suggest that an act of self-sacrifice, and consequently participants attitudes or valuations of it, are very much embedded within a complex framework. An act of self-sacrifice is not a one-dimensional concept that is either valued or not in a particular culture. Rather, cultures vary in who should carry out acts of self-sacrifice, in which situations and the appropriate scale of such acts. Participants in the studies here also varied in how they reasoned about the underlying moral construct of self-sacrifice. Participants were asked if their approval of self-sacrifice would be affected by the likelihood of its success. Some researchers would claim that if it is a strongly held moral value, then participants judgments of self-sacrificial acts should not be affected by the consequences it produces. Indeed, participants from urban samples did not seem to consider likelihoods of success of self-sacrificial actions. Surprisingly, however, rural participants did. These same participants also seemed to value self-sacrifice more overall. So, it appears that participants who cared more about self-sacrifice also seemed to reason more consequentially about it. Similarly, in the very first experiment reported in this dissertation, rural participants were actually more accepting of reward than the other groups when it was compared with the

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 93 neutral case while being more approving of personal losses overall. Taking these studies together, it seems that rural participants hold self-sacrifice as a strong moral value but still think about it in a very concrete and practical manner. To my knowledge, there is very little work that has been done to suggest that cultures vary in whether they reason about moral values deontologically or consequentially. 15 And, even rarer is the claim that people may reason about a particular moral value differently across cultures and contexts. Some recent work suggests that moral judgments are affected by individuals psychological distance relative to the issue. Individuals who are psychologically close to a moral issue reason about it in a more concrete manner than individuals who are relatively psychologically distant (Eyal, Liberman & Trope, 2008). This raises the possibility that self-sacrifice is a romanticized, abstract ideal in urban Indian and American populations and therefore thought about in a paradigmatic way -- while rural participants who deal with scarcity and consequently, sacrifice, more frequently construe it at a more concrete level. Implications for Moral Psychology Most current work that attempts to incorporate cultural values into the study of morality seems to be missing some crucial elements. Moral psychologists and anthropologists are praiseworthy in claiming that cultures differ in which moral values they rely on (Haidt et al, 1993, Shweder et al, 1997). This is certainly a great step forward from relying on moral universals. However, it is interesting to note that psychologists who might never doubt the claim that individuals and cultural groups vary in even the basic conception of the self, would still stay that some moral principles are conceptualized the same way across all contexts and situations. That certainly seems to say something about the concept of morality. As a field, psychologists
15Infact,LimandBaron(1997)seemtosuggesttheopposite.

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 94 are comfortable with accepting cultural variation in almost any domain from perceptual findings (Segall, Campbell & Herskovits, 1966) to numerical concepts (Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994), but cultural variation in moral concepts is still somewhat a tricky topic. It might be that unfamiliar moral practices are harder to fathom and justify than unfamiliar counting practices and that this biases how psychologists study morality. Mere recognition of this fact, that the study of morality might differ in substantial ways from the study of other higher-order cognitive domains, might bring new insights into how moral concepts vary cross-culturally. This dissertation is one small step in this direction. By bringing the idea of guiding systems of morality which are based on overall conceptions of the self, we can start to analyze how various moral values can semantically differ across cultures. The concept of harm though prevalent worldwide can be elicited by different situations but also defined differently. Here, we looked at a special subset of harm harm to the self or self-sacrifice. This concept in itself has not received a great amount of attention in the past which is unfortunate because it seems to play a large role in some moral systems. The value of self-sacrifice seems to affect various cultural practices of how people relate to one another (van Lange et al, 1997) and it might also explain how values toward martyrdom evolve in certain religious groups. Additionally, incorporating the norm of self-sacrifice into work in moral psychology helps the field move away from thinking solely about the norm of self-interest (Miller, 1999; Ratner & Miller, 2001). This work suggests that people are motivated to act in a lot of cases by reasons that seem to fly in the face of pure self-preservation or self-interest. In fact, as shown in some studies reported here, acts motivated by self-interest are often viewed as immoral and deserving of reproach. It seems important, then, to assume that self-sacrifice is an important part of folk moral conceptions contrary to what other recent work suggests (Huebner & Hauser, in press).

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 95 Of course, a valid criticism of the study of self-sacrifice is that the concept on a large part is based in how individuals define themselves. Perhaps if an individuals conception of herself is defined in large part by her community, then an act of self-sacrifice may not be perceived as costly to the self if it benefits the community in some way. Two possible responses to this criticism are that firstly, the definition of the self is an important concept to consider when studying any sort of societal norm, even the norm of self-interest. Can an individual really be said to be acting in ones own self-interest if she is defining herself interdependently? One solution of this problem is to assume that the definition of the self is contextually variable and accept that this will always be an underlying problem. However, this does not mean that the value of self-sacrifice cannot be studied until we know how the self is defined. The current work shows that once self-sacrifice evolves to be an important virtue in a culture, it is manifested in several different domains. Among the domains studied in the present work, the value of selfsacrifice affects participants moral judgments of others and it is written about in cultural folktales. So, it appears that people think of self-sacrifice as an important norm even when it does not concern their physical selves in any way. Another valid criticism of the current approach is that the large SES differences we observe in valuing self-sacrifice could indicate that the norm of self-sacrifice is embedded more in the daily lives and practices of individuals, rather than in more abstract, overarching orientations toward morality. It could simply be the case that low-SES participants and rural Indians just have more experience in dealing with sacrifice, whether that means working 16 hours a day to be able to send your child to school, or putting off non-essential purchases so you can pay for your great aunts last rites.

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition 96 Future Directions The studies carried out in this dissertation are just an initial step in incorporating cultural systems into the study of moral cognition. Not only have we severely limited ourselves on by focusing on just one particular facet of how cultural systems may influence moral reasoning (duty versus rights orientation), but we have also focused only on one particular type of moral value that might be impacted. There, too, this body of work makes only slight headway. For example, the current research only shows that the value of self-sacrifice is affected by the identity of the agent carrying it out but it says nothing about how self-sacrifice is affected by who the beneficiary is. In addition, it appears that in certain cultures, the act of self-sacrifice is defined by its purity in intention and thought. This is definitely an underemphasized aspect of the current work. Next steps in this line might address how anticipation of reward (metaphysical or not) might corrupt the value of self-sacrifice. But, even the minor progress made by the current work is important because it uncovers an important part of duty-based moral systems that have thus far been ignored in the study of moral cognition. Future work will need to address certain populations even within a predominantly right-based culture that operate on duty-based orientations if we are to seriously undertake the challenge of viewing culture as a distribution of various modes of reasoning. So, in rural, less-mobile, farming communities in the United States, we would not be at all surprised to see a system of morality that was similar in a lot of ways to duty-based, traditional farming communities in India. In this regard, independent measures of the extent to which social groups rely on rights or duties when thinking about moral concepts would be useful. However, that is not to say that there still would not be the possibility of significant differences because we have made the point in this work that any one particular aspect of moral cognition exists within a

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Appendix A. Coder Instructions for Experiment 1: Moral content: We are coding for whether a story has any sort of a moral content. Here, moral is defined very loosely because we would like to get an understanding for the types of situations people can construe as being moral situations. But some general instructions might still be useful: o A story might be said to have moral conduct if it tells you anything about what it means to engage in right or wrong conduct o If there is a sense that a particular character in a story is clearly the good guy and the other is clearly a bad guy, then that might be telling you what is a good or bad way to behave o If you can extract any moral lessons from a story, then it might be said to have moral content o Sometimes, the story might describe some really immoral actions which might serve as a cautionary tale. This, too, could be thought of as moral content.

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition107 o A person might be conflicted between choosing a right or wrong action. In some cases dilemma situations can have moral content 1) Rights: Does the story describe cases of what individuals have the right to do? Does the story have instances of individuals benefitting from some societal norm (some kind of basic entitlement)? (1 = yes, 0 = no) a. Use blue to highlight 2) Duties: Does the story have instances of individuals owing something to society? Or fulfilling obligations? (use yellow to highlight) a. May see instances of owing money this can be seen as a duty in some cases but we are more interested in societal norms that are worded as duties so fulfilling debts is a duty. b. Types of duties (separate column) 3) Self-sacrifice: Do individuals sacrifice themselves in any way for someone else or for a principal? a. Is the sacrifice seen as a noble act? (-1 for bad, 0 neutral, 1 good) b. How is the self-sacrificed? (separate column) 4) Self-interest: Are individuals shown to be acting out of motivations for themselves or in order to gain something for themselves? a. Seen as good behavior? (-1 for bad, 0 neutral, 1 good) b. Type of self-interested behavior (separate column)

Appendix B. Complete list of folk tales and collections Story Title Jack, Tom, and Will The Bear's Tale The King's Well Bopoluchi Brother's Day One Man's Virture Two Sisters Four Girls and a King The Four Jogis A Friend in Need The Lord of Death A Feast in a Dream A Story for Sundays Collection American FolkTalesVol1 American FolkTalesVol2 American FolkTalesVol2 Folktales From India Folktales From India Folktales From India Folktales From India Folktales From India Folktales From India Folktales From India Folktales From India Folktales From India Folktales From India

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition108 A Drum Folktales From India In Another Country Folktales From India A Buffalo Made of Lac Folktales From India The Tiger-Makers Folktales From India Four Friends Folktales Of India The Farmer and the Barber Folktales Of India The King's Daughter Folktales Of India The Birth and Marriage of Siva Folktales Of India The Youngest Daughter-in-law Folktales Of India The Wicked Mendicant Folktales Of India The Cruel Daughter-in-law Folktales Of India Two Sisters-in-law Folktales Of India Lord Krishna's Wife Folktales Of India As Long as You Keep Your Legs Up Folktales Of India The Prince and the Shepard Folktales Of India Rich Girl, Poor Girl Folktales Of India The Dexterity of a Squirrel Folktales Of India The Crane and the Crow Folktales Of India The Tale of Bihgaraz Maj Folktales Of India The Rupee Note Folktales Of India Borrowed Earrings Folktales Of India Dala Tarwadi Folktales Of India The Story of Pebet Folktales Of India The Outlaw Babar Deva Folktales Of India The Fox and the Crow Folktales Of India Chamdam and Yuthung Folktales Of India The Sparrow and the Sweet Pudding Folktales Of India The Porcupine Daughter Folktales Of India Sharpening the Dagger Folktales Of India Whickety-Whack, Into My Sack Homespun The Peddler's Dream Homespun Like Meat Loves Salt Homespun The Locket Homespun The Main-Order Bride Homespun The Crack of Dawn A Portrait of Aunt Laura Homespun Miss Daisy Homespun Miss Wunderlich Homespun The Large Stuffed Rabbit Homespun Cousin Norman Homespun The Lucky Package Homespun The Herring Shed Homespun Edna Robinson Homespun A Stepchild That Was Treated Mighty Bad Stockings Of Buttermilk The Two Witches Stockings Of Buttermilk Lady Featherflight Stockings Of Buttermilk

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition109 No Estiendo Stockings Of Buttermilk King Peacock Stockings Of Buttermilk Cold Feet and the Lonesome Queen Stockings Of Buttermilk The Friendly Demon Stockings Of Buttermilk The Little Bull with the Golden Horns Stockings Of Buttermilk The Gold in the Chimney Stockings Of Buttermilk Three Eileschpijjel Stories Stockings Of Buttermilk Jack and the Beanstalk Stockings Of Buttermilk The Big Cabbage Stockings Of Buttermilk Tobe Killed a Bear Stockings Of Buttermilk The Cat That Went A-Traveling Stockings Of Buttermilk The Enchanted Prince Stockings Of Buttermilk Miss Liza and the King Stockings Of Buttermilk Ballu Shah, the miser Treasury Of Indian Tales Himsuka Treasury Of Indian Tales The silver basket Treasury Of Indian Tales Tejimala Treasury Of Indian Tales Dakshina Treasury Of Indian Tales The Snake with a golden tail Treasury Of Indian Tales The dowry of salt Treasury Of Indian Tales Hunchibili Treasury Of Indian Tales Destiny Treasury Of Indian Tales The sweetness of salt Treasury Of Indian Tales David Crockett Meets a Bear Treasury of North American Tales The Cherry Tree Legend Treasury of North American Tales Looking for Trouble Treasury of North American Tales The Bird That Was Ashamed of Its Feet Treasury of North American Tales A Boy and His Donkey Treasury of North American Tales Brer Possum's Dilemma Treasury of North American Tales The Red Rag Under the Churn Treasury of North American Tales The Two Wagoners Treasury of North American Tales Annancy and the Yam Hills Treasury of North American Tales Words of Wisdom Treasury of North American Tales The Golden Rain Treasury of North American Tales Why Men Have to Work Treasury of North American Tales A Bundle of Troubles Treasury of North American Tales The Robe Treasury of North American Tales Brother Rabbit Breaks Up a Party Treasury of North American Tales Jack and the Giants' New Ground Treasury of North American Tales The Boy That Was Foolish-Wise Treasury of North American Tales Bobtail and the Devil Treasury of North American Tales The $50,000 Racehorse Treasury of North American Tales The Yankee Peddler and the Innkeeper Treasury of North American Tales The Girl That Married a Flop-Eared Hound-Dog Treasury of North American Tales A Bunch of Laurel Blooms for a Present Treasury of North American Tales

Farmer Smith and Ma'am Jones Lovers' Retreat Sammy and His Fiddle

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition110 Treasury of North American Tales Treasury of North American Tales Treasury of North American Tales

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition111 Appendix C. Scenarios and questions used in Experiment 2.

One ordinary day, Rahul went out for a walk. As he was returning home, he saw a small child in the path of an oncoming truck. He jumped in to save the child putting his own life at risk. Thankfully, he was able to save the child and himself. He handed the child back to her parents who thanked him profusely. The childs parents gifted Rahul an expensive watch.

Vivek was walking down the street towards a building. He noticed that a child was playing in the middle of the road. A truck was approaching rapidly and about to hit the child. Even though he knew that he could lose his life, Vivek jumped in to save the child. Luckily, he was able to save the child and return her safely to her parents who were very grateful. But, while saving the child, Vivek lost one of his legs.

The mayor of the town where Rahul and Vivek live is trying to decide who should get an award. Who do you think deserves more praise? Rahul or Vivek? (Circle One) 2
Rahul deserves most of the praise

3
Rahul deserves a little more praise than Vivek

4
Vivek deserves a little more praise than Rahul

5
Vivek deserves most of the praise

6
Vivek definitely deserves the award and all of the praise

Whose intentions do you think were more pure? 1

ely Rahuls intentions ere more pure

2
Probably Rahuls intentions were more pure

3
Probably Viveks intentions were more pure

4
Definitely Viveks intentions were more pure

Neutral Scenario

Neeraj was passing through an intersection one day when he noticed that a child was in the path of a truck. Neeraj jumped in to save the child at great risk to his life. Thankfully, he was able to save the child and not get hurt himself. The child and her parents were later joyfully reunited.

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition112 Appendix D. Description of Order Effects in Experiment 3a The data were analyzed separately for each sample to further explore the effects of order on blame or credit assignment. Urban Indian students sensitivity to the outcome of the intervention was moderated by the order of presentation, i.e. whether they compared the role consistent sacrifice to the role inconsistent one or vice versa. When urban students were presented with the civilians action first and then asked to imagine a police man doing the same, they preferred the civilians action in the case when the man lived (M = 3.10, SD = 1.07) and blamed the police man more when the man died, as described earlier (M = 2.07, SD = 1.00). However, when they first read about the police mans action and then were asked to imagine an ordinary civilian intervening in the same way, there was no difference in who they liked more in both Outcome conditions (M = 2.42 in both conditions, SD = 1.00 and .84, respectively). So, it appears that seeing the civilians actions affected the judgments of the policemans self-sacrifice but not vice versa, F(1, 57) = 4.04, p < .05. Also, the means in the case of seeing the roleconsistent sacrifice first were centered on the midpoint of the scale indicating that participants were divided about how deserved more blame or credit. This was also verified by dichotomizing the dependent measure and looking at frequency of whether participants were choosing the policeman or the civilian as most blameworthy/praiseworthy depending on the Outcome condition1. For rural Indian participants, the order of presentation of the role consistent/inconsistent sacrifice emerged as a significant main effect, F(1, 30) = 4.31, p < .05. The main effect of the Outcome on the relative blame/credit assigned to the policeman or civilian remained, i.e. that the civilian received more credit when the old man was saved and the police man deserved more blame when he was not. But, when the police man scenario appeared first, participants approved of the civilian more and blamed the police man less (M = 3.38 and 2.23, SD = .74 and 1.09) than when the role-inconsistent sacrifice appeared first (M = 2.60 and 1.57, SD = 1.17 and .79). American undergraduates responses were not affected by the order of response, they blamed the role-consistent sacrifice more for the mans death and gave more credit to the role-inconsistent sacrifice when the man was saved regardless of which action was described first.

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition113 Appendix E. Materials for Experiment 4

HC-S (high cost serious cause) Radha is a final year college student at a good university. She is a good student but her marks in Chemistry are quite low. One night she is studying for her Chemistry final to take place the next day and her friend comes into her room. The friend is distraught because one of her relatives has just died. Radha knows that if she consoles her friend she will definitely make her friend feel better but she will probably fail the class and delay her graduation. Radha decides to help her friend and fail the class. HC-S (HIGH COST SERIOUS CAUSE)

Radha is a final year college student at a good university. She is a good student but her marks in Chemistry are quite low. One night she is studying for her Chemistry final to take place the next day and her friend comes into her room. The friend is distraught because one of her relatives has just died. Radha knows that if she consoles her friend she will most likely make her friend feel better but she will probably fail the class and delay her graduation. Radha decides to help her friend and fail the class.
HC-S (HIGH COST SERIOUS CAUSE)

Radha is a final year college student at a good university. She is a good student but her marks in Chemistry are quite low. One night she is studying for her Chemistry final to take place the next day and her friend comes into her room. The friend is distraught because one of her relatives has just died. Radha knows that she will have a fifty-fifty chance to make her friend feel better but she will probably fail the class and delay her graduation. Radha decides to help her friend and fail the class.
HC-S (HIGH COST SERIOUS CAUSE)

Radha is a final year college student at a good university. She is a good student but her marks in Chemistry are quite low. One night she is studying for her Chemistry final to take place the next day and her friend comes into her room. The friend is distraught because one of her relatives has just died. Radha knows that she will most likely not make her friend feel better but she will probably fail the class and delay her graduation. Radha decides to help her friend and fail the class.
HC-S (HIGH COST SERIOUS CAUSE)

Vijay has a serious disease and is in desperate need of a heart transplant to survive. His name has been next in line on the list of people to receive a heart for many months. Finally, one day, a hospital calls and he is told that a suitable heart has just become available. He is overjoyed. When he arrives at the hospital, he sees that the highly respected local police commissioner has been in a car accident and also requires a heart transplant. Vijay knows that if the commissioner is saved, he will bring many criminals to justice and make the town safer for everyone. He is a good and just man and criminals are scared of him. He remembers how people suffered before

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition114 the commissioner arrived. With the heart transplant, the commissioner will definitely live. He decides to forego his heart transplant so that the commissioner receives it.

HC-S (HIGH COST SERIOUS CAUSE)

Vijay has a serious disease and is in desperate need of a heart transplant to survive. His name has been next in line on the list of people to receive a heart for many months. Finally, one day, a hospital calls and he is told that a suitable heart has just become available. He is overjoyed. When he arrives at the hospital, he sees that the highly respected local police commissioner has been in a car accident and also requires a heart transplant. Vijay knows that if the commissioner is saved, he will bring many criminals to justice and make the town safer for everyone. He is a good and just man and criminals are scared of him. He remembers how people suffered when the commissioner before the commissioner arrived. With the heart transplant, the commissioner will most likely live. He decides to forego his heart transplant so that the commissioner receives it.
HC-S (HIGH COST SERIOUS CAUSE)

Vijay has a serious disease and is in desperate need of a heart transplant to survive. His name has been next in line on the list of people to receive a heart for many months. Finally, one day, a hospital calls and he is told that a suitable heart has just become available. He is overjoyed. When he arrives at the hospital, he sees that the highly respected local police commissioner has been in a car accident and also requires a heart transplant. Vijay knows that if the commissioner is saved, he will bring many criminals to justice and make the town safer for everyone. He is a good and just man and criminals are scared of him. He remembers how people suffered when the commissioner before the commissioner arrived. With the heart transplant, there is a fifty-fifty chance that the commissioner will live. He decides to forego his heart transplant so that the commissioner receives it.
HC-S (HIGH COST SERIOUS CAUSE)

Vijay has a serious disease and is in desperate need of a heart transplant to survive. His name has been next in line on the list of people to receive a heart for many months. Finally, one day, a hospital calls and he is told that a suitable heart has just become available. He is overjoyed. When he arrives at the hospital, he sees that the highly respected local police commissioner has been in a car accident and also requires a heart transplant. Vijay knows that if the commissioner is saved, he will bring many criminals to justice and make the town safer for everyone. He is a good and just man and criminals are scared of him. He remembers how people suffered when the commissioner before the commissioner arrived. With the heart transplant, the commissioner will most likely not live. He decides to forego his heart transplant so that the commissioner receives it.
HC-S (HIGH COST SERIOUS CAUSE)

Ravi is a single man in his twenties. He works for a large company. Recently he has been working very dilligently on a project that will mean a promotion for him if it succeeds. However,

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition115 one day he comes into the office and finds that overnight all of the work that he has done for the project has accidentally been destroyed. The person who is responsible for the damage is an old co-worker. The co-worker begs Ravi not to turn him in because he will lose his job. Ravi knows that his co-worker has a large family and that he is the only financial support for the entire family. Ravi can assume responsibility for the mess and the co-worker will definitely not lose his job. Ravi decides to take on the blame and he gets fired from the job.
HC-S (HIGH COST SERIOUS CAUSE)

Ravi is a single man in his twenties. He works for a large company. Recently he has been working very dilligently on a project that will mean a promotion for him if it succeeds. However, one day he comes into the office and finds that overnight all of the work that he has done for the project has accidentally been destroyed. The person who is responsible for the damage is an old co-worker. The co-worker begs Ravi not to turn him in because he will lose his job. Ravi knows that his co-worker has a large family and that he is the only financial support for the entire family. Ravi can assume responsibility for the mess and the co-worker will most likely not lose his job. Ravi decides to take on the blame and he gets fired from the job.
HC-S (HIGH COST SERIOUS CAUSE)

Ravi is a single man in his twenties. He works for a large company. Recently he has been working very dilligently on a project that will mean a promotion for him if it succeeds. However, one day he comes into the office and finds that overnight all of the work that he has done for the project has accidentally been destroyed. The person who is responsible for the damage is an old co-worker. The co-worker begs Ravi not to turn him in because he will lose his job. Ravi knows that his co-worker has a large family and that he is the only financial support for the entire family. Ravi can assume responsibility for the mess and there is a fifty-fifty chance that the coworker will not lose his job. Ravi decides to take on the blame and he gets fired from the job.
HC-S (HIGH COST SERIOUS CAUSE)

Ravi is a single man in his twenties. He works for a large company. Recently he has been working very diligently on a project that will mean a promotion for him if it succeeds. However, one day he comes into the office and finds that overnight all of the work that he has done for the project has accidentally been destroyed. The person who is responsible for the damage is an old co-worker. The co-worker begs Ravi not to turn him in because he will lose his job. Ravi knows that his co-worker has a large family and that he is the only financial support for the entire family. Ravi can assume responsibility for the mess and the co-worker will most likely still lose his job. Ravi decides to take on the blame and he gets fired from the job.
HC-S (HIGH COST SERIOUS CAUSE)

Mr. Mehra is the mayor of a small town. One day he learns that terrorists have come into his town and kidnapped twenty children. The terrorists demand that Mr. Mehra turn himself into them in exchange for the children. Mr.Mehra knows that it is difficult to negotiate with the terrorists because they are not trustworthy but in this case he knows that if he gives up himself,

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition116 he will definitely be able to save the children. Mr. Mehra decides to give himself up and probably lose his life.
HC-S (HIGH COST SERIOUS CAUSE)

Mr. Mehra is the mayor of a small town. One day he learns that terrorists have come into his town and kidnapped twenty children. The terrorists demand that Mr. Mehra turn himself into them in exchange for the children. Mr.Mehra knows that it is difficult to negotiate with the terrorists because they are not trustworthy but in this case he knows that if he gives up himself, he will most likely be able to save the children. Mr. Mehra decides to give himself up and probably lose his life.
HC-S (HIGH COST SERIOUS CAUSE)

Mr. Mehra is the mayor of a small town. One day he learns that terrorists have come into his town and kidnapped twenty children. The terrorists demand that Mr. Mehra turn himself into them in exchange for the children. Mr.Mehra knows that it is difficult to negotiate with the terrorists because they are not trustworthy but in this case he knows that if he gives up himself, there is a fifty-fifty chance he will be able to save the children. Mr. Mehra decides to give himself up and probably lose his life.
HC-S (HIGH COST SERIOUS CAUSE)

Mr. Mehra is the mayor of a small town. One day he learns that terrorists have come into his town and kidnapped twenty children. The terrorists demand that Mr. Mehra turn himself into them in exchange for the children. Mr.Mehra knows that it is difficult to negotiate with the terrorists because they are not trustworthy but in this case he knows that if he gives up himself, he will most likely not be able to save the children. Mr. Mehra decides to give himself up and probably lose his life.
HC M (High-cost; Mundane cause)

Radha is a final year college student at a good university. She is a good student but her marks in Chemistry are quite low. One night she is studying for her Chemistry final to take place the next day and her friend comes into her room. The friend wants Radha to go to a end-of-the-year party with her in which the friend is going to definitely win a TV. The friend is hesitant to go alone. Radha knows that she will probably fail the class and delay her graduation if she goes. Radha decides to go to the party and fail the class.
HC M (HIGH-COST; MUNDANE CAUSE) Radha is a final year college student at a good university. She is a good student but her marks in Chemistry are quite low. One night she is studying for her Chemistry final to take place the next day and her friend comes into her room. The friend wants Radha to go to a end-of-the-year party with her in which the friend is going to most likely win a TV. The friend is hesitant to go alone. Radha knows that she will probably fail the class and delay her graduation if she goes. Radha decides to go to the party and fail the class.

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition117

HC M (HIGH-COST; MUNDANE CAUSE)

Radha is a final year college student at a good university. She is a good student but her marks in Chemistry are quite low. One night she is studying for her Chemistry final to take place the next day and her friend comes into her room. The friend wants Radha to go to a end-of-the-year party with her in which the friend is going to have a fifty-fifty chance to win a TV. The friend is hesitant to go alone. Radha knows that she will probably fail the class and delay her graduation if she goes. Radha decides to go to the party and fail the class.
HC M (HIGH-COST; MUNDANE CAUSE)

Radha is a final year college student at a good university. She is a good student but her marks in Chemistry are quite low. One night she is studying for her Chemistry final to take place the next day and her friend comes into her room. The friend wants Radha to go to a end-of-the-year party with her in which the friend is most likely not going to win a TV. The friend is hesitant to go alone. Radha knows that she will probably fail the class and delay her graduation if she goes. Radha decides to go to the party and fail the class.
HC M (HIGH-COST; MUNDANE CAUSE)

Vijay has a serious disease and is in desperate need of a heart transplant to survive. His name has been next in line on the list of people to receive a heart for many months. Finally, one day, a hospital calls and he is told that a suitable heart has just become available. He is overjoyed. When he arrives at the hospital, he sees that the highly ranked local police commissioner has been in a car accident and also requires a heart transplant. Vijay knows that if the commissioner is saved, the city will not have to spend time and money in finding a new replacement commissioner. With the heart transplant, the commissioner will definitely live. He decides to forego his heart transplant so that the commissioner receives it.
HC M (HIGH-COST; MUNDANE CAUSE)

Vijay has a serious disease and is in desperate need of a heart transplant to survive. His name has been next in line on the list of people to receive a heart for many months. Finally, one day, a hospital calls and he is told that a suitable heart has just become available. He is overjoyed. When he arrives at the hospital, he sees that the highly ranked local police commissioner has been in a car accident and also requires a heart transplant. Vijay knows that if the commissioner is saved, the city will not have to spend time and money in finding a new replacement commissioner. With the heart transplant, the commissioner will most likely live. He decides to forego his heart transplant so that the commissioner receives it.
HC M (HIGH-COST; MUNDANE CAUSE)

Vijay has a serious disease and is in desperate need of a heart transplant to survive. His name has been next in line on the list of people to receive a heart for many months. Finally, one day, a hospital calls and he is told that a suitable heart has just become available. He is overjoyed.

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition118 When he arrives at the hospital, he sees that the highly ranked local police commissioner has been in a car accident and also requires a heart transplant. Vijay knows that if the commissioner is saved, the city will not have to spend time and money in finding a new replacement commissioner. With the heart transplant, there is a fifty-fifty chance that the commissioner will live. He decides to forego his heart transplant so that the commissioner receives it.
HC M (HIGH-COST; MUNDANE CAUSE)

Vijay has a serious disease and is in desperate need of a heart transplant to survive. His name has been next in line on the list of people to receive a heart for many months. Finally, one day, a hospital calls and he is told that a suitable heart has just become available. He is overjoyed. When he arrives at the hospital, he sees that the highly ranked local police commissioner has been in a car accident and also requires a heart transplant. Vijay knows that if the commissioner is saved, the city will not have to spend time and money in finding a new replacement commissioner. With the heart transplant, the commissioner will most likely not live. He decides to forego his heart transplant so that the commissioner receives it.
HC M (HIGH-COST; MUNDANE CAUSE)

Ravi is a single man in his twenties. He works for a large company. Recently he has been working very dilligently on a project that will mean a promotion for him if it succeeds. However, one day he comes into the office and finds that overnight all of the work that he has done for the project has accidentally been destroyed. The person who is responsible for the damage is a coworker. The co-worker begs Ravi not to turn him in because he has a brand new imported car which the company has given and the co-worker will definitely have to give it up if he accepts the blame. Ravi decides to take on the blame and he gets fired from the job.
HC M (HIGH-COST; MUNDANE CAUSE)

Ravi is a single man in his twenties. He works for a large company. Recently he has been working very dilligently on a project that will mean a promotion for him if it succeeds. However, one day he comes into the office and finds that overnight all of the work that he has done for the project has accidentally been destroyed. The person who is responsible for the damage is a coworker. The co-worker begs Ravi not to turn him in because he has a brand new imported car which the company has given and the co-worker will most likely have to give it up if he accepts the blame. Ravi decides to take on the blame and he gets fired from the job.
HC M (HIGH-COST; MUNDANE CAUSE)

Ravi is a single man in his twenties. He works for a large company. Recently he has been working very dilligently on a project that will mean a promotion for him if it succeeds. However, one day he comes into the office and finds that overnight all of the work that he has done for the project has accidentally been destroyed. The person who is responsible for the damage is a coworker. The co-worker begs Ravi not to turn him in because he has a brand new imported car which the company has given and theres a fifty-fifty chance that the co-worker will have to give it up if he accepts the blame. Ravi decides to take on the blame and he gets fired from the job.

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition119

HC M (HIGH-COST; MUNDANE CAUSE)

Ravi is a single man in his twenties. He works for a large company. Recently he has been working very dilligently on a project that will mean a promotion for him if it succeeds. However, one day he comes into the office and finds that overnight all of the work that he has done for the project has accidentally been destroyed. The person who is responsible for the damage is a coworker. The co-worker begs Ravi not to turn him in because he has a brand new imported car which the company has given and the co-worker will most likely not have to give it up if he accepts the blame. Ravi decides to take on the blame and he gets fired from the job.
HC M (HIGH-COST; MUNDANE CAUSE)

Mr. Mehra is the mayor of a small town. One day he learns that terrorists have come into his town and stolen a very precious stone The terrorists demand that Mr. Mehra turn himself into them in exchange for the stones return to the town. Mr.Mehra knows that it is difficult to negotiate with the terrorists because they are not trustworthy but in this case he knows that if he gives up himself, he will definitely be able to save the stone. Mr. Mehra decides to give himself up and probably lose his life.
HC M (HIGH-COST; MUNDANE CAUSE)

Mr. Mehra is the mayor of a small town. One day he learns that terrorists have come into his town and stolen a very precious stone The terrorists demand that Mr. Mehra turn himself into them in exchange for the stones return to the town. Mr.Mehra knows that it is difficult to negotiate with the terrorists because they are not trustworthy but in this case he knows that if he gives up himself, he will most likely be able to save the stone. Mr. Mehra decides to give himself up and probably lose his life.
HC M (HIGH-COST; MUNDANE CAUSE)

Mr. Mehra is the mayor of a small town. One day he learns that terrorists have come into his town and stolen a very precious stone The terrorists demand that Mr. Mehra turn himself into them in exchange for the stones return to the town. Mr.Mehra knows that it is difficult to negotiate with the terrorists because they are not trustworthy but in this case he knows that if he gives up himself, there is a fifty-fifty chance he will be able to save the stone. Mr. Mehra decides to give himself up and probably lose his life.
HC M (HIGH-COST; MUNDANE CAUSE)

Mr. Mehra is the mayor of a small town. One day he learns that terrorists have come into his town and stolen a very precious stone The terrorists demand that Mr. Mehra turn himself into them in exchange for the stones return to the town. Mr.Mehra knows that it is difficult to negotiate with the terrorists because they are not trustworthy but in this case he knows that if he gives up himself, he will most likely not be able to save the stone. Mr. Mehra decides to give himself up and probably lose his life.

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition120

LC S (Low-cost; Serious cause)

Radha is a final year college student at a good university. She is a good student but her marks in Chemistry are quite low. One night she is studying for her Chemistry final to take place the next day and her friend comes into her room. The friend is distraught because one of her relatives has just died. Radha knows that she will definitely make her friend feel better but even though she will probably still pass the class, she wont get top marks. Radha decides to help her friend and not get top marks on the exam.
LC S (LOW-COST; SERIOUS CAUSE)

Radha is a final year college student at a good university. She is a good student but her marks in Chemistry are quite low. One night she is studying for her Chemistry final to take place the next day and her friend comes into her room. The friend is distraught because one of her relatives has just died. Radha knows that she will most likely make her friend feel better but even though she will probably still pass the class, she wont get top marks. Radha decides to help her friend and not get top marks on the exam.
LC-S (LOW-COST; SERIOUS CAUSE)

Radha is a final year college student at a good university. She is a good student but her marks in Chemistry are quite low. One night she is studying for her Chemistry final to take place the next day and her friend comes into her room. The friend is distraught because one of her relatives has just died. Radha knows that she will have a fifty-fifty chance to make her friend feel better but even though she will probably still pass the class, she wont get top marks. Radha decides to help her friend and not get top marks on the exam.
LC S (LOW-COST; SERIOUS CAUSE)

Radha is a final year college student at a good university. She is a good student but her marks in Chemistry are quite low. One night she is studying for her Chemistry final to take place the next day and her friend comes into her room. The friend is distraught because one of her relatives has just died. Radha knows that she will most likely not make her friend feel better but even though she will probably still pass the class, she wont get top marks. Radha decides to help her friend and not get top marks on the exam.
LC S (LOW-COST; SERIOUS CAUSE)

Vijay has a serious disease and is in need of a blood transfusion every month. His blood type is very rare and therefore his name has been next in line on the list of people to receive a blood transfusion for many weeks. Finally, one day, a hospital calls and he is told that his blood type has just become available. He is overjoyed. When he arrives at the hospital, he sees that the highly respected local police commissioner has been in a car accident and also requires a blood transfusion. Vijay knows that if the commissioner is saved, he will bring many criminals to justice and make the town safer for everyone. He remembers how people suffered when the

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition121 commissioner before the commissioner arrived. With the blood transfusion, the commissioner will definitely live. He decides to forego his blood transfusion this month and be ill so that the commissioner receives it.
LC S (LOW-COST; SERIOUS CAUSE)

Vijay has a serious disease and is in need of a blood transfusion every month. His blood type is very rare and therefore his name has been next in line on the list of people to receive a blood transfusion for many weeks. Finally, one day, a hospital calls and he is told that her blood type has just become available. He is overjoyed. When he arrives at the hospital, he sees that the highly respected local police commissioner has been in a car accident and also requires a blood transfusion. Vijay knows that if the commissioner is saved, he will bring many criminals to justice and make the town safer for everyone. He remembers how people suffered when the commissioner before the commissioner arrived. With the blood transfusion, the commissioner will most likely live. He decides to forego his blood transfusion this month and be ill so that the commissioner receives it.
LC S (LOW-COST; SERIOUS CAUSE)

Vijay has a serious disease and is in need of a blood transfusion every month. His blood type is very rare and therefore his name has been next in line on the list of people to receive a blood transfusion for many weeks. Finally, one day, a hospital calls and he is told that her blood type has just become available. He is overjoyed. When he arrives at the hospital, he sees that the highly respected local police commissioner has been in a car accident and also requires a blood transfusion. Vijay knows that if the commissioner is saved, he will bring many criminals to justice and make the town safer for everyone. He remembers how people suffered when the commissioner before the commissioner arrived. With the blood transfusion, there is a fifty-fifty chance that the commissioner will live. He decides to forego his blood transfusion this month and be ill so that the commissioner receives it.
LC S (LOW-COST; SERIOUS CAUSE)

Vijay has a serious disease and is in need of a blood transfusion every month. His blood type is very rare and therefore his name has been next in line on the list of people to receive a blood transfusion for many weeks. Finally, one day, a hospital calls and he is told that her blood type has just become available. He is overjoyed. When he arrives at the hospital, he sees that the highly respected local police commissioner has been in a car accident and also requires a blood transfusion. Vijay knows that if the commissioner is saved, he will bring many criminals to justice and make the town safer for everyone. He remembers how people suffered when the commissioner before the commissioner arrived. With the blood transfusion, the commissioner will most likely not live. He decides to forego his blood transfusion this month and be ill so that the commissioner receives it.
LC S (LOW-COST; SERIOUS CAUSE)

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition122 Ravi is a single man in his twenties. He works for a large company. Recently he has been working very dilligently on a project that will mean a promotion for him if it succeeds. However, one day he comes into the office and finds that overnight all of the work that he has done for the project has accidentally been destroyed. The person who is responsible for the damage is an old co-worker. The co-worker begs Ravi not to turn him in because he will lose his job. Ravi knows that his co-worker has a large family and that he is the only financial support for the entire family. Ravi can decide not to report him and the co-worker will definitely not lose his job. It is difficult but Ravi doesnt report him.
LC S (LOW-COST; SERIOUS CAUSE)

Ravi is a single man in his twenties. He works for a large company. Recently he has been working very dilligently on a project that will mean a promotion for him if it succeeds. However, one day he comes into the office and finds that overnight all of the work that he has done for the project has accidentally been destroyed. The person who is responsible for the damage is an old co-worker. The co-worker begs Ravi not to turn him in because he will lose his job. Ravi knows that his co-worker has a large family and that he is the only financial support for the entire family. Ravi can decide not to report him and the co-worker will most likely not lose his job. It is difficult but Ravi doesnt report him.
LC S (LOW-COST; SERIOUS CAUSE)

Ravi is a single man in his twenties. He works for a large company. Recently he has been working very dilligently on a project that will mean a promotion for him if it succeeds. However, one day he comes into the office and finds that overnight all of the work that he has done for the project has accidentally been destroyed. The person who is responsible for the damage is an old co-worker. The co-worker begs Ravi not to turn him in because he will lose his job. Ravi knows that his co-worker has a large family and that he is the only financial support for the entire family. Ravi can decide not to report him and there is a fifty-fifty chance the old man will not lose his job. It is difficult but Ravi doesnt report him.
LC S (LOW-COST; SERIOUS CAUSE)

Ravi is a single man in his twenties. He works for a large company. Recently he has been working very dilligently on a project that will mean a promotion for him if it succeeds. However, one day he comes into the office and finds that overnight all of the work that he has done for the project has accidentally been destroyed. The person who is responsible for the damage is an old co-worker. The co-worker begs Ravi not to turn him in because he will lose his job. Ravi knows that his co-worker has a large family and that he is the only financial support for the entire family. Ravi can probably decide not to report him and the co-worker will most likely still lose his job. It is difficult but Ravi doesnt report him.
LC S (LOW-COST; SERIOUS CAUSE)

Mr. Mehra is the mayor of a small town. One day he learns that terrorists have come into his town and kidnapped twenty children. The terrorists demand that Mr. Mehra resign from his

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition123 position as the mayor or they will kill the twenty children. Mr. Mehra knows that it is difficult to negotiate with the terrorists because they are not trustworthy but in this case he knows that if he resigns from his position, he will definitely be able to save the children. Mr. Mehra decides to resign from his position.
LC S (LOW-COST; SERIOUS CAUSE)

Mr. Mehra is the mayor of a small town. One day he learns that terrorists have come into his town and kidnapped twenty children. The terrorists demand that Mr. Mehra resign from his position as the mayor or they will kill the twenty children. Mr. Mehra knows that it is difficult to negotiate with the terrorists because they are not trustworthy but in this case he knows that if he resigns from his position, he will most likely be able to save the children. Mr. Mehra decides to resign from his position.
LC S (LOW-COST; SERIOUS CAUSE)

Mr. Mehra is the mayor of a small town. One day he learns that terrorists have come into his town and kidnapped twenty children. The terrorists demand that Mr. Mehra resign from his position as the mayor or they will kill the twenty children. Mr. Mehra knows that it is difficult to negotiate with the terrorists because they are not trustworthy but in this case he knows that if he resigns from his position, there is a fifty-fifty chance he will be able to save the children. Mr. Mehra decides to resign from his position.
LC S (LOW-COST; SERIOUS CAUSE)

Mr. Mehra is the mayor of a small town. One day he learns that terrorists have come into his town and kidnapped twenty children. The terrorists demand that Mr. Mehra resign from his position as the mayor or they will kill the twenty children. Mr. Mehra knows that it is difficult to negotiate with the terrorists because they are not trustworthy but in this case he knows that if he resigns from his position, he will most likely not be able to save the children. Mr. Mehra decides to resign from his position.
LC M (Low-cost; Mundane cause)

Radha is a final year college student at a good university. She is a good student but her marks in Chemistry are quite low. One night she is studying for her Chemistry final to take place the next day and her friend comes into her room. The friend wants Radha to go to a end-of-the-year party with her in which the friend is going to definitely win a TV. The friend is hesitant to go alone. Radha knows that even though she will probably still pass the class, she wont get the top marks. Radha decides to go to the party and not get top marks on the exam.
LC M (LOW-COST; MUNDANE CAUSE)

Radha is a final year college student at a good university. She is a good student but her marks in Chemistry are quite low. One night she is studying for her Chemistry final to take place the next day and her friend comes into her room. The friend wants Radha to go to a end-of-the-year party

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition124 with her in which the friend is most likely going to win a TV. The friend is hesitant to go alone. Radha knows that even though she will probably still pass the class, she wont get the top marks. Radha decides to go to the party and not get top marks on the exam.
LC M (LOW-COST; MUNDANE CAUSE)

Radha is a final year college student at a good university. She is a good student but her marks in Chemistry are quite low. One night she is studying for her Chemistry final to take place the next day and her friend comes into her room. The friend wants Radha to go to a end-of-the-year party with her in which the friend is going to have a fifty-fifty chance to win a TV. The friend is hesitant to go alone. Radha knows that even though she will probably still pass the class, she wont get the top marks. Radha decides to go to the party and not get top marks on the exam.
LC M (LOW-COST; MUNDANE CAUSE)

Radha is a final year college student at a good university. She is a good student but her marks in Chemistry are quite low. One night she is studying for her Chemistry final to take place the next day and her friend comes into her room. The friend wants Radha to go to a end-of-the-year party with her in which the friend is most likely not going to win a TV. The friend is hesitant to go alone. Radha knows that even though she will probably still pass the class, she wont get the top marks. Radha decides to go to the party and not get top marks on the exam.
LC M (LOW-COST; MUNDANE CAUSE)

Vijay has a serious disease and is in need of a blood transfusion every month. His blood type is very rare and therefore his name has been next in line on the list of people to receive a blood transfusion for many weeks. Finally, one day, a hospital calls and he is told that her blood type has just become available. He is overjoyed. When he arrives at the hospital, he sees that the highly respected local police commissioner has been in a car accident and also requires a blood transfusion. Vijay knows that if the commissioner is saved, the city will not have to spend time and money in finding a new replacement commissioner. With the blood transfusion, the commissioner will definitely live. He decides to forego his blood transfusion this month and be ill so that the commissioner receives it.
LC M (LOW-COST; MUNDANE CAUSE)

Vijay has a serious disease and is in need of a blood transfusion every month. His blood type is very rare and therefore his name has been next in line on the list of people to receive a blood transfusion for many weeks. Finally, one day, a hospital calls and he is told that her blood type has just become available. He is overjoyed. When he arrives at the hospital, he sees that the highly respected local police commissioner has been in a car accident and also requires a blood transfusion. Vijay knows that if the commissioner is saved, the city will not have to spend time and money in finding a new replacement commissioner. With the blood transfusion, the commissioner will most likely live. He decides to forego his blood transfusion this month and be ill so that the commissioner receives it.

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition125

LC M (LOW-COST; MUNDANE CAUSE)

Vijay has a serious disease and is in need of a blood transfusion every month. His blood type is very rare and therefore his name has been next in line on the list of people to receive a blood transfusion for many weeks. Finally, one day, a hospital calls and he is told that her blood type has just become available. He is overjoyed. When he arrives at the hospital, he sees that the highly respected local police commissioner has been in a car accident and also requires a blood transfusion. Vijay knows that if the commissioner is saved, the city will not have to spend time and money in finding a new replacement commissioner. With the blood transfusion, there is a fifty-fifty chance that the commissioner will live. He decides to forego his blood transfusion this month and be ill so that the commissioner receives it.
LC M (LOW-COST; MUNDANE CAUSE)

Vijay has a serious disease and is in need of a blood transfusion every month. His blood type is very rare and therefore his name has been next in line on the list of people to receive a blood transfusion for many weeks. Finally, one day, a hospital calls and he is told that her blood type has just become available. He is overjoyed. When he arrives at the hospital, he sees that the highly respected local police commissioner has been in a car accident and also requires a blood transfusion. Vijay knows that if the commissioner is saved, the city will not have to spend time and money in finding a new replacement commissioner. With the blood transfusion, the commissioner will most likely not live. He decides to forego his blood transfusion this month and be ill so that the commissioner receives it.
LC M (LOW-COST; MUNDANE CAUSE)

Ravi is a single man in his twenties. He works for a large company. Recently he has been working very dilligently on a project that will mean a promotion for him if it succeeds. However, one day he comes into the office and finds that overnight all of the work that he has done for the project has accidentally been destroyed. The person who is responsible for the damage is a coworker. The co-worker begs Ravi not to turn him in because he has a brand new imported car which the company has given and the co-worker will definitely not have to give up. It is difficult but Ravi doesnt report him.
LC M (LOW-COST; MUNDANE CAUSE)

Ravi is a single man in his twenties. He works for a large company. Recently he has been working very dilligently on a project that will mean a promotion for him if it succeeds. However, one day he comes into the office and finds that overnight all of the work that he has done for the project has accidentally been destroyed. The person who is responsible for the damage is a coworker. The co-worker begs Ravi not to turn him in because he has a brand new imported car which the company has given and the co-worker will most likely not have to give up. It is difficult but Ravi doesnt report him.

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition126

LC M (LOW-COST; MUNDANE CAUSE)

Ravi is a single man in his twenties. He works for a large company. Recently he has been working very dilligently on a project that will mean a promotion for him if it succeeds. However, one day he comes into the office and finds that overnight all of the work that he has done for the project has accidentally been destroyed. The person who is responsible for the damage is a coworker. The co-worker begs Ravi not to turn him in because he has a brand new imported car which the company has given and there is a fifty-fifty chance that the co-worker will have to give up. It is difficult but Ravi doesnt report him.
LC M (LOW-COST; MUNDANE CAUSE)

Ravi is a single man in his twenties. He works for a large company. Recently he has been working very dilligently on a project that will mean a promotion for him if it succeeds. However, one day he comes into the office and finds that overnight all of the work that he has done for the project has accidentally been destroyed. The person who is responsible for the damage is a coworker. The co-worker begs Ravi not to turn him in because he has a brand new imported car which the company has given and the co-worker will most likely have to give up. It is difficult but Ravi doesnt report him.
LC M (LOW-COST; MUNDANE CAUSE)

Mr. Mehra is the mayor of a small town. One day he learns that terrorists have come into his town and stolen a very precious stone. The terrorists demand that Mr. Mehra resign from his position as the mayor in exchange for the stones return to the town. Mr. Mehra knows that it is difficult to negotiate with the terrorists because they are not trustworthy but in this case he knows that if he resigns from his position, he will definitely be able to save the stone. Mr. Mehra decides to resign from his position.
LC M (LOW-COST; MUNDANE CAUSE)

Mr. Mehra is the mayor of a small town. One day he learns that terrorists have come into his town and stolen a very precious stone. The terrorists demand that Mr. Mehra resign from his position as the mayor in exchange for the stones return to the town. Mr. Mehra knows that it is difficult to negotiate with the terrorists because they are not trustworthy but in this case he knows that if he resigns from his position, he will most likely be able to save the stone. Mr. Mehra decides to resign from his position
LC M (LOW-COST; MUNDANE CAUSE)

Mr. Mehra is the mayor of a small town. One day he learns that terrorists have come into his town and stolen a very precious stone. The terrorists demand that Mr. Mehra resign from his position as the mayor in exchange for the stones return to the town. Mr. Mehra knows that it is difficult to negotiate with the terrorists because they are not trustworthy but in this case he knows

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition127 that if he resigns from his position, there is a fifty-fifty chance he will be able to save the stone. Mr. Mehra decides to resign from his position
LC M (LOW-COST; MUNDANE CAUSE)

Mr. Mehra is the mayor of a small town. One day he learns that terrorists have come into his town and stolen a very precious stone. The terrorists demand that Mr. Mehra resign from his position as the mayor in exchange for the stones return to the town. Mr. Mehra knows that it is difficult to negotiate with the terrorists because they are not trustworthy but in this case he knows that if he resigns from his position, he will most likely not be able to save the stone. Mr. Mehra decides to resign from his position Appendix F. Materials for Follow-up Study The objective of this experiment was to show that duty and right-based systems of morality can be thought of as habitual modes of thinking which fall into place after years of enculturation within a particular cultural system but are not immutable. Thus, by making ones duties more salient, participants from predominantly rights-based cultures might start to display similar values as are found in mostly duty-based cultures. Participants were primed to think about their duties versus rights and this was predicted to increase the value of self-sacrifice.
Participants

Forty-seven participants from Northwestern Universitys Introductory Psychology subject pool participated in this study in partial fulfillment of course requirements. The sample consisted of 28 females and the mean age was 18.6 years.
Materials and Procedure

Participants were randomly assigned to one of three between-subject conditions. In the duty condition, participants were asked to think of their friends and families and write a paragraph of two explaining what sort of duties or obligations they had towards them. In the rights condition, participants were instead asked to write about what sort of rights or entitlements they could expect to receive from the same group of people. In the neutral condition, participants did not

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition128 receive a prime and went straight on to the dependent variable. The variable of interest in this study was participants judgments of self-sacrifice. It was designed to look like a separate and unrelated study. Participants were told that they were going to read a scenario about someone engaging in a particular behavior and that they were going to be asked a few questions about it. The scenario they received was about a girl who chooses to fail her class in order to console a grieving friend. This scenario was chosen because it was assumed that it would be a relevant situation for most undergraduate participants. This was found to be the case as several participants spontaneously volunteered that they, too, had faced a very similar situation. Participants were then asked three questions: 1) Do you think the actor did the right thing? 2) Do you believe that the actor behaved morally? 3) Would you have done the same thing if you were in this position? The responses of first two questions were made on six-point Likert-type scales. The latter was a dichotomous choice between yes and no.
Results

It took participants in the rights and duties condition about seven to eight minutes to complete the writing assignment. The self-sacrifice measure took about two minutes to complete. Participants responses to the first two questions about the rightness and moral value of the action were correlated (Cronbachs = .58). So, for the remainder of the analyses, these questions were combined into one measure of approval. It was predicted that participants in the duty condition would be most approving of self-sacrifice, followed by the neutral condition and the rights condition. The data were first analyzed using a one-way ANOVA to look at the effect of condition on the perceived rightness of the act. Participants in the control condition, who completed the task, without writing about either their duties or their rights were quite approving of self-sacrifice

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition129 (M = 4.59, SD = .78). The results from the control condition show that self-sacrifice is considered a morally laudable act in general, even among highly academically motivated students. In addition, participants in the duty condition who spent several minutes writing about the various obligations they had toward others approved of self-sacrifice even more than the control condition (M = 5.06, SD = .89). Finally, participants in the rights condition were the least approving of self-sacrifice (M = 4.23, SD = .73) though still above the midpoint of the scale indicating a generally positive attitude towards self-sacrifice (see Figure 5). This data suggests that reminding participants of their duties or rights did affect their judgments of self-sacrifice, F(2, 44) = 4.15, p<.05. The rights/duties manipulation did not have a statistically reliable effect on whether participants would themselves fail the class to console a friend (third question in the questionnaire). About 71% of participants in the duties condition said they would help their friend at great cost to themselves compared to about 61% in the rights condition. Though this difference is in the predicted direction, it failed to reach statistical significance, 2(1, N = 27) = .30, ns.

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition130

Experiment 2 - Priming Rights/Dutiesbased Orientations Figure 5. Approval of self-sacrifice as a function of priming

6 Approval of Self-Sacrifice 5 4 3 2 1 0 Control Rights-prime Duties-prime

Discussion

The purpose of this experiment was to demonstrate that duty-based and right-based orientations toward morality are particular modes of thinking which are flexible to a certain extent. Priming these orientations can have various effects on cognitive and reasoning process. Here, rights and duties-based orientations were primed to show that changing ones relationship within a social circle can affect how much self-sacrifice is valued. This experiment revealed that by making an individuals duties more salient rather than her rights increased the value of and willingness to self-sacrifice. Though the results from this experiment were obtained from a very specialized sample, i.e. upper-middleclass undergraduates for the most part, it is encouraging to note that there seems to be a link between particular orientations to morality and the value of self-sacrifice. It is also interesting that participants' essays did not seem to perceptibly differ in the amount of moral content they contained or the types of moral principles elicited. Rather, the most salient

Self-Sacrifice and Culturally-Based Moral Cognition131 difference seemed to be whether morality was perceived as something that was owed to others versus something to be received by others. Of course, further qualitative analyses are required to determine what particular factors were varied by the manipulation and no doubt, there will be some differences in the types of moral values elicited in the different orientations toward morality. However, for the current purposes, these results indicate that approval of self-sacrifice is in part influenced by highlighting one's duties to others.