The Sociological Quarterly 22 (Spring 1981):151-180

Some Categories Interpretive of Sociology*

Max Weber, Heidelberg' I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. Contents The Meaningof an "Interpretive" Sociology Relationshipto Psychology Relationshipto Legal Dogmatics Social Action Associationand AssociationalAction Consensus Institutionand Organization

I. Meaning of an "Interpretive" ("verstehenden") Sociology Human behavior, "external" or "internal," exhibits both relational contexts (Zusammenhaenge) and regularities in its course, as do all occurrences. Unique to human behavior, however, (at least in the fullest sense), are relationships and regularities whose course can be intelligibly interpreted. An "understanding" contains in ("Verstiindnis") of human behavior achieved through interpretation varying degrees, above all, a specific qualitative "self-evidence" ("Evidenz"). That an interpretation possesses this self-evidence in especially high measure still proves nothing in itself about its empirical validity. For behavior that is identical in its external course and result can be based on the most varied constellations of motives, and the most plausible motive may not be the one that really came into play. Rather, the "understanding" ("Verstehen") of the context must always be verified, as far as possible, with the usual methods of causal attribution before any interpretation, however plausible, becomes a valid "intelligible explanation." The instrumentally rational (zweckrational) interpretation possesses the highest measure of "self-evidence." Instrumentally rational behavior is behavior exclusively oriented to means (subjectively) considered adequate to attain goals (subjectively) clearly comprehended. Not only instrumentally rational action is understandable to us; we also "understand" the typical course of the emotions and their typical consequences for behavior. The "understandable" has fluid boundaries for the empirical disciplines. Ecstasy and mystical experience, just as, above all, certain kinds of psychopathic contexts or the behavior of small children (or perhaps of animals, of no concern to us here), are not as accessible to our understanding and our interpretive explanation as are other processes. Yet the "abnormal" as such is not inaccessible to interpretive explanation. On the contrary: the act of an exceptional person can correspond to an "objectively correct type" (a term discussed later) and thus be absolutely understandable and directly accessible to comprehension. As has often been said, one "need not be
?1981 by The Sociological Quarterly. All rights reserved. 0038-0253/81/1300-0151$00.75 * Translated by Edith E. Graber, Department of Sociology, Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri 63130. This translation is published by arrangement with J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tiibingen, Federal Republic of Germany.

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Caesar to understand Caesar." Otherwise all writing of history would be meaningless. Conversely, there are circumstances we view as "individual" and indeed "psychically" ordinary activities of a person that, in their context, completely lack that specific qualitative self-evidence that characterizes the "understandable." As is true of many psychopathic processes, the course of memory and intellectual exercise, for example, are only partly "understandable." The interpretive sciences, therefore, treat ascertainable regularities of such psychic processes just as they treat the laws of physical nature. The specific self-evident nature of instrumentally rational behavior does not, of course, entail viewing interpretation in rational terms as the special goal of sociological explanation. One could as well claim the opposite, given the role that "irrational" ("zweckirrationale") emotions and "feelings" play in the actions of men. One could also cite the fact that every interpretive analysis oriented toward instrumental rationality continually encounters purposes that can no longer be interpreted as rational "means" for other purposes, but rather must be accepted simply as goals (Zielrichtungen) not further subject to rational interpretation (though their emergence as such may remain subject to "psychological" explanation). It is true, though, that in the sociological analysis of understandable relationships, rationally interpretable behavior very often constitutes the most appropriate "ideal type:" sociology begins, as does history, by interpreting "pragmatically," that is, on the basis of rationally understandable contexts of action. Social economics, for instance, in its rational construction of "economic man," proceeds in this way. So, generally, does interpretive sociology, because its specific focus is not simply any kind of "inner state" or outer behavior whatever, but rather, action. And to us, "action" ("Handeln") (including intentional omission and acquiescence) is always intelligible behavior toward objects, behavior whose "actual" or "intended" subjective meaning may be more or less clear to the actor, whether consciously noted or not. Buddhist contemplation and Christian asceticism are, for the actors, subjectively related to "inner" objects; the rational economic transaction of a person with material goods is related to "outer" objects. Action specifically significant for interpretive sociology is, in particular, behavior that: (1) in terms of the subjectively intended meaning of the actor, is related to the behavior of others, (2) is codetermined in its course through this relatedness, and thus (3) can be intelligibly explained in terms of this (subjectively) intended meaning. Emotional actions and "feelings"-say, "dignity," "pride," "envy," "jealousy"--that are indirectly relevant for the course of the action, are also related in terms of subjective meaning to the outer world and, especially to the action of others. Interpretive sociology, however, is concerned neither with physiological phenomena which used to be called "psychophysical," (pulse rates, for example, or changes in reaction time and the like) nor with strictly psychic conditions whereby the physiological phenomena might be characterized (for example, the combination of feelings of tension, pleasure, and aversion). Rather, interpretive sociology makes distinctions in terms of the typical meaningful (above all: external) relationships of action; for that reason, as we shall see, instrumentally rational action serves as an ideal type, enabling us to assess the significance of the

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irrational action. If one were to designate the (subjectively intended) meaning of the action relationship as the "inner side" of human behavior-a questionable figure of speech-only then would one be able to say that interpretive sociology considers each phenomenon exclusively "from the inside out;" this, however, does not require enumerating its physical or psychic phenomena. Variations in psychological qualities of behavior, therefore, are not as such directly relevant for us. Identical relationships of meaning are not linked to identical operative "psychic" constellations, although it is certain that differences in one can be influenced by differences in the other. For example, however, a category like "the profit motive" does not belong in any "psychology." For the "same" striving for profit in the "same" business enterprise on the part of two successive proprietors not only may go hand in hand with very different "character traits," but may be directly conditioned, in their entirely identical courses and final results, by completely opposite "psychic" constellations and character traits; also the ultimate psychological "goals" need have no relationship to one another. Processes whose meaning is not subjectively related to the behavior of others are not for that reason sociologically irrelevant. On the contrary, precisely they may contain the decisive conditions and thus the causes of action. Action, for the interpretive sciences, is to a very considerable degree meaningfully related to the "outer world," to objects and processes of nature which are devoid of meaning. The theoretically constructed action of the isolated economic actor, for example, is related exclusively to the outer world. But the relevance for interpretive sociology of processes devoid of subjective "meaning" ("Sinnbezogenheit")as, say, the course of vital statistics, the selection processes of anthropological types, or, of purely psychic facts-lies exclusively in their role as "conditions" and "consequences" toward which meaningful action is oriented, just as climatic or botanical conditions are relevant for economic theory. The processes of heredity, for instance, cannot be understood in terms of a subjectively intended meaning, and naturally all the less so, the more exactly their conditions are scientifically established. Suppose, for example, that it were somehow possible-and here we consciously express ourselves as laymen-for the degree of presence of certain sociologically relevant qualities and drives, as, for example, those favoring either the emergence of ambition for certain kinds of social power or the probability of attaining that power-the capacity for rational orientation of action in general, say, or certain other specifiable intellectual qualities in particular-to be linked fairly unequivocally with a cephalic index or with descent from certain human groups identifiable by any characteristic feature whatever. Interpretive sociology would, of course, have to take these particular facts into account in its work exactly as it takes into account, for example the fact of the typical life cycle or of the mortality of man in general. Its unique task, however, would begin only at the precise point where it would be possible to explain interpretively: (1) through which action, meaningfully oriented to objects (whether they be in the outer world or in the individual's inner world), persons who were endowed with and whose effort was influenced by these specific hereditary qualities attempted to achieve their purposes, to what extent and why this did or did not succeed; (2) what intelligible consequences this (heredity-conditioned) effort has had upon the meaningful behavior of others?