Concepts and Properties or Predication and Copulation Author(s): P. F. Strawson Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 37, No.

149 (Oct., 1987), pp. 402-406 Published by: Blackwell Publishing for The Philosophical Quarterly Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2219568 . Accessed: 08/08/2011 14:20
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ThePhilosophical Vol. Quarterly 37 No. 149 ISSN 0031-8094 $2.00

DISCUSSIONS
CONCEPTS AND PROPERTIES OR PREDICATION AND COPULATION
BY P. F. STRAWSON

a to David Wiggins In a recent article1 repair" Frege's proposes "running of The involves plea for "a doctrine thesenseandreference predicates. repair of in contentionsWiggins' I with thecopula". While article,think agreeing themain I should that what in in that repair itself needofa (perhaps his is minor) repair. say on the I follows am not committing pointconcerning myself anycontentious of Frege.I am concerned withwhatseemsto me truein only interpretation in what seems meto needcorrection it. to and own Wiggins' position with from each contains expression one sentences ofwhich We aretoconsider simple such 'Socrates' three eachofthefollowing classes: proper names, as 'John', etc.; (1) nouns suchas such 'brave' common terms adjectives as 'wise', etc.; (i.e. (2) general suchas 'is' or suchas 'work', 'run'etc.);and(3) a copula 'man'etc.;verbs 'horse', form theverb. of which a 'is a' or theinflections yield finite term the is: stands orrefers an object; general to, for, position thename Wiggins' or the stands or refers a concept; copuladoes notstandfor, refer to, for, to, viz. of but semantic orfunction, that combining role anything, hasan indispensable which then can term form properly to a with general the predicative expression, of or The with nameto form sentence, vehicle truth falsity. the a a combine does as stand orrefer anything, for, to, properly predicative expression not, a whole, to it a which does.(Thiswithout (the term) prejudice though containspart general or the the factthatin some languages symbolisms copula,as distinguishable of be or element, sometimes replaced displaced a convention linguistic may "by mere concatenation"2.) But Allthis, I say, seems me highly to indeed correct. I haveone as plausible, to terms stand or for is reservation. (what concepts general Wiggins willing identify to or or or but "forms characters traits universals"3; he is unwilling refer with to) is His reasonforthisunwillingnessthat themwithproperties. stated identify with to a term 'man')cancombine thecopula yield properly whereas general (say, a with to a which inturn can combine a name yield sentence, predicative expression cannot combine exactly in the thecorresponding property-name 'manhood') (say,
1 D. Wiggins,"The Sense and Referenceof Predicates:a RunningRepair to Frege's Doctrineand a Plea forthe Copula", ThePhilosophical 34 Quarterly (1984). 2 op. cit.p. 327. 3 op. cit.p. 323.

CONCEPTS AND PROPERTIES

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to same waywitha copulative expression yieldan equivalent properly predicative whichcan in turncombine witha nameto form sentence. can say a We expression or We can 'Jesusis a man',butcannot, cannotequivalently, 'Jesusis manhood'. say 'Socratesis wisdom'.Whatthis 'Socratesis wise',but not,or not equivalently, say shows,Wiggins says,is that'man' and 'manhood'(or 'wise' and 'wisdom')do not standforthe same thing.4 This conclusion is what I want to question. I should emphasize that, in else it, something thatWiggins says,whichseems questioning I am notquestioning he to me perfectly true true.The thing saysthatseems to me perfectly is thatthe than term morefundamental thecorresponding is or, property-name, as he general are thanproperty-designations"5. puts it, that"concept-words more fundamental This is surelycorrectin that the abstractnouns which name properties are from corresponding commonnouns or verbs. derivative the adjectives, linguistically it Thus - to quote Wiggins he says,of the expression 'manhood',that"surely is form thenominalization a man',which or of, with, an alternative 'being synonymous [i.e. properly predicative] expression'~ is a man' presupposesthe unsaturated the at which(in mystory, least) presupposes Fregeanconceptman"6. of thispointabout the linguistic derivativeness the propertyHowever,neither is name nor the associated earlierpoint that the property-name grammatically the term seemsto from debarred playing exactly same roleas theassociatedgeneral of and the me to warrant denialof theidentity concept(as understood Wiggins) by to matter a otherwise to attribute a purely is To formal, syntactical property. think it or ontological significance does not have. categorial in line of reasoning involved Wiggins' There is perhapsanother position a line In the which of reasoning whichgoes as follows. thecase ofproperties, expressions to them.So refer or standforthemalso (appearto) nameor designate (appear to) at But properties ifthereare such entities all - are objects. in thecase of concepts them. whichrefer or standforthemdo not name or designate to the expressions nouns or nominalizing phrases;theyare generalterms.So They are not abstract to to are according Wiggins, say concepts notobjects.This is whyFregewas right, is is 'the concepthorse' thatthe concepthorse not a concept.For the expression, to a designative, name; it refers an object. So conceptsand - if theyexist- the so different corresponding properties, farfrom being identical, belongto entirely categories. of the If thisis indeeda partofWiggins' reasonfordenying identity conceptand For Frege's reasonfor then property, he is falseto his ownposition. corresponding so and in generalfordistinguishing is thatthe concepthorse not a concept, saying to conceptsare, and objects,is thatexpressions between concepts referring sharply in his view,essentially but i.e. unsaturated, essentially predicative; thisis properly in his the (in rejects, insisting myview precisely viewwhichWiggins, making repair, of term(concept-referring that expression) rightly) it is onlythecombinationgeneral So thisline of reasoning and copula thatis properly (quite apartfrom predicative.
4
6

op. cit.p. 320. op. cit.p. 323. op. cit.p. 320-1.

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P. F. STRAWSON

it the strains revealsin the strictly Fregeanconceptof a concept)is notavailableto in In it, endorsing it appearsthathe has allowedto remain place Wiggins. implicitly whichhe sets out to repair. structure too muchof the original to With this obstacle removed,I see no remaining impediment identifying withtheircorresponding properties if,thatis, we are prepared(unlike, concepts the at to indifferent term, say,Quine) to countenance latter all. Ifwe seek a neutral for the relationwhich abstractnoun and variationsin grammatical category, generaltermalike have to the one item concerned,the relevant corresponding I or or used) the term'specify'7 property concept, suggest(indeedhave elsewhere Thus we avoid both the perhapsoverloaded'referto' and the term'introduce'8. or 'name' or 'designate'. 'standfor'and theperhapstoo restrictive Alternatively, in to of concession difference grammatical and addition, bywayofmaximum category, and we could, if we liked,adopt the to mymindunnecessary idiosyncratic ruling as whenspecified an thatthe one itemin questionis to be known as a property by whenspecified a general abstract noun or nominalizing phraseand as a concept by term. for or eccentric pious. There are indeedgrounds wouldbe merely But thisruling but the 'concept' and 'property'; theyare distinguishing uses of the expressions of the Thus, to have,or to exhibit, property courageis to be quite othergrounds. of To or courageous to behavecourageously. have,or to grasp,theconcept courage is to knowor come to knowwhat courage is or what it is to be courageousor be the of and behavecourageously; to exhibit concept couragewouldperhaps to give undera of something's a lectureon the subject.Again,philosophers falling speak (unless, concept; but nobody speaks of something's fallingunder a property Or it perhaps, is a piece of stageproperty). again,one can perhapssayof a concept or but that thatit is clear or incoherent confused; one cannotsayof a property it is or of these clear or incoherent confused.In the context the presentdiscussion, are to differences nothing the purpose. But if it is insistedthat theybe taken to between accountof,thenwe seem forced concludethatthe difference concepts in consists this:thatto talkof the conceptis to and their corresponding properties of the whereasto talkoftheproperty talkof the ideaor thought thething, property, to itself. And ifthisis so, thenitwouldseem better have said is to talkof thething refers or to like thatwhatthegeneralterm, theabstract at thestart noun,normally or is not standsforor specifies introduces the property, the concept. aboutthe expressions and 'property' 'concept'and the Enough,forthemoment, or have in standard in difference meaning use whichtheyactually Englishusage. are nothingto the presentpurpose. as These differences, already remarked, makes no appeal to them; and indeed they seem quite Wigginssignificantly are to irrelevant hisuse ofthe expression 'concept',as I takeit they to Frege's also. of in of Consider,instead,two groupsof sentences, the members the first which for calls a concept-word a wordstanding a concept) thereoccurswhatWiggins (i.e. and in the membersof the second of which there occurs the corresponding
7 In Subject Predicate Logicand Grammar in and (London, 1974) In Individuals (London, 1959)

CONCEPTS AND PROPERTIES

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the sentences a of We property-name. are to imagine beingused to report saying X. some speaker, X said, of Socrates, I X X 1 { thathe was wise at he was wise wise thathe fellunderthe concept, as wise as beingwise wisdom the property wisdom of to Socrates

described Socrates characterized

X said, of Socrates,thathe had ascribed attributed

wisdom the property ofbeing wisedom beingwisej

between are of The variations thesereports merely verbal.The content themall is him as the effectively same. They all say the same thingabout X and all report the same thingabout Socrates.For theyall report him,in a more or less saying or as Socratesin the straightforward,a more or less stilted, style, characterizing both saying in same way.But ifwe agreewithWiggins thatthe generalterm'wise' and standsfora conceptwhile the abstract noun 'wisdom'names a property in the identification concept,so understood, property, of and thenwe shall refusing also have to say thatthe reports groupI and the reports groupII say quite of of different thingsabout X and reportX as sayingquite different thingsabout forwe shallhave to saythatwhile,in all thesereports is Socrates; alike,reference made to X, to Socratesand to one otheritem,the third itemis, in some of these a a reports, conceptand in others, quite different,property. something Surelyit is the moreplausibleto say- to changeand simplify example thatthetwomembers of the pair Socratesis courageous Socrateshas courage if aboutSocrates;and that, anything, besidesSocrateshimself, is saythesame thing in referred in each case, it is one and the same thing each; and hence thatthe to as in context byWiggins) and the (i.e. expression, 'concept', understood thepresent are alternative for expression, expressions classifying thingsof 'property', simply kindis predicatively if thatkind.Whena thing that of then, itis specified copulated, it copulatedby the use of the verb'to be', and it if is by an adjective, is normally either theverb'to have' or noun,itis normally copulated specified an abstract by by 'instances'etc.) by some variant (e.g. 'possesses,'exemplifies', Of course thereare those who would junk the whole apparatusof concepts, etc. are properties These remarks notaddressedto them.There are also thosewho out of piety perhaps, concepts as would junk propertieswhile preserving, in are These last,if I am right, in an impossible understood the presentcontext. or one ontological perspective position. Finallythereare perhapssome who,from thatthereis no seriouspurposeservedby or another, perhapsfromnone, think

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P. F. STRAWSON

nominal in abstract nouns(or equivalent phrases)or byquantifying their places that be could not, theoretically, equally well servedwithout them,i.e. by the use of in general terms and by quantifying theirplaces. But eitherthe qualification whichshouldbe herealludesto someunderlying philosophical theory "theoretically" stated and independently argued for on its own merits,or what is explicitly at of which, envisagedis a capriciousattempt a reform language- an attempt if would renderdiscourseintolerably cumbersome, it didn't, undertaken, seriously at anysophisticated, or But level,crippleit altogether. this generalising theoretical concernus. does not really party Oxford MagdalenCollege,

ON A KRIPKEAN READING OF DONNELLAN'S REFERENTIAL ATTRIBUTIVE1

BY THOMAS E. PATTON

In his "Reference Definite and after distinKeithDonnellan, Descriptions", and use a can between referential an attributive that definite a description guishing in famous to "a Russell's have,charges theory thisarea withfailing represent . it correct account theuse ofdefinite of descriptions because ignores altogether in thereferential Reference and use...".(206) But Saul Kripke, his "Speaker's if defends in Semantic Russell, only Reference", Donnellan, a "methodoloagainst addresses two not these questions: gical, substantive"(6) which study an Do Donnellan's observations Russell's provide argument against contradict Do Russell's?(12) theory? hisviews the in Donnellan's concludes "that considerations do paper, themselves, by Kripke notrefute Now thiscouldholdforeither twogeneral of Russell's theory".(6) views indeed do contradict reasons: Donnellan's but Russell's, hisobservations (i) or his do but fail establish views, (ii)hisobservations establish views, these to these And both fail contradict to Russell's. Kripke feels to routes obliged follow ofthese in for to his conclusion, Donnellan a dilemma, he finds unclear it what catching in are. Donnellan takes distinction yield his to an Donnellan's views fact clearly of seem but kind ambiguity he take tobe?Thismight does it ambiguity, what plain in whenhe explicitly the a rejects, one passage, idea thatit is either enough thatit might a pragmatic be or one one, and suggests syntactic a semantic finds "Donnellan's denial that advocates semantic he a But instead.(207) Kripke to inconsistent much hispaper",(13) undertakes defend with of and ambiguity...
1 them brackets, that in their and for Pagenumbers passages phrases I quotewillfollow in obvious thetext. sources always being