HEIRS OF VALERIANO S. CONCHA, SR. petitioners, vs. SPOUSES GREGORIO J. LUMOCSO, et.al. DECISION Petitioners, Concha, et.

al, are heirs of spouses Dorotea and Valeriano Concha, Sr., claim to be the rightful owners of several parcels of land. In three separate actions, petitioners filed against respondents, Lomocso, et.al. for Reconveyance and/or annulment of Title with Damages, seeking to annul OCTs issued in the name of respondents covering the parcels of land claimed by petitioners. The three complaints commonly alleged: a. That on May 21, 1958, petitioners' parents acquired by homestead the properties subject to the action, with an area of 24 hectares; b. That since 1931, spouses Concha "painstakingly preserved" the forest in the 24-hectare land, including the excess four (4) hectares "untitled forest land" c. That they possessed this excess 4 hectares of land "continuously, publicly, notoriously, adversely, peacefully, in good faith and in concept of an owner since 1931; d. That petitioners continued possession and occupation of the 4hectare land after the death of their parents; e. That respondents, "by force, intimidation, and stealth forcibly entered the premises, illegally cut, collected, [and] disposed" of several trees grown on the land; f. That the land is private land or that even assuming it was part of the public domain, plaintiffs had already acquired imperfect title thereto" g. That respondents "surreptitiously" filed free patent applications over the lots despite their full knowledge that petitioners owned the lots h. That respondents' free patents and the corresponding OCTs were issued "on account of fraud, deceit, bad faith and misrepresentation"; and i. That the lots in question have not been transferred to an innocent purchaser. On separate occasions, respondents moved for the dismissal of the respective cases against them on the same grounds of: a. Lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matters of the complaints; b. b. Failure to state causes of action for reconveyance; c. Prescription; and d. Waiver, abandonment, laches and estoppel. On the issue of jurisdiction, respondents contended that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaints pursuant to Section 19(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P.) 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, as in each case, the assessed values of the subject lots are less than P20,000.00. Petitioners opposed,14 contending that the instant cases involve actions the subject matters of which are incapable of pecuniary estimation which, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691, fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTCs. They also contended that they have two main causes of action: for reconveyance and for recovery of the value of the trees felled by respondents. Hence,

the totality of the claims must be considered which, if computed, allegedly falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC. The trial court denied the respective motions to dismiss of respondents. The respondents filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration to no avail. Dissatisfied, respondents jointly filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of Restraining Order Ex Parte. In its Decision, the CA reversed the resolutions and order of the trial court. It held that even assuming that the complaints state a cause of action, the same have been barred by the statute of limitations. The CA ruled that an action for reconveyance based on fraud prescribes in ten (10) years, hence, the instant complaints must be dismissed as they involve titles issued for at least twenty-two (22) years prior to the filing of the complaints. Issues: 1. Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the cases. Held: 1. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases.-- Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: x x x (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; Hence, the MTC clearly has jurisdiction over the instant cases. Petitioners' contention that this case is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 is erroneous. Petitioners' contention that the value of the trees cut in the subject properties constitutes "any interest therein (in the subject properties)" that should be computed in addition to the respective assessed values of the subject properties is unavailing. Section 19(2) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, is clear that the RTC shall exercise jurisdiction "in all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)." It is true that the recovery of the value of the trees cut from the subject properties may be included in the term "any interest therein." However, the law is emphatic that in determining which court has jurisdiction, it is only the assessed value of the realty involved that should be computed. In this case, there is no dispute that the assessed values of the subject properties as shown by their tax declarations are less than P20,000.00. Clearly, jurisdiction over the instant cases belongs not to the RTC but to the MTC.

CHARLIE VIOS and SPS. ROGELIO and TERESITA ANTONIO, and as nominal party, Hon. Emilio L. Leachon, Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 224, Quezon City, Petitioners, vs. MANUEL PANTANGCO, JR. Respondent. Facts: Respondent Pantanco filed with the MTC-Quezon City a complaint for ejectment and damages against petitioners Vios, et. al. Pantangco alleged in his complaint that: 1. He is a co-owner by purchase from the former owner of a certain residential land registered under TCT No. 76956; 2. Prior to his purchase of the property, he inquired from the petitioners whether they were interested in buying the property; when the petitioners responded that they were not, he told them that he would give them one (1) week from his purchase of the property to vacate the premises; he claimed that the petitioners agreed; 3. After the consummation of the sale to him, the petitioners refused to vacate notwithstanding the agreement; and (4) he filed the complaint when no settlement was reached before the Pangkat Tagapagkasundo. The petitioners specifically denied in their Answer the material allegations of the complaint and pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that: 1. The disputed property belongs to the government since it forms part of unclassified public forest; 2. The real previous owner of the property was Alfredo Aquino, from whom they acquired their rights through a document entitled "Waiver";

3. Pantangco's title is fake as it originated from Original Certificate of Title which was previously nullified 4. Assuming Pantangco's title to be valid, the property it covers is different from the premises they (the petitioners) occupy. They asked for the dismissal of the complaint and the payment of damages by way of a counterclaim. The MTC rendered a decision in Pantangco's favor, ordering the petitioners to: (1) immediately vacate the premises; (2) remove all structures and shanties constructed thereon; and (3) pay reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the property Notices and copies of the MTC decision were transmitted on even date to the petitioners through their counsels of record. On August 5, 1996, the Mauricio Law Office, through Atty. Melanio Mauricio, Jr., filed a Notice of Appearance with Urgent Motion stating that petitioner Vios received an incomplete copy of the decision from his former counsel, Atty. Sollano, and is, therefore, requesting the MTC to furnish petitioner Vios with a complete copy of the MTC decision. Pantangco, filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution, arguing that the decision is already final and executory as no notice of appeal was filed within the reglementary period by any of the petitioners. The MTC granted the motion and the writ was issued. Petitioner Vios moved to quash the writ asserting that it was null and void because the MTC decision had not become final and executory as he had not been notified of the decision; the counsel to whom a copy of the MTC decision was sent, had allegedly withdrawn as his counsel sometime in November 1995. Petitioner Vios filed with the RTC, Branch 224, Quezon City a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, assailing both the MTC decision and the writ of execution. The RTC rendered a decision (RTC decision) in petitioner Vios' favor. It annulled the MTC decision for being contrary to the evidence; it annulled as well the related writ of execution on the reasoning that the decision it was implementing was not yet final and executor since there was lack of notice, the period for appeal has not expired and the decision has not become final and executory which made the writ of execution subsequently issued as null and void.3 Petitioner Vios moved for the immediate execution of the RTC decision. Pantangco, on the other hand, moved to reconsider the decision. The RTC denied petitioner Vios' motion for execution in light of Pantangcos timely motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, the RTC denied Pantangco's motion for reconsideration. Thus, petitioner Vios filed a Second Motion for Immediate Execution. This time, the RTC granted the motion. The writ was not immediately implemented, leading to the issuance of an alias writ of execution which the Sheriff this time implemented by turning possession of the disputed property over to petitioner Vios. Pantangco filed with the CA a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of the RTC Decision. He essentially asserted in his petition that the RTC decision is void, given that the MTC decision cannot be assailed on certiorari; the proper remedy is an ordinary appeal from the MTC decision. He further argued that no remedy is available from the final and executory MTC decision as the remedy of appeal was lost when the period to appeal expired fifteen (15) days from receipt of petitioner's counsel of record of a copy of the MTC decision; certiorari

is not a substitute for the remedy of appeal already lost. The RTC therefore, according to Pantangco, had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the certiorari petition and the decision it rendered was null and void. Issue: Whether or not the CA committed an error in entertaining the petition to declare the nullity of the decision of the RTC even if the available remedy was an ordinary appeal and therefore the RTC decision which set aside the MTC decision and restoring the petitioners to their possession of the subject premises has attained the stage of finality. Ruling: A petition for certiorari the remedy that petitioner Vios availed of to question the MTC decision before the RTC is an original action whose resulting decision is a final order that completely disposes of the petition. The proper remedy from the RTC decision on the petition for certiorari that petitioner Vios filed with that court is an ordinary appeal to the CA under Section 2, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court. We agree with respondents. We hold that the appellate court did not err in dismissing petitioner's Petition for Certiorari, pursuant to Rule 41, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court (and not under Rule 44, Section 10, invoked by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 5 March 2001). Rule 47 is a remedy based on external fraud and lack of jurisdiction.The intent to use this Rule suggests itself, not only because of the title of the petition, but because of its substance. Among other arguments, Pantangco claimed nullity of the RTC decision for lack of jurisdiction; only interlocutory orders of the MTC are subject to the RTC certiorari jurisdiction; final MTC orders must be appealed. He likewise stressed that the RTC has no jurisdiction to reverse the decision of the MTC using a Rule 65 petition for certiorari because the Rule applies only to interlocutory orders rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction. Pantangcos Rule 47 remedy is fatally defective because its use against an RTC decision in a certiorari case is foreclosed by the availability of an appeal to the CA. Section 1 of Rule 47 provides that it covers only annulment of judgments for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.

G.R. No. 152651 August 7, 2006 ANDABAI T. ARIMAO, Petitioner, vs. SAADEA P. TAHER, Respondent. The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow: On 22 March 1995, petitioner was appointed as Director II, Bureau of Non-formal Education, of the DECS. Thereafter, on 17 July 1995, respondent was appointed Education Supervisor II. Petitioners appointment, however, was protested by a certain Alibai T. Benito, who claimed that said appointment did not pass through any evaluation by the personnel selection board. Petitioners appointment was eventually disapproved by the CSC, for failure to meet the experience required for the position, and petitioner was reverted to her former position of Education Supervisor II. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision. In the interim, petitioner applied for and was granted by the DECSARMM an academic scholarship with pay effective 30 October 1996 in her capacity as Education Supervisor II. The scholarship was limited to a period of one year. Meanwhile, petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied and subsequently, the Court of Appeals issued an Entry of Judgment declaring the denial of the petition by the CSC to be final and executory. In the meantime, the position of Education Supervisor II being occupied by respondent was devolved from DECS-ARMM to the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA)- ARMM. On 2 December 1998, petitioner informed the CSC that she was already allowed by the Director of TESDA-ARMM to report for duty, only that she and respondent are reporting to the same position. On 10 December 1998, the CSC Regional Director enjoined respondent from reporting to the TESDA-ARMM. It appears, however, that respondent continued to report as Education Supervisor II. On 7 December 1998, respondent, unaware that petitioner was granted a study leave, filed a complaint before the Regional Director, ARMM, relative to petitioners continued absence. On 24 December 1998, upon the complaint filed by respondent, the Executive Secretary of ARMM, declared petitioner to have been Absent Without Leave (AWOL) by reason of her failure to report to her office for at least a year after the expiration of her study leave and directed that she be dropped from the payroll. Petitioner appealed to the Office of the ARMM Regional Governor. In Resolution No. 001-99 dated 17 March 1999, the said office denied the appeal, finding that petitioner failed to report to office despite the fact that she was not able to enroll immediately upon the approval of her study leave. On 20 July 2000, the Regional Vice Governor/Acting Regional Governor, ordered petitioner to reassume her former position as Education Supervisor II, and revoked the ARMM Executive Secretarys Resolution dated 24 December 1998. However, on 1 August 2000, the same Acting Regional Governor issued an order to maintain STATUS QUO on the part of Ms. SAADEA P. TAHER, Education Supervisor II with permanent status duly approved by the Civil Service Commission.

However, on 4 August 2000, ARMM Regional Governor Misuari issued a Memorandum ordering petitioners reinstatement. Respondent thus filed a Petition for Prohibition before the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City, claiming that she has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy, as she stands to suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury if she is removed from the office which she has held for more than five years. On 21 August 2000, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction commanding ARMM Regional Governor Misuari and the TESDA-ARMM to desist from carrying out the said Memorandum. On 16 October 2001, the trial court held that the 04 August 2000 Memorandum of the ARMM Regional Governor could no longer be implemented because the CSC resolutions ordering petitioners reinstatement, relied upon by ARMM Regional Governor Misuari, were superseded by the CSC resolutions finding petitioner on AWOL and dropping her from the payroll. According to the trial court, this controversy has to be resolved by the CSC, which has the exclusive jurisdiction over disciplinary cases and cases involving personnel actions affecting employees in the public service. Issue: 1. Whether the trial court erred in taking cognizance of the petition for prohibition and whether the filing of the petition for prohibition violated the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; Held: 1. The trial court did not err in taking cognizance of the petition for prohibition.The principal purpose for the writ of prohibition is to prevent an encroachment, excess, usurpation or assumption of jurisdiction on the part of an inferior court or quasi-judicial tribunal. It is granted when it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice, or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive or vindictive manner, or to put a stop to multiplicity of actions. Thus, for a party to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, he must establish the following requisites: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions, judicial or ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Under Republic Act No. 6734, executive power in the ARMM is vested in the Regional Governor, The assailed Memorandum of ARMM Regional Governor Misuari was presumably issued in the exercise of his power of control and supervision. However, by ordering the reinstatement of petitioner to her former position based upon an outdated CSC Resolution, despite the AWOL order and her being dropped from the rolls, ARMM Regional Governor Misuari acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction.