DELHI PUBLIC SCHOOL GHAZIABAD MODEL UNITED NATIONS, 2011 (DPSGMUN) BACKGROUND GUIDE

GENERAL ASSEMBLY: COMMITTEE-I (DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY)

DIRECTORCHAIRPERSONRAPPOUTEUR SHREY MAHESHWARIVAIBHAV GUPTA X-B X-B HARSHIT SHARMA X-F

Note from the Chairperson

Dear Delegates, It is my privilege to act as the Chairperson of United Nations General Assembly: Committee-I of the Delhi Public School GhaziabadModel United Nations, 2011. I look forward towards having an amazing discussion. Delegates, I would like to request all of you that there needs to be a major focus towards tabling and debating upon solutions for the issue at hand rather than resorting to accusations and allegations. The art of diplomacy asks for tactful aggression and always giving peace a chance. Also, you all are expected to act as global leaders and realize the fact that the responsibility of ensuring the success of the committee rests on your shoulders. You all are not only expected to research hard but also understand the technicalities of the agenda at hand, so that we are able to ensure that the tabled solutions are practically, economically and politically feasible to be implemented. At last, I would like to wish you all the best for your preparations and look forward towards your zestful participation. Feel free to contact you executive board for any queries you may have. Vaibhav Gupta (X-B) Chairperson, United Nations General Assembly: Committee-I (Disarmament and Security) E-mail: Vaibhavgzb1995@gmail.com

About the Committee: The General Assembly is the main deliberative organ of the UN.

Decisions on important questions, such as those on peace and security, admission of new

members and budgetary matters, require a two-thirds majority. Decisions on other questions are by simple majority. The General Assembly is divided into Six Committees. Out of these, Delhi Public School Ghaziabad Model United Nations, 2011 we will be simulating the First committee which deals with DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY. Agenda: PREVENTING THE ACQUISITION AND THE PROLIFERATION OF

WEAPONS OF M ASS DESTRUCTION BY TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS1

AWeapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) is a tool which can kill and bring significant harm to a large number of humans (and other life forms) and/or cause great damage to man-made and natural structures. For instance, the nuclear bomb dropped at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, exterminated a population of over 26,000 people and destroyed all structures in the blast radius. Therefore, it is extremely important for the international community to ensure that such weapons are kept away from the hands of the non-state actors and terrorist organisations.
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By acquisition of WMDs we not only refer to a situation where terrorist organisations may steal such a weapon, rather we also refer to a situation where such a non-state actor may be able to secure all components and blueprint(s) which can in turn assist the development/procurement of WMD.

The first major step taken by the United Nations was the institution of the 1540 Committee in regard to the Resolution 1540 of the United Nations Security Council, in which it was decided that all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, and requires all States to adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws to this effect. The resolution also requires all States to establish various types of domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of such weapons. WMDs can be classified under THREE categories: y Nuclear Warhead/Weapons y Biological Warheads/Weapons y Chemical Warheads/Weapons Note: Since Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Warheads become Weapons only when deployed on a carrier like a missile or a bomb, therefore even the security of ballistic missiles and bombs will should also be discussed in the committee. A number of bilateral and unilateral treaties and arrangements seek to reduce or eliminate certain categories of nuclear weapons, to prevent the proliferation of such weapons and their delivery vehicles by Terrorist organisations and anti-government cults. Few examples of such

arrangements arey y y y y The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation The Wassenaar Arrangement. The Australia Group

SECURITY OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS OR WEAPONS Nuclear weapons are the most dangerous weapons on earth. One can destroy a whole city, potentially killing millions, and jeopardizing the natural environment and lives of future generations through its long-term catastrophic effects. The dangers from such weapons arise from their very existence. Although nuclear weapons have only been used twice in warfarein the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945about 26,000 reportedly remain in our world today and there have been over 2,000 nuclear tests conducted to date. The foundations of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime have been laid down by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, known as the NPT. Therefore, a complete understanding of the NPT is a pre-requisite for every delegate. Other than these agreements, several other measures are required to be adopted by all member nations in order to prevent the theft or sabotage of nuclear weapons by terrorist organisations. For all delegates the NUCLEAR SECURITY PLAN2, 2010-13 can act as a guideline for drafting solutions to the agenda at hand. Furthermore, a detailed understanding of the Illicit Trafficking Database programme of the IAEA is also very crucial for all delegates. Also, the following topics must be discussed and deliberated upon in the committee: o Clandestine Nuclear Procurement Networks Use of Improvised Nuclear Devices (INDs) and Radiological Dispersion Devises (RDDs) by terrorist organisations;
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GOV/2009/54-GC(53)/18 dt.17 August, 2009

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o Intelligence and Technology sharing for the purpose of ensuring Nuclear Security; SECURITY OF BIOLOGICAL WARHEADS OR WEAPONS Bioterrorism (BT) is the threat or use of biological agents3 that, like most forms of terrorism, is intended to make political, religious or personal statements to governments and populations through attacks primarily aimed at civilians or resources that affect the civilian economy. Biological agents are often simpler to acquire and produce than nuclear, chemical or some conventional weapons. The material for biological agents can be easily grown or purchased. Some agents, such as anthrax or brucellosis, occur naturally in animals in certain parts of the world, and individuals can easily travel the globe to acquire biological agents from regions where such diseases occur naturally. For example, the

AumShinrikyo cult was reported to have gone to Zaire to collect strains of Ebola for use in its bio-weapons program. Until recently, anyone could order agents from supply houses around the world. In 1995, American Type Culture Collection (ATCC), a mail order company that provides biological products, shipped anthrax to Saddam Husseins bio-warfare program in Iraq, and plague to Larry Wayne Harris- a right wing zealot associated with Aryan Nation. Creating sophisticated biological weapons that could be deployed in missiles or bombs requires vast expertise and an expensive infrastructure.
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There are seven types of biological agents: parasites, fungi and yeasts, bacteria, rickettsia and chlamydia, viruses, prions, and toxins. Of these biological agents only bacteria, viruses and toxins are considered when referring to agents that can be used in a biological attack. While toxins are included in the list of biological agents, they are not living organisms, but small proteins produced by bacteria that can poison a person, animal or plant. Bacteria, viruses and toxins can be spread through the contamination of food, water or fomites; via vectors such as insects; or as aerosols suspended in wet or dry formulations.

However, it is relatively simple and inexpensive to create biological weapons for deployment through less complicated means, such as through the contamination of food or water. The equipment needed to create a bio-warfare laboratory is widely available through commercial means, because it is often the same equipment used in legitimate research laboratories. For instance, to prove how easy it is to build a germ warfare facility, the Pentagon secretly and successfully constructed a germ factory in Nevada using only commercially available material. Information on how to create sophisticated biological weapons can be taken from articles published in the scientific literature on a variety of topics, but it requires a trained scientist to understand the relevance of published findings to the creation of weapons. However, information on how to weaponize simpler biological agents is widely available and understandable to people with limited technological training4. So we conclude that a three step approach is needed to establish a bioweaponisationprogramme: 1. Access to Bio-Agents or Chemical Agents; 2. Access to Technology; 3. Access to Information; Further, the delegates must have a pre-requisite knowledge of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
For example Bacteriological Warfare: A Major Threat to North America, written by Larry Wayne Harris of the Aryan Nation. This manual describes the reproduction and growth of biological agents and can be purchased over the Internet for less than $30.
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Destruction (usually referred to as the Biological Weapons Conventionor Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention) and the Chemical Weapons Convention. SECURITY OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS OR WARHEADS On the morning of March 20, 1995, the Tokyo subway system was hit by synchronized chemical attacks on five trains. Using simple lunch-box-sized dispensers to release a mixture containing the military nerve agent Sarin, members of the AumShinrikyo religious cult killed twelve people and injured about a thousand others. The incident was unusual because the cult was using nerve gas that it had made in its own facilities; however, using unsophisticated means to disperse this low-quality agent, the attackers produced results less impressive than those achieved with ordinary explosives in the attacks on the Madrid and London transport systems in 2004 and 2005. Chemical Terrorism activities can be carried out either with the use of a military chemical agent or with the use of an Industrial Chemical Agent. Hence, there needs to be a focus on how different industries make use of various chemicals and how these are disposed off. The most common toxic hazardous materials are chlorine and anhydrous ammonia. While chlorine is normally stored and shipped in very large containers, the use of ammonia in agriculture requires it to be distributed to many more sites in smaller containers. Another major issue is the presence of numerable dual use technologies, which can be easily used for both constructive and destructive purposes. For instance, Tabun was originally developed in a German search for new

pesticides. The most dangerous pesticides have been largely or completely replaced by more selective alternatives that kill pests effectively with less danger to humans. Several highly-toxic "restricted-use" pesticides are still produced and used in very large quantities, and could be hijacked by the truckload. This includes parathion, methyl parathion, and other organophosphorus compounds with LD50s on the order of 10 mg/kg. Release of such agents can happen in two ways: y A terrorist group steals these agents from a storage facility; y A sabotage- internal or external takes place- releasing toxic material; Also, all delegates must undertake an indepth study of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Additional References: y Resolution 1540 of the UNSC, dt.28th April, 2004; y Resolution 1810 of the UNSC, dt.25th April, 2008; y Document: A/64/140- General Assembly (http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/406/58/PDF/N0940658.pdf?OpenEl ement); y Document: A/65/99- General Assembly; (http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/433/44/PDF/N1043344.pdf?OpenEl ement); y http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/Leng/default.htm y http://www.mtcr.info/english/index.html

y http://www.armscontrol.org/documents/icoc y http://www.wassenaar.org/ y http://www.australiagroup.net/en/index.html

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