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Dimaandal vs. COA Date: Ponente: Martinez, J. Facts: Petitioner Zosimo Dimaandal, then Supply Officer III in Batangas, was designated Acting Assistant Provincial Treasurer for Administration by the provincial governor. He was claiming for the difference in salary and Representation and Transportation allowance for his Supply Officer III position and his new designation for the whole year of 1993 but only the differences in allowances attached to the designation and the position he occupied were allowed by the Provincial Auditor. This was affirmed by the COA. Petitioner was appointed Assistant Provincial Treasurer by the Secretary of Finance only in 1994. Provincial Auditor as affirmed by COA: (1) the governor is not the proper appointing power to the position of Assistant Provincial Treasurer but rather the Secretary of Finance (Rev. Admin. Code, Sec. 2077); (2) he was merely designated Assistant Provincial Treasurer in addition to his regular duties. Petitioner: as per Menzon vs. Petilla and Cui vs.Ortiz, a de facto officer is entitled to payment for services rendered in office where he was designated. Issue: WON petitioner is entitled to the difference in salary and Representation and Transportation

allowance for his Supply Officer III position and his new designation for the whole year of 1993 Held: No. He was not a de facto officer. Ratio: The Secretary of Finance, and not the Governor of Batangas, has the power to either designate or appoint the Assistant Provincial Treasurer as per Sec.471 of the Local Government Code. It is also the appointing power which can order the payment of compensation to any designated or appointed employee to a vacant position. Further, there is difference between appointment and designation. Appointment is the selection by the proper authority of an individual who is to exercise the powers and functions of a given office while designation is only the imposition of additional duties to a person already in public service by virtue of an earlier appointment. He also is not a de facto officer, his appointment being made without color of authority. De facto officer: (a) one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face; (b) one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or 1

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informal, so that the incumbent be not a mere volunteer; (c) one who is in possession of an office in the open exercise of its functions under color of an election or an appointment, even though such election or appointment may be irregular. To differentiate this case from Menzon, in that case, petitioner therein Menzon was appointed, not designated, with color of authority. While in Cui, the appointing mayor still had the power to appoint and only the approval of the President was wanting. Further, retroactivity of petitioners appointment to his position, as he claimed, was not confirmed and evident in the appointment itself.

awarded unearned salaries and other emoluments to private respondent because the petitioner was a mere usurper for having been declared mayor only by the trial court and exercised its powers and functions through an execution pending appeal. Issue: WON petitioner is a usurper. Held: No. De facto officer.

Malaluan vs. COMELEC Date: March 6, 1996 Ponente: Hermosisima, Jr., J. Facts: Petitioner Luis Malaluan and respondent Joseph Evangelista were mayoralty candidates for Kidapawan, North Cotabato on the 1992 elections. Evangelista was proclaimed winner by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. Petitioner then lodged a protest to and was declared by the regional trial court as mayor. Petitioner filed a motion for execution pending appeal and this was granted and thus was able to assume the office of mayor. The COMELEC First Division, as affirmed by the en banc, eventually ordered Malaluan to vacate office after finding for Evangelista. Together with this, the COMELEC also

Ratio: A usurper is one who acts officially without any color of right. On the contrary, petitioner exercised the duties of municipal mayor on the color of election to that office. It is of no moment that he was proclaimed winner by the trial court and not by the COMELEC because both, at different stages of the election, have the power to proclaim the winner of the elections and both are legally sanctioned. Thus, petitioner Malaluan was a de facto officer legally entitled to the emoluments of the office of the mayor.

Flores vs. Drilon Date: June 22, 1993 Ponente: Bellosillo, J. Facts: Mayor Richard Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) pursuant to the proviso of RA 7227, Sec. 13, par. d, stating that, "Provided, 2

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however, That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority." This proviso is now assailed as being violative of the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government offices in Const., Art. IX-B, Sec. 7, first paragraph, which provides that, "No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Issue: WON Mayor Gordons appointment as SBMA Chairman was valid Held: No. Ratio: The authority given to appointive officials to hold multiple offices when allowed by law or when it falls under the primary function of said officials office under the second paragraph of Art. IX-B, Sec. 7 does not apply to elective official governed by the first paragraph aforequoted which gives no exception to the rule that an appointive official cannot be appointed or designated to another office. This is also what was intended by the Constitutional Committee as reflected in its records. Further, appointing the Mayor of Olongapo as SBMA chair runs against

the delegation of Senate to the President of the prerogative to appoint as he was already deprived of the facility to choose who to appoint. Respondent Gordons being incumbent mayor of Olongapo City thus makes him ineligible to become Chair of the SBMA. He, however, remains mayor of his city and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void. He may be considered a de facto officer: "one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they involve the interest of the public and third persons, where the duties of the office were exercised x x x under color of a known election or appointment, void because the officer was not eligible, or because there was a want of power in the electing or appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility, want of power or defect being unknown to the public x x x [or] under color of an election, or appointment, by or pursuant to a public unconstitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be such. As he was a de facto officer, respondent Gordon may retain any and all per diems, emoluments and allowances given by reason of his appointment.

Torres vs. Ribo Date: May 21, 1948 Ponente: Tuason, J. Facts: Mamerto Ribo, Bernardo Torres and Alejandro Balderian were running for governor of Leyte in the 1947 3

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elections. As such, they were disqualified to be members of the provincial board of canvassers, Ribo, being then incumbent governor and the other two provincial board members as per Sec. 158 of the Revised Election Code. Pursuant to Sec. 159, in lieu of them, the COMELEC appointed the division superintendent of schools, the district engineer and the district health officer to be members of the board of canvassers. The division superintendent of schools and the district engineer were not able to attend the canvassing, thus they were respectively represented by chief clerk Evaristo Pascual and assistant civil engineer Vicente Tizon. They canvassed the votes and proclaimed Mamerto Ribo as governor-elect. The board again met, now with the division superintendent of schools and the district engineer present, and recanvassed the votes and proclaimed appellee Ribo as governor. Issue: WON chief clerk Pascual and assistant civil engineer Tizon were de facto officers when they acted as members of the provincial board of canvassers Held: No. Ratio: Officer de facto- one who has the reputation of being the officer he assumes to be, and yet is not a good officer in point of law. He must have: (a) acted as an officer for such a length of time;

(b) under color of title; and (c) under such circumstances of reputation or acquiescence by the public and public authorities, as to afford a presumption of appointment or election, and induce people, without inquiry, and relying on the supposition that he is the officer he assumes to be, to submit to or invoke his action. Tizon and Pascual did not possess any of these conditions. They acted without appointment, commission or any color of title to the office. There was no acquiescence, public or private, in their discharge of the position. In fact the very person most greatly affected by their assumption of the office, Bernardo Torres, was not notified and was unaware of it. The appointment of substitute member to the provincial board of canvassers is personal and restricted as the persons eligible to be substitute members were expressly enumerated in Sec. 159 of the Revised Election Code, to the exclusion of other officers. The task acted upon by Tizon and Pascual on the meeting aforementioned cannot be considered as merely ministerial as it required judgment on whether to take the certified statements of municipal treasurers in lieu of their missing election returns so as not to delay the canvassing. Thus, it follows from the above that the meeting of the provincial board of canvassers with Tizon and Pascual and

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their proclamation therein were illegal and of no effect.

Tuanda vs. Sandiganbayan Date: October 17, 1995 Ponente: Kapunan, J. Facts: Bartolome Binaohan and Delia Estrellanes were designated agricultural labor and industrial labor sectoral representatives by Secretary of Local Government. However, they were not recognized by herein petitioners local government officials of Jimalalud, Negros Oriental, which filed an action before the trial court to declare their designations null and void. On the other hand, respondents Binaohan and Estrellanes charged petitioners with violation of RA 3019, Sec. 3 (e) for refusing to pay their per diems, salaries and other benefits by virtue of their designation as sectoral representatives. Petitioners motioned before the Sandiganbayan to suspend their arraignment on the ground that a prejudicial question exists in the civil case they formerly instituted against herein respondents. The Sandiganbayan denied their motion, reasoning that no prejudicial question exists because private respondents were entitle to their salaries and compensation for the service rendered, and even if the trial court nullified their designation as sectoral representatives (which it later did due to lack of prior determination by the Sanggunian as to the sufficiency in

number of the sectors and of consultation to the persons and associations part of the sector concerned), they may be considered at least de facto officers acting as such on the basis of apparently valid appointments issued by competent authority. Issue: WON respondents Binaohan Estrellanes are de facto officers Held: No. Ratio: The conditions and elements of de facto officership are the following. 1) There must be a de jure office; 2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public; and 3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith. One can qualify as a de facto officer only if all the aforestated elements are present. There can be no de facto officer where there is no de jure office, although there may be a de facto officer in a de jure office. Respondents failed to establish that they indeed performed service as their designations were already challenged early on by petitioners. They received the petition filed with the Office of the President barely 8 days after they took their oath of office.

and

Monroy vs. CA Date: 5

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Ponente: , J. Facts: Petitioner Roberto Monroy was the incumbent mayor of Navotas when he filed his certificate of candidacy (COC) as representative of the first district of Rizal in the then coming elections. Three days after such filing, he withdrew his COC which act was approved by the COMELEC. Three days passed when, then vice mayor, respondent Felipe del Rosario took his oath of office as mayor of Navotas, contending that petitioner already forfeited such office upon filing of his COC. The CFI of Rizal, as affirmed by the CA (except as to the award of moral damages), decided in favor of respondent del Rosario, holding that petitioner Monroy ceased to be mayor upon filing his COC and that respondent del Rosario became the municipal mayor upon taking his oath of office. Further, the court adjudged petitioner liable for the salaries respondent was entitled as mayor from the time he took his oath up to the time he reassumed his office. Petitioner Monroy now claims, relying on Rodriguez vs. Tan, 91 Phil. 724, that he was entitled to the salaries he received he being a de facto officer, as found by CA, from the time del Rosario took his oath of office up to the time of his reassumption, i.e., the time Monroy vacated the contested office. Issue: WON petitioner Monroy is a de facto officer and thus entitled to the salaries

and emoluments he received during the period in question Held: No. Ratio: Rodriguez is not applicable in the case at bar for having different factual and legal underpinnings. That case involved a senator proclaimed as duly elected, assumed office and was eventually ousted in an election protest. Said senator was said to be entitled to whatever he received by reason of his office he being a de facto officer. The present controversy however involves the forfeiture of office of Mayor Monroy by filing his certificate of candidacy to an office different from the one he was then holding, followed by the vice mayor laying a claim to the vacated office, thus bringing into operation Rev. Election Code, Sec. 27. The general rule applies in this case: "that the rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from an officer de facto the salary received by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure, even though he entered into the office in good faith and under color of title." This is so despite the seeming hardship to the officer de facto because the de facto doctrine, in the first place, is not created for the de facto officer but rather for the protection of the public affected by the official acts carried out by those not lawful officers.

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The issue here is possession of title and not of office. The de facto officer with no good title takes the salaries during his wrongful assumption of office at the risk of accounting them to the de jure officer.

(SG-15) violated her rights to security of tenure and due process. The appellate court, however, did not award her backwages. Issue: WON respondent Monserate is entitled to backwages Held: Yes, but only to backpay differentials, i.e., difference between her pay as Administrative Officer and Manager II Ratio: Firstly, the appointment of Anino to Monserates position was null and void ab initio because the position Manager II was never vacant since her demotion was void for violating her constitutional right to security of tenure. Nevertheless, petitioner Anito was a de facto officer- one who is in possession of an office and who openly exercises its functions under color of an appointment or election, even though such appointment or election may be irregular. Regarding backwages, it was held in Monroy vs. CA that the de jure officer can recover from the de facto officer the salary the latter received during his wrongful tenure, even though the latter occupied the office in good faith and under color of title. In the case of Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, on the other hand, the court held that a de facto officer may receive emoluments for actual services rendered but only when there is no de jure officer.

Gen. Manager, PPA vs. Monserate Date: April 17, 2002 Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. Facts: Respondent Julieta Monserate was Finance Officer (SG-16) when the PPA undertook reorganization. During the said reorganization, she applied for a higher permanent position of Manager II (SG-19) of the Resource Management Division. She topped other aspirants to the position and was appointed as Manager II (SG-19). Second-place petitioner Ramon Anino filed an appeal/petition in the PPA Appeals board protesting respondents appointment. Eventually, without having been given the opportunity to be heard and even caught by surprise by being not properly notified, Monserate was replaced by Anino as Manager II (SG-19) and was demoted to Administrative Officer (SG-15) (Aninos former position). Respondent Monserate appealed before the CSC, which decided in favor of PPA and petitioner Anino. Upon her appeal to the CA, the appellate court decided in her favor, holding that the PPA resolution removing her from her office was not supported by evidence and was irregularly issued due to lack of proper notice to her and that her demotion to Administrative Officer

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Rule: where there is a de jure officer, a de facto officer, during his wrongful incumbency, is not entitled to the emoluments attached to the office, even if he occupied the office in good faith. In this case, however, since respondent received the salary of Administrative Officer (SG-15), she cannot be entitled to full backwages for Manager II for the entire period of petitioner Aninos wrongful incumbency, but rather only to the backpay differentials (difference of pay for Administrative Officer and Manager II) from her assumption as Administrative Officer until her actual reinstatement as Manager II. Such differential was to be paid by petitioner Anino from his wrongful assumption of office up until his retirement.

members and their deputies and assistants from holding any other employment or office. They also pray that the concerned public officers cease and desist from holding the additional positions they perform. Issue: WON respondents validly occupy positions other than their primary functions Held: No. Ratio: EO 284 is against Art. VII, Sec. 13 by allowing cabinet officials, undersecretaries and assistant secretaries hold not more than 2 other offices as the said constitutional provision absolutely proscribes such holding of other offices. Art. IX-B, Sec. 7 does not apply in this case and the exception therein, which is not found in the stricter Art. VII, Sec. 13, as well cannot be used as a refuge to maintain the validity of EO 284. It also can be seen from the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that it Art. VII, Sec. 13 is intended to eradicate the excesses seen in the Marcos era where the likes of the concerned officials were given the opportunity to be member of the boards of different government instrumentalities and corporations, thus enriching themselves at the expense of the public. And also it would be safer to construe the Constitution from what appears upon its face, how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers understanding. 8

Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary Date: February 22, 1991 Ponente: Fernan, C.J. Facts: Petitioners Civil Liberties Union and Anti-Graft League assail the constitutionality of EO 284 which limits to 2 other offices which a secretary, undersecretary, assistant secretary or any other appointive executive official may hold other than his primary position. They contend that this contravenes Art. VII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution which prohibits the President, Vice-President, Cabinet

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Nevertheless, this prohibition does not apply to ex-officio positions as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of the officials concerned, and are without additional compensation. Respondents may be considered de facto officers during their tenure in their questioned positions, thus they are entitled to emoluments for actual services they rendered. "[I]n cases where there is no de jure, officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office. This doctrine is, undoubtedly, supported on equitable grounds since it seems unjust that the public should benefit by the services of an officer de facto and then be freed from all liability to pay any one for such services. They may retain such per diem, allowances or emoluments they have received by virtue of said positions in question.

Board Member Aurelio Menzon as acting Vice-Governor of the province. The Provincial Board then inquired to the Undersecretary of Local Government the propriety of the designation of petitioner Menzon. The Undersecretary opined that such designation was not in accordance with the Local Government Code as there is no provision to that matter and that it was unnecessary. Thus, the Board resolved to not recognize the designation of Menzon as acting ViceGovernor, this they did despite the reconsideration made by the Undersecretary which favored petitioners designation. Issue: WON petitioner Menzon is entitled to the salaries and emoluments for performing the function of acting ViceGovernor Held: Yes, but his total compensation should not exceed that of the compensation for Vice-Governor Ratio: There is a vacancy in the office of the vice-governor after Vice-Governor Petilla was designated by the Secretary of Local Government as acting Governor. There is no showing that respondent Petilla simultaneously functioned as governor and vicegovernor during his assumption as acting Governor of Leyte. The President, through her, Secretary had the power to remedy the situation, despite the lack of provision in the Local Government Code regarding the 9

Menzon vs. Petilla Date: May 20, 1991 Ponente: , J. Facts: The governorship of Leyte was vacant for almost 2 years, prompting the Secretary of Local Government to designate Vice-Governor Leopoldo Petilla as acting Governor. Alongside this designation, the same Secretary also designated Senior Provincial

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succession to the vice-governorship. The law abhors an interregnum and such is not in the best interest of the public service. The provincial boards claim that it is the proper appointing power cannot overcome the fact that the President is the one with supervision over local governments and that the members of the provincial board are junior to the vicegovernor, and thus the President is the proper choice to be the proper appointing authority, until the law provides otherwise. The appointment of petitioner Menzon also is in accordance with the intent of the Local Government Code as it envisions continuity in the performance of the duties of the vicegovernor as can be seen in its Sec. 49 in relation with Sec. 52, which provides that the member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan with the highest number of votes would assume the office of the vice-governor in case of the incumbents death, removal from office, resignation or incapacity. Petitioner is that member with the highest number of votes. Inevitably, petitioner Menzon should be paid for the services he rendered as acting vice-governor, but should not be double compensated. Thus, his existing compensation as board member should be increased but not to exceed that for the vice-governor. Even if the President does not have the power to designate petitioner as acting vice-governor, still petitioner is at least a de facto officer.

Petitioner assumed the Office of the Vice-Governor under a color of a known appointment. He was appointed by no less than the alter ego of the President, the Secretary of Local Government, after which he took his oath of office before Senator Alberto Romulo. The appointment has the color of validity. The respondents themselves acknowledged the validity of the petitioner's appointment and dealt with him as such. It was only when the controversial Resolution No. 505 was passed by the same persons who recognized him as the acting ViceGovernor that the validity of the appointment of the petitioner was made an issue and the recognition withdrawn. The petitioner, for a long period of time, exercised the duties attached to the Office of the Vice-Governor. He was acclaimed as such by the people of Leyte.

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