θωερτψυιοπασδφγηϕκλζξχϖβνµθωερτψ
υιοπασδφγηϕκλζξχϖβνµθωερτψυιοπασδ
 
 

φγηϕκλζξχϖβνµθωερτψυιοπασδφγηϕκλζ
 
READING RESPONSE 
ξχϖβνµθωερτψυιοπασδφγηϕκλζξχϖβνµ
 

 Laurence Bonjour’s “Critique of Foundationalism” 
θωερτψυιοπασδφγηϕκλζξχϖβνµθωερτψ
Patrick Shannon 
 
υιοπασδφγηϕκτψυιοπασδφγηϕκλζξχϖβν
 
PHIL 215 

µθωερτψυιοπασδφγηϕκλζξχϖβνµθωερτ
 
Dr.Jenna Woodrow 

September 29,2008 
ψυιοπασδφγηϕκλζξχϖβνµθωερτψυιοπα
 

σδφγηϕκλζξχϖβνµθωερτψυιοπασδφγηϕκ
 

 
λζξχϖβνµθωερτψυιοπασδφγηϕκλζξχϖβ
 
νµθωερτψυιοπασδφγηϕκλζξχϖβνµθωερτ
 
ψυιοπασδφγηϕκλζξχϖβνµθωερτψυιοπα
 

σδφγηϕκλζξχϖβνµθωερτψυιοπασδφγηϕκ
 

λζξχϖβνµρτψυιοπασδφγηϕκλζξχϖβνµθ
 

 
ωερτψυιοπασδφγηϕκλζξχϖβνµθωερτψυι
 
οπασδφγηϕκλζξχϖβνµθωερτψυιοπασδφγ
 
ηϕκλζξχϖβνµθωερτψυιοπασδφγηϕκλζξ
 

χϖβνµθωερτψυιοπασδφγηϕκλζξχϖβνµθ
 

ωερτψυιοπασδφγηϕκλζξχϖβνµθωερτψυι
 

 
οπασδφγηϕκλζξχϖβνµθωερτψυιοπασδφγ
 
ηϕκλζξχϖβνµθωερτψυιοπασδφγηϕκλζξ
χϖβνµθωερτψυιοπασδφγηϕκλζξχϖβνµθ
 Shannon  1 

Bonjour begins his “Critique of Foundationalism” with a brief summarization of

the epistemic regress argument: For any inferred belief to be justified, the beliefs that

support it must be justified themselves, resulting in “an infinite and apparently vicious

regress of epistemic justification”(184). Bonjour suggests four possible outcomes of this

regress: 

1) Termination in beliefs that are ultimately unjustifiable. (Scepticism)

2) Infinite regression (Scepticism)

3) Continuous appeal to beliefs which have already been called upon (Coherentism)

4) Termination in beliefs that constitute knowledge without requiring inferential

justification (Foundationalism).

Because scepticism constitutes surrender to epistemic regress, and Coherentism is subject

to “seemingly decisive” objections, he asserts that, prima facie, Foundationalism appears

to be the most attractive solution .

Bonjour distinguishes two principal varieties of Foundationalism: Strong

Foundationalism, which holds that certain basic beliefs possess “sufficient non-inferential

justification to be…indubitable”(185), and Weak Foundationalism, which admits that

these non-inferential beliefs must appeal to other beliefs to form epistemically justified

knowledge. The author’s central criticism of Foundationalism is concerned with whether

or not these answers present an acceptable foundation for knowledge. Absenting the

possibility of innate knowledge, Bonjour argues that no empirical belief can be justified

epistemically without referencing further beliefs. To accept unjustified beliefs for the

sake of convenience would be “epistemically irresponsible”. The author does, however,

 Shannon  2 

admit that two foundationalist answers appear to counter his objection: externalism and

givenness.

Externalism holds that the justification of a subject’s belief does not necessarily

have to fall within his or her reflective purview. The belief may be considered knowledge

as long as it is true and the “natural relation…between the believer and the world” makes

the belief highly likely to be true”(187). Bonjour objects to Externalism on the grounds

that it seems only to waive the requirement for justification when convenient.

Givenness asserts that certain beliefs are not inferred, but are “immediately

apprehended” by the subject, and require no further justification. The difficulty with this

response is that this apprehension would require justification itself, or would be incapable

of providing an epistemic foundation for further knowledge.

In his critique, Bonjour raises decisive objections against the foundationalist

solution to epistemic regress. Presupposing that all knowledge is inferred from the senses,

he makes it quite clear that “no account seems to be available of how an empirical belief

can be genuinely justified …while avoiding all reference to further empirical beliefs or

cognitions which themselves would require justification”(193). It would seem, then, that

we are left with a choice between the Coherentist acceptance of a non-linear dependence

of justification, which “seems unacceptable”, and sceptical surrender (185). Bonjour

does, however, mention a third alternative that he seems hesitant to address. While

discussing Externalism, he mentions that we might abandon the traditional conception of

epistemic justification and knowledge. While Bonjour considers this solution too radical

to discuss in his essay, he admits that “such an altered conception of knowledge may be

inescapable or even…desirable”(189). Furthermore, if Bonjour is correct in his assertion

 Shannon  3 

that the epistemic regress problem is a direct result of our traditional definition of

knowledge as justified true belief, then the most efficient solution would be to alter this

definition to avoid the problem entirely.

Willard Van Orman Quine, a proponent of naturalized Epistemology, explains

concisely the difficulty of resolving the epistemic regress argument with our current

conception of knowledge:

I see philosophy and science as in the same boat – a boat which…we can

rebuild only at sea while staying afloat in it. There is no external vantage

point, [therefore] no first philosophy (O’Brien 129).

Indeed, it seems impossible to confirm without the slightest doubt the veridicality of our

sense data without appealing to any other source of information. If the coherentist

conception of a non-linear corroboration of our perceptions is a sufficient source of

justification, or if there exists within us some innate truth from which we might construct

further knowledge, then we may yet escape from epistemic regress. If not, it follows that

we must develop a new understanding of knowledge. While Quine argues for the

abandonment of normative epistemology, I agree with Bonjour’s view that this is too

radical for immediate consideration. Instead, it seems reasonable to ask whether or not it

is a philosopher’s responsibility to accept the limitations of the human consciousness. If

this is the case, what alternatives are available in our search for wisdom?
 Shannon  4 

WORKS CITED

Bonjour, Laurence. “A Critique of Foundationalism.” The Theory of Knowledge:

Classical and Contemporary Readings 3rd Edition. Ed. Louis P. Pojman.

Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2003.

O’Brien, Dan. An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge. Malden, MA: Polity Press,

2006.