Abalos vs. Macatangay, G.R. No.

155043, September 30, 2004 Article 69 regarding ownership, administration, enjoyment and disposition of the community properties FACTS: Spouses Arturo and Esther Abalos are the registered owners of a parcel of land with improvements located at Azucena St., Makati City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 145316 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati. Arturo executed a Receipt and Memorandum of Agreement (RMOA), in favor for the respondent, binding himself to sell to respondent the subject property and not to offer the same to any other party within 30 days from date. Respondent sent a letter to Arturo and Esther informing them of his readiness and willingness to pay the full amount of the purchase price and demanded upon the spouses to comply with their obligation to turn over possession of the property to him. Esther agreed to surrender possession of the property to respondent within 20 days, while the latter promised to pay the balance of the purchase price for P1, 290, 000.00 after being placed in possession of the property. Esther also obligated herself to execute and deliver to respondent a deed of absolute sale upon full payment. Respondent informed the spouses that he had set aside P1, 290, 000.00 as evidenced by Citibank Check No. 278107 as full payment of the purchase price. But Arturo and Esther failed to deliver the property which prompted respondent to file a complaint for specific performance with damages against petitioners. RULING: Contracts, in general, require the presence of three essential elements: (1) consent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and (3) cause of the obligation which is established. The nullity of the RMOA as a contract of sale emanates not only from lack of Esthers consent thereto but also from want of consideration and absence of respondents signature thereon. This cannot be obliterated by Esthers subsequent confirmation of the putative transaction as expressed in the Contract to Sell. Under the law, a void contract cannot be ratified and the action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe. A void contract produces no effect either against or in favor of anyoneit cannot create, modify or extinguish the juridical relation to which it refers. The congruence of the wills of the spouses is essential for the valid disposition of conjugal property. Where the conveyance is contained in the same document which bears the conformity of both husband and wife, there could be no question on the validity of the transaction. But when there are 2 documents on which the signatures of the spouses separately appear, textual concordance of the documents is indispensable. Hence, in this case where the wifes putative consent to the sale of conjugal property appears in a separate document which does not, however, contain

the same terms and conditions as in the first document signed by the husband, a valid transaction could not have arisen. The interest of each spouse is limited to the net remainder or "remanente liquido" (haber ganancial) resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution. Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage. Significantly, the Family Code has introduced some changes particularly on the aspect of the administration of the conjugal partnership. The new law provides that the administration of the conjugal partnership is now a joint undertaking of the husband and the wife. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal partnership, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. However, the power of administration does not include the power to dispose or encumber property belonging to the conjugal partnership. In all instances, the present law specifically requires the written consent of the other spouse, or authority of the court for the disposition or encumbrance of conjugal partnership property without which, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. Rivera v. Heirs of Romualdo Villanueva G.R. No. 141501 July 21, 2006 FACTS: From 1927 until her death in 1980, Pacita Gonzales cohabited with Romualdo Villanueva without the benefit of marriage because the latter was married to Amanda Musngi who died in 1963. During the 53 years of their cohabitation they acquired the several properties contested in this case. In July 1980, Pacita died without leaving a will. On August 1980, Romualdo and Angelina (said to bethe illegitimate child of Pacita and Romualdo) executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with sale of a number of properties of Pacitas estate. Petitioners (Pacitas half-brothers, etc.) filed a case for partition of her estate and annulment of titles and damages. In dismissing the complaint, the RTC made two findings: (1) Pacita was never married to Romualdo even after Amandas death, and (2) respondent Angelina was Pacitas illegitimate child by Romualdo and therefore her sole heir (to the exclusion of the petitioners). CA affirmed. ISSUE: Whether the real properties acquired during the cohabitation of Pacita and Romualdo are equally owned by them. HELD:

NO. Pacita and Romualdo lived together without the benefit of marriage and therefore their property relations were governed by Art. 144 of the Civil Code. However, the contending parties agreed that the relationship of Pacita and Romualdo was adulterous,at least until the death of Amanda in 1963. Because the cohabitation of Pacita and Romualdo from 1927 to 1963 was adulterous, their property relations during those 36 years were not governed by Art. 144 of the Civil Code which applies only if the couple living together is not in any way incapacitated from getting married. According to the doctrine laid down by Juaniza v. Jose, no co-ownership exists between parties to an adulterous relationship. In Agapay v. Palang, the Court expounded on this doctrine by declaring that in such a relationship (adulterous), it is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply. The only property acquired after Amandas death in 1963 and registered in the names of both Villanueva and Gonzales was only one property. This is governed by the rules on co-ownership pursuant to Art. 144 of the Civil Code. Half of it should pertain to Pacitas heirs and the other half, to Romualdo. The rest of the properties registered solely in Pacitas name were also acquired after the death of Amanda in 1963. These properties are governed by coownership under Art. 144 of the Civil Code. Again, half should accrue to Pacitas heirs and the other half, to Romualdo. Properties registered solely under Pacitas name, although acquired during their cohabitation, accrue to the petitioners. Properties acquired after Amandas death in 1963, both those registered under their names and those registered in Pacitas name, will be the only ones governed by the rules on co-ownership pursuant to Art. 144 of the Civil Code.