Short History of the Sulu Sultanate

Chronology of Key
Events
Abstract
Introduction
Chapter One
Chapter Two
Chapter Three
Chapter Four
.'hap.er P;e
Chapter Seven
Cbapter Eight
Chapter Nine
Chapter Ten
Bibliograpby of
Primary Materials
Contents
The Historical Contex.1 of the F onnation of the Sultanate
The Genealogy of the Sulu Sultanate
The SuJu Sultanate before the amval of the Spaniards, Sulu
] 450-1578
The Coming of the Spaniards and the Beginning of the
Mora Wars, Sulu 1578-1675
How the Sultan of Sulu acquired North Borneo. 1662-c.
1675
ofSulu 1675-1842
Under .t\merican Occupation, Sulu 1899-1946
From "Inc', endence" to War, Sulu 1946-1999
The Sulu Po '. cal System
The 'lIcce< .1 ,n to the Sultanate, 1936-1999
Appendices
1. India and Orienta] copies of agreements between the English and the Sulus in the
2. Treaties between the East India Company and Sulu: J 761-1769
a) Articles of Friendship and Commerce bet\veen the English and the Sulus by Dalrymple
and Sultan Muazzidin, 28.01.176]
b) Articles of alliance between Sultan Alimudin I and the Honourable United Company of
Merchants of England, 1763
c) S-,)"iTt S;;ltanAhmudin I, 1764
d) Treaty of Friendship and Commerce berween Sultan Alimudin and Dalrymple, 1764
e) Giant from the Sultan ofSulu, 1769
3. Treaty bet\veen Spain and Sulu of 1836
4. Trea:y concluded by Commodore Wilkes "ith the Sultan of Sulu, 1842 (SO Jfce: Zalde and
Zaide)
5. Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between Her and the Sultan of Borneo,
27.05 1847
6. Convention of Commerce etc. between Great Britain and SuJu, 29.05.1849
7. Stipulations with the Su1tan and Datus of Jolo, 30.08.1850
8. Act ofre-submission by the SultanofSulu to Spain of 19.04.1851
9. Protocol between Spain, Great Britain and Germany on 11 1877
10. Admission of Spanish soverei&'11ty by the Sultan of SuI u, 22.07. 1878
1 I. The North Borneo Treaty of 1878 benveen Jamalu1 Alam and Overbeck (Source Zaide and
Lalde, Document No. 319)
12. The Sulu Code ofJamc.Jp1 "-Jam and the Ne'Y Sulu Code nfH?jiFLltu (1902)
B. Protoc.ol bet\veen Spain., Great Britain and Germany regarding claims to Sulu and
07.03 1885
,. / ct.:( ment::; ::::oncerning rile Establishment of the Brl cisll 1-'. ; n :,.IOf':
24.12.1888
15. Agreement between the Sulu Sultan and Datus and General John C. Bates (Jolo, August
20,1899)
16.. Agreement between the governor-general of the Philipt" es and the Sultan of Sulu
(Zamboanga, March 1915)
17. A&'Teernent for the transfer of sovereif,1flty from the British 1, rth Borneo Company to the
British Crown, 26.06.1946 (incomplete)
18. loint Statement by the Governments of Great Britain al'<1 the .. deration of Malaya regarding
the Federation of Malaysia
19. A bill to make prmision for and in connection "iththe Federation of North Borneo,
Singapore and the Federation of Malaya
20. The Tripoli Agreement, 1976
21. TheMIM manifesto
1450 (c.)
1578
1675 (c.)
1737
l761
1849
1851
1878
1878
1884-1893
1898
1899
1903
1914
1915
1970
1935
1936
1946
1946
1963
1968
1968
J971
1972
1972
1976
1977
J987
1996
1996
1()99
Chronology of Key Events
Formation of the Sultanate bv Abu Bah
Commencement of Hostilities ben.veen the Spanish and Sulus
Cession of North Borneo to the Su1tan of Sulu
Allmudln I signs peace treaty \\ith Spain
FIrst Treaty \\ith the East lndia Company
Rajah signs treaty with Sulu
Sulu - Spain Treaty
Lease ah'feement of North Borneo to British North Borneo Company (January)
Sulu Treaty 'with Spain (July)
Civil in Sulu
Treaty of Paris: US acquires sovereignty over the Philippines
Bates AgTeement
Formation ofMoro Province sihrnifies direct rule for Sulu
cf)rmatIon otthe Department ofMmdal1ae and
"':::arpenter Agreement
Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes assumes administration ofbik,)5
Fonnation of the Philippine Commomvealth
Death of Jamalul Kiram 11
Annexation of North Bomeo by the British Crown
The Philippines becomes independent
[ncorporation of North Borneo \vithin the Malaysian Federation
Jabjdah Massacre
Formation of the Muslim fndependenceMovement
Formation of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)
Declaration of Martial La,v by Ferdinand Marcos
Outbreak
Tripoli Agreement between fvfNLF and the Marcos Government
of the Tripoli Agreement
Jeddah talks behveen the MNLF and the Aquino Government
Misuari and Ramos sign peace deal
Formation of the South Philippines Council for Peace and Development
MNLF and Abu Sayyaf continue to tlght
Chronology of Sultans
1450
Sharif (1)
Kamaludin (2)
Alaudin (3)
1500 Aunirul Umara (4)
Muizzul
(5)
1550 Nasirudin I (6)
Pangiran Buddirnan (7)
Shah Tangah (8)
1600 Bongsu
(9)
1650 Pangiran Bakhtiar
(10)
Sahabudin
(11 )
1700 Shatludin (12)
Badamdin I (13)
Nasirudin II (14)
]750 A1imudin J (15)
Muazzidin (16)
Aljrnudin n (17)
(18)
Sharafudin (19)
Alimudin III
(20)
A1iudin
(21 )
:3hakiru tlaL \,22)
Jamalul Kiram (23)
1850 Pulalun (24)
J ama1u] Alam I (25)
Badarudin n (26)
1990 Jamalul Kiram II (27)
1950 J ulaspi Kiram (28)
Rodinood
(29)
Kudhar
(30)
c. 1450-c. 1480
-c. 1579
c. 1579-c.16to
c.1610-1649
C. J 649-c. 1685
c. ] 685-c. ] 71 0
c. 1710-c. 1718
c 1718-1732
1732-1735
J 735-1748, 1764-1774
1748-1763
1763-1764, 1778-1791
4 -t _.-.0
I I 1'+- J J I ()
] 79J -)
1808-1
1808-c. 1821
1823-1842
1842-1862
1862-1881

1886-1936
1936-1994
1994-1999
1999-
Abstract
In this Short History of Suitt, a s)TIopsis of the forthcoming historiob'Taphy Complete History of
Sulu \>,ill be made. The account will use pre-history and relations with China as its point of
departure in order to provide the historical contexi: of the formation of the Sulu Sultanate in the
fl
1
t+c"n1'h """n+-'u""" 'Th", ,,+' C"l" .. ..;11 +l..o_ ___ .. _..l +h- -------+
.t. l\. vJ t-U' i. J.lt\... :ES -,.Of L.Il..lh.<I Lj.U.Jl( lHll,\,..: \"'l-H' th. I.! .\. ...\_"L!"I_
challenges the dominant assumptions which surround Spanish accounts of the Mom wars. The
nature of the Sulu Sultanates acquisition of the North Born-=.v territories will then be elucidated
before the subsequent era of contlict with the Spaniards is discussed. The lease of North Borneo
prior to its annexation by the British in 1946 \\111 be touched npon but only by way of prelude to the
more detailed account of the North Borneo situation which \\i11 be the subject of an imminent
publication. The final phase of Spanish aggression towards SuJu, the ongoing campaigns of the
Sulus v,hilst under American occupation, and the recent war \\ith the Philippines government \\ il I
all be clarified, as will the issue of succession to the Sultanate since the death in 1936 of Sultan
lamalul Kiram II. The final chapter \\i11 discuss the political institutions ofthe Sulu Sultanate.
Introduction
The Historical Context of the Formation of the Sulu Sultanate
Since the formation of the sultanate ofSulu over five hundred years age, SuJu has, for large periods,
wielded remarkable levels of economic and political power. Sulu, in the face of repeated attacks by
the Spanish invaders, held firm and maintained its sovereignty. The pattern of resistance to
colonisation has persisted for over four hundred years. The most recent peace treaty in this
protracted cycle of cont1ict, defensive submission., peaceful interlude and offensive riposte \vas
S I guru 111 I Y"io 'lJ)'j,tkarii;l u)c'Nur Misuaii 01 t; Ii:: -Mul v 1-1 aLivnai Libel a tIUjll'f(lil i arid.t !'C:'iucilt l' iuca .
Ramo:; of the Philippines. This Short HistOJ:" (:lthe S'ulu ,Sultanate \\ill analyse the modem political
predicament of Sulu after outlining the last five hl.ndred years of SuJu's jX)Iitical history have.
Before embarking on that historiob'Taphical journey, the remainder of this chapter \\'i11 contexiualise
the formation of the Sultanate.
Two structural arguments can be put forward to explain why such a small nation was able to
maintain its identity and independence far so long. The first argument concerns geography and
trade, \\hile the second addresses geOb'Taphy, the arrival of Is Jam and the early institutionalisation of
a formal polity along Islamic hnes. Each of these explanations will be elucidated upon before the
history of Sulu' s ruling family is discussed in the nexi chapter.
Sulu as a Trading Centre
Situated between Malacp , China ane. the Suli.;s commanding economic location he'
enabled it to play an active part in international trade. Its ports are believed to have received
:-.3 ear!y as the ce!lturv (C}w Man 19
0
0). h;C1:ori.Cl'15
an"; tOUlceenth centuries such as Chao Ju-Kua, \\Tang Tayuan and MaTuan-LlH hav(; altinned ,.ile
long history of Sulu-Chinese trading relations. All three refer to 982 AD as the first confirmable
date of economic interaction (M Tuan-Lin 1319; Wang Tayuan 1349 cited in Zaide and Zaide
1979). Indeed pre-Islamic rulers ofSulu paid tribute to the court five times between 1416 and
1424 (\\Tang Tehming 1967). A Sulu king who died in China while on his \\'ay to 0ffer tribute was
accorded a royal burial (MajuJ, 1973). Although trading relatic,r:: with the Chinese fell away to a
deL'Tee in the tollowing centuries. they reached new heights iF tne eighteenth centurv. The Chinese
_. _. - - -' -"
are but one of countless peoples \:vho have come to Sulu to tnd,c. The Chinese have been followed
by the Indian traders, by Arabs, BUf,rinese, Dutch anlt t. The Sultan derived substantial
pecuniary resources from port charges and tariffs in additi011 fJ the tribute that he collected from his
own subjects and periodically from other peoples such as the Visayans.
The Early Arrival ofIslam and Formal Political Structures
A second benefit of Sulu's geographic position takes the analysis briefly into the realm of pre-
history. Su1u has been the gate\vay of the Philippines for thousands of years. The lower sea levels of
the past revealed land bridges across Wildt is 110\\' the Sulu Archipelago from mainland South East
Asia to the islands which lead to the Pacific Ocean (Agoncilo and Alfonso 1960). For over thirty
thousand years, wave after wave of peoples have migrated through the Sulu Archipelago (ibid.). As
gatekeeper to the Philippines
o
Sulu \\'as the first rebrion of the Philippines to feel the influences of
Islam. It is not possible to pinpoint the exact date of the arrival of Islam in the Sulu Archipelago.
Rather than emphasising the centrality of
one or two Islamic missionaries such as Sharif Makdon (an Islamic missionary and Arab judge),
Majul has provided a compelling case for the ,iew that the advent of Islam in Sulu can be
interpreted as "a function of the general expansion of Islam in Malaysia" (Sal1eby 158; MaJul
1973,35).
...... 1.. ...... + ....... ........... ....l ......... +--...-.. ...... __ ,,+ A _ ..... 1- ..... ....... _ .... -.;ro.,. .......... .....:1 +-_ ...... ..:l ...........r- ............. _'"' ..... ,..... ... L ________ ....1.., ............ ...-..1-
'-'a)Vl-.l,t;\..tal -UHH. (..l .::"tl\:..rQ.\.l)" .:lUc.allJ VI ... -"IQl.I allU U(.l-U\ . .d.:') \ .. :U-IIi\.. l\.J >JUJU -.lIVlll Ul\..< u, .. lllli
century (Cayongcat 1986). This would seem to be a valid assertion in the light of the massacre of
thousands of foreign merchants (many of them Muslims) in Khanfu (Canton) in 878 AD (Tibbets
1957). The resulting Diaspora scattered amongst the islands and coasts of South East Asia. An
event \\ith similar historical consequences was the sacking of Baghdad by the Mongols in 1258
(Majul 1973, 50). Thus, although figures such as Tuan Masha'ika and SharifMakdon would have
yield more plausible results. Pursuing this line of enquiry, l'v1ajul expounds the various theC'ries
associated with the adH;i1t of Islam in the Sulu region. The first two theories, already touched Ui:JVl1,
focus on the roles of trade and missionaries. The third theory is of bJfater sibTflificance for this
narrative. This theory could be tenned as the political economy approach. Islamic
institutions favoured missionaries and Muslim traders, while the traders in turn supported and
strengthened the political institutions economically (Maju11973, 49).
Ultimately, the formation of political institutions along Islamic lines would be the basis upon which
the ad\'ance of the christianising Spanish colonialists would falter. The Northern Philippines, by
contrast, was still without centralised political institutions and offered little resistance to the
Spaniards. Exceptions did exist, not Jeast amongst the 1'v1usIims already living in the North.
Ip,c tiC:"lOli of lslamlc and Pre-Islamic l'oliticfil
Thus the formation of the Sultanate in SuJu, coupled with its economically strategic location, has
fonned much of the basis upon \vhich the Sulu people have resisted four centuries of c0I':'nisation
:<ld have flourisncd ecol1omicai1.y tor m..;.ch of that time. i;; onler l'.J \ . :....'1c
political structures of the Sulu nation in modern times, it is necessary to stress one further point.
formation of the Sultanate in the fifteenth century did not occur in a political vacuum. More
rudimf!ntary forms of governance were already in existence in Sulu. Indeed, the institution of the
married the Islamic political tradition with the pre-existing poh ' .1} structures (see
below).
The _"pie of Sulu and the Sultan's Predecessors
The Taosug people of Sulu are said to be an amalgamation of four peoples. Firstly there were the
Budanuns amongst whose rulers was Rajah Sipad the younger. The Budanuns were, according to
Saleeby, the original inhabitants of Sulu (Saleeby 1908). The Budanuns are believed to have been
similar to the Dayaks ofBomeo, thus substantiating the theory that Sulu was once part of a Bornean
empire (ibid.). According to Sulu tradition, the daughter of Rajah Sipad the younger, who was
hinself descended from Rajah Sipad the older, was s..qid to have married Tuan Masha'ika. The
dynasty of the latter is thought to have supplaeted tl:e d)l1asty (Saleeby 1908; Maj ul 1973).
Legend has it that Tuan Masha'ika was "born out of a bamboo" (1\1ajul 1973, 52). According to
another tradition. Tuan Masha'ika was the son of Janl1vun Kulisa and Indira Suua who came to
, -J_
Sulu with Alexander the Great (Saleeby 1908). In addition to the Budanuns, there were the
Tagimaha people, the Baklaya and the Badjao \\'ho arrived in the Sulu Archipelago in the early
fourteenth century.
In 1390, it is reputed that Rajah Baginda came to Sulu from the Menankabaw region of Sumatra
(\Vester: Gowing Zaide and Zaide 1964). Babrinda assumed power in Sulu at a time when
there are believed to have been three strata of the Sulu ruling class. The first were 'the Datus \vho
were probably the descendants of Sipad the younger and Tuan IVlasha'ika. The second were the
Tagirnaha chiefs, and the third were the Bak laya chiefs (Saleeby 1908, 160).
It was towards the end of the lifetime of Rajah Baginda that Abu Bakr is believed to have come to
Sulu. Following his marriage to Princess Paramisuli, daughter ofBaf:,rinda, he introduced "not Islam
as such but Islam as a form of state religion \\ith its attendant political and social institution" (Majul
1973, 57). The Sultanate of Sulu \vas thus bom, and its first Sultan, Abu Bah, was known as Sultan
Sharif ul-Hashim.
Chapter One
The C.enealogy of the Sulu Sultanate
T
l.." 1.."
1[\ ..... 11u..:.a6l,... t.ll 0u1UHl 1 LUUJl .L\'VU.U1VVU. \..Jail. v""' LIQ\..-LrU t.\J ,,-JUltalt Jl1UIU UJ JIIL-al'':' \,/1 LU,--, fJ1\,..cLIH..lJQ (11"0
tarsilas emanating from the royal family and datus. In 1908. SaJeebyo drawing largely on the tarsila
ofHadji Buto (Sultan Jamalul Kiram's one time 'prime minister') produced what is widely regarded
as the most authoritatiye account of the Sulu genealogy thus far. One of the best knovm efforts to
outline the lineage of the Sulu royaJ family prior to Saleeby's account "vas made by the East India
Company's V,,'jJham DalI}1TIple, However, MajuJ has taken sl1ch acc{)unts one state further and
exc1usiyely (Forrest, 1969) on these three studies, a genealogy of the Sulu royal famjly will now be
suggested. A more detailed account oft;t(; actions and careers of the various Sultans will be drawn
into the following analysis of the history ofSuJu from 1450 to the present day.
While the Sulu Chronolom
r
for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is beyond reasonable doubt
(any differences depend not on the lack of rellable information but on vanations in the
interpretation of history), the historical bases for the geneaiof,ry of the fifteenth
o
sixteenth, still
seventeenth is not and never will be, insulated from error. Oral inputs and the hand of
folklore can impede accuracy.
'TI1e royal tarsilas, as well as detailing genealogical accounts, also assert descent from Prophet
via the Sharif Abu Bah. The term Sharif according to some Muslims denotes descent from the
prophet Mohammed's grandson Hasan. The tarsilas, as \\'as earlier suggested, assert l1nks \\'ith the
r;c-bbT11i-.: toca! I',,:.-,t. COllnecnons are abo mad.e to the 0:;,U lamll1es. j
'\]ex3dJer the Great i::; common in the Malay 1:>'lt is riot IT. be Sulu Genealosy
(Mdj ue 1973).
Till' rlct Sultan, Suhan Shant (;\bu bakl) was succeedeu t_.: l; ';'<J.dln, !\.Fiiral ulnara,
rVluizzullVlutawadin_ NasirudiIL PanLriran Buddiman and Shah fallf!:ah. Shah Tanf!:ah \\'as succeeded
. . -
by Sultan Bongsu, his relative. Because the relationships between the first SuJtans is r;pen to
considerable doubt, it has been decided that this family tree \,ill err on the side of caution and 0nly
specify family rela:ioDships which are beyond reasonable doubt
[t should be noted the.: 1:\1 SuJtanate of Sulu was entwined with the neighbouring Su1tm1atc& ( [
Brunei andlv1aguindap;1(l Sultan Bulkeiah of Brunei is alleged to have married a daughtf'T oLth,
SuIu Sultan, while Sulta'J ?angiran Buddiman married a Brunei princess, Their daughter i
to have married Sul12tl of Brunei. Follo\\ing Brunei's relative demise at the hands of
aggression, The seventeenth century sa\\' closer links betv;een the Sulu Sultanate and the
Maguindanao Sultanate (the latter had after all only been founded in the early sixteenth century by
Sultan Kabungsuan ). Sultan Bongsu's daughter is believed to have married Sultan Qudarat of
,rv1aguindanao, It is with the reign of Sultan Bongsu (c,1610-c. 1649) that the follo\\ing family tree
begins,
I
Sultan BOllgsu(9) (c. 1610-c. 1649)
I
Pangiran Bakhtiar (l 0) .cc. 1649-c. 1685)
(\11) Sbafiudm (12)
N asirndiu ( 14 )
Baaarlldm r r 13 )
AlirrfUdill 1(15) Muazzidlrl (16)
Alimudin (20)
Harun aI-Rashid
Aliudln
r--:----
oadarudin IT (26)
Tambuyollg
Piandao Datu Ombra
Aliuciin (21)
lamalul Lram (23)
PulalLm h 4 )
I
.:amaiul AJdJ}1 ; \2::;.'
lamalul n(n)

iSharafuUin (l9)Alimudin n JJ7)
ShiliJlah (22) ,
Datu Janlalul KiTam
Dahl Atik
I
I
I
Julasp: Kiram (28) Esmilil Ponjongan
Napsu t>-lariam Rada Jabara
_e
n
\ -\it11ar (30)
1
Dewa Mahadi Harris F adzil it;,
The Family Tree of the Sulu Sultanate 1610-Present
Chapter Two
The Sulu Sultanate before the Arriyal of the Spaniards. 1450-1578
Sl1l::au Shaiif member of ]u1i3t Sj:stem (Cayo_ilgcat: '1-0), did Hiuen to
transform the dominions of Rajah Baginda into a fonnal political system. Sultan Sharif remodelled
the pohtical leadership of the islands along the lines of an Arab sultanate. He appointed wanrs and
panglimas, the former acting as ministers, the latter as judges or governors (Cayongcat 1986, 11)
He proclaimed himself as Sultan and claimed that Mohammed was his direct ancestor (GO\ving:
1964) Although he asserted his right to be seen as the absolute sovereibm and O\\ner of all lands, he
along strict A.rabian lines, but was tempered by existing political traditions (Saleeby J 908) This
fusion of new and old systems arguably made the more accountable than other Islamic
polities, \\-ith the Datu system pro\iding a considerable amount of accountability (see below).
Sultan Sharif utilised his knowledge of Islamic ju.isprudence to promulgate a code of laws- the
first of many Sulu Codes (see appendices). The laws were modified in accordance \\ith local
tradition (Saleeby 1908, 163). It \vas this consolidation of the forces of the state \vhich increased
SuIu's ref,rional influence (ibid.).
Thus by 1450 the Sultanate gad been established (Che Man 1990). Before the arrival of the
Spaniards, the Sulu Sultanate had become the --relatively largest, best organised and most powerful
political entity in the Philippines Islands" (Majul 1965, 229). Most of the islands surrounding Sulu
(or JoJo), including Basilan, were tributary to the Sultan of Sulu (ibid.). When the first Spaniards
arrived in 1521 under the stewardship of Magellan, "the power of Sulu was felt allover Luzon and
the ine S-;,<:i, NOlth Gomeo and the Chl'.a !-b .. aadc
to Chir,c. and Japan at the extreme, and to .Malacca, S.1i'1?tra o:r:d Java at other"
1908, 164). On a formal note, SuJu was an independent entity on the 3trival of the
Europeans (Low 1880) whier comprehended "a large part of the island of Borneo" as well as "part
al'c\Jwmg 10 BriT ish (l ; ':::, j j.
Sultan Sharif was succeeded by his son Sultan Kamaludin. Kamaludin was succeeded by Sultan
Alaudin (3), who was his brother according to the Sulu genealogy. The Sulu genealob'Y also
;sserted that he never becam::: 1. Alaudin was succeeded by SultaI: Amirul Umara (4). Not
mentioned in the Sulu genea!of,'Y or. i, Dab}1Uple's list, he has elsewhere been declared a brrandson
of Sultan Sharif (Majul 1973, 14,. )1 teresting!y he is believed to have been the same person as
Sultan Bulkeiah, the fifth Sultan of erunei who according to the Brunei Selesilah the
kingdom of Soolook and merle a E' Jendency of Selurong" (Low 1880). The conquering of Sulu
probably reters to a raid. The Sp1,-:'" also asserts that Sultan Bulkeiah married the daughter of the
Sulu Sultan - Laila Men Chanei.
The fifth Sultan was one Sultan .Muizzul Mutawadin (5). The Sulu genealogy refers to him as
Maharajah Upo, and state that he succeeded to the throne upon the death of Kamaludin (Saleeby
1908). This would perhaps lend credence to the view that Amirul Umara was from Brunei. The
sixth Sultan was, according to a number of tarsilas, Sultan Nasirudin I (6). However, neither
OalI}111ple nor the Sulu geneakgy mentioned him, and he could thus have been an usurper (Majul
I9T, ! The 5n
1
u genealogy states that Sultan Pangiran Buddiman !..!.!H'llim) (7)
succeeded to the sultanate upon the death of Sultan l'v1u'luul Mutawadi'in (Majul, 1973, ] 5). The
Maguindanao tarsilas claim that Panf,riran Buddiman was related to the Brunei royal family (Forrest
1969), while a Spanish source suggests that he was a Bornean who was married to the Sultan of
Brunei's sister (letter from Francisco de Sande to Liciendado Antolinez on 28.07. t578 in Ventura
del Arco, Doc1llJ1entos, Datos y Re/adoncs para la Historia de Filipinas, hasfa hom ineditos
fie/mente copiados de los originales exi.,,fenles en archivos y nibliOlccas. Vol. n in Majul 1973, 16).
Saleeby identified him as Rajah Iro, Pangiran of Brunei, who fought the Spanish when they
attacked Brunei in 1578 (Majul 1973, 15).
12
In June 1578, Rodriguez de Figueroa arrived in .1010 to collect tribute. Sultan Pangiran Buddiman
resisted but then surrendered twelve pearls and some gold (Biair and Robertson in .f\'lajul 1973,
112). Sulu at this point in time claimed sovereignty over the islands of Sulu, Tawi-Tav\i, Basilan
and Zambctinga and_ rv1indanao- The then turned their attention to-
Mindanao as being a vital prerequisite to their designs in the Moluccas. The Sultanates of the South,
feeling their trade, faith and independence under threat, began the ne:\.1: stage of the contlict by
launching an offensive against the Spanish. This offensive in the Visayas was initially lead by the
Maguindanaoans, but later on the early decades of the seventeenth century, the Sulu Sultan played a
leading role.
By this stage Sultan Pangiran Buddiman had died, and Sultan Shah Tangah (Pengiran Tingah)(8)
had assumed the mantel. His \vas contested by Alxlasaolan leading, allegedly, to the Sultan
seeking the support of the Spanish in 1608 after the Spaniards had raided Sulu in 1602. Sultan Shah
Tangah died in the conf1Jct with Abdasaolan and was succee.ded by his relative Sultan Mawallil
Wasit Bongsu (9) (Combos 1897). Sultan Bongsu had c10se connections with Brunei (Majul 1973,
123,1,
Sultan Bongsu pursued an aggressive policy towards the Spanish mounting raids in the Camarines
in 1616 and in 1627 (l\1ajul 1973. 123). These raids were not necessarily simply concerned \\ith
plunder. Arguably they were also aimed at procunng tribute, an act which challenged Spanish rule,
and therefore apolitical act rather than a piratical one. The second raid (lead by the Sultan himself)
elicited a finn response from the Spaniards. The Spaniards found Jolo to be a flourishing trading
community. The Spanjards prece.ded to bum and destroy the to\,\TI including the wealthy Chinese
quaner. rrlf' SL:t1F'l!]'': jJdhr:e,3no the principal n: ... J::.que were also burnt. The Spaniard,:; louted. q
quan>'.' <If gold, cloth and other merchandise (1\1aju! 1973, 127). The Sulus ') (HJ
1
lted a
raid in 1629 under Datu Ache. After a further Spanish raid in 1630, Sultan ;3ongsu of Sulu and
SuJtan Qudarat of Maguindanao made an alliance and launched a further attack in 1634. In 1635
.. -1UHJ W;;l.lS entered a QI;\\, phase v.-ben thc Sp:1nish l,mdeu a! L,.urJJUanga, \v,'lien ' . IS
at that tillie still tributary to Sulu, and built a fort. This marked a new phase in Spanish attempts to
impose their rule and their religion on the south. Spili"1ish outposts and missions were constructed in
Sulu
e
but they were soon abandoned.
It was in 1638 that the Spanish began in e2Ti \!st their attempt to colonise Sulu. Holed up in their
cotta in the hills, the Sulus held out r;:ven:l\\h they were ravaged by famine and disease (Majul
1973, 137). Such was the deternlination (If the Sulus to remain independent The
committed a number of massacres
c
nOlleast p _' the Budanuns after the Sultan
had fled to Tawi-Tawi (Majul 1973, 15T- The brutallty of the Spanish only seemed to serve to
strenbrthen the resolve of the Sulus who sought the help of the Dutch (J\1ajul 1973, I55) The Dutch
intervened on behalf of the Sulus, and in 1646 a peace treaty was signed behveen the Sulus and the
Spaniards.
The 1646 treaty proclaimed perpetual friendship betv;een the nations and provided for a defensive
and offensive ai1iance. The Sulus were to maintain jurisdiction O\'er Tawi-Tm\i and the
islands in between, while the Spaniard:; were to hme certain rights on some of the other islands
(Majul 19/:3, ! 56). Sl.!lt::!n Bongsu's sons were unwilling to accept the treaty, and of them
subsequently died in a battle \vith the Spaniards. In 1649, Bongsu turned power over to his son who
became Sultan Salahudin Karamat (Pangiran Bakhtiar) (10). During his rei!:,'TI
o
the Sulus were
particularly active at raiding (Saleeby 1908).
In 1662, the Spaniards were visited by the Chinese The Chinese demanded tribute (Majul) 1973,
1M}. Fearing an the Spaniards \\ithdrew most of their forces to Manila, allO\\ing the Sulus
to use the geopolitically provided space to raid the Visayas and attempt to reclaim Zamboanga. The
\\ithdrawal of the Spanish forces marked the beginning of an interlude in the Moro wars which
[4
lasted from the] 660s until 1718 when the Spaniards returned to Zamboanga. The first \\'ave of the
Moro wars had lasted almost a century and had begun \\ith Spanish aggression against the Borneans
before the Sultanates fought back from the last years of the six1:eenth century through the early
of .1.-". on1,. ..
u a .1)" H . .1.l tHo.- I...-'l-"-",-U LV UU'\U.LI\..- ..... \...fltv,"- UIo."..-.LX.t\" 'fJ'trU .
concerns forced their retreat.
The period of interlude in the 1vforo\vars \>'ith the Spaniards began v .. ith Basilan reverting to being
tributary to Sulu. It was a period when the Sultanates consolidated their political power and
advanced their commercial activities. Sultan Bakhtiar of Su1u, for example, \\-Tote to the Dutch
monopoly over trade to the south of Sulu (Majul ] 973, ] 71-172). This interlude of relative peace
did not. however, ex1:cll.d to BruneL
the Dutch. This Chapter Four
Bow the Sultan ofSulu acquired North Borneo, 1662-c. 1675
Events in Brunei in the latter half of the seventeent.i} century have had important ramifications for
the history of Sulu. The Dutch had succeeded in eroding Brunei's economic power. The level of
tributes collected internally by the Su1tan had been increased, which had seemingly provoked
internal dissent (Majul 1973). In 1662, the Bendahara Abdul Mubin and his followers killed
Muhammed Ali, the twelfth Sultan ofBTUJlei, following the death of one of the Bendahara's sons at
the hands of the Sultan.. The teud split the ruling family (the Bendahara ,vas the deceased Sultan of
Bnmej's nephew) and provoked a civil war wt.ich lasted For OVLf fen he Br:lldahara Abdui
was proclaimed as the new Suh;m of Brunei. He ll,-<med a c-Ousln, P:mf:;ran Bongsu, as
l:3endahara. Pangiran Bongsu denounced Abdul Mubin as a usurper and was proclaimed Sultan
ly1uaddin_ During the ensuing contlict, Sultan Muaddin \vas based in Brunei ,,,,,hile AMul Mubin
'JCCUpied Pulao Lbenn;n close to the mOuth the riverat Bfunei (lvlajuJ i 973, 71.;
T'he Brunei Selesilah (history) recounted by Low expJains that Sultan Mnaddin sent a letter to the
Batara (Sultan) of Sulu" in which he requested military assistance and promised that '''from the
Nortb far west as Kimani" would belong to Sulu (Low 1880, 17). The of Brunei was
under ,:( '1Siderable pressure to resolve the contlict as there was famine in Brut. e .1.nd trading boats
'.vereh;-i 19 blocked by those holding Pu1ao Chennin (Low 1880). Moreover, 11 -'; Su1tan of Brunei,
while (;t,l exercising SDvereib'llty over the lands to the \Vest, had seen influf:' ,e \vane in shat its
today 31bah (North Borneo). Sulu s political and economic power was on tt '': other hand, in the
{lSc ... r:;.lancy(MajuI1973, 181)_
The Sultan of Sulu \vent to Brunei with five boats. He \vas obliged to stop first at Pulao Chem1in
(by virtue of its location) before probYfessing to Brunei itself on the prctexi of brokering a peace
deal. Once there, the Su1tan of Su]u met \V-ith Sultan Muaddin, whereupon they attacked Pulao
Chermin defeated their opponents and killed Abdul Mubin_ The Sultan of Brunei returned
home \vith a number of captives" while the Sultan of Sulu set sail for Sulu with captives and
rDlml1ions (Low 1880).
There is one Brunei source which asserts that the Sulus played a less active role in the fighting, but
there are also Sulu accounts alleging that the people of Brunei watched while they defeated
Mubin on their own (1\ifajul 1973, 178-179). Vlhatever the real story, and Low"s account of a joint
attack is most probably true_ the rulers of Brunei did not subsequently question Sulu's sovereignty
oyer North Borneo. Su1u soon set about affiTI11ing its political pov,-er in North Borneo, a process that
in all probability had begun before the cession_ The Tiruns were particularly resistant to Sulu rule.
Sultan Badarudin T had to pacif}' them, and married a daughter of one of the leading Tirun families
(I\.1ajuI1973.182).
15
The cession extended from Keemanees northv .. ard and included the islands of Palawan. Ban!uev
.
and Ba]ambangan (H 102-36)_ Some debate surrounds the date of the cession of North Borneo to
<: 1 The> Q"-;+,-,,.., "'l"""'." .... rlA,..l:'"l .... ........ plo .. p,,+,-__ ... + 1'7(\,1 ' ..'7 ....
0t!. '!l.. UV.LJL iLVi! LU .......n.u.uu'"-'l 0U-11.)' 11l - "'"" UlJ to'"" uul-v Ut UVVU-l 1 J v-r \LJa 1) H.t}fic;, \ ... l C;:U lIJ lVla.j Ul l"7
18I). However, Majul argues that the date was most likely 1675. He cites the Sejarah Benmai's
reference to the Brunei civil war lasted for ten years according to the Brunei Selesilah. Finally the
Pangiran Bongsu may have waited for n\'o ye.ars before resisting (Majul 1973, J 83). A Spanish
report indicates that Sultan Muaddin died in J 690, and Sultan Jamalul Alam ""Tote a letter on the
17
th
of September 1879 claiming that "from the year 1105 Hegira (1693) during the rei gn of the late
tribute'" (Montero y Vidal 1882 cited in Majul 1973, 184)_ Thus the date of the cession l'-an be
;'estricted to the period between 1672 and] 693. Majul proffers a slight iltconsistency in that Jamalul
Alam implied that the cession took place in the reign of Sultan Sahabudin, and yet l\1ajul elsewhere
alleges that that Sultan's rei
b
'11 began in 1685_ This inconsistency could however be due to a delay
between the date of the cession and the initiation of tribute payments to the Sultan of Sulu, leaving
Majurs date of 1675 as the most reasonable estimate.
Chapter five
The Ascendancy of Sulu, 1675-1842
SuJtan Bakhtiar is believed to have been succeeded by Sultan Shahabudin (11) in 1685 (Saleeby
1908) In this case the Brunei cession of North Borneo would have occurred in the reign of the
fOffiter. jose lviomero 'Y' Vidars 3CCC-uUC, H1SfO!'la La Firaten(J A1a{a..vo-A-lahomefana tOn
A1indan(Jo, Jo!o " f:Jomeo, includes a reference to Shah3bud.n c.ollecting trIbute from NOltt BJrne:)
-
from as early as 1693 (J\-1ajul 1973,20). He reigned from c. 1685-1710 and is said to have-'ceded"
to the Spanish (ibid} Shahabudin was succeeded by his brother became Sultan
(i2) .. abdicated mfavour of his brother '.vile becameSuftao'lsadarudin I
Sultan Badarudln whose mother was a Tirun, and who married a Tirun, spent a considerable amount
of time subjugating the Tiruns of North Borneo (Majul 1973, 188)_ The Tiruns were seemingly the
most reluctant people in North Borneo to submit to the Sulu yoke, and periodically rebel1ed.
Similarities, or rather continuities, could be drawD'oet ."en the reign of Badarudin 1 and that of
Alimudin L Nor only were they both inYolv;::d,.r:in s'lppressing the Timns, they also both
endeavoured to centralise the political to make the Sulu polity conform
to a greater extent \vith the more traditional fOTIas-of' s'amic governance favoured in the Middle
East The Sulu system had thus far embodied a sit,'TIiflCu.nt degree of devolution of powers amongst
the Datus and appointees of the Sultanate_
Sultan Badarudin was succeeded by Sultan Nasirudin II (14). He was a son or a grandson of
Shahabudin via a daughter and was knO\\"'!1 by the Spaniards as Datu Sabdula_ He chal1enged the
rule of torcing him into exile in 1732, whereupon Nasirudin became Sultan. Another
account has it that Sultan Badarudin was happy to scrrender his position ifhis grand nephew proved
himself to be an accomplished combatant Nasirudin failed in an attempt in 1734 to capture Taytay
fort (MajuJ 1973, 195) precipitated a certain unease \\ith Sultan Nasimdin II amongst th2
Datus. In 1735, Sultan Badarudin rs son was proclaimed as Sultan Alimudin I (15) and Nasirudin
left for Mamboing (De La Costa 1965} The new Sultan did not however take office in Jol0 until the
following year (Majul 1973, 198)_ Sultan Alimudin 1's reign is the first about which a significant
amount is knO\\l1_ Apart from his close relationship with the Spaniards, Alimudin r \vas knO\\l1 to
William Dalrymple of the East India Company.
Imprisoned in Manila and baptised a Christian, Alimudin, perhaps more than most, was prey to the
contradictions that have c.onfronted the Sulu Sultans through the centuries_ Such contradictions
include that bet,veen the Sultan's attempts to centralise political power and the opposition of the
Datus to such the continuing efforts of the Spanish to colonise Sulu and Sulu's
and the persistent attempts of the Iberian Europeans to Christi anise the Moros despite entrenched
(,pp0siti00 Gvlajul 2C}).
Early in Alimudin's the 1737 peace treaty was signed with the Spaniards. The very fact that
the Spaniards entered into such a treaty showed that they yjewed SuIu as an independent state.
Ha\lng made peace v.ith the Spaniards
o
the Sultan was free to follow up the efforts of his father in
pacifYing the Tirun territories I, and in particular the area bet\veen Sibuko River and Tapeadurian
, {--'.f.- ".0,-':1 '")()(\>, ;. ... __ r:.J-"'" rr:_p _,." -f"-----:;t.:--...l .... ... + ............ n"h....,....;+ +--c: -t1.,...;">o 0 __ ,...1
.:..J __ "t'. :"_ 1-.l'._LLh .... i. lj!E .. , .LI_l!Fi ....... I1,JH,i< .. .. d.". .. .,:.., ". ,'";U!,..-"d I,.'\'j:\.. .... ,i./.tit.1 ...
Panglimas of the Sultan who resided amongst them (Majul 1973,201). In accordance \\-;th the 1737
lIeaty, Spain supplied a number of troops for the expedition \vhich H.:;ulted in the Tirun chiefs
reaffirming their allegiance to the sovereignty of the Sulu Sultan (Legajo 707, Archivo General De
Indias, Sevilla, cited in Majul, 1973,202).
Alimudin clearly attempted to use the Spaniards to secure his own posltlOn from rivals and
rebellious subjects. Spanish support for the Tirun sorties resulted in the foundation of a Jesuit
mission in SuI u (Barrantes 1878 inMaj ul ] 973, 204). Despite, or more likely because of his
relations \\ith the Spaniards, Alimudin's opponents multiplied. Amongst them ,vas his brother Datu
Bantilan. Other Datus \"lere also opposed to Alimudin, partly on account of his attempts to
centralise power. Ahmudin is alleged to have ignored the decision-making power of the Datus
(11aju11973,214).
AI1TIlUdm's response tC' hi::; domestic problems tc set forth tor M-aniia to procure rurtt-;::;;
Spanish support ('\1,;>j
1
11 1973, 214). Although Alimudin slJ[vived an assassination on his
way out of Sulu, fie was soon succeeded by his brother Bantilan who took the title of Sultan
Muizzidin (16) (M!liul 1973,216) Alimudin was imprisoned by Sl,Janish and did not return to Sulu
iintiJl !64.
Relations deteriorated with the Spaniards. The Sulus increased their raids while the Spanish
a bellicose stance and seemed quite uninteT"p<;ted in peace. Jolo was bombarded in 1751
and demands were Liade of the Sulus by the Spanlm (l\1ajul 1973, 224-225). Spain was once
again eager to subjugate the Sulus, whose power was ;[1;.1;., 'ively high at this juncture, especially in
relation to the Bruneis whose power had been wa'ling Ju ;ome time (Majul 1973, 237). A further
bombardment of .1010 occurred in 1752, prompting .( unter raids. The Spanish governor of
Zamboanga at this time (PulgaT) killed a number of C1 i',ese meTchants las well as bombing 1010
and destro)ing Su1u plantations (lv1ajul 1973,245).
Unlike his brother whose attempts to centralise the decision-making process had incurred the wrath
of the Datus. Sultan 1'.1uizzidin consulted closely with the chief Datus over an major decisions
(Majul 1973, 249). The Ruma Bichara, made up of the roya1 Datus, was the highest state council
(ibid.)- The chie/Datu.'; all had (J Slake in S1I11I's trading SIlN:ess (<;e(' Kiefer 1972 and 1965),
and h)' extension in a strong state apparatus which ullolred((n' the Ruma Bichara were allocated (l
unique collection <ifi1e la_yes and d s to which the i.'zell/hers of the Ruma Bichara were allocated a
share 1.Majul, 1973,249).
The Dutch monopoly in the Indonesian islands to the South restricted Sulu's trading. It seems that
Sulu's major commercial interest at the time was with China ('Varren 1981). The
intensification of trade with the Chinese in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries has
been attributed to the Chinese desire to purchase the goods of North Borneo (Majul 1973,
250) Thus Borneo they resumed regular trips to Jolo (ibid.) The Timn areas of North Borneo were
1 I It is worth noting that the Tiruns are called the Orang T edong in accounts such as De La Costa's (1965).
17
said to be particularly rich (ibid.). Sulu's trading, relations with the Dutch and .the British were
conducted for political motives as much as for commercial motives. Sultan Badarudin I's
reestablishment of diplomatic relations with the Chinese court, and the sending of tribute were
actions as-c.ribed for motives CrvfajuJ 1073-: 251 AJiuTudin I, scnt at least t\\-O
embassies to China, while Muizzidin sent a number (1v1ajul 1973, 251). The Chinese, apart fTOm
engaging in mutuallv beneficial trade with the STIlus, attending the Ruma Bichara' s meetings on
-- - - -' / '-' '-"
trade policy, 'tribute' and returning hrifts (which exceeded the value of the tribute) had this policy,
had to say about the STIlus, "The Sulu people belong to the Malay race. They \-'{ere good fighters:
brave and cruel. \\'hen Spain conquered Luzon, she tried her best to make Sulu one of her
... 1.." .. (".'" .. .
... ')'(h .-'tlfU I_J'JJ-,t;. C 'c I ..... t'l_.'J...'; I.t\ .. "_"',:.HJt'-,.-.J '-'"(" ..
defeated" (Ching annals in 1-1ajul 1973,25 I).
T71e Arrival of the British
.'
The grO\vlng role of the British in the region from the mid-eighteenth century wasultimateI:y to
have profound consequence for Sulu. In the early stages of their relationship, the Sulus regarded
the British as useful potential allies against the Spaniards and of the Sulu Sultanate in North Borneo
(MajuJ 1973). The latter were threatening the possession British were aILxious to establish a trading
post in the region that could serve as a hnk benveen India and Canton. Sulu and North Borneo (as
well as much of Mindanao) \",ere the only places in the region which maintained their
independence, and therefore provided an acceptable location for a British settlement It \vas v,ith
such an eventuality in mind that the treaty of January 28 1761 'was signed. The treaty was for the
purposes of friendship and commerce. A piece of land was to be supplied for the establishment of a
tacrory, and a defensive allIance was !alu out (see appendice:, )(!>.lajul 12Y / J, L)5j In September
1762, the island of B2hm
i
bangan was ceded to the British (Majul 1973, 254). In the fono'}.
the British seized Manila from the Spaniards, and subsequently entered into negotiatiolls
\vith the fonner Sultan 2NB. The tenn Sulu is used to refer to the state of SuJu, the archipelago and
tLe island. .1010 is the town and port en the island or Suiu. Hu" .. 'e\el. the krm JGL,
sometimes refers to the island of SuIu.
Alimudin to the effect that they would return him to Jo]o in return for his co-operation. A treaty
was declared between the British and Alimudin in January : 763 to such an effect (Majul 1973
256) By June 1763 Sultan Muizzidin had died and had been rer1aced by one of lus sons, \vho had
been proclaimed Sultan Alimndin n (17). The latter rejected Dutch advances, confirmed the
Balambangan cession (Balanibangan had been occupied in Ja'nary 1763 by Dalrymple - H 102),
and "ii-lade adoration' of southern Palawan and Nmth B"cT,eo" (Home Miscellaneous Series,
Volume 1 02, No.3, folios 49-50, lOR, in MajuJ 1973, 25
7
).
The following year in June, Sultan Alimudin (now baptised) was welcomed back and reinstated as
Sultan (Majul 1973,258). Contronted with debts owing to the East India Company, the Sultan then
ceded to that company his North Borneo territories from Kimanis to Towson Abai, although one of
the Sultan's sons was to be governor of the province, and rather than being a cession in the Western
legal sense, the cession was probably only meant as the grdnting, ofa trade monopoly (Majul 1973,
259). The whole of Palawan \vas allegedly included in this 'cession' (ibid.). The treaty of 9th
, ' -
September 1763 between :n:d th'? British only included the Southern part of Palawan,
North Borneo and the intermediate islands to the East India Company (li'102:37). On September
28th, a further, and sl1ghtly more elaborate commerce and friendship treaty was signed (H 102) It
seems that the East India Company was still owed a substantial sum by Sulu. One further treaty
between the British and Alimudin followed in 1769 when the Sultan confirn1ed his sale ofPalawan
and North Borneo to the British (H 102).
The comparison bet\\'een the 'cessions' of the 1760s and the lease of 1878 is interesting. Why were
the British happy to aHm,v a 17605 treaty to lapse unchallenged, and even go as far as to
18
acknmvledge that the Sultan after the 17605 once again "exercised control over the Northern part of
the island;! of Borneo (Colonial Report 1963) when the 1878 lease was pursued so vigorously? The
answer is clear economically and in terms of real pol1tics, but not so clear legally A similar lease
'C,!cr - Bomc-O \vas acquircd- b)- the /\.fficnCau- Trading -in ! .e65
1
(co'venng less
territoT);) but, like the treaties of the 1760s, was allo\yed to lapse (Irwin).
Sultan Alimudin I had coined money with the aim of establishing a tmifonn currency under state
supervision (De 1a Costa 1965,98). He had moreover begun the codification of the laws of Sulu -
Koranjc as w-ell as custom aT)' (Ibid.). He had made et-forts to fonn a state army (ibid.). He had
r0t" .....-k-1- ...... ..... ,.,;+h +t.., .... (,J_.oI'"'\ ........ ] ....... .f.-..,-.,.. - ...... ...... .......... 1I'\.1"+-h ..-}:!"", .......... ..... r- ....... ...... ...;+l....; __ :00 .. , ... 1-..: .... 1- ""- ..... , ..... .......
: i":. .:0"'ii":;.::,.; .... .. l;.. .1J.'!.) .......Y'\..;1 11 "t-U .. ('"(I' 'U'...r' ' .. '*:J'- -, . .7i.'-_ ." t" ..... ',o ... :!) 1. '<'\',,,"' ' ... bl. ,;J,1 "-'-,-i. J _",- 1 i:;' 1...':' :', , " "l,t. .. :. '-." '.!" t;"!-\. l i
Sultanate furt.her. His accommodation of Christia\ missionaries, as \\'ell as the centralising drives
which threakllc-d the Datus' traditional pO\vers precipitate<1 the chain of events WfuLh led to his
lengthy stay in Manila and the consequent abundance of primary material concerning the Sultan
who was baptised as Fernando L
Sultan Ahmudin I handed over his pO\vers to his son who was fonnan} proclaimed Sultan in early
1774. His rei!:,'11al title was Sultan Muhammed Israil(I8). Under his rule, there appears to have
been a pro-Spanish and a pro-British wing amongst the Datus (Majul 1973, 260). "Having been
educated in 11anila, the Sultan was s)lnpathetic towards the Spaniards, a belief compounded \yhen
one of his cousins, Datu Teteng, looted and burned the British settlement on Balambangan (Majul
1973, 262). Scores of British traders fled from 1010 leaving warehouses fmed \"ith merchandise
which were subsequently distributed among members of the Ruma Bichara and other Datus (ibid.).
S;.man 1sra11" <lied in 1718. He IS to b,f\'e breil pOIsoned - p.:::rhaps because of \vnat \VaS
sr'.:n as excessive compliancev/1,h Spanish \vishes - by his cousin Alimudi.n II, who became Sultan
tor the second time. During his reign, it is said that hostilities with Spain increased (Saleeby 1908).
In 179l, lie \'vas succeeded by his cousin who became Sultan (19) It was under the
(ells"1; )1 the latter that battles OC':PLICU bciwt:eh (he Bruneis and the SulUS Til;;:: sought TO
reclaim by force the Sulu Sultan's North Borneo possessions (Majul 1973, 265). Despite Brunei's
pretensions, the Sulus clearJy had control over their Borneo territories.
On the domestic political front, Sharafudin's old a-e had 1 a power struggle for the
'lccession with the British and the Spanish each favouring their OWTI-.c.:.lJhdates (Majul 19/3,265).
;harafudin died in 1808 and 'vas succeeded by his son who took the ) \al title, Sultan Alirnudin
'n (20) betore succumbing to smallpox (Majul 1973, 266). Alimudin younger brother became
the Sultan Aliudin(21), surviving bids for his position from Da'.u Bar;j' an, the son of Alimudin 1]
(Majul 1973, 266). The latter had apparently been the RajalJ tl,ih.;...la, but had fled during the
smallpox epidemic facilitating the accession of his cousin.
Sultan Alludin was alleged to have been sYlnpathetic to neither of the European powers. However,
he \vas concerned with commerce, and shared customs duties with his associate Datus (Maj ul 1973,
266). In 1821, or perhaps 1822, Aliudin was succeeded by his brother who became Sultan
ShakiruUah (22). Believed to have been very orthodox and a promoter of the ulama, Shakirul1ah
died in 1823, \vhereupon his nephev\, a son of /\Jimudin TIl, becanle Sultan Jamalul Kiram I (23)
(1v1ajul 1973, 267).
In 1836, a treaty \vas signed between Jamalul Kiram 1 and the Spaniards \vhich affirn1ed friendship
and provided for commerce and alliance (see appendices). Attempts were also to be made to
combat piracy as although the characterisation of the Sulus as pirates on an official level is
unqualified, unsanctioned episodes of piracy did persist, particularly those committed by the SamaJs
and the Jranuns. Tn the J 8405 the Spanish took direct action against the Samals on Balingingi. Seven
Samal villages v.'ere razed, one hundred and fifty boats were destroyed and silk, brocade, -old and
silver were looted (Admiralty Records, No. 133, p. 106). Piracy in the follow-jng twelve months
\vas dramatically reduced. Arguably, the Spanish attack on the Samals, by reduClng. the power of
the Samals, rendered the Sulu Sultanate a service as the Samats \"ere of an independent mindset
T ... 18'1'1 th,., <'::"lU \: .. J+,.,,.., r.c><l"h",":! "n oo"""'''''n''''''''+ ur;l1
cs
+J.." i ____ _
'.(s"':t .1' U_'-' u".,-s: . __ ..... 0\.4.t.l _\",,'U,--lj\"-u"(A.i aSI""'\"'- LJ\.;lll \"\/11 '-..-l.lUI.J ........ (U"-_ LiVlli !.l{\,.. l...-.flfi"'CU -Jta.I,.":';
appendices). However, it was the intentions of the Spanish \"hieh, unsurprisingly, were to have the
!!reatest sif..'11ificance for the Sulus in the comiml decades as they looked to consolidate their
- _. ........_"
political and commercial position in the region.
',' .. :. ,-- :1' Six
Independence under Threat, Sulo 1842-1&99
In 1842, Jamalul Kiram died and was succeeded by his son Muhammed Fad] who was \Videly
knm:m as SultanPulaJun (24). In ] 844, the French secured the cessjon of Basilan \>,'hieh was never
implemented. The increasing engagement of otber European pt1\\'ers in the SuJu area \vould have
serve-d to convince the Spanish of the urgency of their need to secure their Southern frontiers
The greatest provocation was provided by the Treaty concluded between James Brooke of Britain
and the Sultan PuJa1uf} in 1849 (see ,1ppendices)_ Amongst artic1es were a cornmitment to reduce
piracy and to engage in intensified le\-els of trade. The Spanish concerned by this treaty, as well as
by recent French and Dutch manoeuvres, initiated a new military campaign against Sutu in 1851,
Spanish troops landed at lola on February 2ih, 1851 1973, 286). lola ,vas destroyed yet
ag.:.iIL In SUDSi;:'-IDCrH treaTY (see appendices), tIle Sulus w fly 1-J,e spamsl' flag., suppress
j-1iracy (something they -were barely able to do), anO\;( the Spanish a trair'lllg post and sma1)
at Jo10, and not to sign any treaties with foreign powers. The Sulus perceived the Ireaty as being
primarily one of friendshin, while the Spanish saw it as signif}ring: Sulu's incorporOltion within thE'
'::;PdJlish II1011aH.:hy (Ivi::lJu: !::i73, 266)
Although SuJu retained its independence, Basilan moved to accept Spanish soveceignty (Majul
1973,288). In 1860, Spain established a politico-military government in six F;ve of these
were in Mindancl.I and the si);.111 was BastIan (MajuI 1973,288). The fact that Sulu wasn,-,1 .nduded
was a tacit reGogri! on on the part of the Europeans that Su1u retained its independence..
In 1862, Sultan PI iLiun died_ He had been regarded as an able and just administrator (Sated}' 1908,
218), who like 'b':; father had published a re\ised code of Sulu laws. The land over "'hie', 'Ie ruled
had been desGLed by a British \isitor in J 848 as being well populated and ..;omposed
primarily of fishennen and Crunese that the island was highly cultivated and had an
abundance of cattle (Saleeby J 908, 201). PuJaJun was replaced by his son who became Sultan
Jamalul Alam (25). His claim was contested by Datu Daniel who \\ished the ;;ultanate to be
bestowed upon a descendant of Sultan Shakirullah (1v1ajul 1973, 289). Jamalul Alam, although he
began his reign \\iL.1 opponents, gained the respect of many not least the ulama and the Budanuns
\\ith whom it is said he discussed important decisions (1\-1ajul 1973,292). hrnalu! Alam carried out
a number of public \\orks. He built roads. bridges and mosques, and allegedly c\:ec:Jted the laws
\\ith justice and force (Saleeby 1908.219). He published 2, '2cvi,:, of !?'.\'S \\-hleh was reputed to be
milder than that of his predecessors \Sa1eeby 1908,232). Howeyer the contemporary geopolitical
contex1: lead to an erosion of his power and that of his nation.
Realising that the Sulus remained independent, the Spanish launched another assault on the
embattled nation in 1876. By this stage, the Spanish had steam \var vessels. For Saleeby, just as he
argues that the introduction of fireamls provoked its rise to power in the fifteenth century (Saleeby
1908, 221). The February 1876 bombardment forced the Sultan to retreat to Bud \>,,'hile some
Sulus resorted to guerrilla tactics and to ajuramentado (religious fighting) (Majul 1973, 293). This
war of attrition and repression continued officially until July 1878 when the Sultan entered into a
peace agreement with the Spaniards_ Not only had the protocol of 1877 between Britain, Spain and
Germany (see appendices) been signed during this time, but the North Borneo territories of the
Su1ta1Iate had le3Sed to-the British NoFtl:-Bameo Camp:!}), on 22
nd
af January 1878. .
Under attack from and occupied by the Spaniards, and 'with the Dutch encroaching into his Bornean
lands, the Sultan gave BaTOn Overbeck a lease over his North Borneo territories absolute
power of life and death of the inhabitants of the country \'vith all the absolute rights of property over
the soD of the country" (see appendices)_ Overbeck manipulated the situation to his benefit by
S'J.ltanthat ><theSpanish . Go'-,err..o!" Ge!le:::'.l "to" de::trDY
everything of the SuIus, and that the Brunei Sultan and his men were ready to occupy Sandakan
v"ithout the Sulu Sultan having the power to prevent it" (Fa 572/7)_ Such observations by the
Sultan indicate a certain amount of duress. In a letter to Treacher (Governor of the island of
Labuan), JamaluJ Alam wTote the follovving:
"I have made Baron Overbeck Datu Bendahara at his request, although he is a white man_ And
hereby acknowledges himself as one of my subjects. Now, to my surprise, he makes out vice versa
that the Sulus are his subjects, and he has thrO'i\'D ayvay my flag_ This was not so provided in the
agreement that he shou1d hoist a flag for himself and thTO\\- away mine"" (FO 572,7)
He claimed not to have sold the land but to have farmed it out (ibid_)_ The term pajak" rather than
meaning sale, as it had been interpreted by the British, actually means lease or even "'the right to
exploit the land and monopolise the sale of its assets"_ The latter is the interpretation of the Bruneis_
- A ietter of Rajah B"OO!iC'S actuany Bleans mOHuputy of trade_
Although their tuture policy of annexing North Borneo was to contravene the nature of the
argument, it seems that the British fully recognised that no transfer of sovereignty had actually
L ,. , or fr "h' I G . -1" "'0 0" l' . ' J' . 4- ".. t 1-
.. ';"'Cfl plac..:: l.i u ,..:oi..cr lOUt .wan . lahVl let l e U)rldlH.l, Vv1I.dc':1i iiI !(;spor.se lC j-,)U ("."
concerns about British manoeuvrings, the former stated that the "British Government assumes no
sovereign rights whatever in Borneo" (philippine Claim to Sabah II, 40). The issue of North Borneo
and its illegal transfer out of SuJu's sovereignty by the British \\'i11 be dealt w"ith in much more
detail in the forthcoming paper, W71JI :Sabah belong.' to 5'1I1u_
l\s for the Sulu treaty with Spain (see appendices.), t le Sulus retained a great deal of autonomy in
terms of internal administration as welI as control. Vier the collection of duties in those ports which
were not occupied by the Spaniards_ Some pointsn Sulu ,vere to be occupied by the Spaniards and
the Sulu Sultan was to bind his subjects to oh;\' (he Spanish king. (Hamn aT-Rashid apparently
played a key role in persuading Jamalul Alam to accept the terms of the treaty.) Considerable
differences exist between the Spanish and Sulu translations of the treaty. The Sulus declared that
they \vould obey the Spanish king, and admitted that the Spanish could choose to occupy any place
along the north CDast of Sulu island. However they maintained that the same tenns did not apply to
the south coast except for in a contcx.i of an external threat (Saleeby 1908). Moreover, the Salus
would retain the right to trade and to pract:i::e thei[ religion and customs. They also absolved
themselves of responsibility for the ,\e1fare of catholic priests (Saleeby 1908)_ Fo[eih'1l relatIOns
were to be the preserve of the Spanish_ Thus the treaty could be seen as a protectorate
but certainly not as a surrender of sovereignty on the part of the Sulus_ Indeed, the 1885 protocol
stated that, "the internal administration of SuJu, its customs, Jaws and religion \vere fully respected
and were not subject to Spanish administration, confirmation, approval or interference of any sort,
except in matters pertaining to regulation for the use of firearms" (1885 protocol, Saleeby's
version)_
This is a vital point as it is this treaty being the last signed with the British, defined the political
status of Sulu at the time of the Spanish surrender to the United States in 1899 under the Treaty of
Paris. From the vantage point that the Sulus retained their sovereib'TIty at this point, there is no legal
basis for Americ.an sovereignty over Sulu and their presence in Sulu from] 899 can be seen as Act
of Aggression. The substantial resistance of the Sulus in the first fifteen years of the twentieth
... .. .. +1..c C.,l
U
... .. "n .. .
... \",,-1 \"v tV \.til'U:\"_LU1J\,;. 'lI10t Ul Vi Jt.ll Hau llUl (iv\,..-\....pn ... u .,:-l._iJJ J Q..1J J Ie" Vi 'Lll\", vUlt1'
hand., some see the treaty as signifying the end of the Sulus' four hundred and hventy-six year
independence.
The British continued in 1880 to speak of Sulu's Bomean possessions (FO 57217), no doubt because
it slllted its strategy at that point to portray Slllu as independent Once Spain had acknowledged
longer politic for the British to query Spain's rights within the Sulu archipelago. The juramentados
and other forms of resistance persisted in Sulu, although the SultaIt I..i ied to discourage such actions
(NfajuI 1973, 301). In February ] 881, some Sulus tried to storm the gates of 1010 (ibid} Less than
two months later lamalul Alam died. Disaf,'Teement over the succession had already arisen, and the
competing factions - that supporting Jamalul Alam's eldest son Badarudin (later Badarudin II) and
that lead by Jamalul AIam's second wife lnchi Jamila, and supporting Amirul Kiram (later Sultan
.Tamalul Kiram If). The succession disputes of the 1880s and 18905 precipitated civil wars which
further weakened the Sultanate and drained its tinancial resources. The first and more peaceable
dispute was settled in 1881 when the Datns and the Budanun chiefs backed the nineteen year old
Badarudin \-vho thereby became Sultan Badarudin II (26).
Badarudin spent much of his rein on pilgrimage to Mecca. Povler \vas delegated to lnchi Jamila and
Datu AJiudin in his absence. On his return, he attempte.d to set up a police force. He had also
folioWe<1 e'arli(;;rin-h.is reign \\'hcn h-: pilmshed a number of the perpetTator:.; ()fthe'
Apri11881 on 1010. Thes(: punishment raid<:, carried out in Luuk and Tag}:ib-i, provided a
futllfe sOllfce ot contention betv{een some Datus and the Sultan's family (Majul 1973, 302). The
. Spanish, without the permission of the Sultan, established a naval station at Bongao (ibid.)_ The fact
that such a tile",:: was nor cha]lellged is testirTlony 1O the change in power (eiatlons thatl,id
in the latter half of the nineteenth century in Sulu_ Sultan Badarudin II die.d on February 22nd 1884
(Saleeby 1908, 236-237). There followed one of the \vorst - perhaps the worst - case of civil \var. in
the history of the Sulu nation. The Spanish were from neutral in this war, proclaiming Hamn ar-
Rashid as Sultan and imposing him on the SLi
1
'l people against their \-\'ill in what could be
interpreted as the deployment of divide and rule.
Follo\\ing Badarudin II's death, there were rhreeCJl.lpeting claimants to the Sultanate. The tree
claimants, A.miruI Kiram, Dam ilJiudin and DaD, '{arun ar-Rashid were descendants of Sultan
.Tamalul Kiram 1, Sultan Shakirullah and Suitor: 'l..llmudin I respectively. Just one \veek after the
death of the previous Sultan, Inchi Jamila succeeded in having the majority of the members of the
Ruma Bichara elect Amirul Kiram as Sultan. However, three days later SharifUsman and Panglima
Damang of Parang convened a meeting attended by the chiefs of Parang, Luuk, Lati and Tandu at
\vhich Datu Aliudin was elected Sultan (Jv1ajul 1973,303). The North of Sulu island tended to be in
support of Aliudin whj1e the southern part, centred on Maimbung, supported Amiml Kiram (ibid.).
Most Datus were in the latter's camp.
Aliudin \\as eventG'111y !CTfd to flee to Basilan \\'hen Amiml Kiram's forces destroyed his
cotta. Concerned by Am-iml Kjram's independent TT1indedness Crv1ajul 1973, 305), the Spaniards
conspired to place the more compliant royal Datu, Harun ar-Rashid, in high office event though
Amirul Kiram had the support of most of the Datus and most of the Sulu people (Maju11973, 305).
The Spanish suggested that Amirul Kiram should be Sultan \\ith Harun as regent. They also urged
Aminl1 KiIaTI1 and Harun ar-Rashid to come to Manila to be proclaimed Sultan and regent and to
pledge their loyalty to Spain (ibid.). Amirul was unable to tum to the British because of the changed
geopolitical conte)"1: (see above). The 1885 protocol between Spain, Germany and Britain (see
appendices) had allowed the British and the Spanish to put paid to the antagonism when Britain
recof,'Tlised Spanish sovereIgnty in Sulu in exchange for Spanish renunciatlOTI of their claims to
North Borneo (see appendices). The British expressed no interest in supponing Amim! Kiram (Fa
572114). Thus isolated by the resolution of intra-european hostilities, and uD\\illmg to travel to
;\-as pG\vcrlc33 tc . prevent the S}klnish frem -H3nm on
September 1886, and having him escorted to Sulu the f()lIowing .Month (lv1ajul 1973.3(6)
With military assistance, Sultan Harun carne ashore and attacked his opponents. Mannbung, seat of
lvniruJ Kiram, was attacked in a land-sea operation orchestrated by Hamn and the Spanish
Governor. of Sulu. Despite his superior military power, Hamn never succeeded in paciD:ing his
siege and that no European ventured to go outside the walls of the town (Fa 572!?5). Meanwhile
the Sultan of Brunei had issued a claim that Palawan, Balabak and Kagavan de SLi}.1 belonged to
. _ J _
him. In response the Spanish claimed that these islands belonged to them. The Sulus \vere in no
position to press their claim (Majul 1973, 308).
His situation untenable, Harun finally left for Palawan on the 16th of December 1893. By early
1894, the Spanish had recognised that Amirul Kiram now Sultan Jamalu1 Kiram If (27) (ibid.).
Jamalul Kiram II visited Basilan to collect tribute from the people there, but in 1895 .1010 was
attacked by residents of I.nti and Pa1iku!' presumably by followers of the Shakimllah house
(Saleeby 1908, 245). [n 1897 JamaJuJ Kiram felt sure enough of his position to visit Sandakan. The
Sultan \vas clearly trying to reassert his authority over his dominions (Majul 1973, 309). However
in 1899, the Spaniards left 1010 town to allow American troops to occupy the to\\Tl. Thus began a
new era of Sulu resistance to forei!:,'11 occupation.
Chapter Seven
Sulu under American Occupation, 1899-1946
Tn the twentieth century, under l\merican and Filipino sovereignty, the Sulu Sultanate has been
further weakened The Moros have been increasingly marginalised both economically and
politically. The latest phase of the Moro \\'ars began in the early seventies, and despite the peace
agreement of 1996 between the .tv1NLF leader NUT Misuari ane !11e Philippine President Fidel
Ramos, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front CM1LF) and the more .\.i:reme Abu Sayyaf Group
c.ontinue to fight the Philippine ann)". The actions of these grOiJ\}:, while largely confined to
Mindanao, do occasionally spread to Sulu.
The follo\\ing analysis of SuIu in the twentieth century \\ill (,;1;;1) the contexi of these events in
order to c1arii}' the contemJXlrary situation in Sulu. The analysis of SuIu in the twentieth century is
ine\.i:ricabJy bound up \\ith that of Mindanao. The same could be said for Southern Palawan,
although the latter-s lesser territorial and economic significance relegates to a peripheral JXlsition in
the narrative. The term Moro will be used to specify the southern Muslims as a whole. That is to say
the thirteen ethnic groups \vhich make up the southern Ivfuslims - namely the Maranao,
!\1aguindanao, Tausug, Sarna!, Yakan, Sangij, Badjao, Kolibugall, .lama 1'.1apun, flanu!1, Palawanon,
Kalagan and IvloJbog (Che fVlan 1990. 19). Three of these b'TOUr-S ha\'e come to be dominant in the
Moro movement - the Tausul2s (.[ol)3.'1'.''') M'lranaos and the r-..1af!:uindanaos (J\1ercado 1984.
.
152).
Theoretical Framework
Samuel Huntington \\Tote in the late sixties that "a revolution or a violent separatist movement
occurs in a political system that is incapable of accommodating the democratic participation of the
separatist group" (Syed Serajul fslam, 1998). Other factors include the relative deprivation of the
group, the cultural 'otherness' of the group, the level of repression agamst the group, and the
manipulation of ethnicity by ethnic minority elites (ibid.). In order to be successful, such a
movement requires strong leaders, internal cohesiveness and external support (ibid ).
Building on such theoretical premises, this analysis of SuIu in the twentieth century wdl discllss the
relative deprivation of the 1\10ro people economically and pohtically, as well as the Imdern1ining 01
their culture. Bearim! such issues in mind. and dravving on the common strands of their modern
.
history, the re<lSons for the recent civil war in the southern Philippines (\\'hieh still lingers on)
become clear. Such clarity is imperative to understanrung the political situation m Sulu today
fln:aJysl5 here !1.ee& to be tc !:",,c -;h;yt !'h;--, '2"
persist today having been refracted through the vortex of violent upheaval. If these gnevances have
not been adequately addressed by the Southern Philippines CCluneil for Peace and Developmen1
(SPCPD) which was set up in 1996 as a result of the Ramos-I\1isuari peace agreement, then there
presumably remains the potential for further social unrest T) assess such a proposition, we must
first travel back to 1899 \\Chen the American army of occupation signed the Bates Agreement witl1
the Sulus.
The Bates Agreement, 1899.
At the time of the Spanish evacuation, Sulu can be seen as an independent soyereignty. 'Their laws
and the administration of their internal affairs \vere not interfered with. Their rehgi01L social
conditions, national usage and customs were unaffected by any change whatsoever. Spanish
lullut;n.:e andiu"-rlsJicl10it .. hd U(lelld beyon:: th;:; limits of the galDson and no mater.1! or
progres::: reached the 1\10TO communi!)' through that channel" (Saleeby, 1908,24':').
Tn addition, no ta.'>: or tribute \vas col1ected from the Sulus, and their territorY was exempted from
the H!-'Cr,,'tion af the or [fle PhilifJpwe lsltiud.::;. t-ll{)reover, the pead lealained to
hands of the Sulus (ibjd.). The lack of capitulation to the Spaniards is echoed by the Christian
missionary Gowing \vho stated that the life of the Sulu people "refrained practically unchanged.
Very few became Christians. The Spanish education system was not extended" to the people of
SuIll, no were applied, an-::l Su)., customs prevailed (GO\\ing, 1964).
The wording of the Bates Agreement (see appen.iices), like that of so many agreements before iL
was contentious (Forbes 1925
0
2771. Although ro,bes asserts that the Bates agreement made Sulu a
protectorate of the United States, the SlIlus re;:;rrded it as merely amounting to the recognition of
the American f1ag" and noL contrary to the. ,T"erican "iew, embodying any transfer of sovereisrnty
(Forbes 1925, 277). According to ehe Man, the Moros acknowledged American sovereignty and
pledged to help suppress piracy and arrest individuals charged \\ith crimes against non-Moros,
whlle the United States agreed to protect Moros from foreign intrusions and to respect the authority
of the Sultan and other chiefs (Che 1"fan 1990, 46-47). Other scholars have interpreted it as
acknowledging the Sultan's authority to govern his people (Syed Serajul Islam 1998) Mercado does
not view the Bates Af:,rreement in such neutral light For the Bates treaty "",as a
deceptive and expedient ploy by the expeditionary forces to prevent any alliance between
the Sultanate :md thf' Fili;-in0 re\'olulionaries and to neutralise the Mow forces in ':.b!,::
the American tTOOpS were engaged in the pacification campmgns in Luzon and the Vis3vas"
(Mercado 1984, 174),
Mercado also asserts that the Bates Treaty had no legal or constitutional basis. "for the treat\
- - '.'
between General Bates and the Sultan of Sulu had never been sanctioned by the US President and
Congress"Obid.). A similar postulation has been made by Mercado concerning the matter in which
the United States had acquired the Philippines in the first place. The Americans had exploited the
Philippine revolts against Spanish rule, which had culminated in the Philippine Revolution of 1896,
for their own benefit (Mercado J 984). The Spaniards had already been stretched by Mora resistance
in tbe south, and 19orot resistance in the north_ The i\mericans had seemingly courted the exiled
Philippine leadership of Auginaldo in Hong Kong, sailed v .. 1th the nationalists to Manila where it is
-c--..... :f"1o..:J. 1-1..,,",+ +-1--....... A --.. ..... .... "' ................. -ro-?-...:J .,...,....,. .. .....-,..........;a.....; -"-.. ..... +,- .........t....nr<.-;o. .... nt...;1;_..-;--.,....,..., C-. __ C:''''''J{\ --_":11}-0- .1..-:1
-1 pu:\\ .. L.lJ.Ul Ule rl,.111\...lJ'-d. 1:) 11\,..5""U tV un ..... 1 JJ.l.lIl-'lJIHft... . .:'I J\..}"1 ..::.J.L.V II1JJj Hi , ..,'U11C
the Philippine revolutionaries encircled the Spaniards last stronghold in Intramuos Uvfercado, J 984,
173).
The Bates ASTfeement was unilaterally abrogated by the United States in 1904 by Act 1259 of the
Philippine Commission (CO 87411 029)_ The United States had decided tbat the relative autonomy
latel\' been taken care of bv this stage. anc the Americans were thus able to tum their attention to
J _
strengthening their control over the Moros (1.1ercadc, 1984). Consequently dilccl rule was imposed
on the newly created 1\10ro Province (this was cljvided into five districts Zamboanga, Lanao,
Cotal::ato, Davao and Sulu)_ The colonial Government set about inteSTfating the southern Philippines
into national society_ The integration was to be cultural, political and economic
{lnder American Rule
The United States decision to secularise its programmes for Mora-land was not well received (Che
Man 1990, Tan 1977, Syed Serajul Islam 1998)_ "American laws and notions or Justice were
public schools and other sen'ices were land was surveyed and titled; and
homesteaders were encouraged to migrate from overpopulated northern areas and settle on open
land m Mludanao" t Schlegel ) ')'79 in Che J'/lan J Y9u)_ LJncb th--: Gcpartment ot MIndanao and Sulu
(1914-1920), a 'polic
j
' of attraction' \vas introduce.d.., incorporating American systems' rf
government Sulu's longstanding socio-political institutions and customs were largely svvept aside.
The intention 'vas to "develop, civilise and educate the public" (Syed Serajul Islam 1998). The
of the cQ1Jliial admiuistratlOnin the l1nplemcntatlOo 0: it;; lJrogr:immes -
deployment of non-Muslims to teach Muslims for example - provoked considerable opposition_
Perceived as undennining traditional teachers, most Muslims refused to send their children to
school (ibid_).
The proviSIon of loans to settlers was accompanied by an exp2I, ,,11ll of the number of acres set aside
for the new Christian arrivals (ibid} The Land Re&ristration ,\:.:t 0 C"1902 was followed by the Public
Lind Acts of 1905, 1913, 1914 and 1919 (ibid_)_ The outcome cf lhese laws was that the Moros lost
many of their ancestral Jands (Che Man 1990, Gowing 1979_ ':;-,red Serajul Islam 1998) The 1919
Public Land Act made common lands govemment-ov.-11c:d (\ -':leMan 1990). Land was distributed
vvith an explicit bias to\vards Christians who were entitled to parcels of 24 acres, whereas the
Muslims were only entitled to parcels of ten acres (Syed Serajul Islam 1998)_ This marginalisation
of the Moros ec.onomically \'{as exacerbated by the arrival of American, and to a lesser ex1:ent
Japanese corporations \'.'hich expropriated vast tracts orland for export cropping-(ibid.)'
Coupled \',ith the perceived threat to their culture, the economic marginalisation of the Moros
prompted sustained hostility on the pan of tbe Mushms, ""hose economic power had been eroded
already by their sustained confh:l: 5pi''cin_ Their resentment was compounded by the ever
increasing numbers of Christians arriving in the south. Between 1903 and 1980, the Moros' share of
the population in the south declined from 76%:, to 23% (Che Man 1990)_
. It was in this context that the am1ed resistance of the Moros continued against the Americans.
Between 1903 and 1937, the colonial administration's constabulary was invol\-ed in quelling
twenty-six major uprisings and hundreds of -Cottas' in Mindanao and Sulu (Hurley 1938,266). As
well as factors already outlined, a further cause of contliet was the continuation of local rivalries
amongst the Moros (Tan 1977, 19)_ Some of the major anti-American uprisings on Sulu included
those of PangJima Hassan in 1901 and Maharajah Andung in 1904, Inter-Muslim disputes included
the [ndanan-Tahil feud in 1900, the South Ubian-Tandubas dispute in 1900, the Sanda Uprising in
19] 9 and the clispute between Su1tan Badarudin's son-in-law, Datu Ombra. and Tambuyong over
;UC-CC33icll tv-the Su1tailutc and property rights (Tuil 1977}
There were a number oflarger confrontations \'lith the Americans. These included the Pala Uprising
in 1904-1905 in 1010 in response to the anti-slavery la\vs in which 320 Muslims \\'ere killed (Tan
1977). The anti-slavery laws deprived the traditional Sulu leaders of an important source of their
wealth (Che Iv1an 1990, 49). More famously, there was the Bud Dajo battle of 1906 in which 994
Bud Dajo when Governor Pershing, who had until then focused his attentions on economic
development, issued a Jecree to disarm the Moros (Che Man 1990, 50). In 1904, there had
34,000 1.10ros ready to fight (Hurley 1938,263), of which one source alleges that 15,000 died in all
the campaigns against the Americans (Hurley] 938,266).
The American campaigns of 1899-1913 serious1y damaged the Sulus' military capacity and further
eroded the Sultan's power. The Americans suspected the Sultan of being, "m cahoots with the
resisting leaders'- (Tan 1993, 9). fndeed, in 1903, JamaluJ Kiram II had supported Panglima
Hassan's rebellion \"hich ..,vas launched in response to the replacement of Agarna (reli;rlous) courts
\\ith the western system of jurisprudence (CheMan 1990,48).
Tn J 913, the Battle ofBagsak took place. The latter, in which 450 Muslims were kined, is often seen
as the preface to the Carpenter Agreement of 1915, by \,'hich the Sultan relinquished his
out retamec1 his spiritual power 1977). It tas ,illce ";13"[ nns agreement
nE',:er {atified (S.a.f.1. document c.olk::;tion} This is of c.)ilsiderab1e impor!ane,_> as rather like
the July 1878 treaty between Spain and Su1u, this was the last significant political agreement
l",etween the SUlll and the Americans before the incDrporation of the Muslim south into the
;. :depenJent Republic oJ the ?hl1Ippines.
Ir 1913, Moro Province had been reorganised into the Department of !v1in'ianao and Sulu. It was at
thiS that Carpenter had become Governor. A policy of 'Filip in is at IOn' had been undertaken,
b",' \VI. ';1. the Christian Filipinos were given gJcaterpowers in the administrativl ,'fMoro-land (Che
1\1<:)11i 1,<;9.', 52). Some Moros responded by clinging to the traditional \\'1 lj others accepted
thc;rTre.v predicament SuI u's integration \\1th the rest of the Philippines'Y(ts "ltvanced in 1916
\'Ihen. f sident 'Wilson sif,'TIcd the Jones La\\' (Public Act 240), under\\'r; 1 the Philippine
1 p.gisl". j:e assumed legislative control over Mindanao and Su1u (Che MaJl199r, 2)_ The relatively
.;f':..l six year duration of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu cam:: L :ui end in 1920 upon
the fonnation of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes, which fell under. the jurisdiction of the
Department of the InterioL This signified a considerable but not total transfer of administrative and
legislative power from the Americans to the Christianised Filipinos (ibid.),
The Moros were even more averse to being governed by the Christian Filipinos than they were to
being governed by the Americans, and in 1921 the Sulu leaders petiti,}ned the United Sates
Pre iident to have Su]u administered separately from the rest of the PhilippiJes (Che Man 1990,53).
[n 1924, i\toro leaders expressed their intentio!l t'J themseh'es independent should the
United States grant independence to the Philippines (ibid.).
Mom resistance had little impact, and was entirely ineffective in stemming the integration of Moro-
land into the Philippines. In 1934, the Tydings-1kDuffie Independence Act was passed to establish
a Commonwealth in the Phihppines under which the Filipinos would have full po\vers over internal
affairs (ibid.). Further appeals and incldents fell on deaf ears. induding the plea that our
religion is no more, our lives are no more" (Che Man] 990, 55).
Convinced of the futility of their etTorts, some Moro leaders decided to enter the system which had
been imposed upon them. Amongst them was Arolas Tulawi ofSulu who became a delegate to the
Constitutional Convention in 1934 (Ibid.). In 1935, Datu Ombra Amilbangsa in Sulu and Datu
.. ..
'J_lll.:')UUl UalVUJ.U-il '" :I.\,..- \"'-.I"\..\".;l\...U ;:, UH ..... \..H LU\""- l"UUv.l-l'U \-1U \.LJ. VI1U\.. UI\"
Commonwealth, the political predicament of the Sulus deteriorated further when the Administrative
Code for Mindanao and SuJu, which had given the south exemption from certain laws, was repealed
(ibid.). TheMoro Board, which had been established to settle some disputes according to traditional
MOIO Jaws, was also repealed. In 1917, the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes was replaced by the
Office of Commissioner for Mindanao and Sulu (Gmving 1979). The Office was concerned
social and economic prof,rrammes for the Moros \vere reduced and Jamalu] K;ram's 'successor' \vas
not recognisW .. (Che Man 1990, 55). DC\'dopment efforts under the Commonwealth were carried
out primarily tor the benefit of the Christian settlers and foreign entrepreneurs (GO"v.ing ] 979,
177). There was some anned particularly around L'mao in Mindanao, but these protests
soon fell away as most Moros supported the war efforts against the Japanese occupiers (Che Mail
1990). The resistance of the Moros bet\\'een 1899 and 1946 had not been cohesively organised, and
after 1913, it had never been very intense.
The incorporation of Sulu into the Philippines was bitterly contested by many Moros. Prior to
independence on July 4th 1946, the Moro leaders submitted a memorandum to the United States
government ""vhich stated, "Vole do not \vant to be included in the Philippines Independence. For
once independence is launched, there win be trouble between us and the Christian Filipinos because
from time immemorial these two people have not lived hannoniously '" It is not proper [for two
J peopk', to INe rogether under oIle flag" (pute Rah'lmul ;,rSyc<l Sf::aJUl islam ! :;YX!.
This <;Ltement shm:vs the depth of antagonism between the Muslims an0 the ( ':rristians whieh
been heightened by centuries of Spanish-Sulu fighting and then intensified by American colonia]
policy.
Reflecting on the theories concerning separatist movements, one important factor, was already in
place at this stage the relative deprivation of the Muslim people in a contex.i of very llttle
distribution of the benefits of development As \\'e shaH see in the next chapter, by 1972, the
factors internal (temporarily at least), ex.iernal support, intensification of the bTrou;, .-
relative deprivation, and r oresslon by the state - \vere all in place. Mom-land has been home, ('
armed insurgents ever sin ... '.e.
Chapter Eight
From "Independence' to \Var, Sulu 1946-1999
Before the "'af.
Following the Second \Vorld War, there was a marked resurgence oflslam (Che Man 1990,
57). From the early 19505, a stream of I\'iuslim preachers went to J\1indanao and Sulu, and
t
v
-, in the
secesslonist af:,ritations were subdued between 1946 and 1968 (Tan 1993). To a degree this CaT' he
attributed to the partial cooptio:) of the traditional A1oro leaders by their Phihppine counterparts
(tv1ercado 1984, 154: Syed Serajul Islam 1998: Tan 1993).
The Philippine Government made concessions to the traditional Moro leaders, and some
Moro leaders engaged in joc'al and national politics. The Mm\" elite as a whole sat relatively easily
with the national integration policy (T8n 1993). Several members of the traditional Muslim elite
took up local and national political positions (ibid.). Some of the families \\ho may ha\'e been
involved in this process were the Kirams, the Abubakrs, the Tmva1is, the Rasuls, the Sangkulis, the
Annis, and later the Tans and the Loongs (Tan 1993,41). The Taosugs and Samals elected Leon
Fernandez, a catholic ]a,Yyer, as Governor of Sulu, In addition, the Izquierdos, Calixtos and the
Carpizos enjoyed political patronage in local 1010
poiJtIcs (l'1TI ] 993-,41)_ Cbme:se families as rhe Tans, Lims, Kongs, eos and IIv.:, '1!<;C iap-1erl
roles (ibid.). The Muslim leadership sained access to resources, and allegedly henefit' j
from Ilnancial resources sent for development and other purposes (ibid,).
Tilt: lilCltaSlng sense ot alienation atncngst Moro peupie COm;nLi(;U lU 610\\, as
relative deprivation was compounded by economic and political policies. 1-1ercado argues that
independence made little difference in terms of increased self determination within the archipelago
(Mercado 1984). He quotes the US 41gh Commissioner in the Philippines, Paul McNutt_ as
saymg_
Politically we brought the Islands throu (1 progressive steps to the verge of independence,
Economically. we brought the Islands thnL;h steps to almost complete dependence
upon our markets (Mercado 1984, J 5.:1).
The Moros continued to be dispossessed of their ancestral lands fn some cases the
traditional leaders became the owners of fonnerly public lands and tended to either sell them to
settlers or to enter into ne\v partnership ,\oith foreign and national businessmen(ibid,), The
Philippine gm'emment passed a series of laws to lebritimize its expropriation of lands traditionaJly
o"med by Moros for plantation agriculture or resettlement projects (S:,/ed Serajul Islam ] 998), In
195
7
, the Commission on National [nkh'Tation CCNt} was set up to accelerate the integration of the
Moros (Tan 1993).
The lack of material benefit for the Moro people of Mindanao and Sulu was an the more
remarkable when the natural wealth of the Muslim part ofthe Philippines is rehristered.
More than 50
0
:0 of coconut production and timber production v,ere concentrated in
Mindanao and Sulu (Mercado 1984, 153). Bananas and pineapples. major c\.port crops and rubber,
were predominantly produced in Mindanao and Sulu(ibid.). More than half of the country's fish
catch - for export and domestic consumption was from the waters of Mindanao and Sulu in 1984
(ibid,). Moreover, on Mindanao, there are mineral deposits of copper, gold, mckel, coal, iron, zinc
and lead, manganese and chromate (ibid). In 1984, there were twenty-three American and ten
Japanese corporations involved in Mindanao (ibid.).
Development projects seemed to bypass the 1\10111S who failed to benefit from infrastructure
projects (Gowing
o
1979). The Philippine Senate Committee on National Minorities reported "that
U7. to 197! theITi y,,'a:; not a Siiidc iliif::ation -pro',' eet in aTr" D1iiiiicir-.a.lit; "\vh.::[ec t'",1uslirHs c(institllted a
.r __....... l_
majority (Philippine Senate in Che Man. 1990,61). According to George, 'Two decades after the
Philippines became independent, 1-1uslims in Mindanao were a
devitalized people, their laws and customs in danger of disintegrating" (George] 980
0
122).
Moreover, due to the intensification of the transmigTation drive, the non-:l'v10m population had
increased from 2,010
0
223 in 1948 to 6)94,224 in 1970 (Che Man 1990,60). Competition from the
pDst- 1946 period (Che Man 1990,60). A degree of government repression resulted as some Sulus
engaged in smuggling and banditry (ibid.'!- In 1961, Datu Ombra Amilban!:,rsa, the son-in-law of
Badarudin n and one time claimant of the Sultanate. introduced Congress Bm 5682 call1ng for
.
and Recobrnising the IndependeEce of the Prmince of Sulu" (ibid.).
The situation in the south deteriorated after Ferdinand Marcos became President in 1965. In
1968, the Jabidah Massacre took place
o
twenty-eight Muslim military trainees were murdered,
allegedly \vhen they refuse-d to take part in 'Operation Merdeka' in which troops were to be
deployed in North Borneo to a&ritate tor N0I1h Borneo to become a part of the Philippines (lv1ercado
1984; Che Man 1990, Gowing 1979).
Not only did this incident result in Malaysla breaking off diplomatic relations, it also acted
as a fuse for the latent conflict in the south. Later that year the Muslim independence Mo;'ement
was formed by Datu Udtog IV1atalam. This organisation had the ex-press objective of creating an
Islamic Republic ofM'jndanao, SuIu and PaIawan (CheMan, 199061). The MIM had international
," !PpDl T +!'-'!T! Maiayslc ,,-,\'hHAl &::;Slsted m traming the hIst mnety Mt!"l iUI reCruit:.: ;!;g{Jenlia warrare
on the Malay-Thai border (!v1ercado 1984, Che l\1an 199
n
) Rashid T ."Jcm(!.:, an establi<;hed
politiCIan was involved in the recruitment process (ibid.). was a Liberal Party politician.
Marcos, on the other hand, was financing the Nationahst Party Muslim politicians (McKenm J 998)
Most of the oatus ""ere alLegedly ochm.:i the state , .... hich suppo-:. ted them (ilHd. i. Lu(;.man, as ,yeti as
being associated with Mi suari (who was to become the leader of the arn1ed secessionist movement),
was a close associate of Ton 1\'1usiapha, the ChiefM inkier of Sa bah and an ethnic Tausug (ibid.).
Amass Bawling a traditional leader from Sulu \\'as also involved with the MTh1 (Tan 1993).
From 1970, violent il.eidents began to occur bet\veen Muslims and Christians in the south
\\1th greater regularit\' and The Images were fonned by Christian politicians to fight their
Muslim rivals. By the end (f 1970,30,000 people had been displaced from their homes (Che Man
1990. 75;. In 197L inf>cPlous Manila massacre occurred_ wnen 65 Muslims were i!unned 00WP
.',' .' "--
in a mosque in Mind,'nQv (mid.). This intensified the rebgious aspect of the conflict Within a YfJT 0
the Libyan Gm'ernment had oftered their support to the secessionists, and the Muslim organisations
had become more unified (l\1ercado 1984; Che Man 1990).
By this stage, the Mora National Liberation Front(MNLF) had been formed
3
, partially in
response to disil1usionment \\1th some of the 1V1Thlleaders who were being offered deals by Manila.
Datu Udtog !\1atalam had allegedly been offered the position of Presidential Adviser on Muslim
affairs (t\{ired 1984). In:1eed the MTM had come to be seen as a vehicle for the traditional ruling Ltnd
l'arnilies of the Muslim south to maintain and recour political and
economic positions (ibid.). Discontent among the Mora traditional leaders had arisen when their
economic and Political positions \\1thin the south had been "undermined by their Christian
counterparts" (ibid.). Hmvever the Moro independence movement moved from being centred on a
dispute bet\\een Muslim and Christian leaders to being focused on the demands and aspirations of a
wider section of the community. A precedent had been set whereby some Moros vie\ved L.1eir
traditional leaders with mistrust. The lvfNLF was thus formed in part as a rejection oftlle traditional
leadership both politically and ideologically (Che Man 1990). Howeyer, some traditional leaders
such as the Mindanao fonner conb'Tessman, Rashid Lucman, were included within theMNLF
leadership,
- . The 197 1 reduced the political of the frtrther; and"v .. -}jcn
Jv1arcos La,\, in 1971, the \var became inevitable (ibid.). Marcos' declaration of
martial law broadened the MNLF s support base, placed power almost exc1 usively in Christian
hands, and e:s:duded many non-\iolent political options (Noble 1976 in Che Man 1990). Thousands
of people were arrested under martial law, and the Congress was abolished (Mercado 1984, 1 6 I).
: .. ' .. h}" J 9-72 all ;",f-the, c\Jndit1ons 'DcCeSS3Ij for a protected m.rrV.CTIlcnt \;tGre iTt.
place. The Moros were relatively deprived in economic and political ter.ns. They were internally
cohesive for the time being. They haJ a strong sense of identity and felt that their way of life was
under threat. Moreover, they had an effective leader in 1-1isuari and enjoyed exiemal support from
Malaysia and Libya
4
. .
3 Most commentators give 1971 as the (late of the fonnation ofthe Mora National Liberation Front
HoweveL some, such as Che Man, brive the date as 1969.
In 1972, the Islamic Directorate of the Philippines ODP) \vas set up to receive assistance for the
Moros. Tbe TDF s organisers \\'ere Cesar I\1ajul, (Chaim1an),
The '''ar
The vioJe:ace between 1973 and 1977, by whIch tiIPP th.;re Wf>r:;' one mIll;cn
inkLnally displaced people, and 200,000 refugees in Sabah (M.cKenna 1995 '. A conservative
estimate has the number of dead civilians in the 1970s as 60,000 (Mercado] 984, 163 ),lbe figure
has since risen to 125,000 (The Guardian). By the end of 1972, there was fighting throut:hout
<;.Quth--'--\\'estem as well as in Cotabal0, Lanao, in the ZamooaDga peu:in:::uiru, rlasllail,
Sulu and Tav\1.-Ta\.\1. benveen the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the MNLF and their
armed ,ving the Bangasmoro Army (ibid.} The fighting in SuIu in 1974 was one of the bloodiest
episodes of the waL 1010 to\\-n had been occupied by tbe 1v1NLF, hut the Philippine army launched a
major offensive. Jol0 was razed to the ground, properties \vere burned down and looted and
population was to poverty (Tan 1993,48). There \vere also clashes on Tav"i-Ta\.'i and
BasiIan,
In 1976, Tur.l' the Chief Minister of Sa bah ,vas defeated in an election in
the erosion of the major 10hristical support base. His successor Tun Stephens wa.;;
accommodating to the Moro rebels. Moreover, the Libyan govemment was
pressing for negotiations to take place, Within this context, the 1976 Tripoli Agreement \Vas made
Both sides accepted a casual ab'Teement under the auspices ofthe Tripoli Agreement, 1\10reoveL
under the agreement, an Autonomous Regional Government was to be created in the thirteen
prO\'inces oft>.1indanao and Sulu (see appendices: Mercado 1984). This autonomous regional
government \\as to be situated within the territoriality of the Republic of the PhiJippines, and 1t was
to he:: subject to its constitutional processes (ibid.). A referend'JlTI ',"?: to ?lace to measure
publjc Opinion in the islands.
In 1977, not only did the cease-fire break down, but the MNLF began to break into
factions, The di,isions \vere between pro and anti--':Marcos factions, between the traditional elite
leaders, radical religious leaders and leftist secular leaders. The
fol1o\\ing table clarifies the nature of the cleavages amongst the Moro rebels in the 19805,
Organisation MNLF MILF MJ\TLF Refonnists
Objectl\-e, Independent State Independent Autonomous rebrion
Ideoloh>1Cal
Leaning.
EtrtnlC Sltppvrt
Base.
Left
Tausug-Joloanvs
Islamic State
islamic

Center-Right
Macapanton Abbas (secretaT)'), Senator Domocao Alonto, Senator Mamintai
"1; T .
.l UUH't.t. .... .)o tt(Hf- ,#"',H l...ilHIC ...q.1'Vtt. '\.. .. pq1 .. L, "i_itl!!:; LJdtU IVlt!.U .. l-t:'1
Sinsuat, Sultan Amilkadra Abubakar, Mrs. Soared Tamano, Abdul Karim Sidri,
Musib Buat. Farouk Carpizo, and Nur Misuari (Che :Man 1990,76 77).
Geographical
Support Base.
Origins of
Leadership and
name of leadeL
SuJu Cotabato Lanao
Radjca1, young, Traditional, Traditional, secular,
secular. Leader Nut relibrious, aristocratic. Leader
Misuari aristocratic. Leader Dimas Pundatu
Hashim Salamat
Table One: Principal Cleavages of the Moms, I 980s.
The MNLF had made a number of mistakes. The development of a grassroots democratic
revolutionary movement had not been sufficiently advance.d. Dependence on foreif,JU support had
Illat::,: t1<,; rebeis' position fragile. No quahtat-jve In.1pnWcment oftbe po5jtion ufthe Morn people
had bifa effected by the No af1cmots had been made to forge alliances vdth potential
Christlan allies (Mercado 1984) Whatever the extent of the MNLF's mistakes, the traditional elite
members of movement wished to reach a deal \vith Marcos. In 1982, Dimas Punciat;) announced
[Vi1W.it1Glj of (he lviNLF-kefom1isl Group. :Hashim Salamat tonned the Mom lsiJ.ifllC
Front, having branded Misuari a corrupt leftist.
In Januarv 1985, Che Man found the island of Sulu under MNLF control outside Job. The
island was divided into zones, \\ith groups of villages commanded by different leaders. In 1986,
AY.'<i 10 succeeded Marcos after Marcos was brought down by a popular upr which was
supvo:ted by the Mom rebels. Aquino met with Misuari, and in 1987 the Jedda: Accord was
reac'le.:! (Miranda 1997). In August 1989, (he Autonomous Region in Mushm.JVindanao (ARMM)
was IDltiated by Aquino. Later that same year, a plebiscite was held to ratif)' tit: l\RM: .. M. Only four
out .)1 the thirteen provinces of the south voted in favour. These, the provinc' S of Lanao del Sur,
Sulu and Tawi-Ta\\-i are the only provinces in which MllSliiPS are now in a
majorit/. In 1990, elections for the ARMM were held and the administrative body was inaugurated
later that year (Miranda 1997). At Jeddab, Misuari had temporarily dropped his demand tor outright
independence, but the ARMM in four provinces only was deemed insufficient (Che Man 1990).
In the early 1 9905, Tan carried out a cursoT)' survey of public opinion in regard to the
.f\1NLF, autonomy and independence. Support for the 'Bangasmoro struggle' was, by this stage
highly divergent even in the ivluslim heartlands. The island ofSulu, and ia pai1icular Maimbung,
remained the stronghold of the MNLF There, autonomy was seen as and divisi\e
However, Manila's autonomy policy, initiated "by l\1aTcos, h:id served to divide first the Morn
leadership, and then the Mom people. In Ta\\'i-Tawi, opinion 'was divided between those \\ho
accepted the Governmenfs autonomy offer, and those who continued to
SJn 1990, the. only areas \vith Muslim majorities v.-ere as follows:
Basilan Lauao del Sur (93.8%1),Maguindanao Sulu (96. i9%, Ta\\;-Ta\\i
Cotabato (52.64%){Source: Din, Patricio in Sob darity, No 147148)
support the Bangsamoro struggle. A similar divergence of opinion was evident on Siasl. In Basl1an,
31
support for the government was strongest (Tan 1993).
In 1992, Fidel Ramos became President of the Philippines and negotiations wlth Misuari
hegar. in 1993. On the 2lid vf SeptembCt 1996, t.iisu.ari and Ramos finally Ieac::icd an agreement.
The agreement made provision for an interim South PhjJippines Council for Peace and
Development (SPCDP)(Guardian 3 1/08;96). In 1999, a plebiscite ,vas due to take place. Under the
SPCDP, Misuari would have control of development jn the four provinces. Misuari, under the
agreement, became Governor of the ref,rlon under Ramos (ibid.). Howe,-er, despite the nmv of
billions dollars of foreign investments, procured by Misuari, the MILF under Salamat vowed to
,.t.-h_ ,. ... .. 1.._ ;- '. .. - - - .-. ---+ 1.. ..1 k __ .. "L ... -'.
, 1:.t.!tlt:lu:l,t;" J _lL!b tU(.tl \"..:,.,_ "'U('.; !.!h---...... .. _! .
material benefit to the Mom people (Guardjan 02/0911997). 50% of the popu1ation continued to liv
under the poverty line' (ibid.) _ In 1997, Ramos opened Itcgoriarions with the MILF, hut in 1999
MILF rebe1s were still active in North Cotabato
province(Jane's Infonnation Group). Moreover, a new radical Islamist organisation had emerged lr
the early I 9905. The Abu Sayyaf Group were believed to he responsible for a bomb attack on SuI u
island in 1998 (Jane's Information Group).
Chapter Nine
The Su luPotitical System
Sultanate before the erosion of its politica1 pO\vers since the last decades of the nineteenth century.
The political status of Sulu has changed in the twentieth century, not least since the formation of the
Republic of the Pllllippinesin 1946. Now, \\ithjn Sulu, actual and aspiring pohtical representatives
\ie for position, and the patronage systems of contemporary representati\e democracies have
replaced the shifting alliances of the Sultanate's polity (Kiefer 1972). The situatlOn has been further
camplic.3.ted the fi2htl!1rr engulfed Sulu in 1.970:; :15 the l'Jati0na 11.jberafion-
'-' - - ...
Front fought the Philippine government for an independent Moro State (George McKenna
1998; CheMan 1990).
However, before the latest bout of fighting there were clear signs that aspects of the
traditional elite political structure lingered on in more than the personage of the Sultan (Arce
1983). f\n analysis of the polity as it stood one hundred years ago therefore retains a relevance for
understanding the underlying traditional political structures of the contemporary era. The follo\\ing
account does include observations stemming from the second half of the t\\'entieth century. [1
should however be recognised that there is a dearth of accounts addressing the situation in Sulu
since Lf.Je peace agreement of 1996.
The following analysis draws primarily from articles by Kiefer (1972), Kiefer (l971),Majul
(1965) and includes references to Forrest (1969). The best accOunt of the state of Sulu's political
structures is provided by 1'\rce (1983). The analysis \\-ill move from a sociological emphasis to a
analysis
As has already been noted, the Tausug-dominated Sulu polity \vas based on a local
of Islamic political ideas, and incorporated South East Asian notions of governance
,<. '''7'"' '" , C' " 1 1 d' r '1 ' c: '
\.!'.,,ie1 .1'1 L,)j I uLdU S pl1ysica ISw.oce tlOln Lveeca \vas mure c'mpensatect 1t.JI lJY lhe
Sulus' belief that theirs was one of the most important Muslim societies (ibid.
Sultanate
The formal organisation of the Sultanate did not follow the orthodox principles cf Islamic
Jurisprudence, nor did it even approximate to many of the other Islamic states (Majul: 1965:232).
Moreover there were notable differences between the p-Jlitical institutions of Sulu and those of the
Magindanao sultanates. The institution of the sultanate and all the formal offices under it "were
relatively more developed in Sulu than in any other part of the Philippines" (MajuI: 1965:233).
Majul puts this dO\vll to Sulu's earlier contact \\ith Islam as \vell as to its f,'Teater level of
commercjal relations with the outside world (ibid.).
The Sulu Sultanate can be seen as a compromise between the pre-Islamic social structure
and the classical institution of the Sultanate as understood by a conservative ulema" Alternatively,
one could tenn the arrangement as a mix ofadat (customary la\\') and Shari (holy lawKibid_). Kiefer
describes the Sultanate as a plural polity embrac:ng the entire SuIt! archipelago. and including the
dominant Tausug, the '8mal, the.Badjao and the Yakan (Kiefer I 97.?,23).
Social Structu re
The Tausug social structure IS not based on full corporate b'TOUPS, and it is only very loosely
based on corporate organisation (Kiefer 1972). Rather, the structural basis of Taosug society could
be characterised as fluid networks of personal ties (ibid.). Six ,!:,'TOUpS constitute the social structure-
kindred, territory, mosque, faction, estate and title (jbid.). A brief description of these six categories
provides a useful point of departure for an exploration of the Sulu polity. The first of the six ,!:,'TOUpS,