Analysis

August 10, 2011

Summary: In the wake of the AKPs victory and the resignation of Turkeys top military commanders six weeks later, there is no longer any doubt who has exclusive control over foreign policy. Turkey now must prove it is able to transcend its long tradition of democracy without democrats both internally and externally. The AKP government has won a mandate in its third term to write a new social contract and be a true inspiration for its region. Having spent the last two terms demanding a global role for Turkey, the AKP now has its wish in the Arab Spring, but must deliver if it wants to be seen a credible mediator rather than simply a rhetorically bombastic and ineffective regional power. Without a harmonic and symbiotic voice, Turkey risks losing the influence it has carefully cultivated over the last decade. Managing the interdependency between a democratizing and fractious domestic political scene with an ambitious foreign policy vision in Ankara for the AKP will be of critical importance.

The Interlinking of Turkeys Domestic and Foreign Policy in the AKPs Third Term
by Joshua W. Walker

Turkeys global rise over the course of the last decade is well-documented and being studied by many countries and commentators who focus on the incumbent Justice and Development Partys (AKP) stewardship of a new Turkish foreign policy. This is only logical given that the re-orientation of Turkeys 21st century foreign policy coincided with the emergence of the self-confident Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan and his AKP. Elected in 2002 with 34 percent of the popular vote against the backdrop of corrupt incumbent parties and re-elected again in 2007 with 47 percent, under the cloud of military interference and e-proclamations, the AKP successfully navigated and conquered Turkish politics to become a predominant force even before the June 12, 2011, elections. In the wake of the AKPs victory with close to half of the popular vote, and the resignation of Turkeys top military commanders six weeks later, there is no longer any doubt who has exclusive control over foreign policy in a way unprecedented for civilian leaders and a single party in modern Turkish history. Turkey now must prove it is able to transcend its long tradition of

democracy without democrats, in which one group within the heterogeneous, polarized polity most recently, the AKP captures the state, only to enact policies and rules that enable it to monopolize power and govern without compromise. Turkey Today Turkey today is simultaneously more democratic and more engaged in the world than at any time since the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Yet at the same time, it has more tensions with its Western allies than since its 1974 operation in Cyprus. Further progress hinges on a series of remaining domestic challenges, most importantly the writing of a new constitution, that is complicated by its current foreign policy posture. Unlike during the Cold War, when Turkeys overriding national interests were focused on internal enemies and the larger threat of the Soviet Union, Turkish foreign policy today is complicated and inter-related with its own internal developments as an important capitalist, Muslim-majority, secular democracy, which is being carefully watched amidst the backdrop of historic regional changes. The new

Offices Washington, DC Berlin Paris Brussels BelgraDe ankara BuCharest WarsaW

Analysis
foreign policy of Turkey championed by the three-term ruling AKP has brought with it a realignment and re-evaluation of Ankaras traditional positioning in world politics. No longer simply a bridge or instrument of or from the West, Turkey has established its own agency in the last two terms of the AKP through a pro-active foreign policy that seeks to balance its pragmatic interests and principles. Whether or not this will continue to be possible in the AKPs third term remains to be seen. Turkeys domestic political transformation and its democratization under the AKP have played an important role in the expansion of Turkeys international relations. Despite the traditional hostility of Turkeys secular Kemalist elite towards its Muslim and Soviet neighborhood in favor of a more comprehensive partnership with the more powerful West, the popular sentiment of most Turks remains skeptical towards the West1 as evidenced by polling done by Pew. Consequently, in periods of democratically elected civilian governments, Turkey has pursued closer relations with its neighborhood. This is most clearly demonstrated by the foreign policy initiatives of Prime Ministers Menderes and zal, long before the AKP. Regional Dynamism The rise of the AKP and the Anatolian Tigers, representing the new business elites of the Turkish heartland in Kayseri, Konya, or Gaziantep rather than the traditional Western centers of the Marmaris, has redefined the once dominant narrative of Turkeys heartland being economically backwards and too religiously conservative, as the Kemalist elites and military once propagated. Today, Turkey under the AKP operates according to a new vision of the countrys long-term economic and geopolitical objectives, turning away from its once exclusively Western orientation and instead towards its own regional neighborhood. This re-orientation is marked by the concepts of zero problems with neighbors and strategic depth, as explained by the current Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutolu. The direct impact this has had on business and trade is a refocusing of attention and energy within rather than beyond Turkeys immediate neighborhood. Despite the initial successes of Turkish foreign policy in opening new markets and expanding into its neighborhood, throughout the Arab Spring, Ankara has been forced to confront the new realities of the Middle East. Having initially inspired great admiration in both the Arab world and the West for its early embrace of changes in Tunisia and Egypt, Turkey misjudged Libya by initially rejecting sanctions and even opposing NATOs involvement, losing much credibility before changing course. Now with the ongoing protests and brutal repression by the AKP leaderships brother Bashar Assad, Ankara has only reluctantly spoken out as Syrians poured across the border and continue to be killed during protests every day. Syria has been the showcase of AKPs policy of engagement in the Middle East therefore the time it has taken for them to run out of patience with Assad will be consequential for Turkeys future role in the region. Turkey finds itself in the uncomfortable situation of being a flip-flopping regional power, confronting accusations it used to lob at the West for its double standards and hypocrisy in the region. Now the EU, Turkey, and the United States find themselves in the same boat without any tangible benefits. Unlike previous foreign ministers such as Abdullah Gul and Ali Babacan that spoke softly and in unison with the prime minister, Ahmet Davutolus tenure has been fraught with domestic disagreements over important foreign policy issues such as Armenia, Cyprus, and Israel to name only the most recent instances. The voice of the prime minister has typically drowned out the work and voice of the foreign

Turkey finds itself in the uncomfortable situation of being a flip-flopping regional power, confronting accusations it used to lob at the West for its double standards and hypocrisy in the region.

1 This has been seen in polling most recently completed by the Pew Global Attitudes Project http://www.pewtrusts.org/our_work_report_detail.aspx?id=85899362116

Analysis
ministry that has tried to navigate these treacherous waters without awakening populist nationalism within domestic politics. Without a harmonic and symbiotic voice, Turkey risks losing the influence it has carefully cultivated over the last decade. Turkeys soft power that is often extolled in its active diplomacy as a regional leader is no longer just about trade and diplomacy. It also calls for active support for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Additionally, having zero-problems with the people and regimes of the region is becoming increasingly impossible. As regimes such as Syria kill their own people, fractions within Ankara disagree over fundamental Turkish responses, causing further confusion. Balancing Turkish Foreign Policy in the AKPs Third Term The perceived decline of the West versus the rise of the East in the 21st century, has animated the AKP to strategically pursue its own sense of Turkeys destiny with its 360 degrees of strategic depth with great success. Having spent the last two terms demanding a global role for Turkey, the AKP now has its wish, but must deliver if it wants to be seen a credible global mediator rather than simply a rhetorically bombastic but ineffective regional power. Benefiting from Turkeys economic and regional dynamism, the AKP seems poised to continue to prioritize its Anatolian roots rather than the traditional Western business community that has been unable to politically challenge them. The outstanding question now is whether the AKP will perpetuate the old pattern of enshrining its own preferences at the expense of others in Turkeys deeply divided polity and the effect this will have in its international behavior. Perhaps the greatest foreign policy challenge for the AKP in its third term will be balancing its historically close strategic alliance with America and its ongoing membership association with the EU amidst the new economic realities of Western crisis and a newly assertive foreign policy with its neighbors that could lead to further tensions between the countrys perceived interests and principles. Managing the interdependency between a democratizing and stable domestic political scene and ambitious foreign policy vision in Ankara for the AKP will be of critical importance. A new challenge for the West will be to actively engage Turkey and encourage the AKPs activism to live up to the

Perhaps the greatest foreign policy challenge for the AKP in its third term will be balancing its historically close strategic alliance with America and its ongoing membership association with the EU amidst the new economic realities of Western crisis and a newly assertive foreign policy with its neighbors.
principles set forth in its ambitious foreign policies of the first two terms. Trying to bully Turkey into cutting off relations with Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria, Iran, or any actor will only generate backlash against the West that it can ill-afford from one of the most important democracies and economies in the region. Divergent interests will sometimes lead to disagreements, which can be minimized by emphasizing the overriding common interest in a democratizing, freemarket Middle East that looks to the transatlantic community for assistance in the short-run. Creating a New Social Contract for Turkey Turkey needs constitutional reform, and the AKP has interpreted its electoral victory as giving it a popular mandate to create a new social contract for the country. The prime ministers desire to turn Turkey into a presidential rather than a parliamentary system may have to wait, as he first must address the perennial Kurdish issue. However, only a new constitution can create the necessary space for a political solution that still seems a long way off. The new social contract cannot simply be an alliance of convenience

Analysis
between the AKP and Kurds, which is not sustainable in the long run. After all, previous coalitions, from the army and the left (post-1960), to the army and the right (post-1980), to the Islamist/liberal alliance of the 2000s have floundered. Rather, it will need to include all of Turkey: social democrats, Kemalists, Alevis, and women who fear the AKPs conservative hegemony. The AKP has clearly mastered the game of electoral democracy but knows it can only leave a lasting legacy if it can carry Turkey across the threshold with a new constitution; therefore the party will do everything in its power to cultivate a political coalition to make this happen. The new AKP government must rise above rhetoric to live up to the mandate it has won in the latest election to write a new social contract and be a true inspiration for its region. Rather than simply criticizing the AKP for its faults, the West owes Ankara a genuine good faith effort to work together towards resolving foreign policy issues such as Armenia or Cyprus while accurately reflecting the enormity of the domestic tasks ahead such as writing a new constitution and the Kurdish question. The majority of Turkeys pluralist political community demands a civilian constitution based on democratic principles that may not be as liberal as some Turks and Westerners would like. However, helping Turkey maintain its influence as a model democracy in the region and aspirant for global status is in everyones common interest.

About the Author

Joshua W. Walker is a Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund.

About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a nonpartisan American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated to promoting better understanding and cooperation between North America and Europe on transatlantic and global issues. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy and business communities, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven offices in Europe: Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, and Warsaw. GMF also has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm.

About the On Turkey Series

GMFs On Turkey is an ongoing series of analysis briefs about Turkeys current political situation and its future. GMF provides regular analysis briefs by leading Turkish, European, and American writers and intellectuals, with a focus on dispatches from on-the-ground Turkish observers. To access the latest briefs, please visit our web site at www. gmfus.org/turkey or subscribe to our mailing list at http://database. gmfus.org/reaction.