Abbas vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal 166 SCRA 651 (1988) GR L-33767 ABBAS V.

SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL Facts: On October 9, 1987, the petitioners filed before the respondent Tribunal an electioncontest docketed as SET Case No. 002-87 against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition whowere proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections by theCommission on Elections. On November 17, 1987, the petitioners, with the exception of Senator Estrada butincluding Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (who had been designated Member of the Tribunalreplacing Senator Estrada, the latter having affiliated with the Liberal Party and resigned asthe Opposition's representative in the Tribunal) filed with the respondent Tribunal a Motionfor Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing andresolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them are interested parties tosaid case, as respondents therein. Senator Juan Ponce Enrile in the meantime had voluntarily inhibited himself fromparticipating in the hearings and deliberations of the respondent tribunal in both SET CaseNo. 00287 and SET Case No. 001-87, the latter being another contest filed by Augusto'sSanchez against him and Senator Santanina T. Rasul as alternative respondents, citing hispersonal involvement as a party in the two cases. The petitioners, in essence, argue that considerations of public policy and the normsof fair play and due process imperatively require the mass disqualification sought and thatthe doctrine of necessity which they perceive to be the foundation petition of the questionedResolutions does not rule out a solution both practicable and constitutionallyunobjectionable, namely; the amendment of the respondent Tribunal's Rules of procedureso as to permit the contest being decided by only three Members of the Tribunal. The proposed amendment to the Tribunal's Rules (Section 24) requiring theconcurrence of five (5) members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature is aproviso that where more than four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining membersshall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and mayadopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situationcreated by the petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leavethe resolution of the contest to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices ofthis Court, whose disqualification is not sought. Issue: Whether the proposed amendment to the Tribunal's Rules (Section 24) is neither unfeasible nor repugnant to the Constitution. Held: No. We opine that in fact the most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in theplain terms and intent of the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, createsthe Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction andpowers.It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices of the Supreme Court and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended thatboth those "judicial' and 'legislative' components commonly share the duty and authority ofdeciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. Therespondent Tribunal correctly stated one part of this proposition when it held that saidprovision "... is a clear expression of an intent that all (such) contests ... shall be resolvedby a panel or body in which their (the Senators') peers in that Chamber are represented."1The other part, of course, is that the constitutional provision just as clearly mandates the participation in the same process of decision of a representative or representatives of the Supreme Court.

Said intent is even more clearly signalled by the fact that the proportion of Senatorsto Justices in the prescribed membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is 2 to 1-anunmistakable indication that the "legislative component" cannot be totally excluded fromparticipation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to thespirit and intent of the Constitution. Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of anySenator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate without invitingthe same objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed mass disqualification, ifsanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty thatno other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of theparticipation of its entire membership of Senators. It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of theConstitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that wouldinvolve all 24 Senators-elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon.Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections when oncemore, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitutionprovides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations or for the substitution ofSenators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in suchsituations must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense ofjustice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrainfromparticipating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interestsor biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we aremerely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannotlegally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendmentof its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudicationof a senatorial election contest. Pimentel vs. HRET 393 SCRA 227 (2002) GR 141489 Pimentel, et al. v. House of Representives Electoral Tribunal Facts: On 3 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. On 11 May 1998, in accordance with the Party-List System Act, national elections were held which included, for the first time, the election through popular vote of party-list groups and organizations whose nominees would become members of the House. Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list representatives from 13 organizations, including Melvyn D. Eballe, Leonardo Q. Montemayor, Cresente C. Paez, Loretta Ann P. Rosales and Patricia M. Sarenas from party-list groups Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives[5] (APEC), AlyansangBayanihanngmgaMagsasaka, ManggagawangBukid at Mangingisda (ABA), NATCO Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), and Abanse! Pinay (ABANSE). Due to the votes it garnered, APEC was able to send 2 representatives to the House, while the 12 other party-list groups had one representative each. Also elected were district representatives belonging to various political parties. Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET and CA contingent by electing its representatives to these two constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure involves the nomination by the political parties of House members who are to occupy seats in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Commission on Appointments (CA). From available records, it does not appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections the partylist groups in the House nominated any of their representatives to the HRET or the CA. As of the date of filing of the present petitions for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the House contingents to the HRET and the CA were composed solely of district representatives belonging to the different political parties. On 18 January 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters addressed to then Senate President Blas F. Ople, as Chairman of the CA, and to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo (now

retired), as Chairman of the HRET. The letters requested Senate President Ople and Justice Melo to cause the restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively, to include party-list representatives to conform to Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In its meeting of 20 January 2000, the HRET resolved to direct the Secretary of the Tribunal to refer Senator Pimentel s letter to the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives. On the same day, HRET Secretary Daisy B. Panga-Vega, in an Indorsement of even date, referred the letter to House of Representatives Secretary General Roberto P. Nazareno. On 2 February 2000, Eballe, et al. filed with this Court their Petitions for Prohibition, Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order) against the HRET, its Chairman and Members, and against the CA, its Chairman and Members. They contend that, under the Constitution and the Party-List System Act, party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET, and 2.4 seats in the CA. They charge that the HRET, CA, et al. committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to act positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel. In its Resolution of 8 February 2000, the Court en banc directed the consolidation of GR 141490 with GR 141489. On 11 February 2000, Eballe et al. filed in both cases a motion to amend their petitions to implead then Speaker Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as an additional respondent, in his capacity as Speaker of the House and as one of the members of the CA. The Court granted both motions and admitted the amended petitions. Senator Pimentel filed the present petitions on the strength of his oath to protect, defend and uphold the Constitution and in his capacity as taxpayer and as a member of the CA. He was joined by 5 party-list representatives from APEC, ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOPNATCCO as co-petitioners. Issue: [1] Whether the present composition of the House Electoral Tribunal violates the constitutional requirement of proportional representation because there are no party-list representatives in the HRET. [2]: Whether the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to include party-list representatives constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Held: [1] NO. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber of Congress exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber s respective electoral tribunal. These constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation.[26] However, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the House of this constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[27] Otherwise, the doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of government to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit.[28] Neither can the Court speculate on what action the House may take if party-list representatives are duly nominated for membership in the HRET and the CA. The petitions are bereft of any allegation that respondents prevented the party-list groups in the House from participating in the election of members of the HRET and the CA. Neither does it appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections, the House barred the party-list representatives from seeking membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears from the available facts that the party-list groups in the House at that time simply refrained from participating in the election process. The party-list representatives did not designate their nominees even up to the time they filed the petitions, with the predictable result that the House did not consider any party-list representative for election to the HRET or the CA. As the primary recourse of the party-list representatives lies with the House of Representatives, the Court cannot resolve the issues presented by petitioners at this time.

[2]: There is no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in response to the letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and their internal rules, the HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to reconstitute themselves. Bondocvs Pineda, 201 SCRA 792 (1991) GR 97710 Facts: In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and EmigdioBondoc of the NP were candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the House of Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP). Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest. On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a letter informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the HRET.

Issue: Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party therein, may change that party s representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein

Held: The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration. As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void. Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasura s right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member s congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another

Co vs HRET 199 SCRA 692 (1991) GR 92191 and 92192 Facts: The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident ofLaoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The congressional election for the second district of NorthernSamar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislativedistrict are the petitioners, SixtoBalinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. RespondentOng was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests on the grounds that Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines and not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar. Issue: Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a citizen of the Philippines. Held: Yes. In the year 1895, the private respondent s grandfather, OngTe, arrived in the Philippines fromChina and established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar. The father of the private respondent,JoseOngChuan was born in China in 1905 but was brought by OngTe to Samar in the year 1915, he filed withthe court an application for naturalization and was declared a Filipino citizen. In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim. For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and voted there during those elections. Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with analien father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural born citizens. Besides, privaterespondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in thePhilippines. On the issue of residence, it is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish hisresidence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of afriend or relative. To require him to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamountto a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, votingand residence requirements.

CosetengvsMitra 187 SCRA 377 (199) GR 86649 Facts: Congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted in representatives from diverse political parties Petitioner Anna Dominique Coseteng was the only candidate elected under the banner of KAIBA. A year later, the Laban ngDemokratikong Pilipino or LDP was organized as a political party. As 158 out of 202 members of the House of Representatives formally affiliated with the LDP, the House committees, including the House representation in the Commission on Appointments, had to be reorganized. Petitioner Coseteng then wrote a letter to Speaker Ramon Mitra requesting that as representative of KAIBA, she be appointed as a member of the Commission on Appointments and House Electoral Tribunal. On December 5, 1988, the House of Representatives, revised the House majority membership in the Commission on Appointments to conform with the new political alignments by replacing Rep. Raul A. Daza, LP, with Rep. Luis C. Singson, LDP, however, Congressman Ablan, KBL, was retained as the 12th member representing the House minority.

On February 1, 1989, Coseteng and her party, filed this Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs praying that the Supreme Court declare as null and void the election of respondent Ablan, Verano-Yap, Romero, Cuenco, Mercado, Bandon, Cabochan, Imperial, Lobregat, Beltran, Locsin, and Singson, as members of the Commission on Appointments, to enjoin them from acting as such and to enjoin also the other respondents from recognizing them as members of the Commission on Appointments on the theory that their election to that Commission violated the constitutional mandate of proportional representation Issue: 1. WON the question raised is political. 2. WON the members of the House in the Commission on Appointments were chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Holding/ Held: 1. No, it is not. The political question issue was settled in Daza vs. Singson, where this Court ruled that the legality, and not the wisdom, of the manner of filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution is justiciable, and, even if the question were political in nature, it would still come within our powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government. 2. Yes, petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads: Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex oficio Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the House of Representatives elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members. (Art. VI, 1987 Constitution.) The composition of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political parties in the House. There are 160 members of the LDP in the House. They represent 79% of the House membership (which may be rounded out to 80%). Eighty percent (80%) of 12 members in the Commission on Appointments would equal 9.6 members, which may be rounded out to ten (10) members from the LDP. The remaining two seats were apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in the Coalesced Majority and the KBL (respondent RoqueAblan) as the principal opposition party in the House. There is no doubt that this apportionment of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was done on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein. There is no merit in the petitioner s contention that the House members in the Commission on Appointments should have been nominated and elected by their respective political parties. The petition itself shows that they were nominated by their respective floor leaders in the House. They were elected by the House (not by their party) as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution. The validity of their election to the Commission on Appointments-eleven (11) from the Coalesced Majority and one from the minority-is unassailable. Guingonavs Gonzales 214 SCRA 789 (1993) GR 106971

Facts: The mathematical representation of each of the political parties represented in the Senate for the Commission on Appointments (CA) is as follows: LDP 7.5; LP-PDP-LABAN--.5; NPC 2.5; LAKAS-NUCD 1.5. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one Senator by adding one-half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect respondent Senator Romulo. In so doing, one other party s fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter s representation in the CA to less than their proportional representation in the Senate.

Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of Art. VI, Sec. 18

Held: The respondent s claim to membership in the CA by nomination and election of the LDP majority in the Senate is not in accordance with Sec. 18 of Art. VI of the Constitution and therefore violative of the same because it is not in compliance with the requirement that 12 senators shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties represented therein. To disturb the resulting fractional membership of the political parties in the CA by adding together 2 halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional representation because it will give the LDP an added member in the CA by utilizing the fractional membership of the minority political party, who is deprived of half a representation. The provision of Sec. 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on proportional representation. The Constitution does not require that the full complement of 12 senators be elected to the membership in the CA before it can discharge its functions and that it is not mandatory to elect 12 senators to the CA. The overriding directive of Art. VI, Sec. 18 is that there must be a proportional representation of the political parties in the membership of the CA and that the specification of 12 members to constitute its membership is merely an indication of the maximum complement allowable under the Constitution. The act of filling up the membership thereof cannot disregard the mandate of proportional representation of the parties even if it results in fractional membership in unusual situations. Even if the composition of the CA is fixed by the Constitution, it can perform its functions even if not fully constituted, so long as it has the required quorum. Pelaezvs Auditor General 15 SCRA 569 (1965_ GR L-23825 Emmanuel PelaezVs. Auditor-General (1965) This is a special civil action for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunctioninstituted by Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer,against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives andagents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of the EOs issued by the President creating 33 municipalities and/or any disbursementby said municipalities. FACTS: In 1964, the President, pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Codeissued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three(33) municipalities.Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void on the ground thatsaid Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 andconstitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.When RA 2370 (The Barrio Charter) provides that barrios may "not be created ortheir boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in theareas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality ormunicipalities.Section 68 of RAC, which said EOs are based, provides that the President maydefine or divide the boundary or boundaries of any province, subprovince,municipality, municipal district XXX as the public welfare may require provided, thatthe authorization of the Congress of the Philippines shall first be obtained.Petitioner argues that the President under the new law cannot create a barrio, howmuch more of a municipality which is composed of several barrios.Respondent answered that a new municipality can be created without creating newbarrios, such as, by placing old barrios under the jurisdiction of the newmunicipality. This answer however overlooks on the main import of the petitionersargument, which questions the President s authority to create municipalities.Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalities underthis section does not amount to an undue delegation of legislative power, relyingupon Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binagonan. ISSUE: WON the President has the legislative authority to issue the EOs creatingmunicipalities. DECISION:

The Court declared the EOs null and void. The Auditor General permanentlyrestrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementationof said EOs or any disbursement by the created municipalities. RATIO: The Court said that the respondent s argument based on Cardona vs. Binangonanis untenable because the case do not involve a creation of municipality but atransfer of municipality. The authority to create municipal corporations is essentiallylegislativein nature. It sstrictly a legislative function. The power to fix such common boundary, in order toavoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of anadministrativenature in the adoption of means and ways tocarry into effect the law creating said municipalities.Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the powerto fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it isessential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that saidlaw:(a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed,carried out or implemented by the delegate. (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.Without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, withreasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only tomake the law, but worse, to adopt measures inconsistent with the end sought to beattained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powersand the system of checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the veryfoundation of our Republican system. The Court said that Section 68 of the RAC does not meet these well settledrequirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in theenforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out orimplemented by the President. It can be noted thatthe executive orders in question were issued after thelegislative bills for the creation of the municipalities involved in this case had failed to pass Congress. A better proof of the fact that the issuance of saidexecutive orders entails the exercise of purely legislative functions can hardly be given. Senate of the PhilsvsErmita GR 169777 April 20 2006

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes . Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional. In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP). The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wiretapping, and the role of military in the so-called GloriagateScandal . Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464,

Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. ISSUE: Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional? RULING: No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case. Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected. The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.
Bengzonvs Senate Blue Ribbon Committee 203 SCRA 767 GR 89914
Facts: Senator Enrile asks the Senate to look into the matter of the alleged acquisition of the Lopa Group of the properties of KokoyRomualdez which is a subject of sequestration by the PCGG. Senator Enrile citing probable violations of Republic Act No. 3019 Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 5. The petitioners representing Ricardo Lopa who passed away prior the decision of the court issued this petition for prohibition and an issuance a temporary restraining order and/or injuctive relief enjoin the Blue Ribbon committee of compelling them to appear before them. Issues: Coming to the specific issues raised in this case, petitioners contend that (1) the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee's inquiry has no valid legislative purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of legislation; (2) the sale or disposition of hteRomualdez corporations is a "purely private transaction" which is beyond the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to inquire into; and (3) the inquiry violates their right to due process. Ruling: The Supreme court granted the petition. The committee investigation wanted by Senator Enrile is not in aid of a legislation, therefore is violative of the separation of powers between the Senate or Congress and that Judiciary. The pending civil case of the petitioners under Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan is where these issues by the Senate should be discussed. Saying further that the power of the Senate and Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation is not absolute or without limitation.

NORECO vs Sang. Panlunsod of Dumaguete 155 SCRA 421 (1987) Gr L-72492 In 1985, the SP of Dumaguete sought to conduct an investigation in connection with pending legislation related to the operations of public utilities. Invited in the hearing are the heads of NORECO II Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac. NORECO II is alleged to have installed inefficient power lines in the said city. Torres and Umbac refused to appear before the SP and they alleged that the power to investigate, and to order the improvement of, alleged inefficient power lines to conform to standards is lodged exclusively with the National Electrification Administration; and neither the Charter of the City of Dumaguete nor the LGC grants the SP. The SP averred that inherent in the legislative functions performed by the respondent SP is the power to conduct investigations in aid of legislation and with it, the power to punish for contempt in inquiries on matters within its jurisdiction. ISSUE: Whether or not LGUs can issue contempt. HELD: There is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the LGC (BP 337) granting local legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and the power to punish non-members for contempt. Absent a constitutional or legal provision for the exercise of these powers, the only possible justification for the issuance of a subpoena and for the punishment of non-members for contumacious behavior would be for said power to be deemed implied in the statutory grant of delegated legislative power. But, the contempt power and the subpoena power partake of a judicial nature. They cannot be implied in the grant of legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere incidents of the performance of legislative functions. To allow local legislative bodies or administrative agencies to exercise these powers without express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. There being no provision in the LGC explicitly granting local legislative bodies, the power to issue compulsory process and the power to punish for contempt, the SP of Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt. The Ad-Hoc Committee of said legislative body has even less basis to claim that it can exercise these powers. Even assuming that the SP and the Ad-Hoc Committee had the power to issue the subpoena and the order complained of, such issuances would still be void for being ultra vires. The contempt power (and the subpoena power) if actually possessed, may only be exercised where the subject matter of the investigation is within the jurisdiction of the legislative body. ABAKADA GURO vsPurisima, GR 166715 Aug 14 2008
FACTS: RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board).It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status. The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their revenue targets for the year, as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or reward is taken from the fund and allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion to their contribution in the excess collection of the targeted amount of tax revenue. Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency ISSUES: 1. W/N RA 9335 constitutional? 2. W/N the limitation the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. 3. W/N the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President RATIO: 1. Yes.The presumption is disputable but proof to the contrary is required to rebut it. Petitioners' claim that the implementation of RA 9335 will turn BIR and BOC officials and employees into "bounty hunters and mercenaries" is not only without any factual and legal basis and purely speculative.

Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public officers may by law be rewarded for exemplary and exceptional performance. A system of incentives for exceeding the set expectations of a public office is not anathema to the concept of public accountability. In fact, it recognizes and reinforces dedication to duty, industry, efficiency and loyalty to public service of deserving government personnel. 2. No. Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special function of being the instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions - taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection. 3. No. RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law. Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected respectively of the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year as approved by the DBCC and stated in the BESF submitted by the President to Congress. Thus, the determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on the President as it also undergoes the scrutiny of theDBCC.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the implementing rules and regulations of the law is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore NULL and VOID. The constitutionality of the remaining provisions of RA 9335 is UPHELD. Pursuant to Section 13 of RA 9335, the rest of the provisions remain in and effect. SO ORDERED

Tiovs VRB 151 SCRA 208 (1987) GR L-75697

Facts: The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators adversely affected by Presidential Decree No. 1987, An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the amended the National Internal Revenue Code provided that: "SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax." "Section 10.Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program. Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and the other fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila Commission. The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of movie houses and theaters. Such unregulated circulation have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractor's specific, amusement and other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues. Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of approximately

P180 Million in taxes each year. The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the movie industry.

Issues: (1) Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police power. (2) Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional.

Held: Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power. The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition. We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing Presidential Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void. While the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the moribund movie industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in government revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit and municipal license fees are required to engage in business." WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.

Phil. Consti. Assn. vsGimenez 15 SCRA 479 (1965) GR L-23326

Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the validity of RA 3836 insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives, and to the elective officials of both Houses (of Congress). The provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of the members of Congress during their term of office, contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. The same provision constitutes "selfish class legislation" because it allows members and officers of Congress to retire after twelve (12) years of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every four years of service, which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or re election of the retiree, while all other officers and employees of the government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years of service and are given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, which, in any case, cannot exceed 24 months. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the highest rate received, insofar as members of Congress are concerned, is another attempt of the legislator to further increase their compensation in violation of the Constitution. The Sol-Gen counter argued alleging that The grant of retirement or pension benefits under Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers objected to by the petitioner does not constitute "forbidden compensation" within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution. The law in question does not constitute class legislation. The payment of commutable vacation and sick leave benefits under the said Act is merely "in the nature of a basis for computing the gratuity due each retiring member" and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to increase their salary. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3836 is constitutional. HELD: Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution, which reads: "The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems and other emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of travelling expenses to and from their respective district in the case of Members of the House of Representatives and to and from their places of residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise

provided by law, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos." When the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for the Members of Congress, the amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies a special proviso which reads as follows: "No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such increase." In other words, under the original constitutional provision regarding the power of the National Assembly to increase the salaries of its members, no increase would take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the members of the Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase. The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the term compensation "other emoluments". This is the pivotal point on this fundamental question as to whether the retirement benefit as provided for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the purview of the term "other emoluments." "Emolument" as "the profit arising from office or employment; that which is received as compensation for services or which is annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees and perquisites." It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a part of compensation for services of one possessing any office. Republic Act 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. RA 3836 is hereby declared unconstitutional by the SC.

Lidasanvs COMELEC 21 SCRA 496 (1967) GR 28089

FACTS y y y On June 18, 1966, Chief Executive signed into law House Bill (HB) 1247, now known as Republic Act (RA) 4790 An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur The new municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur includes: Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos, and Magolatung. It also includes: barrios of Togaig and Madalum (both situated in Buldon, Cotabato) and barrios of Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tangabao, Tiongko, Colodan, and Kabamawakan (all situated in Parang, Cotabato) Bara Lidasan, resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato affected by the implementaion of RA 4790, questions the constitutionality of RA 4790.

y ISSUE

y Whether or not RA 4790 is valid? RULING y RA 4790 declared as NULL and VOID o Constitutional requirement aforestated that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill o Constitutional provision contains DUAL LIMITATIONS upon legislative power:  1. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogenous subjects.  2. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. o It violates the constitutional requirement that the subject of the bill be expressed in its title. o It did not inform the Congress the full impact of the Law. Moreover, It did not inform the citizens of Buldon and Parang inCotabato that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and municipalities and that such will be added to the Province of Lanao del Sur.

o o

The subject was the creation of the municipality of Dianaton. Hence, it makes the title misleading and deceptive Even upon removing the barrios of Cotabato included in the municipality of Dianaton, it is still unconstitutional because the valid part is not independent of the invalid portion. Thus, it is indivisible, and it is accordingly null and void in its totality.

DISSENTING OPINION Fernando, J. y y The subject was the creation of the municipality of Dianaton and it was clearly embodied in the title. The legislature is not required to make the title of the act a complete index of its contents.

Lacsonvs Exec Secretary 301 SCRA 298 GR 128096

Facts: Eleven persons believed to be members of the KuratongBaleleng gang, an organized crime syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those included in the ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-intervenors. Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation Command, that what actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out between the KuratongBaleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman AnianoDesierto formed a panel of investigators to investigate the said incident. Said panel found the incident as a legitimate police operation. However, a review board modified the panel s finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six respondents including herein petitioner, charged as principal, and herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended informations before the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an accessory. The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the principal accused are government officals with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites. However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word principal from the phrase principal accused in Section 2 of R.A. 7975. Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7 which provides that the said law shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof. Issues: (1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners right to due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution as the provisions seemed to have been introduced for the Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire jurisdiction over the KuratongBaleleng case. (2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto statute.

(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the KuratongBaleleng was committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the determination whether the case falls within the Sandiganbayan s or Regional Trial Court s jurisdiction.

Held: Petitioner and intervenors posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law is too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant such a declaration. Every classification made by the law is presumed reasonable and the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when the following concur: (1) it must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class; all of which are present in this case. Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to all cases involving certain public officials and under the transitory provision in Section 7, to all cases pending in any court. Contrary to petitioner and intervenors argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the KuratongBaleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in any court. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law, generally, provides retroactive effect of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations or those that define crimes and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards the Sandiganbayan s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional. In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the information which is essential in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of the amended information, there was no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody. The stringent requirement that the charge set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was not established. Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.

Cruz vsParas 123 SCRA 569 (1983) GR L-42571 and 42572

Facts: Being the principal cause in the decadence of morality and because of their other adverse effects on the community, the respondents passed Ordinance No. 84 which may be cited as the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan which says that operator of night clubs, cabarets or dance halls shall henceforth be issued permits/licenses to operate within the jurisdiction of the municipality and no license/permit shall be issued to any professional hostess, hospitality girls and professional dancer for employment in any of the aforementioned establishments. The prohibition in the issuance of licenses/permits to said persons and operators of said establishments shall include prohibition in the renewal thereof. Petitioners allege that their rights to due process and equal protection of the laws were violated as the licenses previously given to them was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing.

The lower court dismissed the cases of prohibition with preliminary injuction and upheld the constitutionality of the Ordinance in question. Hence, the petition for certiorari by way of appeal. Issue: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan, represented by respondents, can prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation Held: No Ratio: Police power is granted to municipal corporations in general terms as follows: "General power of council to enact ordinances and make regulations. - The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein." It is a general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State.If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. The case is different from Ermita Malate Hotel & Motel Operators v. City Mayor because what was involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit. The writ of certiorari is granted and the decision of the lower court reversed, set aside, and nullified. Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975 of the Municipality of Bocaue is declared void and unconstitutional.

Tolentinovs Sec of Finance 235 SCRA 632 (1994) GR 115455

Facts: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds. One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution.

Issue:

Whether

or

not

RA

7716

violates

Art.

VI,

Secs.

24

and

26(2)

of

the

Constitution

Held: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate s power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor

does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.

BengzonvsDrilon 208 SCRA 133 (1992) GR 103524

On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the Special Provision for the Supreme Court and the Lower Court s General Appropriations were vetoed by the President because a resolution by the Court providing for appropriations for retired justices has been enacted. The vetoed bill provided for the increase of the pensions of the retired justices of the Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals as well as members of the Constitutional Commission. ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is constitutional. HELD: The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in accordance to Republic Act 1797. The president has no power to set aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws. The veto is unconstitutional since the power of the president to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item. NOTES: Pocket Veto Not Allowed Under the Constitution, the President does not have the so-called pocket-veto power, i.e., disapproval of a bill by inaction on his part. The failure of the President to communicate his veto of any bill represented to him within 30 days after the receipt thereof automatically causes the bill to become a law. This rule corrects the Presidential practice under the 1935 Constitution of releasing veto messages long after he should have acted on the bill. It also avoids uncertainty as to what new laws are in force. When is it allowed? The exception is provided in par (2),Sec 27 of Art 6 of the Constitution which grants the President power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill. The veto in such case shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object. 3 ways how a bill becomes a law. 1. When the President signs it 2. When the President vetoes it but the veto is overridden by 2/3 vote of all the members of each House; and 3. When the president does not act upon the measure within 30 days after it shall have been presented to him.

PHILCONSA vs Enriquez 235 SCRA 506 (1994) GR 113105 A. FACTS: RA 7663 (former House bill No. 10900, the General Appropriations Bill of 1994) entitled An Act Appropriating Funds for the Operation of the Government of the Philippines from January 1 to December 1, 1994, and for other Purposes was approved by the President and vetoed some of the provisions. Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocation for operational expenses to any other expense category claiming that it violates Sec. 25, Art 7 of the Constitution. Issues of constitutionality were raised before the Supreme Court.

PhilConsA prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare unconstitutional and void a.) Art 16 on the Countrywide Development Fund and b.) The veto of the President of the Special provision of Art XLVIII of the GAA of 1994. 16 members of the Senate sought the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the Exec. Secretary, the Sec of Dept of Budget and Management and the National Treasurer and questions: 1.) Constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994 and 2.) the constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt services. Senators Tanada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against the same respondents. Petitioners contest the constitutionality of: 1.) veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the AFP and DPWH; and 2.) the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGUs, DPWH, and Natl Highway Authority. B. ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the president on four special provisions is constitutional and valid? C. HELD: 1. Special Provision on Debt Ceiling Congress provided for a debt-ceiling. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation for debt service. The said provisions are germane to & have direct relation w/ debt service. They are appropriate provisions & cannot be vetoed w/o vetoing the entire item/appropriation. VETO VOID. 2. Special Provision on Revolving Funds for SCUs said provision allows for the use of income & creation of revolving fund for SCUs. Provision for Western Visayas State Univ. & Leyte State Colleges vetoed by Pres. Other SCUs enjoying the privilege do so by existing law. Pres. merely acted in pursuance to existing law. VETO VALID.

3. Special Provision on Road Maintenance Congress specified 30% ratio fo works for maintenance of roads be contracted according to guidelines set forth by DPWH. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. It is not an inappropriate provision; it is not alien to the subj. of road maintenance & cannot be veoted w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. VETO VOID. 4. Special Provision on Purchase of Military Equip. AFP modernization, prior approval of Congress required before release of modernization funds. It is the so-called legislative veto. Any prov. blocking an admin.action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval must be subj. of a separate law. VETO VALID.

5. Special Provision on Use of Savings for AFP Pensions allows Chief of Staff to augment pension funds through the use of savings. According to the Consttution, only the Pres. may exercise such power pursuant to a specific law. Properly vetoed.VETO VALID. 6. Special Provision on Conditions for de-activation of CAFGUs use of special fund for the compensation of the said CAFGUs. Vetoed, Pres. requires his prior approval. It is also an amendment to existing law (PD No. 1597 & RA No. 6758). A provision in an appropriation act cannot be used to repeal/amend existing laws. VETO VALID.