FACTS: Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya.

He has retired from his office and he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom. He filed for reelection to the same office for the 1980 local elections. On the other hand, BP 52 was passed (par 1 thereof) providing disqualification for the likes of Dumlao. Dumlao assailed the BP averring that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. His petition was joined by Atty. Igot and Salapantan Jr. These two however have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayers suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign and the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of the law. ISSUE: Whether or not the there is cause of action. HELD: The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case would never have been merged. Dumlaos cause is different from Igots. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the requisites so that itd be eligible for judicial review. There are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case. In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met. The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office as null and void. The assertion that Sec 4 of BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable. In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.

Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree. But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. Republic SUPREME Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980 PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. Raul M. Gonzales for petitioners Office of the Solicitor General for respondent. of the Philippines COURT

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J: This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order filed by petitioners, in their own behalf and all others allegedly similarly situated, seeking to enjoin respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing certain provisions of Batas Pambansa Big. 51, 52, and 53 for being unconstitutional. The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a member of the Bar who, as such, has taken his oath to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo. Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Said Section 4 provides: Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C of the Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared as disqualification for any

of the elective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof. Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 6,5 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired (Emphasis supplied) Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him, and that the classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation." For their part, petitioners igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of the following statutory provisions: Sec 7. Terms of Office Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective officials hereinabove mentioned shall hold office for a term of six (6) years, which shall commence on the first Monday of March 1980. .... (Batas Pambansa Blg. 51) Sec. 4. Sec. 4. ... Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices covered by this Act, or to participate in any partisan political activity therein: provided that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima fascie evidence of such fact. ... (Batas Pambansa (Paragraphing and supplied). Big. 52) Emphasis

Section 6. Election and Campaign Period The election period shall be fixed by the Commission on Elections in accordance with Section 6, Art. XII-C of the Constitution. The period of campaign shall commence on December 29, 1979 and terminate on January 28, 1980. (ibid.) In addition to the above-cited provisions, petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr. also question the accreditation of some political parties by respondent COMELEC, as authorized by Batas Pambansa Blg. 53, on the ground that it is contrary to section 9(1)Art. XIIC of the Constitution, which provides that a "bona fide candidate for any public office shall be it. from any form of harassment and discrimination. "The question of accreditation will not be taken up in this case but in that of Bacalso, et als. vs. COMELEC et als. No. L-52232) where the issue has been squarely raised, Petitioners then pray that the statutory provisions they have challenged be declared null and void for being violative of the Constitution. I . The procedural Aspect At the outset, it should be stated that this Petition suffers from basic procedural infirmities, hence, traditionally unacceptable for judicial resolution. For one, there is a misjoinder of parties and actions. Petitioner Dumlao's interest is alien to that of petitioners Igot and Salapantan Petitioner Dumlao does not join petitioners Igot and Salapantan in the burden of their complaint, nor do the latter join Dumlao in his. The respectively contest completely different statutory provisions. Petitioner Dumlao has joined this suit in his individual capacity as a candidate. The action of petitioners Igot and Salapantan is more in the nature of a taxpayer's suit. Although petitioners plead nine constraints as the reason of their joint Petition, it would have required only a modicum more of effort tor petitioner Dumlao, on one hand said petitioners lgot and Salapantan, on the other, to have filed separate suits, in the interest of orderly procedure. For another, there are standards that have to be followed inthe exercise of the function of judicial review, namely (1) the existence of an appropriate case:, (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question: (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity and (4) the necessity that the constiutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case (People vs. Vera 65 Phil. 56 [1937]). It may be conceded that the third requisite has been complied with, which is, that the parties have raised the issue of constitutionality early enough in their pleadings. This Petition, however, has fallen far short of the other three criteria. A. Actual case and controversy.

Section 1. Election of certain Local Officials ... The election shall be held on January 30, 1980. (Batas Pambansa, Blg. 52)

It is basic that the power of judicial review is limited to the determination of actual cases and controversies. Petitioner Dumlao assails the constitutionality of the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted earlier, as being contrary to the equal protection clause guaranteed by the Constitution, and seeks to prohibit respondent COMELEC from implementing said provision. Yet, Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of that provision. No petition seeking Dumlao's disqualification has been filed before the COMELEC. There is no ruling of that constitutional body on the matter, which this Court is being asked to review on Certiorari. His is a question posed in the abstract, a hypothetical issue, and in effect, a petition for an advisory opinion from this Court to be rendered without the benefit of a detailed factual record Petitioner Dumlao's case is clearly within the primary jurisdiction (see concurring Opinion of now Chief Justice Fernando in Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30, 96 [1978]) of respondent COMELEC as provided for in section 2, Art. XII-C, for the Constitution the pertinent portion of which reads: "Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall have the following power and functions: 1) xxx 2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all members of the National Assembly and elective provincial and city officials. (Emphasis supplied) The aforequoted provision must also be related to section 11 of Art. XII-C, which provides: Section 11. Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof. B. Proper party. The long-standing rule has been that "the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement" (People vs. Vera, supra). In the case of petitioners Igot and Salapantan, it was only during the hearing, not in their Petition, that Igot is said to be a candidate for Councilor. Even then, it cannot be denied that neither one has been convicted nor charged with acts of disloyalty to the State, nor disqualified from being candidates for local elective positions. Neither one of them has been calle ed to have been adversely affected by the operation of the statutory provisions they assail as unconstitutional Theirs is a generated grievance. They have no personal nor substantial interest at stake. In the absence of any litigate interest, they

can claim no locus standi in seeking judicial redress. It is true that petitioners Igot and Salapantan have instituted this case as a taxpayer's suit, and that the rule enunciated in People vs. Vera, above stated, has been relaxed in Pascual vs. The Secretary of Public Works (110 Phil. 331 [1960], thus: ... it is well settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions nullifying at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that "the expenditure of public funds, by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds," which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. In the same vein, it has been held: In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and they may, therefore, question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. (Philippine Constitution Association, Inc., et als., vs. Gimenez, et als., 15 SCRA 479 [1965]). However, the statutory provisions questioned in this case, namely, sec. 7, BP Blg. 51, and sections 4, 1, and 6 BP Blg. 52, do not directly involve the disbursement of public funds. While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power" (Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S., 83 [1960]), or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC (see Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 [1960]), or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. (Philippine Constitution Association vs. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 [1966]), citing Philippine Constitution Association vs. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 [1965]). Besides, the institution of a taxpayer's suit, per se is no assurance of judicial review. As held by this Court in Tan vs. Macapagal (43 SCRA 677 [1972]), speaking through our present Chief Justice, this Court is vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained.

C. Unavoidability of constitutional question. Again upon the authority of People vs. Vera, "it is a wellsettled rule that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case; i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented." We have already stated that, by the standards set forth in People vs. Vera, the present is not an "appropriate case" for either petitioner Dumlao or for petitioners Igot and Salapantan. They are actually without cause of action. It follows that the necessity for resolving the issue of constitutionality is absent, and procedural regularity would require that this suit be dismissed. II. The substantive viewpoint. We have resolved, however, to rule squarely on two of the challenged provisions, the Courts not being entirely without discretion in the matter. Thus, adherence to the strict procedural standard was relaxed in Tinio vs. Mina (26 SCRA 512 [1968]); Edu vs. Ericta (35 SCRA 481 [1970]); and in Gonzalez vs. Comelec (27 SCRA 835 [1969]), the Opinion in the Tinio and Gonzalez cases having been penned by our present Chief Justice. The reasons which have impelled us are the paramount public interest involved and the proximity of the elections which will be held only a few days hence. Petitioner Dumlao's contention that section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is discriminatory against him personally is belied by the fact that several petitions for the disqualification of other candidates for local positions based on the challenged provision have already been filed with the COMELEC (as listed in p. 15, respondent's Comment). This tellingly overthrows Dumlao's contention of intentional or purposeful discrimination. The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safer guard of equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable. In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law would be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand,

it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials. Coming now to the case of retirees. Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65 year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree. But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection neither does it permit of such denial (see People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1933]). Persons similarly situated are sinlilarly treated. In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all Chose belonging to the same class (Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30 [1978] citing Felwa vs. Salas, 18 SCRA 606 [1966]; Rafael v. Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board, 21 SCRA 336 [1967]; Inchong etc., et al. vs. Hernandez 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]). The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments. The classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even it at times, it may be susceptible to the objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies" (Chief Justice Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines, 1977 ed., p. 547). There is an additional consideration. Absent herein is a showing of the clear invalidity of the questioned provision. Well accepted is the rule that to justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal breach. Courts are practically unanimous in the pronouncement that laws shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt (Peralta vs. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 55 [1978], citing Cooper vs. Telfair 4 Dall 14; Dodd, Cases on Constitutional Law, 3rd ed. 1942, 56). Lastly, it is within the compentence of the legislature to prescribe qualifications for one who desires to become a candidate for office provided they are reasonable, as in this case.

In so far as the petition of Igot and Salapantan are concerned, the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted in full earlier, and which they challenge, may be divided in two parts. The first provides: a. judgment of conviction jor any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact ... The supremacy of the Constitution stands out as the cardinal principle. We are aware of the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute, of the well-settled principle that "all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of constitutionality," and that Courts will not set aside a statute as constitutionally defective "except in a clear case." (People vs. Vera, supra). We are constrained to hold that this is one such clear case. Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of dislotalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code). And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet. there is "clear and present danger" that because of the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him. Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courts rather than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of findings between two government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person charged, will thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination. Being infected with partial declaration objectionable portion from the first portion constitutional infirmity, a of nullity of only that is mandated. It is separable of the second paragraph of

section 4 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52 which can stand by itself. WHEREFORE, 1) the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid. Said paragraph reads: SEC. 4. Special disqualification. In addition to violation of Section 10 of Article XII(C) of the Constitution and disqualifications mentioned in existing laws which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in Section 1 hereof, any retired elective provincial, city or municipal official, who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired. 2) That portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 providing that "... the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact", is hereby declared null and void, for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused. SO ORDERED. Makasiar, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur. Fernando, C.J., concurs and submits a brief separate opinion. De Castro, J., abstain as far as petitioner Dumlao is concerned.

The Facts FRIVALDO COMELEC On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition4 with the Comelec docketed as SPA No. 95-028 praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines," and that his Certificate of Candidacy be cancelled. On May 1, 1995, the Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a Resolution5 granting the petition with the following disposition:6

"WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares that respondent is DISQUALIFIED to run for the Office of Governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he is NOT a citizen of the Philippines. Accordingly, respondent's certificate of candidacy is cancelled." The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc7 affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of the Second Division. The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election returns and a Certificate of Votes8.dated May 27, 1995 was issued showing the following votes obtained by the candidates for the position of Governor of Sorsogon: Antonio Jr. Juan Frivaldo 73,440 RaulR.Lee 53,304 Isagani Ocampo 1,925 P. H. Escudero,

On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed Resolution13 holding that Lee, "not having garnered the highest number of votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered the highest number of votes, and xxx having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 xxx (is) qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon"; thus: "PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission (First Division), therefore RESOLVES to GRANT the Petition. Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court, the proclamation of Raul R. Lee as Governor of Sorsogon is hereby ordered annulled, being contrary to law, he not having garnered the highest number of votes to warrant his proclamation. Upon the finality of the annulment of the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, the Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass, proclaim petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo as the duly elected Governor of Sorsogon having garnered the highest number of votes, and he having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30,1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 and, thus, qualified to hold the office of Governor of Sorsogon. Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), the Clerk of the Commission is directed to notify His Excellency the President of the Philippines, and the Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Sorsogon of this resolution immediately upon the due implementation thereof." On December 26,1995, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Comelec en banc in its Resolution14 promulgated on February 23, 1996. On February 26, 1996, the present petition was filed. Acting on the prayer for a temporary restraining order, this Court issued on February 27, 1996 a Resolution which inter alia directed the parties "to maintain the status quo prevailing prior to the filing of this petition." The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship a Continuing Disqualification? Lee contends that the May 1,1995 Resolution53 of the Comelec Second Division in SPA No. 95-028 as affirmed in toto by Comelec En Banc in its Resolution of May 11, 1995 "became final and executory after five (5) days or on May 17,1995, no restraining order having been issued by this Honorable Court."54 Hence, before Lee "was proclaimed as the elected governor on June 30, 1995, there was already a final and executory judgment disqualifying" Frivaldo. Lee adds that this Court's two rulings (which Frivaldo now concedes were legally "correct") declaring Frivaldo an alien have also become final and

51,060

G.

On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a (supplemental) petition9 praying for his proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon. In an order10 dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the petition "only on June 29, 1995," the Comelec en bane directed "the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial candidate in the province of Sorsogon on June 29,1995 x x x." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of June 30,1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon. On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition,11 docketed as SPC No. 95-317, praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted." As such, when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) x x x was released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor x x x." In the alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec,12 the Vice-Governor not Lee should occupy said position of governor.

executory way before the 1995 elections, and these "judicial pronouncements of his political status as an American citizen absolutely and for all time disqualified (him) from running for, and holding any public office in the Philippines." We do not agree. It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in connection with the 1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in connection with the 1992 elections. That he was disqualified for such elections is final and can no longer be changed. In the words of the respondent Commission (Second Division) in its assailed Resolution:55 "The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had decided that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen and thus disqualified for the purpose of the 1988 and 1992 elections. However, there is no record of any 'final judgment' of the disqualification of Frivaldo as a candidate for the May 8, 1995 elections. What the Commission said in its Order of June 21, 1995 (implemented on June 30, 1995), directing the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, was that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen 'having been declared by the Supreme Court in its Order dated March 25, 1995, not a citizen of the Philippines.' This declaration of the Supreme Court, however, was in connection with the 1992 elections." Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose. Hence, in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration,56 we held: "Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again, as the occasion demands." The Third Issue: Comelec's Jurisdiction Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317 Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition in SPC No. 95-317 because the only "possible types of proceedings that may be entertained by the Comelec are a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case." Again, Lee reminds us that he was proclaimed on June 30, 1995 but that Frivaldo filed SPC No. 95-317 questioning his (Lee's) proclamation only on July 6, 1995 "beyond the 5-day reglementary period." Hence, according to him, Frivaldo's "recourse was to file either an election protest or a quo warranto action." This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution57 has given the Comelec ample power to "exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective x x x provincial x

x x officials." Instead of dwelling at length on the various petitions that Comelec, in the exercise of its constitutional prerogatives, may entertain, suffice it to say that this Court has invariably recognized the Commission's authority to hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations of which SPC No. 95-317 obviously is one.58 Thus, in Mentang vs. COMELEC,59 we ruled: "The petitioner argues that after proclamation and assumption of office, a pre-proclamation controversy is no longer viable. Indeed, we are aware of cases holding that pre-proclamation controversies may no longer be entertained by the COMELEC after the winning candidate has been proclaimed, (citing Gallardo vs. Rimando, 187 SCRA 463; Salvacion vs. COMELEC, 170 SCRA 513; Casimiro vs. COMELEC, 171 SCRA 468.) This rule, however, is premised on an assumption that the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to make such declaration of nullity. (citing Aguam vs. COMELEC, 23 SCRA 883; Agbayani vs. COMELEC, 186 SCRA 484.)" The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a proclamation must "be done within ten (10) days following the proclamation." Inasmuch as Frivaldo's petition was filed only six (6) days after Lee's proclamation, there is no question that the Comelec correctly acquired jurisdiction over the same. Coquilla vs COMELEC The facts are as follows: Petitioner Coquilla was born on February 17, 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided there until 1965, when he joined the United States Navy. He was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen.2 From 1970 to 1973, petitioner thrice visited the Philippines while on leave from the U.S. Navy.3 Otherwise, even after his retirement from the U.S. Navy in 1985, he remained in the United States. On October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he continued making several trips to the United States, the last of which took place on July 6, 2000 and lasted until August 5, 2000.4 Subsequently, petitioner applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 81715 to the Special Committee on Naturalization. His application was approved on November 7, 2000, and, on November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines. Petitioner was issued Certificate of Repatriation No. 000737 on November 10, 2000 and Bureau of Immigration Identification Certificate No. 115123 on November 13, 2000. On November 21, 2000, petitioner applied for registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar. His application was approved by the Election Registration Board on January 12, 2001.6 On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating therein that he had been a

resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for "two (2) years."7 On March 5, 2001, respondent Neil M. Alvarez, who was the incumbent mayor of Oras and who was running for reelection, sought the cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy on the ground that the latter had made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by stating that he had been a resident of Oras for two years when in truth he had resided therein for only about six months since November 10, 2000, when he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines. The COMELEC was unable to render judgment on the case before the elections on May 14, 2001. Meanwhile, petitioner was voted for and received the highest number of votes (6,131) against private respondents 5,752 votes, or a margin of 379 votes. On May 17, 2001, petitioner was proclaimed mayor of Oras by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.8 He subsequently took his oath of office. On July 19, 2001, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted private respondents petition and ordered the cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy on the basis of the following findings: Respondents frequent or regular trips to the Philippines and stay in Oras, Eastern Samar after his retirement from the U.S. Navy in 1985 cannot be considered as a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant . . . of the U.S.A. prior to November 10, 2000 as would qualify him to acquire the status of residency for purposes of compliance with the one-year residency requirement of Section 39(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 in relation to Sections 65 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. The one (1) year residency requirement contemplates of the actual residence of a Filipino citizen in the constituency where he seeks to be elected. All things considered, the number of years he claimed to have resided or stayed in Oras, Eastern Samar since 1985 as an American citizen and permanent resident of the U.S.A. before November 10, 2000 when he reacquired his Philippine citizenship by [repatriation] cannot be added to his actual residence thereat after November 10, 2000 until May 14, 2001 to cure his deficiency in days, months, and year to allow or render him eligible to run for an elective office in the Philippines. Under such circumstances, by whatever formula of computation used, respondent is short of the one-year residence requirement before the May 14, 2001 elections.9 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the COMELEC en banc on January 30, 2002. Hence this petition.

Issue: On the merits, the question is whether petitioner had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least one (1) year before the elections held on May 14, 2001 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy. HELD: We find that he had not. First, 39(a) of the Local Government Code (R.A No. 7160) provides: Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect. (Emphasis added) The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation,"21 but rather to "domicile" or legal residence,22 that is, "the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi)."23 A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the childs parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice).24 In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a resident alien. Indeed, residence in the United States is a requirement for naturalization as a U.S. citizen. Title 8, 1427(a) of the United States Code provides: Requirements of naturalization. Residence (a) No person, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, shall be naturalized unless such applicant, (1) immediately preceding the date of filing his application for naturalization has resided continuously, after being lawfully admitted for permanent residence, within the United States for at least five years and during the five years immediately preceding the date of filing his petition has been physically present therein for periods totaling at least half of that time, and who has resided within the State or within the district of the Service in the United States in which the applicant filed the application for at least three months, (2) has resided continuously within the United States from the date of the application up to the time

of admission to citizenship, and (3) during all the period referred to in this subsection has been and still is a person of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States. (Emphasis added) In Caasi v. Court of Appeals,25 this Court ruled that immigration to the United States by virtue of a "greencard," which entitles one to reside permanently in that country, constitutes abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. With more reason then does naturalization in a foreign country result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. Nor can petitioner contend that he was "compelled to adopt American citizenship" only by reason of his service in the U.S. armed forces.26 It is noteworthy that petitioner was repatriated not under R.A. No. 2630, which applies to the repatriation of those who lost their Philippine citizenship by accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the United States, but under R.A. No. 8171, which, as earlier mentioned, provides for the repatriation of, among others, natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. In any event, the fact is that, by having been naturalized abroad, he lost his Philippine citizenship and with it his residence in the Philippines. Until his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship on November 10, 2000, petitioner did not reacquire his legal residence in this country. Second, it is not true, as petitioner contends, that he reestablished residence in this country in 1998 when he came back to prepare for the mayoralty elections of Oras by securing a Community Tax Certificate in that year and by "constantly declaring" to his townmates of his intention to seek repatriation and run for mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections.27 The status of being an alien and a non-resident can be waived either separately, when one acquires the status of a resident alien before acquiring Philippine citizenship, or at the same time when one acquires Philippine citizenship. As an alien, an individual may obtain an immigrant visa under 1328 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1948 and an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR)29 and thus waive his status as a non-resident. On the other hand, he may acquire Philippine citizenship by naturalization under C.A. No. 473, as amended, or, if he is a former Philippine national, he may reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation or by an act of Congress,30 in which case he waives not only his status as an alien but also his status as a non-resident alien. In the case at bar, the only evidence of petitioners status when he entered the country on October 15, 1998, December 20, 1998, October 16, 1999, and June 23, 2000 is the statement "Philippine Immigration [] Balikbayan" in his 1998-2008 U.S. passport. As for his entry on August 5, 2000, the stamp bore the added inscription "good for one year stay."31 Under 2 of R.A. No. 6768 (An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program), the term balikbayan includes a former Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in a

foreign country and comes or returns to the Philippines and, if so, he is entitled, among others, to a "visa-free entry to the Philippines for a period of one (1) year" (3(c)). It would appear then that when petitioner entered the country on the dates in question, he did so as a visa-free balikbayan visitor whose stay as such was valid for one year only. Hence, petitioner can only be held to have waived his status as an alien and as a non-resident only on November 10, 2000 upon taking his oath as a citizen of the Philippines under R.A. No. 8171.32 He lacked the requisite residency to qualify him for the mayorship of Oras, Eastern, Samar. Petitioner invokes the ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections33 in support of his contention that the residency requirement in 39(a) of the Local Government Code includes the residency of one who is not a citizen of the Philippines. Residency, however, was not an issue in that case and this Court did not make any ruling on the issue now at bar. The question in Frivaldo was whether petitioner, who took his oath of repatriation on the same day that his term as governor of Sorsogon began on June 30, 1995, complied with the citizenship requirement under 39(a). It was held that he had, because citizenship may be possessed even on the day the candidate assumes office. But in the case of residency, as already noted, 39(a) of the Local Government Code requires that the candidate must have been a resident of the municipality "for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election." Nor can petitioner invoke this Courts ruling in Bengzon III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.34 What the Court held in that case was that, upon repatriation, a former natural-born Filipino is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen. Third, petitioner nonetheless says that his registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar in January 2001 is conclusive of his residency as a candidate because 117 of the Omnibus Election Code requires that a voter must have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the city or municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. As held in Nuval v. Guray,35 however, registration as a voter does not bar the filing of a subsequent case questioning a candidates lack of residency. Petitioners invocation of the liberal interpretation of election laws cannot avail him any. As held in Aquino v. Commission on Elections:36 A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a republican government those laws are themselves ordained by the people. Through their representatives, they dictate the qualifications necessary for service in government positions. And as petitioner clearly lacks one of the essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of Representatives, not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters of the Second District of Makati City

would substitute for a requirement mandated by the fundamental law itself. Fourth, petitioner was not denied due process because the COMELEC failed to act on his motion to be allowed to present evidence. Under 5(d), in relation to 7, of R.A. No. 6646 (Electoral Reforms Law of 1987), proceedings for denial or cancellation of a certificate of candidacy are summary in nature. The holding of a formal hearing is thus not de rigeur. In any event, petitioner cannot claim denial of the right to be heard since he filed a Verified Answer, a Memorandum and a Manifestation, all dated March 19, 2001, before the COMELEC in which he submitted documents relied by him in this petition, which, contrary to petitioners claim, are complete and intact in the records. III. The statement in petitioners certificate of candidacy that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for "two years" at the time he filed such certificate is not true. The question is whether the COMELEC was justified in ordering the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for this reason. We hold that it was. Petitioner made a false representation of a material fact in his certificate of candidacy, thus rendering such certificate liable to cancellation. The Omnibus Election Code provides: SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge. SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due

notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. Indeed, it has been held that a candidates statement in her certificate of candidacy for the position of governor of Leyte that she was a resident of Kananga, Leyte when this was not so37 or that the candidate was a "natural-born" Filipino when in fact he had become an Australian citizen38 constitutes a ground for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy. On the other hand, we held in Salcedo II v. COMELEC39 that a candidate who used her husbands family name even though their marriage was void was not guilty of misrepresentation concerning a material fact. In the case at bar, what is involved is a false statement concerning a candidates qualification for an office for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. This is a misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy. The cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy in this case is thus fully justified. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the resolution of the Second Division of the Commission on Elections, dated July 19, 2001, and the order, dated January 30, 2002 of the Commission on Elections en banc are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur. EN BANC [G.R. No. 127318. August 25, 1999] FRANCIS KING L. MARQUEZ, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. NOLI C. DIAZ, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 80, Muntinlupa City, and LIBERTY SANTOS, respondents. DECISION PURISIMA, J.: Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Francis King L. Marquez, assailing the 19 November 1996 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc in SPR No. 15-96, entitled Francis King L. Marquez vs. Noli C. Diaz, Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 80, Muntinlupa City, and Liberty Santos, which Resolution upheld the jurisdiction of respondent Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) to hear and decide the case of disqualification by reason of age against the herein petitioner. The COMELEC Resolution sets forth the relevant facts as follows: During the May 6, 1996 SK elections, Francis King L. Marquez and Liberty Santos ran as candidates for the position of SK Chairman of Barangay Putatan, Muntinlupa City. Marquez garnered the highest number of votes and was

proclaimed SK Chairman on election day, May 6, 1996. On May 16, 1996, private respondent filed an election protest before the Metropolitan Trial Court, Br. 80, Muntinlupa City, which protest was docketed as Civil Case No. SP 3255. Private respondent (then protestant) impugned the election of petitioner (then protestee) on the ground that the latter is disqualified by age to the office of SK Chairman. In its order of May 24, 1996, the trial court found the protest sufficient in form and substance. It issued a Temporary Restraining Order commanding petitioner to refrain from taking his oath of office as SK Chairman of Barangay Putatan, Muntinlupa City. However, on May 27, 1996, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the election protest with prayer for the cancellation of hearing. He stated that the averments in the election protest are limited only on the issue of whether or not Marquez is eligible or qualified to assume the office of SK Chairman such that private respondents right of action is a quo warranto proceeding although captioned as election protest. He sought the dismissal of the election protest on the ground that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the subject of the action and that protestant failed to comply with SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94. As to his first assignment of error, he contended that the May 6, 1996 SK elections are primarily governed by COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 to the effect that the trial courts jurisdiction is confined only to frauds, irregularities and anomalies in the conduct of the SK elections and that the determination of eligibility or qualification of a candidate for SK elections is vested with the election officer concerned under Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. And as to the second assignment of error, petitioner alleged that private respondent did not mention that she had previously filed a petition involving the same issue and parties with the Election Officer of Muntinlupa whose office according to petitioner, is considered a quasi-judicial agency of the government. In his (sic) opposition, private respondent argued that the term election protest should not be taken in such restrictive sense as to limit its definition to only such acts pertaining to the manner or conduct of the election and the attending circumstances surrounding the casting and counting of ballots. Such term, according to her, should be given the widest possible scope as to include all such questions arising from or relative to the election held. On the question of non-compliance with the Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94, she stated that the failure of the election officer of Muntinlupa to resolve the question of qualification of Marquez prompted her to file an election protest such that upon the filing of the same, there is no pending action over the same issue lodged with any tribunal or agency to speak of. On June 4, 1996, respondent judge issued an order dismissing the Motion to Dismiss and set the hearing of the case accordingly. The trial court interpreted the provision of Sec. 6 of

Comelec Resolution No. 2824 as referring to those cases filed before the SK elections and do not cover those cases filed after the election of candidates. It ruled that quo warranto proceedings fall under its jurisdiction within the purview of Sec. 253, par. 2 of the Omnibus Election Code, and that the failure of the Election Officer of Muntinlupa to act on the complaint warranted the filing by the protestant Liberty Santos) of a petition for quo warranto with the Metropolitan Trial Court o Muntinlupa under the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Dissatisfied with the aforesaid Resolution, petitioner filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition alleging that: THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 80, MUNTINLUPA CITY, PRESIDED BY PUBLIC RESPONDENT JUDGE, HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND DECIDE A DISQUALIFICATION CASE, BY REASON OF AGE IN RELATION TO THE MAY 6, 1996 SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN (SK) ELECTIONS. Petitioner contends that Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 is controlling. Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 provides: Qualifications of Elective Members - An elective official of the SK must be: (a) a registered voter; (b) a resident in the barangay for at least one (1) year immediately prior to the elections; and (c) able to read and write Filipino, any Philippine language or dialect or English. Cases involving the eligibility or qualification of candidates shall be decided by the city/municipal Election Officer (EO), whose decision shall be final. On the other hand, Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code reads: Petition for Quo Warranto - Any voter contesting the election of any municipal or barangay officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Regional Trial Court or Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court, respectively, within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election. We hold that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code applies. R. A. 7808, which took effect on September 2, 1994 provides that the Omnibus Election Code shall govern the elections of the Sangguniang Kabataan. This means that the election of Sangguniang Kabataan shall be governed by the following provisions of the OEC: Sec. 252. Election contest for barangay offices. A sworn petition contesting the election of a

barangay officer shall be filed with the proper municipal or metropolitan trial court by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election. The trial court shall decide the election protest within fifteen days after the filing thereof. The decision of the municipal or metropolitan trial court may be appealed within ten days from receipt of a copy thereof by the aggrieved party to the regional trial court which shall decide the case within thirty days from its submission, and whose decisions shall be final. Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. Any voter contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election. It was pursuant to this provision of R.A. 7808 in relation to Arts. 252-253 of the OEC that in its Resolution No. 2824, promulgated on February 6, 1996, the COMELEC provided in Section 49 as follows: Finality of Proclamation - The proclamation of the winning candidates shall be final. However, the Metropolitan Trial Courts/Municipal Trial Courts/Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MeTC/MTC/MCTC) shall have original jurisdiction over all election protest cases, whose decision shall be final. The Commission en banc in meritorious cases may entertain a petition for review of the decision of the MeTC/MTC/MCTC in accordance with the Comelec Rules of Procedure. An appeal bond of P2,000.00 shall be required, which shall be refundable if the appeal is found meritorious. [underscoring supplied]. Thus, any contest relating to the election of members of the Sangguniang Kabataan (including the chairman) whether pertaining to their eligibility or the manner of their election is cognizable by MTCs, MCTCs, and MeTCs. Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824, which provides that: cases involving the eligibility or qualification of candidates [of SK] shall be decided by the city/municipal Election officer (EO) whose decision shall be final. applies only to proceedings before the election. This is evident from the use of the word candidates in Section 6 and the phrase winning candidates in Section 49. The distinction is based on the principle that it is the proclamation which marks off the jurisdiction of the courts from the jurisdiction of election officials. Before proclamation, cases concerning eligibility of SK officers and members are cognizable by the Election Officer or EO as he is called in Section 6. But after the election and proclamation, the same cases become quo warranto cases cognizable by MTCs, MCTCs, and MeTCs.

The case of Jose M. Mercado vs. Board of Election Supervisors, in which this Court ruled that election protests involving SK elections are to be determined by the Board of Election Supervisors was decided under the aegis of COMELEC Resolution No. 2499, which took effect on August 27, 1992, Article V, Section 24 of which provides: The said board [of election supervisors] shall have direct general supervision in the conduct of elections of sangguniang kabataan in the barangay and shall act as final arbiter in the resolution of all election protests. However, COMELEC Resolution No. 2824, which took effect on February 6, 1996 and was passed pursuant to R.A. 7808, in relation to Arts. 252-253 of the OEC, has since transferred the cognizance of such cases from the BES to the MTCs, MCTCs and MeTCs. So that Section 49 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824, now provides that: the Metropolitan Trial Courts/Municipal Trial Courts/Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MeTC/MTC/MCTC) shall have original jurisdiction over all election protest cases, whose decision shall be final... Thus, the doctrine of Mercado is no longer controlling. It is also argued that Section 49 of COMELEC Resolution applies only to election protests, and does not include quo warranto suits. As already stated, quo warranto suits are now cognizable by the MTCs, MCTCs, and MeTCs pursuant to Art. 253 of the OEC and RA 7808. Section 49 of Resolution 2824 must be understood to cover both election protests and quo warranto cases, otherwise, to limit it only to election protests would leave parties in an SK election to file their quo warranto cases in the Regional Trial Court because of the absence of a specific provision. First, quo warranto proceedings involving elective barangay officials, such as the Barangay Chairman and seven [7] members, are cognizable by the MTC, MCTC or MeTC. To contend that quo warranto proceedings involving an SK Chairman should be brought in the Regional Trial Court would, in effect, make the SK Chairman, who is just an ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Barangay, more important than the Chairman and elective members of the same Sangguniang Barangay. Second, if election protests involving SK officers are cognizable by the MTCs, there is no reason why quo warranto proceedings involving the same officers should not be cognizable by the same courts. If the objection to the election of an SK Chairman involves a question both as to his eligibility for the office and of fraud in his election, two petitions would have to be filed in different fora - one in the RTC (for the quo warranto suit) and another one in the MTC (for the election protest). The same objection to the splitting of jurisdiction which has led to a reform in our law of procedure can thus be made to this interpretation.

Mindful of the jurisprudence aforecited, and after a careful study and examination of the records on hand, we are therefore led to the conclusion that the Commission on Elections correctly upheld the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa City over private respondents petition for quo warranto in Civil Case No. SP 3255. The following disquisition of respondent Commission on Elections is noteworthy: We are in accord with the trial courts interpretation that cases involving the eligibility or qualification of candidates refer to those cases filed before the SK elections and do not cover those that are filed after the election of SK candidates. The disqualification case having been filed after the election and proclamation of the winning candidate, the governing law therefore is second paragraph of Sec. 253 of the Omnibus Election Code which confers upon the respondent court the jurisdiction to take cognizance of the disqualification case filed against Marquez. Corollarily, while Sec. 49 of Comelec Resolution No. 2824 speaks of finality of the proclamation of the winning SK candidates, it does not prevent the herein respondent court from exercising original jurisdiction in the event an election protest is filed which in our opinion includes matters which could be raised in a quo warranto proceedings against a proclaimed SK candidate. Emphatically, the contention of herein petitioner that public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion when he assumed jurisdiction over the disqualification proceedings has no legal and factual basis considering that the election protest which, admittedly, is in the nature of a disqualification proceeding sought to be dismissed, was filed after the SK election, within the reglementary period of ten (10) days after proclamation of the results of the election, and duly filed by virtue of the inaction of the election officer of Muntinlupa. On the assertation that Sec. 253 of the Omnibus Election Code is not applicable on the ground that the same applies only to barangay elective officials, we hold that such contention is offtangent considering that an SK Chairman is considered a barangay official under Sec. 387 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code (sic) which provides: Sec. 387. Chief Officials and Offices. - (a) There shall be in each barangay a punong barangay, seven (7) sangguniang barangay members, the sangguniang kabataan chairman, a barangay secretary, and a barangay treasurer. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC in SPR No. 15-96 is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. [G.R. No. 120099. July 24, 1996] EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BIENVENIDO O. MARQUEZ, JR., respondents.

DECISION FRANCISCO, J.: Petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez and private respondent Bienvenido O. Marquez, Jr. (Rodriguez and Marquez, for brevity) were protagonists for the gubernatorial post of Quezon Province in the May 1992 elections. Rodriguez won and was proclaimed duly-elected governor. Marquez challenged Rodriguez victory via petition for quo warranto before the COMELEC (EPC No. 92-28). Marquez revealed that Rodriguez left the United States where a charge, filed on November 12, 1985, is pending against the latter before the Los Angeles Municipal Court for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and attempted grand theft of personal property. Rodriguez is therefore a "fugitive from justice" which is a ground for his disqualification/ineligibility under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code (R.A. 7160), so argued Marquez. The COMELEC dismissed Marquez quo warranto petition (EPC No. 92-28) in a resolution of February 2, 1993, and likewise denied a reconsideration thereof. Marquez challenged the COMELEC dismissal of EPC No. 92-28 before this Court via petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 112889. The crux of said petition is whether Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice" as contemplated by Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code based on the alleged pendency of a criminal charge against him (as previously mentioned). In resolving that Marquez petition (112889), the Court in "Marquez, Jr. vs. COMELEC" promulgated on April 18, 1995, now appearing in Volume 243, page 538 of the SCRA and hereinafter referred to as the MARQUEZ Decision, declared that: x x x, fugitive from justice includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence (x x x), and it may be so conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term." Whether or not Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice" under the definition thus given was not passed upon by the Court. That task was to devolve on the COMELEC upon remand of the case to it, with the directive to proceed therewith with dispatch conformably with the MARQUEZ Decision. Rodriguez sought a reconsideration thereof. He also filed an "Urgent Motion to Admit Additional Argument in Support of the Motion for Reconsideration" to which was attached a certification from the Commission on Immigration showing that Rodriguez left the US on June 25, 1985 roughly five (5) months prior to the institution of the criminal complaint filed against him before the Los Angeles court. The Court however denied a reconsideration of the MARQUEZ Decision.

In the May 8, 1995 election, Rodriguez and Marquez renewed their rivalry for the same position of governor. This time, Marquez challenged Rodriguez' candidacy via petition for disqualification before the COMELEC, based principally on the same allegation that Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice." This petition for disqualification (SPA No. 95-089) was filed by Marquez on April 11, 1995 when Rodriguez' petition for certiorari (112889) from where the April 18, 1995 MARQUEZ Decision sprung was still then pending before the Court. On May 7, 1995 and after the promulgation of the MARQUEZ Decision, the COMELEC promulgated a Consolidated Resolution for EPC No. 92-28 (quo warranto case) and SPA No. 95-089 (disqualification case). In justifying a joint resolution of these two (2) cases, the COMELEC explained that: 1. EPC No. 92-28 and SPA No. 95-089 are inherently related cases; 2. the parties, facts and issue involved are identical in both cases 3. the same evidence is to be utilized in both cases in determining the common issue of whether Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice" 4. on consultation with the Commission En Banc, the Commissioners unanimously agreed that a consolidated resolution of the two (2) cases is not procedurally flawed. Going now into the meat of that Consolidated Resolution, the COMELEC, allegedly having kept in mind the MARQUEZ Decision definition of "fugitive from justice", found Rodriguez to be one. Such finding was essentially based on Marquez' documentary evidence consisting of 1. an authenticated copy of the November 12, 1995 warrant of arrest issued by the Los Angeles Municipal Court against Rodriguez, and 2. an authenticated copy of the felony complaint which the COMELEC allowed to be presented exparte after Rodriguez walked-out of the hearing of the case on April 26, 1995 following the COMELEC's denial of Rodriguez' motion for postponement. With the walk-out, the COMELEC considered Rodriguez as having waived his right to disprove the authenticity of Marquez' aforementioned documentary evidence. The COMELEC thus made the following analysis: "The authenticated documents submitted by petitioner (Marquez) to show the pendency of a criminal complaint against the respondent (Rodriguez) in the Municipal Court of Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., and the fact that there is an outstanding warrant against him amply proves petitioner's contention that the respondent is a fugitive from justice. The Commission cannot look with favor on respondent's defense that long before the felony complaint was allegedly filed, respondent was already in the Philippines and he did not know of the filing of the same nor was he aware that he was being proceeded against

criminally. In a sense, thru this defense, respondent implicitly contends that he cannot be deemed a fugitive from justice, because to be so, one must be aware of the filing of the criminal complaint, and his disappearance in the place where the long arm of the law, thru the warrant of arrest, may reach him is predicated on a clear desire to avoid and evade the warrant. This allegation in the Answer, however, was not even fortified with any attached document to show when he left the United States and when he returned to this country, facts upon which the conclusion of absence of knowledge about the criminal complaint may be derived. On the contrary, the fact of arrest of respondent's wife on November 6, 1985 in the United States by the Fraud Bureau investigators in an apartment paid for respondent in that country can hardly rebut whatever presumption of knowledge there is against the respondent." And proceeding therefrom, the COMELEC, in the dispositive portion, declared: "WHEREFORE, considering that respondent has been proven to be fugitive from justice, he is hereby ordered disqualified or ineligible from assuming and performing the functions of Governor of Quezon Province. Respondent is ordered to immediately vacate said office. Further, he is hereby disqualified from running for Governor for Quezon Province in the May 8, 1995 elections. Lastly, his certificate of candidacy for the May 8, 1995 elections is hereby set aside." At any rate, Rodriguez again emerged as the victorious candidate in the May 8, 1995 election for the position of governor. On May 10 and 11, 1995, Marquez filed urgent motions to suspend Rodriguez' proclamation which the COMELEC granted on May 11, 1995. The Provincial Board of Canvassers nonetheless proclaimed Rodriguez on May 12, 1995. The COMELEC Consolidated Resolution in EPC No. 92-28 and SPA No. 95-089 and the May 11, 1995 Resolution suspending Rodriguez' proclamation thus gave rise to the filing of the instant petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 120099) on May 16, 1995. On May 22, 1995, Marquez filed an "Omnibus Motion To Annul The Proclamation Of Rodriguez To Proclaim Marquez And To Cite The Provincial Board of Canvassers in Contempt" before the COMELEC (in EPC No. 92-28 and SPA No. 95-089). Acting on Marquez' omnibus motion, the COMELEC, in its Resolution of June 23, 1995, nullified Rodriguez' proclamation and ordered certain members of the Quezon Province Provincial Board of Canvassers to explain why they should not be cited in contempt for disobeying the poll body's May 11, 1995 Resolution suspending Rodriguez' proclamation. But with respect to Marquez' motion for his proclamation, the COMELEC deferred action until after this Court has resolved the instant petition (G.R. No. 120099). Rodriguez filed a motion to admit supplemental petition to include the aforesaid COMELEC June

23, 1995 Resolution, apart from the May 7 and May 11, 1995 Resolutions (Consolidated Resolution and Order to suspend Rodriguez' proclamation, respectively). As directed by the Court, oral arguments were had in relation to the instant petition (G.R. No. 120099) on July 13, 1995. Marquez, on August 3, 1995, filed an "Urgent Motion For Temporary Restraining Order Or Preliminary Injunction" which sought to restrain and enjoin Rodriguez "from exercising the powers, functions and prerogatives of Governor of Quezon x x x." Acting favorably thereon, the Court in a Resolution dated August 8, 1995 issued a temporary restraining order. Rodriguez' "Urgent Motion To Lift Temporary Restraining Order And/Or For Reconsideration" was denied by the Court in an August 15, 1995 Resolution. Another similar urgent motion was later on filed by Rodriguez which the Court also denied. In a Resolution dated October 24, 1995, the Court "x x x RESOLVED to DIRECT the Chairman of the Commission on Elections ('COMELEC') to designate a Commissioner or a ranking official of the COMELEC to RECEIVE AND EVALUATE such legally admissible evidence as herein petitioner Eduardo Rodriguez may be minded to present by way of refuting the evidence heretofore submitted by private respondent Bienvenido Marquez, Sr., or that which can tend to establish petitioner's contention that he does not fall within the legal concept of a fugitive from justice. Private respondent Marquez may likewise, if he so desires, introduce additional and admissible evidence in support of his own position. The provisions of Sections 3 to 10, Rule 33, of the Rules of Court may be applied in the reception of the evidence. The Chairman of the COMELEC shall have the proceedings completed and the corresponding report submitted to this Court within thirty (30) days from notice hereof." The COMELEC complied therewith by filing before the Court, on December 26, 1995, a report entitled "EVIDENCE OF THE PARTIES and COMMISSION'S EVALUATION" wherein the COMELEC, after calibrating the parties' evidence, declared that Rodriguez is NOT a "fugitive from justice" as defined in the main opinion of the MARQUEZ Decision, thus making a 180-degree turnaround from its finding in the Consolidated Resolution. In arriving at this new conclusion, the COMELEC opined that intent to evade is a material element of the MARQUEZ Decision definition. Such intent to evade is absent in Rodriguez' case because evidence has established that Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines (June 25, 1985) long before the criminal charge was instituted in the Los Angeles Court (November 12, 1985). But the COMELEC report did not end there. The poll body expressed what it describes as its "persistent discomfort" on whether it read and applied correctly the MARQUEZ Decision definition of "fugitive from justice". So as not to miss anything, we quote the COMELEC's observations in full:

x x x. The main opinion's definition of a 'fugitive from justice includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but also those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution.' It proceeded to state that: This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence (Philippine Law Dictionary Third Edition, p. 399 by F.B. Moreno; Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 671; King v. Noe, 244 SC 344; 137 SE 2d 102, 103; Hughes v. Pflanz, 138 Federal Reporter 980; Tobin v. Casaus, 275 Pacific Reporter 2d p. 792), and it may be so conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term. But in the majority of the cases cited, the definition of the term 'fugitive from justice' contemplates other instances not explicitly mentioned in the main opinion. Black's Law Dictionary begins the definition of the term by referring to a 'fugitive from justice' as: (A) person, who, having committed a crime, flees from jurisdiction of the court where crime was committed or departs from his usual place of abode and conceals himself within the district. x xx Then, citing King v. Noe, the definition continues and conceptualizes a 'fugitive from justice' as: x x x a person who, having committed or been charged with a crime in one state, has left its jurisdiction and is found within the territory of another when it is sought to subject him to the criminal process of the former state. (our emphasis) In Hughes v. Pflanz, the term was defined as: a person who, having committed within a state a crime, when sought for, to be subjected to criminal process, is found within the territory of another state. Moreno's Philippine Law considers the term as an: Dictionary, 5th Ed.

expression which refers to one having committed, or being accused, of a crime in one jurisdiction and is absent for any reason from that jurisdiction. Specifically, one who flees to avoid punishment x x x (Italics ours) From the above rulings, it can be gleaned that the objective facts sufficient to constitute flight from justice are: (a) a person committed a 'crime' or has been charged for the commission thereof; and (b) thereafter, leaves the jurisdiction of the court where said crime was committed or his usual place of abode. Filing of charges prior to flight is not always an antecedent requirement to label one a 'fugitive from justice. Mere commission of a 'crime' without charges having been filed for the same and flight subsequent thereto sufficiently meet the definition. Attention is directed at the use of

the word 'crime' which is not employed to connote guilt or conviction for the commission thereof. Justice Davide's separate opinion in G.R. No. 112889 elucidates that the disqualification for being a fugitive does not involve the issue of the presumption of innocence, the reason for disqualification being that a person 'was not brought within the jurisdiction of the court because he had successfully evaded arrest; or if he was brought within the jurisdiction of the court and was tried and convicted, he has successfully evaded service of sentence because he had jumped bail or escaped. The disqualification then is based on his flight from justice. Other rulings of the United States Supreme Court further amplify the view that intent and purpose for departure is inconsequential to the inquiry. The texts, which are persuasive in our jurisdiction, are more unequivocal in their pronouncements. In King v. US (144 F. 2nd 729), citing Roberts v. Reilly (116 US 80) the United States Supreme Court held: x x x it is not necessary that the party should have left the state or the judicial district where the crime is alleged to have been committed, after an indictment found, or for the purpose of avoiding an anticipated prosecution, but that, having committed a crime within a state or district, he has left and is found in another jurisdiction (Italics supplied) Citing State v. Richter (37 Minn. 436), the Court further ruled in unmistakable language: The simple fact that they (person who have committed crime within a state) are not within the state to answer its criminal process when required renders them, in legal intendment, fugitives from justice. THEREFORE, IT APPEARS THAT GIVEN THE AUTHORITIES CITED IN G.R. NO. 112889, THE MERE FACT THAT THERE ARE PENDING CHARGES IN THE UNITED STATES AND THAT PETITIONER RODRIGUEZ IS IN THE PHILIPPINES MAKE PETITIONER A 'FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE.' From the foregoing discussions, the determination of whether or not Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice hinges on whether or not Rodriguez' evidence shall be measured against the two instances mentioned in the main opinion, or is to be expanded as to include other situations alluded to by the foreign jurisprudence cited by the Court. In fact, the spirited legal fray between the parties in this case focused on each camp's attempt to construe the Court's definition so as to fit or to exclude petitioner within the definition of a 'fugitive from justice'. Considering, therefore, the equally valid yet different interpretations resulting from the Supreme Court decision in G.R. No. 112889, the Commission deems it most conformable to said decision to evaluate the evidence in light of the varied constructions open to it and to respectfully submit the final determination of the case to the Honorable Supreme Court as the final interpreter of the law."

The instant petition dwells on that nagging issue of whether Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice, the determination of which, as we have directed the COMELEC on two (2) occasions (in the MARQUEZ Decision and in the Court's October 24, 1995 Resolution), must conform to how such term has been defined by the Court in the MARQUEZ Decision. To reiterate, a "fugitive from justice": "x x x includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution." The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction. Rodriguez' case just cannot fit in this concept. There is no dispute that his arrival in the Philippines from the US on June 25, 1985, as per certifications issued by the Bureau of Immigrations dated April 27 and June 26 of 1995, preceded the filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and of the issuance on even date of the arrest warrant by that same foreign court, by almost five (5) months. It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the US, as there was in fact no complaint and arrest warrant much less conviction to speak of yet at such time. What prosecution or punishment then was Rodriguez deliberately running away from with his departure from the US? The very essence of being a "fugitive from justice" under the MARQUEZ Decision definition, is just nowhere to be found in the circumstances of Rodriguez. With that, the Court gives due credit to the COMELEC in having made the. same analysis in its "x x x COMMISSION'S EVALUATION". There are, in fact, other observations consistent with such analysis made by the poll body that are equally formidable so as to merit their adoption as part of this decision, to wit: "It is acknowledged that there was an attempt by private respondent to show Rodriguez' intent to evade the law. This was done by offering for admission a voluminous copy of an investigation report (Exhibits I to I-17 and J to J-87 inclusive) on the alleged crimes committed which led to the filing of the charges against petitioner. It was offered for the sole purpose of establishing the fact that it was impossible for petitioner not to have known of said investigation due to its magnitude. Unfortunately, such conclusion misleads because investigations of this nature, no matter how extensive or prolonged, are shrouded with utmost secrecy to afford law enforcers the advantage of surprise and effect the arrest of those who would be charged. Otherwise, the indiscreet conduct of the investigation would be nothing short of a well-publicized announcement to the perpetrators of the imminent filing of charges against them. And having been forewarned, every effort to sabotage the

investigation may be resorted to by its intended objects. But if private respondent's attempt to show Rodriguez' intent to evade the law at the time he left the United States has any legal consequence at all, it will be nothing more than proof that even private respondent accepts that intent to evade the law is a material element in the definition of a fugitive. "The circumstantial fact that it was seventeen (17) days after Rodriguez' departure that charges against him were filed cannot overturn the presumption of good faith in his favor. The same suggests nothing more than the sequence of events which transpired. A subjective fact as that of petitioner's purpose cannot be inferred from the objective data at hand in the absence of further proof to substantiate such claim. In fact, the evidence of petitioner Rodriguez sufficiently proves that his compulsion to return to the Philippines was due to his desire to join and participate vigorously in the political campaigns against former President Ferdinand E. Marcos. For indeed, not long after petitioner's arrival in the country, the upheaval wrought by the political forces and the avalanche of events which occurred resulted in one of the more colorful events in Philippine history. The EDSA Revolution led to the ouster of former Pres. Marcos and precipitated changes in the political climate. And being a figure in these developments, petitioner Rodriguez began serving his home province as OIC-Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Quezon in 1986. Then, he was elected Governor in 1988 and continues to be involved in politics in the same capacity as reelected Governor in 1992 and the disputed reelection in 1995. Altogether, these landmark dates hem in for petitioner a period of relentless, intensive and extensive activity of varied political campaigns first against the Marcos government, then for the governorship. And serving the people of Quezon province as such, the position entails absolute dedication of one's time to the demands of the office. "Having established petitioner's lack of knowledge of the charges to be filed against him at the time he left the United States, it becomes immaterial under such construction to determine the exact time when he was made aware thereof. While the law, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, does not countenance flight from justice in the instance that a person flees the jurisdiction of another state after charges against him or a warrant for his arrest was issued or even in view of the imminent filing and issuance of the same, petitioner's plight is altogether a different situation. When, in good faith, a person leaves the territory of a state not his own, homeward bound, and learns subsequently of charges filed against him while in the relative peace and service of his own country, the fact that he does not subject himself to the jurisdiction of the former state does not qualify him outright as a fugitive from justice. "The severity of the law construed in the manner as to require of a person that he subject himself to the jurisdiction of another state while already in his country or else be disqualified from office, is more apparent when applied in petitioner's case. The criminal process of the United States

extends only within its territorial jurisdiction. That petitioner has already left said country when the latter sought to subject him to its criminal process is hardly petitioner's fault. In the absence of an intent to evade the laws of the United States, petitioner had every right to depart therefrom at the precise time that he did and to return to the Philippines. No justifiable reason existed to curtail or fetter petitioner's exercise of his right to leave the United State and return home. Hence, sustaining the contrary proposition would be to unduly burden and punish petitioner for exercising a right as he cannot be faulted for the circumstances that brought him within Philippine territory at the time he was sought to be placed under arrest and to answer for charges filed against him. "Granting, as the evidence warrants, that petitioner Rodriguez came to know of the charges only later, and under his circumstances, is there a law that requires petitioner to travel to the United States and subject himself to the monetary burden and tedious process of defending himself before the country's courts? "It must be noted that moral uprightness is not a standard too far-reaching as to demand of political candidate the performance of duties and obligations that are supererogatory in nature. We do not dispute that an alleged 'fugitive from justice' must perform acts in order not to be so categorized. Clearly, a person who is aware of the imminent filing of charges against him or of the same already filed in connection with acts he committed in the jurisdiction of a particular state, is under an obligation not to flee said place of commission. However, as in petitioner's case, his departure from the United States may not place him under a similar obligation. His subsequent knowledge while in the Philippines and nonsubmission to the jurisdiction of the former country does not operate to label petitioner automatically a fugitive from justice. As he was a public officer appointed and elected immediately after his return to the country, petitioner Rodriguez had every reason to devote utmost priority to the service of his office. He could not have gone back to the United States in the middle of his term nor could he have traveled intermittently thereto without jeopardizing the interest of the public he serves. To require that of petitioner would be to put him in a paradoxical quandary where he is compelled to violate the very functions of his office." However, Marquez and the COMELEC (in its "COMMISSION'S EVALUATION" as earlier quoted) seem to urge the Court to re-define "fugitive from justice." They espouse the broader concept of the term as culled from foreign authorities (mainly of U.S. vintage) cited in the MARQUEZ Decision itself, i.e., that one becomes a "fugitive from justice" by the mere fact that he leaves the jurisdiction where a charge is pending against him, regardless of whether or not the charge has already been filed at the time of his flight. Suffice it to say that the "law of the case" doctrine forbids the Court to craft an expanded re-definition of "fugitive from justice" (which is at variance with the MARQUEZ Decision) and proceed therefrom in resolving the instant

petition. The various definitions of that doctrine have been laid down in People v. Pinuila, 103 Phil. 992, 999, to wit: "'Law of the case' has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court." (21 C.J.S. 330) "It may be stated as a rule of general application that, where the evidence on a second or succeeding appeal is substantially the same as that on the first or preceding appeal, all matters, questions, points, or issues adjudicated on the prior appeal are the law of the case on all subsequent appeals and will not be considered or readjudicated therein." (5 C.J.S. 1267) "In accordance with the general rule stated in Section 1821, where, after a definite determination, the court has remanded the cause for further action below, it will refuse to examine question other than those arising subsequently to such determination and remand, or other than the propriety of the compliance with its mandate; and if the court below has proceeded in substantial conformity to the directions of the appellate court, its action will not be questioned on a second appeal. "As a general rule a decision on a prior appeal of the same case is held to be the law of the case whether that decision is right or wrong, the remedy of the party deeming himself aggrieved being to seek a rehearing." (5 C.J.S. 1276-77). "Questions necessarily involved in the decision on a former appeal will be regarded as the law of the case on a subsequent appeal, although the questions are not expressly treated in the opinion of the court, as the presumption is that all the facts in the case bearing on the point decided have received due consideration whether all or none of them are mentioned in the opinion." (5 C.J.S. 1286-87). To elaborate, the same parties (Rodriguez and Marquez) and issue (whether or not Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice") are involved in the MARQUEZ Decision and the instant petition. The MARQUEZ Decision was an appeal from EPC No. 92-28 (the Marquez' quo warranto petition before the COMELEC). The instant petition is also an appeal from EPC No. 92-28 although the COMELEC resolved the latter jointly with SPA No. 95-089 (Marquez' petition for the disqualification of Rodriguez). Therefore, what was irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule in the MARQUEZ Decision must govern the instant petition. And we specifically refer to the concept of "fugitive from justice" as defined in the main opinion in the MARQUEZ Decision which highlights the significance of an intent to evade but which Marquez and the COMELEC, with their proposed expanded definition, seem to trivialize.

Besides, to re-define "fugitive from justice" would only foment instability in our jurisprudence when hardly has the ink dried in the MARQUEZ Decision. To summarize, the term "fugitive from justice" as a ground for the disqualification or ineligibility of a person seeking to run for any elective local position under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code, should be understood according to the definition given in the MARQUEZ Decision, to wit: "A 'fugitive from justice' includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution." (Italics ours.)" Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof that there has already been a conviction or at least, a charge has already been filed, at the time of flight. Not being a "fugitive from justice" under this definition, Rodriguez cannot be denied the Quezon Province gubernatorial post. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Resolutions of the COMELEC dated May 7, 1995 (Consolidated Resolution), May 11, 1995 (Resolution suspending Rodriguez' proclamation) and June 23, 1995 (Resolution nullifying Rodriguez' proclamation and ordering the Quezon Province Provincial Board of Canvassers to explain why they should not be cited in contempt) are SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED. Romero, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Hermosisima, Jr., and Panganiban, JJ., concur. Torres, Jr., J., concurs in a separate opinion. Vitug, J., dissents. Bellosillo, J., on leave. Marquez v. COMELEC Facts: Marquez, a candidate for an elective position in Quezon Province during the 1998 elections, filed a petition praying for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Rodriguez on the ground of disqualification under section 40 of the Local Government Code (Section 40. Disqualification. The following persons are disqualified from running for any local elective position (e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad.) Rodriguez is allegedly criminally charged with insurance fraud in the United States and that his arrest is yet to be served because of his flight from the country. The COMELEC dismissed Marquezs Petition. Rodriguez was proclaimed the Governor-elect of Quezon. Issues: WON Rodriguez, at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is said to be a fugitive from justice as provided for in section 40 of the Local Government Code.

Held: Fugitive from justice does not mean a person convicted by final judgment. It includes those who after being charged flee to avoid prosecution. The COMELEC is directed to proceed and settle the case in conformity of the given clarification with the term fugitive from justice. Rodriguez v. COMELEC Facts: In the May 1995 elections for governor, Marquez questioned Rodriguezs candidacy via a petition for disqualification before the COMELEC, based on the allegation that Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice" for leaving the US where a charge against him for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and attempted grand theft of personal property was pending. Marquez claims that Rodriguez should be disqualified or held ineligible under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code. COMELEC then promulgated a Consolidated Resolution for EPC No. 92-28 (quo warranto case filed by Marquez in 1992 elections) and SPA No. 95-089 (present disqualification case), where it found Rodriguez a fugitive from justice in line with the MARQUEZ Decisions (1995) definition of "fugitive from justice. With Rodriguezs walk-out during the hearing of the case, COMELEC considered him as having waived his right to disprove the authenticity of Marquez' documentary evidence. Nevertheless, Rodriguez emerged as the victorious candidate in the May 8, 1995 election for the position of governor. However, COMELEC also made a report entitled "EVIDENCE OF THE PARTIES and COMMISSION'S EVALUATION" wherein the COMELEC, after calibrating the parties' evidence, declared that Rodriguez is NOT a "fugitive from justice" as defined in the main opinion of the MARQUEZ Decision, thus making a 180-degree turnaround from its finding in the Consolidated Resolution. COMELEC opined that intent to evade is a material element of the MARQUEZ Decision definition. Such intent to evade is absent in Rodriguez' case because evidence has established that Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines (June 25, 1985) long before the criminal charge was instituted in the Los Angeles Court (November 12, 1985). Issue: Is Rodriguez a fugitive from justice as defined by the Court in the MARQUEZ Decision? Held:No. A fugitive from justice is defined as not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that makes a person leave a particular jurisdiction, and there can only be intent to evade

prosecution or punishment when the fleeing person knows of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction. Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof that there has already been a conviction or at least, a charge has already been filed, at the time of flight. This cannot be applied in the case of Rodriguez. Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines on June 25, 1985, five months before the filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and of the issuance of the arrest warrant by that same foreign court. It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the US, as there was in fact no complaint and arrest warrant much less conviction to speak of yet at such time. The Court also agrees with the COMELEC that: -The voluminous copy of an investigation report presented by Marquez in order to establish the fact that it was impossible for petitioner not to have known of said investigation due to its magnitude is misleading because investigations of this nature, no matter how extensive or prolonged, are shrouded with utmost secrecy to afford law enforcers the advantage of surprise and effect the arrest of those who would be charged. - The circumstantial fact that it was 17 days after Rodriguez' departure that charges against him were filed cannot overturn the presumption of good faith in his favor. The evidence presented by Rodriguez even proves that his compulsion to return to the Philippines was due to his desire to join and participate vigorously in the political campaigns against former President Ferdinand E. Marcos. And being a figure in the events leading to the EDSA Revolution, Rodriguez began serving his home province as OIC-Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Quezon in 1986, Governor in 1988, re-elected Governor in 1992 and the disputed re-election in 199