About the author ESSaY

Edward P.
The Open Society and Its Critics:
Joseph Minorities and Political Lobbying
in the United States
Edward P. Joseph is a leading
commentator on international affairs.
His articles have been published in
Foreign Affairs, the New York Times and the
Washington Post. He is co-author, with By Edward P. Joseph February 2008
Michael O’Hanlon, of the June 2007
Brookings-Saban Center paper, The Case
for Soft Partition in Iraq.
Joseph’s work has frequently taken him
to the Middle East. In 2002, he visited
Israel and the Palestinian territories at
the height of the Palestinian intifada.
Also, he served in Baghdad during 2004 as
Coordinator of the US government’s main
democracy assistance program to the
interim Iraqi Government.
Joseph is Visiting Scholar and
Professorial Lecturer at Johns Hopkins
School of Advanced International Studies
in Washington, DC.

About ZWORD

Z Word is an online journal focusing on

the contemporary debate over Zionism,
anti-Zionism, anti-Semitism and related
areas. Editorially independent, Z Word
identifies and challenges anti-Zionist
Rough and Tumble: American politics may not be for the fainthearted, but anyone is welcome
orthodoxies in mainstream political Photo credit: Digital Stock Corporation
exchange.
Z Word is supported by the American
Jewish Committee. To learn more about
Z Word, visit us online at: Mohsin Hamid is an unlikely point of entry into the flawed assumptions of
John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt1. After all, Hamid, a British citizen born in
www.z-word.com
Pakistan, is the author of an acclaimed novel, The Reluctant Fundamentalist, which
or contact the editors at:
tells the story of a Pakistani domiciled in the United States who becomes so
info@z-word.com disillusioned in the aftermath of the 9/11 atrocities that he returns to Pakistan.
Yet Hamid, in an October 2007 interview with the New York Times,
CREDITS nailed down a crucial facet of America that Mearsheimer and Walt, and
© Copyright the American Jewish
their many admirers in Europe, have ignored. “Americans,” Hamid said,
Committee (AJC). All content “are more inclined to think (whether you are a Muslim or not) if you speak
herein, unless otherwise specified, is with an American accent, you’re an American. In Europe, it’s more a ques-
owned solely by the AJC and may not tion of tribe. In Europe you can be a second- or third-generation Turkish-
disseminated in any way without prior
written consent from the AJC. All rights German, and there is still a question of whether you are European.”2
reserved.
 This relative openness on the part of the United States
helps explain why American Muslims feel so much more
integrated, less alienated and more engaged as citizens
than their European counterparts. As a direct conse-
quence, minorities in America have fewer qualms about
turning to the political process in order to achieve their
goals—even when it comes to delicate matters like defining
what counts as the “national interest” in foreign policy.
American Exceptionalism
Hamid’s observation about the difference in Muslim at-
titudes on either side of the Atlantic is backed up by compre-
hensive public opinion research. In a groundbreaking May
2007 survey, Pew Research found that Muslim Americans
are “assimilated, happy with their lives, and moderate with
respect to many of the issues that have divided Muslims
and Westerners around the world…. [Muslim Americans]
are decidedly American in their outlook, values, and
attitudes.”3 These attitudes in America “stand in contrast
with those of Muslim minorities of Western Europe [based
on] Pew Global Attitudes surveys conducted in 2006 in
Great Britain, France, Germany and Spain…. Nearly half
of Muslims in the U.S. (47%) say they think of themselves
first as a Muslim, rather than as an American. But far
more Muslims in three of the four Western European
nations surveyed said they considered themselves first
as Muslims, rather than citizens of their countries.”4
Remarkably, on the decisive issue of Israel, Pew
found that “Muslim Americans are far more likely than
Muslims in the Middle East and elsewhere to say that a
way can be found for the state of Israel to exist so that
the rights of the Palestinians are addressed. In this re-
gard, the views of Muslim Americans resemble those of the
general public in the United States” (emphasis added.).5
Put together, the views of Hamid and his fellow
Muslims in America mean that something is seri-
ously awry. They are apparently rather satisfied in a
country that Mearsheimer and Walt insist is in the grips
of “The Israel Lobby”—a lobby whose impact, they
maintain, has gravely worsened America’s standing
among Muslims inside and outside the Islamic world.
In Europe in particular, Mearsheimer and Walt have
been hailed6 for their “courage” in standing up against
the perceived taboo of discussing Jewish influence on US
foreign policy.7 Yet few voices in Europe or the US have
The Open Society and Its Critics: Minorities and Political Lobbying in the United States 2
noted this glaring paradox: how can it be that in America,
where foreign policy has supposedly been hijacked by
groups pushing Israel’s interests over all others, Muslim
citizens have far more affinity with their adopted coun-
try than do their counterparts in Europe? Indeed, how
can it be that Muslim Americans have such affinity with
their fellow Americans—including on the signature
topic of Israel—than their alienated counterparts in
Europe, where foreign policy has traditionally been much
more oriented towards the Arab side in the conflict?
Engaging in the Political Process
One British academic, Christopher Hill of Cambridge
University, has gamely tried to tackle the subject. Hill’s
article “Bringing War Home,” in the September 2007
issue of International Relations, examines how foreign
policy and Muslim attitudes intersect in the UK, the US
and France. Hill acknowledges “generalized Muslim
alienation” in the UK and links this to British foreign policy
which, despite being more “balanced” on the Palestinian
issue, has followed the US into Iraq and Afghanistan.8
What Hill cannot explain is why America’s decidedly
pro-Israel foreign policy does not alienate its own Muslim
communities. Hill’s view of America, common to many
European intellectuals, is one in which Jewish influence not
only dominates the power structure, but intimidates the
Muslim and Arab American polities. In a passage redolent of
European misconceptions about the US, Hill asserts—
without support—that “(A)ny Arab, Iranian or other form of
Islamic group [in the US] which does not accept the param-
eters of the neo-conservative orthodoxy will not only not
get a hearing, but it is likely to be the focus of suspicion.”9
This caricature of an invisible, intimidated Arab com-
munity stacked against an omnipotent, insidious Israel
lobby is similar to that purveyed by Mearsheimer and
Walt. On the one hand, Mearsheimer and Walt “repeat-
edly emphasize” that “lobbying on Israel’s behalf is wholly
legitimate” and is “simply part of the normal rough-and-
tumble that is the essence of democratic politics.” On the
other hand, they lament the “illegitimate extremes” that
“some (emphasis added) pro-Israel groups” have taken,
for example, attempting to silence individuals “who hold
views they dislike” and intimidating and smearing crit-
ics. In the same paragraph, however, this “some” morphs
back into the Israel lobby as a whole. The authors conclude
that “the lobby” (not “some” exceptional elements within
the lobby) uses “strong arm tactics” and other methods
that “have no place in a democratic society” effectively
shutting out Arab voices and their sympathizers.10
In this rough and tumble of democratic politics in the
US, dissenting, pro-Arab viewpoints are nowhere to be
found, according to Mearsheimer and Walt. Indeed, they
put the term, “Arab lobby” in quotes (unlike the Israel
Lobby, which is emblazoned as the title of their book),
suggesting it does not even exist. They dismiss significant
defeats for Israel in the American arena, notably the
Reagan Administration’s 1982 sale of AWACS aircraft
to Saudi Arabia, as having no import or consequence.
Their explanation for the weakness of “the Arab lobby”
is that, unlike the Israel lobby—which does not require
“...Muslim and Arab-American groupings
bear a significant resemblance in diversity
to the Jewish organizations which comprise
the core of Mearsheimer and Walt’s ‘Israel
Lobby’”
quotation marks—it lacks “an indigenous base of sup-
port in the United States.” Arab states like Saudi Arabia,
unlike Israel, “must hire foreign agents to do their bid-
ding. Their support is not rooted in American soil.”11
Another harsh critic of the “Zionist lobby,” Janice
J. Terry, takes a different view. Terry is as frustrated as
Mearsheimer and Walt with the outsized influence of
Israel’s supporters, yet she acknowledges that there is a
cast of pro-Arab lobbyists and interest groups that are
also active in advancing an alternative viewpoint. Unlike
Mearsheimer and Walt, Terry believes that the weakness
of Arab interest groups doesn’t stem from the fact that
they are not grounded in the US, but rather that they are
“small and under-financed” and “plagued by divisive-
ness.”12 Terry goes into impressive detail into the origins
and composition of various pro-Arab and pro-Israel
groups, lamenting the weakness of the former and the
strength of the latter, but not hesitating to confirm that
Arab Americans do have a voice in the United States.
Whatever the explanation for the relative ineffective-
ness of a counterweight lobby to Israel’s supporters in
The Open Society and Its Critics: Minorities and Political Lobbying in the United States 3
the US, it is noteworthy that this has not translated into
the scenes of Muslim rage and alienation increasingly
common in Europe. The Pew survey states, “overwhelm-
ingly, Muslim Americans believe that hard work pays
off in this society.”13 And that hard work, Muslims
seem to acknowledge, extends to lobbying as well.
Rather than whine about the the Israel lobby, noted
Muslim authors and organizers Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf
and Daisy Khan argue that “[we] American Muslims need to
face up to some tough challenges. First, we need to establish
credibility by making clear our concerns over U.S. foreign
policy and its impact on Muslims around the world.”14
Similarly, Fawaz A. Gerges of Sarah Lawrence University
asserts calmly that “it has taken the Israeli lobby half a cen-
tury to arrive at this historical juncture. It will likely take
the Muslim community as long, if and when the community
decides to organize itself politically and institutionally. The
key word is institutional building, which is in its infancy.” 15
Like Abdul Rauf and Khan, Gerges believes that community
mobilization, not bitterness and retreat, is the way forward.
All the indications are that Muslim Americans have
heeded this advice. It might even be said, when it comes
to both the profusion of groups and the range of politi-
cal and religious views held, that the Muslim and Arab
American groupings bear a significant resemblance in
diversity to the Jewish organizations which comprise
the core of Mearsheimer and Walt’s “Israel Lobby.”
Perhaps the most vocal Muslim American organiza-
tion is the Council on American-Islamic Relations
(CAIR)—often criticized for what its detractors charge is a
sympathetic attitude towards Hamas and Hezbollah16 —
but it is not the only one. Nor is there a standard set of
issues which all Muslim American organizations work
on. For example, the American Islamic Congress (AIC),
led by an Iraqi woman, Zainab al Suwaiji17, emphasizes
the importance of Muslim Americans leading the charge
against anti-American sentiment in the Islamic world.
Yet all these groups, whether progressive or conservative,
proudly engage in the political process. Indeed, CAIR’s
endorsement of Mearsheimer and Walt sits awkwardly
with the impressive roster of elected officials on its own
website, beginning with President Bush, who have spo-
ken warmly of the Muslim contribution to America.
CAIR’s website provides prominent, thorough instruc-
tions on how members should engage Congress, register
voters, contact the media and advance issues. Contrary to
the message from Israel lobby critics (that pro-Arab and
Muslim groups are dejected and demoralized against the
titanic power of Israel’s friends), the dominant message,
shared by other groups like the AIC, stresses empowerment,
not impotence. The theme is clearly to encourage American
Muslims to speak out, not fulminate at being shut out.
In that sense, European supporters of Mearsheimer and
Walt would do well to study how the American systems’
openness works for the cause of integration of diverse
groups. Yossi Shain, an academic at Georgetown University,
argues with prodigious evidence that, precisely through po-
litical participation and lobbying, Muslims in America trade
European-style isolation for American-style integration
and respect for democratic values. Shain cites examples
such as the 1994 election of Spencer Abraham, an Arab
American, to the United States Senate as pulling even de-
vout Muslims into group-oriented political activism.18 Like
Jews, Armenians and other ethnic lobbies, Arab Americans,
many of whom are Christian, generally advance their cause
in the name of the national interest and in the vocabulary
of democratic values, further reinforcing the compat-
ibility of both group identity and affinity as Americans.19
An article written during the riots in rundown, largely
Muslim suburbs in France in the fall of 2005, by Niraj
Warikoo of the Detroit Free Press, suggests that Yossi
Shain’s thesis has its adherents among Arab Americans
as well. Warikoo chronicled the stark contrast in Arab-
and Muslim-American attitudes in Michigan. One im-
migrant, Ahmed Hammoud, told Warikoo that despite
graduating from a top university, “in France, you’re never
considered French if you’re of Arab descent. It’s easier
here [in America], people are more open.”20 Hammoud
linked this openness to the ability to organize on po-
litical issues, helping found Dearborn’s Arab American
Political Action Committee. At a crowded event to
mobilize the community to support selected candidates,
a Palestinian American, Nasser Abunab, was moved to
declare, “this is an example of how open America is, we
don’t sweep things under the rug like Europeans.”
This freedom—and societal encouragement—to
assemble is central to America’s superior ability to inte-
grate Muslim communities at time of fear over Islamist
terrorism. Both Europe and America frequently struggle
when Muslims wish to build a neighborhood mosque.
But as The Economist observed, “[America’s approach] is
fairer to Muslims…Although America has plenty of Islam-
The Open Society and Its Critics: Minorities and Political Lobbying in the United States 4
bashers ready to play on people’s fears, it offers better
protection to the mosque builders [than Europe does.]
In particular, its constitution, legal system and political
culture all generally take the side of religious liberty.”21
Anyone Can Do It
It is no coincidence that a system that favors religious
freedom also is open to ethno-religious communities
that mobilize. Tony Smith, another fierce Israel lobby
critic, acknowledges that “it is the structure of American
democracy that allows ethnic communities … access to
policy-making.”22 Smith adds that “the chief feature of
American politics is that relative to other democracies …
the American state is comparatively lacking in autonomy
because it is highly penetrated by interest groups that
are capable of making their agenda that of the govern-
ment.” In fact, these limits on state and executive power
had their origin in part on religious grounds. Far from
requiring enormous finances and resources, the American
system—founded on circumscribing the role of the state—
is distinctively receptive, particularly in Congress, to the
demands of citizens and groups.” Though many “believe
that it takes hundreds of thousands of people to influence
foreign policy,” Janice Terry states that, “only 5,000 to
10,000 committed activists can have a substantial impact.”
There are vivid examples ripped from the headlines of
small ethnic lobbying groups wielding substantial influ-
ence. On 10 October 2007, Armenian Americans, who num-
ber but 1.5 million (in other words, barely half-a-percent)
of the US population, convinced the House International
Relations Committee to pass a resolution recognizing the
genocide of Armenians by Ottoman Turkey. On 14 October,
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, defying ap-
peals from the Administration, vowed to take the measure
to the floor of the House for a full vote.23 By the own
accounts of senior members of the Armenian American
community, this tiny group managed to pull off a sub-
stantial Congressional foreign policy victory not through
money, but through sheer persistence and group cohesion.24
Despite substantial internal differences in policy on other
issues (mirroring the wide disparity of views within the
Jewish American, Arab American and Muslim American
communities), Armenians are united in their demand that
their shared national tragedy be recognized (again, mirror-
ing Jewish cohesiveness on issues related to the Holocaust.)
Focused, persistent and organized, the Armenians pre- Huntington has warned that ethnic demands subordinate
vailed at a time when many in the Administration were the “national interest” to foreign interests.29 Israel lobby
seized of the resolution’s potential to aggravate Turkey. critic Tony Smith worries that ethnic lobbies contribute to
After the victory in committee, the Turkish lobby swung the “Balkanization of the United States” while damaging
into action, helped by a consortium of Turkish officials “the national interest” by fostering an “incoherent foreign
and Turkish-American organizations aided by a former policy.”30 Concerns about the ability of ethnic groups to
Congressman.25 As the message from the Turkish lobby
intensified, and as tensions mounted in Turkey and neigh-
boring Iraqi Kurdistan, the Armenian genocide resolution “(Mearsheimer and Walt’s) conceit is that an
was shelved. Indeed, Turkish experts now state that follow- amorphous foreign policy elite, presumably
ing its initial fury at the US over the Committee resolution white and non-ethnic, knows better than
on genocide, Ankara sees the fact that the resolution has
stalled as an “amicable gesture.”26 The Armenian-Turkish
do minority groups what the true national
tussle suggests that the solution to “factions” proposed interest is”
by James Madison—competition - is indeed the remedy
to the age-old anxiety that democracy will be hijacked by influence foreign policy go back to the era of Theodore
particular interests. It is also a reminder that the Executive, Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. Mearsheimer and Walt
which steadfastly opposed the Armenian cause, is far reflect this tradition; their true preoccupation is a system
less vulnerable to ethnic lobbying than is Congress. that permits a highly organized minority, be it Jewish or
Rather than fostering traditional stereotypes about Armenian or other, to subvert the “true” national interest.
Jewish power, those who want to see a change in US foreign Of course, none of these prominent academics an-
policy in the Middle East should follow the Armenian ex- swers the eternal question: just who gets to determine
ample and do the hard work of making their case. One group “the national interest,” if not competing ethnic groups
which happens to consist of mainly Muslims, and which and power centers? Just as Supreme Court Justice Potter
has embraced this lesson, is the Kurdish community. Many Stewart famously said about obscenity, these academic gray
Kurdish Americans recently demonstrated in several US cit- beards apparently know the national interest when they see
ies including Washington on the eve of a crucial meeting be- it. And they know with certainty that US “unconditional”
tween President Bush and Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan. support for Israel isn’t in the national interest.31 Instead of
Unlike their counterparts in Europe (be they Turkish or fostering a reasonable debate about how to balance par-
Kurdish), these Muslim Kurds see their participation in ticular ethnic interests with wider interests, Mearsheimer,
the lobbying process as part of their American identity. Walt, Huntington and Smith would like to restrict debate.
One demonstrator justified the action precisely through Their conceit is that an amorphous foreign policy elite,
her American identity, stating proudly to a reporter, “we presumably white and non-ethnic, knows better than do
are Kurds, yes—but we are also Kurdish Americans!”27 minority groups what the true national interest is. In fact,
their perspective is just as parochial as those of the minor-
The National Interest: Who Decides ity groups, most obviously American Jews, whose influence
they assail. It isn’t “the national interest” that is at stake
Palestinian sympathizers who cheer Mearsheimer and when the “Israel lobby” or “the Armenian lobby” rises to
Walt’s depiction of the Israel lobby as, effectively, a subver- grab the ear—and voice—of the country; rather, it is their
sive movement, are missing the core irony of their message. conception of the national interest that is put in jeopardy.
While the authors have trained their eyes on Israel and Those who believe passionately in support for Taiwan,
its supporters their book has direct implications for any Kosovo, or indeed even Palestine should take care before
minority influence over “the national interest.” It is no coin- embracing the hidden elitism of Mearsheimer, Walt or oth-
cidence that Mearsheimer and Walt offer effusive praise in ers in the anti-Israel lobby.32 Today, their main preoccupa-
their introduction to the eminent political scientist, Samuel tion is policy on Israel, tomorrow it could be any other inter-
Huntington.28 Assailing the advent of multiculturalism, est of particular concern to a mobilized group, exercising its

The Open Society and Its Critics: Minorities and Political Lobbying in the United States 5
“legitimate rights” but working against “the national inter- Middle East is dangerously skewed towards Israel need to
est.” The broader message from these Israel lobby critics is learn how to make their case—on the merits—not through
that foreign policy in American democracy is too important stigmatizing Israel’s sympathizers. Rather than disparage
to be left to the people’s various ethnic lobbies. And that is the American system, which permits the “Israel lobby”
a position that is both undemocratic and un-American. and other ethnic lobbies to operate, Europeans more than
anyone need to study how the American system’s openness
works for the integration of diverse groups. For as long
“Rather than disparage the American as America remains open to ethnic lobbying that reflects
system...Europeans more than anyone American values—and does not reward the decidedly
need to study how the American system’s un-American stigmatization espoused by Mearsheimer and
openness works for the integration of diverse Walt—Jews, Muslims and the national interest all benefit.
Finally, pro-Israel groups benefit as well from embrac-
groups” ing America’s openness to a diversity of viewpoints and
influences, including those that differ on Israel-Palestine
What’s more, at a time when integration of Muslim policy. The small minority who might be tempted them-
populations is at a premium for national security, it is most selves to resort to the “smear tactics” that Mearsheimer
certainly against the national interest. If America is to avoid and Walt allege should reflect carefully. There is no reason
not just another 9/11, but the 7/7 experienced in the United to emulate these authors, whose tract amounts to an
Kingdom (terrorist attacks produced by homegrown, indictment of an ethno-religious group and its supporters.
disaffected and alienated Islamists), it needs to embrace, Speaking out on behalf of one’s issues, without stereotyp-
not oppose, its openness to citizen influence from Muslims ing or stigmatizing the other side, is part of what makes
and others. Those worried that American policy on the America so great—and Mearsheimer and Walt so wrong.

The Open Society and Its Critics: Minorities and Political Lobbying in the United States 6
1 Mearsheimer, John J. and Walt, Stephen M., The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, New York: 2007
2 Perlez, Jane. “A Pakistan-American Voice in Search of a True Home.” New York Times, 13 October 2007, A4.
3 Pew Research Center. “Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream.” 22 May, 2007, p. 1.
4 Ibid, p. 3.
5 Ibid.
6 See, for example, Philippe Grangrereau, “Le lobby israélien au cœur de la polémique aux Etats-Unis,” Liberation, 4 October 2007, and Geoffrey Wheatcroft,
“Costs and Benefits,” The Guardian, 29 September 2007
7 Mearsheimer and Walt state repeatedly that the Israel Lobby comprises far more than Jews, for example, evangelical Christians who are strong Israel
supporters. However, the “taboo” which Mearsheimer and Walt have “broken” only makes sense in connection to Jews who, they note, have historically
been vilified as manipulating and maintaining power through a “cabal.”
8 “In a survey of more than 450 Muslim students … after the July 2005 bombings 62 per cent said that British foreign policy had played a ‘major’ or ‘complete’
part in leading to the attacks. More than a quarter said they felt a conflict between their loyalty to the UK and their loyalty to the umma.” Hill, Christopher.
“Bringing War Home.” International Relations. 21 (3): October, 2007, p. 275. See also p. 266: “Despite the higher levels of suspicion and misunderstanding
[in the US], there have been relatively few intercommunal problems. Muslims have suffered disproportionately from the heightened security concerns
after 9/11, but there have been no cases of pogroms or riots of the kind which have disfigured relations between blacks and whites … or which have occurred
between Muslim and white youths in some British towns.”
9 Hill, p. 271.
10 The Israel Lobby, p. 185.
11 The Israel Lobby, p. 144.
12 Terry, Janice J. US Foreign Policy in the Middle East: The Role of Lobbies and Special Interest Groups, Pluto Press, Ann Arbor, MI:2005, p. 62. Despite the far less
salacious title of her book, Terry is just as tendentious as Mearsheimer and Walt. She invokes the term “Zionist lobby” as an epithet, and apparently blames
US policy on the Palestinian issue alone as responsible for the attacks of 9/11. See Terry, p. 54. Terry appears regretful that Arab states have not been more
effective in “making the US pay” for its policies in response to the Arab boycott of Israel. See Terry, p. 124.
13 Pew Research Center. “Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream.” 22 May, 2007, p. 1.
14 Abdul Rauf, Imam Feisal and Khan, Daisy. “The Ideals We Share,” Newsweek, 30 July, 2007, p. 33.
15 Gainem, Alexander. “Is there a Muslim Lobby in the US?” IslamOnLine.net. 26 May, 2006. http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=
1156077817990&pagename=Zone-English-Muslim_Affairs%2FMAELayout
16 Daniel Pipes has labeled CAIR a “friend of terror.” Pipes, Daniel. “CAIR: ‘Moderate” Friend of Terror.” New York Post, 22 April, 2002. http://www.
danielpipes.org/article/394
17 See http://www.aicongress.org/
18 Shain, Yossi. Marketing the American Creed Abroad: Diasporas in the US and their Homelands. P. 108. Shain notes that Islam presents a particular
challenge for integration in that its traditions, founded on Muhammed’s Hijra (flight from Mecca to Medina), reject in principle the notion of Muslims
building a minority life in a non-Islamic country. How does one live as a believer and preserve the faith under Western democracies where, as Shain quotes
Amer Haleen of the Islamic Society of North America, the “system [was] organized by design to elevate the will of man above the will of God?” Id. p. 109.
19 National Association of Arab Americans (NAAA) described their organization’s goals as follows: “Arab Americans are deeply proud of their culture and
heritage. They seek to promote the closest possible relations between the United States and the Arab World. … They are American first, last, and always.”
Id. p. 115. Even Mearsheimer and Walt acknowledge that the “Israel lobby” makes its case in the name of the national interest.
20 Warikoo, Niraj. “Metro Arabs Don’t Feel France’s Alienation, Discrimination Here.” Detroit Free Press, 28 November, 2005. http://www.euro-islam.info/
spip/article.php3?id_article=803
21 “Islam, the American way: Why the United States is fairer to Muslims than ‘Eurabia’ is.” The Economist, 30 August, 2007. http://www.economist.com/
opinion/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=9724266
22 Smith, Tony. Foreign Attachments. P. 86.
23 Nancy Pelosi, appearing live on ABC News “This Week,” 14 October, 2007.
24 Telephone interview with Van Krikorian, past president and continuing board member, Armenian Assembly of America, 18 October 2007.
25 See Thompson, Marilyn W. “An Ex-Leader in Congress is Now Turkey’s Man in the Lobbies of Capitol Hill,” New York Times, 17 October, 2007. http://www.
nytimes.com/2007/10/17/washington/17lobby.html?_r=1&oref=slogin
26 Soner Cagaptay, Turkish research program director, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy speaking on The Diane Rehm Show, 23 October 2007.
27 Report on National Public Radio, “Morning Edition,” 4 November, 2007.
28 Mearsheimer and Walt, Preface, pp. xi-xii.
29 Huntington, Samuel P. “The Erosion of American National Interests,” Foreign Affairs 76:5 19997, p. 33, cited in Smith, Tony, Foreign Attachments, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, 2000, pp. 44-45.
30 Smith worries that the Madisonian solution of competing factions will lead to an “incoherent foreign policy” that is not in “the national interest.” He does
not specify who, if not competing ethnic groups and power centers, is to determine “the national interest.”
31 Mearsheimer and Walt make an elaborate case for the proposition that US support for Israel is not in the national interest. But rather than proffer the
argument as, like any other proposition, subject to fair-minded debate, the authors treat it as self-evident. Because it cannot be questioned that US support
for Israel is mistaken, therefore the only explanation for this anomaly is that an ethnic lobby has seized the national interest.
32 In a vivid example of the conceit and realist bias of ethnic lobby critics, Tony Smith issues this alarm: “And even now some groups in Taipei are working
with Taiwanese Americans to get U.S. support to make the island independent of China….”
The Open Society and Its Critics: Minorities and Political Lobbying in the United States 7