STANDARD CHARTERED BANK (Philippine Branch), PAUL SIMON MORRIS, SUNDARA RAMESH, OWEN BELMAN, SANJAY AGGARWAL, RAJAMANI

CHANDRASHEKAR, MARIVEL GONZALES, MA. ELLEN VICTOR, CHONA G. REYES, ZENAIDA IGLESIAS, RAMONA BERNAD, MICHAELANGELO AGUILAR, and FERNAND TANSINGCO, Petitioners, - versus SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND CURRENCIES, as represented by its Chairperson, HON. EDGARDO J. ANGARA, Respondent. G.R. No. 167173 Promulgated: December 27, 2007 x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION NACHURA, J.: Before us is a Petition for Prohibition (With Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Injunction) dated and filed on March 11, 2005 by petitioners against respondent Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, as represented by its Chairperson Edgardo J. Angara (respondent). Petitioner Standard Chartered Bank (SCB)-Philippines is an institution incorporated in England with limited liability and is licensed to engage in banking, trust, and other related operations in the Philippines. Petitioners Paul Simon Morris, Sundara Ramesh, Owen Belman, Sanjay Aggarwal, Rajamani Chandrashekar, Marivel Gonzales, Ma. Ellen Victor, Chona G. Reyes, Zenaida Iglesias, Ramona Bernad, Michaelangelo Aguilar, and Fernand Tansingco are the Chief Executive Officer, Chief Operations Officer, Country Head of Consumer Banking, General Manager for Credit Card and Personal Loans, Chief Financial Officer, Legal and Compliance Officer, former Trust and Investment Services Head, Country Tax Officer, Head of Corporate Affairs, Head of Banking Services, Head of Client Relationships, and the Head of Global Markets of SCB-Philippines, respectively. Respondent, on the other hand, is one of the permanent committees of the Senate of the Philippines.

The petition seeks the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) to enjoin respondent from (1) proceeding with its inquiry pursuant to Philippine Senate (P.S.) Resolution No. 166; (2) compelling petitioners who are officers of petitioner SCB-Philippines to attend and testify before any further hearing to be conducted by respondent, particularly that set on March 15, 2005; and (3) enforcing any holddeparture order (HDO) and/or putting the petitioners on the Watch List. It also prays that judgment be rendered (1) annulling the subpoenae ad testificandum and duces tecum issued to petitioners, and (2) prohibiting the respondent from compelling petitioners to appear and testify in the inquiry being conducted pursuant to P.S. Resolution No. 166. The facts are as follows: On February 1, 2005, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, Vice Chairperson of respondent, delivered a privilege speech entitled Arrogance of Wealth[1] before the Senate based on a letter from Atty. Mark R. Bocobo denouncing SCBPhilippines for selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of the Securities Regulation Code (R.A. No. 8799) and urging the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future. Upon motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, the speech was referred to respondent. Prior to the privilege speech, Senator Enrile had introduced P.S. Resolution No. 166,[2] to wit: RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE COMMITTEE ON BANKS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND CURRENCIES, TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY, IN AID OF LEGISLATION, INTO THE ILLEGAL SALE OF UNREGISTERED AND HIGH-RISK SECURITIES BY STANDARD CHARTERED BANK, WHICH RESULTED IN BILLIONS OF PESOS OF LOSSES TO THE INVESTING PUBLIc WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7721, otherwise known as the "Law Liberalizing the Entry and Scope of Operations of Foreign Banks in the Philippines, was approved on May 18, 1994 to promote greater participation of foreign banks in the Philippine Banking Industry that will stimulate economic growth and serve as a channel for the flow of funds into the economy; WHEREAS, to promote greater competition in the Philippine Banking Industry, foreign banks were accorded the same privileges, allowed to perform the

same functions and subjected to the same limitations under relevant banking laws imposed upon domestic banks; WHEREAS, Standard Chartered Bank was among the foreign banks granted the privilege to do business in our country under Republic Act No. 7721; WHEREAS, there are complaints against Standard Chartered Bank whose actions have reportedly defrauded hundreds of Filipino investors of billions of pesos through the sale of unregistered securities in the form of high-risk mutual funds falsely advertised and marketed as safe investment havens; WHEREAS, there are reports that Standard Chartered Bank clearly knew that its actions were violative of Philippine banking and securities laws but cleverly disguised its illegal acts through the use of pro-forma agreements containing waivers of liability in favor of the bank; WHEREAS, there are reports that in the early stages of conducting these questionable activities, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas warned and eventually fined Standard Chartered Bank a measly P30,000 for violating Philippine banking laws; WHEREAS, the particular operations of Standard Chartered Bank may constitute "conducting business in an unsafe and unsound manner, punishable under Section 37 of Republic Act No. 7653 and should have drawn the higher penalty of revocation of its quasi-banking license; WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 8791 or the "General Banking Act of 2000" deems a particular act or omission as conducting business in an unsafe and unsound manner as follows: "Section 56.2 The act or omission has resulted or may result in material loss or damage or abnormal risk to the institution's depositors, creditors, investors, stockholders or to the Bangko Sentral or to the public in general." WHEREAS, the sale of unregistered securities is also a clear violation of Republic Act No. 8799 or "The Securities Regulation Code of 2000" which states: "Section 8.1 Securities shall not be sold or offered for sale or distribution within the Philippines, without a registration statement duly filed with and approved by the Commission. Prior to such sale, information on the securities, in such form

and with such substance as the Commission may prescribe, shall be made available to each prospective purchaser." WHEREAS, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reportedly issued a Cease-and-Desist Order (CDO) against Standard Chartered Bank for the sale of these unregistered securities but the case was reportedly settled administratively and dismissed after Standard Chartered Bank paid a fine of P7 Million; WHEREAS, the SEC reportedly made an official finding that Standard Chartered Bank actively engaged in promoting and marketing the so-called "Global Third Party Mutual Funds to the investing public and even set revenue quotas for the sale of these funds; WHEREAS, existing laws including the Securities Regulation Code seem to be inadequate in preventing the sale of unregistered securities and in effectively enforcing the registration rules intended to protect the investing public from fraudulent practices; WHEREAS, the regulatory intervention by the SEC and BSP likewise appears inadequate in preventing the conduct of proscribed activities in a manner that would protect the investing public; WHEREAS, there is a need for remedial legislation to address the situation, having in mind the imposition of proportionate penalties to offending entities and their directors, officers and representatives among other additional regulatory measures; Now, therefore, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, to direct the Committee on Banks, Currencies, and Financial Institutions, to conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the reported sale of unregistered and high-risk securities by Standard Chartered Bank which resulted in billions of losses to the investing public. Acting on the referral, respondent, through its Chairperson, Senator Edgardo J. Angara, set the initial hearing on February 28, 2005 to investigate, in aid of legislation, the subject matter of the speech and resolution filed by Senator Enrile. Respondent invited petitioners, among others, to attend the hearing, requesting them to submit their written position paper. Petitioners, through counsel, submitted

to respondent a letter[3] dated February 24, 2005 presenting their position, particularly stressing that there were cases pending in court allegedly involving the same issues subject of the legislative inquiry, thereby posing a challenge to the jurisdiction of respondent to continue with the inquiry. On February 28, 2005, respondent commenced the investigation. Senator Enrile inquired who among those invited as resource persons were present and who were absent. Thereafter, Senator Enrile moved that subpoenae be issued to those who did not attend the hearing and that the Senate request the Department of Justice, through the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, to issue an HDO against them and/or include them in the Bureaus Watch List. Senator Juan Flavier seconded the motion and the motion was approved. Respondent then proceeded with the investigation proper. Towards the end of the hearing, petitioners, through counsel, made an Opening Statement[4] that brought to the attention of respondent the lack of proper authorization from affected clients for the bank to make disclosures of their accounts and the lack of copies of the accusing documents mentioned in Senator Enrile's privilege speech, and reiterated that there were pending court cases regarding the alleged sale in the Philippines by SCB-Philippines of unregistered foreign securities. The February 28, 2005 hearing was adjourned without the setting of the next hearing date. However, petitioners were later served by respondent with subpoenae ad testificandum and duces tecum to compel them to attend and testify at the hearing set on March 15, 2005. Hence, this petition. The grounds relied upon by petitioners are as follows: I. THE COMMITTEE ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND/OR ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN CONDUCTING AN INVESTIGATION, PURPORTEDLY IN AID OF LEGISLATION, BUT IN REALITY PROBING INTO THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE STANDARD CHARTERED BANK HAD SOLD UNREGISTERED FOREIGN SECURITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES. SAID ISSUE HAS LONG BEEN THE SUBJECT OF CRIMINAL AND CIVIL ACTIONS NOW PENDING BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG CITY, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI CITY AND THE PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE OF MAKATI CITY.

II. THE COMMITTEE ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION BY CONDUCTING AN INVESTIGATION, PURPORTEDLY IN AID OF LEGISLATION, BUT IN REALITY IN AID OF COLLECTION BY A HANDFUL OF TWO (2) CLIENTS OF STANDARD CHARTERED BANK OF LOSSES WHICH WERE FOR THEIR ACCOUNT AND RISK. AT ANY RATE, SUCH COLLECTION IS WITHIN THE PROVINCE OF THE COURT RATHER THAN OF THE LEGISLATURE. III. THE COMMITTEE ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND/OR ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN COMPELLING PETITIONERS, SOME OF WHOM ARE RESPONDENTS IN THE PENDING CRIMINAL AND CIVIL ACTIONS BROUGHT BY SAID CLIENTS, IN VIOLATION OF PETITIONERS RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION AND RIGHT TO PURSUE AND DEFEND THEIR CAUSE IN COURT RATHER THAN ENGAGE IN TRIAL BY PUBLICITY A CLEAR VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS, RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND TO TRAVEL. IV. THE COMMITTEE ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION BY DISREGARDING ITS OWN RULES.[5] Petitioners argue that respondent has no jurisdiction to conduct the inquiry because its subject matter is the very same subject matter of the following cases, to wit: (a) CA-G.R. SP No. 85078, entitled Manuel V. Baviera vs. Hon. Esperanza P. Rosario, et al., pending before the 9th Division of the Court of Appeals. In the petition, Mr. Baviera seeks to annul and set aside the dismissal by the Department of Justice of his complaint against Standard Chartered Bank and its officers accusing them of SELLING UNREGISTERED FOREIGN SECURITIES IN VIOLATION OF P.D. NO. 1869 (SYNDICATED ESTAFA) AND ARTICLE 315 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.

(b) CA-G.R. SP No. 86200, entitled Manuel V. Baviera vs. Hon. Rafael Buenaventura, et al., pending before the 15th Division of the Court of Appeals. In the petition, Mr. Baviera seeks to annul and set aside the termination for lack of probable cause by the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) of the investigation of Standard Chartered Bank for money laundering activities BY SELLING UNREGISTERED FOREIGN SECURITIES. (c) CA-G.R. SP No. 87328, entitled Manuel V. Baviera vs. Hon. Esperanza Paglinawan Rozario, et al., pending before the 16th Division of the Court of Appeals. The petition seeks to annul and set aside the dismissal by the Department of Justice of Mr. Baviera's complaint accusing SCB and its officers of violation of the Securities Regulation Code by SELLING UNREGISTERED FOREIGN SECURITIES. (d) Civil Case No. 70173, entitled Mr. Noel G. Sanchez, et al. vs. Standard Chartered Bank, pending before Branch 155 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. Plaintiff seeks damages and recovery of their investment accusing the bank of SELLING UNREGISTERED FOREIGN SECURITIES. (e) Criminal Case No. 332034, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Manuel V. Baviera, pending before Branch 64 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City. Petitioner Morris is the private complainant in this information for extortion or blackmail against Mr. Baviera for demanding the payment of US$2 Million with the threat to EXPOSE THE BANK'S LARGE SCALE SCAM CONSISTING [OF] ILLEGAL SELLING OF UNREGISTERED FOREIGN SECURITIES BY THE BANK, before various government offices, such as the Department of Justice, the BIR, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Regional Trial Courts, and both houses of Congress. (f) Criminal Case No. 331395, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Manuel V. Baviera, pending before Branch 64 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City. Petitioners Victor and Chona Reyes are the private complainants in this information for perjury committed by Mr. Baviera in securing a hold departure order against the petitioners herein from the Department of Justice for their alleged involvement in syndicated estafa and swindling BY SELLING UNREGISTERED FOREIGN SECURITIES. (g) I.S. No. 2004-B-2279-80, entitled Aurelio Litonjua III and Aurelio Litonjua, Jr. vs. Antonette de los Reyes, et al., pending before the Office of the Prosecutor,

Makati City. This is a criminal complaint accusing SCB and its officers of estafa for SELLING UNREGISTERED FOREIGN SECURITIES.[6] Citing Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,[7] the petitioners claim that since the issue of whether or not SCB-Philippines illegally sold unregistered foreign securities is already preempted by the courts that took cognizance of the foregoing cases, the respondent, by this investigation, would encroach upon the judicial powers vested solely in these courts. The argument is misplaced. Bengzon does not apply squarely to petitioners case. It is true that in Bengzon, the Court declared that the issue to be investigated was one over which jurisdiction had already been acquired by the Sandiganbayan, and to allow the [Senate Blue Ribbon] Committee to investigate the matter would create the possibility of conflicting judgments; and that the inquiry into the same justiciable controversy would be an encroachment on the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had set in much earlier. To the extent that, in the case at bench, there are a number of cases already pending in various courts and administrative bodies involving the petitioners, relative to the alleged sale of unregistered foreign securities, there is a resemblance between this case and Bengzon. However, the similarity ends there. Central to the Courts ruling in Bengzon -- that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was without any constitutional mooring to conduct the legislative investigation -- was the Courts determination that the intended inquiry was not in aid of legislation. The Court found that the speech of Senator Enrile, which sought such investigation contained no suggestion of any contemplated legislation; it merely called upon the Senate to look into possible violations of Section 5, Republic Act No. 3019. Thus, the Court held that the requested probe failed to comply with a fundamental requirement of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, which states: The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. Accordingly, we stopped the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee from proceeding with the legislative investigation in that case.

Unfortunately for the petitioners, this distinguishing factual milieu in Bengzon does not obtain in the instant case. P.S. Resolution No. 166 is explicit on the subject and nature of the inquiry to be (and already being) conducted by the respondent Committee, as found in the last three Whereas clauses thereof, viz.: WHEREAS, existing laws including the Securities Regulation Code seem to be inadequate in preventing the sale of unregistered securities and in effectively enforcing the registration rules intended to protect the investing public from fraudulent practices; WHEREAS, the regulatory intervention by the SEC and BSP likewise appears inadequate in preventing the conduct of proscribed activities in a manner that would protect the investing public; WHEREAS, there is a need for remedial legislation to address the situation, having in mind the imposition of proportionate penalties to offending entities and their directors, officers and representatives among other additional regulatory measures; (emphasis supplied) The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the said resolution, exposes the error in petitioners allegation that the inquiry, as initiated in a privilege speech by the very same Senator Enrile, was simply to denounce the illegal practice committed by a foreign bank in selling unregistered foreign securities x x x. This fallacy is made more glaring when we consider that, at the conclusion of his privilege speech, Senator Enrile urged the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future. Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation. As succinctly stated in the landmark case Arnault v. Nazareno[8] [T]he power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or

effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who possess it. Neither can the petitioners claim that they were singled out by the respondent Committee. The Court notes that among those invited as resource persons were officials of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). These officials were subjected to the same critical scrutiny by the respondent relative to their separate findings on the illegal sale of unregistered foreign securities by SCB-Philippines. It is obvious that the objective of the investigation was the quest for remedies, in terms of legislation, to prevent the recurrence of the allegedly fraudulent activity. Still, petitioners insist that the inquiry conducted by respondent was, in fact, in aid of collection. They claim that Atty. Bocobo and Manuel Baviera, the latter a party to the pending court cases cited by petitioners, were only seeking a friendly forum so that they could recover their investments from SCB-Philippines; and that the respondent has allowed itself to be used as the conveniently available vehicle to effect this purpose. However, as correctly pointed out by respondent in its Comment on the petition, Atty. Bocobo did not file a complaint before the Senate for the purpose of recovering his investment. On the contrary, and as confirmed during the initial hearing on February 28, 2005, his letter-complaint humbly requested the Senate to conduct an inquiry into the purportedly illegal activities of SCB-Philippines, with the end view of preventing the future occurrence of any similar fraudulent activity by the banks in general.[9] Baviera, on the other hand, was not a complainant but merely a witness in the investigation, invited to testify on the alleged illegal sale of unregistered foreign securities by SCB-Philippines, being one of the supposed victims thereof. The Court further notes that when it denied petitioners prayer for the issuance of a TRO to restrain the hearing set on March 15, 2005,[10] respondent proceeded with the investigation. On the said date, outraged by petitioners imputation that it was conducting the investigation in aid of collection, respondent held petitioners, together with their counsel, Atty. Reynaldo Geronimo, in contempt and ordered their detention for six hours.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of this Courts Resolution dated March 14, 2005 only with respect to the denial of the prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction, alleging that their being held in contempt was without legal basis, as the phrase in aid of collection partakes of an absolutely privileged allegation in the petition. We do not agree. The Court has already expounded on the essence of the contempt power of Congress and its committees in this wise The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative power. How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and information on which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge and information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its power and authority? When the framers of the Constitution adopted the principle of separation of powers, making each branch supreme within the realm of its respective authority, it must have intended each departments authority to be full and complete, independently of each others authority or power. And how could the authority and power become complete if for every act of refusal, every act of defiance, every act of contumacy against it, the legislative body must resort to the judicial department for the appropriate remedy, because it is impotent by itself to punish or deal therewith, with affronts committed against its authority or dignity.[11] The exercise by Congress or by any of its committees of the power to punish contempt is based on the principle of self-preservation. As the branch of the government vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, it can assert its authority and punish contumacious acts against it. Such power is sui generis, as it attaches not to the discharge of legislative functions per se, but to the sovereign character of the legislature as one of the three independent and coordinate branches of government.[12] In this case, petitioners imputation that the investigation was in aid of collection is a direct challenge against the authority of the Senate Committee, as it ascribes ill motive to the latter. In this light, we find the contempt citation against the petitioners reasonable and justified. Furthermore, it is axiomatic that the power of legislative investigation includes the power to compel the attendance of witnesses. Corollary to the power to compel the attendance of witnesses is the power to ensure that said witnesses would be available

to testify in the legislative investigation. In the case at bench, considering that most of the officers of SCB-Philippines are not Filipino nationals who may easily evade the compulsive character of respondents summons by leaving the country, it was reasonable for the respondent to request the assistance of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation to prevent said witnesses from evading the inquiry and defeating its purpose. In any event, no HDO was issued by a court. The BID instead included them only in the Watch List, which had the effect of merely delaying petitioners intended travel abroad for five (5) days, provided no HDO is issued against them. [13] With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has violated, suffice it to state that privacy is not an absolute right. While it is true that Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, guarantees respect for the rights of persons affected by the legislative investigation, not every invocation of the right to privacy should be allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry. In Sabio v. Gordon, [14] we have held that the right of the people to access information on matters of public concern generally prevails over the right to privacy of ordinary financial transactions. In that case, we declared that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest. Employing the rational basis relationship test, as laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc,[15] there is no infringement of the individuals right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, in this case, to ensure that the government agencies involved in regulating banking transactions adequately protect the public who invest in foreign securities. Suffice it to state that this purpose constitutes a reason compelling enough to proceed with the assailed legislative investigation.[16] As regards the issue of self-incrimination, the petitioners, officers of SCBPhilippines, are not being indicted as accused in a criminal proceeding. They were summoned by respondent merely as resource persons, or as witnesses, in a legislative inquiry. As distinguished by this Court [An] accused occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, an accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions.[17] Concededly, this right of the accused against self-incrimination is extended to respondents in administrative investigations that partake of the nature of or are analogous to criminal proceedings. The privilege has consistently been held to

extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law; and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not.[18] However, in this case, petitioners neither stand as accused in a criminal case nor will they be subjected by the respondent to any penalty by reason of their testimonies. Hence, they cannot altogether decline appearing before respondent, although they may invoke the privilege when a question calling for an incriminating answer is propounded.[19] Petitioners argument, that the investigation before respondent may result in a recommendation for their prosecution by the appropriate government agencies, such as the Department of Justice or the Office of the Ombudsman, does not persuade. As held in Sinclair v. United States[20] -It may be conceded that Congress is without authority to compel disclosures for the purpose of aiding the prosecution of pending suits; but the authority of that body, directly or through its Committees, to require pertinent disclosures in aid of its own constitutional power is not abridged because the information sought to be elicited may also be of use in such suits. x x x It is plain that investigation of the matters involved in suits brought or to be commenced under the Senate resolution directing the institution of suits for the cancellation of the leases might directly aid in respect of legislative action. The prosecution of offenders by the prosecutorial agencies and the trial before the courts is for the punishment of persons who transgress the law. The intent of legislative inquiries, on the other hand, is to arrive at a policy determination, which may or may not be enacted into law. Except only when it exercises the power to punish for contempt, the respondent, as with the other Committees of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, cannot penalize violators even if there is overwhelming evidence of criminal culpability. Other than proposing or initiating amendatory or remedial legislation, respondent can only recommend measures to address or remedy whatever irregularities may be unearthed during the investigation, although it may include in its Report a recommendation for the criminal indictment of persons who may appear liable. At best, the recommendation, along with the evidence, contained in such a Report would be persuasive, but it is still up to the prosecutorial agencies and the courts to determine the liabilities of the offender.

Finally, petitioners sought anew, in their Manifestation and Motion[21] dated June 21, 2006, the issuance by this Court of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction to prevent respondent from submitting its Committee Report No. 75 to the Senate in plenary for approval. However, 16 days prior to the filing of the Manifestation and Motion, or on June 5, 2006, respondent had already submitted the report to the Senate in plenary. While there is no showing that the said report has been approved by the Senate, the subject of the Manifestation and Motion has inescapably become moot and academic. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Prohibition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Manifestation and Motion dated June 21, 2006 is, likewise, DENIED for being moot and academic.

SO

ORDERED.

G.R. No. 170338

December 23, 2008

VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS, respondents. x----------------------x G.R. No. 179275 December 23, 2008

More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. They captured unprecedented public attention and thrust the country into a controversy that placed the legitimacy of the present administration on the line, and resulted in the near-collapse of the Arroyo government. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the Presidents instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.1 In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then Minority Floor Leader Francis G. Escudero delivered a privilege speech, "Tale of Two Tapes," and set in motion a congressional investigation jointly conducted by the Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (respondent House Committees). During the inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged. But on July 5, 2005, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of former NBI Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the respondent House Committees seven alleged "original" tape recordings of the supposed three-hour taped conversation. After prolonged and impassioned debate by the committee members on the admissibility and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were eventually played in the chambers of the House.2 On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to suspend the hearings indefinitely. Nevertheless, they decided to prepare committee reports based on the said recordings and the testimonies of the resource persons.3 Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) filed with this Court a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction4 docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that the respondent House Committees be restrained from using these tape recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped conversations in their committee reports and for any other purpose. He further implored that the said recordings and any reference thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the inquiry, and the respondent House Committees directed to desist from further using the recordings in any of the House proceedings.5

SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI, petitioners, vs. THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT THE HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, respondents. x----------------------x MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-intervention x----------------------x AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO, RODOLFO G. BIAZON, PANFILO M. LACSON, LOREN B. LEGARDA, M.A. JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and ANTONIO F. TRILLANES, respondents-intervenors DECISION NACHURA, J.:

Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and debates on the "Garci tapes" abruptly stopped.

As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate proceeded with its public hearings on the "Hello Garci" tapes on September 7,12 1713 and October 1,14 2007. Intervening as respondents,15 Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Benigno Noynoy C. Aquino, Rodolfo G. Biazon, Panfilo M. Lacson, Loren B. Legarda, M.A. Jamby A.S. Madrigal and Antonio F. Trillanes filed their Comment16 on the petition on September 25, 2007. The Court subsequently heard the case on oral argument.17 On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the ISAFP and one of the resource persons summoned by the Senate to appear and testify at its hearings, moved to intervene as petitioner in G.R. No. 179275.18 On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 170338 and 179275.19 It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello Garci" recordings, they have different objectivesthe first is poised at preventing the playing of the tapes in the House and their subsequent inclusion in the committee reports, and the second seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation. The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the second, G.R. No. 179275.

After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo Lacson roused the slumbering issue with a privilege speech, "The Lighthouse That Brought Darkness." In his discourse, Senator Lacson promised to provide the public "the whole unvarnished truth the whats, whens, wheres, whos and whys" of the alleged wiretap, and sought an inquiry into the perceived willingness of telecommunications providers to participate in nefarious wiretapping activities. On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacsons speech was referred to the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo Biazon, who had previously filed two bills6 seeking to regulate the sale, purchase and use of wiretapping equipment and to prohibit the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from performing electoral duties.7

In the Senates plenary session the following day, a lengthy debate ensued when Senator Richard Gordon aired his concern on the possible transgression of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 42008 if the body were to conduct a legislative inquiry on the matter. On August 28, 2007, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered a privilege speech, articulating her considered view that the Constitution absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or communication of the contents of the "Hello Garci" tapes. However, she recommended a legislative investigation into the role of the Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP), the Philippine National Police or other government entities in the alleged illegal wiretapping of public officials.9

-IBefore delving into the merits of the case, the Court shall first resolve the issue on the parties standing, argued at length in their pleadings.

On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of Appeals, filed before this Court a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction,10 docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the Constitution.11

In Tolentino v. COMELEC,20 we explained that "[l]egal standing or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged governmental act x x x," thus, generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.21

The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."22 However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural technicality, the Court, in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent direct injury test. David v. MacapagalArroyo23 articulates that a "liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings."24 The fairly recent Chavez v. Gonzales25 even permitted a non-member of the broadcast media, who failed to allege a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, to challenge the acts of the Secretary of Justice and the National Telecommunications Commission. The majority, in the said case, echoed the current policy that "this Court has repeatedly and consistently refused to wield procedural barriers as impediments to its addressing and resolving serious legal questions that greatly impact on public interest, in keeping with the Courts duty under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether or not other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws, and that they have not abused the discretion given to them."26 In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies his standing to initiate the petition by alleging that he is the person alluded to in the "Hello Garci" tapes. Further, his was publicly identified by the members of the respondent committees as one of the voices in the recordings.27 Obviously, therefore, petitioner Garcillano stands to be directly injured by the House committees actions and charges of electoral fraud. The Court recognizes his standing to institute the petition for prohibition. In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify their standing by alleging that they are concerned citizens, taxpayers, and members of the IBP. They are of the firm conviction that any attempt to use the "Hello Garci" tapes will further divide the country. They wish to see the legal and proper use of public funds that will necessarily be defrayed in the ensuing public hearings. They are worried by the continuous violation of the laws and individual rights, and the blatant attempt to abuse constitutional processes through the conduct of legislative inquiries purportedly in aid of legislation.28

Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is summoned to attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings.29 Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in the execution of the laws and that intervenor Sagge asserts his constitutional right to due process,30 they satisfy the requisite personal stake in the outcome of the controversy by merely being citizens of the Republic. Following the Courts ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives,31 we find sufficient petitioners Ranadas and Agcaoilis and intervenor Sagges allegation that the continuous conduct by the Senate of the questioned legislative inquiry will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.32 It should be noted that in Francisco, rights personal to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, yet the Court granted standing to the petitioners therein for, as in this case, they invariably invoked the vindication of their own rightsas taxpayers, members of Congress, citizens, individually or in a class suit, and members of the bar and of the legal professionwhich were also supposedly violated by the therein assailed unconstitutional acts.33 Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows that the petitioners and intervenor Sagge advance constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. The issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, and should be resolved for the guidance of all.34 Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the liberal attitude it has shown in prior cases climaxing in the more recent case of Chavez, the Court recognizes the legal standing of petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili and intervenor Sagge. - II -

The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and academic. Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the principle that the exercise by this Court of judicial power is limited to the determination and resolution of actual cases and controversies.35 By actual cases, we mean existing conflicts appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise the decision of the Court will amount to an advisory opinion. The power of judicial inquiry does not extend to hypothetical questions because any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.36 Neither will the Court determine a moot question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted. A case becomes moot when its purpose has become stale.37 It is unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question as a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be enforced.38 In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores from the Court, as aforementioned, the issuance of an injunctive writ to prohibit the respondent House Committees from playing the tape recordings and from including the same in their committee report. He likewise prays that the said tapes be stricken off the records of the House proceedings. But the Court notes that the recordings were already played in the House and heard by its members.39 There is also the widely publicized fact that the committee reports on the "Hello Garci" inquiry were completed and submitted to the House in plenary by the respondent committees.40 Having been overtaken by these events, the Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for being moot and academic. After all, prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished.41

requirements of due process.42 Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.43 What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that "[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."44 The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006.45 With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session. Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same question. In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,46 we said: Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees likewise violated Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the "duly published rules of procedure." We quote the OSGs explanation: The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate of every Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the Senates membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm. Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion, reinforces this ruling with the following rationalization: The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a continuing legislative body. The present Senate has twenty-four members, twelve of whom are elected every three years for a term of six years each. Thus, the term of twelve Senators expires every three years, leaving less than a majority of Senators to continue into

- III As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement. Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic

the next Congress. The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 Constitution, requires a majority of Senators to "constitute a quorum to do business." Applying the same reasoning in Arnault v. Nazareno, the Senate under the 1987 Constitution is not a continuing body because less than majority of the Senators continue into the next Congress. The consequence is that the Rules of Procedure must be republished by the Senate after every expiry of the term of twelve Senators.47 The subject was explained with greater lucidity in our Resolution48 (On the Motion for Reconsideration) in the same case, viz.: On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body," this Court sees fit to issue a clarification. Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is "continuing," as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national election or change in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress before it. The Rules of the Senate itself confirms this when it states: RULE XLIV UNFINISHED BUSINESS SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the next session in the same status. All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if present for the first time. Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time. The logic and practicality of such a rule is readily apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will typically have a different composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound by the acts and deliberations of the Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body even with respect to the conduct of its business, then pending matters will not be deemed terminated with the

expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of course, continue into the next Congress with the same status. This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and of the opposite nature of the conduct of its business is reflected in its Rules. The Rules of the Senate (i.e. the Senates main rules of procedure) states: RULE LI AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators elected in the preceding elections shall begin their term of office, the President may endorse the Rules to the appropriate committee for amendment or revision. The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which should be presented at least one day before its consideration, and the vote of the majority of the Senators present in the session shall be required for its approval. RULE LII DATE OF TAKING EFFECT SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption and shall remain in force until they are amended or repealed. Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account the new composition of the Senate after an election and the possibility of the amendment or revision of the Rules at the start of each session in which the newly elected Senators shall begin their term. However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules are intended to be valid from the date of their adoption until they are amended or repealed. Such language is conspicuously absent from the Rules. The Rules simply state "(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation." The latter does not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such rules until they are amended or repealed. In view of the difference in the language of the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into the next Congress. The Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative inquiries which come within the rule on unfinished business.

The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice. If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be effective even in the next Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its main rules regarding effectivity. Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page.49 The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senates defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate. Justice Carpios response to the same argument raised by the respondents is illuminating: The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Taada v. Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that the rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation," precluding any other form of publication. Publication in accordance with Taada is mandatory to comply with the due process requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a persons liberty at risk. A person who violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and detained by the Senate. The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,50 otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid

publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes.51 In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents.52 It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations. Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of this fact, the recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative investigation subject thereof still could not be undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees, because no published rules governed it, in clear contravention of the Constitution. With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised in the consolidated petitions. WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the petition in G.R. No. 179275 is GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be issued enjoining the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines and/or any of its committees from conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the "Hello Garci" tapes. SO ORDERED.

SPOUSES PNP DIRECTOR ELISEO D. DELA PAZ (Ret.) and MARIA FE C. DELA PAZ, Petitioners, - versus SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS and the SENATE SERGEANT-AT-ARMS JOSE BALAJADIA, JR., Respondents. G.R. No. 184849 Promulgated: February 13, 2009 RESOLUTION NACHURA, J.: This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[1] under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed on October 28, 2008 by petitioners-spouses General (Ret.) Eliseo D. dela Paz (Gen. Dela Paz) and Mrs. Maria Fe C. dela Paz (Mrs. Dela Paz) assailing, allegedly for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the orders of respondent Senate Foreign Relations Committee (respondent Committee), through its Chairperson, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago (Senator Santiago), (1) denying petitioners Challenge to Jurisdiction with Motion to Quash Subpoenae and (2) commanding respondent Senate Sergeant-at-Arms Jose Balajadia, Jr. (Balajadia) to immediately arrest petitioners during the Senate committee hearing last October 23, 2008. The petition thus prays that respondent Committee be enjoined from conducting its hearings involving petitioners, and to enjoin Balajadia from implementing the verbal arrest order against them. The antecedents are as follow On October 6, 2008, a Philippine delegation of eight (8) senior Philippine National Police (PNP) officers arrived in Moscow, Russia to attend the 77th General Assembly Session of the International Criminal Police Organization (ICPO)INTERPOL in St. Petersburg from October 6-10, 2008. With the delegation was Gen. Dela Paz, then comptroller and special disbursing officer of the PNP. Gen. Dela Paz, however, was to retire from the PNP on October 9, 2008. On October 11, 2008, Gen. Dela Paz was apprehended by the local authorities at the Moscow airport departure area for failure to declare in written form the 105,000 euros [approximately P6,930,000.00] found in his luggage. In addition, he was also found to have in his possession 45,000 euros (roughly equivalent to P2,970,000.00).

Petitioners were detained in Moscow for questioning. After a few days, Gen. Dela Paz and the PNP delegation were allowed to return to the Philippines, but the Russian government confiscated the euros. On October 21, 2008, Gen. Dela Paz arrived in Manila, a few days after Mrs. Dela Paz. Awaiting them were subpoenae earlier issued by respondent Committee for the investigation it was to conduct on the Moscow incident on October 23, 2008. On October 23, 2008, respondent Committee held its first hearing. Instead of attending the hearing, petitioners filed with respondent Committee a pleading denominated Challenge to Jurisdiction with Motion to Quash Subpoena.[2] Senator Santiago emphatically defended respondent Committees jurisdiction and commanded Balajadia to arrest petitioners. Hence, this Petition. Petitioners argue that respondent Committee is devoid of any jurisdiction to investigate the Moscow incident as the matter does not involve state to state relations as provided in paragraph 12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules of Procedure (Senate Rules). They further claim that respondent Committee violated the same Senate Rules when it issued the warrant of arrest without the required signatures of the majority of the members of respondent Committee. They likewise assail the very same Senate Rules because the same were not published as required by the Constitution, and thus, cannot be used as the basis of any investigation involving them relative to the Moscow incident. Respondent Committee filed its Comment[3] on January 22, 2009. The petition must inevitably fail. First. Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states: Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings. This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary authority to the Houses of Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules. As such, the exercise of this power is generally exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process.[4] The challenge to the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, raised by petitioner in the case at bench, in effect, asks this Court to inquire into a matter that is within the full discretion of the Senate. The issue partakes of the nature of a political question that, in Taada v. Cuenco,[5] was characterized as a

question which, under the Constitution, is to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. Further, pursuant to this constitutional grant of virtually unrestricted authority to determine its own rules, the Senate is at liberty to alter or modify these rules at any time it may see fit, subject only to the imperatives of quorum, voting and publication. Thus, it is not for this Court to intervene in what is clearly a question of policy, an issue dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of the Senates action. Second. Even if it is within our power to inquire into the validity of the exercise of jurisdiction over the petitioners by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, we are convinced that respondent Committee has acted within the proper sphere of its authority. Paragraph 12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules provides: 12) Committee on Foreign Relations. Fifteen (15) members. All matters relating to the relations of the Philippines with other nations generally; diplomatic and consular services; the Association of Southeast Asian Nations; the United Nations Organization and its agencies; multi-lateral organizations, all international agreements, obligations and contracts; and overseas Filipinos. A reading of the above provision unmistakably shows that the investigation of the Moscow incident involving petitioners is well within the respondent Committees jurisdiction. The Moscow incident could create ripples in the relations between the Philippines and Russia. Gen. Dela Paz went to Moscow in an official capacity, as a member of the Philippine delegation to the INTERPOL Conference in St. Petersburg, carrying a huge amount of public money ostensibly to cover the expenses to be incurred by the delegation. For his failure to comply with immigration and currency laws, the Russian government confiscated the money in his possession and detained him and other members of the delegation in Moscow. Furthermore, the matter affects Philippine international obligations. We take judicial notice of the fact that the Philippines is a state-party to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. The two conventions contain provisions dealing with the movement of considerable foreign currency across borders.[6] The

Moscow incident would reflect on our countrys compliance with the obligations required of state-parties under these conventions. Thus, the respondent Committee can properly inquire into this matter, particularly as to the source and purpose of the funds discovered in Moscow as this would involve the Philippines commitments under these conventions. Third. The Philippine Senate has decided that the legislative inquiry will be jointly conducted by the respondent Committee and the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon Committee). Pursuant to paragraph 36, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules, the Blue Ribbon Committee may conduct investigations on all matters relating to malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance in office by officers and employees of the government, its branches, agencies, subdivisions and instrumentalities, and on any matter of public interest on its own initiative or brought to its attention by any of its members. It is, thus, beyond cavil that the Blue Ribbon Committee can investigate Gen. Dela Paz, a retired PNP general and member of the official PNP delegation to the INTERPOL Conference in Russia, who had with him millions which may have been sourced from public funds. Fourth. Subsequent to Senator Santiagos verbal command to Balajadia to arrest petitioners, the Philippine Senate issued a formal written Order[7] of arrest, signed by ten (10) senators, with the Senate President himself approving it, in accordance with the Senate Rules. Fifth. The Philippine Senate has already published its Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in two newspapers of general circulation.[8] Sixth. The arrest order issued against the petitioners has been rendered ineffectual. In the legislative inquiry held on November 15, 2008, jointly by the respondent Committee and the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, Gen. Dela Paz voluntarily appeared and answered the questions propounded by the Committee members. Having submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Senate Committees, there was no longer any necessity to implement the order of arrest. Furthermore, in the same hearing, Senator Santiago granted the motion of Gen. Dela Paz to dispense with the presence of Mrs. Dela Paz for humanitarian considerations.[9] Consequently, the order for her arrest was effectively withdrawn. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and for being moot and academic. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 180643

March 25, 2008

ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner, vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, respondents. DECISION LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: At bar is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the show cause Letter1 dated November 22, 2007 and contempt Order2 dated January 30, 2008 concurrently issued by respondent Senate Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,3 Trade and Commerce,4 and National Defense and Security5 against petitioner Romulo L. Neri, former Director General of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA). The facts, as culled from the pleadings, are as follows: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People's Republic of China. In connection with this NBN Project, various Resolutions were introduced in the Senate, as follows: (1) P.S. Res. No. 127, introduced by Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., entitled RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND INDUSTRY TO INVESTIGATE, IN AID OF LEGISLATION, THE CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO THE APPROVAL OF THE BROADBAND CONTRACT WITH ZTE AND THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE OFFICIALS CONCERNED IN GETTING IT CONSUMMATED AND TO

MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO HALE TO THE COURTS OF LAW THE PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY ANOMALY IN CONNECTION THEREWITH AND TO PLUG THE LOOPHOLES, IF ANY IN THE BOT LAW AND OTHER PERTINENT LEGISLATIONS. (2) P.S. Res. No. 144, introduced by Senator Mar Roxas, entitled RESOLUTION URGING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO TO DIRECT THE CANCELLATION OF THE ZTE CONTRACT (3) P.S. Res. No. 129, introduced by Senator Panfilo M. Lacson, entitled RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY IN AID OF LEGISLATION INTO THE NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF AWARDING THE NATIONAL BROADBAND NETWORK CONTRACT TO THE CHINESE FIRM ZHONG XING TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT COMPANY LIMITED (ZTE CORPORATION) WITH THE END IN VIEW OF PROVIDING REMEDIAL LEGISLATION THAT WILL PROTECT OUR NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY, SECURITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. (4) P.S. Res. No. 136, introduced by Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, entitled RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE PROPER SENATE COMMITTEE TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY, IN AID OF LEGISLATION, ON THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION OF THE NATIONAL BROADBAND NETWORK (NBN) PROJECT OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. At the same time, the investigation was claimed to be relevant to the consideration of three (3) pending bills in the Senate, to wit: 1. Senate Bill No. 1793, introduced by Senator Mar Roxas, entitled AN ACT SUBJECTING TREATIES, INTERNATIONAL OR EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS INVOLVING FUNDING IN THE PROCUREMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS, GOODS, AND CONSULTING SERVICES TO BE INCLUDED IN THE SCOPE AND APPLICATION OF PHILIPPINE PROCUREMENT LAWS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9184, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT REFORM ACT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES;

2. Senate Bill No. 1794, introduced by Senator Mar Roxas, entitled AN ACT IMPOSING SAFEGUARDS IN CONTRACTING LOANS CLASSIFIED AS OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8182, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8555, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1996, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES; and 3. Senate Bill No. 1317, introduced by Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, entitled AN ACT MANDATING CONCURRENCE TO INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS. Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations to certain personalities and cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project. Petitioner was among those invited. He was summoned to appear and testify on September 18, 20, and 26 and October 25, 2007. However, he attended only the September 26 hearing, claiming he was "out of town" during the other dates. In the September 18, 2007 hearing, businessman Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. It appeared that the Project was initially approved as a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) project but, on March 29, 2007, the NEDA acquiesced to convert it into a government-to-government project, to be financed through a loan from the Chinese Government. On September 26, 2007, petitioner testified before respondent Committees for eleven (11) hours. He disclosed that then Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking "executive privilege". In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,6 (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,7 and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve.8 Unrelenting, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to petitioner, requiring him to appear and testify on November 20, 2007.

However, in the Letter dated November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita requested respondent Committees to dispense with petitioner's testimony on the ground of executive privilege. The pertinent portion of the letter reads: With reference to the subpoena ad testificandum issued to Secretary Romulo Neri to appear and testify again on 20 November 2007 before the Joint Committees you chair, it will be recalled that Sec. Neri had already testified and exhaustively discussed the ZTE / NBN project, including his conversation with the President thereon last 26 September 2007. Asked to elaborate further on his conversation with the President, Sec. Neri asked for time to consult with his superiors in line with the ruling of the Supreme Court in Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006). Specifically, Sec. Neri sought guidance on the possible invocation of executive privilege on the following questions, to wit: a) Whether the President followed up the (NBN) project? b) Were you dictated to prioritize the ZTE? c) Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project after being told about the alleged bribe? Following the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, the foregoing questions fall under conversations and correspondence between the President and public officials which are considered executive privilege (Almonte v. Vasquez, G.R. 95637, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. PEA, G.R. 133250, July 9, 2002). Maintaining the confidentiality of conversations of the President is necessary in the exercise of her executive and policy decision making process. The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of her conversations and correspondences, like the value which we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making. Disclosure of conversations of the President will have a chilling effect on the President, and will hamper her in the effective discharge of her duties and responsibilities, if she is not protected by the confidentiality of her conversations.

The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People's Republic of China. Given the confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to the President, he cannot provide the Committee any further details of these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect. In light of the above considerations, this Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly. Considering that Sec. Neri has been lengthily interrogated on the subject in an unprecedented 11-hour hearing, wherein he has answered all questions propounded to him except the foregoing questions involving executive privilege, we therefore request that his testimony on 20 November 2007 on the ZTE / NBN project be dispensed with. On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before respondent Committees. Thus, on November 22, 2007, the latter issued the show cause Letter requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in contempt. The Letter reads: Since you have failed to appear in the said hearing, the Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon), Trade and Commerce and National Defense and Security require you to show cause why you should not be cited in contempt under Section 6, Article 6 of the Rules of the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon). The Senate expects your explanation on or before 2 December 2007. On November 29, 2007, petitioner replied to respondent Committees, manifesting that it was not his intention to ignore the Senate hearing and that he thought the only remaining questions were those he claimed to be covered by executive privilege, thus: It was not my intention to snub the last Senate hearing. In fact, I have cooperated with the task of the Senate in its inquiry in aid of legislation as shown by my almost 11 hours stay during the hearing on 26 September 2007. During said hearing, I answered all the questions that were asked of me, save for those which I thought was covered by executive privilege, and which was confirmed by the Executive Secretary in his Letter 15 November 2007. In good faith, after that exhaustive

testimony, I thought that what remained were only the three questions, where the Executive Secretary claimed executive privilege. Hence, his request that my presence be dispensed with. Be that as it may, should there be new matters that were not yet taken up during the 26 September 2007 hearing, may I be furnished in advance as to what else I need to clarify, so that as a resource person, I may adequately prepare myself. In addition, petitioner submitted a letter prepared by his counsel, Atty. Antonio R. Bautista, stating, among others that: (1) his (petitioner) non-appearance was upon the order of the President; and (2) his conversation with President Arroyo dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the bribery scandal involving high government officials and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines. The letter ended with a reiteration of petitioner's request that he "be furnished in advance" as to what else he needs to clarify so that he may adequately prepare for the hearing. In the interim, on December 7, 2007, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition for certiorari assailing the show cause Letter dated November 22, 2007. Respondent Committees found petitioner's explanations unsatisfactory. Without responding to his request for advance notice of the matters that he should still clarify, they issued the Order dated January 30, 2008, citing him in contempt of respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he would appear and give his testimony. The said Order states: ORDER For failure to appear and testify in the Committee's hearing on Tuesday, September 18, 2007; Thursday, September 20, 2007; Thursday, October 25, 2007; and Tuesday, November 20, 2007, despite personal notice and Subpoenas Ad Testificandum sent to and received by him, which thereby delays, impedes and obstructs, as it has in fact delayed, impeded and obstructed the inquiry into the subject reported irregularities, AND for failure to explain satisfactorily why he should not be cited for contempt (Neri letter of 29 November 2007), herein attached) ROMULO L. NERI is hereby cited in contempt of this (sic) Committees and ordered arrested and detained in the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he will appear and give his testimony.

The Sergeant-At-Arms is hereby directed to carry out and implement this Order and make a return hereof within twenty four (24) hours from its enforcement. SO ORDERED. On the same date, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the above Order.9 He insisted that he has not shown "any contemptible conduct worthy of contempt and arrest." He emphasized his willingness to testify on new matters, however, respondent Committees did not respond to his request for advance notice of questions. He also mentioned the petition for certiorari he filed on December 7, 2007. According to him, this should restrain respondent Committees from enforcing the show cause Letter "through the issuance of declaration of contempt" and arrest. In view of respondent Committees' issuance of the contempt Order, petitioner filed on February 1, 2008 a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (With Urgent Application for TRO/Preliminary Injunction), seeking to restrain the implementation of the said contempt Order. On February 5, 2008, the Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order (a) enjoining respondent Committees from implementing their contempt Order, (b) requiring the parties to observe the status quo prevailing prior to the issuance of the assailed order, and (c) requiring respondent Committees to file their comment. Petitioner contends that respondent Committees' show cause Letter and contempt Order were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. He stresses that his conversations with President Arroyo are "candid discussions meant to explore options in making policy decisions." According to him, these discussions "dwelt on the impact of the bribery scandal involving high government officials on the country's diplomatic relations and economic and military affairs and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines." He also emphasizes that his claim of executive privilege is upon the order of the President and within the parameters laid down in Senate v. Ermita10 and United States v. Reynolds.11 Lastly, he argues that he is precluded from disclosing communications made to him in official confidence under Section 712 of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, and Section 2413 (e) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Respondent Committees assert the contrary. They argue that (1) petitioner's testimony is material and pertinent in the investigation conducted in aid of legislation; (2) there is no valid justification for petitioner to claim executive privilege; (3) there is no abuse of their authority to order petitioner's arrest; and (4) petitioner has not come to court with clean hands. In the oral argument held last March 4, 2008, the following issues were ventilated: 1. What communications between the President and petitioner Neri are covered by the principle of 'executive privilege'? 1.a Did Executive Secretary Ermita correctly invoke the principle of executive privilege, by order of the President, to cover (i) conversations of the President in the exercise of her executive and policy decision-making and (ii) information, which might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People's Republic of China? 1.b. Did petitioner Neri correctly invoke executive privilege to avoid testifying on his conversations with the President on the NBN contract on his assertions that the said conversations "dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and diplomatic matters relating to the impact of bribery scandal involving high government officials and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines" x x x within the principles laid down in Senate v. Ermita (488 SCRA 1 [2006])? 1.c Will the claim of executive privilege in this case violate the following provisions of the Constitution: Sec. 28, Art. II (Full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest) Sec. 7, Art. III (The right of the people to information on matters of public concern) Sec. 1, Art. XI (Public office is a public trust) Sec. 17, Art. VII (The President shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed) and the due process clause and the principle of separation of powers? 2. What is the proper procedure to be followed in invoking executive privilege?

3. Did the Senate Committees gravely abuse their discretion in ordering the arrest of petitioner for non-compliance with the subpoena? After the oral argument, the parties were directed to manifest to the Court within twenty-four (24) hours if they are amenable to the Court's proposal of allowing petitioner to immediately resume his testimony before the Senate Committees to answer the other questions of the Senators without prejudice to the decision on the merits of this pending petition. It was understood that petitioner may invoke executive privilege in the course of the Senate Committees proceedings, and if the respondent Committees disagree thereto, the unanswered questions will be the subject of a supplemental pleading to be resolved along with the three (3) questions subject of the present petition.14 At the same time, respondent Committees were directed to submit several pertinent documents.15 The Senate did not agree with the proposal for the reasons stated in the Manifestation dated March 5, 2008. As to the required documents, the Senate and respondent Committees manifested that they would not be able to submit the latter's "Minutes of all meetings" and the "Minute Book" because it has never been the "historical and traditional legislative practice to keep them."16 They instead submitted the Transcript of Stenographic Notes of respondent Committees' joint public hearings. On March 17, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Memorandum, founded on the following arguments: (1) The communications between petitioner and the President are covered by the principle of "executive privilege." (2) Petitioner was not summoned by respondent Senate Committees in accordance with the law-making body's power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation as laid down in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution and Senate v. Ermita. (3) Respondent Senate Committees gravely abused its discretion for alleged noncompliance with the Subpoena dated November 13, 2007. The Court granted the OSG's motion the next day, March 18, 2008. As the foregoing facts unfold, related events transpired.

On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No. 151, revoking Executive Order No. 464 and Memorandum Circular No. 108. She advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita17 when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation. At the core of this controversy are the two (2) crucial queries, to wit: First, are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege? And second, did respondent Committees commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt Order? We grant the petition. At the outset, a glimpse at the landmark case of Senate v. Ermita18 becomes imperative. Senate draws in bold strokes the distinction between the legislative and oversight powers of the Congress, as embodied under Sections 21 and 22, respectively, of Article VI of the Constitution, to wit: SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. SECTION 22. The heads of department may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, or as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the state or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session. Senate cautions that while the above provisions are closely related and complementary to each other, they should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. Section 21 relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Its aim is to elicit information that may be used for legislation. On the

other hand, Section 22 pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress' oversight function.19 Simply stated, while both powers allow Congress or any of its committees to conduct inquiry, their objectives are different. This distinction gives birth to another distinction with regard to the use of compulsory process. Unlike in Section 21, Congress cannot compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 22. The Court's pronouncement in Senate v. Ermita20 is clear: When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is 'in aid of legislation' under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault. In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. (Emphasis supplied.) The availability of the power of judicial review to resolve the issues raised in this case has also been settled in Senate v. Ermita, when it held: As evidenced by the American experience during the so-called "McCarthy era," however, the right of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is, in theory, no less susceptible to abuse than executive or judicial power. It may thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to the Court's certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. Hence, this decision.

I The Communications Elicited by the Three (3) Questions are Covered by Executive Privilege We start with the basic premises where the parties have conceded. The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is broad. This is based on the proposition that a legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change.21 Inevitably, adjunct thereto is the compulsory process to enforce it. But, the power, broad as it is, has limitations. To be valid, it is imperative that it is done in accordance with the Senate or House duly published rules of procedure and that the rights of the persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected. The power extends even to executive officials and the only way for them to be exempted is through a valid claim of executive privilege.22 This directs us to the consideration of the question -- is there a recognized claim of executive privilege despite the revocation of E.O. 464? A- There is a Recognized Claim of Executive Privilege Despite the Revocation of E.O. 464 At this juncture, it must be stressed that the revocation of E.O. 464 does not in any way diminish our concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings. Unlike the United States which has further accorded the concept with statutory status by enacting the Freedom of Information Act23 and the Federal Advisory Committee Act,24 the Philippines has retained its constitutional origination, occasionally interpreted only by this Court in various cases. The most recent of these is the case of Senate v. Ermita where this Court declared unconstitutional substantial portions of E.O. 464. In this regard, it is worthy to note that Executive Ermita's Letter dated November 15, 2007 limits its bases for the claim of executive privilege to Senate v. Ermita, Almonte v. Vasquez,25 and Chavez v. PEA.26 There was never a mention of E.O. 464.

While these cases, especially Senate v. Ermita,27 have comprehensively discussed the concept of executive privilege, we deem it imperative to explore it once more in view of the clamor for this Court to clearly define the communications covered by executive privilege. The Nixon and post-Watergate cases established the broad contours of the presidential communications privilege.28 In United States v. Nixon,29 the U.S. Court recognized a great public interest in preserving "the confidentiality of conversations that take place in the President's performance of his official duties." It thus considered presidential communications as "presumptively privileged." Apparently, the presumption is founded on the "President's generalized interest in confidentiality." The privilege is said to be necessary to guarantee the candor of presidential advisors and to provide "the President and those who assist him with freedom to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately." In In Re: Sealed Case,30 the U.S. Court of Appeals delved deeper. It ruled that there are two (2) kinds of executive privilege; one is the presidential communications privilege and, the other is the deliberative process privilege. The former pertains to "communications, documents or other materials that reflect presidential decisionmaking and deliberations and that the President believes should remain confidential." The latter includes 'advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated." Accordingly, they are characterized by marked distinctions. Presidential communications privilege applies to decision-making of the President while, the deliberative process privilege, to decision-making of executive officials. The first is rooted in the constitutional principle of separation of power and the President's unique constitutional role; the second on common law privilege. Unlike the deliberative process privilege, the presidential communications privilege applies to documents in their entirety, and covers final and post-decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative ones31 As a consequence, congressional or judicial negation of the presidential communications privilege is always subject to greater scrutiny than denial of the deliberative process privilege. Turning on who are the officials covered by the presidential communications privilege, In Re: Sealed Case confines the privilege only to White House Staff that has "operational proximity" to direct presidential decision-making. Thus, the

privilege is meant to encompass only those functions that form the core of presidential authority, involving what the court characterized as "quintessential and non-delegable Presidential power," such as commander-in-chief power, appointment and removal power, the power to grant pardons and reprieves, the sole-authority to receive ambassadors and other public officers, the power to negotiate treaties, etc.32 The situation in Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Department of Justice33 tested the In Re: Sealed Case principles. There, while the presidential decision involved is the exercise of the President's pardon power, a non-delegable, core-presidential function, the Deputy Attorney General and the Pardon Attorney were deemed to be too remote from the President and his senior White House advisors to be protected. The Court conceded that functionally those officials were performing a task directly related to the President's pardon power, but concluded that an organizational test was more appropriate for confining the potentially broad sweep that would result from the In Re: Sealed Case's functional test. The majority concluded that, the lesser protections of the deliberative process privilege would suffice. That privilege was, however, found insufficient to justify the confidentiality of the 4,341 withheld documents. But more specific classifications of communications covered by executive privilege are made in older cases. Courts ruled early that the Executive has a right to withhold documents that might reveal military or state secrets,34 identity of government informers in some circumstances,,35 and information related to pending investigations.36 An area where the privilege is highly revered is in foreign relations. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.37 the U.S. Court, citing President George Washington, pronounced: The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success must often depend on secrecy, and even when brought to a conclusion, a full disclosure of all the measures, demands, or eventual concessions which may have been proposed or contemplated would be extremely impolitic, for this might have a pernicious influence on future negotiations or produce immediate inconveniences, perhaps danger and mischief, in relation to other powers. The necessity of such caution and secrecy was one cogent reason for vesting the power of making treaties in the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, the principle on which the body was formed confining it to a small number of members. To admit, then, a right in the House of Representatives to demand and to have as a matter of course all the papers respecting a negotiation with a foreign power would be to establish a dangerous precedent.

Majority of the above jurisprudence have found their way in our jurisdiction. In Chavez v. PCGG38, this Court held that there is a "governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other security matters." In Chavez v. PEA,39 there is also a recognition of the confidentiality of Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings. In Senate v. Ermita, the concept of presidential communications privilege is fully discussed. As may be gleaned from the above discussion, the claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief,40 appointing,41 pardoning,42 and diplomatic43 powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others. The above cases, especially, Nixon, In Re Sealed Case and Judicial Watch, somehow provide the elements of presidential communications privilege, to wit: 1) The protected communication must relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable presidential power." 2) The communication must be authored or "solicited and received" by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in "operational proximity" with the President. 3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought "likely contains important evidence" and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.44 In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions "fall under conversation and correspondence between the President and public officials" necessary in "her executive and policy decision-making process" and, that "the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People's Republic of China." Simply put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.

Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable power" of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.45 Second, the communications are "received" by a close advisor of the President. Under the "operational proximity" test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo's cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. The third element deserves a lengthy discussion. United States v. Nixon held that a claim of executive privilege is subject to balancing against other interest. In other words, confidentiality in executive privilege is not absolutely protected by the Constitution. The U.S. Court held: [N]either the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances. The foregoing is consistent with the earlier case of Nixon v. Sirica,46 where it was held that presidential communications are presumptively privileged and that the presumption can be overcome only by mere showing of public need by the branch seeking access to conversations. The courts are enjoined to resolve the competing interests of the political branches of the government "in the manner that preserves the essential functions of each Branch."47 Here, the record is bereft of any categorical explanation from respondent Committees to show a compelling or citical need for the answers to the three (3) questions in the enactment of a law. Instead, the questions veer more towards the exercise of the legislative oversight function under Section 22 of Article VI rather than Section 21 of the same Article. Senate v. Ermita ruled that the "the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation." It is conceded that it is difficult to draw the line between an inquiry in aid of legislation and an inquiry in the exercise of oversight function of Congress. In this regard, much will depend on the content of the questions and the manner the inquiry is conducted.

Respondent Committees argue that a claim of executive privilege does not guard against a possible disclosure of a crime or wrongdoing. We see no dispute on this. It is settled in United States v. Nixon48 that "demonstrated, specific need for evidence in pending criminal trial" outweighs the President's "generalized interest in confidentiality." However, the present case's distinction with the Nixon case is very evident. In Nixon, there is a pending criminal proceeding where the information is requested and it is the demands of due process of law and the fair administration of criminal justice that the information be disclosed. This is the reason why the U.S. Court was quick to "limit the scope of its decision." It stressed that it is "not concerned here with the balance between the President's generalized interest in confidentiality x x x and congressional demands for information." Unlike in Nixon, the information here is elicited, not in a criminal proceeding, but in a legislative inquiry. In this regard, Senate v. Ermita stressed that the validity of the claim of executive privilege depends not only on the ground invoked but, also, on the procedural setting or the context in which the claim is made. Furthermore, in Nixon, the President did not interpose any claim of need to protect military, diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets. In the present case, Executive Secretary Ermita categorically claims executive privilege on the grounds of presidential communications privilege in relation to her executive and policy decision-making process and diplomatic secrets. The respondent Committees should cautiously tread into the investigation of matters which may present a conflict of interest that may provide a ground to inhibit the Senators participating in the inquiry if later on an impeachment proceeding is initiated on the same subject matter of the present Senate inquiry. Pertinently, in Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon,49 it was held that since an impeachment proceeding had been initiated by a House Committee, the Senate Select Committee's immediate oversight need for five presidential tapes should give way to the House Judiciary Committee which has the constitutional authority to inquire into presidential impeachment. The Court expounded on this issue in this wise: It is true, of course, that the Executive cannot, any more than the other branches of government, invoke a general confidentiality privilege to shield its officials and employees from investigations by the proper governmental institutions into possible criminal wrongdoing. The Congress learned this as to its own privileges in Gravel v. United States, as did the judicial branch, in a sense, in Clark v. United States, and the executive branch itself in Nixon v. Sirica. But under Nixon v. Sirica, the showing required to overcome the presumption favoring confidentiality turned, not

on the nature of the presidential conduct that the subpoenaed material might reveal, but, instead, on the nature and appropriateness of the function in the performance of which the material was sought, and the degree to which the material was necessary to its fulfillment. Here also our task requires and our decision implies no judgment whatever concerning possible presidential involvement in culpable activity. On the contrary, we think the sufficiency of the Committee's showing must depend solely on whether the subpoenaed evidence is demonstrably critical to the responsible fulfillment of the Committee's functions. In its initial briefs here, the Committee argued that it has shown exactly this. It contended that resolution, on the basis of the subpoenaed tapes, of the conflicts in the testimony before it 'would aid in a determination whether legislative involvement in political campaigns is necessary' and 'could help engender the public support needed for basic reforms in our electoral system.' Moreover, Congress has, according to the Committee, power to oversee the operations of the executive branch, to investigate instances of possible corruption and malfeasance in office, and to expose the results of its investigations to public view. The Committee says that with respect to Watergate-related matters, this power has been delegated to it by the Senate, and that to exercise its power responsibly, it must have access to the subpoenaed tapes. We turn first to the latter contention. In the circumstances of this case, we need neither deny that the Congress may have, quite apart from its legislative responsibilities, a general oversight power, nor explore what the lawful reach of that power might be under the Committee's constituent resolution. Since passage of that resolution, the House Committee on the Judiciary has begun an inquiry into presidential impeachment. The investigative authority of the Judiciary Committee with respect to presidential conduct has an express constitutional source. x x x We have been shown no evidence indicating that Congress itself attaches any particular value to this interest. In these circumstances, we think the need for the tapes premised solely on an asserted power to investigate and inform cannot justify enforcement of the Committee's subpoena. The sufficiency of the Committee's showing of need has come to depend, therefore, entirely on whether the subpoenaed materials are critical to the performance of its legislative functions. There is a clear difference between Congress' legislative tasks and the responsibility of a grand jury, or any institution engaged in like functions. While fact-finding by a legislative committee is undeniably a part of its task, legislative judgments normally depend more on the predicted consequences of

proposed legislative actions and their political acceptability, than on precise reconstruction of past events; Congress frequently legislates on the basis of conflicting information provided in its hearings. In contrast, the responsibility of the grand jury turns entirely on its ability to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that certain named individuals did or did not commit specific crimes. If, for example, as in Nixon v. Sirica, one of those crimes is perjury concerning the content of certain conversations, the grand jury's need for the most precise evidence, the exact text of oral statements recorded in their original form, is undeniable. We see no comparable need in the legislative process, at least not in the circumstances of this case. Indeed, whatever force there might once have been in the Committee's argument that the subpoenaed materials are necessary to its legislative judgments has been substantially undermined by subsequent events. (Emphasis supplied) Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner's claim of executive privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.50 We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege. The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides: The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The provision itself expressly provides the limitation, i.e. as may be provided by law. Some of these laws are Section 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713,51 Article 22952 of the Revised Penal Code, Section 3 (k)53 of R.A. No. 3019, and Section 24(e)54 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. These are in addition to what our body of jurisprudence classifies as confidential55 and what our Constitution considers as belonging to the larger concept of executive privilege. Clearly, there is a recognized public interest in the confidentiality of certain information. We find the information subject of this case belonging to such kind.

More than anything else, though, the right of Congress or any of its Committees to obtain information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the people's right to public information. The former cannot claim that every legislative inquiry is an exercise of the people's right to information. The distinction between such rights is laid down in Senate v. Ermita: There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of people to information on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials. These powers belong only to Congress, not to an individual citizen. Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information. The members of respondent Committees should not invoke as justification in their exercise of power a right properly belonging to the people in general. This is because when they discharge their power, they do so as public officials and members of Congress. Be that as it may, the right to information must be balanced with and should give way, in appropriate cases, to constitutional precepts particularly those pertaining to delicate interplay of executive-legislative powers and privileges which is the subject of careful review by numerous decided cases. B- The Claim of Executive Privilege is Properly Invoked We now proceed to the issue -- whether the claim is properly invoked by the President. Jurisprudence teaches that for the claim to be properly invoked, there must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter."56 A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a "precise and certain reason" for preserving their confidentiality.57 The Letter dated November 17, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita satisfies the requirement. It serves as the formal claim of privilege. There, he expressly states that "this Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly."

Obviously, he is referring to the Office of the President. That is more than enough compliance. In Senate v. Ermita, a less categorical letter was even adjudged to be sufficient. With regard to the existence of "precise and certain reason," we find the grounds relied upon by Executive Secretary Ermita specific enough so as not "to leave respondent Committees in the dark on how the requested information could be classified as privileged." The case of Senate v. Ermita only requires that an allegation be made "whether the information demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc." The particular ground must only be specified. The enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive."58 The following statement of grounds satisfies the requirement: The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People's Republic of China. Given the confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to the President, he cannot provide the Committee any further details of these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect. At any rate, as held further in Senate v. Ermita, 59 the Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect to a coordinate and co-equal department. II Respondent Committees Committed Grave Abuse of Discretion in Issuing the Contempt Order Grave abuse of discretion means "such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law."60 It must be reiterated that when respondent Committees issued the show cause Letter dated November 22, 2007, petitioner replied immediately, manifesting that it was

not his intention to ignore the Senate hearing and that he thought the only remaining questions were the three (3) questions he claimed to be covered by executive privilege. In addition thereto, he submitted Atty. Bautista's letter, stating that his non-appearance was upon the order of the President and specifying the reasons why his conversations with President Arroyo are covered by executive privilege. Both correspondences include an expression of his willingness to testify again, provided he "be furnished in advance" copies of the questions. Without responding to his request for advance list of questions, respondent Committees issued the Order dated January 30, 2008, citing him in contempt of respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he would appear and give his testimony. Thereupon, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, informing respondent Committees that he had filed the present petition for certiorari. Respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt Order in view of five (5) reasons. First, there being a legitimate claim of executive privilege, the issuance of the contempt Order suffers from constitutional infirmity. Second, respondent Committees did not comply with the requirement laid down in Senate v. Ermita that the invitations should contain the "possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry," along with "the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof." Compliance with this requirement is imperative, both under Sections 21 and 22 of Article VI of the Constitution. This must be so to ensure that the rights of both persons appearing in or affected by such inquiry are respected as mandated by said Section 21 and by virtue of the express language of Section 22. Unfortunately, despite petitioner's repeated demands, respondent Committees did not send him an advance list of questions. Third, a reading of the transcript of respondent Committees' January 30, 2008 proceeding reveals that only a minority of the members of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was present during the deliberation. 61 Section 18 of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides that: "The Committee, by a vote of majority of all its members, may punish for contempt any witness before it who disobeys any order of the Committee or refuses to be sworn or to testify or to answer proper questions by the Committee or any of its members."

Clearly, the needed vote is a majority of all the members of the Committee. Apparently, members who did not actually participate in the deliberation were made to sign the contempt Order. Thus, there is a cloud of doubt as to the validity of the contempt Order dated January 30, 2008. We quote the pertinent portion of the transcript, thus: THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO, A). For clarification. x x x The Chair will call either a caucus or will ask the Committee on Rules if there is a problem. Meaning, if we do not have the sufficient numbers. But if we have a sufficient number, we will just hold a caucus to be able to implement that right away becauseAgain, our Rules provide that any one held in contempt and ordered arrested, need the concurrence of a majority of all members of the said committee and we have three committees conducting this. So thank you very much to the members SEN. PIMENTEL. Mr. Chairman. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO,A). May I recognize the Minority Leader and give him the floor, Senator Pimentel. SEN. PIMENTEL. Mr. Chairman, there is no problem, I think, with consulting the other committees. But I am of the opinion that the Blue Ribbon Committee is the lead committee, and therefore, it should have preference in enforcing its own decisions. Meaning to say, it is not something that is subject to consultation with other committees. I am not sure that is the right interpretation. I think that once we decide here, we enforce what we decide, because otherwise, before we know it, our determination is watered down by delay and, you know, the so-called "consultation" that inevitably will have to take place if we follow the premise that has been explained. So my suggestion, Mr. Chairman, is the Blue Ribbon Committee should not forget it's the lead committee here, and therefore, the will of the lead committee prevails over all the other, you, know reservations that other committees might have who are only secondary or even tertiary committees, Mr. Chairman. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO, A.) Thank you very much to the Minority Leader. And I agree with the wisdom of his statements. I was merely mentioning that under Section 6 of the Rules of the Committee and under Section 6, "The

Committee by a vote of a majority of all its members may punish for contempt any witness before it who disobeys any order of the Committee." So the Blue Ribbon Committee is more than willing to take that responsibility. But we only have six members here today, I am the seventh as chair and so we have not met that number. So I am merely stating that, sir, that when we will prepare the documentation, if a majority of all members sign and I am following the Sabio v. Gordon rule wherein I do believe, if I am not mistaken, Chairman Gordon prepared the documentation and then either in caucus or in session asked the other members to sign. And once the signatures are obtained, solely for the purpose that Secretary Neri or Mr. Lozada will not be able to legally question our subpoena as being insufficient in accordance with law. SEN. PIMENTEL. Mr. Chairman, the caution that the chair is suggesting is very well-taken. But I'd like to advert to the fact that the quorum of the committee is only two as far as I remember. Any two-member senators attending a Senate committee hearing provide that quorum, and therefore there is more than a quorum demanded by our Rules as far as we are concerned now, and acting as Blue Ribbon Committee, as Senator Enrile pointed out. In any event, the signatures that will follow by the additional members will only tend to strengthen the determination of this Committee to put its foot forward put down on what is happening in this country, Mr. Chairman, because it really looks terrible if the primary Committee of the Senate, which is the Blue Ribbon Committee, cannot even sanction people who openly defy, you know, the summons of this Committee. I know that the Chair is going through an agonizing moment here. I know that. But nonetheless, I think we have to uphold, you know, the institution that we are representing because the alternative will be a disaster for all of us, Mr. Chairman. So having said that, I'd like to reiterate my point. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO, A.) First of all, I agree 100 percent with the intentions of the Minority Leader. But let me very respectfully disagree with the legal requirements. Because, yes, we can have a hearing if we are only two but both under Section 18 of the Rules of the Senate and under Section 6 of the Rules of the Blue Ribbon Committee, there is a need for a majority of all members if it is a case of contempt and arrest. So, I am simply trying to avoid the court rebuking the Committee, which will instead of strengthening will weaken us. But I do agree, Mr. Minority Leader, that we should push for this and show the executive branch that the well-decided the issue has been decided upon the Sabio versus Gordon case. And

it's very clear that we are all allowed to call witnesses. And if they refure or they disobey not only can we cite them in contempt and have them arrested. x x x 62 Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees likewise violated Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the "duly published rules of procedure." We quote the OSG's explanation: The phrase 'duly published rules of procedure' requires the Senate of every Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the Senate's membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm. And fifth, respondent Committees' issuance of the contempt Order is arbitrary and precipitate. It must be pointed out that respondent Committees did not first pass upon the claim of executive privilege and inform petitioner of their ruling. Instead, they curtly dismissed his explanation as "unsatisfactory" and simultaneously issued the Order citing him in contempt and ordering his immediate arrest and detention. A fact worth highlighting is that petitioner is not an unwilling witness. He manifested several times his readiness to testify before respondent Committees. He refused to answer the three (3) questions because he was ordered by the President to claim executive privilege. It behooves respondent Committees to first rule on the claim of executive privilege and inform petitioner of their finding thereon, instead of peremptorily dismissing his explanation as "unsatisfactory." Undoubtedly, respondent Committees' actions constitute grave abuse of discretion for being arbitrary and for denying petitioner due process of law. The same quality afflicted their conduct when they (a) disregarded petitioner's motion for reconsideration alleging that he had filed the present petition before this Court and (b) ignored petitioner's repeated request for an advance list of questions, if there be any aside from the three (3) questions as to which he claimed to be covered by executive privilege. Even the courts are repeatedly advised to exercise the power of contempt judiciously and sparingly with utmost self-restraint with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, not for retaliation or

vindication.63 Respondent Committees should have exercised the same restraint, after all petitioner is not even an ordinary witness. He holds a high position in a coequal branch of government. In this regard, it is important to mention that many incidents of judicial review could have been avoided if powers are discharged with circumspection and deference. Concomitant with the doctrine of separation of powers is the mandate to observe respect to a co-equal branch of the government. One last word. The Court was accused of attempting to abandon its constitutional duty when it required the parties to consider a proposal that would lead to a possible compromise. The accusation is far from the truth. The Court did so, only to test a tool that other jurisdictions find to be effective in settling similar cases, to avoid a piecemeal consideration of the questions for review and to avert a constitutional crisis between the executive and legislative branches of government. In United States v. American Tel. & Tel Co.,64 the court refrained from deciding the case because of its desire to avoid a resolution that might disturb the balance of power between the two branches and inaccurately reflect their true needs. Instead, it remanded the record to the District Court for further proceedings during which the parties are required to negotiate a settlement. In the subsequent case of United States v. American Tel. &Tel Co.,65 it was held that "much of this spirit of compromise is reflected in the generality of language found in the Constitution." It proceeded to state: Under this view, the coordinate branches do not exist in an exclusively adversary relationship to one another when a conflict in authority arises. Rather each branch should take cognizance of an implicit constitutional mandate to seek optimal accommodation through a realistic evaluation of the needs of the conflicting branches in the particular fact situation.

It thereafter concluded that: "The Separation of Powers often impairs efficiency, in terms of dispatch and the immediate functioning of government. It is the long-term staying power of government that is enhanced by the mutual accommodation required by the separation of powers."

In rendering this decision, the Court emphasizes once more that the basic principles of constitutional law cannot be subordinated to the needs of a particular situation. As magistrates, our mandate is to rule objectively and dispassionately, always mindful of Mr. Justice Holmes' warning on the dangers inherent in cases of this nature, thus: "some accident of immediate and overwhelming interestappeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well settled principles of law will bend."66 In this present crusade to "search for truth," we should turn to the fundamental constitutional principles which underlie our tripartite system of government, where the Legislature enacts the law, the Judiciary interprets it and the Executive implements it. They are considered separate, co-equal, coordinate and supreme within their respective spheres but, imbued with a system of checks and balances to prevent unwarranted exercise of power. The Court's mandate is to preserve these constitutional principles at all times to keep the political branches of government within constitutional bounds in the exercise of their respective powers and prerogatives, even if it be in the search for truth. This is the only way we can preserve the stability of our democratic institutions and uphold the Rule of Law. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The subject Order dated January 30, 2008, citing petitioner Romulo L. Neri in contempt of the Senate Committees and directing his arrest and detention, is hereby nullified. SO ORDERED.

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT) PARTY-LIST, represented by SALVADOR B. BRITANICO, Petitioner, - versus -

The COMELEC and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed their respective Comments. At the outset, both maintain that RA 9369 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality, save for the prayer of the COMELEC to declare Section 43 as unconstitutional. The Assailed Provisions of RA 9369

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Petitioner assails the following provisions of RA 9369: RESPONDENT. 1. Section 34 which provides: G.R. NO. 177508 SEC. 34. Sec. 26 of Republic Act No. 7166 is hereby amended to CARPIO, J.: THE CASE BEFORE THE COURT IS A PETITION FOR PROHIBITION[1] WITH A PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER OR A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION[2] FILED BY PETITIONER BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT) PARTY LIST (PETITIONER) ASSAILING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9369 (RA 9369)[3] AND ENJOINING RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) FROM IMPLEMENTING THE STATUTE. RA 9369 is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2231 and House Bill No. 5352 passed by the Senate on 7 December 2006 and the House of Representatives on 19 December 2006. On 23 January 2007, less than four months before the 14 May 2007 local elections, the President signed RA 9369. Two newspapers of general circulation, Malaya and Business Mirror, published RA 9369 on 26 January 2007. RA 9369 thus took effect on 10 February 2007. On 7 May 2007, petitioner, a duly accredited multi-sectoral organization, filed this petition for prohibition alleging that RA 9369 violated Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.[4] Petitioner also assails the constitutionality of Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 of RA 9369. According to petitioner, these provisions are of questionable application and doubtful validity for failing to comply with the provisions of the Constitution. read as follows: SEC. 26. Official Watchers. - Every registered political party or coalition of political parties, and every candidate shall each be entitled to one watcher in every polling place and canvassing center: Provided That, candidates for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlunsod, or Sangguniang Bayan belonging to the same slate or ticket shall collectively be entitled to only one watcher. The dominant majority party and dominant minority party, which the Commission shall determine in accordance with law, shall each be entitled to one official watcher who shall be paid a fixed per diem of four hundred pesos (400.00). There shall also recognized six principal watchers, representing the six accredited major political parties excluding the dominant majority and minority parties, who shall be designated by the Commission upon nomination of the said parties. These political parties shall be determined by the Commission upon notice and hearing on the basis of the following circumstances: (a) The established record of the said parties, coalition of groups that now composed them, taking into account, among other things, their showing in past election; (b) The number of incumbent elective officials belonging to them ninety (90) days before the date of election;

c) Their identifiable political organizations and strengths as evidenced by their organized/chapters;

(d) The ability to fill a complete slate of candidates from the municipal level to the position of President; and (e) Other analogous circumstances that may determine their relative organizations and strengths. 2. Section 37 which provides: SEC. 37. Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166 is hereby amended read as follows: to

AND SUPPORTING STATEMENTS. SAID ELECTION RETURNS SHALL BE SUBMITTED BY PERSONAL DELIVERY WITHIN TWO (2) DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF NOTICE. WHEN IT APPEARS THAT ANY CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS OR SUPPORTING STATEMENT OF VOTES BY CITY/MUNICIPALITY OR BY PRECINCT BEARS ERASURES OR ALTERATION WHICH MAY CAST DOUBT AS TO THE VERACITY OF THE NUMBER OF VOTES STATED HEREIN AND MAY AFFECT THE RESULT OF THE ELECTION, UPON REQUESTED OF THE PRESIDENTIAL, VICE PRESIDENTIAL OR SENATORIAL CANDIDATE CONCERNED OR HIS PARTY, CONGRESS OR THE COMMISSION EN BANC, AS THE CASE MAY BE SHALL, FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF VERIFYING THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF VOTES CAST FOR PRESIDENT, VICE PRESIDENT OR SENATOR, COUNT THE VOTES AS THEY APPEAR IN THE COPIES OF THE ELECTION RETURNS SUBMITTED TO IT. IN CASE OF ANY DISCREPANCY, INCOMPLETENESS, ERASURE OR ALTERATION AS MENTIONED ABOVE, THE PROCEDURE ON PREPROCLAMATION CONTROVERSIES SHALL BE ADOPTED AND APPLIED AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 17,18,19 AND 20. ANY PERSON WHO PRESENT IN EVIDENCE A SIMULATED COPY OF AN ELECTION RETURN, CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS OR STATEMENT OF VOTES, OR A PRINTED COPY OF AN ELECTION RETURN, CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS OR STATEMENT OF VOTES BEARING A SIMULATED CERTIFICATION OR A SIMULATED IMAGE, SHALL BE GUILTY OF AN ELECTION OFFENSE SHALL BE PENALIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881. 3. SECTION 38 WHICH PROVIDES: SEC. 38. SECTION 15 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7166 IS HEREBY AMENDED TO READ AS FOLLOWS: SEC. 15. PRE-PROCLAMATION CASES IN ELECTIONS FOR PRESIDENT, VICE PRESIDENT, SENATOR, AND MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. - FOR PURPOSES OF THE ELECTIONS FOR PRESIDENT, VICE PRESIDENT, SENATOR, AND MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, NO PRE-PROCLAMATION CASES SHALL BE

SEC. 30. Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for the Election of President and Vice President: The Commission en banc as the National Board of Canvassers for the election of senators: Determination of Authenticity and Due Execution of Certificates of Canvass. Congress and the Commission en banc shall determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificate of canvass for president and vice president and senators, respectively, as accomplished and transmitted to it by the local boards of canvassers, on a showing that: (1) each certificate of canvass was executed, signed and thumbmarked by the chairman and members of the board of canvassers and transmitted or caused to be transmitted to Congress by them; (2) each certificate of canvass contains the names of all of the candidates for president and vice president or senator, as the case may be, and their corresponding votes in words and their corresponding votes in words and in figures; (3) there exits no discrepancy in other authentic copies of the certificates of canvass or any of its supporting documents such as statement of votes by city/municipality/by precinct or discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in words and figures in the certificate; and (4) there exist no discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in words and figures in the certificates of canvass against the aggregate number of votes appearing in the election returns of precincts covered by the certificate of canvass: Provided, That certified print copies of election returns or certificates of canvass may be used for the purpose of verifying the existence of the discrepancy. WHEN THE CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS, DULY CERTIFIED BY THE BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF EACH PROVINCE, CITY OF DISTRICT, APPEARS TO BE INCOMPLETE, THE SENATE PRESIDENT OR THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION, AS THE CASE MAY BE, SHALL REQUIRE THE BOARD OF CANVASSERS CONCERNED TO TRANSMIT BY PERSONAL DELIVERY, THE ELECTION RETURNS FORM POLLING PLACES THAT WERE NOT INCLUDED IN THE CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS

ALLOWED ON MATTERS RELATING TO THE PREPARATION, TRANSMISSION, RECEIPT, CUSTODY AND APPRECIATION OF ELECTION RETURNS OR THE CERTIFICATES OF CANVASS, AS THE CASE MAY BE, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED FOR IN SECTION 30 HEREOF. HOWEVER, THIS DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE AUTHORITY OF THE APPROPRIATE CANVASSING BODY MOTU PROPRIO OR UPON WRITTEN COMPLAINT OF AN INTERESTED PERSON TO CORRECT MANIFEST ERRORS IN THE CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS OR ELECTION RETURNS BEFORE IT. QUESTIONS AFFECTING THE COMPOSITION OR PROCEEDINGS OF THE BOARD OF CANVASSERS MAY BE INITIATED IN THE BOARD OR DIRECTLY WITH THE COMMISSION IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 19 HEREOF. ANY OBJECTION ON THE ELECTION RETURNS BEFORE THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS, OR ON THE MUNICIPAL CERTIFICATES OF CANVASS BEFORE THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OR DISTRICT BOARD OF CANVASSERS IN METRO MANILA AREA, SHALL BE SPECIFICALLY NOTICED IN THE MINUTES OF THE RESPECTIVE PROCEEDINGS. 4. SECTION 43 WHICH PROVIDES: SEC. 43. SECTION 265 OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881 IS HEREBY AMENDED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

1. WHETHER RA 9369 VIOLATES SECTION 26(1), ARTICLE VI OF THE CONSTITUTION; WHETHER SECTIONS 37 AND 38 VIOLATE SECTION 17, ARTICLE VI[5] AND PARAGRAPH 7, SECTION 4, ARTICLE VII[6] OF THE CONSTITUTION; Whether Section 43 violates Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution;[7] and WHETHER SECTION 34 VIOLATES SECTION 10, ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION.[8] THE COURTS RULING THE PETITION HAS NO MERIT. IS SETTLED THAT EVERY STATUTE IS PRESUMED TO BE CONSTITUTIONAL.[9] THE PRESUMPTION IS THAT THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED TO ENACT A VALID, SENSIBLE AND JUST LAW. THOSE WHO PETITION THE COURT TO DECLARE A LAW UNCONSTITUTIONAL MUST SHOW THAT THERE IS A CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL BREACH OF THE CONSTITUTION, NOT MERELY A DOUBTFUL, SPECULATIVE OR ARGUMENTATIVE ONE; OTHERWISE, THE PETITION MUST FAIL.[10] In this case, petitioner failed to justify why RA 9369 and the assailed provisions should be declared unconstitutional. RA 9369 does not violate Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution

SEC. 265. PROSECUTION. THE COMMISSION SHALL, THROUGH ITS DULY AUTHORIZED LEGAL OFFICERS, HAVE THE POWER, CONCURRENT WITH THE OTHER PROSECUTING ARMS OF THE GOVERNMENT, TO CONDUCT PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF ALL ELECTION OFFENSES PUNISHABLE UNDER THIS CODE, AND TO PROSECUTE THE SAME. THE ISSUES PETITIONER RAISES THE FOLLOWING ISSUES:

Petitioner alleges that the title of RA 9369 is misleading because it speaks of poll automation but contains substantial provisions dealing with the manual canvassing of election returns. Petitioner also alleges that Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 are neither embraced in the title nor germane to the subject matter of RA 9369. Both the COMELEC and the OSG maintain that the title of RA 9369 is broad enough to encompass topics which deal not only with the automation process but with everything related to its purpose encouraging a transparent, credible, fair, and accurate elections. The constitutional requirement that every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof has always been given a practical rather than a technical construction.[11] The requirement is

satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough to include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve.[12] The title of a law does not have to be an index of its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title.[13] Moreover, a title which declares a statute to be an act to amend a specified code is sufficient and the precise nature of the amendatory act need not be further stated.[14] RA 9369 is an amendatory act entitled An Act Amending Republic Act No. 8436, Entitled An Act Authorizing the Commission on Elections to Use an Automated Election System in the May 11, 1998 National or Local Elections and in Subsequent National and Local Electoral Exercises, to Encourage Transparency, Credibility, Fairness and Accuracy of Elections, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as Amended, Republic Act No. 7166 and Other Related Election Laws, Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes. Clearly, the subject matter of RA 9369 covers the amendments to RA 8436, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (BP 881),[15] Republic Act No. 7166 (RA 7166),[16] and other related election laws to achieve its purpose of promoting transparency, credibility, fairness, and accuracy in the elections. The provisions of RA 9369 assailed by petitioner deal with amendments to specific provisions of RA 7166 and BP 881, specifically: (1) Sections 34, 37 and 38 amend Sections 26, 30 and 15 of RA 7166, respectively; and (2) Section 43 of RA 9369 amends Section 265 of BP 881. Therefore, the assailed provisions are germane to the subject matter of RA 9369 which is to amend RA 7166 and BP 881, among others. Sections 37 and 38 do not violate Section 17, Article VI and Paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution PETITIONER ARGUES THAT SECTIONS 37 AND 38 VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION BY IMPAIRING THE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (PET) AND THE SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (SET). ACCORDING TO PETITIONER, UNDER THE AMENDED PROVISIONS, CONGRESS AS THE NATIONAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS FOR THE ELECTION OF PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT (CONGRESS), AND THE COMELEC EN BANC AS THE NATIONAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS (COMELEC EN BANC), FOR THE ELECTION OF SENATORS MAY NOW ENTERTAIN PRE-PROCLAMATION CASES IN THE ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT, VICE PRESIDENT, AND SENATORS. PETITIONER CONCLUDES THAT IN ENTERTAINING PRE-PROCLAMATION CASES, CONGRESS AND THE COMELEC EN BANC UNDERMINE THE

INDEPENDENCE AND ENCROACH UPON THE JURISDICTION OF THE PET AND THE SET. The COMELEC maintains that the amendments introduced by Section 37 pertain only to the adoption and application of the procedures on pre-proclamation controversies in case of any discrepancy, incompleteness, erasure or alteration in the certificates of canvass. The COMELEC adds that Section 37 does not provide that Congress and the COMELEC en banc may now entertain pre-proclamation cases for national elective posts. OSG argues that the Constitution does not prohibit pre-proclamation cases involving national elective posts. According to the OSG, ONLY SECTION 15 OF RA 7166[17] EXPRESSLY DISALLOWS PREPROCLAMATION CASES INVOLVING NATIONAL ELECTIVE POSTS BUT THIS PROVISION WAS SUBSEQUENTLY AMENDED BY SECTION 38 OF RA 9369. In Pimentel III v. COMELEC,[18] we already discussed the implications of the amendments introduced by Sections 37 and 38 to Sections 15 and 30[19] of RA 7166, respectively and we declared: Indeed, this Court recognizes that by virtue of the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 9369 to Sections 15 and 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, preproclamation cases involving the authenticity and due execution of certificates of canvass are now allowed in elections for President, Vice-President, and Senators. The intention of Congress to treat a case falling under Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, as a pre-proclamation case is apparent in the fourth paragraph of the said provision which adopts and applies to such a case the same procedure provided under Sections 17, 18, 19 and 20 of Republic Act No. 7166 on pre-proclamation controversies. In sum, in [the] elections for President, Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the general rule is still that preproclamation cases on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or certificates of canvass are still prohibited. As with other general rules, there are recognized exceptions to the prohibition, namely: (1) correction of manifest errors; (2) questions affecting the composition or proceeding of the board of canvassers; and (3) determination of the

authenticity and due execution of certificates of canvass as provided in Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369.[20] In the present case, Congress and the COMELEC en banc do not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the PET and the SET. There is no conflict of jurisdiction since the powers of Congress and the COMELEC en banc, on one hand, and the PET and the SET, on the other, are exercised on different occasions and for different purposes. The PET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice President. The SET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the Senate. The jurisdiction of the PET and the SET can only be invoked once the winning presidential, vice presidential or senatorial candidates have been proclaimed. On the other hand, under Section 37, Congress and the COMELEC en banc shall determine only the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass. Congress and the COMELEC en banc shall exercise this power before the proclamation of the winning presidential, vice presidential, and senatorial candidates. Section 43 does not violate Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution Both petitioner and the COMELEC argue that the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the exclusive power to investigate and prosecute cases of violations of election laws. Petitioner and the COMELEC allege that Section 43 is unconstitutional because it gives the other prosecuting arms of the government concurrent power with the COMELEC to investigate and prosecute election offenses.[21] We do not agree with petitioner and the COMELEC that the Constitution gave the COMELEC the exclusive power to investigate and prosecute cases of violations of election laws. Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices. This was an important innovation introduced by the Constitution because this provision was not in the 1935[22] or 1973[23] Constitutions.[24] The phrase [w]here appropriate leaves to the legislature the power to determine the kind of election offenses that the COMELEC shall prosecute exclusively or concurrently with other prosecuting arms of the government.

The grant of the exclusive power to the COMELEC can be found in Section 265 of BP 881, which provides: Sec. 265. Prosecution. - The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government: Provided, however, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within four months from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted. (Emphasis supplied) This was also an innovation introduced by BP 881. The history of election laws shows that prior to BP 881, no such exclusive power was ever bestowed on the COMELEC.[25] We also note that while Section 265 of BP 881 vests in the COMELEC the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigations and prosecute election offenses, it likewise authorizes the COMELEC to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government. In the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the authority of the COMELEC was subsequently qualified and explained.[26] The 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides: Rule 34 - Prosecution of Election Offenses Sec. 1. Authority of the Commission to Prosecute Election Offenses. - The Commission shall have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the election laws and to prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be provided by law. (Emphasis supplied) It is clear that the grant of the exclusive power to investigate and prosecute election offenses to the COMELEC was not by virtue of the Constitution but by BP 881, a legislative enactment. If the intention of the framers of the Constitution were to give the COMELEC the exclusive power to investigate and prosecute election offenses, the framers would have expressly so stated in the Constitution. They did not.

In People v. Basilla,[27] we acknowledged that without the assistance of provincial and city fiscals and their assistants and staff members, and of the state prosecutors of the Department of Justice, the prompt and fair investigation and prosecution of election offenses committed before or in the course of nationwide elections would simply not be possible.[28] In COMELEC v. Espaol,[29] we also stated that enfeebled by lack of funds and the magnitude of its workload, the COMELEC did not have a sufficient number of legal officers to conduct such investigation and to prosecute such cases.[30] The prompt investigation, prosecution, and disposition of election offenses constitute an indispensable part of the task of securing free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.[31] Thus, given the plenary power of the legislature to amend or repeal laws, if Congress passes a law amending Section 265 of BP 881, such law does not violate the Constitution. Section 34 does not violate Section 10, Article III of the Constitution assails the constitutionality of the provision which fixes the per diem of poll watchers of the dominant majority and dominant minority parties at Pon election day. Petitioner argues that this violates the freedom of the parties to contract and their right to fix the terms and conditions of the contract they see as fair, equitable and just. Petitioner adds that this is a purely private contract using private funds which cannot be regulated by law. The OSG argues that petitioner erroneously invoked the non-impairment clause because this only applies to previously perfected contracts. In this case, there is no perfected contact and, therefore, no obligation will be impaired. Both the COMELEC and the OSG argue that the law is a proper exercise of police power and it will prevail over a contract. According to the COMELEC, poll watching is not just an ordinary contract but is an agreement with the solemn duty to ensure the sanctity of votes. The role of poll watchers is vested with public interest which can be regulated by Congress in the exercise of its police power. The OSG further argues that the assurance that the poll watchers will receive fair and equitable compensation promotes the general welfare. The OSG also states that this was a reasonable regulation considering that the dominant majority and minority parties will secure a copy of the election returns and are given the right to assign poll watchers inside the polling precincts. There is no violation of the non-impairment clause. First, the non- impairment clause is limited in application to laws that derogate from prior acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties.[32]

There is impairment if a subsequent law changes the terms of a contract between the parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties.[33] As observed by the OSG, there is no existing contract yet and, therefore, no enforceable right or demandable obligation will be impaired. RA 9369 was enacted more than three months prior to the 14 May 2007 elections. Hence, when the dominant majority and minority parties hired their respective poll watchers for the 14 May 2007 elections, they were deemed to have incorporated in their contracts all the provisions of RA 9369. Second, it is settled that police power is superior to the non-impairment clause. [34] The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of contracts is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the community. Section 8 of COMELEC Resolution No. 1405[35] specifies the rights and duties of poll watchers: THE WATCHERS SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO STAY IN THE SPACE RESERVED FOR THEM INSIDE THE POLLING PLACE. THEY SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO WITNESS AND INFORM THEMSELVES OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE BOARD; TO TAKE NOTES OF WHAT THEY MAY SEE OR HEAR, TO TAKE PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND INCIDENTS, IF ANY, DURING THE COUNTING OF VOTES, AS WELL AS THE ELECTION RETURNS, TALLY BOARD AND BALLOT BOXES; TO FILE A PROTEST AGAINST ANY IRREGULARITY OR VIOLATION OF LAW WHICH THEY BELIEVE MAY HAVE BEEN COMMITTED BY THE BOARD OR BY ANY OF ITS MEMBERS OR BY ANY PERSON; TO OBTAIN FROM THE BOARD A CERTIFICATE AS TO THE FILING OF SUCH PROTEST AND/OR OF THE RESOLUTION THEREON; TO READ THE BALLOTS AFTER THEY SHALL HAVE BEEN READ BY THE CHAIRMAN, AS WELL AS THE ELECTION RETURNS AFTER THEY SHALL HAVE BEEN COMPLETED AND SIGNED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE BOARD WITHOUT TOUCHING THEM, BUT THEY SHALL NOT SPEAK TO ANY MEMBER OF THE BOARD, OR TO ANY VOTER, OR AMONG THEMSELVES, IN SUCH A MANNER AS WOULD DISTURB THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE BOARD; AND TO BE FURNISHED, UPON REQUEST, WITH A CERTIFICATE OF VOTES FOR THE CANDIDATES, DULY SIGNED AND THUMBMARKED BY THE

CHAIRMAN AND ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF ELECTION INSPECTORS. Additionally, the poll watchers of the dominant majority and minority parties in a precinct shall, if available, affix their signatures and thumbmarks on the election returns for that precinct.[36] The dominant majority and minority parties shall also be given a copy of the certificates of canvass[37] and election returns[38] through their respective poll watchers. Clearly, poll watchers play an important role in the elections. MOREOVER, WHILE THE CONTRACTING PARTIES MAY ESTABLISH SUCH STIPULATIONS, CLAUSES, TERMS, AND CONDITIONS AS THEY MAY DEEM CONVENIENT, SUCH STIPULATIONS SHOULD NOT BE CONTRARY TO LAW, MORALS, GOOD CUSTOMS, PUBLIC ORDER, OR PUBLIC POLICY.[39]

INVESTED WITH PUBLIC INTEREST. IN FACT, EVEN PETITIONER CONCEDES THAT POLL WATCHERS NOT ONLY GUARD THE VOTES OF THEIR RESPECTIVE CANDIDATES OR POLITICAL PARTIES BUT ALSO ENSURE THAT ALL THE VOTES ARE PROPERLY COUNTED. ULTIMATELY, POLL WATCHERS AID IN FAIR AND HONEST ELECTIONS. POLL WATCHERS HELP ENSURE THAT THE ELECTIONS ARE TRANSPARENT, CREDIBLE, FAIR, AND ACCURATE. THE REGULATION OF THE PER DIEM OF THE POLL WATCHERS OF THE DOMINANT MAJORITY AND MINORITY PARTIES PROMOTES THE GENERAL WELFARE OF THE COMMUNITY AND IS A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER. WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

IN BELTRAN V. SECRETARY OF HEALTH,[40] WE SAID:

FURTHERMORE, THE FREEDOM TO CONTRACT IS NOT ABSOLUTE; ALL CONTRACTS AND ALL RIGHTS ARE SUBJECT TO THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE AND NOT ONLY MAY REGULATIONS WHICH AFFECT THEM BE ESTABLISHED BY THE STATE, BUT ALL SUCH REGULATIONS MUST BE SUBJECT TO CHANGE FROM TIME TO TIME, AS THE GENERAL WELL-BEING OF THE COMMUNITY MAY REQUIRE, OR AS THE CIRCUMSTANCES MAY CHANGE, OR AS EXPERIENCE MAY DEMONSTRATE THE NECESSITY.[41] (EMPHASIS SUPPLIED)

THEREFORE, ASSUMING THERE WERE EXISTING CONTRACTS, SECTION 34 WOULD STILL BE CONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE THE LAW WAS ENACTED IN THE EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE TO PROMOTE THE GENERAL WELFARE OF THE PEOPLE. WE AGREE WITH THE COMELEC THAT THE ROLE OF POLL WATCHERS IS

PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC.,

Petitioner, Present:

G.R. No. 166006 3. The Administrator of the Fertilizer Pesticide Authority to include in its fertilizer pricing formula a capital contribution component of not less than P10 per bag. This capital contribution shall be collected until adequate capital is raised to make PPI viable. Such capital contribution shall be applied by FPA to all domestic sales of fertilizers in the Philippines.[5] (Underscoring supplied) Pursuant to the LOI, Fertiphil paid P10 for every bag of fertilizer it sold in the domestic market to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA). FPA then remitted the amount collected to the Far East Bank and Trust Company, the depositary bank of PPI. Fertiphil paid P6,689,144 to FPA from July 8, 1985 to January 24, 1986.[6] After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10 levy. With the return of democracy, Fertiphil demanded from PPI a refund of the amounts it paid under LOI No. 1465, but PPI refused to accede to the demand.[7] Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages[8] against FPA and PPI with the RTC in Makati. It questioned the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 for being unjust, unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and an unlawful imposition that amounted to a denial of due process of law.[9] Fertiphil alleged that the LOI solely favored PPI, a privately owned corporation, which used the proceeds to maintain its monopoly of the fertilizer industry. In its Answer,[10] FPA, through the Solicitor General, countered that the issuance of LOI No. 1465 was a valid exercise of the police power of the State in ensuring the stability of the fertilizer industry in the country. It also averred that Fertiphil did not sustain any damage from the LOI because the burden imposed by the levy fell on the ultimate consumer, not the seller. RTC Disposition On November 20, 1991, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Fertiphil, disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant Planters Product, Inc., ordering the latter to pay the former:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, - versus CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: FERTIPHIL CORPORATION, Respondent. March 14, 2008 x-------------------------------------------------x DECISION REYES, R.T., J.: THE Regional Trial Courts (RTC) have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of statutes, executive orders, presidential decrees and other issuances. The Constitution vests that power not only in the Supreme Court but in all Regional Trial Courts. The principle is relevant in this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming with modification that of the RTC in Makati City,[2] finding petitioner Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) liable to private respondent Fertiphil Corporation (Fertiphil) for the levies it paid under Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 1465. The Facts Petitioner PPI and private respondent Fertiphil are private corporations incorporated under Philippine laws.[3] They are both engaged in the importation and distribution of fertilizers, pesticides and agricultural chemicals. On June 3, 1985, then President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his legislative powers, issued LOI No. 1465 which provided, among others, for the imposition of a capital recovery component (CRC) on the domestic sale of all grades of fertilizers in the Philippines.[4] The LOI provides:

1) the sum of P6,698,144.00 with interest at 12% from the time of judicial demand; 2) 3) the sum of P100,000 as attorneys fees; the cost of suit.

In the case at bar, the plaintiff paid the amount of P6,698,144.00 to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority pursuant to the P10 per bag of fertilizer sold imposition under LOI 1465 which, in turn, remitted the amount to the defendant Planters Products, Inc. thru the latters depository bank, Far East Bank and Trust Co. Thus, by virtue of LOI 1465 the plaintiff, Fertiphil Corporation, which is a private domestic corporation, became poorer by the amount of P6,698,144.00 and the defendant, Planters Product, Inc., another private domestic corporation, became richer by the amount of P6,698,144.00. Tested by the standards of constitutionality as set forth in the afore-quoted jurisprudence, it is quite evident that LOI 1465 insofar as it imposes the amount of P10 per fertilizer bag sold in the country and orders that the said amount should go to the defendant Planters Product, Inc. is unlawful because it violates the mandate that a tax can be levied only for a public purpose and not to benefit, aid and promote a private enterprise such as Planters Product, Inc.[12] PPI moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.[13] PPI then filed a notice of appeal with the RTC but it failed to pay the requisite appeal docket fee. In a separate but related proceeding, this Court[14] allowed the appeal of PPI and remanded the case to the CA for proper disposition. CA Decision On November 28, 2003, the CA handed down its decision affirming with modification that of the RTC, with the following fallo: IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the MODIFICATION that the award of attorneys fees is hereby DELETED.[15] In affirming the RTC decision, the CA ruled that the lis mota of the complaint for collection was the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465, thus: The question then is whether it was proper for the trial court to exercise its power to judicially determine the constitutionality of the subject statute in the instant case.

SO ORDERED.[11] Ruling that the imposition of the P10 CRC was an exercise of the States inherent power of taxation, the RTC invalidated the levy for violating the basic principle that taxes can only be levied for public purpose, viz.: It is apparent that the imposition of P10 per fertilizer bag sold in the country by LOI 1465 is purportedly in the exercise of the power of taxation. It is a settled principle that the power of taxation by the state is plenary. Comprehensive and supreme, the principal check upon its abuse resting in the responsibility of the members of the legislature to their constituents. However, there are two kinds of limitations on the power of taxation: the inherent limitations and the constitutional limitations. One of the inherent limitations is that a tax may be levied only for public purposes: The power to tax can be resorted to only for a constitutionally valid public purpose. By the same token, taxes may not be levied for purely private purposes, for building up of private fortunes, or for the redress of private wrongs. They cannot be levied for the improvement of private property, or for the benefit, and promotion of private enterprises, except where the aid is incident to the public benefit. It is wellsettled principle of constitutional law that no general tax can be levied except for the purpose of raising money which is to be expended for public use. Funds cannot be exacted under the guise of taxation to promote a purpose that is not of public interest. Without such limitation, the power to tax could be exercised or employed as an authority to destroy the economy of the people. A tax, however, is not held void on the ground of want of public interest unless the want of such interest is clear. (71 Am. Jur. pp. 371-372)

As a rule, where the controversy can be settled on other grounds, the courts will not resolve the constitutionality of a law (Lim v. Pacquing, 240 SCRA 649 [1995]). The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of political departments are valid, absent a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. However, the courts are not precluded from exercising such power when the following requisites are obtaining in a controversy before it: First, there must be before the court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the question must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity; and lastly, the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 [2000]). Indisputably, the present case was primarily instituted for collection and damages. However, a perusal of the complaint also reveals that the instant action is founded on the claim that the levy imposed was an unlawful and unconstitutional special assessment. Consequently, the requisite that the constitutionality of the law in question be the very lis mota of the case is present, making it proper for the trial court to rule on the constitutionality of LOI 1465.[16] The CA held that even on the assumption that LOI No. 1465 was issued under the police power of the state, it is still unconstitutional because it did not promote public welfare. The CA explained: In declaring LOI 1465 unconstitutional, the trial court held that the levy imposed under the said law was an invalid exercise of the States power of taxation inasmuch as it violated the inherent and constitutional prescription that taxes be levied only for public purposes. It reasoned out that the amount collected under the levy was remitted to the depository bank of PPI, which the latter used to advance its private interest. On the other hand, appellant submits that the subject statutes passage was a valid exercise of police power. In addition, it disputes the court a quos findings arguing that the collections under LOI 1465 was for the benefit of Planters Foundation, Incorporated (PFI), a foundation created by law to hold in trust for millions of farmers, the stock ownership of PPI.

Of the three fundamental powers of the State, the exercise of police power has been characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs. It may be exercised as long as the activity or the property sought to be regulated has some relevance to public welfare (Constitutional Law, by Isagani A. Cruz, p. 38, 1995 Edition). Vast as the power is, however, it must be exercised within the limits set by the Constitution, which requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. Thus, our courts have laid down the test to determine the validity of a police measure as follows: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals (National Development Company v. Philippine Veterans Bank, 192 SCRA 257 [1990]). It is upon applying this established tests that We sustain the trial courts holding LOI 1465 unconstitutional. To be sure, ensuring the continued supply and distribution of fertilizer in the country is an undertaking imbued with public interest. However, the method by which LOI 1465 sought to achieve this is by no means a measure that will promote the public welfare. The governments commitment to support the successful rehabilitation and continued viability of PPI, a private corporation, is an unmistakable attempt to mask the subject statutes impartiality. There is no way to treat the self-interest of a favored entity, like PPI, as identical with the general interest of the countrys farmers or even the Filipino people in general. Well to stress, substantive due process exacts fairness and equal protection disallows distinction where none is needed. When a statutes public purpose is spoiled by private interest, the use of police power becomes a travesty which must be struck down for being an arbitrary exercise of government power. To rule in favor of appellant would contravene the general principle that revenues derived from taxes cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private individuals.[17] The CA did not accept PPIs claim that the levy imposed under LOI No. 1465 was for the benefit of Planters Foundation, Inc., a foundation created to hold in trust the stock ownership of PPI. The CA stated: Appellant next claims that the collections under LOI 1465 was for the benefit of Planters Foundation, Incorporated (PFI), a foundation created by law to hold in trust for millions of farmers, the stock ownership of PFI on the strength of Letter of

Undertaking (LOU) issued by then Prime Minister Cesar Virata on April 18, 1985 and affirmed by the Secretary of Justice in an Opinion dated October 12, 1987, to wit: 2. Upon the effective date of this Letter of Undertaking, the Republic shall cause FPA to include in its fertilizer pricing formula a capital recovery component, the proceeds of which will be used initially for the purpose of funding the unpaid portion of the outstanding capital stock of Planters presently held in trust by Planters Foundation, Inc. (Planters Foundation), which unpaid capital is estimated at approximately P206 million (subject to validation by Planters and Planters Foundation) (such unpaid portion of the outstanding capital stock of Planters being hereafter referred to as the Unpaid Capital), and subsequently for such capital increases as may be required for the continuing viability of Planters. The capital recovery component shall be in the minimum amount of P10 per bag, which will be added to the price of all domestic sales of fertilizer in the Philippines by any importer and/or fertilizer mother company. In this connection, the Republic hereby acknowledges that the advances by Planters to Planters Foundation which were applied to the payment of the Planters shares now held in trust by Planters Foundation, have been assigned to, among others, the Creditors. Accordingly, the Republic, through FPA, hereby agrees to deposit the proceeds of the capital recovery component in the special trust account designated in the notice dated April 2, 1985, addressed by counsel for the Creditors to Planters Foundation. Such proceeds shall be deposited by FPA on or before the 15th day of each month. The capital recovery component shall continue to be charged and collected until payment in full of (a) the Unpaid Capital and/or (b) any shortfall in the payment of the Subsidy Receivables, (c) any carrying cost accruing from the date hereof on the amounts which may be outstanding from time to time of the Unpaid Capital and/or the Subsidy Receivables and (d) the capital increases contemplated in paragraph 2 hereof. For the purpose of the foregoing clause (c), the carrying cost shall be at such rate as will represent the full and reasonable cost to Planters of servicing its debts, taking into account both its peso and foreign currencydenominated obligations. (Records, pp. 42-43) Appellants proposition is open to question, to say the least. The LOU issued by then Prime Minister Virata taken together with the Justice Secretarys Opinion does not preponderantly demonstrate that the collections made were held in trust in favor of millions of farmers. Unfortunately for appellant, in the absence of sufficient evidence to establish its claims, this Court is constrained to rely on what is

explicitly provided in LOI 1465 that one of the primary aims in imposing the levy is to support the successful rehabilitation and continued viability of PPI.[18] PPI moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.[19] It then filed the present petition with this Court. Issues Petitioner PPI raises four issues for Our consideration, viz.: I THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LOI 1465 CANNOT BE COLLATERALLY ATTACKED AND BE DECREED VIA A DEFAULT JUDGMENT IN A CASE FILED FOR COLLECTION AND DAMAGES WHERE THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY IS NOT THE VERY LIS MOTA OF THE CASE. NEITHER CAN LOI 1465 BE CHALLENGED BY ANY PERSON OR ENTITY WHICH HAS NO STANDING TO DO SO. II LOI 1465, BEING A LAW IMPLEMENTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF ASSURING THE FERTILIZER SUPPLY AND DISTRIBUTION IN THE COUNTRY, AND FOR BENEFITING A FOUNDATION CREATED BY LAW TO HOLD IN TRUST FOR MILLIONS OF FARMERS THEIR STOCK OWNERSHIP IN PPI CONSTITUTES A VALID LEGISLATION PURSUANT TO THE EXERCISE OF TAXATION AND POLICE POWER FOR PUBLIC PURPOSES. III THE AMOUNT COLLECTED UNDER THE CAPITAL RECOVERY COMPONENT WAS REMITTED TO THE GOVERNMENT, AND BECAME GOVERNMENT FUNDS PURSUANT TO AN EFFECTIVE AND VALIDLY ENACTED LAW WHICH IMPOSED DUTIES AND CONFERRED RIGHTS BY VIRTUE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF OPERATIVE FACT PRIOR TO ANY DECLARATION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF LOI 1465. IV

THE PRINCIPLE OF UNJUST VEXATION (SHOULD BE ENRICHMENT) FINDS NO APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT CASE.[20] (Underscoring supplied) Our Ruling We shall first tackle the procedural issues of locus standi and the jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve constitutional issues. Fertiphil has locus standi because it suffered direct injury; doctrine of standing is a mere procedural technicality which may be waived. PPI argues that Fertiphil has no locus standi to question the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 because it does not have a personal and substantial interest in the case or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement.[21] It asserts that Fertiphil did not suffer any damage from the CRC imposition because incidence of the levy fell on the ultimate consumer or the farmers themselves, not on the seller fertilizer company.[22] We cannot agree. The doctrine of locus standi or the right of appearance in a court of justice has been adequately discussed by this Court in a catena of cases. Succinctly put, the doctrine requires a litigant to have a material interest in the outcome of a case. In private suits, locus standi requires a litigant to be a real party in interest, which is defined as the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.[23] In public suits, this Court recognizes the difficulty of applying the doctrine especially when plaintiff asserts a public right on behalf of the general public because of conflicting public policy issues. [24] On one end, there is the right of the ordinary citizen to petition the courts to be freed from unlawful government intrusion and illegal official action. At the other end, there is the public policy precluding excessive judicial interference in official acts, which may unnecessarily hinder the delivery of basic public services. In this jurisdiction, We have adopted the direct injury test to determine locus standi in public suits. In People v. Vera,[25] it was held that a person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The direct

injury test in public suits is similar to the real party in interest rule for private suits under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[26] Recognizing that a strict application of the direct injury test may hamper public interest, this Court relaxed the requirement in cases of transcendental importance or with far reaching implications. Being a mere procedural technicality, it has also been held that locus standi may be waived in the public interest.[27] Whether or not the complaint for collection is characterized as a private or public suit, Fertiphil has locus standi to file it. Fertiphil suffered a direct injury from the enforcement of LOI No. 1465. It was required, and it did pay, the P10 levy imposed for every bag of fertilizer sold on the domestic market. It may be true that Fertiphil has passed some or all of the levy to the ultimate consumer, but that does not disqualify it from attacking the constitutionality of the LOI or from seeking a refund. As seller, it bore the ultimate burden of paying the levy. It faced the possibility of severe sanctions for failure to pay the levy. The fact of payment is sufficient injury to Fertiphil. Moreover, Fertiphil suffered harm from the enforcement of the LOI because it was compelled to factor in its product the levy. The levy certainly rendered the fertilizer products of Fertiphil and other domestic sellers much more expensive. The harm to their business consists not only in fewer clients because of the increased price, but also in adopting alternative corporate strategies to meet the demands of LOI No. 1465. Fertiphil and other fertilizer sellers may have shouldered all or part of the levy just to be competitive in the market. The harm occasioned on the business of Fertiphil is sufficient injury for purposes of locus standi. Even assuming arguendo that there is no direct injury, We find that the liberal policy consistently adopted by this Court on locus standi must apply. The issues raised by Fertiphil are of paramount public importance. It involves not only the constitutionality of a tax law but, more importantly, the use of taxes for public purpose. Former President Marcos issued LOI No. 1465 with the intention of rehabilitating an ailing private company. This is clear from the text of the LOI. PPI is expressly named in the LOI as the direct beneficiary of the levy. Worse, the levy was made dependent and conditional upon PPI becoming financially viable. The LOI provided that the capital contribution shall be collected until adequate capital is raised to make PPI viable. The constitutionality of the levy is already in doubt on a plain reading of the statute. It is Our constitutional duty to squarely resolve the issue as the final arbiter of all

justifiable controversies. The doctrine of standing, being a mere procedural technicality, should be waived, if at all, to adequately thresh out an important constitutional issue. RTC may resolve constitutional issues; the constitutional issue was adequately raised in the complaint; it is the lis mota of the case. PPI insists that the RTC and the CA erred in ruling on the constitutionality of the LOI. It asserts that the constitutionality of the LOI cannot be collaterally attacked in a complaint for collection.[28] Alternatively, the resolution of the constitutional issue is not necessary for a determination of the complaint for collection.[29] Fertiphil counters that the constitutionality of the LOI was adequately pleaded in its complaint. It claims that the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 is the very lis mota of the case because the trial court cannot determine its claim without resolving the issue.[30] It is settled that the RTC has jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree or an executive order. This is clear from Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxxx (2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: (a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. (Underscoring supplied) In Mirasol v. Court of Appeals,[31] this Court recognized the power of the RTC to resolve constitutional issues, thus: On the first issue. It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or executive order. The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all Regional Trial Courts.[32]

In the recent case of Equi-Asia Placement, Inc. v. Department of Foreign Affairs, [33] this Court reiterated: There is no denying that regular courts have jurisdiction over cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by administrative agencies. Such jurisdiction, however, is not limited to the Court of Appeals or to this Court alone for even the regional trial courts can take cognizance of actions assailing a specific rule or set of rules promulgated by administrative bodies. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts.[34] Judicial review of official acts on the ground of unconstitutionality may be sought or availed of through any of the actions cognizable by courts of justice, not necessarily in a suit for declaratory relief. Such review may be had in criminal actions, as in People v. Ferrer[35] involving the constitutionality of the now defunct AntiSubversion law, or in ordinary actions, as in Krivenko v. Register of Deeds[36] involving the constitutionality of laws prohibiting aliens from acquiring public lands. The constitutional issue, however, (a) must be properly raised and presented in the case, and (b) its resolution is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented.[37] Contrary to PPIs claim, the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 was properly and adequately raised in the complaint for collection filed with the RTC. The pertinent portions of the complaint allege: 6. The CRC of P10 per bag levied under LOI 1465 on domestic sales of all grades of fertilizer in the Philippines, is unlawful, unjust, uncalled for, unreasonable, inequitable and oppressive because: xxxx (c) It favors only one private domestic corporation, i.e., defendant PPPI, and imposed at the expense and disadvantage of the other fertilizer importers/distributors who were themselves in tight business situation and were then exerting all efforts and maximizing management and marketing skills to remain viable; xxxx

(e) It was a glaring example of crony capitalism, a forced program through which the PPI, having been presumptuously masqueraded as the fertilizer industry itself, was the sole and anointed beneficiary; 7. The CRC was an unlawful; and unconstitutional special assessment and its imposition is tantamount to illegal exaction amounting to a denial of due process since the persons of entities which had to bear the burden of paying the CRC derived no benefit therefrom; that on the contrary it was used by PPI in trying to regain its former despicable monopoly of the fertilizer industry to the detriment of other distributors and importers.[38] (Underscoring supplied) The constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 is also the very lis mota of the complaint for collection. Fertiphil filed the complaint to compel PPI to refund the levies paid under the statute on the ground that the law imposing the levy is unconstitutional. The thesis is that an unconstitutional law is void. It has no legal effect. Being void, Fertiphil had no legal obligation to pay the levy. Necessarily, all levies duly paid pursuant to an unconstitutional law should be refunded under the civil code principle against unjust enrichment. The refund is a mere consequence of the law being declared unconstitutional. The RTC surely cannot order PPI to refund Fertiphil if it does not declare the LOI unconstitutional. It is the unconstitutionality of the LOI which triggers the refund. The issue of constitutionality is the very lis mota of the complaint with the RTC. The P10 levy under LOI No. 1465 is an exercise of the power of taxation. At any rate, the Court holds that the RTC and the CA did not err in ruling against the constitutionality of the LOI. PPI insists that LOI No. 1465 is a valid exercise either of the police power or the power of taxation. It claims that the LOI was implemented for the purpose of assuring the fertilizer supply and distribution in the country and for benefiting a foundation created by law to hold in trust for millions of farmers their stock ownership in PPI. Fertiphil counters that the LOI is unconstitutional because it was enacted to give benefit to a private company. The levy was imposed to pay the corporate debt of PPI. Fertiphil also argues that, even if the LOI is enacted under the police power, it is still unconstitutional because it did not promote the general welfare of the people or public interest.

Police power and the power of taxation are inherent powers of the State. These powers are distinct and have different tests for validity. Police power is the power of the State to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare,[39] while the power of taxation is the power to levy taxes to be used for public purpose. The main purpose of police power is the regulation of a behavior or conduct, while taxation is revenue generation. The lawful subjects and lawful means tests are used to determine the validity of a law enacted under the police power.[40] The power of taxation, on the other hand, is circumscribed by inherent and constitutional limitations. We agree with the RTC that the imposition of the levy was an exercise by the State of its taxation power. While it is true that the power of taxation can be used as an implement of police power,[41] the primary purpose of the levy is revenue generation. If the purpose is primarily revenue, or if revenue is, at least, one of the real and substantial purposes, then the exaction is properly called a tax.[42] In Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Edu,[43] it was held that the imposition of a vehicle registration fee is not an exercise by the State of its police power, but of its taxation power, thus: It is clear from the provisions of Section 73 of Commonwealth Act 123 and Section 61 of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code that the legislative intent and purpose behind the law requiring owners of vehicles to pay for their registration is mainly to raise funds for the construction and maintenance of highways and to a much lesser degree, pay for the operating expenses of the administering agency. x x x Fees may be properly regarded as taxes even though they also serve as an instrument of regulation. Taxation may be made the implement of the state's police power (Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148). If the purpose is primarily revenue, or if revenue is, at least, one of the real and substantial purposes, then the exaction is properly called a tax. Such is the case of motor vehicle registration fees. The same provision appears as Section 59(b) in the Land Transportation Code. It is patent therefrom that the legislators had in mind a regulatory tax as the law refers to the imposition on the registration, operation or ownership of a motor vehicle as a tax or fee. x x x Simply put, if the exaction under Rep. Act 4136 were merely a regulatory fee, the imposition in Rep. Act 5448 need not be an additional tax. Rep. Act 4136 also speaks of other fees such as the special permit fees for certain types of motor vehicles (Sec. 10) and additional fees for change of registration (Sec. 11). These are not to be understood as taxes because such fees are very minimal to be revenue-raising. Thus, they are

not mentioned by Sec. 59(b) of the Code as taxes like the motor vehicle registration fee and chauffeurs license fee. Such fees are to go into the expenditures of the Land Transportation Commission as provided for in the last proviso of Sec. 61.[44] (Underscoring supplied) The P10 levy under LOI No. 1465 is too excessive to serve a mere regulatory purpose. The levy, no doubt, was a big burden on the seller or the ultimate consumer. It increased the price of a bag of fertilizer by as much as five percent. [45] A plain reading of the LOI also supports the conclusion that the levy was for revenue generation. The LOI expressly provided that the levy was imposed until adequate capital is raised to make PPI viable. Taxes are exacted only for a public purpose. The P10 levy is unconstitutional because it was not for a public purpose. The levy was imposed to give undue benefit to PPI. An inherent limitation on the power of taxation is public purpose. Taxes are exacted only for a public purpose. They cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private persons.[46] The reason for this is simple. The power to tax exists for the general welfare; hence, implicit in its power is the limitation that it should be used only for a public purpose. It would be a robbery for the State to tax its citizens and use the funds generated for a private purpose. As an old United States case bluntly put it: To lay with one hand, the power of the government on the property of the citizen, and with the other to bestow it upon favored individuals to aid private enterprises and build up private fortunes, is nonetheless a robbery because it is done under the forms of law and is called taxation.[47] The term public purpose is not defined. It is an elastic concept that can be hammered to fit modern standards. Jurisprudence states that public purpose should be given a broad interpretation. It does not only pertain to those purposes which are traditionally viewed as essentially government functions, such as building roads and delivery of basic services, but also includes those purposes designed to promote social justice. Thus, public money may now be used for the relocation of illegal settlers, low-cost housing and urban or agrarian reform. While the categories of what may constitute a public purpose are continually expanding in light of the expansion of government functions, the inherent requirement that taxes can only be exacted for a public purpose still stands. Public purpose is the heart of a tax law. When a tax law is only a mask to exact funds from

the public when its true intent is to give undue benefit and advantage to a private enterprise, that law will not satisfy the requirement of public purpose. The purpose of a law is evident from its text or inferable from other secondary sources. Here, We agree with the RTC and that CA that the levy imposed under LOI No. 1465 was not for a public purpose. First, the LOI expressly provided that the levy be imposed to benefit PPI, a private company. The purpose is explicit from Clause 3 of the law, thus: 3. The Administrator of the Fertilizer Pesticide Authority to include in its fertilizer pricing formula a capital contribution component of not less than P10 per bag. This capital contribution shall be collected until adequate capital is raised to make PPI viable. Such capital contribution shall be applied by FPA to all domestic sales of fertilizers in the Philippines.[48] (Underscoring supplied) It is a basic rule of statutory construction that the text of a statute should be given a literal meaning. In this case, the text of the LOI is plain that the levy was imposed in order to raise capital for PPI. The framers of the LOI did not even hide the insidious purpose of the law. They were cavalier enough to name PPI as the ultimate beneficiary of the taxes levied under the LOI. We find it utterly repulsive that a tax law would expressly name a private company as the ultimate beneficiary of the taxes to be levied from the public. This is a clear case of crony capitalism. Second, the LOI provides that the imposition of the P10 levy was conditional and dependent upon PPI becoming financially viable. This suggests that the levy was actually imposed to benefit PPI. The LOI notably does not fix a maximum amount when PPI is deemed financially viable. Worse, the liability of Fertiphil and other domestic sellers of fertilizer to pay the levy is made indefinite. They are required to continuously pay the levy until adequate capital is raised for PPI. Third, the RTC and the CA held that the levies paid under the LOI were directly remitted and deposited by FPA to Far East Bank and Trust Company, the depositary bank of PPI.[49] This proves that PPI benefited from the LOI. It is also proves that the main purpose of the law was to give undue benefit and advantage to PPI. Fourth, the levy was used to pay the corporate debts of PPI. A reading of the Letter of Understanding[50] dated May 18, 1985 signed by then Prime Minister Cesar Virata reveals that PPI was in deep financial problem because of its huge corporate debts. There were pending petitions for rehabilitation against PPI before the

Securities and Exchange Commission. The government guaranteed payment of PPIs debts to its foreign creditors. To fund the payment, President Marcos issued LOI No. 1465. The pertinent portions of the letter of understanding read:
Republic of the Philippines Office of the Prime Minister Manila LETTER OF UNDERTAKING May 18, 1985 TO: THE BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS LISTED IN ANNEX A HERETO WHICH ARE CREDITORS (COLLECTIVELY, THE CREDITORS) OF PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC. (PLANTERS) Gentlemen: This has reference to Planters which is the principal importer and distributor of fertilizer, pesticides and agricultural chemicals in the Philippines. As regards Planters, the Philippine Government confirms its awareness of the following: (1) that Planters has outstanding obligations in foreign currency and/or pesos, to the Creditors, (2) that Planters is currently experiencing financial difficulties, and (3) that there are presently pending with the Securities and Exchange Commission of the Philippines a petition filed at Planters own behest for the suspension of payment of all its obligations, and a separate petition filed by Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company, Manila Offshore Branch for the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver for Planters. In connection with the foregoing, the Republic of the Philippines (the Republic) confirms that it considers and continues to consider Planters as a major fertilizer distributor. Accordingly, for and in consideration of your expressed willingness to consider and participate in the effort to rehabilitate Planters, the Republic hereby manifests its full and unqualified support of the successful rehabilitation and continuing viability of Planters, and to that end, hereby binds and obligates itself to the creditors and Planters, as follows: xxxx 2. Upon the effective date of this Letter of Undertaking, the Republic shall cause FPA to include in its fertilizer pricing formula a capital recovery component, the proceeds of which will be used initially for the purpose of funding the unpaid portion of the outstanding capital stock of Planters presently held in trust by Planters Foundation, Inc. (Planters Foundation), which unpaid capital is estimated at approximately P206 million (subject to validation by Planters and Planters Foundation) such unpaid portion of the

outstanding capital stock of Planters being hereafter referred to as the Unpaid Capital), and subsequently for such capital increases as may be required for the continuing viability of Planters. xxxx The capital recovery component shall continue to be charged and collected until payment in full of (a) the Unpaid Capital and/or (b) any shortfall in the payment of the Subsidy Receivables, (c) any carrying cost accruing from the date hereof on the amounts which may be outstanding from time to time of the Unpaid Capital and/or the Subsidy Receivables, and (d) the capital increases contemplated in paragraph 2 hereof. For the purpose of the foregoing clause (c), the carrying cost shall be at such rate as will represent the full and reasonable cost to Planters of servicing its debts, taking into account both its peso and foreign currency-denominated obligations. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES By: (signed) CESAR E. A. VIRATA Prime Minister and Minister of Finance[51]

It is clear from the Letter of Understanding that the levy was imposed precisely to pay the corporate debts of PPI. We cannot agree with PPI that the levy was imposed to ensure the stability of the fertilizer industry in the country. The letter of understanding and the plain text of the LOI clearly indicate that the levy was exacted for the benefit of a private corporation. All told, the RTC and the CA did not err in holding that the levy imposed under LOI No. 1465 was not for a public purpose. LOI No. 1465 failed to comply with the public purpose requirement for tax laws. The LOI is still unconstitutional even if enacted under the police power; it did not promote public interest. Even if We consider LOI No. 1695 enacted under the police power of the State, it would still be invalid for failing to comply with the test of lawful subjects and lawful means. Jurisprudence states the test as follows: (1) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.[52]

For the same reasons as discussed, LOI No. 1695 is invalid because it did not promote public interest. The law was enacted to give undue advantage to a private corporation. We quote with approval the CA ratiocination on this point, thus: It is upon applying this established tests that We sustain the trial courts holding LOI 1465 unconstitutional. To be sure, ensuring the continued supply and distribution of fertilizer in the country is an undertaking imbued with public interest. However, the method by which LOI 1465 sought to achieve this is by no means a measure that will promote the public welfare. The governments commitment to support the successful rehabilitation and continued viability of PPI, a private corporation, is an unmistakable attempt to mask the subject statutes impartiality. There is no way to treat the self-interest of a favored entity, like PPI, as identical with the general interest of the countrys farmers or even the Filipino people in general. Well to stress, substantive due process exacts fairness and equal protection disallows distinction where none is needed. When a statutes public purpose is spoiled by private interest, the use of police power becomes a travesty which must be struck down for being an arbitrary exercise of government power. To rule in favor of appellant would contravene the general principle that revenues derived from taxes cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private individuals. (Underscoring supplied) The general rule is that an unconstitutional law is void; the doctrine of operative fact is inapplicable. PPI also argues that Fertiphil cannot seek a refund even if LOI No. 1465 is declared unconstitutional. It banks on the doctrine of operative fact, which provides that an unconstitutional law has an effect before being declared unconstitutional. PPI wants to retain the levies paid under LOI No. 1465 even if it is subsequently declared to be unconstitutional. We cannot agree. It is settled that no question, issue or argument will be entertained on appeal, unless it has been raised in the court a quo.[53] PPI did not raise the applicability of the doctrine of operative fact with the RTC and the CA. It cannot belatedly raise the issue with Us in order to extricate itself from the dire effects of an unconstitutional law. At any rate, We find the doctrine inapplicable. The general rule is that an unconstitutional law is void. It produces no rights, imposes no duties and affords no protection. It has no legal effect. It is, in legal contemplation, inoperative as if it has not been passed.[54] Being void, Fertiphil is not required to pay the levy. All levies

paid should be refunded in accordance with the general civil code principle against unjust enrichment. The general rule is supported by Article 7 of the Civil Code, which provides: ART. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or nonobservance shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice to the contrary. When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play.[55] It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. [56] The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy[57] or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.[58] Here, We do not find anything iniquitous in ordering PPI to refund the amounts paid by Fertiphil under LOI No. 1465. It unduly benefited from the levy. It was proven during the trial that the levies paid were remitted and deposited to its bank account. Quite the reverse, it would be inequitable and unjust not to order a refund. To do so would unjustly enrich PPI at the expense of Fertiphil. Article 22 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that every person who, through an act of performance by another comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground shall return the same to him. We cannot allow PPI to profit from an unconstitutional law. Justice and equity dictate that PPI must refund the amounts paid by Fertiphil. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated November 28, 2003 is AFFIRMED SO ORDERED.

Corporation and Tokuyama Corporation, purportedly the largest cement manufacturers in Japan.5 G.R. No. 158540 July 8, 2004 Private respondent Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corporation6 ("Philcemcor") is an association of domestic cement manufacturers. It has eighteen (18) members,7 per Record. While Philcemcor heralds itself to be an association of domestic cement manufacturers, it appears that considerable equity holdings, if not controlling interests in at least twelve (12) of its member-corporations, were acquired by the three largest cement manufacturers in the world, namely Financiere Lafarge S.A. of France, Cemex S.A. de C.V. of Mexico, and Holcim Ltd. of Switzerland (formerly Holderbank Financiere Glaris, Ltd., then Holderfin B.V.).8 On 22 May 2001, respondent Department of Trade and Industry ("DTI") accepted an application from Philcemcor, alleging that the importation of gray Portland cement9 in increased quantities has caused declines in domestic production, capacity utilization, market share, sales and employment; as well as caused depressed local prices. Accordingly, Philcemcor sought the imposition at first of provisional, then later, definitive safeguard measures on the import of cement pursuant to the SMA. Philcemcor filed the application in behalf of twelve (12) of its membercompanies.10 After preliminary investigation, the Bureau of Import Services of the DTI, determined that critical circumstances existed justifying the imposition of provisional measures.11 On 7 November 2001, the DTI issued an Order, imposing a provisional measure equivalent to Twenty Pesos and Sixty Centavos (P20.60) per forty (40) kilogram bag on all importations of gray Portland cement for a period not exceeding two hundred (200) days from the date of issuance by the Bureau of Customs (BOC) of the implementing Customs Memorandum Order.12 The corresponding Customs Memorandum Order was issued on 10 December 2001, to take effect that same day and to remain in force for two hundred (200) days.13 In the meantime, the Tariff Commission, on 19 November 2001, received a request from the DTI for a formal investigation to determine whether or not to impose a definitive safeguard measure on imports of gray Portland cement, pursuant to Section 9 of the SMA and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. A notice of commencement of formal investigation was published in the newspapers on 21 November 2001. Individual notices were likewise sent to concerned parties, such as Philcemcor, various importers and exporters, the Embassies of Indonesia, Japan and

SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE PHILIPPINE CEMENT MANUFACTURERS CORP., THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE & INDUSTRY, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, and THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, respondents. DECISION TINGA, J.: "Good fences make good neighbors," so observed Robert Frost, the archetype of traditional New England detachment. The Frost ethos has been heeded by nations adjusting to the effects of the liberalized global market.1 The Philippines, for one, enacted Republic Act (Rep. Act) No. 8751 (on the imposition of countervailing duties), Rep. Act No. 8752 (on the imposition of anti-dumping duties) and, finally, Rep. Act No. 8800, also known as the Safeguard Measures Act ("SMA")2 soon after it joined the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.3 The SMA provides the structure and mechanics for the imposition of emergency measures, including tariffs, to protect domestic industries and producers from increased imports which inflict or could inflict serious injury on them.4 The wisdom of the policies behind the SMA, however, is not put into question by the petition at bar. The questions submitted to the Court relate to the means and the procedures ordained in the law to ensure that the determination of the imposition or nonimposition of a safeguard measure is proper. Antecedent Facts Petitioner Southern Cross Cement Corporation ("Southern Cross") is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of cement manufacturing, production, importation and exportation. Its principal stockholders are Taiheiyo Cement

Taiwan, contractors/builders associations, industry associations, cement workers' groups, consumer groups, non-government organizations and concerned government agencies.14 A preliminary conference was held on 27 November 2001, attended by several concerned parties, including Southern Cross.15 Subsequently, the Tariff Commission received several position papers both in support and against Philcemcor's application.16 The Tariff Commission also visited the corporate offices and manufacturing facilities of each of the applicant companies, as well as that of Southern Cross and two other cement importers.17 On 13 March 2002, the Tariff Commission issued its Formal Investigation Report ("Report"). Among the factors studied by the Tariff Commission in its Report were the market share of the domestic industry,18 production and sales,19 capacity utilization,20 financial performance and profitability,21 and return on sales.22 The Tariff Commission arrived at the following conclusions: 1. The circumstances provided in Article XIX of GATT 1994 need not be demonstrated since the product under consideration (gray Portland cement) is not the subject of any Philippine obligation or tariff concession under the WTO Agreement. Nonetheless, such inquiry is governed by the national legislation (R.A. 8800) and the terms and conditions of the Agreement on Safeguards. 2. The collective output of the twelve (12) applicant companies constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of gray Portland cement and blended Portland cement. 3. Locally produced gray Portland cement and blended Portland cement (Pozzolan) are "like" to imported gray Portland cement. 4. Gray Portland cement is being imported into the Philippines in increased quantities, both in absolute terms and relative to domestic production, starting in 2000. The increase in volume of imports is recent, sudden, sharp and significant. 5. The industry has not suffered and is not suffering significant overall impairment in its condition, i.e., serious injury. 6. There is no threat of serious injury that is imminent from imports of gray Portland cement. 7. Causation has become moot and academic in view of the negative determination of the elements of serious injury and imminent threat of serious injury.23

Accordingly, the Tariff Commission made the following recommendation, to wit: The elements of serious injury and imminent threat of serious injury not having been established, it is hereby recommended that no definitive general safeguard measure be imposed on the importation of gray Portland cement.24 The DTI received the Report on 14 March 2002. After reviewing the report, then DTI Secretary Manuel Roxas II ("DTI Secretary") disagreed with the conclusion of the Tariff Commission that there was no serious injury to the local cement industry caused by the surge of imports.25 In view of this disagreement, the DTI requested an opinion from the Department of Justice ("DOJ") on the DTI Secretary's scope of options in acting on the Commission's recommendations. Subsequently, then DOJ Secretary Hernando Perez rendered an opinion stating that Section 13 of the SMA precluded a review by the DTI Secretary of the Tariff Commission's negative finding, or finding that a definitive safeguard measure should not be imposed.26 On 5 April 2002, the DTI Secretary promulgated a Decision. After quoting the conclusions of the Tariff Commission, the DTI Secretary noted the DTI's disagreement with the conclusions. However, he also cited the DOJ Opinion advising the DTI that it was bound by the negative finding of the Tariff Commission. Thus, he ruled as follows: The DTI has no alternative but to abide by the [Tariff] Commission's recommendations. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and in accordance with Section 13 of RA 8800 which states: "In the event of a negative final determination; or if the cash bond is in excess of the definitive safeguard duty assessed, the Secretary shall immediately issue, through the Secretary of Finance, a written instruction to the Commissioner of Customs, authorizing the return of the cash bond or the remainder thereof, as the case may be, previously collected as provisional general safeguard measure within ten (10) days from the date a final decision has been made; Provided, that the government shall not be liable for any interest on the amount to be returned. The Secretary shall not accept for consideration another petition from the same industry, with respect to the same imports of the product under consideration within one (1) year after the date of rendering such a decision." The DTI hereby issues the following:

The application for safeguard measures against the importation of gray Portland cement filed by PHILCEMCOR (Case No. 02-2001) is hereby denied.27 (Emphasis in the original) Philcemcor received a copy of the DTI Decision on 12 April 2002. Ten days later, it filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus28 seeking to set aside the DTI Decision, as well as the Tariff Commission's Report. Philcemcor likewise applied for a Temporary Restraining Order/Injunction to enjoin the DTI and the BOC from implementing the questioned Decision and Report. It prayed that the Court of Appeals direct the DTI Secretary to disregard the Report and to render judgment independently of the Report. Philcemcor argued that the DTI Secretary, vested as he is under the law with the power of review, is not bound to adopt the recommendations of the Tariff Commission; and, that the Report is void, as it is predicated on a flawed framework, inconsistent inferences and erroneous methodology.29 On 10 June 2002, Southern Cross filed its Comment.30 It argued that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over Philcemcor's Petition, for it is on the Court of Tax Appeals ("CTA") that the SMA conferred jurisdiction to review rulings of the Secretary in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure. It likewise argued that Philcemcor's resort to the special civil action of certiorari is improper, considering that what Philcemcor sought to rectify is an error of judgment and not an error of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, and that a petition for review with the CTA was available as a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Finally, Southern Cross echoed the DOJ Opinion that Section 13 of the SMA precludes a review by the DTI Secretary of a negative finding of the Tariff Commission. After conducting a hearing on 19 June 2002 on Philcemcor's application for preliminary injunction, the Court of Appeals' Twelfth Division31 granted the writ sought in its Resolution dated 21 June 2002.32 Seven days later, on 28 June 2002, the two-hundred (200)-day period for the imposition of the provisional measure expired. Despite the lapse of the period, the BOC continued to impose the provisional measure on all importations of Portland cement made by Southern Cross. The uninterrupted assessment of the tariff, according to Southern Cross, worked to its detriment to the point that the continued imposition would eventually lead to its closure.33

Southern Cross timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution on 9 September 2002. Alleging that Philcemcor was not entitled to provisional relief, Southern Cross likewise sought a clarificatory order as to whether the grant of the writ of preliminary injunction could extend the earlier imposition of the provisional measure beyond the two hundred (200)-day limit imposed by law. The appeals' court failed to take immediate action on Southern Cross's motion despite the four (4) motions for early resolution the latter filed between September of 2002 and February of 2003. After six (6) months, on 19 February 2003, the Court of Appeals directed Philcemcor to comment on Southern Cross's Motion for Reconsideration.34 After Philcemcor filed its Opposition35 on 13 March 2003, Southern Cross filed another set of four (4) motions for early resolution. Despite the efforts of Southern Cross, the Court of Appeals failed to directly resolve the Motion for Reconsideration. Instead, on 5 June 2003, it rendered a Decision,36 granting in part Philcemcor's petition. The appellate court ruled that it had jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari since it alleged grave abuse of discretion. It refused to annul the findings of the Tariff Commission, citing the rule that factual findings of administrative agencies are binding upon the courts and its corollary, that courts should not interfere in matters addressed to the sound discretion and coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.37 Nevertheless, it held that the DTI Secretary is not bound by the factual findings of the Tariff Commission since such findings are merely recommendatory and they fall within the ambit of the Secretary's discretionary review. It determined that the legislative intent is to grant the DTI Secretary the power to make a final decision on the Tariff Commission's recommendation.38 The dispositive portion of the Decision reads: WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, petitioner's prayer to set aside the findings of the Tariff Commission in its assailed Report dated March 13, 2002 is DENIED. On the other hand, the assailed April 5, 2002 Decision of the Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry is hereby SET ASIDE. Consequently, the case is REMANDED to the public respondent Secretary of Department of Trade and Industry for a final decision in accordance with RA 8800 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. SO ORDERED.39 On 23 June 2003, Southern Cross filed the present petition, assailing the appellate court's Decision for departing from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, and not deciding the substantial questions in accordance with law and

jurisprudence. The petition argues in the main that the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction over Philcemcor's petition, the proper remedy being a petition for review with the CTA conformably with the SMA, and; that the factual findings of the Tariff Commission on the existence or non-existence conditions warranting the imposition of general safeguard measures are binding upon the DTI Secretary. The timely filing of Southern Cross's petition before this Court necessarily prevented the Court of Appeals Decision from becoming final.40 Yet on 25 June 2003, the DTI Secretary issued a new Decision, ruling this time that that in light of the appellate court's Decision there was no longer any legal impediment to his deciding Philcemcor's application for definitive safeguard measures.41 He made a determination that, contrary to the findings of the Tariff Commission, the local cement industry had suffered serious injury as a result of the import surges.42 Accordingly, he imposed a definitive safeguard measure on the importation of gray Portland cement, in the form of a definitive safeguard duty in the amount of P20.60/40 kg. bag for three years on imported gray Portland Cement.43 On 7 July 2003, Southern Cross filed with the Court a "Very Urgent Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or A Writ of Preliminary Injunction" ("TRO Application"), seeking to enjoin the DTI Secretary from enforcing his Decision of 25 June 2003 in view of the pending petition before this Court. Philcemcor filed an opposition, claiming, among others, that it is not this Court but the CTA that has jurisdiction over the application under the law. On 1 August 2003, Southern Cross filed with the CTA a Petition for Review, assailing the DTI Secretary's 25 June 2003 Decision which imposed the definite safeguard measure. Prescinding from this action, Philcemcor filed with this Court a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss in regard to Southern Cross's petition, alleging that it deliberately and willfully resorted to forum-shopping. It points out that Southern Cross's TRO Application seeks to enjoin the DTI Secretary's second decision, while its Petition before the CTA prays for the annulment of the same decision.44 Reiterating its Comment on Southern Cross's Petition for Review, Philcemcor also argues that the CTA, being a special court of limited jurisdiction, could only review the ruling of the DTI Secretary when a safeguard measure is imposed, and that the factual findings of the Tariff Commission are not binding on the DTI Secretary.45 After giving due course to Southern Cross's Petition, the Court called the case for oral argument on 18 February 2004.46 At the oral argument, attended by the counsel

for Philcemcor and Southern Cross and the Office of the Solicitor General, the Court simplified the issues in this wise: (i) whether the Decision of the DTI Secretary is appealable to the CTA or the Court of Appeals; (ii) assuming that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction, whether its Decision is in accordance with law; and, (iii) whether a Temporary Restraining Order is warranted.47

During the oral arguments, counsel for Southern Cross manifested that due to the imposition of the general safeguard measures, Southern Cross was forced to cease operations in the Philippines in November of 2003.48 Propriety of the Temporary Restraining Order Before the merits of the Petition, a brief comment on Southern Cross's application for provisional relief. It sought to enjoin the DTI Secretary from enforcing the definitive safeguard measure he imposed in his 25 June 2003 Decision. The Court did not grant the provisional relief for it would be tantamount to enjoining the collection of taxes, a peremptory judicial act which is traditionally frowned upon,49 unless there is a clear statutory basis for it.50 In that regard, Section 218 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997 prohibits any court from granting an injunction to restrain the collection of any national internal revenue tax, fee or charge imposed by the internal revenue code.51 A similar philosophy is expressed by Section 29 of the SMA, which states that the filing of a petition for review before the CTA does not stop, suspend, or otherwise toll the imposition or collection of the appropriate tariff duties or the adoption of other appropriate safeguard measures.52 This evinces a clear legislative intent that the imposition of safeguard measures, despite the availability of judicial review, should not be enjoined notwithstanding any timely appeal of the imposition. The Forum-Shopping Issue In the same breath, we are not convinced that the allegation of forum-shopping has been duly proven, or that sanction should befall upon Southern Cross and its counsel. The standard by Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in order that sanction may be had is that "the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping."53 The standard implies a malicious intent to subvert procedural rules, and such state of mind is not evident in this case.

The Jurisdictional Issue On to the merits of the present petition. In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals, after asserting only in brief that it had jurisdiction over Philcemcor's Petition, discussed the issue of whether or not the DTI Secretary is bound to adopt the negative recommendation of the Tariff Commission on the application for safeguard measure. The Court of Appeals maintained that it had jurisdiction over the petition, as it alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DTI Secretary, thus: A perusal of the instant petition reveals allegations of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DTI Secretary in rendering the assailed April 5, 2002 Decision wherein it was ruled that he had no alternative but to abide by the findings of the Commission on the matter of safeguard measures for the local cement industry. Abuse of discretion is admittedly within the ambit of certiorari.

The petition for review shall comply with the same requirements and shall follow the same rules of procedure and shall be subject to the same disposition as in appeals in connection with adverse rulings on tax matters to the Court of Appeals.57 (Emphasis supplied)

It is not difficult to divine why the legislature singled out the CTA as the court with jurisdiction to review the ruling of the DTI Secretary in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure. The Court has long recognized the legislative determination to vest sole and exclusive jurisdiction on matters involving internal revenue and customs duties to such a specialized court.58 By the very nature of its function, the CTA is dedicated exclusively to the study and consideration of tax problems and has necessarily developed an expertise on the subject.59

Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It is alleged that, in the assailed Decision, the DTI Secretary gravely abused his discretion in wantonly evading to discharge his duty to render an independent determination or decision in imposing a definitive safeguard measure.54 We do not doubt that the Court of Appeals' certiorari powers extend to correcting grave abuse of discretion on the part of an officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions.55 However, the special civil action of certiorari is available only when there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.56 Southern Cross relies on this limitation, stressing that Section 29 of the SMA is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law which Philcemcor did not avail of. The Section reads: Section 29. Judicial Review. Any interested party who is adversely affected by the ruling of the Secretary in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure may file with the CTA, a petition for review of such ruling within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof. Provided, however, that the filing of such petition for review shall not in any way stop, suspend or otherwise toll the imposition or collection of the appropriate tariff duties or the adoption of other appropriate safeguard measures, as the case may be.

At the same time, since the CTA is a court of limited jurisdiction, its jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case should be clearly conferred and should not be deemed to exist on mere implication.60 Concededly, Rep. Act No. 1125, the statute creating the CTA, does not extend to it the power to review decisions of the DTI Secretary in connection with the imposition of safeguard measures.61 Of course, at that time which was before the advent of trade liberalization the notion of safeguard measures or safety nets was not yet in vogue. Undeniably, however, the SMA expanded the jurisdiction of the CTA by including review of the rulings of the DTI Secretary in connection with the imposition of safeguard measures. However, Philcemcor and the public respondents agree that the CTA has appellate jurisdiction over a decision of the DTI Secretary imposing a safeguard measure, but not when his ruling is not to impose such measure. In a related development, Rep. Act No. 9282, enacted on 30 March 2004, expressly vests unto the CTA jurisdiction over "[d]ecisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry, in case of nonagricultural product, commodity or article xxx involving xxx safeguard measures under Republic Act No. 8800, where either party may appeal the decision to impose or not to impose said duties."62 Had Rep. Act No. 9282 already been in force at the beginning of the incidents subject of this case, there would have been no need to make any deeper inquiry as to the extent of the CTA's jurisdiction. But as Rep. Act No. 9282 cannot be applied retroactively to the present case, the

question of whether such jurisdiction extends to a decision not to impose a safeguard measure will have to be settled principally on the basis of the SMA. Under Section 29 of the SMA, there are three requisites to enable the CTA to acquire jurisdiction over the petition for review contemplated therein: (i) there must be a ruling by the DTI Secretary; (ii) the petition must be filed by an interested party adversely affected by the ruling; and (iii) such ruling must be in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure. The first two requisites are clearly present. The third requisite deserves closer scrutiny. Contrary to the stance of the public respondents and Philcemcor, in this case where the DTI Secretary decides not to impose a safeguard measure, it is the CTA which has jurisdiction to review his decision. The reasons are as follows:

In short, if we were to rule for respondents we would be confirming the exercise by two judicial bodies of jurisdiction over basically the same subject matterprecisely the split-jurisdiction situation which is anathema to the orderly administration of justice.64 The Court cannot accept that such was the legislative motive especially considering that the law expressly confers on the CTA, the tribunal with the specialized competence over tax and tariff matters, the role of judicial review without mention of any other court that may exercise corollary or ancillary jurisdiction in relation to the SMA. The provision refers to the Court of Appeals but only in regard to procedural rules and dispositions of appeals from the CTA to the Court of Appeals.65

The principle enunciated in Tejada v. Homestead Property Corporation66 is applicable to the case at bar: First. Split jurisdiction is abhorred. Essentially, respondents' position is that judicial review of the DTI Secretary's ruling is exercised by two different courts, depending on whether or not it imposes a safeguard measure, and in either case the court exercising jurisdiction does so to the exclusion of the other. Thus, if the DTI decision involves the imposition of a safeguard measure it is the CTA which has appellate jurisdiction; otherwise, it is the Court of Appeals. Such setup is as novel and unusual as it is cumbersome and unwise. Essentially, respondents advocate that Section 29 of the SMA has established split appellate jurisdiction over rulings of the DTI Secretary on the imposition of safeguard measure. This interpretation cannot be favored, as the Court has consistently refused to sanction split jurisdiction.63 The power of the DTI Secretary to adopt or withhold a safeguard measure emanates from the same statutory source, and it boggles the mind why the appeal modality would be such that one appellate court is qualified if what is to be reviewed is a positive determination, and it is not if what is appealed is a negative determination. In deciding whether or not to impose a safeguard measure, provisional or general, the DTI Secretary would be evaluating only one body of facts and applying them to one set of laws. The reviewing tribunal will be called upon to examine the same facts and the same laws, whether or not the determination is positive or negative. The Court agrees with the observation of the [that] when an administrative agency or body is conferred quasi-judicial functions, all controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to its specialization are deemed to be included within the jurisdiction of said administrative agency or body. Split jurisdiction is not favored.67 Second. The interpretation of the provisions of the SMA favors vesting untrammeled appellate jurisdiction on the CTA. A plain reading of Section 29 of the SMA reveals that Congress did not expressly bar the CTA from reviewing a negative determination by the DTI Secretary nor conferred on the Court of Appeals such review authority. Respondents note, on the other hand, that neither did the law expressly grant to the CTA the power to review a negative determination. However, under the clear text of the law, the CTA is vested with jurisdiction to review the ruling of the DTI Secretary "in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure." Had the law been couched instead to incorporate the phrase "the ruling imposing a safeguard measure," then respondent's claim would have indisputable merit. Undoubtedly, the phrase "in connection with" not only qualifies but clarifies the succeeding phrase "imposition of a safeguard measure." As expounded later, the phrase also encompasses the opposite or converse ruling which is the non-imposition of a safeguard measure. In the American case of Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,68 the United States Supreme Court, in interpreting a key provision of the Employee Retirement Security Act of

1974, construed the phrase "relates to" in its normal sense which is the same as "if it has connection with or reference to."69 There is no serious dispute that the phrase "in connection with" is synonymous to "relates to" or "reference to," and that all three phrases are broadly expansive. This is affirmed not just by jurisprudential fiat, but also the acquired connotative meaning of "in connection with" in common parlance. Consequently, with the use of the phrase "in connection with," Section 29 allows the CTA to review not only the ruling imposing a safeguard measure, but all other rulings related or have reference to the application for such measure. Now, let us determine the maximum scope and reach of the phrase "in connection with" as used in Section 29 of the SMA. A literalist reading or linguistic survey may not satisfy. Even the US Supreme Court in New York State Blue Cross Plans v. Travelers Ins.70 conceded that the phrases "relate to" or "in connection with" may be extended to the farthest stretch of indeterminacy for, universally, relations or connections are infinite and stop nowhere.71 Thus, in the case the US High Court, examining the same phrase of the same provision of law involved in Shaw, resorted to looking at the statute and its objectives as the alternative to an "uncritical literalism."72 A similar inquiry into the other provisions of the SMA is in order to determine the scope of review accorded therein to the CTA.73 The authority to decide on the safeguard measure is vested in the DTI Secretary in the case of non-agricultural products, and in the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture in the case of agricultural products.74 Section 29 is likewise explicit that only the rulings of the DTI Secretary or the Agriculture Secretary may be reviewed by the CTA.75 Thus, the acts of other bodies that were granted some powers by the SMA, such as the Tariff Commission, are not subject to direct review by the CTA. Under the SMA, the Department Secretary concerned is authorized to decide on several matters. Within thirty (30) days from receipt of a petition seeking the imposition of a safeguard measure, or from the date he made motu proprio initiation, the Secretary shall make a preliminary determination on whether the increased imports of the product under consideration substantially cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry.76 Such ruling is crucial since only upon the Secretary's positive preliminary determination that a threat to the domestic industry exists shall the matter be referred to the Tariff Commission for formal investigation, this time, to determine whether the general safeguard measure should be imposed or not.77 Pursuant to a positive preliminary determination, the Secretary may also decide that the imposition of a provisional safeguard measure would be warranted under Section 8 of the SMA.78 The Secretary is also authorized to decide, after

receipt of the report of the Tariff Commission, whether or not to impose the general safeguard measure, and if in the affirmative, what general safeguard measures should be applied.79 Even after the general safeguard measure is imposed, the Secretary is empowered to extend the safeguard measure,80 or terminate, reduce or modify his previous rulings on the general safeguard measure.81 With the explicit grant of certain powers involving safeguard measures by the SMA on the DTI Secretary, it follows that he is empowered to rule on several issues. These are the issues which arise in connection with, or in relation to, the imposition of a safeguard measure. They may arise at different stages the preliminary investigation stage, the post-formal investigation stage, or the post-safeguard measure stage yet all these issues do become ripe for resolution because an initiatory action has been taken seeking the imposition of a safeguard measure. It is the initiatory action for the imposition of a safeguard measure that sets the wheels in motion, allowing the Secretary to make successive rulings, beginning with the preliminary determination. Clearly, therefore, the scope and reach of the phrase "in connection with," as intended by Congress, pertain to all rulings of the DTI Secretary or Agriculture Secretary which arise from the time an application or motu proprio initiation for the imposition of a safeguard measure is taken. Indeed, the incidents which require resolution come to the fore only because there is an initial application or action seeking the imposition of a safeguard measure. From the legislative standpoint, it was a matter of sense and practicality to lump up the questions related to the initiatory application or action for safeguard measure and to assign only one court and; that is the CTA to initially review all the rulings related to such initiatory application or action. Both directions Congress put in place by employing the phrase "in connection with" in the law. Given the relative expanse of decisions subject to judicial review by the CTA under Section 29, we do not doubt that a negative ruling refusing to impose a safeguard measure falls within the scope of its jurisdiction. On a literal level, such negative ruling is "a ruling of the Secretary in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure," as it is one of the possible outcomes that may result from the initial application or action for a safeguard measure. On a more critical level, the rulings of the DTI Secretary in connection with a safeguard measure, however diverse the outcome may be, arise from the same grant of jurisdiction on the DTI Secretary by the SMA.82 The refusal by the DTI Secretary to grant a safeguard measure involves

the same grant of authority, the same statutory prescriptions, and the same degree of discretion as the imposition by the DTI Secretary of a safeguard measure.

Where the error is one of law or of fact, which is a mistake of judgment, appeal is the remedy.86 It is very conceivable that the DTI Secretary, after deliberate thought and careful evaluation of the evidence, may either make a negative preliminary determination as he is so empowered under Section 7 of the SMA, or refuse to adopt the definitive safeguard measure under Section 13 of the same law. Adopting the respondents' theory, this negative ruling is susceptible to reversal only through a special civil action for certiorari, thus depriving the affected party the chance to elevate the ruling on appeal on the rudimentary grounds of errors in fact or in law. Instead, and despite whatever indications that the DTI Secretary acted with measure and within the bounds of his jurisdiction are, the aggrieved party will be forced to resort to a gymnastic exercise, contorting the straight and narrow in an effort to discombobulate the courts into believing that what was within was actually beyond and what was studied and deliberate actually whimsical and capricious. What then would be the remedy of the party aggrieved by a negative ruling that simply erred in interpreting the facts or the law? It certainly cannot be the special civil action for certiorari, for as the Court held in Silverio v. Court of Appeals: "Certiorari is a remedy narrow in its scope and inflexible in its character. It is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop."87 Fortunately, this theoretical quandary need not come to pass. Section 29 of the SMA is worded in such a way that it places under the CTA's judicial review all rulings of the DTI Secretary, which are connected with the imposition of a safeguard measure. This is sound and proper in light of the specialized jurisdiction of the CTA over tax matters. In the same way that a question of whether to tax or not to tax is properly a tax matter, so is the question of whether to impose or not to impose a definitive safeguard measure. On another note, the second paragraph of Section 29 similarly reveals the legislative intent that rulings of the DTI Secretary over safeguard measures should first be reviewed by the CTA and not the Court of Appeals. It reads: The petition for review shall comply with the same requirements and shall follow the same rules of procedure and shall be subject to the same disposition as in appeals in connection with adverse rulings on tax matters to the Court of Appeals. This is the only passage in the SMA in which the Court of Appeals is mentioned. The express wish of Congress is that the petition conform to the requirements and procedure under Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Since Congress mandated

The position of the respondents is one of "uncritical literalism"83 incongruent with the animus of the law. Moreover, a fundamentalist approach to Section 29 is not warranted, considering the absurdity of the consequences. Third. Interpretatio Talis In Ambiguis Semper Fienda Est, Ut Evitur Inconveniens Et Absurdum.84

Even assuming arguendo that Section 29 has not expressly granted the CTA jurisdiction to review a negative ruling of the DTI Secretary, the Court is precluded from favoring an interpretation that would cause inconvenience and absurdity.85 Adopting the respondents' position favoring the CTA's minimal jurisdiction would unnecessarily lead to illogical and onerous results. Indeed, it is illiberal to assume that Congress had intended to provide appellate relief to rulings imposing a safeguard measure but not to those declining to impose the measure. Respondents might argue that the right to relief from a negative ruling is not lost since the applicant could, as Philcemcor did, question such ruling through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, in lieu of an appeal to the CTA. Yet these two reliefs are of differing natures and gravamen. While an appeal may be predicated on errors of fact or errors of law, a special civil action for certiorari is grounded on grave abuse of discretion or lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the decider. For a special civil action for certiorari to succeed, it is not enough that the questioned act of the respondent is wrong. As the Court clarified in Sempio v. Court of Appeals: A tribunal, board or officer acts without jurisdiction if it/he does not have the legal power to determine the case. There is excess of jurisdiction where, being clothed with the power to determine the case, the tribunal, board or officer oversteps its/his authority as determined by law. And there is grave abuse of discretion where the tribunal, board or officer acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of his judgment as to be said to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Certiorari is often resorted to in order to correct errors of jurisdiction.

that the form and procedure adopted be analogous to a review of a CTA ruling by the Court of Appeals, the legislative contemplation could not have been that the appeal be directly taken to the Court of Appeals. Issue of Binding Effect of Tariff Commission's Factual Determination on DTI Secretary. The next issue for resolution is whether the factual determination made by the Tariff Commission under the SMA is binding on the DTI Secretary. Otherwise stated, the question is whether the DTI Secretary may impose general safeguard measures in the absence of a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission. The Court of Appeals relied upon Section 13 of the SMA in ruling that the findings of the Tariff Commission do not necessarily constitute a final decision. Section 13 details the procedure for the adoption of a safeguard measure, as well as the steps to be taken in case there is a negative final determination. The implication of the Court of Appeals' holding is that the DTI Secretary may adopt a definitive safeguard measure, notwithstanding a negative determination made by the Tariff Commission. Undoubtedly, Section 13 prescribes certain limitations and restrictions before general safeguard measures may be imposed. However, the most fundamental restriction on the DTI Secretary's power in that respect is contained in Section 5 of the SMAthat there should first be a positive final determination of the Tariff Commissionwhich the Court of Appeals curiously all but ignored. Section 5 reads: Sec. 5. Conditions for the Application of General Safeguard Measures. The Secretary shall apply a general safeguard measure upon a positive final determination of the [Tariff] Commission that a product is being imported into the country in increased quantities, whether absolute or relative to the domestic production, as to be a substantial cause of serious injury or threat thereof to the domestic industry; however, in the case of non-agricultural products, the Secretary shall first establish that the application of such safeguard measures will be in the public interest. (emphasis supplied) The plain meaning of Section 5 shows that it is the Tariff Commission that has the power to make a "positive final determination." This power lodged in the Tariff

Commission, must be distinguished from the power to impose the general safeguard measure which is properly vested on the DTI Secretary.88 All in all, there are two condition precedents that must be satisfied before the DTI Secretary may impose a general safeguard measure on grey Portland cement. First, there must be a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission that a product is being imported into the country in increased quantities (whether absolute or relative to domestic production), as to be a substantial cause of serious injury or threat to the domestic industry. Second, in the case of non-agricultural products the Secretary must establish that the application of such safeguard measures is in the public interest.89 As Southern Cross argues, Section 5 is quite clear-cut, and it is impossible to finagle a different conclusion even through overarching methods of statutory construction. There is no safer nor better settled canon of interpretation that when language is clear and unambiguous it must be held to mean what it plainly expresses:90 In the quotable words of an illustrious member of this Court, thus: [I]f a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. The verba legis or plain meaning rule rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude the court from construing it differently. The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute.91 Moreover, Rule 5 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the SMA,92 which interprets Section 5 of the law, likewise requires a positive final determination on the part of the Tariff Commission before the application of the general safeguard measure. The SMA establishes a distinct allocation of functions between the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary. The plain meaning of Section 5 shows that it is the Tariff Commission that has the power to make a "positive final determination." This power, which belongs to the Tariff Commission, must be distinguished from the power to impose general safeguard measure properly vested on the DTI Secretary. The distinction is vital, as a "positive final determination" clearly antecedes, as a condition precedent, the imposition of a general safeguard measure. At the same time, a positive final determination does not necessarily result in the imposition of a general safeguard measure. Under Section 5, notwithstanding the positive final determination of the Tariff Commission, the DTI Secretary is tasked to

decide whether or not that the application of the safeguard measures is in the public interest. It is also clear from Section 5 of the SMA that the positive final determination to be undertaken by the Tariff Commission does not entail a mere gathering of statistical data. In order to arrive at such determination, it has to establish causal linkages from the statistics that it compiles and evaluates: after finding there is an importation in increased quantities of the product in question, that such importation is a substantial cause of serious threat or injury to the domestic industry. The Court of Appeals relies heavily on the legislative record of a congressional debate during deliberations on the SMA to assert a purported legislative intent that the findings of the Tariff Commission do not bind the DTI Secretary.93 Yet as explained earlier, the plain meaning of Section 5 emphasizes that only if the Tariff Commission renders a positive determination could the DTI Secretary impose a safeguard measure. Resort to the congressional records to ascertain legislative intent is not warranted if a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute.94 Indeed, the legislative record, if at all to be availed of, should be approached with extreme caution, as legislative debates and proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the statute when the meaning is clear.95 Our holding in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary96 on the resort to deliberations of the constitutional convention to interpret the Constitution is likewise appropriate in ascertaining statutory intent: While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk xxx. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face."97 Moreover, it is easy to selectively cite passages, sometimes out of their proper context, in order to assert a misleading interpretation. The effect can be dangerous. Minority or solitary views, anecdotal ruminations, or even the occasional crude witticisms, may improperly acquire the mantle of legislative intent by the sole virtue

of their publication in the authoritative congressional record. Hence, resort to legislative deliberations is allowable when the statute is crafted in such a manner as to leave room for doubt on the real intent of the legislature. Section 5 plainly evinces legislative intent to restrict the DTI Secretary's power to impose a general safeguard measure by preconditioning such imposition on a positive determination by the Tariff Commission. Such legislative intent should be given full force and effect, as the executive power to impose definitive safeguard measures is but a delegated powerthe power of taxation, by nature and by command of the fundamental law, being a preserve of the legislature.98 Section 28(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution confirms the delegation of legislative power, yet ensures that the prerogative of Congress to impose limitations and restrictions on the executive exercise of this power: The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.99 The safeguard measures which the DTI Secretary may impose under the SMA may take the following variations, to wit: (a) an increase in, or imposition of any duty on the imported product; (b) a decrease in or the imposition of a tariff-rate quota on the product; (c) a modification or imposition of any quantitative restriction on the importation of the product into the Philippines; (d) one or more appropriate adjustment measures, including the provision of trade adjustment assistance; and (e) any combination of the above-described actions. Except for the provision of trade adjustment assistance, the measures enumerated by the SMA are essentially imposts, which precisely are the subject of delegation under Section 28(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.100 This delegation of the taxation power by the legislative to the executive is authorized by the Constitution itself.101 At the same time, the Constitution also grants the delegating authority (Congress) the right to impose restrictions and limitations on the taxation power delegated to the President.102 The restrictions and limitations imposed by Congress take on the mantle of a constitutional command, which the executive branch is obliged to observe. The SMA empowered the DTI Secretary, as alter ego of the President,103 to impose definitive general safeguard measures, which basically are tariff imposts of the type spoken of in the Constitution. However, the law did not grant him full, uninhibited

discretion to impose such measures. The DTI Secretary authority is derived from the SMA; it does not flow from any inherent executive power. Thus, the limitations imposed by Section 5 are absolute, warranted as they are by a constitutional fiat.104 Philcemcor cites our 1912 ruling in Lamb v. Phipps105 to assert that the DTI Secretary, having the final decision on the safeguard measure, has the power to evaluate the findings of the Tariff Commission and make an independent judgment thereon. Given the constitutional and statutory limitations governing the present case, the citation is misplaced. Lamb pertained to the discretion of the Insular Auditor of the Philippine Islands, whom, as the Court recognized, "[t]he statutes of the United States require[d] xxx to exercise his judgment upon the legality xxx [of] provisions of law and resolutions of Congress providing for the payment of money, the means of procuring testimony upon which he may act."106 Thus in Lamb, while the Court recognized the wide latitude of discretion that may have been vested on the Insular Auditor, it also recognized that such latitude flowed from, and is consequently limited by, statutory grant. However, in this case, the provision of the Constitution in point expressly recognizes the authority of Congress to prescribe limitations in the case of tariffs, export/import quotas and other such safeguard measures. Thus, the broad discretion granted to the Insular Auditor of the Philippine Islands cannot be analogous to the discretion of the DTI Secretary which is circumscribed by Section 5 of the SMA. For that matter, Cario v. Commissioner on Human Rights,107 likewise cited by Philcemcor, is also inapplicable owing to the different statutory regimes prevailing over that case and the present petition. In Cario, the Court ruled that the constitutional power of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) to investigate human rights' violations did not extend to adjudicating claims on the merits.108 Philcemcor claims that the functions of the Tariff Commission being "only investigatory," it could neither decide nor adjudicate.109 The applicable law governing the issue in Cario is Section 18, Article XIII of the Constitution, which delineates the powers and functions of the CHR. The provision does not vest on the CHR the power to adjudicate cases, but only to investigate all forms of human rights violations.110 Yet, without modifying the thorough disquisition of the Court in Cario on the general limitations on the investigatory power, the precedent is inapplicable because of the difference in the involved statutory frameworks. The Constitution does not repose binding effect on the results of the CHR's investigation.111 On the other hand, through Section 5 of the SMA and under the authority of Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution, Congress

did intend to bind the DTI Secretary to the determination made by the Tariff Commission.112 It is of no consequence that such determination results from the exercise of investigatory powers by the Tariff Commission since Congress is well within its constitutional mandate to limit the authority of the DTI Secretary to impose safeguard measures in the manner that it sees fit. The Court of Appeals and Philcemcor also rely on Section 13 of the SMA and Rule 13 of the SMA's Implementing Rules in support of the view that the DTI Secretary may decide independently of the determination made by the Tariff Commission. Admittedly, there are certain infelicities in the language of Section 13 and Rule 13. But reliance should not be placed on the textual imprecisions. Rather, Section 13 and Rule 13 must be viewed in light of the fundamental prescription imposed by Section 5. 113 Section 13 of the SMA lays down the procedure to be followed after the Tariff Commission renders its report. The provision reads in full:
SEC. 13. Adoption of Definitive Measures. Upon its positive determination, the Commission shall recommend to the Secretary an appropriate definitive measure, in the form of: (a) An increase in, or imposition of, any duty on the imported product; (b) A decrease in or the imposition of a tariff-rate quota (MAV) on the product; (c) A modification or imposition of any quantitative restriction on the importation of the product into the Philippines; (d) One or more appropriate adjustment measures, including the provision of trade adjustment assistance; (e) Any combination of actions described in subparagraphs (a) to (d).

The Commission may also recommend other actions, including the initiation of international negotiations to address the underlying cause of the increase of imports of the product, to alleviate the injury or threat thereof to the domestic industry, and to facilitate positive adjustment to import competition. The general safeguard measure shall be limited to the extent of redressing or preventing the injury and to facilitate adjustment by the domestic industry from the adverse effects directly attributed to the increased imports: Provided, however, That when quantitative import restrictions are used, such measures shall not reduce the quantity of imports below the average imports for the three (3) preceding representative years, unless clear justification is given that a different level is necessary to prevent or remedy a serious injury.

A general safeguard measure shall not be applied to a product originating from a developing country if its share of total imports of the product is less than three percent (3%): Provided, however, That developing countries with less than three percent (3%) share collectively account for not more than nine percent (9%) of the total imports. The decision imposing a general safeguard measure, the duration of which is more than one (1) year, shall be reviewed at regular intervals for purposes of liberalizing or reducing its intensity. The industry benefiting from the application of a general safeguard measure shall be required to show positive adjustment within the allowable period. A general safeguard measure shall be terminated where the benefiting industry fails to show any improvement, as may be determined by the Secretary. The Secretary shall issue a written instruction to the heads of the concerned government agencies to implement the appropriate general safeguard measure as determined by the Secretary within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the report. In the event of a negative final determination, or if the cash bond is in excess of the definitive safeguard duty assessed, the Secretary shall immediately issue, through the Secretary of Finance, a written instruction to the Commissioner of Customs, authorizing the return of the cash bond or the remainder thereof, as the case may be, previously collected as provisional general safeguard measure within ten (10) days from the date a final decision has been made: Provided, That the government shall not be liable for any interest on the amount to be returned. The Secretary shall not accept for consideration another petition from the same industry, with respect to the same imports of the product under consideration within one (1) year after the date of rendering such a decision. When the definitive safeguard measure is in the form of a tariff increase, such increase shall not be subject or limited to the maximum levels of tariff as set forth in Section 401(a) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. To better comprehend Section 13, note must be taken of the distinction between the investigatory and recommendatory functions of the Tariff Commission under the SMA. The word "determination," as used in the SMA, pertains to the factual findings on whether there are increased imports into the country of the product under consideration, and on whether such increased imports are a substantial cause of

serious injury or threaten to substantially cause serious injury to the domestic industry.114 The SMA explicitly authorizes the DTI Secretary to make a preliminary determination,115 and the Tariff Commission to make the final determination.116 The distinction is fundamental, as these functions are not interchangeable. The Tariff Commission makes its determination only after a formal investigation process, with such investigation initiated only if there is a positive preliminary determination by the DTI Secretary under Section 7 of the SMA.117 On the other hand, the DTI Secretary may impose definitive safeguard measure only if there is a positive final determination made by the Tariff Commission.118 In contrast, a "recommendation" is a suggested remedial measure submitted by the Tariff Commission under Section 13 after making a positive final determination in accordance with Section 5. The Tariff Commission is not empowered to make a recommendation absent a positive final determination on its part.119 Under Section 13, the Tariff Commission is required to recommend to the [DTI] Secretary an "appropriate definitive measure."120 The Tariff Commission "may also recommend other actions, including the initiation of international negotiations to address the underlying cause of the increase of imports of the products, to alleviate the injury or threat thereof to the domestic industry and to facilitate positive adjustment to import competition."121 The recommendations of the Tariff Commission, as rendered under Section 13, are not obligatory on the DTI Secretary. Nothing in the SMA mandates the DTI Secretary to adopt the recommendations made by the Tariff Commission. In fact, the SMA requires that the DTI Secretary establish that the application of such safeguard measures is in the public interest, notwithstanding the Tariff Commission's recommendation on the appropriate safeguard measure based on its positive final determination.122 The non-binding force of the Tariff Commission's recommendations is congruent with the command of Section 28(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that only the President may be empowered by the Congress to impose appropriate tariff rates, import/export quotas and other similar measures.123 It is the DTI Secretary, as alter ego of the President, who under the SMA may impose such safeguard measures subject to the limitations imposed therein. A contrary conclusion would in essence unduly arrogate to the Tariff Commission the executive power to impose the appropriate tariff measures. That is why the SMA empowers the DTI Secretary to adopt safeguard measures other than those recommended by the Tariff Commission.

Unlike the recommendations of the Tariff Commission, its determination has a different effect on the DTI Secretary. Only on the basis of a positive final determination made by the Tariff Commission under Section 5 can the DTI Secretary impose a general safeguard measure. Clearly, then the DTI Secretary is bound by the determination made by the Tariff Commission. Some confusion may arise because the sixth paragraph of Section 13124 uses the variant word "determined" in a different context, as it contemplates "the appropriate general safeguard measure as determined by the Secretary within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the report." Quite plainly, the word "determined" in this context pertains to the DTI Secretary's power of choice of the appropriate safeguard measure, as opposed to the Tariff Commission's power to determine the existence of conditions necessary for the imposition of any safeguard measure. In relation to Section 5, such choice also relates to the mandate of the DTI Secretary to establish that the application of safeguard measures is in the public interest, also within the fifteen (15) day period. Nothing in Section 13 contradicts the instruction in Section 5 that the DTI Secretary is allowed to impose the general safeguard measures only if there is a positive determination made by the Tariff Commission. Unfortunately, Rule 13.2 of the Implementing Rules of the SMA is captioned "Final Determination by the Secretary." The assailed Decision and Philcemcor latch on this phraseology to imply that the factual determination rendered by the Tariff Commission under Section 5 may be amended or reversed by the DTI Secretary. Of course, implementing rules should conform, not clash, with the law that they seek to implement, for a regulation which operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute is a nullity.125 Yet imperfect draftsmanship aside, nothing in Rule 13.2 implies that the DTI Secretary can set aside the determination made by the Tariff Commission under the aegis of Section 5. This can be seen by examining the specific provisions of Rule 13.2, thus:
RULE 13.2. Final Determination by the Secretary RULE 13.2.a. Within fifteen (15) calendar days from receipt of the Report of the Commission, the Secretary shall make a decision, taking into consideration the measures recommended by the Commission.

case of non-agricultural products, the Secretary shall first establish that the imposition of the safeguard measure will be in the public interest.
RULE 13.2.c. Within two (2) calendar days after making his decision, the Secretary shall also order its publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation. He shall also furnish a copy of his Order to the petitioner and other interested parties, whether affirmative or negative. (Emphasis supplied.)

Moreover, the DTI Secretary does not have the power to review the findings of the Tariff Commission for it is not subordinate to the Department of Trade and Industry ("DTI"). It falls under the supervision, not of the DTI nor of the Department of Finance (as mistakenly asserted by Southern Cross),126 but of the National Economic Development Authority, an independent planning agency of the government of co-equal rank as the DTI.127 As the supervision and control of a Department Secretary is limited to the bureaus, offices, and agencies under him,128 the DTI Secretary generally cannot exercise review authority over actions of the Tariff Commission. Neither does the SMA specifically authorize the DTI Secretary to alter, amend or modify in any way the determination made by the Tariff Commission. The most that the DTI Secretary could do to express displeasure over the Tariff Commission's actions is to ignore its recommendation, but not its determination. The word "determination" as used in Rule 13.2 of the Implementing Rules is dissonant with the same word as employed in the SMA, which in the latter case is undeviatingly in reference to the determination made by the Tariff Commission. Beyond the resulting confusion, however, the divergent use in Rule 13.2 is explicable as the Rule textually pertains to the power of the DTI Secretary to review the recommendations of the Tariff Commission, not the latter's determination. Indeed, an examination of the specific provisions show that there is no real conflict to reconcile. Rule 13.2 respects the logical order imposed by the SMA. The Rule does not remove the essential requirement under Section 5 that a positive final determination be made by the Tariff Commission before a definitive safeguard measure may be imposed by the DTI Secretary. The assailed Decision characterizes the findings of the Tariff Commission as merely recommendatory and points to the DTI Secretary as the authority who renders the final decision.129 At the same time, Philcemcor asserts that the Tariff Commission's functions are merely investigatory, and as such do not include the power to decide or adjudicate. These contentions, viewed in the context of the fundamental requisite set forth by Section 5, are untenable. They run counter to the statutory prescription that

RULE 13.2.b. If the determination is affirmative, the Secretary shall issue, within two (2) calendar days after making his decision, a written instruction to the heads of the concerned government agencies to immediately implement the appropriate general safeguard measure as determined by him. Provided, however, that in the

a positive final determination made by the Tariff Commission should first be obtained before the definitive safeguard measures may be laid down. Was it anomalous for Congress to have provided for a system whereby the Tariff Commission may preclude the DTI, an office of higher rank, from imposing a safeguard measure? Of course, this Court does not inquire into the wisdom of the legislature but only charts the boundaries of powers and functions set in its enactments. But then, it is not difficult to see the internal logic of this statutory framework. For one, as earlier stated, the DTI cannot exercise review powers over the Tariff Commission which is not its subordinate office. Moreover, the mechanism established by Congress establishes a measure of check and balance involving two different governmental agencies with disparate specializations. The matter of safeguard measures is of such national importance that a decision either to impose or not to impose then could have ruinous effects on companies doing business in the Philippines. Thus, it is ideal to put in place a system which affords all due deliberation and calls to fore various governmental agencies exercising their particular specializations. Finally, if this arrangement drawn up by Congress makes it difficult to obtain a general safeguard measure, it is because such safeguard measure is the exception, rather than the rule. The Philippines is obliged to observe its obligations under the GATT, under whose framework trade liberalization, not protectionism, is laid down. Verily, the GATT actually prescribes conditions before a member-country may impose a safeguard measure. The pertinent portion of the GATT Agreement on Safeguards reads: 2. A Member may only apply a safeguard measure to a product only if that member has determined, pursuant to the provisions set out below, that such product is being imported into its territory in such increased quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production, and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry that produces like or directly competitive products.130 3. (a) A Member may apply a safeguard measure only following an investigation by the competent authorities of that Member pursuant to procedures previously established and made public in consonance with Article X of the GATT 1994. This investigation shall include reasonable public notice to all interested parties and

public hearings or other appropriate means in which importers, exporters and other interested parties could present evidence and their views, including the opportunity to respond to the presentations of other parties and to submit their views, inter alia, as to whether or not the application of a safeguard measure would be in the public interest. The competent authorities shall publish a report setting forth their findings and reasoned conclusions reached on all pertinent issues of fact and law.131 The SMA was designed not to contradict the GATT, but to complement it. The two requisites laid down in Section 5 for a positive final determination are the same conditions provided under the GATT Agreement on Safeguards for the application of safeguard measures by a member country. Moreover, the investigatory procedure laid down by the SMA conforms to the procedure required by the GATT Agreement on Safeguards. Congress has chosen the Tariff Commission as the competent authority to conduct such investigation. Southern Cross stresses that applying the provision of the GATT Agreement on Safeguards, the Tariff Commission is clearly empowered to arrive at binding conclusions.132 We agree: binding on the DTI Secretary is the Tariff Commission's determinations on whether a product is imported in increased quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production and whether any such increase is a substantial cause of serious injury or threat thereof to the domestic industry.133 Satisfied as we are with the proper statutory paradigm within which the SMA should be analyzed, the flaws in the reasoning of the Court of Appeals and in the arguments of the respondents become apparent. To better understand the dynamics of the procedure set up by the law leading to the imposition of definitive safeguard measures, a brief step-by-step recount thereof is in order. 1. After the initiation of an action involving a general safeguard measure,134 the DTI Secretary makes a preliminary determination whether the increased imports of the product under consideration substantially cause or threaten to substantially cause serious injury to the domestic industry,135 and whether the imposition of a provisional measure is warranted under Section 8 of the SMA.136 If the preliminary determination is negative, it is implied that no further action will be taken on the application. 2. When his preliminary determination is positive, the Secretary immediately transmits the records covering the application to the Tariff Commission for immediate formal investigation.137

3. The Tariff Commission conducts its formal investigation, keyed towards making a final determination. In the process, it holds public hearings, providing interested parties the opportunity to present evidence or otherwise be heard.138 To repeat, Section 5 enumerates what the Tariff Commission is tasked to determine: (a) whether a product is being imported into the country in increased quantities, irrespective of whether the product is absolute or relative to the domestic production; and (b) whether the importation in increased quantities is such that it causes serious injury or threat to the domestic industry.139 The findings of the Tariff Commission as to these matters constitute the final determination, which may be either positive or negative. 4. Under Section 13 of the SMA, if the Tariff Commission makes a positive determination, the Tariff Commission "recommends to the [DTI] Secretary an appropriate definitive measure." The Tariff Commission "may also recommend other actions, including the initiation of international negotiations to address the underlying cause of the increase of imports of the products, to alleviate the injury or threat thereof to the domestic industry, and to facilitate positive adjustment to import competition."140 5. If the Tariff Commission makes a positive final determination, the DTI Secretary is then to decide, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the report, as to what appropriate safeguard measures should he impose. 6. However, if the Tariff Commission makes a negative final determination, the DTI Secretary cannot impose any definitive safeguard measure. Under Section 13, he is instructed instead to return whatever cash bond was paid by the applicant upon the initiation of the action for safeguard measure. The Effect of the Court's Decision The Court of Appeals erred in remanding the case back to the DTI Secretary, with the instruction that the DTI Secretary may impose a general safeguard measure even if there is no positive final determination from the Tariff Commission. More crucially, the Court of Appeals could not have acquired jurisdiction over Philcemcor's petition for certiorari in the first place, as Section 29 of the SMA properly vests jurisdiction on the CTA. Consequently, the assailed Decision is an absolute nullity, and we declare it as such. What is the effect of the nullity of the assailed Decision on the 5 June 2003 Decision of the DTI Secretary imposing the general safeguard measure? We have recognized

that any initial judicial review of a DTI ruling in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure belongs to the CTA. At the same time, the Court also recognizes the fundamental principle that a null and void judgment cannot produce any legal effect. There is sufficient cause to establish that the 5 June 2003 Decision of the DTI Secretary resulted from the assailed Court of Appeals Decision, even if the latter had not yet become final. Conversely, it can be concluded that it was because of the putative imprimatur of the Court of Appeals' Decision that the DTI Secretary issued his ruling imposing the safeguard measure. Since the 5 June 2003 Decision derives its legal effect from the void Decision of the Court of Appeals, this ruling of the DTI Secretary is consequently void. The spring cannot rise higher than the source. The DTI Secretary himself acknowledged that he drew stimulating force from the appellate court's Decision for in his own 5 June 2003 Decision, he declared: From the aforementioned ruling, the CA has remanded the case to the DTI Secretary for a final decision. Thus, there is no legal impediment for the Secretary to decide on the application.141 The inescapable conclusion is that the DTI Secretary needed the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals to justify his rendering a second Decision. He explicitly invoked the Court of Appeals' Decision as basis for rendering his 5 June 2003 ruling, and implicitly recognized that without such Decision he would not have the authority to revoke his previous ruling and render a new, obverse ruling. It is clear then that the 25 June 2003 Decision of the DTI Secretary is a product of the void Decision, it being an attempt to carry out such null judgment. There is therefore no choice but to declare it void as well, lest we sanction the perverse existence of a fruit from a non-existent tree. It does not even matter what the disposition of the 25 June 2003 Decision was, its nullity would be warranted even if the DTI Secretary chose to uphold his earlier ruling denying the application for safeguard measures. It is also an unfortunate spectacle to behold the DTI Secretary, seeking to enforce a judicial decision which is not yet final and actually pending review on appeal. Had it been a judge who attempted to enforce a decision that is not yet final and executory, he or she would have readily been subjected to sanction by this Court. The DTI Secretary may be beyond the ambit of administrative review by this Court, but we are capacitated to allocate the boundaries set by the law of the land and to exact fealty to the legal order, especially from the instrumentalities and officials of government.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is DECLARED NULL AND VOID and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the DTI Secretary dated 25 June 2003 is also DECLARED NULL AND VOID and SET ASIDE. No Costs. SO ORDERED. ROMEO P. GEROCHI, KATULONG NG BAYAN ENVIRONMENTALIST CONSUMERS NETWORK, INC. (ECN), Petitioners, -versusDEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE), ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (ERC), NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC), POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT GROUP (PSALM Corp.), STRATEGIC POWER UTILITIES GROUP (SPUG), and PANAY ELECTRIC COMPANY INC. (PECO), Respondents. G.R. No. 159796 Promulgated: July 17, 2007 x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x (KB) and

[2] which seeks to implement the said imposition, be declared unconstitutional. Petitioners also pray that the Universal Charge imposed upon the consumers be refunded and that a preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) be issued directing the respondents to refrain from implementing, charging, and collecting the said charge.[3] The assailed provision of law reads:

SECTION 34. Universal Charge. Within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act, a universal charge to be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity end-users for the following purposes:

(a) Payment for the stranded debts[4] in excess of the amount assumed by the National Government and stranded contract costs of NPC[5] and as well as qualified stranded contract costs of distribution utilities resulting from the restructuring of the industry; (b) Missionary electrification;[6] (c) The equalization of the taxes and royalties applied to indigenous or renewable sources of energy vis--vis imported energy fuels; (d) An environmental charge equivalent to one-fourth of one centavo per kilowatthour (P0.0025/kWh), which shall accrue to an environmental fund to be used solely for watershed rehabilitation and management. Said fund shall be managed by NPC under existing arrangements; and (e) A charge to account for all forms of cross-subsidies for a period not exceeding three (3) years.

DECISION NACHURA, J.: Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi, Katulong Ng Bayan (KB), and Environmentalist Consumers Network, Inc. (ECN) (petitioners), come before this Court in this original action praying that Section 34 of Republic Act (RA) 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), imposing the Universal Charge,[1] and Rule 18 of the Rules and Regulations (IRR)

The universal charge shall be a non-bypassable charge which shall be passed on and collected from all end-users on a monthly basis by the distribution utilities. Collections by the distribution utilities and the TRANSCO in any given month shall be remitted to the PSALM Corp. on or before the fifteenth (15th) of the succeeding month, net of any amount due to the distribution utility. Any end-user or selfgenerating entity not connected to a distribution utility shall remit its corresponding universal charge directly to the TRANSCO. The PSALM Corp., as administrator of the fund, shall create a Special Trust Fund which shall be disbursed only for the

purposes specified herein in an open and transparent manner. All amount collected for the universal charge shall be distributed to the respective beneficiaries within a reasonable period to be provided by the ERC.

an additional amount of P0.0205 per kilowatt-hour should be added to the P0.0168 per kilowatt-hour provisionally authorized by the Commission in the said Order. Accordingly, a total amount of P0.0373 per kilowatt-hour is hereby APPROVED for withdrawal from the Special Trust Fund managed by PSALM as its share from the Universal Charge for Missionary Electrification (UC-ME) effective on the following billing cycles: (a) and (b) June 26-July 25, 2003 for National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO);

The Facts Congress enacted the EPIRA on June 8, 2001; on June 26, 2001, it took effect. [7] On April 5, 2002, respondent National Power Corporation-Strategic Power Utilities Group[8] (NPC-SPUG) filed with respondent Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) a petition for the availment from the Universal Charge of its share for Missionary Electrification, docketed as ERC Case No. 2002-165.[9]

July 2003 for Distribution Utilities (Dus).

Relative thereto, TRANSCO and Dus are directed to collect the UC-ME in the amount of P0.0373 per kilowatt-hour and remit the same to PSALM on or before the 15th day of the succeeding month. In the meantime, NPC-SPUG is directed to submit, not later than April 30, 2004, a detailed report to include Audited Financial Statements and physical status (percentage of completion) of the projects using the prescribed format. Let copies of this Order be furnished petitioner NPC-SPUG and all distribution utilities (Dus). SO ORDERED.

On May 7, 2002, NPC filed another petition with ERC, docketed as ERC Case No. 2002-194, praying that the proposed share from the Universal Charge for the Environmental charge of P0.0025 per kilowatt-hour (/kWh), or a total of P119,488,847.59, be approved for withdrawal from the Special Trust Fund (STF) managed by respondent Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Group (PSALM)[10] for the rehabilitation and management of watershed areas.[11] On December 20, 2002, the ERC issued an Order[12] in ERC Case No. 2002165 provisionally approving the computed amount of P0.0168/kWh as the share of the NPC-SPUG from the Universal Charge for Missionary Electrification and authorizing the National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO) and Distribution Utilities to collect the same from its end-users on a monthly basis. On June 26, 2003, the ERC rendered its Decision[13] (for ERC Case No. 2002-165) modifying its Order of December 20, 2002, thus: WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the provisional authority granted to petitioner National Power Corporation-Strategic Power Utilities Group (NPCSPUG) in the Order dated December 20, 2002 is hereby modified to the effect that

On August 13, 2003, NPC-SPUG filed a Motion for Reconsideration asking the ERC, among others,[14] to set aside the above-mentioned Decision, which the ERC granted in its Order dated October 7, 2003, disposing: WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner National Power Corporation-Small Power Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated June 26, 2003 is hereby modified accordingly. Relative thereto, NPC-SPUG is directed to submit a quarterly report on the following:

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Projects for CY 2002 undertaken; Location Actual amount utilized to complete the project; Period of completion; Start of Operation; and Explanation of the reallocation of UC-ME funds, if any.

3) The imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-users is oppressive and confiscatory and amounts to taxation without representation as the consumers were not given a chance to be heard and represented.[18] Petitioners contend that the Universal Charge has the characteristics of a tax and is collected to fund the operations of the NPC. They argue that the cases[19] invoked by the respondents clearly show the regulatory purpose of the charges imposed therein, which is not so in the case at bench. In said cases, the respective funds[20] were created in order to balance and stabilize the prices of oil and sugar, and to act as buffer to counteract the changes and adjustments in prices, peso devaluation, and other variables which cannot be adequately and timely monitored by the legislature. Thus, there was a need to delegate powers to administrative bodies.[21] Petitioners posit that the Universal Charge is imposed not for a similar purpose. On the other hand, respondent PSALM through the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) contends that unlike a tax which is imposed to provide income for public purposes, such as support of the government, administration of the law, or payment of public expenses, the assailed Universal Charge is levied for a specific regulatory purpose, which is to ensure the viability of the country's electric power industry. Thus, it is exacted by the State in the exercise of its inherent police power. On this premise, PSALM submits that there is no undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC since the latter merely exercises a limited authority or discretion as to the execution and implementation of the provisions of the EPIRA. [22] Respondents Department of Energy (DOE), ERC, and NPC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), share the same view that the Universal Charge is not a tax because it is levied for a specific regulatory purpose, which is to ensure the viability of the country's electric power industry, and is, therefore, an exaction in the exercise of the State's police power. Respondents further contend that said Universal Charge does not possess the essential characteristics of a tax, that its imposition would redound to the benefit of the electric power industry and not to the public, and that its rate is uniformly levied on electricity end-users, unlike a tax which is imposed based on the individual taxpayer's ability to pay. Moreover, respondents deny that there is undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC since the EPIRA sets forth sufficient determinable standards which would guide the ERC in the exercise of the powers granted to it. Lastly, respondents argue that the imposition of the Universal Charge is not oppressive and confiscatory since it is an exercise of the police power of the State and it complies with the requirements of due process.[23]

SO ORDERED.[15]

Meanwhile, on April 2, 2003, ERC decided ERC Case No. 2002-194, authorizing the NPC to draw up to P70,000,000.00 from PSALM for its 2003 Watershed Rehabilitation Budget subject to the availability of funds for the Environmental Fund component of the Universal Charge.[16] On the basis of the said ERC decisions, respondent Panay Electric Company, Inc. (PECO) charged petitioner Romeo P. Gerochi and all other end-users with the Universal Charge as reflected in their respective electric bills starting from the month of July 2003.[17] Hence, this original action. Petitioners submit that the assailed provision of law and its IRR which sought to implement the same are unconstitutional on the following grounds: 1) The universal charge provided for under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and sought to be implemented under Sec. 2, Rule 18 of the IRR of the said law is a tax which is to be collected from all electric end-users and self-generating entities. The power to tax is strictly a legislative function and as such, the delegation of said power to any executive or administrative agency like the ERC is unconstitutional, giving the same unlimited authority. The assailed provision clearly provides that the Universal Charge is to be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, hence leaving to the latter complete discretionary legislative authority. 2) The ERC is also empowered to approve and determine where the funds collected should be used.

On its part, respondent PECO argues that it is duty-bound to collect and remit the amount pertaining to the Missionary Electrification and Environmental Fund components of the Universal Charge, pursuant to Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and the Decisions in ERC Case Nos. 2002-194 and 2002-165. Otherwise, PECO could be held liable under Sec. 46[24] of the EPIRA, which imposes fines and penalties for any violation of its provisions or its IRR.[25]

2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: (a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. But this Court's jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, while concurrent with that of the regional trial courts and the Court of Appeals, does not give litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of forum from which to seek such relief.[28] It has long been established that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and call for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.[29] This circumstance alone warrants the outright dismissal of the present action. This procedural infirmity notwithstanding, we opt to resolve the constitutional issue raised herein. We are aware that if the constitutionality of Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is not resolved now, the issue will certainly resurface in the near future, resulting in a repeat of this litigation, and probably involving the same parties. In the public interest and to avoid unnecessary delay, this Court renders its ruling now. The instant complaint is bereft of merit. The First Issue To resolve the first issue, it is necessary to distinguish the States power of taxation from the police power. The power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited in its range, acknowledging in its very nature no limits, so that security against its abuse is to be found only in the responsibility of the legislature which imposes the tax on the constituency that is to pay it.[30] It is based on the principle that taxes are the lifeblood of the government, and their prompt and certain availability is an imperious need.[31] Thus, the theory behind the exercise of the power to tax emanates from necessity; without taxes, government cannot fulfill its mandate of promoting the general welfare and well-being of the people.[32]

The Issues The ultimate issues in the case at bar are: 1) Whether or not, the Universal Charge imposed under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is a tax; and 2) Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power to tax on the part of the ERC.[26] Before we discuss the issues, the Court shall first deal with an obvious procedural lapse. Petitioners filed before us an original action particularly denominated as a Complaint assailing the constitutionality of Sec. 34 of the EPIRA imposing the Universal Charge and Rule 18 of the EPIRA's IRR. No doubt, petitioners have locus standi. They impugn the constitutionality of Sec. 34 of the EPIRA because they sustained a direct injury as a result of the imposition of the Universal Charge as reflected in their electric bills. However, petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts when they filed this Complaint directly with us. Furthermore, the Complaint is bereft of any allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the ERC or any of the public respondents, in order for the Court to consider it as a petition for certiorari or prohibition. Article VIII, Section 5(1) and (2) of the 1987 Constitution[27] categorically provides that: SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: 1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.

On the other hand, police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property.[33] It is the most pervasive, the least limitable, and the most demanding of the three fundamental powers of the State. The justification is found in the Latin maxims salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law) and sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (so use your property as not to injure the property of others). As an inherent attribute of sovereignty which virtually extends to all public needs, police power grants a wide panoply of instruments through which the State, as parens patriae, gives effect to a host of its regulatory powers.[34] We have held that the power to "regulate" means the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control, with due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons.[35] The conservative and pivotal distinction between these two powers rests in the purpose for which the charge is made. If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised does not make the imposition a tax.[36] In exacting the assailed Universal Charge through Sec. 34 of the EPIRA, the State's police power, particularly its regulatory dimension, is invoked. Such can be deduced from Sec. 34 which enumerates the purposes for which the Universal Charge is imposed[37] and which can be amply discerned as regulatory in character. The EPIRA resonates such regulatory purposes, thus: SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State: (a) To ensure and accelerate the total electrification of the country; (b) To ensure the quality, reliability, security and affordability of the supply of electric power; (c) To ensure transparent and reasonable prices of electricity in a regime of free and fair competition and full public accountability to achieve greater operational and economic efficiency and enhance the competitiveness of Philippine products in the global market; (d) To enhance the inflow of private capital and broaden the ownership base of the power generation, transmission and distribution sectors; (e) To ensure fair and non-discriminatory treatment of public and private sector entities in the process of restructuring the electric power industry; (f) To protect the public interest as it is affected by the rates and services of electric utilities and other providers of electric power;

(g) To assure socially and environmentally compatible energy sources and infrastructure; (h) To promote the utilization of indigenous and new and renewable energy resources in power generation in order to reduce dependence on imported energy; (i) To provide for an orderly and transparent privatization of the assets and liabilities of the National Power Corporation (NPC); (j) To establish a strong and purely independent regulatory body and system to ensure consumer protection and enhance the competitive operation of the electricity market; and (k) To encourage the efficient use of energy and other modalities of demand side management. From the aforementioned purposes, it can be gleaned that the assailed Universal Charge is not a tax, but an exaction in the exercise of the State's police power. Public welfare is surely promoted. Moreover, it is a well-established doctrine that the taxing power may be used as an implement of police power.[38] In Valmonte v. Energy Regulatory Board, et al.[39] and in Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank,[40] this Court held that the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) and the Sugar Stabilization Fund (SSF) were exactions made in the exercise of the police power. The doctrine was reiterated in Osmea v. Orbos[41] with respect to the OPSF. Thus, we disagree with petitioners that the instant case is different from the aforementioned cases. With the Universal Charge, a Special Trust Fund (STF) is also created under the administration of PSALM.[42] The STF has some notable characteristics similar to the OPSF and the SSF, viz.: 1) In the implementation of stranded cost recovery, the ERC shall conduct a review to determine whether there is under-recovery or over recovery and adjust (true-up) the level of the stranded cost recovery charge. In case of an over-recovery, the ERC shall ensure that any excess amount shall be remitted to the STF. A separate account shall be created for these amounts which shall be held in trust for any future claims of distribution utilities for stranded cost recovery. At the end of the stranded cost recovery period, any remaining amount in this account shall be used to reduce the electricity rates to the end-users.[43] 2) With respect to the assailed Universal Charge, if the total amount collected for the same is greater than the actual availments against it, the PSALM shall retain the balance within the STF to pay for periods where a shortfall occurs.[44]

3) Upon expiration of the term of PSALM, the administration of the STF shall be transferred to the DOF or any of the DOF attached agencies as designated by the DOF Secretary.[45] The OSG is in point when it asseverates: Evidently, the establishment and maintenance of the Special Trust Fund, under the last paragraph of Section 34, R.A. No. 9136, is well within the pervasive and nonwaivable power and responsibility of the government to secure the physical and economic survival and well-being of the community, that comprehensive sovereign authority we designate as the police power of the State.[46] This feature of the Universal Charge further boosts the position that the same is an exaction imposed primarily in pursuit of the State's police objectives. The STF reasonably serves and assures the attainment and perpetuity of the purposes for which the Universal Charge is imposed, i.e., to ensure the viability of the country's electric power industry. The Second Issue The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. A logical corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegari potest (what has been delegated cannot be delegated). This is based on the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another. [47] In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life, delegation of legislative power to various specialized administrative agencies is allowed as an exception to this principle.[48] Given the volume and variety of interactions in today's society, it is doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws that will deal adequately with and respond promptly to the minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to administrative bodies - the principal agencies tasked to execute laws in their specialized fields - the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and effectuate its policies. All that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that the regulation be not in contradiction to,

but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law. These requirements are denominated as the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.[49] The Court finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards. Although Sec. 34 of the EPIRA merely provides that within one (1) year from the effectivity thereof, a Universal Charge to be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity end-users, and therefore, does not state the specific amount to be paid as Universal Charge, the amount nevertheless is made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the law itself. For one, Sec. 43(b) (ii) of the EPIRA provides: SECTION 43. Functions of the ERC. The ERC shall promote competition, encourage market development, ensure customer choice and penalize abuse of market power in the restructured electricity industry. In appropriate cases, the ERC is authorized to issue cease and desist order after due notice and hearing. Towards this end, it shall be responsible for the following key functions in the restructured industry: xxxx (b) Within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Act, promulgate and enforce, in accordance with law, a National Grid Code and a Distribution Code which shall include, but not limited to the following: xxxx (ii) Financial capability standards for the generating companies, the TRANSCO, distribution utilities and suppliers: Provided, That in the formulation of the financial capability standards, the nature and function of the entity shall be considered: Provided, further, That such standards are set to ensure that the electric power industry participants meet the minimum financial standards to protect the

public interest. Determine, fix, and approve, after due notice and public hearings the universal charge, to be imposed on all electricity end-users pursuant to Section 34 hereof; Moreover, contrary to the petitioners contention, the ERC does not enjoy a wide latitude of discretion in the determination of the Universal Charge. Sec. 51(d) and (e) of the EPIRA[50] clearly provides: SECTION 51. Powers. The PSALM Corp. shall, in the performance of its functions and for the attainment of its objective, have the following powers: xxxx (d) To calculate the amount of the stranded debts and stranded contract costs of NPC which shall form the basis for ERC in the determination of the universal charge; (e) To liquidate the NPC stranded contract costs, utilizing the proceeds from sales and other property contributed to it, including the proceeds from the universal charge. Thus, the law is complete and passes the first test for valid delegation of legislative power. As to the second test, this Court had, in the past, accepted as sufficient standards the following: "interest of law and order;"[51] "adequate and efficient instruction;"[52] "public interest;"[53] "justice and equity;"[54] "public convenience and welfare;"[55] "simplicity, economy and efficiency;"[56] "standardization and regulation of medical education;"[57] and "fair and equitable employment practices."[58] Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others, to ensure the total electrification of the country and the quality, reliability, security and affordability of the supply of electric power[59] and watershed rehabilitation and management[60] meet the requirements for valid delegation, as they provide the limitations on the ERCs power to formulate the IRR. These are sufficient standards. It may be noted that this is not the first time that the ERC's conferred powers were challenged. In Freedom from Debt Coalition v. Energy Regulatory Commission,[61] the Court had occasion to say:

In determining the extent of powers possessed by the ERC, the provisions of the EPIRA must not be read in separate parts. Rather, the law must be read in its entirety, because a statute is passed as a whole, and is animated by one general purpose and intent. Its meaning cannot to be extracted from any single part thereof but from a general consideration of the statute as a whole. Considering the intent of Congress in enacting the EPIRA and reading the statute in its entirety, it is plain to see that the law has expanded the jurisdiction of the regulatory body, the ERC in this case, to enable the latter to implement the reforms sought to be accomplished by the EPIRA. When the legislators decided to broaden the jurisdiction of the ERC, they did not intend to abolish or reduce the powers already conferred upon ERC's predecessors. To sustain the view that the ERC possesses only the powers and functions listed under Section 43 of the EPIRA is to frustrate the objectives of the law. In his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion[62] in the same case, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice, Reynato S. Puno described the immensity of police power in relation to the delegation of powers to the ERC and its regulatory functions over electric power as a vital public utility, to wit: Over the years, however, the range of police power was no longer limited to the preservation of public health, safety and morals, which used to be the primary social interests in earlier times. Police power now requires the State to "assume an affirmative duty to eliminate the excesses and injustices that are the concomitants of an unrestrained industrial economy." Police power is now exerted "to further the public welfare a concept as vast as the good of society itself." Hence, "police power is but another name for the governmental authority to further the welfare of society that is the basic end of all government." When police power is delegated to administrative bodies with regulatory functions, its exercise should be given a wide latitude. Police power takes on an even broader dimension in developing countries such as ours, where the State must take a more active role in balancing the many conflicting interests in society. The Questioned Order was issued by the ERC, acting as an agent of the State in the exercise of police power. We should have exceptionally good grounds to curtail its exercise. This approach is more compelling in the field of rate-regulation of electric power rates. Electric power generation and distribution is a traditional instrument of economic growth that affects not only a few but the entire nation. It is an important factor in encouraging investment and promoting business. The engines of progress may come to a screeching halt if the delivery of electric power is impaired. Billions of pesos would be lost as a result of

power outages or unreliable electric power services. The State thru the ERC should be able to exercise its police power with great flexibility, when the need arises. This was reiterated in National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms v. Energy Regulatory Commission[63] where the Court held that the ERC, as regulator, should have sufficient power to respond in real time to changes wrought by multifarious factors affecting public utilities. From the foregoing disquisitions, we therefore hold that there is no undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC. Petitioners failed to pursue in their Memorandum the contention in the Complaint that the imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-users is oppressive and confiscatory, and amounts to taxation without representation. Hence, such contention is deemed waived or abandoned per Resolution[64] of August 3, 2004. [65] Moreover, the determination of whether or not a tax is excessive, oppressive or confiscatory is an issue which essentially involves questions of fact, and thus, this Court is precluded from reviewing the same.[66] As a penultimate statement, it may be well to recall what this Court said of EPIRA: One of the landmark pieces of legislation enacted by Congress in recent years is the EPIRA. It established a new policy, legal structure and regulatory framework for the electric power industry. The new thrust is to tap private capital for the expansion and improvement of the industry as the large government debt and the highly capital-intensive character of the industry itself have long been acknowledged as the critical constraints to the program. To attract private investment, largely foreign, the jaded structure of the industry had to be addressed. While the generation and transmission sectors were centralized and monopolistic, the distribution side was fragmented with over 130 utilities, mostly small and uneconomic. The pervasive flaws have caused a low utilization of existing generation capacity; extremely high and uncompetitive power rates; poor quality of service to consumers; dismal to forgettable performance of the government power sector; high system losses; and an inability to develop a clear strategy for overcoming these shortcomings. Thus, the EPIRA provides a framework for the restructuring of the industry, including the privatization of the assets of the National Power Corporation (NPC), the transition to a competitive structure, and the delineation of the roles of various

government agencies and the private entities. The law ordains the division of the industry into four (4) distinct sectors, namely: generation, transmission, distribution and supply. Corollarily, the NPC generating plants have to privatized and its transmission business spun off and privatized thereafter.[67] Finally, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative.[68] Indubitably, petitioners failed to overcome this presumption in favor of the EPIRA. We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would warrant a pronouncement that Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and Rule 18 of its IRR are unconstitutional and void. WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. ORDERED. SO

for P5,000 monthly from its sister companies, Consolidated Assembly, Inc. (Consolidated Assembly) and Pair Management and Development Corporation (Pair Management). On January 8, 1998, petitioner requested respondent city government of Caloocan, through respondent Mamerto Manahan, City Assessor and Administrator, to extend tax exemption to the parcels of land claiming that the same were being used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes pursuant to Article VI, Section 28(3) of the 1987 Constitution[2] and other applicable provisions of the Local Government Code. On February 5, 1998, respondent city government, on recommendation of respondent Atty. Nestor Francisco, City Legal Officer, denied the request on the ground that the subject parcels of land were owned by Consolidated Assembly and Pair Management which derived income therefrom in the form of rentals and other local taxes assumed by the petitioner. Hence, from the land owners standpoint, the same were not actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes.[3] On February 15, 1999, the petitioner, on the one hand, and the Consolidated Assembly and Pair Management, on the other, entered into separate agreements [4] which in effect novated their existing contracts of lease on the subject parcels of land and converted them to donations of the beneficial use thereof. On February 19, 1999, the petitioner wrote respondent City Assessor informing the latter of the new agreements and seeking a reconsideration of respondents earlier denial of the application for tax exemption.[5] In this connection, a duly notarized certification[6] jointly issued by Consolidated Assembly and Pair Management to the effect that they no longer received income by way of rentals from the subject properties, accompanied by the corresponding board resolutions,[7] were submitted by the petitioner. Nevertheless, on July 21, 1999, respondent city government again denied the application for tax exemption, reasoning out as follows: Firstly, it may be reasonably implied from the above facts that SYSTEMS COMPUTER COLLEGE is an agency for its sister corporations, particularly, PAIR MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and CONSOLIDATED ASSEMBLY, INC. to evade payment of Real Property Taxes. It bears stress (sic) that immediately after the denial by this Office of the first request of SYSTEMS PLUS COMPUTER COLLEGE for Real Property Tax Exemption of the properties then leased to it by its sister companies; PAIR

THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 146382. August 7, 2003]

SYSTEMS PLUS COMPUTER COLLEGE OF CALOOCAN CITY, petitioner, vs. LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN CITY, MAMERTO MANAHAN, ATTY. NESTOR D. FRANCISCO, as City Assessor and City Legal Officer of Caloocan City, and ADORACION ANGELES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 121. respondents. DECISION CORONA, J.: The instant petition for certiorari assails the Resolution[1] of the respondent Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 121, dated December 29, 1999, dismissing the petition for mandamus in Civil Case No. C-595, and the Order dated February 23, 2000 denying the subsequent motion for reconsideration. Petitioner Systems Plus Computer College is a non-stock and non-profit educational institution organized and established in 1997 with business address at 141-143 10th Avenue, Caloocan City. As such, it enjoys property tax exemption from the local government on its buildings but not on the parcels of land which petitioner is renting

MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and CONSOLIDATED ASSEMBLY, INC., the latter corporations donated the beneficial use of the subject properties to SYSTEMS PLUS COMPUTER COLLEGE, if only to evade payment of Real Property Taxes. The revenue officers, in proper cases, may disregard the separate corporate entity where it serves as a shield for tax evasion. xxx. Secondly, the grant of exemption from taxation rests upon the theory that an exemption will benefit the body of people, and not upon any idea of lessening the burden of individual or corporate owners. Thirdly, while the beneficial use of the properties being sought to be exempt from Real Property Taxes were donated to SYSTEMS PLUS COMPUTER COLLEGE, there is no showing that the same are actually, directly and exclusively used either for religious, charitable, or educational purposes.[8] Twice debunked, petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with the respondent Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 121, which, however, dismissed it for being premature. Its timely motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari[9] imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court when it ruled: (1) that mandamus does not lie against the public respondents and (2) that petitioner failed to exhaust available administrative remedies. Mandamus is defined as a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the act required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office or which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[10] Where administrative remedies are available, a petition for mandamus does not lie.[11] Under Section 226 of RA 7160,[12] the remedy of appeal to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals is available from an adverse ruling or action of the provincial, city or municipal assessor in the assessment of property, thus: Section 226. Local Board of Assessment Appeals. -Any owner or person having legal interest in the property who is not satisfied with the action of the provincial, city or municipal assessor in the assessment of his property may, within sixty (60)

days from the date of receipt of the written notice of assessment, appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals of the province or city by filing a petition under oath in the form prescribed for the purpose, together with copies of the tax declarations and such affidavits or documents submitted in support of the appeal. However, petitioner argues that it is not contesting any assessment made by respondent City Assessor. Petitioners argument obviously proceeds from its misunderstanding of the term assessment. Under Section 199(f), Title II, Book II, of the Local Government Code of 1991, assessment is defined as the act or process of determining the value of a property, or proportion thereof subject to tax, including the discovery, listing, classification and appraisal of properties. Viewed from this broader perspective, the determination made by the respondent City Assessor with regard to the taxability of the subject real properties squarely falls within its power to assess properties for taxation purposes subject to appeal before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals. Petitioner also argues that it is seeking to enforce, through the petition for mandamus, a clear legal right under the Constitution and the pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code granting tax exemption on properties actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes. But petitioner is taking an unwarranted shortcut. The argument gratuitously presumes the existence of the fact which it must first prove by competent and sufficient evidence before the City Assessor. It must be stressed that the authority to receive evidence, as basis for classification of properties for taxation, is legally vested on the respondent City Assessor whose action is appealable to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals, if necessary. The petitioner cannot bypass the authority of the concerned administrative agencies and directly seek redress from the courts even on the pretext of raising a supposedly pure question of law without violating the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Hence, when the law provides for remedies against the action of an administrative board, body, or officer, as in the case at bar, relief to the courts can be made only after exhausting all remedies provided therein.[13] Otherwise stated, before seeking the intervention of the courts, it is a precondition that petitioner should first avail of all the means afforded by the administrative processes.[14] Besides, mandamus does not lie against the respondent City Assessor in the exercise of his function of assessing properties for taxation purposes. While its duty to conduct assessments is a ministerial function, the actual exercise thereof is necessarily discretionary. Well-settled is the rule that mandamus may not be availed

of to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way, or to retract or reverse an action already taken in the exercise of either.[15] WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.