Power Parity, Preponderance, and War between Great Powers, 1816-1989 Author(s): William Moul Source: The Journal

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Power Parity,Preponderance,and War between Great Powers, 1816-1989

WILLIAMMOUL
Departmentof Political Science Universityof Waterloo,Ontario

Empiricalstudyhas wornessentialtheoreticaledges fromthe powertransition theoryandrivalbalanceof-powertheories,leaving a misshapenquestion:does parityin quantitative powercapabilitiesof opposing individualstatesdiscourageor encouragewarbetween those two states?Distortionsof boththeoryandevidence-mixing balancesof power with balancesof terror;overlookingpolitical geography,political incapacity, and alliance formations;and confining observationsto state-dyads-render the evidence poor and weak. Whenthe distortionsareremoved,the very strongevidence is thatapproximate parityin powercapabilities encouragedwar between greatpower disputantsbetween 1816 and 1989.

Keywords: power parity; war; peace; great powers

Empirical studyhas worn essential theoreticaledges from the power transitiontheory andrivalbalance-of-powertheories,leaving a misshapenquestion:does parityin powercapabilitiesof opposing individualstatesdiscourageor encourage quantitative warbetweenthose two states?The majortheoreticaldistortionis the exclusion of alliance formationsand,consequently,the balanceof powerof opposingsides. Whatever the balance-of-powertheory,it connects assessments of power, complicatedby alliances andthe possibilitiesof alliance,to warorpeace betweenthe opposingsides (e.g., Morgenthau1967). So also does the power transitiontheory:Organski(1968, 370) of arguesthatthe preponderance the satisfiedmaintainspeace, and"waris most likely the the power of the dissatisfiedchallengerand its allies begins to approximate when of those who supportthe statusquo."Nevertheless,his first test of his theory power theoriesomits the weight thatallianceformationscould add againstbalance-of-power because counting coalition wars as if they were individualwars between individual statesyields morewarsfor analysis(OrganskiandKugler1980,46). This workset the for tests of the powertransition concerningwarsbetween argument pattern subsequent
AUTHOR'S NOTE:Thanksto TrudyMoul's keen editorialeye, this article is far better.Withoutthe workof the Correlates Warproject,directedby David Singer,I could do verylittle. All dataused areavailof able at www.yale.edu/unsy/jcr/jcrdata.htm. 2003468-489 JOURNAL CONFLICT OF Vol. RESOLUTION, 47 No.4, August DOI:10.1177/0022002703252980 ? 2003SagePublications 468

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greatpowers.1All examinegreatpowerdyadsover lengthytime intervalsas if politics among stateswere within autonomouspairsof states.All presumegreatpowersto be nonterritorial thatgeopolitical position and distanceare unimportant. presume so All that political capacity to use the tallied power capabilities is the same for all great power governments.Finally, the variousestimates of power capabilitiesused to test the powertransition rivalbalance-of-power theoriespass overfundamental differand The ences between balancesof both power andterror.2 differencesin power capabilities indices, aboutwhich therehas been controversy, minorcomparedto the distorare tions introduced by not qualifying the quantitativeindex with consideration of alliances,politicalgeography, politicalincapacity,andmutuallyassureddestruction. The first partof this articleshows thatthe distortionsof both theory and evidence renderpoor and weak supportnot only for the power transitionbut also against the commonbalanceof power.The second partshows, when the distortionsareremoved, that approximateparity in power capabilitiesencouragedwar between great power disputantsduringthe period from 1816 to 1989.

POOR AND WEAK EVIDENCE Table1 describesresultsfromthe firsttest of the powertransition theoryandresults from the firstreanalysisusing an index of powercapabilitiesotherthangross national product(GNP). Organskiand Kugler (1980) find no supportfor the power parityto war propositionwhen they examine great power "total"war duringthe period from 1860 to 1975, whereasHouwelingandSiccama(1988) find modestsupportwhen they examine approximatelytwice the numberof great power wars over a longer time period. Given the then unavailabilityof GNP estimates for all great powers before 1860 and no estimatesat all for Austriaor Austria-Hungary, choice of GNP as the the index severely limits Organski and Kugler's analysis. Their stipulation that the War (1870) and the Russo-JapaneseWar (1904) were "total"also Franco-Prussian limits their analysis.
1. During the period from 1816 to 1989, the greatpowers were the United Kingdom (UK); France (FR), 1816-1940,1945-1989; Prussia(PRU)-after 1870, Germany(GER), 1816-1918, 1925-1945;Russia (RUS)-after 1921, the USSR, 1816-1917, 1922-1989; Austria(AUS)-after 1866, Austria-Hungary (AH), 1816-1918; Italy (IT), 1860-1943; Japan(JP), 1895-1945; the United States (USA), 1899-1989; and China (CHN), 1950-1989 (Small and Singer 1982, Table2.1). 2. Morgenthau's (1964) positionon the differencebetweena balanceof poweranda balanceof terror is straightforward. He Organski's(1968,337) statedpositionis difficultto understand. is benton an effortto dismiss the existence of nucleardeterrence: that "agreed nuclearweaponscan spreaddeath,agreedthatthey can spreadterror, is still doubtfulthattheyhavecreateddeterrence." it and Organski Kugler(1980, 177) conclude, in cases of superpowerconflict, that if a contestantis weak on the spot wherefightingis to be done, chancesarethat,whateverits statusin termsof nucleararmaments, will lose.... Winnershave been [those]thatcould win withoutturnit ing to nuclearweapons... the victorwas the countrythatcould win withoutescalatingthe dispute[to war and to nuclearexchanges]. Wouldit not make sense to say simply thatone reasonnot to escalate to warwhen mutualdestructionis assuredwould be to avoid assurednucleardestruction? so, thatwould be nucleardeterrenceand a "balance If of terror"?

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JOURNALOF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

The panels in Table 1 tally the (approximately) 20-year-wideintervalsof the ratio of powercapabilitiesof each greatpowerto each othergreatpower.An "equal" interval is one in which the ratio falls between 0.80 and 1.20 for most of the years. If one state appearedto have overtakenanother,the intervalwould be "equal,overtaking," even if the decidedly inferiorstate appearedto shoot beyond the once superiorone muchof the time).Thereare 126 observations theperiodfrom 1860 for (i.e., "unequal" to 1975, which is more thanthe 119 countedfor the longer periodfrom 1820 to 1975 (bottomhalf of Table 1) because Organskiand Kugler (1980) put Japanamong the greatpowers in the 1945 to 1975 period. More idiosyncratically, they also put Japan the "contenders"-those thatcould shootto the top-immediately afterWorld among WarII. Only amongthe contendersdo OrganskiandKuglerfind strongsupportfor the in powertransition theory.The strengthof thatrelationship, largepart,dependson the United States-Japanand USSR-Japanpairs after 1945.3 of As two ardent proponents thattheorymakeclear,"itis paritythatis... of theoret.. ical importance .[and]it wouldhavebeen betterif PowerTransition Theoryhadbeen namedPower ParityTheory"(Lemke and Kugler 1996, 12). The paritycategoriesin and Table 1-"equal, no overtaking" "equal,overtaking"-account for 6 of 19 or 32% and 16 of 33 or 48% of the wars (lower). The numberscould supof the wars (upper) argumentand the contraryargument.Unequal great port the parity-encourages-war one-halfof the warscounted,muchas balance-of-power powersfoughtapproximately thinkerssuggestwouldhappenif the weakerdo not acttogetherto oppose the stronger. The evidence in support of the power transitiontheory is no stronger in later in reanalysesthataresummarized Table2. Onereasonthe evidenceis pooris thatthere were 9 warswith a greatpoweron each side duringthe periodfrom 1816 to 1975, not 19 or 33 or 34.4Anotheris thatstatesformedalliancesto alterthe balanceof power,but allianceformationsarenot examined.Two-by-twoobservationsof greatpowersmake assessment of alliance commitmentsdifficult (Moul 2002b). Kim's studies (1989, 1991, 1996) of internaland "external" power capabilitiesillustratethis. Kim gauges the balance of power composed of a state's own resourcesand some fractionof the resourcesof those statesthatwould preferit to some otherstate.Following Bueno de Mesquita(1981, 109-18), the preferencesare measuredby the similarityof the allianceportfolioof one stateto allianceportfoliosof others,indicatedby taub correlation coefficients.If the coefficientwere 1.0-indicating identicalalliancecommitmentsthen the power capabilitiesof each state would be addedto those of the other.When less than 1.0, taub is the fractionof A's capabilitiesthatB could counton or the likelihood of B contributing power capabilitiesto A. to Threethingsareimportant note.First,Kim's (1989, 1991, 1996) studiesareinnovative because they are the only tests of the power transition to attempt to test
3. Organskiand Kugler(1980), Houweling and Siccama (1988, 1991, 1996), Lemke (1996), and de Soysa, Oneal, and Park(1997) use tau c coefficient to measurethe strengthof the relationship.The coeffiof cient has no good simple interpretation a presumedmonotonerelationship(Freeman1986, 60-61). More to to thereis no consistentorderfrom"unequal" "equal,no overtaking" "equalwith overtakfundamentally, but is "unequal" less equalthan"equal," "equal,no ing" as theremustbe to gauge a monotonerelationship: is overtaking" not less equal than "equalwith overtaking." 4. The differencebetween 33 and 34 wars is the USSR-Japanwar at Changkufengin 1938, which is included in Small and Singer (1982) and not earlierversions of the data set.

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TABLE 1

Balances of Power and Incidentsof War:GreatPower Pairs, 1816-1975

Unequal War 1860-1975 (Organskiand Kugler 1980) No Yes Total 1816-1975 (Houweling and Siccama 1988) No Yes Total n % Equal, No Overtaking n % Equal, Overtaking n % Total

81 13 94 58 17 75

13.8 100.0

11 0 11 14 4 18

0.0 100.0

15 6 21 14 12 26

28.6 100.0

107 19 126 86 33 119

22.7 100.0

22.2 100.0

46.1 100.0

NOTE:For 1860-1975 (Organskiand Kugler 1980, Table 1.4), powercapabilitiesaremeasuredwith gross nationalproduct,and time intervalsare 1860-1880, 1880-1900, 1900-1913, 1920-1939, 1945-1955, and 1955-1975. Austria (AUS, later Austria-Hungary [A-H]) is excluded because of missing data. Included great powers: Russia (RUS), later the USSR; the United Kingdom (UK); Prussia(PRU), later Germany (GER);France(FR); Italy (IT); Japan(JP);United States (USA); and China(CHN). After 1945, Germany and Japanare also included.For 1816-1975 (Houweling and Siccama 1988), power capabilitiesare measured with the Doran and Parsons(1980) index, and the time intervalsare 1816-1835, 1836-1855, 18561875, 1876-1895, 1896-1914, 1920-1939, 1946-1965, and 1966-1975. TABLE2

FurtherBalances of Power and Incidentsof War:GreatPower Pairs, 1820-1975

Unequal War Correlatesof Warcomposite capabilitiesindex No Yes Total Gross domestic product No Yes Total n % Equal, No Overtaking n % Equal, Overtaking n % Total

52 13 65 52 17 69

20.0 100.0

14 7 21 16 4 20

33.3 100.0

19 14 33 17 13 30

42.4 100.0

85 34 119 85 34 119

24.6 100.0

20.0 100.0

33.3 100.0

NOTE:In the firstmeasureof power capabilities,de Soysa, Oneal,and Park(1997, Table5) use the Correlates of Warcomposite capabilitiesindex (Bremer1980); time intervalsas in Table 1, save 1820-1835, not 1816-1835. The othermeasureof powercapabilitiesis gross domesticproduct(Maddison1995);time intervals as above.

Organski'sbasic argumentaboutwarbetween opposing allies. Second, as Kim notes (i.e., 1996, 105), the observationsof dyads with alliancesincludedmakethe observations more interdependentthan they already are. Misinformationis obtained by repeatedobservationsof the same war.Withoutalliances, the GreatWarpairsfall in differentcells; with alliances, the pairs could all fall redundantly, perhapsmislead-

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JOURNALOF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

ingly, into one cell. Countingeach pairof allied versus centralpowers as if each pair had fought in differentwars is misleadingbecause they did not fight differentwars. betweenstateallianceportfolios,little is knownof the Third,whateverthe relationship of general alliance agreements,and nothing is known of the particulars any alliance agreement. The extremecases sow sufficientdoubtregardingthe validity of the similarityof the alliance portfolio measurementprocedure.5 two states were to have a defense If alliance and no otheralliancepartners, value of taub, the coefficient used to meathe surepreferenceof one for the other,would be 1.0. Accordingly,the power capability shareswould be addedtogether.If the two stateswere to have a neutralityagreement and no otheralliance partners, value of tau b would be 1.0. The power capability the shareswouldbe addedtogether.If the two wereto haveanententeandno otheralliance the partners, tau b would be the identical 1.0. The power capabilityshareswould be addedtogether.Whateverthe alliance-an agreementto combine resourcesto fight, standaside should therebe a fight, or consult-we would know nothingof the casus foederis and nothingof the crucialparticulars. Inattention politicalgeography, to to particularly geopoliticalbuffersand,if no barto distancesbetween statesis anothersource of poor evidence in Tables 1 and 2. rier, Arithmeticallyequal great powers separatedfrom one anotherby anotherstate or states-such as Austria-Hungary Japanand also Italy and Japanduring 1895and The 1914-are takento be equal,if not equal,withJapanovertaking. firstpairprovides and poor evidence favorableto the power transitiontheorybecause Austria-Hungary Japanwereon opposingsides in 1914 withoutexchangingblows. The secondprovides becauseJapanandItalyendedup on the same side in poorevidencethatis unfavorable the GreatWar. Franceand Russia, separatedby Prussia(laterGermany),are Nineteenth-century takento havebeen equalsif theywereto meet in war.Whatappears possible in Tables1 and2 was not possible on the groundunless a defense alliancewith Prussia(Germany) hadturneda barrier a conduit.Any good assessmentof Germany'sfightingpower into shouldtakeinto accountGermany's centralposition.Any good assessmentof Russia's should considerthe vast distances,the primitiveroad and rail networks,and position the ferocious climate. Accordingly,what appearsin the tables to be war between the very much unequalRussia and Japanwas not so on the groundor at sea because both Russian and Japaneseofficials did consider the weatherand the distances. Generals Distance and Winter,with Russia in Europe,were with Japanin 1904 in East Asia. The last sourceof poor evidence is inattention the political incapacityto use the to counted.The simple countwronglyputsFrancesuperiorto Prussia powercapabilities at Prussia'sdefeatof FranceandputsRussiasuperior JapanatJapan'sdefeatof Rusto sia. Furthermore, massive civil unrulinessin Franceand in Russia followed defeat so thatresourcesused to fight enemies inside were not availableto fight enemies outside. Similarly,resourcesto fight one statewouldnot be availableto fight anotherstate.The presumptionthat each pair in the two world wars fought a duel unconnectedto any
5. Bueno de Mesquitastates thathe does not thinkthatthese possibilities upset the analyses thathe reports(Bueno de Mesquita 1981, 116-17; personalcommunication,September22, 1997).

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other 1914-1918 or 1939-1945 warfare,includingits own duels with anotherstate, is critical.The pairsformedby splittingup the worldwarsarein the majorityof the pairs in Tables 1 and 2. Anotherexample of inattentionto political incapacityis sufficientto cause further uneasewith some of the numbersin the tables.Accordingto one of the two indices that include military personnel and military expenditures,there was a power transition between the USSR and Germanybetween 1925, when Germanyrejoined the great powerranks,and 1938, shortlybefore GermanyattackedPolandand began what was to become WorldWarII. Germanygave way to the USSR accordingto one index (Doran and Parsons 1980; Houweling and Siccama 1988). According to a second index (Singer,Bremer,and Stuckey 1972; Geller 1996, Figure 8.1), there was rough equality and no overtaking.What both overlook, but what actors at the time did not overlook, was Stalin's destructionof the Red Army officer corps in 1936 and the USSR's wars with Japanin 1938 and 1939. Unless we adjustthe numbersof military personneland the amountsof militaryexpenditurefor political incapacityto use the men and monies, the numberswill mislead. Related considerationsare that warfare altersbalancesof power,andpeacetimeestimatesof powercapabilitiesneed not correspond to balances of power well into the fighting. For example, balances of power among Europeangreatpowers in 1941 after2 years of war in Europeand with Japan after4 yearsof warin Asia shouldnot be assessedby the ratiosof powercapabilitiesin 1938 because this makesfor poor evidence. Such evidence constitutesmorethanonethirdof the observationsof war countedin Tables 1 and 2.6 Examine Table 3. Considerpolitical incapacityto use the resourcescounted and evidence of "a powerful and parsimonioustool for anticipatingthe initiationof wars between [greatpower]contenders" be seen there(LemkeandWerner1996,258; cf. to if Lemke2002). Apparently, a pairwas roughlyequalin powercapabilitiesandone of them was committedto change the statusquo, the odds of war would be seven times greaterthanif no powerparityand/orno commitmentto changethe statusquo existed. LemkeandWerner(1996) gauge commitmentto changethe statusquo with extraordinaryincreasesin militaryexpenditures.They take care to discounttimes of domestic and interstatewarfare,when increasesneed not tell of commitmentto change the status quo. They do not discountthe balancesof power in times of domestic warfareor war with a state otherthanthe one in the pair observed. The two observations Table3 of warandnojoint parity,as well as commitmentto in the statusquo, arethe United Kingdomand Russia in 1854 and the USSR and change Germanyin 1941. In the former,the powerdisparity(on paper,not in andon the Black Sea) was much largerthanit would appearto be: Russia's enemies, in additionto the UnitedKingdom,were the OttomanEmpireandFrance.In the latter,as mentioned,the ratio of power capabilitiesat the time of the Munichcrisis (1938), the actualnumber used here,does not describeadequatelythe positionof Germanyandthe USSR shortly beforeOperation Barbarossa yearslater.The threeobservations Table3 of warand 3 in
6. IT/A-H, 1915; IT/GER, 1915; USA/GER, 1917; USA/A-H, 1917; UK/IT, 1940; FR/IT, 1940; GER/USSR, 1941; USA/JP, 1941; USA/GER, 1941; USA/IT, 1941; USSR/IT, 1941; UK/JP,1941.

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RESOLUTION JOURNALOF CONFLICT

TABLE3

Power Parity,Commitmentto Change, and War: GreatPower "Contender" Dyads, 1820-1980

to Power Parityand Commitment Change? War No Yes Total Yes 5 3 8 No 23 2 25 Total 28 5 33

SOURCE:Lemke andWerner(1996, Table 12); balanceof power assessed with Correlatesof Warproject capabilitiesindex (Bremer 1980). NOTE:q = 0.35; 2 = 0.12; odds ratio = 6.9.

Kingdomand parity,plus commitmentto change the statusquo, areGermany/United Germany/Russiain 1914 and Germany/UnitedKingdom in 1939. To measure the in powerpositionof Germany 1914 relativeto each of the UnitedKingdomandRussia, with each measurement ignoringthe othergreatpower andwith each ignoringFrance To and an alliance combinationaroundGermany,is to measureimproperly. increase the numberof war observationsby dividing the world wars into easternand western fronts,as if one fronthadnothingto do withthe other,is also to measureimproperly. When Lemke (2002) extends the power transitiontheory to nongreatpowers in local interstatehierarchies,he attends to variationsin political capacity to use the resourcescountedandpolitical geography.A local hierarchyis a set of state-dyadsin which each state"hasthe abilityto exertmilitaryinfluencewithinthe other'sterritory" per(Lemke2002, 71). Elsewhere,Lemke arguesthe meritsof his multiplehierarchy spectivefor explaininggreatpowerwarsgenerally.Indeed,findingsfor all greatpower in wars,as reproduced Table 1 (i.e., HouwelingandSiccama 1988), encouragedthinkThe SevenWeeksWar,for instance,could be seen as "a ing aboutmultiplehierarchies. war between membersof the CentralEuropeanlocal hierarchy" (Lemke 1996, 90). WhenItalywas simply a geographicalexpression,the Warof ItalianUnificationwas a war between the dominantand challenger great powers of the region. The RussoJapaneseWar and USSR-Japanesewars in the 1930s were wars over which great power would dominateNortheastAsia. These wars are not examined. in Lemke and Werner(1996) include Austria (and Austria-Hungary) the great power ranks but exclude the Seven Weeks War and the War of Italian Unification for becauseAustriawas not amongthe "contenders" top place. In theiranalysisof "all [greatpower] dyads,"Lemke and Wernerkeep to wars involving the dominantgreat power.(Dependingon the measureof powercapabilitiesused, such greatpower wars include or exclude the Russo-JapaneseWar in 1904 and the Russia-Austriawar in from the great 1914.) Later,Lemke (2002) excludes Austria(and Austria-Hungary) laterthe USSR, to Europebecausehe stipulatesthat powerranksandconfines Russia, a state is in but one regionalhierarchyeven thoughit competedand fought in several

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and regions.7This decision appearsarbitrary is unnecessarilyrestrictive.The evidence to follow drawsin all greatpower versus greatpower wars since 1816.

GOOD AND STRONG EVIDENCE measureof power capabilitiesis a modificationof the Correlates The quantitative of Warprojectcomposite capabilityindex (Bremer 1980). Before WorldWarII, it is the averageof the percentagesharesheld by one greatpowerof the numbersof military personnel, the amounts of military expenditures,iron produced, energy consumed (after 1860), and steel produced(after 1880) held by all great powers (Moul 1989). industrial the Oneal(1989) demonstrates limitationsof counting 19th-century production and consumptionto gauge late 20th-centuryindustrialmight. Therefore,estimates of gross domestic product(GDP), which he favors,substitutefor iron and steel productionand energyconsumptionafterWorldWarII.8The averageannualpercentage shareof variouspower capabilitiesis the greatpower's power capabilitiesindex value; the balanceof power between greatpowers is the averageratio of the stronger side to the weakerin any year and the 2 previousyears. (If the year in questionwas a The sides arethe opposing waryear,the averageof the previous2 yearsis substituted.) sides in all serious (or militarized)disputesbetween greatpowers duringthe periods 1816-1939 and 1946-1989 (Jones,Bremer,andSinger 1996).9The capabilitysharesof great powers on the same side are added together. Sides are judged to have been roughly equal if the ratio of power capabilitiesheld by the side with more versus the side with less is less thanor equalto 1.5 and if qualificationsto the powercapabilities values do not push the ratiobeyond 1.5. Examiningdisputesinsteadof time intervals allows the quantitative powercapabilitiesto be qualifiedproperlyso as to increasethe of assessmentsof parityorpreponderance. evidence is assessed validity (Longitudinal elsewhere [Moul 2002a].) Assessments of the outcomeof war,madeby sides to a dispute should a disputeescalate to war,arebasic to balance-of-powerandpower transition theories.As faras I can tell, the qualifiednumbersdo correspond, roughlyequalor with what those at the time judged to be so. unequal, When the numbersare unqualified,as in Table4, the relationshipbetween rough parityandthe escalationto warof disputesbetweengreatpowersis very weak. In onethirdof the 185 disputesidentifiedbetween 1816 and 1989, the opposing sides were roughly equal. Fourof those 59 disputes-6.7%-ended in war:in 1859, the Warof
7. Lemke (2002, 146-60) does consider great power interferencein local hierarchiesbut not war between greatpowers there. 8. The results using this (unqualified)index are much the same as those in other reanalyses of Organskiand Kugler(1980) reportedin Tables 1 and 2. 9. Because all disputeswith a greatpoweron both sides are included,thereis no selection bias in the sense of the words.History,as it were, did "select"seriousdisputesandleft aside otherconflicts of ordinary interestthat could be relevantto assessing whetherpower parityor preponderance keeps peace. With no plainway to definethe relevantpopulationof eventsandnonevents,thereis no way to gauge anybias (Achen and Snidal 1989). On the other hand, one could examine relationsamong all the great powers that had a to geopoliticalopportunity warovertime, no matterif therewere disputesor nondisputes.The findingsfrom the longitudinalstudy(Moul 2002a) aremuchthe sameas foundhere.The questionof why some conflicts of interestbecame serious disputes remains.

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JOURNALOF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

TABLE4

Balances of Power and Dispute Outcome: All GreatPower versus GreatPower Disputes, 1816-1989
Outcome GreatPower CapabilitiesRatio Equal (less thanor equal to 1.5) Unequal (greaterthan 1.5) Total NOTE: ) = 0.06; (2 = 0.004; odds ratio = 1.8. War 4 5 9 Peace 55 121 176 Total 59 126 185

ItalianUnification;in 1870, the Franco-Prussian War;in 1914, WorldWarI; and in 1939,WorldWarII. If the sides wereroughlyequalin power,a disputewas 1.8 times as likely to escalate to war than if the sides were very much unbalancedor unequal; )2 indicatesa minuterelationship. The strengthof the relationshipincreases with the qualificationsto the index of power capabilities.The first qualificationconcerns the 47 disputes when each side held a secure second-strikenuclearcapability;thereby,assessmentsof the balanceof Shortof war,the courseof anyof powerwere madein the shadowof a balanceof terror. the 47 disputes might depend on the assessments made of conventionalforce (e.g., Geller 1990). However,both power parityand preponderance proponentsagree that those involved,whateverthe balanceof power,would have been determinedto avoid war with the likelihood of mutuallyassureddestruction.Therefore,Table 5 keeps to the 138 disputes about which theoreticalexpectationsdiffer because the truly catastrophicconsequence was not in plain sight. Aside from two disputes between the USSR and the United Kingdom (1965 and 1967), all those excluded are disputes between the United States andthe USSR thatoccurredbetween 1960 and 1989 or the USSR andChinabetween 1975 and 1989. In morecases thannot,thebalancesof terror coincided with and overshadowedapparently roughly equal U.S.-USSR balances in power capabilitiesand rough paritybetween the United States versus the USSR and China.This is why the resultingstatisticalassociations,althoughlargerthanthose in Table4, areweak: ()2increasestenfold from minuteto a very slight 0.03, andthe odds ratio doubles to 3.7. Stateswith nuclear-tipped but long-rangeballistic missiles were not separated, the balancesof power in Table5 includegeographicallyseparated opposing sides. Political geographystructures and opportunities risks if a state is willing to fight, and alliances andtechnologycan alterpolitical geography(Most and Starr1989; Moul 1988, sides to a disputewere separated 250-52). Before long-rangebomberaircraft, whereby none on side A was contiguous(by land)with one on side B, andtherewas no operative defense alliance to connect otherwise noncontiguousopponents (Small and Singer 1969). Treatytexts mustbe examinedin contextbecause not all defense alliancesthat might appearto have been operativewere so. For instance,the USSR andCzechoslovakiamaintained defense alliancein 1936 andagreedthatthe militaryassistanceproa visions dependedon the provisionthatFrance,also in a defense alliancewith Czecho-

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TABLE5

Balances of Power and Dispute Outcome:Balances of Terror Excluded, GreatPower versus GreatPower Disputes, 1816-1989
Outcome GreatPower CapabilitiesRatio Equal (less thanor equal to 1.5) Unequal (greaterthan 1.5) Total War 4 5 9 Peace 23 106 129 Total 27 111 138

NOTE: b= 0.16; 2 = 0.03; odds ratio= 3.7. Excludeddisputesareas follows: all (37) from 1960 with USA and USSR on opposing sides; USSR/UK, 1965, 1967; USSR/CHN, 1974 (2), 1977, 1978 (2), 1979, 1980, 1986. See Table 1 for definitionsof abbreviations.

slovakiaandin anotherwith the USSR, lent assistanceto the attacked party.In turn,the Franco-USSRalliance, neverratifiedin the FrenchAssembly, providedassistanceif one or the other'shome territorywere attackedby a thirdstate. The net effect was to keep the 1936, USSR-Germanydispute bilateraland, thereby,among the separated cases (Hochman 1984, chap. 3). of An imperialterritory one greatpowerthatadjoinsanothergreatpowerconnected otherwisenoncontiguoussides. After 1895, the RussianandJapaneseempiresmet in and China,Manchuria, Siberia,as well as on Sakhalinand the Koreanpeninsula.The United Kingdom and the United States were connected indirectly along Canada's southernborder,ChinaandFrancewere connectedindirectlyat Indochina,andChina andthe United Kingdomwere connectedindirectlyat Hong Kong.In the relevantdisputes, the United States and China could use the power capabilitiestallied, but the United Kingdom, one ocean removedfrom the formerand, like France,two oceans removedfrom the latter,could not (cf. Lemke 2002, 150-51). Noncontiguousmetropolitan greatpowers were not put within reach of one anotherif peripheralimperial possessions of each were contiguous (Diehl 1985; Bremer 1992; Vasquez 1996; Senese 1999). For example, the pre-1914 German and British empires abuttedin connectiondid not alterthe assessAfricaandin New Guinea.However,theperipheral wereto war.The peripheral mentsof the outcomeif the UnitedKingdomandGermany connections did lead to conflicts of interestbut, whateverthe political geographyin defensivebarrier Africaor on New Guinea,the NorthSea remaineda substantial sepathe two greatpowers. Blind to political geography,the power capabilityindex rating grossly overestimatesGermanyin the balance with the United Kingdom. With no of 2001) or thatBritannia, appreciation the "stoppingpower of water"(Mearsheimer with navalresourcesfar greaterthanall its continentalenemies put together,did rule balanceappearsonly to have been level in the waves, the United Kingdom-Germany
1899.10
10. The disputesbetweennoncontiguousgreatpowerswhose overseasempirestouchedone another, excluded from Table 6, involved the United Kingdom. As is the case in the 1899, UK/GER dispute, the powercapabilityratiosmislead.If one were to includedisputesbetweennoncontiguousgreatpowerswhose and overseas empirestouchedone anotherand to weigh, as one must, the sea barrier Britishdominanceat

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The watersthat separatedthe United Kingdomfrom the continentput continental greatpowerswithinits reach.We mustattendto the stoppingpowerof water,the reach of sea power,andthe limits to thatreachat shoreline.1' Because of the stoppingpower of waterandthe limits of unassistedsea poweron land-incommensurable landpower andsea power-I considerdisputesbetweenthe UnitedKingdom,withouta continental ally, anda European sides. As greatpowerto havebeen disputesbetween separated Palmerston,Britishforeign secretaryfor most of the periodbetween 1816 and 1851, remarked,"Englandcannot alone carryher points on the Continent;she must have allies as instruments workwith"(Bartlett1979, 156). "Wearefish,"declareda later to foreign secretary(Clayton 1974, 186). Because of both the reachof sea powerandthe limits of sea powerat the shoreline,disputesbetweenthe United KingdomandRussia involvingthe OttomanEmpire,the decline of which prompted"theeasternquestion" (who would gain as the "sick man" at Constantinoplegrew worse), requirespecial attention. Threedisputes-in 1836, 1878, and 1853-illustrate my generalprocedure. The seizureof the British ship Vixenby Russiannavalforces blockadingthe coast a of Circassiain the easternBlack Sea prompted "sharp burstof Russophobia" 1836 in (Anderson1970, 93). Russophobiawas one thing. It would be "another thing to take hostile steps ... where, from local andgeographicalcircumstances,thereis no means of enforcingthe opinion of England"(Lobanov-Rostovsky1954, 111). The local and geographicalcircumstanceswere passageto the Black Sea throughthe Turkishstraits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorous and thence to Russia. Warshipswere not allowed passage by ancientrule, interstateagreement,and Ottomanstrengthat Constantinople.In 1836, the Treatyof UnkiarSkelessi committedthe OttomanEmpireto close the Straitsto non-Russianwarshipsin the event of Russia being at war.Separation, therefore,was a mix of the geographicaland the political. Warin Occasionally,as in the peculiarsituationat the close of the Russo-Turkish 1878, passage throughthe Straitscould be forced againstancientrule, treaty,and the sultan'sprohibition.This 1878 case, the second of the threeillustrations,is a troublesome one. "Warseemed to hang on a thread"(Dawson 1971, 123) when the British navy and the Russian armyapproached Constantinople early in the year. Russia was exhaustedin victory,andwith Ottomandefeat,the sultancould not enforcehis refusal to permitBritishentryinto the Straits.I take the United Kingdomand Russia to have in been separated the disputesjust priorto this Russo-Turkish andnot separated war at its end in January1878, when they were within cannon shot. In 1853, duringthe preludeto anotherRusso-Turkish the sides to the disputewar, because the United Kingdom,France,andAustriaversusRussia-were not separated Austria and Russia were contiguous. As the Russo-Turkishconflict deepened, the UnitedKingdomandFrance,atthe sultan'srequest,movednavalforces fromthe Mediterranean side of the Straitsto Constantinople. The Russiandestructionof the Ottomanfleet led to the entryof the BritishandFrenchfleets to the Black Sea with instrucsea, the numericalresults would be much the same as those in Table 6. The additionaldisputes would be cases of unequalsides and no war.Otherstudiesof greatpowerdisputesdo not define contiguousstatesby contiguityof overseas imperialpossessions. 11. The usual measureof contiguity-land borderor less than 150 miles over water (Bremer 1992; Vasquez 1996; Senese 1999)-misses this entirely (cf. Lemke 2002).

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tions decidedly favorable to Turkish interests. Later, in March 1854, the United Kingdom,France,and the OttomanEmpireformeda defense alliance againstRussia. This alliance kept the opposing sides in the nonseparated category afterthe Austrian secured its interestsby threateningto fight, chose to not fight a government,having warin which Austriawould supplythe principalbattlefield.Hence, the warwas fought in the Crimea,a place where sea power could confrontland power. sides areexcluded(see Table6), the odds ratiois 4.0 andthe (2 Whenthe separated is 0.04, much the same as the values found when the separatedsides were included. The numberssuggest erroneouslylittle importanceto geopoliticalbuffersbecause no greatpower versus greatpower war occurredwhere the sides were separated. Usually, nonseparated opponentsare close to one another,and there is no call to adjustthe ratiosof power capabilitiesaccordingto the distanceto be traveledif there are were to be war.The cases in which adjustments requiredmake a considerabledifference to the relationshipbetween balances of power and escalation of serious disputesto war.CompareTables6 and7. The (2 in the latteris 0.23 in comparisonwith the for 0.04 when calculatedwith no adjustment loss of strengthover long distances.The is in the oddsratiois as dramatic: from4 to 22. This improvement the resultof a change decrease in the numberof apparentlyroughly equal cases and, more so, of the shift of two previously unequal disputes that ended in war to the roughly equal side of the cross-tabulation. The shifts from roughly equal to unequalmerit little attention. ratiosthattake no accountof the stoppingpower of an ocean, such Balance-of-power the as ratiosof the United Statesto Europeangreatpowersregarding Alaskanboundand the blockade of Venezuela,are wrong (cf. Lemke 2002, 150-51). ary Oneof the threecases of unequalto roughlyequalin Table7-1830, Prussia,Russia/ France-is discussedlater.Here,the two changesto roughlyequalthatmeritattention areRussianwarsat the edges of the tsar'sempire.Withouttakinginto accountthe lossof-strengthgradients,the balance-of-powercapabilitiesratio in 1853 (United Kingis dom, France,Austria/Russia) 2.8 againstRussia.Withthe loss of strengthaccording to the modified Bueno de Mesquita (1981) formula,the ratio reduces to 1.2 against Russia.12 The high transportation costs within Russia-"at every step ... corpses of men and horses who had fallen on the way to Sevastopol"(EncylopaediaBritannica 1910-1911, vol. 23, 453)-would raise that number.The high costs to the invaders, wrackedby disease andexhaustedaftershortmarches,would lower it. Althoughsuch arithmeticis crude and arbitrary, result of roughly equal instead of unequaldoes the accordwith historicalandcontemporary accountsof the situationin 1853 and 1854 in the Black Sea area. WithoutGeneralDistance, the balance-of-powercapabilitiesratio favoredRussia over Japanby a wide marginin 1903 and 1904. Adjustedfor distance,the balance of
12. In his "adhoc andadmittedlycrude"formula,Bueno de Mesquita(1981, 107) posits thatmilitary forces traveled250 miles perday in the periodbetween 1816 and 1918,375 miles perday between 1919 and 1945, and 500 miles per day after 1945. Halves of those daily distances are more reasonable(cf. Lemke 2002, 67-81). Validityof the result of the formuladepends on correspondencewith reasonableestimates madeby those atthe time. Bueno de Mesquitacomposes andcalibrateshis formulawith sharesof the Correlates of Warpower capabilitiesfor all states, notjust the sharesfor the greatpowers and historians'assessments of rough equality before the Russo-JapaneseWarin 1904.

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TABLE6

Balances of Power and Dispute Outcome:Balances of Terror Excluded, NonseparatedSides, GreatPower versus GreatPower Disputes, 1816-1989
Outcome GreatPower CapabilitiesRatio Equal (less thanor equal to 1.5) Unequal (greaterthan 1.5) Total War 4 5 9 Peace 16 80 96 Total 20 85 105

SeparatedDisputantsin Table5 ExcludedHere (Power CapabilitiesRatio) 1831, UK/FR 1831, UK/FR 1833, UK, FR/RUS 1836, UK/RUS 1848, FR/AUS 1849, UK, FR/RUS 1861 UK/RUS 1876, UK/RUS 1877, UK/RUS 1878, UK/RUS 1885, UK/RUS (1.1) (1.1) (1.8) (1.1) (2.1) (2.5) (2.8) (2.3) (1.8) (1.7) (3.1) 1887, UK/GER 1888, UK/GER 1890, UK/IT 1893, UK/FR 1893, UK/FR 1896, UK/FR 1898, UK/FR 1899, UK/GER 1904, UK/RUS 1908, USA/JP 1911, UK/IT (1.7) (1.6) (8.1) (2.0) (2.0) (2.0) (2.0) (1.1) (1.4) (10.0) (4.5) 1923, USSR/UK 1932, UK, USA/JP 1934, GER/IT 1934, UK/IT 1936, USSR/GER 1937, UK/IT 1937, USSR/IT 1937, UK, USA/JP 1938, UK, FR/JP 1946, UK/USSR 1951, USSR/UK (1.4) (6.9) (2.4) (2.2) (1.4) (2.1) (4.2) (7.2) (2.6) (2.6) (3.1)

NOTE:( = 0.20; 2 = 0.04; odds ratio = 4. See Table 1 for definitionsof abbreviations.

power would appearto be 1.8 in Russia's favor,not the initial 6.2. However,the formula passes over crucialfeatures-most important, existence and the capacityof the the railwayacross Siberiaandconnectionsin Manchuria. 1900, when the distanceIn balanceof powerwas identicalto thatin 1903 and 1904, the line was not useadjusted able. Two years later, Russia's ministerof war recommendedthat the tsar abandon Russia's Manchurian claims so as to not antagonizeJapan(Kuropatkin 1909, vol. 1, 189-93). Russia's land forces in the areadid increase,but Japanhad more and could more in the shortand mediumterm. transport In contrastto the initial forces on land, Russia's FarEasternfleet was superiorin fell tonnageto Japan'sbeforethe war.Japandestroyedit when PortArthur andutterly defeatedthe second fleet, which finally reachedwatersoff Japanafter a voyage of 7 were fully monthsfrom the Baltic Sea. For theirpart,the Japanese"decision-makers awareof the riskinvolved... the armycalculatedthatJapanhad a fifty-fiftychance... the navy expected thathalf of its forces would be lost, but it hoped the enemy's naval with theremaininghalf"(Okamoto1970, 101). Thepolitiforces wouldbe annihilated of that arenais essential to appreciatethe origins and the end of this cal geography War.Ratherthanunequal,roughlyequal is the properassessmentof Russo-Japanese the balanceof power capabilitiesbetween Russia and Japanin northeastAsia shortly before war in 1904. betweenthe outbreak warandthe measuresof of Table8 describesthe relationship balance of power that considerpolitical incapacity.The varioussources of impaired

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TABLE7

Balances of Power (Adjustedfor Distance) and Dispute Outcome: Balances of Terror Excluded, NonseparatedSides, GreatPower versus GreatPower Disputes, 1816-1989
Outcome GreatPower CapabilitiesRatio Equal (less than or equal to 1.5) Unequal (greaterthan 1.5) Total Equal in Table6 to Unequal 1951, CHN/UK 1952, CHN/UK 1953, CHN/UK 1954, CHN/UK 1902, USA/UK 1902, UK, GER, IT/USA 1903, USA/UK War 6 3 9 Peace 4 92 96 Total 10 95 105

Unequal in Table6 to Equal 1903, RUS/JP(War) 1853, UK, FR, AUS/RUS (War) 1830, PRU, RUS/FR

NOTE: p= 0.48; p2= 0.23; odds ratio= 22.0. See Table 1 for definitionsof abbreviations.

politicalabilityto fight a greatpowerwar,suchas existingcivil, colonial, imperial,and interstatewars (e.g., Small and Singer 1982; Erickson1962; Conquest1973; Harding 1991), sometimes add to imbalances in power (e.g., 1911, Austria-Hungary/Italy; 1912, France/Italy).At other times, they subtractfrom the apparentlystrongerside or (e.g., 1830, Russia, Prussia/France) subtractfrom each side (e.g., 1938, Russia/ Thereareonly fourreversalsfromroughlyequal: 1871, France/(Prussia) GerJapan). and 1911, Austria-Hungary/Italy. many (two disputes);1830, Russia, Prussia/France; As noted above, the power capabilitiesarithmeticafterthe Franco-Prussian misWar leads wildly. Francein 1871 was defeatedand occupiedby Germanarmies.Whathad been its easterndefenses were now in the new Germanstate.The Frenchgovernment had to attendto the ParisCommunards, suppressa revoltin Algeria, and settle a stagbill gering reparations (Mitchell 1979, 18-34; 1981). in The remaining reversals Table8-1830, Russia,Prussia/France 1911,Austriaand as Hungary/Italy-are as straightforward the others.FromParis,revolutionspreadto declaredBelgium to be independent. While Brussels,wherea provisionalgovernment Francesupported Belgium warily,Russiaassembledanarmyof 150,000 in Polandand unsuccessfully attemptedto press Prussia and Austria to interveneagainst the Belmonarch,"hadbeen terrifiedby the gians. Louis Philippe,France'snew constitutional standtakenby Russia andthe menace of the Russianarmyin Poland,for above all he needed peace to maintain his newly acquired and still shaky throne" (LobanovRostovsky 1954, 94). Rumor that the Russian army that would intervenewould be from Poland led to insurrectionthere (Davies 1982, 318). Russia, then "paralyzed"

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TABLE8

Balances of Power (Adjustedfor Political Incapacityand Distance) and Dispute Outcome:Balances of Terror Excluded,Nonseparated Sides, GreatPower versus GreatPower Disputes, 1816-1989
Outcome GreatPower CapabilitiesRatio Equal (Less thanor equal to 1.5) Unequal (greaterthan 1.5) Total Equal in Table7 to Unequal 1830, RUS, PRU/FR 1871, FR/GER 1871, FR/GER 1911 A-H/IT War 6 3 9 Peace 4 92 96 Total 10 95 105

Unequalin Table7 to Equal Nil

NOTE: p= 0.59; q2 = 0.35; odds ratio= 46. See Table 1 for definitionsof abbreviations.

(Langer 1968, 672) by war within its empire, acquired a strong interest in peace abroad. In the 1911 dispute between Austria-Hungary and Italy, the balance was more favorableto Austria-Hungary thanthe 1.5 ratioindicates.The disputeoccurredin the midst of Italy's war with the OttomanEmpire over Tripoli and Cyrenaicaand was promptedby Italy's militarydifficulties.The "sick man"of Europeprovedto be spry in Africa, and, to weaken him, Italiandecision makersthreatenedto expandthe war elsewherein the Mediterranean regionwhere greatpowers, such as Austria-Hungary, wished to keep the statusquo (Langer1968, 710, 800; Bosworth 1979, 176). Italywas in the inferiorposition. To improvepositionor seek to improvepositionif thereshouldbe war,balancersof poweruse alliancesandmustbe waryof an opponent'salliancesandalliancepossibilities. Defense agreementsenhancepower capabilitiesof the memberstates and, with other alliances, alterpolitical geography.In Table9, the concernis the impact of the additionof powercapabilitiesfroma defense alliancepartner onto the powercapabilities ratios. The contributionsof nongreatpowers to balances of power do not lend themselves to simple arithmetic,and reasonable,reliablejudgmentssuffice. The statistical results of would-be coalitions on the relationshipbetween balances of power and the outcome of disputes are striking.The 42 is a substantial0.51, which is an increaseof 15%to the percentageof the variation accountedforbefore coalitionswere considered.The odds ratiois now 108.5. Loosely put, given a dispute,roughequality in powercapabilitiesof opposing sides increasethe chancesof warby 100 times than when both sides are not so balanced. These statisticsresult from a small numberof changes to the previoustable from roughlyequalto unequalandvice versa.Whensmallnumbersyield suchlargereturns,

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TABLE9

Balances of Power (Adjustedfor Political Incapacity,Distance, and Alliance Formations)and Dispute Outcome:Balances of Terror Excluded, NonseparatedSides, GreatPower versus GreatPower Disputes, 1816-1989
Outcome GreatPower CapabilitiesRatio Equal (less than or equal to 1.5) Unequal (greaterthan 1.5) Total Equal in Table8 to Unequal 1887, FR/GER 1887, FR/GER 1885, FR/GER War 7 2 9 Peace 3 93 96 Total 10 95 105

Unequal in Table8 to Equal 1865, PRU, IT/AUS (War) 1912, RUS/A-H 1938, UK, FR, USSR/GER

NOTE: ) = 0.71; <2 = 0.51; odds ratio = 108.5. See Table 1 for definitionsof abbreviations.

caution is necessary.The three instances of reversalfrom roughly equal include one disputebetweenGermanyandFrancein 1885 andtwo othersin 1887. The defense alliance that makes the difference is the Triple Alliance, which provided,among other contingencies, that Italyjoin with Germanyin the event of Francewarringon Gerturnsthe Germany/France many.AddingItalyto Germany powercapabilitiesratiosto 1.52 in 1885 and 1.73 in 1887. The 1.52 ratiounderestimates what was, in the eyes of France'sleaders,a dangerouspositionof inferiority relativeto Germany. Accordingto a contemporary confidentialstudyby Frenchsoldiersof the militaryexpenditures and of bothgreatpowers,Germanyspentmuchmoreon armedforce thandid Franceannually duringthe last thirdof the 19thcentury(Mitchell 1981, 52). This contradictsthe estimatesof militaryexpenditures used in the powercapabilitiesindex, which indicate in militaryexpenditures. The very closeness of the calls might well be roughequality attributed measurementerror.Moreover,Germanyhad isolated Francediplomatito cally andstackedallianceformationsagainstFrenchambitionsto recoverlandslost in 1870. Aside from the additionof power capabilities,the Triple Alliance threatened Francewith waron two fronts,andthe ThreeEmperors LeagueensuredthatGermany could concentrate one front.(These alliancesandthe Russia-Germany on Reinsurance Treaty also enhanced Germany'sposition in 1887 [cf. Niou, Ordeshook,and Rose 1989].) The disputantsin the threecases of reversalto roughlyequal (see Table9) did fight within 2 years. Considerthe 1865, 1912, and 1938 disputes one by one. The power capabilitiesof the greatpower protagonistsin the quarrelover the futureof Germany were roughly equal in 1865 and 1866. The ratio is 10.2/7.9 = 1.3, and many knowledgeable contemporaryobserversjudged Austria would have the betterpart in war with Prussia (e.g., Craig [1964] 1975; Rothenberg1976, 64-72; Wawro 1996). The ratiois madeunequalwith the additionof the resourcesof Italy,very much"theleast of

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the greatpowers"(Bosworth 1979, 1-9), to thatof Prussia.The two had a defense alliance, as did the states of the Third Germany with Austria, save Mecklenburgassessmentof the contributions Schwerin,which sided with Prussia.The quantitative of the smallerGermanstatesmade in Table9 keeps to the numberof men in arms,the amounts spent on arms, and the amount of iron produced.(I have no estimates of energyconsumptionfor these states.)The ratioof powercapabilitiesfor all of the combatants,greatpower and nongreatpower,is very close to 1.0. By 1912, the Europeangreatpowers tied themselves in opposing alliance obligations. Keeping to the balance between Russia and Austriain their 1912 dispute, the ratio is 2.8. The additionof Serbia,Austria-Hungary's oppositionin the Balkans, to Russia's shareadds to the imbalance.The additionof relevantgreatpower protector allies to each side makesit level: eitherAustria-Hungary GermanyversusRussia plus plus Franceor the Dual Alliance plus the United Kingdomversusthe TripleAlliance. The 1938 case of a change to roughlyequal from unequalis because of a subtraction from one side-the USSR from the USSR plus Franceplus the United Kingdom.At takeover Munich,leadersfromFranceandthe UnitedKingdomnegotiatedGermany's of partsof Czechoslovakiawith Hitler while conferencecohost, Mussolini, and victim, Czechoslovak representatives,observed. The Anglo-French objective was an agreementwith Germany,and Hitleremphaticallyhad refusedto hearof negotiating with the USSR (Taylor1979, 1, 12). The USSR hada defense alliancewith Czechoslovakia, which, as mentionedearlier,hinged on the not-ratifiedUSSR defense alliance of home territories the signatories.Withthe USSR takenout of with Franceregarding the ratio of power capabilities,the numberdropsfrom 1.9 to 1.2. Given the small numberof wars, one change when war was the outcome has large statisticalandsubstantive consequences.Thereis one case in whichthe powercapabilities ratioof 1.5 could be putup or down dependingon which qualificationto the arithmetic we consider.This is the 1859 France/Austria dispute,which came to be called theWarof ItalianUnification,althoughthe waraims andwarendfell shortof that.War between Franceand Austriawas well preparedon France'spartand, on Austria's,a series of diplomatic and, later, military blunders.A "secret and always to remain to secret"treatyin January1859, back-dated December 1858 (MackSmith 1988,259thatFrancesend as manyas 200,000 men to expel Austriafromnorthern 60), specified A Italy if Austria were to attack Sardinia-Piedmont. Franco-Russianagreementto Franceandsupposedto be worrisometo Austriaand,perhaps, benevolentto neutrality, to Prussia,followed shortly(Sumner1933). Onthe Austrianside, therewere no strong allies: the governmentsof Modena,Parma,and Tuscanywere boundto Austriawith defense alliances, but the people, unlike the governments,should be counted against the Austrianforeigner.Prussiahad refusedto join in anotherdefense alliance with its rival in Germany,and the articles of the GermanConfederationdid not provide for automaticassistance in case of war for Habsburgpossessions outside of Germany. Therewas provisionfor exceptiononly in the eventthatanotherbeganthe warandthe GermanDiet recognizedthe war to be a threatto Germanterritory. The dispute opened with Austrianobjectionsto militarymovementsby SardiniaPiedmont.FranzJoseph,emperorof Austria,unawareof the specifics of the Napoleon

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to III-CountCavourrelationship,sent an ultimatumto Sardinia-Piedmont cease provocativemilitaryactivities.His expectationwas thatthe overwhelmingAustrianforce that would be plain and, if not plain to Sardinia-Piedmont, Napoleon III would make mattersplain to discourageCavour.In the unlikely event that Francedid not do so, FranzJosephthen expected assistancefrom Prussia,whateverthe rivalrywithin GerAll manyandthe legal provisionsof Confederation. of this was badly wrong.The ultialliance and ended any chance of matum triggered the Franco-Sardinia-Piedmont Prussian support.The blunder was "of the first order"(Hallberg 1955, 192; Bled 1992). The assessmentof rough equalityon the eve of the war rests on the judgmentthat then,on the eve, the situationwas not assuredlyas difficultfor Austriaas it came to be. First, there was the possibility of Prussian action on the Rhine frontierfor which therewas a delay betweendecFrancetook precautions.Second, andmoreimportant, larationof war andthe arrivalof Frenchforces. The distancewas within the 340-mile radiusallowed by Bueno de Mesquita's(1981) (modified)formulabefore any loss of strength.Nevertheless, French forces took some time to get to the arena in northcentralItaly.The Austrianarmies,if properlyled, could have defeated the opposing Italianforces and then faced the French,who arrivedon foot and horse throughthe mountainsor by ship to Genoa. "If, instead, they [the Austrians]were to allow the enemy tojoin forces,thenthey wouldbe in difficulties"(Bled 1992, 105). Incompetent in leadersputAustriain difficulties.Francewas notpreponderant northern Italybefore the war;Austriawas no longer preponderant remaineddifficult to dislodge from but the quadralateral fortressesin northeastern Italy.Roughequalityis a bettercharacterization of the opposing sides than is unequal(cf. Moul 1988).

MORE AND LESS CONTRARY DISPUTES The correlationin Table 9 is not perfect. Some of the five disputes that fall away fromthe equal-warandunequal-nowardiagonalareexceptionsto provethe rule.The others weaken it. The 1911 Austria-Hungary/Italy dispute, the 1912 Russia/AustriaHungarydispute,and the Munichcrisis in 1938-roughly equal and no war-appear to be the sort thatstrengthen; 1938 and 1939 USSR/Japanwars between unequal the sides are of the sort thatweaken. The lapse of the Russia-Germany ReinsuranceTreatyin June 1890 and the consequent Franco-Russiandefense alliance in January1894 markeda turningpoint in Europeangreatpowerpolitics. The Italy versusAustria-Hungary disputein 1911 and the RussiaversusAustria-Hungary disputein 1912 can be seen as fixing the divisionof the greatpowers,which beganwith the Franco-Russian agreementandcontinuedwith Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian ententes. After the 1911 Moroccan dispute, the between Franceand the United Kingdom became a military friendly understanding arrangement against Germany(Williamson 1969, 299). The 1912 dispute involving Russia and Austria-Hungary the Balkans was followed by anotherdispute that in ended in the GreatWar.Telling of these events appearsto add to ratherthan subtract

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from the argumentthat "waris most likely when the power of the dissatisfiedchalthe lenger and its allies begins to approximate power of those who supportthe status quo" (Organski1968, 370). The 1938 dispute that led to the division of Czechoslovakiaat the behest of Gerthansubtract fromthatargument. Warfollowed withina manyappearsto addto rather at yearof appeasement Munich.In the September1938 to September1939 interim,the United Kingdom and Francehad allied with Poland to warnoff Germanywith their of guarantee Poland'sindependence; Germanyandthe USSR agreedto divide Poland and other states when Germany attacked Poland. The USSR-Germanyneutrality agreementtransformedthe balance of the triad-the United Kingdom plus France roughlyequal to Germanyplus Italy roughlyequal to the USSR-into level balance, with Germanyon one side and the United Kingdom,France,andPolandon the other. With wars in 1914 and 1939, the 1911, 1912, and 1938 disputesappearto have been "close things"increasingthe chances of war between roughlyequal sides. The warsbetweenthe USSR andJapanin 1938 and 1939 tell againstthatpowerparity argument. With Japan's conquest of Manchuria and creation of the puppet Manchukuostate, the Chinese bufferinto which the USSR and Japanintrudedalong the Chinese EasternRailway corridorbecame thousandsof miles of ill-markedcommon border.The Manchukuo-Mongolian border,the borderof the dependentsof the two Asian greatpowers,addedto the lengthacrosswhich rivalarmiescould meet.Two of of the hundreds borderskirmishesendedin warin 1938 and 1939 whenthe quantitative balancesof powerdecidedlyfavoredthe USSR. The ratioof forces in the FarEast, as estimatedby the Japanesearmygeneralstaff, matchedthe ratioof powercapabilities correctedby formulafor costs of transporting power(Coox, 1985, Table7.1; Hata Ikuhiko 1976, Table 1). Other qualificationsto the quantificationalso tell against for Japan.Japan'swar with China,in preparation and anticipationof futurewar with the USSR principalenemy,continuedto drainawayresources.On the otherside of the ledgerwere Stalin'spurgesof the Red Army.Some officersin Japan'sKwantungarmy thoughtthat they had nothing to fear from the now decapitatedenemy army (Coox 1985, 85-86), although their superiorsin Tokyo thought otherwise. Tokyo forbade presentedTokyowith disasprovocations,andthenthe disobedientfield commanders trousdefeats in 1938 and 1939. The wars at Changkufengand Nomonhancontradict the power parityargumentand the common balance-of-powerargumentthathas the preponderant power pressingthe weaker side ratherthanthe otherway around. CONCLUSION Crudeas it might appearto diplomatichistorians,who appreciatethe detail and the nuanceI force into the cells of 2 x 2 cross-tabulations, relationshipbetween balances of power and war between greatpowers is now clear.Crudeas the 2 x 2 crosstabulationsmight appearto multivariatemodel builders-who would treat power and capabilitynumbers,alliances,geographicdistance,geopoliticalseparation, political capacityas if they were individualvariables,apartfromratherthanpartandparcel of balances of power-the evidence presentedhere is strongand proper.As the evi-

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dence improves-attending to balances of terror,political geography,political incapacity, and alliance formationsand not confining observationsto state-dyads-the relationshipbecomes stronger.The change from the 1.8 odds ratio (when the power capabilitiesare simply counted)to 108 (when those quantitiesareproperlyqualified) is dramatic.The precise '2and odds ratio values should be treatedgingerly because they are sensitiveto changesto few cases, and some cases areless securethanareothers.13Nevertheless, the conclusion is sturdy:in the absence of a balance of terror, power parityof opposing sides, with few exceptions, encouragedgreatpower disputantsto fight one anotherduringthe periodbetween 1816 and 1989. One mightbe temptedto thinkthatthe effortto producesuch evidence is excessive and unnecessary.After all, many drawthe correctconclusion from large amountsof evidence in hand.They do so improperly. Thatevidence is muchpoorerthanit appears to be and much weakerthanit is thoughtto be. The science is to drawcorrectconclusions from properevidence. Moreover,until theorists,such as Organski(1968), proposed powerparityto war,the poor and weak evidence suggestedthata level balance of powerkeptthe peace farmoreoften thannot. Withappropriate strongevidence and in hand,we can pursuerigorousanswersto the questionof why power parityencouraged war and any policy implications.

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case studies. World Politics Achen, C. H., andD. Snidal. 1989. Rationaldeterrencetheoryandcomparative 41:143-69. Anderson,M. S. 1970. The greatpowers and the Near East, 1774-1923. London:Arnold. Bartlett,C. 1979. Britainand the Europeanbalance, 1815-1848. In Europe'sbalance ofpower, 1815-1848, edited by A. Sked. London:Macmillan. Bled, J.-P. 1992. FranzJoseph. Oxford,UK: Blackwell. UK:Cambridge Bosworth,R. J. B. 1979.Italy: Theleast ofthe greatpowers.Cambridge, UniversityPress. Bremer,S. A. 1980. Nationalcapabilitiesandwarproneness.In TheCorrelatesof WarII:Testingsome realpolitik models, edited by J. David Singer.New York:Free Press. . 1992. Dangerousdyads:Conditionsaffectingthe likelihoodof interstatewar, 1816-1965. Journal of ConflictResolution36:309-41. Bueno de Mesquita,B. 1981. The war trap. New Haven, CT: Yale UniversityPress. Clayton, G. D. 1974. Britain and the eastern question:Missolongi to Gallipoli. London:Lion Library. Conquest,R. 1973. Thegreat terror:Stalin'spurge of the thirties.London:Macmillan. Coox, A. D. 1985. Nomonhan:Japan against Russia, 1939. Stanford,CA: StanfordUniversityPress. Craig,G. [1964] 1975. The battle of Koniggratz.Reprint,Westport,CT: Greenwood. Davies, N. 1982. God's playground:A history of Poland. Vol. 2. New York:ColumbiaUniversityPress. Dawson,W.H. 1971. Forward policy andreaction.In TheCambridge historyofBritishforeignpolicy, 17831919, edited by A. W. Wardand G. P. Gooch. Westport,CT: Greenwood. de Soysa, I., J. R. Oneal, and Yong-HeePark.1997. Testingpower transitiontheoryusing alternative measures of nationalcapabilities.Journalof ConflictResolution41:509-28. Diehl, P. D. 1985. Contiguityand militaryescalationin majorpowerrivalries,1816-1980. Journalof Politics 47:1203-11. 13. Therecould be errorssuch as my earliermistakenlisting of the two 1885, GER/FRdisputesand the 1926, USSR/JP dispute among the equals (reportedin Moul 2002a).

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