Simpson Linnik Investigation Review

September 9, 2011
Mayor and Council

City of Tacoma
747 Market Street, Suite 1200
Tacoma, Washington 98402-3766
Mark S. Simpson
6009 Lakehurst
Arlington, Texas 76016
mss326@hotmail.com
Re: Independent Review of the Tacoma Police Department's lina Linnik Investigation
Dear Mayor and Council:
Pursuant to the contract approved on June 24, 2011 between the City of Tacoma and myself, a
comprehensive review of the investigation into lina Linnik's abduction and murder has been completed.
An extensive written report detailing the case is enclosed for your review. The report includes several
policy and process recommendations designed to strengthen the effectiveness of the Tacoma Police
Department and improve the public trust.
Child abductions and homicide cases are some of the most challenging crimes any law enforcement
official will ever be asked to investigate. Between 1996 and 1997, lied the Amber Hagerman Task Force
and investigation in Arlington, Texas, and had the honor of being instrumental in creating the AMBER
Alert system that has since been adopted nationwide. As in the Amber Hagerman case, the lina Linnik
investigation was an extremely emotional, high-profile case that scarred the community.
Since the abduction and murder of lina Linnik, the Tacoma Police Department has made a number of
significant improvements to its response capacity and investigative capabilities in dealing with abducted
or endangered missing children. Should the Tacoma Police Department adopt the Child Abduction
Response Team (CART) concept as an integral part of its child abduction response plan, the Tacoma
Police Department will have a comprehensive child recovery strategy. Discussions of the improvements
implemented by the Police Department since lina Linnik's abduction can be found on pages 33-35 ofthe
report under the headings of tlConciusion" and "Summary. II
During my more than 36 years in law enforcement and related consulting assignments, I have had the
pleasure of working with some of the finest, most dedicated professionals in the industry. After
conducting multiple personal interviews and hours of in-depth research, it is apparent that the men and
women of the Tacoma Police Department are true professionals who take their commitment to serve
and protect very seriously. The recommendations included in this report will further support their
commitment.
I truly appreciate the opportunity to serve the City of Tacoma through this project and I look forward to
the continued improvement and success of the Tacoma Police Department.
Sincerely,
Mark S. Simpson
Consultant
Tacoma, Washington
Police Case Study:
A Comprehensive Review of the
Zinaida "Zina" Linnik
Kidnapping and Murder
Investigation
Mark S. Simpson
September 20 J J

Case Overview:
Tacoma Police Department Offense number: 071851842
Victim: Zinaida "Zina" Linnik, Age 12
Offense Date: July 4, 2007
Offense Time: Approximately 2145 hours
Abduction location: 2510 South J Street, Tacoma, Washington
Recovery D a ~ e : July 12, 2007
Recovery Location: Silverton Lake Recreation Area,
Eatonville, Washington
Introduction:
On Wednesday, July 4, 2007 at approximately 2' 45 hours, '2-year-old Zina Linnik was
in an alley behind her family's home at 25' 0 South J Street playing with friends and
family members and watching fireworks displays. Zina's father, Mikhail, was in the back
yard and asked her to gather her brothers and sisters and come home. Zina put her
bicycle in the garage and set off down the alley to do as her father asked.
Mikhail went into the house but came back out moments later when he heard a scream.
He went to the alley just in time to see what he described as an older model gray van,
parked, facing north toward 25'h Street. He did not see anyone around the van, except
the driver who was in the process of getting into the vehicle and closing the driver's
door. Mikhail did not see his face. As the van drove away, Mikhail looked into the alley
and saw one of Zina's flip-flop sandals laying on the pavement. Mikhail searched the
area for approximately' 0 minutes before his daughter, Nina, called 9' , .
Mikhail later told police that the van was gray in color, had two windows in the back,
and a partial license plate of "667" or "677." He described the driver as being an Asian
male with a "typical" Asian hair cut, a little longer on the top than the sides. The driver
was of medium build.
The investigation of the kidnapping, and ultimately the sexual assault, and murder of
Zina Linnik had begun. Her remains were recovered eight days later, on July 12, 2007
at the Silverton Lake Recreation Area, 20 miles from the abduction site. A suspect in the
case, Terapon Adhahn, was arrested and directed police to the body.
Case Study: The lina Linnik Investigation Page 2
Demographics of Tacoma, Washington:
Tacoma is an urban port city and is the county seat of Pierce County, Washington. It has
a total mass of 62.6 sq. miles of which 50.1 sq. miles is land, and 12.5 is water. It is the
third largest city in the state. As of the 20 I 0 census, the city's population is 198,397. The
population density is 3,923.8 persons per square
mile. There are 8 I , 102 housing units with an
average density of 1,619 per square mile. The
racial makeup of the city is:
White: 60.25%

African American: 12.17%
Native American: 8.23%
Hispanic or Latino of any race 7. I 1%
Other races: 6.28%
Pacific Islander: 3.02%
view
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The Tacoma Police Department divides the city into four sectors for policing purposes. It
has a staffing level of 372 commissioned officers and 42 civilians. In 20 I 0 the Police
Department earned accreditation through the Commission on Accreditation of Law
Enforcement Agencies (CALEA)
The Initial Offense:
On July 4, 2007, 12-year-old Zinaida (commonly referred to as Zina) Linnik was living
with her parents, Mikhail and Valentina Linnik, and seven brothers and sisters at 2510
South J Street in Tacoma, Washington. The family had begun celebrating the Fourth of
July holiday at approximately 1400 hours with a barbeque cookout in the backyard.
Seven of the eight Linnik children were present; I 8-year-old Stanislav Linnik had gone
with another family on a fishing trip. As the evening went on, a number of children
including the Linniks went into the alleyway behind J Street to watch the fireworks and
play.
At approximately 2130 hours, Mikhail Linnik, who had been inside the residence along
with his wife and daughter Nina, told his daughter Zina to gather up the rest of the
family and come home. Zina, who had been in the alley, put her bicycle in the garage
and started walking south, down the alley to find her brothers and sisters. According
to later interviews with Mikhail, after a few moments he heard a scream from the alley.
Zina's sister Nina and her mother Valentina also heard the scream. Mikhail recognized
the voice as that of his daughter Zina, and noted that the scream was one he associated
with fear, pain, or trouble. Mr. Linnik went back outside and walked to the fence at the
rear of his property. He observed an older model gray van with a partial license plate of
" 1667" and maybe a "8" parked in the alley and facing north. He did not see Zina, and
did not know if there was anyone inside the van. He did see a man who he described as
an Asian male approximately 5'8" wearing a light colored baseball cap and blue jeans
Case Study: The Zina Linni k Investigation Page 3
walk from the passenger side of the van to the driver's door and enter. He did not get a
good look at the suspect's face. The van left north bound through the alley at a normal
rate of speed, and then turned east on South 25
th
Street.
Mr. Linnik walked to the south end of the alley where the other children were playing to
look for Zina. His 16-year-old daughter Nina, who had also been in the house walked
with him. When he fail ed to find her, he and Nina returned to the area of their home.
Nina noticed a flip-flop sandal that was Zina's laying on the ground near where her
father said the van had been. Nina, her parents, and siblings searched for Zina for
approximately 10 minutes more.
Because the family could not find Zina, had heard her scream, and had found one of
her shoes, they feared that she may have been kidnapped. At 2151 hours on July 4,
Nina Linnik made a 91 I call to report the possible kidnapping of her sister, Zina.
Nina Linnik made the call as she was more fluent in English than her parents. The Linnik
family had emigrated to the United States in 1997 from Ukraine, and the parents had a
poor command of the English language. Nina interpreted for her father to the 91 I
operator. The salient points communicated in the 91 I call given by Nina were:
Little sister (Zina) possibly kidnapped by a man driving a gray van
Provided an address of 251 0 South J Street, Tacoma
Told 91 I operator that she and her father had heard Zina scream
Stated the offense occurred approximately I 0 minutes prior
Provided a partial license number " 1677"
Stated that the van left in an unknown direction on 25
th
St.
Provided phYSical description of Zina
Told the 91 I operator that one of Zina's flip-flops was found on the ground in
the alley
Gave 91 I operator a partial description of the suspect
One two-man unit was dispatched to the address of 251 0 South J Street:
Requested patrol unit to divert for a possible abduction
Provided description of the victim to the patrol unit
Provided vehicle description and license to patrol unit
Notified patrol sergeant of the call
Rebroadcast to responding patrol unit and supervisor the description of the
vehicle and suspect
Patrol responded to the scene and began the initial investigation. Additional marked
patrol units, and later, Criminal Investigations Division (ClD) personnel were called out
to assist.
Case Study: The Zina Linnik Investigation Page 4
Zina Unnik Descriptors at the Time of the Kidnapping
Zinaida (ZinaJ Linnik. White Female, Age 12
Date of Birth: November 24, 1994
Height: 4' I I "
Weight: 80 pounds
Eyes: Brown
Hair: Brown
Last Seen Wearing:
Pink short sleeved 'T shirt
Pink, orange and yellow Capri pants
Pink flip-flop sandal (one)
Satellite Imagery of the Linnik Neighborhood:
2510 South J Street, Tacoma Washington. ' Note: the south end of the alley is a dead
end. The suspect drove north to the intersection and then east on 25
th
Street.
Initial Response By Patrol:
When Patrol Officers Kelley and Lim arrived, they were briefed by Nina and Pavel Linnik
who acted as interpreters for their father, Mikhail. As the officers gained more
information, they were told by some of the neighborhood children that an Asian male
with a van that fit the description given by Mr. Linnik lived further south down the alley.
Pavel Linnik directed Officer Kelley to 2536 South J Street. Pavel told Officer Kelley that
he saw the van there on almost a daily basis. Officer Kelley contacted the resident. Ms.
Chantha Teap who told him that her son, Samnith Khann, drove a gray van, but was
not currently at home. She said he had left the house earlier, but was due back
between 2200 and 2300 hours. She had no way to contact him. Officer Kelley noted in
his report that due to a language barrier, he was not sure how much she understood of
what he was asking.
Patrol Sergeant Paris arrived and was briefed by Officer Kelley. Paris asked for additional
units to help search the area. Officer Lim continued to gather information about Zina
and the Linnik family and made an additional information broadcast. Officer Lim also
checked the Linnik residence and Zina's bedroom. He found nothing out of place.
Officer Lim interviewed family members in a brief attempt to develop a victimology of
Zina that might help move the investigation forward, but learned nothing of
significance.
Zina Linnik Family Dynamics
The Linnik family emigrated from Ukraine, entering the United States on February 21,
1997 through the Port of New York. They requested and were granted refugee status
citing religious persecution in their home country. Extended family members living in
Washington State were identified as sponsors.
Family (Parents of Victim I
Father:
Age:
Date of Birth:
Race:
Sex:
Residence:
Mother:
Age:
Date of Birth:
Race:
Sex:
Residence:
Case Study: The Zina Linnik Investigation
Mikhail S. Linnik
47
11/21/ 1959
White
Male
2510 South J. Tacoma, Washington
Valentina G. Linnik
45
07/ 09/ 61
White
Female
2510 South J, Tacoma, Washington
Page 6
Family (Siblings)
Brother:
Age:
Date of Birth:
Race:
Sex:
Residence:
Sister:
Age:
Date of Birth:
Race:
Sex:
Residence:
Brother:
Age:
Date of Birth:
Race:
Sex:
Residence:
Sister:
Age:
Race:
Sex:
Date of Birth:
Residence:
Sister:
Age:
Date of Birth:
Race:
Sex:
Residence:
Victim:
Age:
Date of Birth
Race:
Sex:
Height:
Weight:
Hair:
Eyes:
Residence:
Stanislav M. Linnik
18
01/ 04/ 1989
White
Male
Nina M. Linnik
16
06/ 21/ 1991
White
Female
Pavel M. Linnik
14
07/ 30/ 1992
White
Male
Svetlana M. Linnik
13
White
Female
10/05/ 1993
Oksana M. Linnik
12
01j24/ 1995
White
Male
Zinaida Mykhailivna Linnik aka: Zina
12
11/ 24/ 94
White
Female
4' 11 "
80lbs
Brown
Brown
Brother:
Age:
Date of Birth:
Race:
Sex:
Residence:
Brother:
Age:
Date of Birth:
Race:
Sex:
Residence:
Vadim M. Linnik
9
12/ 21/ 1997
White
Male
Samuel M. Linnik
5
12/ 05/2001
White
Male
2510 South J. Tacoma, Washington
At the time of the family contact by Officer Lim, the Linniks were concerned, but not
hysterical.
Patrol Sergeant Paris contacted the on-call Criminal Investigations sergeant, Sergeant
Davidson, for assistance, briefed him on the incident status, and according to his
recollection of events asked the Communications Center to prepare the proper
documentation for an AMBER Alert. When Detective Devault. the first investigator to
arrive on scene checked in, Sergeant Paris briefed him on the situation and told him that
he had requested an AMBER Alert. Detective Devault said that detectives wanted to
hold off on the alert because a suspect had been identified. From his conversation with
Detective Devault. Sergeant Paris believed that investigative personnel had talked about
the issuance of the AMBER Alert prior to Devault's arrival on scene.
Officer Kelley went back to the address of 2536 South J Street to gather more
information. He was able to contact a brother of the suspect who confirmed that
Samnith Khann owned the van. He provided a phone number for Khann, but Officer
Kelley was not able to make contact with him. Through further investigation, Samnith
Khann was located at 2521 South Ainsworth. His van was found there as well. When
police first attempted contact at the house, Samnith Khann hid for a few minutes but
then came out of the residence and surrendered to police.
Khann was transported to the Tacoma Police Department for interrogation, and his van
impounded to be searched.
Samnith Khann's Toyota van as it was found at 2521 South Ainsworth
The Interrogation of Samnith Khann:
Detective Devault provided Khann with his Miranda warning and began the
interrogation. Khann was asked to provide an activities timeline for the date of July 4,
2007 and did so. He was also able to provide several alibis for his whereabouts on the
evening of July 4. He signed a voluntary consent to search for the van, which was
executed by Detective Wade and an associate.
When the search was complete and Khann's alibi established, he was released and the
van returned to him. Khann agreed to take a polygraph, and did in fact under go one
on July 8,2007. He passed.
Alley way view looking south to north Zina's flip-flop that was found in the alley
Initial Investigative Activities:
Some of the investigative strategies being employed in the opening hours of the Linnik
investigation are captured below. These initiatives are not all inclusive, but rather
represent the major movements and thought processes in place early on in the
response.
July 4, 2007
~ 2155 hours: Original 91 I call reporting the kidnapping of Zina Linnik
~ 2156 hours: First patrol officer is dispatched
~ 2157 hours: Dispatch broadcast of victim, suspect. and suspect vehicle
description
~ 2213 hours: On scene patrol officer rebroadcasts description of victim and
suspect
~ 2222 hours: Patrol requests check of local hospitals
~ 2251 hours: ClD call out requested by on scene patrol Sergeant Paris
o Sgt. Paris recollects that it was at about 2251 hours that he also requested
an AMBER Alert
Daylight view of the alley behind the 2500 blk. of J. Street. Evidence markers can be seen on
the ground. The view is from north to south.
~ 2252 hours: Potential suspect information is broadcast based on description of
person and vehicle
o (Neighbor Samnith Khann)
~ 2322 hours: Patrol requests that Crime Scene Search respond to 2510 South J
Street
~ 2329 hours: AMBER Alert is requested (per CAD print out)
~ 2300 hours: Patrol supervisor requests additional units for search assistance
~ 2330 hours: Request Public Information Officer (PIO) to contact on scene
personnel
~ 2330 hours: Specific searches for the suspect and vehicle are underway
~ 2346 hours: Contact attempted at suspect residence
~ 2352 hours: AMBER fax ready to go, waiting on confirmation from PIO
Mark Fulghum, the Public Information Officer, responded to the scene at approximately
midnight and talked with Sgt. Davidson, the ClD supervisor who was managing the
case. Sgt. Davidson told Officer Fulghum that he wanted to delay issuing the AMBER
Alert due to the fact that a suspect had been identified and was about to be arrested.
Officer Fulghum acknowledged Sgt. Davidson's request, and left the scene at
approximately 0100 hours after the suspect had been taken into custody.
Detective Lindsey Wade of the Tacoma Police Department was a part of the initial call
out. Her aSSignment was to report to the police department and begin background
work on the identified suspect, Samnith Khann. She was briefed by Sgt. Davidson, and
in a later conversation told that she would function as the primary case agent. At
approximately 0400 hours when Samnith Khann was ruled out as a suspect, Detective
Wade went to the abduction site.
The Request for an AMBER Alert:
Between 0330 and 0400 hours, when Samnith Khann was cleared as a suspect. Sgt.
Davidson contacted Officer Fulghum at home and asked for the AMBER Alert to be
issued. At the time of Zina's abduction, as the Public Information Officer, Fulghum was
the only person authorized by the Tacoma Police Department to issue the AMBER Alert.
According to Davidson, Officer Fulghum acknowledged the request. Apparently, due
to the fact that he had been working since the early hours of July 4 and had also taken
some over-the-counter medication, Officer Fulghum fell back to sleep before issuing the
alert. It would not be until a little after 0800 hours on July 5, 2007 when Fulghum
arrived at work and checked on the case status that the request would be made. The
AMBER Alert went out at approximately 1000 hours.
~ 0044 hours: Suspect vehicl e is located, PIO advises that AMBER Alert is not
needed
~ 0050 hours: Suspect is located and taken into custody (KhannJ
~ Note: CAD indicates that additional personnel were called in throughout the
night
~ 0400 hours: Detective Wade made contact with victim's friend in an attempt to
gain additional witness information and victimology
~ 0400 hours(+j -J: Officer Fulghum was contacted telephonically by on-scene Sgt.
Davidson and requested to proceed with an AMBER Alert, which is not issued at
that time due to Officer Fulghum falling back to sleep
~ 0600-0715 hours(+j -J: Captain Meinema of Criminal Investigations called the
police station from home. He was briefed by Lt. Taylor and told that an AMBER
Alert had not been issued. Captain Meinema told Lt. Taylor to do so
0745-0800 (+/-); Captain Meinema arrived at work and asked if the AMBER Alert
had been issued. Lt. Taylor replied that it had not. Captain Meinema told him to
doso
0800 hours (+/-); Officer Fulghum expedited contact with the Washington State
Police to issue an AMBER Alert as per existing protocol
0855 hours; Searches using volunteers begin (multiple areas documented in ICS
reports)
1 000 hours (+/ -); AMBER Alert is issued by the Washington State Police
1300 hours Detective Wade requested that Pierce County compile a sex offender
list of those persons who own vans similar to that described by witnesses
1400 hours; A tip line is operational. The Emergency Operations Center had
been running since approximately midnight
Day; A number of searches are coordinated bloodhounds including the place
last seen, door-to-door canvasses, etc.
As time progresses, searches are made proactively in an attempt to push the
investigation forward
Throughout the day and night. investigators followed up on leads and proactive
initiatives.
On the evening of July 5, 2007, Detectives
Wade, Graham, and members of the F.B .1.
went to the Linnik home to interview some of
the family members. While there, Detectives
Wade and Graham asked Mikhail Linnik to
draw a picture of the back of the van as he
remembered seeing it in the alley on
July 4. Mikhail drew a van with two
windows in the back and the license plate
displayed in the lower center portion. He
added the numerals "667" and "677" as
what he remembered from the license.

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r I I' \ I
IG'
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IAH .... "Nl 'i;
Case Study: The Zina Linnik Investigation
001 _ r
Drawing made by Mikhail Linnik on
the evening of July 5, 2007
Page 12
On the morning of July' 6, Detective Wade began a series of queries through the
Tacoma Police Department Records Management System using various combinations of
7667,667 and the letter "8. " One of her search results was a gray Chevrolet Astro Van
license B 1 766 7B. It was linked to a theft report made in June of 2007 by Michael Raney.
Insofar as there were several viable leads to be worked in addition to this one, it was
forwarded to the Command Post for follow up and assigned lead number EZECII SE 21.
In following up on the Astro Van lead, on July 7, Tacoma Detective Willrich learned that
Michael Raney was not the owner of the van, but rather had been in possession of it
when some tools were stolen from it at a Lowe's. Raney was the reportee on the theft.
In a later interview, Raney told Willrich that the van's owner was Terapon Adhahn.
Adhahn used the van as a work vehicle, and was currently driving it. Detective Willrich
learned that Terapon Adhahn was an Asian male, 5'4" in height, and weighed
approximately 110. pounds. He was also a convicted sex offender. Attempts to locate
Terapon Adhahn on July 7, 2007 were unsuccessful.
Terapon Adhahn
Terapon Adhahn aka ," "Dang"
Date of Birth: August 30, 1964
Age: 42
Height: 5' 4"
Weight: 120
Hair: Black
Eyes: Brown
Residence: 1 2 I 5 1 17th Street South, Tacoma
On the morning of July 8, 2007 the lead on Terapon Adhahn was referred to on-duty
officers for additional follow up. Detectives and F.B.1. agents were able to locate a gray
Chevrolet Astro Van parked under the carport at 1215 117'h Street South, which was
where Terapon was living. The license plate on the van, 659 TIG, returned to a 1995
Oldsmobile Cutlass owned by Leon Williams of Yelm, Washington.
Detectives set up surveillance on the residence. A person who they believed to be
Terapon Adhahn stepped outside, and upon seeing the unmarked detective vehicles
went back into the house. Shortly thereafter, a male who fit the description was
observed walking hurriedly between I l7'h and I 18
th
on Ainsworth. He was contacted
on the street and detained by Detective Wade, who identified the individual as Terapon
Case' Study: The lina Linnik Investigation Page 13
Adhahn. Wade explained that he was being contacted as a part of the investigation
into the disappearance of Zina Linnik, and asked if he would consent to the detectives
searching his home and van. He agreed.
While Detectives Wade and Shipp searched the residence and van, Detective Graham
interviewed Mr. Adhahn, asking him about his movements and activities for July 4,
2007.
~ Terapon stated that he had dinner with "his mother" Yay, who he called his
adopted mother, arriving there about 1700 hours and departing around 2100
hours
~ He drove straight home and then called Yay to talk to her about the fireworks
~ After the phone call he watched T.v. and went to bed
o Did not remember what was on T. V. because he was drinking beer
o Went to sleep with the T.v. on
~ Said no one had ever taken his van without his knowledge or permission
~ Said he worked on the 4th at a lady's house but couldn't remember the address
~ Said that on July 8 (the current date) he drove a car belonging to Yay's daughter
to look at a job. He described it as a black Nissan Pathfinder
~ When asked about the plates on the van he admitted that they were not the
ones that belonged on it
~ Said that the real plates had been stolen about 6 months previously, but he had
not reported them to law enforcement
~ The plates on the van were put on about 3 days ago and that he had taken them
from an abandoned car
~ Terapon said he had had several different plates on the van because he had no
money to buy new ones and would steal plates and use them until they expired
o Said he threw the old plates away when he was done with them
~ When asked about his drinking habits, Terapon said that he drank at night to go
to sleep
During the course of the conversation, Detective Graham asked Terapon if he had seen
the police sitting down the street from his house. He replied that he had not, that he
left to go for a walk for his health.
From Written Consent to a Search Warrant:
Due to her desire to do a more extensive search of the house and van, Detective Wade
decided that the benefits of a search warrant would be more appropriate. While the
house was secured, Terapon was transported to the Tacoma Police Department and a
search warrant was drafted. Terapon was later charged with "Visa Overstay" and
remanded to Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
Rear view of Terapon's van with stolen tags
still in place.
Passenger side view of Terapon's van. He said
he pushed Zina into the van through the sliding
door and then got in after her.
The warrant was signed at 0040 hours, July 9, 2007. Specifically named in the warrant
were the residence located at 1215 I 17th Street South, a gray 2000 Chevrolet Astro Van,
Washington License # 8176678 and a blue and silver Samsung T-Mobile cellular phone.
Interior view of Terapon's van as seen through the passenger side cargo door
1215 I 17th Street South, the Home of Terapon Adhahn
Insofar as the detectives did not know the exact sequence of the abduction and
restraint of Zina Unnik, they crafted a search warrant to give them broadest powers of
seizure that would be reasonable.
Items identified in the warrant for seizure included:
Weapons, inclusive of:
o firearms
o knives
o blunt instruments
Ammunition
Items capable of restraining the victim inclusive of:
o ropes
o handcuffs
o plastic zip ties
o chains
o tape
Items capable of assisting in the concealment and or disposal of the victim
inclusive of:
o containers
o bags
o blankets
o shovels
o tarps
o cleaners
o solvents
Items such as receipts, etc. that would tend to show evidence of planning the
crime and or the whereabouts of Terapon Adhahn during the timeframe of the
crime
Any property belonging to the victim
Trace evidence inclusive but not limited to:
o hair
o fibers
o semen
o blood
General crime scene processing
o sketching
o video taping
o photographing
Indicia of occupancy, ownership, or control of the places to be searched.
Two amendments to the warrant were added with the permission of the signingjudge:
All outbuildings and sheds on the property
A more descriptive statement of the Astro Van, using the VIN and the license
plate that was currently affixed to the van.
In executing the search warrant, the F.B.I.'s Evidence Response Team was utilized to
collect all evidence.
On Monday, July 9, 2007, the investigation continued with detectives following up on
leads and proactive searches. These strategies would continue into July' 2. There had
been no communications with Adhahn since he had been taken into custody. Tacoma
detectives worked to gather as much information as possible on Terapon, his habits,
and his associates. Their goal was to either keep him in the suspect pool or eliminate
him and move on.
By July' 2, 2007, detectives believed Terapon Adhahn was a strong suspect in the
disappearance of Zina Linnik. A meeting was held involving members of the
Prosecutor's Office, Tacoma detectives, and the Director of the Department of Assigned
Counsel, Michael Kawamura. Mr. Kawamura was briefed on the situation and the fact
that the detectives felt that Terapon Adhahn was involved in the disappearance of Zina
Linnik. His assistance was requested in trying to persuade Adhahn to help in locating
Zina. After a private conversation between Mr. Kawamura and Adhahn, Mr. Kawamura
told the detectives that Terapon Adhahn was not involved in her disappearance and
could not help.
Later that same day at approximately 1605 hours, Detective Wade received a call from
Kawamura saying that Terapon wanted to talk again. As a result of a conversation at
approximately 1745 hours, Terapon agreed to take detectives to Zina's body if he could
have a cigarette first. Terapon then rode with detectives and directed them to Zina's
body, which was concealed in high grass and tree branches in the Silverton Lake
Recreation Area, near SR-7. Her body was discovered nude, with none of her clothing
being found at or near the disposal site.
This photo is representative of the foliage in the area where Zina Linni/(s body was hidden
PCMEO 0 7"'()883
Unnik, Zinaida M.
2510 S . "J" Sl
Tacoma, WA 9&405-3832
07/1212007
SUbJ: Body of a white femaJe child found.
Location: Parcel of private property near the
"SJrver Lake" recreation areB,
e. _ Eat onville, WA 98328-9205
-e'9"Pl-';
I
o B"'-
A
Drawn by:
Osborne. Medical Investigator
Date drawn: 07/1512007
Diagram of crime scene and established pathway of technicians
Case Study: The Zina Linnik Investigat ion
//
I

Recreatio
a rea
Page 19
Satellite view of recovery site
Terapon Adhahn's Recollection of his Actions: July 4 through 8, 2007
As a part of this investigative report, two interviews of Terapon Adhahn were reviewed.
One interview was conducted in 2008, and the other in 201 1. The purpose of the
interviews was to more fully understand his thoughts, motivations, and movements on
July 4-8, 2007. The following is a summary of those interviews. It should be noted that
Mr. Adhahn's recollections are, at times in seeming conflict with the physical evidence
and his own prior statements. Causative factors that may help account for
inconsistencies in Mr. Adhahn's statements may be linked to his admission of drinking
himself into a stupor every night through the consumption of at least a case of beer per
day, some sense of remorse, or a general fear of the situation. His original decision to
lead investigators to Zina's body was most likely the result of his fear of the death
penalty if charged with her murder.
July 4, 2007
~ Worked a job site as an independent contractor until approximately 1800 hours
~ Drove to the home of Ms. Rowe where he ate dinner, departing at
approximately21 00 hours
~ Drove home
o Thinking about his son Chad whom he had not visited with for some time
o Called his ex-wife, Caroline Afflleke, on her cell phone but received no
response
>- Left home and drove to his ex-wife's home on Ainsworth, knocked on the door
but found the residence vacant
o Upset because he could not contact his ex-wife or son
o By his own admission had consumed almost a case of Bud Light beer
>- Was driving around and decided to go to the residence of a friend "Thik" who
lived on Martin Luther King Blvd. and repair the brakes on her car
o The brake job was cancelled due to Thik attending a 4 th of July party
>- As he was driving around he pulled into the alley way behind South J Street to
turn around
o Pulled in from 25
th
St. and turned around, facing back north
}- Observed Zina walking north through the alley
o Saw her in his rear view mirror
o Had never seen her before
o Decided spontaneously to abduct her
>- Terapon slid across the seat to the passenger side of his van so he could exit on
the same side Zina was walking up on
o Engaged her in conversation, asking a desultory question about a party,
and then grabbed her as she turned away from him
}- Terapon pushed Zina into the van through the passenger side cargo door, and
followed her into the van
>- Terapon pushed her up between the driver's and passenger's seat and controlled
her by holding her with his right hand
}- Terapon drove north out of the alley and turned east on 25
th
Street and then
south on J.
o Terapon stated that Zina screamed and fought him
>- Terapon drove approximately two blocks away and stopped near Center Street to
bind Zina more firmly because the tape he had used was not holding
o Used plastic zip ties to bind her hands and feet
o Placed a rag in her mouth to quiet her, and used a zip tie to hold the rag in
place
>- Terapon drove toward his home, holding Zina down between the two front
seats
o Because Zina was making noises and Terapon thought the zip tie had
slipped, he reached back and pulled it tighter. He said he did not look
back as he did so. He heard no more sounds from Zina
}- When Terapon arrived home, he backed his vehicle into the carport, got out and
went around to the side cargo door to retrieve Zina
o Terapon observed that Zina was not moving
o Terapon observed that the zip tie he had used to hold the rag in her
mouth had slipped down around her neck and had strangled her
o Terapon observed that Zina's face was purple, and that she had "red dots"
in her eyes
}- Terapon cut the zip tie from her neck and attempted CPR, but was already
convinced she was dead
o Terapon went into the house; drank some beer
o Terapon went out to the van, removed Zina and brought her back into
the house '
o Terapon continued to drink beer and was in an intoxicated state
o Terapon, in his deposition, stated that he did not remember everything
that happened
Does not remember using duct tape as a means of restraint
(20 I 0 interview)
Does not recall, and does not believe he struck Zina on the head
with a hammer or other instrument
." During the nighttime hours between July 4 and the morning of July 5, 2007
Terapon performed sex acts on Zina's body in the bedroom of his house
July 5,2007
." At some point Terapon passed out and slept until approximately noon on July 5,
2007
o When he awoke Zina's body was on the floor next to his bed
o Moved her body to a separate room in the house
~ In the afternoon hours, Terapon left the residence and drove around. He
recalled being chased by a car
." In the evening hours, Terapon watched TV. and saw that an AMBER Alert had
been issued
." Terapon wrapped Zina's body in a blanket and put it back in the laundry room
." Terapon removed the license plates from his van, hid them, and later stole license
plates from a disabled car and placed them on his van
July 7, 2007
." At approximately 0500hours Terapon took Zina's body to the area of Silverton
Lake and disposed of it in some tall grass
o There were no ligatures left on the body
o The body was nude
o The body was left face down
o Terapon, by his own statement tried not to look at Zina's face
o Terapon tried to further secret the body by covering it with tall grass
JulyS, 2007
~ Terapon borrowed a Nissan Pathfinder and drove Zina's clothing to Tiger
Mountain where he disposed of them
Kidnapping Sequence and Elapsed Time
In response to questions during a deposition, Terapon Adhahn gave the following
estimated time sequence from when he abducted Zina from 2510 South J Street until he
arrived at his home, 1215 177th Street South.
Zina Linnik was abducted in the alley behind her residence, 2510 South J Street,
Tacoma, Washington
Two-minute drive from the abduction location to a parking lot on Center Street
Five minutes to secure Zina's hands and feet with zip ties and gag her using a rag
and a zip tie
20 minutes to drive from Center St. to his residence
Total elapsed time: Approximately 27 minutes
Terapon said that he had never been to the area of Silverton Lake where he disposed of
the body, but had driven by it in the past. His intent was to dispose of Zina's body in
such a place that there was a minimal likelihood that it would be discovered. He had no
real explanation of why he did not dispose of her clothing at the same time he did the
body, but did say he made no attempt to destroy evidence. He simply put Zina's
clothing into a bag, drove to the Tiger Mountain area, and threw it over a guardrail.
Search Warrants Executed During the Course of the Investigation:
07/09/2007 Warrant 1/ 07-1-50609-0
Type: Evidentiary
Affiant: Lindsey Wade
Location: 1215 I 17th Street South, Tacoma
Gray Chevrolet Astro Van, 2000 year model License: B 17667
Blue and Silver Sam sung T-Mobile phone
(Identify and develop evidence linking Terapon Adhahn to the
kidnapping of Zina Linnik)
07/12/2007 Warrant 1/ 07-1-50619-7
Type: Evidentiary
Affiant: Detective J. Blair
Location: Tacoma Police Station
(Recovery of digital evidence from mobile phone; a motion to seal
was also included)
07/18/2007 Warrant # 07-1-50641-3
Type: Evidentiary
Affiant: Detective Bradley Graham
Location: '2' 5 , '7
th
Street South, Tacoma
(Attempt to locate oranges or similar fruit after autopsy report
findings indicated that Zina had consumed oranges in relative
proximity to the time of her death. The Linnik family reported they
did not purchase or have oranges in their residence)
07/19/2007 Warrant # MJ.07-346
Type: Evidentiary
Affiant: Postal Inspector Beaty
Location: Postal Inspector's Office, Tacoma
(Development of witnesses based on letters to Terapon Adhahn
from Thailand)
07/24/2007 Warrant # 07-1-50646-4
Type: . Evidentiary
Affiant: Bradley Graham
Location: '2' 5 , '7'h Street South, Tacoma
(Evidence not named or identified at the time of the July 9, 2007
warrant)
07/24/2007 Warrant # 07-1-50645-6
Type: Evidentiary
Affiant: Detective B. Void
Location: '2' 5 , , ]'h Street South, Tacoma
(Seizure of blood spatter evidence identified from F.B.I.
photographs and statements by Terapon Adhahn not known on
the date of July 9,2007)
Analysis of the Investigative Response to the Zina Linnik Kidnapping /
Murder and Key Decision Points:
Communications/Dispatch:
I) Law Enforcement Support Agency (LESA) dispatched the call immediately and
diverted police resources to the scene
Tacoma Patrol:
I) Officers Kelley and Lim responded to the scene immediately and contacted the
complainant
i) Interviewed the reportee to confirm the details of the abduction
ii) Contacted the appropriate patrol supervisor (Sgt. Paris) to inform him of their
situation and request additional assistance
iii) Sergeant Paris responded to the scene, was briefed by patrol officers and
requested additional assets to search for Zina Linnik
(a) Sergeant Paris contacted Sergeant Tom Davidson and asked for a
C.ID. response
(b) Sergeant Paris, based on the facts of the incident and the resources
available to him at the time, requested that communications begin the
steps necessary for the issuance of an AMBER Alert
2) As a result of interviews by Patrol Officer Kelley, a specific suspect was identified
based on the vehicle and suspect descriptors given him by Mr. Linnik and
confirmed by neighbors
i) Patrol Officer Kelley continued his investigation to further identity the suspect.
his vehicle and current location
ii) Patrol Officer Lim continued interviews with the family to develop a
victimology of Zina Linnik and made reasonable searches to confirm that Zina
was, in fact. missing under circumstances that would indicate she was either
an endangered missing or abducted child
3) As additional patrol assets arrived, area searches were initiated
Tacoma Police Criminal Investigations
I) Due to the identification of a suspect. and both the strength and weight of this
lead, detectives requested that the AMBER Alert be delayed until such time as the
lead could be explored
2) When the identified suspect and his vehicle were found and secured, Officer
Fulghum, the Public Information Officer, left the scene and went home.
3) At approximately 0400 hours on July 5, when the initial suspect was cleared,
Sergeant Davidson shifted investigative focus, contacted Officer Fulghum, and
requested an AMBER Alert be initiated
4) Between 0600 and 0715 hours on July 5, 2007, Captain Meinema contacted Lt.
Taylor for a routine briefing before coming to work and was told of the
Case Study: The Zina linnik Investigation Page 25
kidnapping. He asked if an AMBER Alert had been issued and was told no. He told
Lt. Taylor to do so
5) At approximately 0745 to 0800 hours Captain Meinema arrived at work and asked
for an update. He again asked if an AMBER Alert had been requested, and was
told no. He told Lt. Taylor to do so
6) At approximately 0800 hours Officer Fulghum arrived at work and asked if an
AMBER Alert was still necessary, and told yes
7) Officer Fulghum expedited the alert. It was put out at approximately J 000 hours
8) Detectives reach out to the F.B.I., Pierce County Sheriffs Department and other
agencies to assist in the investigation
9) A tip line is set up and the assistance of the news media is sought
J 0) Detectives use proactive methods to attempt to locate suspects, the victim or
witnesses
J J) Sex Offenders are worked
J 2) Proactive searches are employed in an attempt to locate Zina Linnik
J 3) Canvasses and related tactics are employed to identify unknowing witnesses
J 4) On July 6, 2007 Terapon Adhahn is identified as a potential suspect and worked
i) Adhahn is contacted and interviewed
ii) Search warrants are executed at Adhahn's residence and his Chevrolet Van.
iii) Adhahn is remanded to the custody of ICE
15) From July 6 through J 2, 2007, the Tacoma Police continue to work leads inclusive
of Terapon Adhahn
J 6) July J 2, 2007 a meeting was held with the District Attorney's Office and the
Director of the Department of Assigned Counsel, Michael Kawamura, to discuss
Terapon Adhahn as a possible suspect in the disappearance of Zina Linnik
i) Michael Kawamura interviewed Adhahn and was told by him that he had
nothing to do with the disappearance of Zina Linnik and could not help the
investigators
ii) On July 12, at approximately 1605 hours Kawamura contacted Detective
Wade and told her that Adhahn wanted to talk
iii) On July 12, at approximately 17 J 5 hours Adhahn admitted to killing Zina
Linnik and lead detectives to the body
(a) The F.B.I. Evidence Recovery Team worked the crime scene
17) July J 8, 2008 Search warrant executed at J 2 J 5 I J],h St. South looking for specific
food items that autopsy results indicated Zina may have consumed, possibly after
her abduction
18) July 19, 2007 Search warrant executed through the Postal Inspector's Service to
identify other potential witnesses
19) July 24, 2007 Search warrant executed at J 2 J 5 J J 7th St. South looking for
evidence that had not previously been known about during the investigation
20) Terapon Adhahn was charged and later convicted for the sexual assault and
murder of Zina Linnik
Review and Analysis of the Investigative Response to the Zina Unnik
Abduction:
From my review of the available data, it appears that responding officers from the
Tacoma Police Department did a good job in beginning' the investigation into the
abduction and murder of Zina Linnik. Officers Kelley and Lim arrived on scene,
interviewed Mr. Linnik and immediately began their field investigation. Officer Lim
worked with the family while Officer Kelley attempted to locate other witnesses and
control the crime scene. Officers Kelley and Lim were quick to contact their field
supervisor to both notify him of the incident and request additional assistance.
Sergeant Paris, upon his arrival took control of the situation and called in additional
assets to assist in the search. He contacted the ClD on-call sergeant. Sergeant Davidson,
and requested a response. Sergeant Paris also initiated steps in accordance with
Departmental policy to initiate an AMBER Alert. Sergeant Paris kept the investigation
moving until the arrival of the first detective, Detective Devault.
In the course of the field investigation, a solid suspect was developed. Because the
suspect and the vehicle both matched the description given by Mr. Linnik; the suspect
lived in close proxi mity to the abduction location, and was located; Sergeant Davidson
made the decision not to issue the AMBER Alert. Based on the information available at
the time, his decision to withhold the alert activation was, in my opinion, reasonable.
When the suspect was taken into custody, Officer Fulghum, the Public Information
Officer who was on scene and the only person authorized to activate the AMBER Alert,
went home. It is important to note that even after the initial suspect was taken into
custOdy, both patrol and criminal investigations personnel continued to actively search
for Zina and attempted to locate and identify other potential witnesses.
When Sergeant Davidson and his detectives were able to clear their initial suspect. they
immediately shifted in their attention, with Davidson contacting Officer Fulghum to ask
for an AMBER Alert. With that telephone contact complete, Sergeant Davidson
assumed the AMBER Alert would be issued, and continued proactive measures in an
attempt to locate Zina Linnik and whoever took her.
In my opinion, based on the data presented to me, an AMBER Alert should have been
issued at 0400 hours as soon as Samnith Khann has been eliminated as a suspect.
Unfortunately, an AMBER Alert issued at that time would most likely not have saved
Zina Linnik's life. It must be understood that the AMBER Alert is not a public service
announcement. but rather an investigative resource. A part of the AMBER Alert requires
having sufficient actionable information to pass on to the community to seek their
assistance. The other part of the AMBER Alert is having not only the people available to
receive the information as it is called in, but also there must be personnel available to
respond to leads in a timely manner. The Emergency Operations Center was up and
running and Sergeant Davidson had detectives available to act on any legitimate tips
that came in.
By morning, with the Tacoma Police Department Emergency Operations Center
activated, other agencies inclusive of the F.B.I. were brought in to assist. When it was
determined that the AMBER Alert had not been issued, the mistake was corrected and
the alert was activated at approximately 1000 hours. In the evening hours of July 5,
2007, Detectives Wade and Graham re-interviewed Mr. Linnik and asked him to draw
on a piece of paper his recollection of what the back of the van looked like. He did so
and added the numbers 667 and 776 as his recollection of the partial license plate.
On July 6, 2007, Detective Wade did a number of searches through the Department's
investigative databases, and identified several potential suspects and vehicles. Because
she did not have time to work them, she forwarded them to the Emergency Operations
Center where they were put in queue for assignment. Clearly, the lead management
system being employed at the time was functioning properly, as the information
developed by Detective Wade was assigned out on July 7.
Even with the arrest of Terapon Adhahn, Tacoma detectives, members of the F.B.I. and
others continued to work on lead follow ups inclusive of ground searches,
neighborhood canvasses, roadblock canvasses, media interviews, etc. There is nothing
in any of the investigative documents to indicate a lessening of intensity of efforts by
pOlice. After Adhahn directed detectives to the body, the investigation continued to put
the prosecution in the best possible position to try the case.
At the time of Zina's abduction and murder, the Tacoma Police Department did not
have a comprehensive child recovery plan. There were no detailed protocols at that
time to respond to, investigate, and maintain a prolonged child abduction investigation.
AMBER Alert Protocols Used at the Time of Zina Linnik's Kidnapping:
At the time of Zina Linnik's kidnapping, the protocols within the Tacoma Police
Department for issuing an AMBER Alert were relatively unencumbered. Based on
information provided by Officer Mark Fulghum in deposition, the following criteria were
required:
Circumstances: The circumstances under which the child was missing or taken
must fall within the guidelines of Washington State AMBER Alert
protocols
Victim Information: There must be enough information about the victim in terms of
identifiers and/or descriptors to put out to the public
Suspect Information: If p'ossible, there should be suspect identifiers that can be released
to the public
Suspect Vehicle: If possible, there should be sufficient information describing the
suspect vehicle to enable members of the community to
recognize it if it is seen
AMBER Alert Issuance Progression: Tacoma Police Department
After a supervisor on scene of a reported kidnapping confirms that such an event has, in
all probability, occurred:
1. On scene supervisor 2. Dispatch personnel 3. Dispatch personnel
requests that dispatch
complete an AMBER Alert
contact Tacoma Public
personnel put together
request form to submit to
Information Officer
information for an
the Washi ngton State
Police that details the
AMBER Alert
request
I
4. Public Information Officer
I I
6. Washi ngton
reviews the document for
s. AMBER Alert
State Police issue
information is faxed or e-

compliance and authorizes
mailed to the Washington
AMBER Alert
the issuance
State Police
The protocols in place for issuing an AMBER Alert in the city of Tacoma at the time of
Zina Linnik's kidnapping were straightforward and uncomplicated; however, the
problem occurred in that section of the protocol that did not all ow for alternat ives for
who could authorize an alert if the Public Information Officer was unavailable.
AMBER Alert Issuance Progression Changes Effective in October 2007:
Tacoma Police Department
To eliminate the constricting factor of requiring the approval of a Public Information
Officer before activating the alert, a change was made to the AMBER Alert verification
process specifically for the Tacoma Police Department. Step two (2), as illustrated above
has been eliminated. Currently all three of the sergeants avai lable for call out as well as
selected detectives have direct access to the Washington State Police AMBER Alert
portal and can enter the required information for an AMBER Alert directly, further
reducing the amount of time involved in the AMBER Alert process.
The AMBER Alert Protocols in Place as of October 1, 2007 for LESA
In November of 2002, LESA (Law Enforcement Support Agency) developed written
protocols for the issuance of the AMBER Alert. They were captured under their
Standard Operating Procedures number 02.010. The protocols were revised in October
Case Study: The Zina Li nnik Investigation Page 29
of 2007. They describe both the circumstances by which the AMBER Alert can be
issued, and the responsibilities of the communications personnel involved. The Purpose
Statement of the policy says the following, "Procedure for handling AMBER Alerts for all
police agencies within Pierce County."
For issuance, all four of the following criteria must apply:
~ Confirmation by a law enforcement agency that an abduction has occurred
~ The abduction involved the taking of a child that is 17 years or younger
~ The child is in immediate danger of serious bodily injury or death
~ There is adequate descriptive information available to believe that its
dissemination to the public could help locate the child, suspect, or suspect vehicle
The policy goes on to state the responsibilities of:
~ The Communications Officer
~ The Dispatcher
~ The Communications Supervisor
Bullet number one detailing the responsibilities of the Communications Supervisor states
in part:
"Upon notification of a request for an AMBER Alert within Pierce County, obtain the
requestor's callback info and relay to the PIO. The PIO and the requesting agency will
determine approval. For TPD. approval will be determined at the Sergeant level or
above (italics added). Notity TPD PIO that an AMBER Alert has been authorized and by
whom .... "
Current AMBER Alert Protocols in Place for the Tacoma Police Department
Contained within the Tacoma Police Department Procedures Manual under the Sub-
Section titled, "Juvenile-Abducted" are the guidelines for issuance of an AMBER Alert by
the Tacoma Police Department and the duties of the affected personnel. The initial
responding officers, in completing their field investigation and taking a Missing Persons
Report are tasked with considering all of the facts and circumstances of the situation
and determining if the incident meets the elements needed by the Tacoma Police
Department for issuance of an AMBER Alert.
~ The child is under 18 years of age, is known to be abducted, and is not a
runaway
~ The abducted child is believed to be in imminent danger of serious bodily injury
or death
~ The AMBER Alert should occur within four hours of the event qualitying under
the criteria as an AMBER Alert unless circumstances or timeliness of the
information warrant otherwise
There must be enough descriptive information available to believe that an AMBER Alert
activation will assist in the recovery of the child.
The last paragraph under bullet "A" of Initial Responding Officers states, "A timely and
accurate AMBER Alert activation is imperative (bold in original). If the initial responding
Officer believes all of the criteria for initiation of the AMBER Alert Plan are fulfilled, then
a Supervisor, the shift Lieutenant/ COO and PIO must be notified immediately. If the PIO
is not available, then lESA will be notified and the alert will be activated with their
assistance."
The manual identifies t he following involved ranks, and details their duties regarding
their initial response to the call and the activation of the AMBER Alert:
: Initial Responding Officer
: Responding Supervisor
: Responding Public Information Officer
: Responding Shift Lieutenant/COO
All follow-up investigations become the responsibi lity of CID.
Washington State AMBER Alert Plan as Applied to the Tacoma Police
Department:
Agency of Jurisdiction Tacoma Police WSP issue Update
(Tacoma) confirms Department has an AMBER Alert information
through their
~
approved AMBER Alert
!---+i
based on
~
or cancel
investigation that AMBER Plan and access to WSP Tacoma data upon
Alert criteria is met AMBER Alert portal request
Abducted and Endangered Missing Persons Protocols
Police agencies seek to develop policies, procedures, and protocols that maximize their
capacities and capabilities when dealing with abducted or endangered missing
children. One such "Comprehensive Child Recovery Strategy" has been developed by
law enforcement consultants and practitioners working under a grant provided through
the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice.
The grant itself is admi ni stered through Fox Valley Technical College, Appleton
Wisconsin.
Whi le the information contained in the strategy does necessarily represent the official
position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice, the strategy itself is the result of an
in-depth examination of the issues impacting child abducti ons and those persons
charged with investigating them. The program strategies and policy development
protocols have been continually tested against the realities law enforcement is faced
with when dealing with abducted and endangered missing children.
Comprehensive Child Recovery Strategy
Program Strategy
StaKeholder Command Post
IdejtifiCation Operf'tions
Preliminary
Investigative Search and
prot1cols Recovery
Call Intake prot1coiS
Awareness
j
Abduction
Verification Specific Agency
protlCOIS Resp?nse
Resource
Inventory AMBER Alert
ActiVltion
Criteria for
Abducted/
Missing
Children Inter gency
Notifications
Proposed CALEA Standards:
Policy Development
Technology
Support
1
Control
Staff ling Debriefing and
Evaluation
Tratng
Tering
Liability
Media Plans !
1
Strategy Oversight
& Policymaking
Resource and
Information Annual
Sharing Review
Another, perhaps more straightforward descriptive process of handling cases involving
abducted and endangered missing children can be found within some proposed, but
not yet adopted, CALEA standards. The protocols set out guidelines for police agencies
to examine when developing strategies for dealing with abducted and endangered
missing children. These 16 protocols track closely the Comprehensive Child Recovery
Strategy described above:
1 )
2)
Identification of stakeholders
Protocols to be followed regarding call intake and initial data entry and
management
3) . Resource identification and utilization
Preliminary investigation protocols 4)
5) Criteria for identification, clarification and response to specific types of missing
children cases
6) Command Post Operations
7) Search and recovery protocols
8) Specific agency response and identification of roles and responsibilities
9) AMBER Alert activation protocols
10) Inter- and Intra- agency notifications
II) Technology identification and utilization
12) Phone Bank operations to process tips and leads, and lead management
13) Media Plan
14) Debriefing! After Action reviews
15) Targeted training to include scenario based exercises
16) Annual review of child recovery strategies
CONCLUSION
Since the kidnapping and murder of Zina Linnik in 2007, the Tacoma Police Department
has made considerable strides in refining their policies and procedures for responding
to and investigating endangered missing and/or abducted children. At the time of
Zina's murder, Tacoma Police Department was working under the Incident Command
System, which drives the various command, operations, logistical, and support
operations of any major incident. There were very little procedural guidelines available
regarding specific strategies for prosecuting a child abduction investigation. The
guidelines for issuing an AMBER Alert were in place prior to Zina's kidnapping, but had
never been tested. The problems inherent to limiting authorizing authority to the Public
Information Officer had not been identified. There was little procedural depth in how to
respond to and investigate an abducted child. The unique challenges these crimes
present was not adequately appreciated.
On December 14, 2007, Chief Ramsdell and his command staff were presented with an
After Action Report prepared by Captain Feddersen that reviewed the Linnik
investigation. The report detailed what went well in the investigation, where there
were areas for improvement. and listed five (5) specific areas for improvement that
could impact future investigations. Those identified areas were:
1) Improve AMBER Alert Process
2) Standardize/Familiarize Tip Software that will be used for receiving, assigning,
tracking and completing tasks
3) Standardizing Canvassing Forms
4) Standardize Child Abduction Plan
5) Continue use of the Incident Command System to maximize the system's features
and to manage the incident by objectives and based on priorities
Items 1,2, and 4 are the most critical. Standardizing canvassing forms is important, but
form standardization in and of itself will not drive an abducted child investigation.
>- Item Number 1: "Improve AMBER Alert Process" - There is clear and demonstrable
evidence that this has been addressed. There have been policy upgrades to the Law
Enforcement Support Agency (LESA) for streamlining the activation process. Their
current policies define the specific responsibilities of personnel of the Tacoma Police
Department in terms of who can issue an AMBER Alert. Instead of the responsibility
resting solely with one person, the Tacoma Police Department has trained several of
its investigative supeNisors and detectives in the proper protocols and vested them
with the authority to do so. It should be noted that the Tacoma Police Department
has also developed a form that all police personnel have access to, which provides
guidelines on exactly what is needed for an AMBER Alert. The form is readily
available to responding uniformed patrol personnel who are usually the first on
scene when an abduction is suspected or reported.
~ Item Number 2: "Standardize/Familiarize TIp Software" - Although I have not seen it, I
have been told that Tacoma Police Department is about to unveil an internal leads
management system. Once it comes on line, it should be a significant asset not only
for child abduction investigations, but for any other complex investigation as well .
~ Item Number 4: "Development of a Standardized Child Abduction Plan" has received
the most attention. This is evident in Tacoma's Procedures Manual, chapters
"Incident Event Management" and "Juvenile-Abducted. " The Incident Event
Management chapter details the application and use of the National Incident
Management System (NIMS) within the Tacoma Police Department. As written, the
National Incident Management System can be used to manage a number of types of
critical incidents, inclusive of a rapid, targeted response to a child abduction. The
Incident Command System (ICS), which is contained within the National Incident
Management System, provides the ability to expand or constrict resources as the
situation warrants.
~ Item Number 5: "Continued use of the Incident Command System" is something that
will evolve as a result of any number of kinds of mUlti-agency or multi-discipline
deployments.
The Tacoma Police Department Procedures Manual chapter titled, "Juvenile-Abducted"
addresses specifically the response protocols from the initial on-scene patrol officer
through the shift lieutenant. It is written to work in complete compatibility with the
Incident Command System as described in the chapter titled, "Incident Event
Management. " "Juvenile-Abducted" is a five-part procedure that ends with item E,
"Follow-up Responsibilities, " which states in totality, "All follow-up investigations will be
the responsibility of the Criminal Investigations Division." It does not address specific
investigative strategies.
The current policies and procedures related to child abductions that have been
developed by the Tacoma Police Department since the 2007 kidnapping and murder of
Zina Linnik represent a truly significant improvement. However; as written, they are
insufficient to optimize a rapid, targeted response to the event of a child abduction.
Unlike most other criminal investigative efforts, time is the enemy of the police in the
event of a child's kidnapping. Resources deployed and decisions made in the opening
minutes or hours can ultimately mean the difference between the life and death of the
child.
,
During the course of this review, considerable time was spent evaluating the original
2007 investigation, the policies in place at the time, and the improvements that have
been made since then. Over the course of two days in August 20 I I, I interviewed the
lead detective on the Linnik investigation (Detective Wade) for five hours on the tactics
employed then and the policy development since. Later, I spent two hours interviewing
Detective Wade and her sergeant Robert Mauli, regarding policy and procedures. As a
part of those interviews, I learned that the Tacoma Police Department is in the process
of developing its own Child Abduction Response Team (CART).
Child Abduction Response Teams were developed in the state of Florida after the
kidnapping and murder of I I-year-old Carlie Brucia in 2004. The teams are designed to
bring a number of different people with high levels of expertise from a variety of
disciplines together for an organized, targeted response to a child abduction.
Additionally, because they are formally organized, they are familiar with the various
forms, protocols and investigative strategies used in criminal investigations. They have
pre-identified resources, and can deploy rapidly. As a result of preplanning, they can
prosecute either short or long term investigations.
While speaking with Detective Wade and Sergeant Mauli, I was provided with a copy of
their draft Child Abduction Response Team police and protocols, which I have examined
and found to be incompliance with model policies for Child Abduction Response Teams.
The draft Tacoma CART is supported by the pre-existing Tacoma Policy Manual chapters,
"Incident' Event Management " "Juvenile-Abducted, " and other internal police response
guidelines. Additionally, the contents of the draft CART protocols reflect the benefits of
the training selected Tacoma police officers have received since 2007 in how to
maximize their investigative actions.
SUMMARY
Based on my review of the original investigation of the kidnapping and murder of Zina
Linnik, I believe that the policies in place for the City of Tacoma Police Elepartment at the
time and the revisions the Tacoma Police Department has made since, have significantly
improved its capacity and capability to respond to and investigate endangered, missing
and abducted children.
Should the Tacoma Police Department adopt the Child Abduction Response Team
concept as an integral part of its child abduction response plan, the Police Department
will have a comprehensive child recovery strategy. The fact that the Child Abduction
Response Team concept reqUires routine review and analysis of its resources and
response capabilities, and requires ongoing training and asset development, will insure
that the capability of the Tacoma Police Department to respond to and investigate child
abductions will not diminish over time.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
MARK S. SIMPSON
Mark S. Simpson retired from the Arlington Texas Police Department in January of 2007
with 32 years of distinguished service. At the time of his retirement, Sgt. Simpson was
the supervisor of the Crimes Against Persons Unit. In that capacity, he managed all
robbery, homicide, adult missing persons and kidnapping investigations. In 2004, he
created and led the Department's Cold Case Homicide Team. He served as the
supervisor of the Amber Hagerman Homicide Task Force from 1996 to 1997 and was
instrumental in the development of the original Amber Plan.
Sergeant Simpson initiated, developed, and implemented the Arlington Police
Department's domestic violence "No Drop Policy" in collaboration with the Tarrant
County District Attorney's Office, as well as the Sex Offender Registration Program used
by the department. Sergeant Simpson also developed the department's Standard
Operating Procedures necessary for the partnership between the Arlington Police
Department and the Alliance for Children; the local child advocacy center for victims of
physical and sexual abuse.
In 1992, he developed the Gang Suppression Task Force, which led to the formation of
the Arlington Police Department's Gang Unit. Additionally, Sgt. Simpson worked in the
Department's Narcotics Division serving as an undercover officer and later as the
Narcotics Division Supervisor.
In addition to being named Arlington Police Department's Supervisor of the Year, Sgt.
Si mpson received the Ufe Saving Award and is a two-time recipient of the Distinguished
Service Award. He teaches internationally on the subject of managing major criminal
investigations and on the AMBER Plan.
Mark S. Simpson received his Bachelor of Science Degree in Criminal Justice from Dallas
Baptist University in 1991 . Since his retirement in 2007, Mr. Simpson has worked as an
independent consultant with Fox Valley Technical College, developing and teaching
courses on investigative strategies in criminal cases, case management and logistics. He
has lectured internationally on these subjects. In 2007, he was named Law Enforcement
Officer of the Year by the United States Department of Justice.

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September 9, 2011

Mayor and Council

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