Whiteness and the Participation-Inclusion Dilemma Author(s): Joel Olson Source: Political Theory, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Jun.

, 2002), pp. 384-409 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3072591 . Accessed: 23/08/2011 15:06
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Sage Publications, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Political Theory.

http://www.jstor.org

RACE AND HOMELESSNESS: CONTEMPORARY DYNAMICS OF INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION

WHITENESS AND THE PARTICIPATIONINCLUSION DILEMMA

JOEL OLSON ArizonaState UniversityWest

orderto maintainan integratedschool district, in 1972 the New York City centralBoardof Educationassignedthirty-twoBlack andPuertoRican youths to JohnWilson JuniorHigh School 211, located in the Canarsiesection of Brooklyn.The Canarsieschool boardrefusedto admitthem,however, fearingthatenrollingany moreBlack or PuertoRican studentsin its schools would "tip"the 95 percentwhite community,leading to white flight. When the state educationcommission finally orderedthe Canarsieboardto accept the students,the boardcalled for a boycottof eight schools. The presidentof the boardexplainedthatthey acted not out of racismbut in accordancewith the principleof decentralization school governance,which"givesthe comof munitiesthe rightto controltheirown destinies,"including"arightto control our own integration."The boycott was justified, he argued, because the the attemptto assignthe studentsto JohnWilsonundermined democraticwill of the community.1 Under severe pressurefrom city and state officials, the Canarsieboardfinally agreed to end the seven-day boycott. Yet when they presentedthe agreementto Canarsieresidents,2,000 enragedwhite parents shouteddown the board,vowing to continuethe protest.The next day, 600 white parentsformed a new organization,ConcernedParentsof Canarsie,

In

AUTHOR'SNOTE: Thanks to Lisa Disch, Lawrie Balfour, Bruce Baum, Joseph Lowndes, for AugustNimtz,RamseyEric Ramsey,David Roediger,and StephenK. White help improving this essay.
POLITICAL THEORY,Vol. 30 No. 3, June 2002 384-409 ? 2002 Sage Publications

384

DILEMMA Olson / THE PARTICIPATION-INCLUSION

385

thatpledgedto preventfurtherinflux of Black andPuertoRicanchildrenand to hold the local school boardaccountableto the community.2 The controversyin Canarsieshows thatwhite resistanceto the full inclusion of people of color continues to challenge prospects for American democracyeven afterthe civil rights movement.But the means used in this participation, strugglealso presenta democraticproblem.Decentralization, civic associations,andcommunitycontrol-long the watchwordsof participatory and radical democrats-were used to perpetuate racial discrimination. The expansion of citizen participation in overwhelmingly white Canarsie-from the creationof local school boardsto a strongPTAto mass meetings-did not lead to inclusionandracialharmonybutreinforcedwhite domination. This essay explores the tension between participationand inclusion within a white-dominated polity. Withthe passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 andthe VotingRightsAct of 1965, whiteness,or the conditionof racial privilegein a democraticpolity,lost its statesanction.Statepolicy todayaims to ensurea "colorblind" society in which race has no negativebearingon the or political statusof individuals.Nevertheless,choose any social, economic, indicator-infant mortality rates, prison sentences, traffic stops, college graduationrates, wealth accumulation,life expectancy,SAT scores, unemploymentrates-and the result is the same: the persistenceof white advanAlthough no longer a publicly recognized tage and Black disadvantage.3 of status,whitenesspersistsat every level of Americansociety, conposition into the tinuingto operateas a normthatsedimentsaccruedwhite advantages of modem society, makingthem seem like the "natural" ordinaryoperations result of individualeffort. democratictheorygenerallyhas not confrontedthe persisUnfortunately, tentproblemof whiteness. This is because, I argue,much of democratictheory has relied too heavily on a politics of inclusion to resolve problems of race and difference. Such a politics understands racial discriminationas a form of exclusion from the public sphereto which the solution is inclusion. Whiteness is certainlyan exclusionarypower, but it is also a form of privilege. Lackingan analysis of racialprivilege,the politics of inclusion cannot it grasp the full scope of whiteness. Furthermore, offers little in terms of increased participationin politics. In fact, I argue, the quest for inclusion often precludesgreaterparticipation, since the goal of thatquest is to attain ratherthanempower.But as the Canarsieboycott makes clear,parstanding ticipationin itself is also insufficientto resolve the whitenessproblem.In the handsof a white majority, control"of schools can become a tool "community to enforce segregationand perpetuatewhite domination.

386

POLITICAL THEORY/ June 2002

The resultis a peculiardilemma.In a white-controlled polity,a strategyof inclusion may undermineexplicit racial discrimination,but it does little to underminewhiteness as a norm. Nor does it increase participation.Yet in expandingparticipation itself is insufficientto resolve the whitenessproblem. In a racistpolity,the questfor greaterparticipation may actuallyserveto the tyranny of the dominant race. The key to resolving this strengthen dilemmabetweenparticipation inclusion,I argue,is throughthe dissoluand tion of whitenessas a significantsocial-politicalcategory.Dissolving or abolthe ishing whitenessnot only includesthe excluded,it undermines tyrannyof the white majorityand expandsdemocraticparticipation. My argument begins by using recentwork in the field of criticalrace theto explain how whiteness has shifted from a form of standingto a norm ory after the civil rights movement. I then examine the politics of inclusion throughan analysisof recentworkson the politics of difference.I arguethat holds muchpotentialto dissolve WilliamConnolly's"ethosof pluralization" buthis own applicationof this ethos ends up sustainingan undemwhiteness, ocraticwhite identityinstead,in partbecause it remainstetheredto the politics of inclusion.I then turnto IrisMarionYoung'sJusticeand the Politics of Difference.Young overcomes the limits of inclusion by smartlyredefining inclusionfroman end in itself to a meanstowarda participatory politics. The to her analysisis a critiqueof privilegethatcould connect missing ingredient her argumentfor participation the problemof whiteness. This connection to is made by Lani Guinierin her work on the tyrannyof the majority.Guinier shows thatthe problemwith white tyrannyin the electoralprocess is not so much that it excludes African Americansas it preventstheir participation. Her work is significantbecause it links the dissolution of whiteness to the in expansionof participation the public sphere.In so doing, it overcomesthe dilemmaandsuggests thatattemptsto abolishwhiteparticipation-inclusion ness not only fight racism,they potentiallyflow over the containersof liberal democracy.

DEMOCRACY THEDEATHOF HERRENVOLK The rise of mass citizenshipbegan in the Jacksonianera. "Universalsufhowever,was not universal.It excludedwomenandAmericanIndians frage," and went to great lengths to disenfranchisefree Blacks.4Slaves, however, were not only excluded; they were the antithesisagainst which citizenship was defined.

Olson / THE PARTICIPATION-INCLUSION DILEMMA

387

[B]lack chattel slavery stood at the opposite social pole from full citizenship and so of definedit. The importance whatI call citizenshipas standingemergesout of this basic fact of ourpoliticalhistory.The valueof citizenshipwas derivedprimarily fromits denial to slaves, to some white men, and to all women.

In orderto assertone's rightto citizenship,then, it was crucialto distinguish oneself from slaveryandthe slaves. Given the close associationof blackness with slavery,this requireddistancingoneself from Black people. In effect, it meant proving that one was white. Although the race of Europeansseems self-evident today, the whiteness of many Europeanimmigrantswas by no means automaticallyassumed upon their arrivalin America. For the Irish, Italians, Jews, and others, whiteness was a status that had to be earned.6 to Along with the nation'simmigrationlaws (which restrictednaturalization "whitepersons"),slaveryforgedan ironbondbetweenwhitenessandcitizenThus, citizenship not ship in law and the Americanpolitical imagination.7 those who enjoyedfull politicalrightsfromthose who did only distinguished not, it helped to define race itself, for proof of citizenship was proof of whiteness. Whitecitizenshippersistedthroughthe Civil War.It was brieflydisrupted but by Reconstruction resumedthereafter, guaranteed segregationlaws in by the South and extralegal means of exclusion, intimidation, and terror the throughout nation,all tacitly sanctionedby the federalgovernment.This coexistence of democraticcitizenshipand white supremacyresultedin what a sociologist Pierrevan den Berghe calls a "Herrenvolk democracy," regime that is "democratic for the master race but tyrannical for subordinate The function of Herrenvolkdemocracy was to tamp down class groups."8 conflict. Its linchpinwas white privilege,or what W.E.B. Du Bois termsthe "public and psychological wages" grantedto whites in exchange for their complicity with the social order.9In the Herrenvolk,poor whites receive racialprivilegesfrom elites and in exchange guaranteethe political stability necessaryfor the accumulationof capital.Stabilityis ensuredby subordinating people of color and by pinning one's aspirationsfor a betterlife to individual effort ratherthanclass solidarity.As AnthonyMarxwrites, "Tohold togetherthe nation-state, preservingstabilityneededfor growth,whites were unifiedacrossclass by race.... Economicinterestswere subordinate white to racialunity,with this class compromisemade explicit and enforcedby state policy varying in response to ongoing class tensions."'?These "wages of whiteness"arepublic privilegesin thatthey grantwhites a statusanddignity deniedto those who arenot white, expressedin the rightto participate a full in of civic activities and to enjoy equal access to public accommodarange This also includes materialbenefits such as higherwages, the ability tions."1

388

POLITICAL THEORY/ June 2002

to competeforjobs in anunrestricted market,exclusive access to certain jobs, the rightto the best schools andneighborhoods money can buy,and an equal to opportunity become a capitalist.They arepsychological privilegesin that enable the white citizen to feel himself equal to any other white and they superiorto anyonewho is not white, regardlessof wealth or social status.In the Herrenvolkera, the wages of whiteness meant that the poorest, lowest, meanestwhite personwas held in higheresteem thaneven the most sophisticated, prestigious,and wealthy Black person. The structure Herrenvolk of democracysuggests a definitionof whiteness as a cross-class alliance betweencapitalandone sectionof the workingclass. A majorityof the working class allies itself with the capitalistclass on the while all othersarenotbasis of raceratherthanclass. This groupis "white," in white. Membersof the allianceenjoy all the satisfactionof membership an with othermembers,vet potentialmemexclusive club:the rightto fraternize bers, and denigratethose who are not allowed to join. Whiteness, then, is rather thana biological or culturalidentity. essentiallya politicalrelationship both an interorder.It represents It is the dominantcategoryin a hierarchical This enjoymentor expectation est in andan expectationoffavoredtreatment. defines what it of the "systematic conferral of benefit and advantage"'2 means to be white ratherthan skin color, ethnicity,or culture.Whiteness is conditionof racialprivilegein a society thatdeclaresall men the paradoxical createdequal. The essentialprincipleof Herrenvolk democracy-democracy for whites, for everyoneelse-was finally overthrown the civil rightsmoveby tyranny ment. Withthe passage of civil and voting rights legislation in 1964-65, the standingof the white citizen was officially abolished and the state became committed to protectingthe rights of all ratherthan the privileges of the Nevertheless,the victories of the civil rights movement did not majority.13 into abolish the cross-class alliance. Instead,whiteness has metamorphosed less visible but no less real forms.White privilegemay be overtandexplicit, as in the days of "whitesonly"facilities, but it may also consist of covertand tacit advantagesthat whites enjoy with or without conscious acknowledgor ment, such as redlinedneighborhoods exemptionfrom criminalprofiling. This latter form dominates the post-civil rights era. Contemporarywhite of advantages privilegeis like an "invisibleweightless knapsack"14 unearned that whites draw on in their daily lives to improve or maintaintheir social position,even as they hold to the ideals of politicalequalityandequalopportunity.The simultaneoussense of equalityandprivilegethatmarkswhiteness persists as one of today's most formidablechallenges to a more democratic society.

Olson / THE PARTICIPATION-INCLUSION DILEMMA

389

TO FROMSTANDING NORMALIZATION Whitenesspersistsbecause the colorblinddemocracypresupposesracial distinctionsratherthanovercomesthem. It does so in a fashion similarto the way in which privatepropertyis presupposedby the state even after it is from it. As Marx argues, when propertyis abolished in the "emancipated" for public sphereby eliminatingthe propertyrequirement suffrage,private itself is not abolished.Instead,it thrivesas the rulingprincipleof the property birth,educaprivaterealm.Whenthe stateabolishesdistinctionsof property, andoccupationby grantingall adultmales equalpoliticalrights,it frees tion, education, privateintereststo act unfettered.Social distinctionsof property, and occupationcontinue to exist but now they are "private" mattersthat lie outside the jurisdictionof the political realm,immunefrom public accountability. "Farfrom abolishing these real distinctions,the state only exists on the presuppositionof theirexistence; it feels itself to be a political state and assertsits universalityonly in oppositionto these elements of its being."15 The relationshipbetween race and the state is similar. Once "emancipated"from the state, race is cast into the privaterealm. But as with private property,it does not disappearwhen it is freed from the state. Instead,the colorblinddemocracyredefines race from a relationshipof superiorityand inferiorityto a politically neutralcategory.An individual'srace now appears as a "natural" attribute shouldhave no bearingon one's political or ecothat nomic life. Rather than eliminating race, the colorblind state makes it racesas formedpriorto the public spherethrough prepolitical:it understands or naturalmeans such as biology, ancestry,culture,or essentially "private" even personalchoice. The political emancipationof race is, of course, a big step forward.Nevertheless, transformingrace into a prepoliticalcategory does not abolish its political influence. Just as the emancipationof property withdrawsinequalitiesof wealth from public deliberation,the emancipation of race removes the cross-class alliance from public scrutiny.16 The prepoliticization racehas threeimportant of consequences.First,race remainspublicly significanteven as it becomes a privatematter, the test of for a successful colorblinddemocracyis how well racialdiversityis accommodated.The peacefulcoexistence of variousracialidentitiesis a sign of a stable social order,while the absenceof diversityindicatesthe potentialfor instability. Obligationsof diversityjustify extensive stateregulation.Decisions that were once the ultimateprerogativeof the privateindividual-whom to hire, whom to allow to dine in your restaurant, whom to sell your home to, whom to allow in yoursocial club-are now publiclyregulated.Numerousrelationships-student and teacher,school and neighborhood,neighborand neighbor, owner and customer, employer and employee, cop and suspect, real

390

POLITICAL THEORY/ June 2002

estate agent and buyer and seller-are subjectedto increasedstate scrutiny, albeit for colorblindpurposes.Just as Foucaultmaintainsthat sex was not repressed in nineteenth-centuryEurope but proliferatedthrough various techniques and deployments,race is reproducedthroughthe various practices of the colorblinddemocracy.17 Second, a prepoliticalconceptionof race redefines racism from white supremacy to discrimination in general. Ignoringthe history of the Herrenvolk,the state assumes that all prejudice and discriminationare equally noxious. Anti-white attitudesare as significant as anti-Blackracism.Racism is no longer a social structure a matter but of individualcharacter. problemis no longer segregationbut "hate," The not but "intolerance," privilegebut "extremism." not Racsystematicinequality affair."18 ism, as Lewis Gordon writes, becomes an "equal-opportunity in regulatingnondiscrimination and diversity,the colorblind state Finally, redefines whiteness from a privilegedidentity to a politically neutralracial category.The white racebecomes simply one raceamongothers,andthe historical effects of three hundredyears of systematicwhite privilege are renderedpolitically invisible. of Thus,the transformation raceinto a prepoliticalcategorydoes not eliminate the significanceof whiteness so much as it normalizesit. Ratherthana formof publicstanding,whitenessin the colorblindstatefunctionsas a norm in which white privilege is sedimentedinto the backgroundof social life as the "natural outcome"of ordinary practicesandindividualchoices, makingit difficultto discernany systematicexplanationfor the advantages whites continueto enjoy afterthe civil rightsmovement. 9The state'sofficial positionof colorblindnessand its interestin regulatingdiversitymask the fact that the "normalindividual"is still the white individualand that the freedom of the white individual remains the standardagainst which social progress is judged. Whiteness as norm functions in at least two ways. As Cheryl Harris argues,it is a propertyinterestthatformsthe background againstwhich legal and equal opportunitiesare framed, defined, and disputes, rights claims, It adjudicated.20 is a form of propertybecause it sharesthe same premise as the rightto exclude. In the Herrenvolk whitenesswas literallya era, property: interestthatstoodfor the expectationof favoredstatus,protectionof property humanbeing. legal claims on Nativeland,andthe prospectof owninganother the the "Whitenesswas the characteristic, attribute, propertyof free human beings."21The colorblind state changed the form of whiteness, Harris intact.While courtsno longer acknowledges,butkept its exclusive character still refuseto eliminateinequalformsof discrimination, they protectexplicit ities of resourcesthatwhites have builtup over time. The colorblinddemocracy thus providesfor formalpolitical equalitybut not substantiveequality,

DILEMMA Olson / THE PARTICIPATION-INCLUSION

391

of or the redistribution resourcesto rectify white advantage."Whitenessas has taken on more subtle forms"since the civil rights movement, property "but[it] retainsits core characteristic-the legal legitimationof expectations of power andcontrolthatenshrinethe statusquo as a neutralbaseline, while maskingthe maintenanceof white privilege and domination."22 Whiteness also acts as a filter that provides whites an edge in an "equal In opportunity"society.23 the Herrenvolkera, standingwas akin to aristocraticprivilege. Once achieved,it was stable, inheritable,and enduring.But as white standingwas swept away by the civil rightsmovement,"thepossithat bility of aristocratization" white privilege offered disappearedas social advancementbecame subject to the competitive rules of the marketrather than inheringpartiallyin racial privilege. In the absence of racial standing, access to statusshifts to institutionsof "merit" such as the universityandthe market.Yet as ImmanuelWallersteinargues,in a world with too many job "desert," qualifiedpeople seeking too few status-holding positions, "merit," and"qualified" become politicalterms.Withthe talentpool too largeandtoo deep, it has to be skimmed somehow, essentially throughmeans that seem and arbitrary unfairto its victims. In such a context, whiteness operatesas a filterthatreducesthe possibility thatwhites or theirchildrenwill fall victim to the "arbitrary triage"that pares the pool of status seekers that merit can trimby so much.Rationalwhites act to securewhateveradvantages only they can by opposingthose policies thatundermine white advantage,such as affirmativeaction and school desegregation,althoughsuch strugglesare usually carriedout on the groundsof "individualrights"or "communitycontrol of schools" ratherthan explicit appealsto white supremacy. Whitenessis reproduced even as throughthese processesof normalization the colorblinddemocracyoutlawsracialdiscrimination. White advantageis depositedinto the social structure throughmeansas ostensiblyraceneutralas the generational transfer of wealth, criminal profiling, college entrance exams, and trackingin schools. These advantagesare material,yet they are also public andpsychological, for whitenessdoes not guarantee wealth,only the potentialto acquireit. This is why whitenessis both an interestin and an expectationof favoredtreatment.Such expectationsarecognates of the dual sense of equalityand supremacythatcharacterized white identityin the Herrenvolkera. The result is a racial orderin which, as Lawrie Balfour writes, "the persistence of hierarchyis simultaneouslycondemned and taken for granted."24 For those who are not white, the normalizationof white privilege often feels like the same emperor in new clothes, as whites continue to enjoy advantagesin nearlyevery aspectof social life. Meanwhile,personsof color continueto sufferHerrenvolk-era humiliationslike racialprofiling and per-

392

POLITICAL THEORY/ June 2002

sistent fits of white terrorinflictedby racial "extremists." whites, on the For other hand, normalizationis standing's poor cousin. In the Herrenvolk democracy,standingwas an individualizingform of power.Its functioning requiredthat every individualwhite person enjoy standingover every notwhite person.Justa few exceptionsthreatened entiresystem. By granting the to whites collectively, the Herrenvolkgrantedstatus to each and standing every white individually.The colorblinddemocracy,however,by definition requiresthat some not-whites enjoy greaterstatusthan some whites, otherwise the "colorblind"state would still be a Herrenvolksystem. Whiteness thus tends to shift from an individualizingto an aggregateform of power. Guaranteed standingis replacedby statisticaladvantages.Poverty,violence, and inferiorschooling, poor health,high incarceration unemployment rates, income disparities,and substandard continueto disproportionately housing affect those who are not white, while whites continueto disproportionately escape them. But because they are probabilities,not guarantees,the aggregated advantagesof normalizedwhiteness hardly seem like privileges. It means almost nothing to a particularwhite man to know that, on average, white males live almost ten years longer than Black males. The statistical likelihood thata white child will score 200 points higheron her SAT than a Black child is no guaranteethatthe white child will actuallyperformat that level, much less get into the school of her choice. Such statistics,however telling they are of the continuingwages of whiteness, are small comfortto a world used to more. containswithinit the seeds of futureinstability. In this way, normalization The result could be a reactionaryeffort to reestablishHerrenvolkforms of white privilege;evidence of this possibility is easily perceptibletoday. Yet to instabilityis also an opportunity expanddemocracyif whites can be convinced that short-term racial privileges are not worththeir long-termcosts. Overcoming the material,public, and psychological wages of whiteness, then, is not only crucial to eliminating racism, it is a vital component of efforts to expanddemocraticparticipation. Attemptsby theoriststo connect anti-racismwith a radicaldemocraticpolitics, however,have been thwarted by a peculiardilemma.

DILEMMA THEPARTICIPATION-INCLUSION To considerthe challengewhitenessposes for democratictheory,we must turnto the work of JudithShklar.AmericanCitizenshipstandsas one of the for strongestchallengesto politicaltheoriesthatargue,in one way or another, more participation ordinarypeople in those affairsthat affect their daily by

Olson / THE PARTICIPATION-INCLUSION DILEMMA

393

life.25Shklar argues that the primaryvalue of American citizenship is the social statusit confers, not the political power it bestows. Theoriesof democraticparticipationseek an ideal form of political activity that emulatesthe ancient Greek polis, but the disenfranchisedin Americanhistory have not but struggledfor participation standing.
The conceptof the Aristoteliancitizen as rulerhas not reallyhadmuchbearingon Americans.... [Disenfranchised Americans]haveaskedfor somethingquitedifferent,thatcitso izenshipbe equally distributed, thattheirstandingmight also be recognizedand their interestsbe defended and promoted.The call for a classical participatory democracy may,therefore,be farfromdemocratic,because it does not correspondto the aspirations of most Americansnow and has never done so in the past.26

Theoristsandactivistsof democraticparticipation oftenhaveto learnthis lesson the hardway, when they discoverthatthe people for whom they arefighting to empoweroften do not seem interestedin greaterparticipation. The exclusive characterof citizenship,rootedin the antitheticalrelationship between the citizen and the slave, representsthe basic challenge of Americandemocracyfor Shklar.The democratictaskis notto implementfarflung models of strong democracy but to achieve the full inclusion of excludedgroupsin orderto grantall Americansequalstandingas "independent citizen-earners." minimumrequirements standing,she argues,are The for the rightto vote and the rightto a job. Whatone does with the vote-or even whetherone uses it-is relativelyunimportant; whatcounts is the statusthat comes frompossessing it. Likewise, one'sjob need not be fulfilling or enjoyable, only recognized as essential to a sense of belonging.27 Shklar'sargumentposes a dilemmabetween inclusion and participation. A politics of inclusionholds thatthe centralproblemof moder democracyis the numeroussystems of exclusion thataccompanyit and that the principal means towarda more democraticsociety is the full inclusion of excluded populationsinto the polity. The "questfor inclusion,"Shklarargues, is to grantequal standingto all. Yet the problemwith inclusion, as Shklarreadily confesses, is thatit tendsto producea passiveformof citizenshipthatis disinclined towardexpandedparticipation because its objectiveis the possession of statusrather thanthe exerciseof one's powerin public affairs.On the other assumesthatsubstantive citizen participation hand,a politics of participation in deliberationand decision makingis the benchmarkof a democraticsocifor do ety. Accordingto Shklar,arguments participation not speakto the real political desires of Americans, who seek standing. But the problem runs deeper than that. Theories of democraticparticipationrarely confront the problemof racialstanding.In a white-dominated polity,expandingparticipation strengthensthe grip of the white majority,since whites set the agenda

394

POLITICAL THEORY/ June 2002

and determinewho participatesand how. After all, Black and PuertoRican childrenwere keptout of Canarsieschools throughmass meetings.By ignoring the problemof whiteness, a strategyfor participation may contributeto the tyrannyof the white majority. Of course, inclusion and participation not necessarily contradictory. are Inclusionis a prerequisite democratic for participation-one cannotbe active in a club unless one has been let into it-and the purposeof inclusionis often to empowerthe formerlyexcluded to act in the public sphere.The dilemma between them is a historical consequence of racialized citizenship in the United States, not an inherentcontradiction.Nevertheless, the dilemma is of impressive.The questfor inclusionexpandsthe membership the polity but in it because it reproducescitizenship as discourages greaterparticipation standing.The quest for participation promises more democracy,yet it does not confrontthe problemof racialstanding; thus,it may end up tighteningthe of the white majority. presentlyconstructed, As neitherholds tyrannicalgrip out much hope for a more democraticsociety. How, in a polity in which whitenessanddemocracyhavebeen inextricablyconnected,can greaterparticipationbe achievedwithout inviting a lynch mob? The dilemma between inclusion and participation most evident when is each is understoodas a strategyfor a democraticsociety. A strategyof inclusion seeks the full admissionof all personsinto the polity,while a strategyof aims to expandparticipation withinthe polity.The formertends participation in to emphasizethe needto guarantee politicalequalityandequalopportunity the face of discrimination,while the lattertends to emphasize the need to expanddeliberationand decision makingby ordinarypersons.These strategies should be complementary,but the history of white supremacyin the United States places them at cross-purposes.28 The strategyof inclusion fails to resolve the dilemma for two reasons. First, it may eliminate white standing,but it does not abolish whiteness as norm. For example, Shklar recognizes that racial inequality persists even afterthe Civil RightsandVotingRightsActs, buther solutionfor it-a stateguaranteed for everyone-does not necessarily abolish white privilege. job Such a guarantee would no doubtaid manypeople of color,perhapsa dispronumberof themcomparedto whites, butthe rightto ajob or even a portionate living wage does not necessarilyunderminewhites' privilegedaccess to the best jobs, the highest salaries,and the most lucrativecontracts.Nor do such measuresnecessarilyundermine"firsthired,last fired"policies, glass floors, or wealthimbalancesthatfavorwhites. The second problemis thatinclusion The is not a strategyfor greaterparticipation. absenceof substantive participationby ordinarycitizens in the affairsthataffect them is not a problemfor

DILEMMA Olson / THE PARTICIPATION-INCLUSION

395

Shklar's"dystopicliberalism," it is for anytheorythatseeks to stretchthe but limits of liberaldemocracy.29 A strategyto dissolve or abolish the cross-class alliance that constitutes whitenessaddressesboth of these problems.Whitenessis the dominantcategory in the racialorder.Abolishingthe categoryeliminatesthe social significance of white identity and hence "abolishes"the identityitself. Practically speaking,an abolitioniststrategyhas two prongs.It seeks to eliminateovert or normalizedsystems of white privilege such as redlining,racialprofiling, and trackingin schools, and it implies supportfor any policy or program, such as affirmative actionandreparations, undermineswhite advantage. that It calls attentionto andseeks to redressany outcome(such as raciallyskewed mortgage rejection, unemployment, and life expectancy rates) in which racialprivilege is evident yet is explainedaway as the "natural outcome"of marketsor the aggregationof individualchoices. The second prongopposes any attemptto reconstitutewhiteness in the post-civil rights era. Effortsto resuscitatea "progressive" "anti-racist" or white identity have gained curin the educationfield, but this noble cause faces historicalforces too rency stiff to overcome.30 White identity in the United States has always reflected an interestin and an expectationof favoredtreatment. This historicalburden of privilegepresentsan almost insuperableobstacleto transforming "white" into a radicallydemocraticidentity.In the absenceof a usablepast, effortsto reinventwhiteness tempt to raise demons that should ratherbe exorcised. The firstprongis essentially a thoroughcivil rightsagendaand is consistentwith a strategyof inclusion.The second prong,however,is distinctin its attemptto "exclude" (by dissolving) dominant identities from the public sphere.The strategyof abolition is also differentin terms of its objectives. One of its ends is to break up the cross-class alliance in orderto eliminate overt and normalizedsystems of white privilege and to expand the public sphere to include subordinatedgroups. Yet it is also a strategyfor greater democracy.Abolishing the cross-class alliance opens up opportunitiesto forge new relationswith more democraticpotential.Replacing white racial unity with class unity,for example,would go a long way towardchallenging inequalitiesof wealth thatdemocratictheoristsrecognize as a crucialobstacle to a moredemocraticsociety. Further, opens up opportunities expand it to democraticparticipation. The simultaneousexistence of racialprivilege and political equality that characterizeswhiteness inhibits attemptsto expand democracybecause it gives whites an interestin preservingtheir privilege, often at the expense of expandingdemocracy.Dissolving whiteness eliminates these competing interests and thus holds potential to expand democraticparticipation.

396

POLITICAL THEORY/ June 2002

Of course, a just distribution wealth and greaterdemocraticparticipaof tion do not follow automaticallyfrom the dissolutionof whiteness;they are I only possibilities. Further, readily acknowledgethatthe notion of abolishwhite identityis difficultto imagine.Nevertheless,it is not withouthistoring ical and philosophicalprecedent.The abolitionof feudalism abolishedlord andserf.The abolitionof slaveryabolishedmasterandslave.The abolitionof In capitalismpromisesto abolish bourgeoisand proletarian. much the same the dissolution of whiteness suggests the abolition of the categories way, "white"and "not-white"themselves. As the dissolution of the aristocracy paved the way for representativegovernmentand the abolition of slavery inauguratedRadical Reconstruction,the dissolution of whiteness could democracy. potentiallyexpandthe boundariesof contemporary I hastento addthatabolishingwhitenessis not the same as abolishingrace impliesdissolvingits antitheperse. Althoughdissolvingthecategory"white" sis "not-white"as well, it does not require abolishing Black, Chicano/a, Indian,or othersuch identities, since they have a culturaland social content of statusas not-white.But since the white cateindependent theirsubordinate has little contentindependentof its position of privilege, it could congory ceivably disappearas a viable identity. Despite the strategyof inclusion's difficulty in eliminating normalized the whiteness and in expandingdemocraticparticipation, politics of incluto sion dominatesdemocratictheory'sapproach race.Meanwhile,the historical dilemma between it and participationis rarely considered. Some conOthers scarcely sider racism to be symptomatic of broader problems.31 are mentionit.32Still others assume that inclusion and participation symbiotic: the politics of inclusion are slowly, if unevenly,removingdiscriminawhich tion from Americansociety, which in turnencouragesparticipation, An furtherreduces discrimination.33 increasingly common response is to as defineracialdiscrimination a problemof difference.Accordingto this perthe plurality of identities-ethnic, national, racial, cultural, spective, gendered,religious-is both the centralproblem and grandopportunityof politics. Modem society is pluraland diverse,yet it rests on a contemporary series of exclusions. The philosophical-political challenge of theoriesof difdifference as an asset to ference is to constructa politics that understands Theoriesof differencearepotentiallyuseful thana threat.34 democracyrather dilemmabecause they tend to in cuttingthroughthe participation-inclusion be more attunedto the limits of inclusion, sometimes approaching positions similarto a strategyof abolition.Nevertheless,even the politics of difference can be trippedup by the problemof whiteness and the dilemma it creates, sometimesin spite of itself. An exampleof this lies in one of the most impor-

Olson / THE PARTICIPATION-INCLUSION DILEMMA

397

tant texts on the politics of difference, William Connolly's The Ethos of Pluralization.

AND THE DIFFERENCE POLITICSOF INCLUSION TheEthos of Pluralizationbegins as a conversationwith pluralism.Connolly acknowledgesthat conventionalpluralismhas its strengths:it is premised on the irreduciblediversityof the social sphereand often encourages the developmentof difference, especially in situationswhere culturalconsensus is impossible. Nevertheless, conventional pluralism assumes that diverseidentities,interests,andculturesorbitarounda "universal" ideal, like civic identity,or rationalself-interest,andit tendsto assumethatindireason, viduals' identities are coherentand fully formedpriorto their entranceinto the public sphereratherthanconstructedin the public sphereitself. As such, conventionalpluralismtreatsidentitiesas largelystaticandunchanging.This indiassumptionof stableidentitygives rise to the constructionof a "normal vidual" against which "abnormal"identities are measured. This is the "unconsciousconservatism" the centerof the conventionalpluralistimagiat nation:new additionsto the public spheremust comportwith the norm,else they are considereda potentialthreatto social stability.35 Arboreal Connolly characterizesconventionalpluralism as "arboreal." assumes a tree-likeconceptionof difference:multipleand diverse pluralism branchesjut out everywherebut areconnectedto a common trunkof values. Arboreal pluralism's fear is that diversity can be taken too far: the of overproliferation identitiescan fragmentthe public spherelike too many branches,burdeningthe trunkto the point where it splits. This fear is heavy unnecessary,Connolly argues.It reflects the limits of the arborealimagination ratherthanthe amountof diversitya society can actuallyaccommodate. He proposesa "rhizomatic to pluralism" overcomethe limits of conventional A rhizome is a plant thathas no centraltrunkor stem but instead pluralism. consists of a networkof roots below andshoots abovethatspreadthroughout the environment,appearingin a variety of locations and connected only throughthe network itself. A rhizomaticpluralismrejects the notion that there can be too much diversity.A public sphere will fragmentunder the stressof differenceonly if its identitiesdeclarethemselvesnormalor truthful andexcludeotheridentitiesas abnormal, false, or deviant."Topluralizeis not to fragmentize," writes. "Todogmatizeis to fragmentize."36 rhizomatic he A pluralismavoids this sort of fundamentalismby embracingpluralization,

398

POLITICAL THEORY/ June 2002

of which not only encouragesthe proliferation identitiesbut recognizes that in relationsamong identities alter identities themselves. Pluralizachanges tion rests upon an "ethosof criticalresponsiveness"that "opensup cultural space through which new possibilities of being might be enacted" and The ways of being."37 democratictask, respectsthe pluraland "multifarious is to pluralizethe political realmby "[striving]to cultivate Connolly asserts, an ethos of criticalresponsivenessto political movementsthatchallenge the self-confidence and congealedjudgmentsof dominantconstituencies."38 revisionof pluralism.Connolly is The ethos of pluralization an important that it is fundamentalism,not diversity,that threatens convincingly argues as social stability.He pointsto normalization a centralproblemfor expanding while conventionalpluralismunderstands diversity as democracy.Further, the presence of multiple but fixed, alreadyformed identities in the public That assumesthatsuch identitiesare"self-revisionary." sphere,pluralization the emergenceof a new identityor changes in an existing one inevitably is, and through modify otheridentities,since they areconstructed reconstructed relationsof difference.For example, a rhizomaticpluralismwould not just includeoppressedraces in the public sphereon an equalfooting with whites, itself by compelling it to shed its it would reconfigure"Angloidnationality" of superiorityand normalcy. presumptions
The long termresultof such a series of shifts [in the self-recognitionof a dominantconof stituency]in severaldomainswouldbe the historicaltransition Americafroma majorminoritiesin a democraticstate to a democraticstate itynationpresidingover numerous of multipleminoritiescontendingand collaboratingwitha general ethos offorbearance and critical responsiveness.39

The ethos of pluralizationwould not merely welcome other peoples into a polity once reservedexclusively for whites, it would alter white identity as well. "Thepolitics of enactment... presses hegemonicidentities,which are always dependentupon the very differences they define, to translatethis into experienceof disturbance a will to modify themselvesso thattheyno lonremainexactly what they were."40 ger The termsConnollyuses to describechangesin dominantidentities,such are and as "modify" "self-revise,""reconfigure," "transition," not wholly and to terms such as "abolition" "dissolution." Nevertheless,his equivalent claim thatthe entranceof new identitiesin the social spherecreates"newpossibilities of being" for existing identities suggests a compatibilitybetween rhizomaticpluralismand a strategyof abolition."Criticalresponsivenessto denaturalization he the injuriesof Otherness," writes,"impliesa comparative of and reconfiguration hegemonic identities whose characterdepended on

Olson / THE PARTICIPATION-INCLUSION DILEMMA

399

If these specifications of difference."41 a dominantidentity possesses little as outside a system of subordination, in the case of whiteness, its meaning and could easily be readto imply its dis"denaturalization reconfiguration" solution.After all, white identityis not so mucha signifierfor a pinkishpeoEuropeanancestryas it is for a system of power that ple of predominantly constructsrelationsof subordination privilege. Dismantlingthese relaand tions leaves white identityas little morethanan empty signifierthatis barely useful to describea skin color. The ethos of pluralization points in the direction of white abolition, since it holds that a politics of racial difference implies the erosion of white dominance-and thus white identityitself. Notwithstanding this compatibility, however, Connolly's argument arrivesat political conclusions that, if followed, would solidify whiteness ratherthandissolve it. A rhizomaticpluralism,he maintains,would modify of "Angloididentity"and compel it to shed its presumptions supremacyand Given this, the political task would seem to be to encouragethose normality. activities that confront and undermine such presumptions.Yet Connolly rejectsa directapproachto confrontingwhiteness. He arguesthatthe issues addressedby welfare liberals in the post-civil rights era-women's rights, racism, ecology, discrimination-ignore the hardshipsfaced by the white workingclass, pushingit into the open armsof the right."Thepolitics of welfareliberalismfromthe late sixties onwardbetrayedthe white workingclass, driving a section of it towarda fundamentalismof gender, self, race, and nation."42 suggests thatthe "fundamentalisms" the white workingclass of He could be "renegotiated" retooling programscurrentlyaimed at women by andpeople of color, such as affirmative a action,so thatthey incorporate class or income dimension.This would "go a long way towardeasing the sense of insult and discriminationamong Reagan Democrats,for their children ... would no longer be singled out as the only constituencythat deserves to be stuck in the crumbyjobs now availableto it."43 This indirect approachof combating white racism by expanding racea specific programsto incorporate class dimensionis increasinglypopularin left-liberal circles. Ruy Teixeira and Joel Rogers, for example, argue that althoughthe white workingclass comprisesabout55 percentof the electorate, its needs have long been ignoredby the political system. The partythat can win over this "forgottenmajority"will dominatethe political landscape well into the twenty-firstcentury.44 Doing so will requireadvocatinga stronthatcan improvebasic aspectsof workers'lives, fromhealth ger government insuranceto educationto retirementto a healthybalancebetween work and family life. The Democratsareideologically bettersituatedto carryout such a programthan the Republicans,but to do so Democratswill have to shift

400

POLITICAL THEORY/ June 2002

theirfocus from the conditionof gays, women, and minoritiestowardadvocating "universal" programsthat help all of the working class. Thus, they should replace programssuch as affirmativeaction and busing with classbased affirmativeaction and "class-basedintegration" programs.45 This argumentis ironic because the Americanwelfare state historically did not ignore the white workingclass but cateredto its racialinterests.The Social Security Act excluded farm workersand domestics (most of whom were Black) fromreceivingbenefits.The FederalHousingAgency promoted residential segregation and channeled money toward white suburbs.The Environmental ProtectionAgency located garbagedumps and toxic waste sites away from white neighborhoods,while the federal highway system comdestroyedhousing in Black neighborhoodsto connect white suburban mutersto their downtownjobs. All of these welfare liberal programswere in premisedon the consolidationof the "possessiveinvestment" whiteness.46 Given this, the white workingclass's alienationfrom progressivepolitics is more likely due to their resistance to programsthat erode their privileged standingthan an overemphasison subordinated groupsby welfare liberals. whites' expectations of favored status is key to expanding Confronting or democracy,but a "universal" class-basedprogramdownplayswhites' historicalprivileges.In so doing, it appeaseswhite expectationsrather thanchalthem. lenges This is not to say thatclass-basedprograms wouldnot help AfricanAmericans and otherpeople of color. They likely would, and they might even distributebenefits to people of color disproportionately comparedto whites, as TeixeiraandRogerscontend.Nevertheless,the success of suchprogramsstill dependson how well they comportwith what DerrickBell calls the "white self-interest principle":whites will supportsocial and political programs aimed at AfricanAmericansonly if they standto benefit from them as well. This leaves such programspolitically vulnerableshould whites' supportfor themwane.This vulnerability signifies the continuingpowerof whiteness.47 An ethos of pluralization equippedto avoidthese pitfalls.It undermines is the power of dominantidentitiesby challengingthem to not merely include new identityclaims withinits spherebutto transform itself in the face of such inclusion. Unfortunately, does not follow throughon the implicaConnolly tions of his argumentas it relates to white identity.48 Pursuingclass-based that include all of the poor ratherthan programsthat undermine programs white advantagemay appearto be more inclusive and less divisive, but due to the historical dilemma between participationand inclusion in a whitedominatedpolity, such inclusion does not necessarilyunderminewhite norit. malizationbutcan unintentionally perpetuate Giventhe limits of inclusion in the face of the participation-inclusion dilemma, an ethos of pluralization

DILEMMA Olson / THE PARTICIPATION-INCLUSION

401

calls for a politics of differencethatdirectlychallenges whiteness and links this challengeto a participatory politics. The basis of such a politics lies in the work of Iris MarionYoung and Lani Guinier.

AND PARTICIPATION THE POLITICSOF DIFFERENCE for emergesoutof hercritiqueof whatshe Young'sargument participation terms the distributiveparadigmof justice, which understands justice as the fair and ethical distributionof benefits, burdens,and resources among the is membersof a society.Young'smaincriticismof the paradigm thatits focus on distribution constructsa model of citizens as possessorsandconsumersof goods. This tends to depoliticize social life, as the emphasison distribution takes precedence over other issues, such as the organizationof production and decision-makingprocesses.49 Young proposes a more active conception of justice, a politics of difference, that improves on the distributiveparadigmby including deliberation and decision making as elements of justice in additionto distribution.The primaryconcernof justice, Youngargues,shouldbe to confrontdomination and ("the institutionalconstrainton self-determination") oppression ("the institutional constraint self-development").50 on Dominationandoppression, she argues,are groupconditions. Similarto Connolly's conceptionof idensocial groupsas "expressionsof social relations."51 Inditity, she understands viduals do not just constitutegroups;groupsconstituteindividuals.Justice, then, is the elimination of the oppressionand dominationof social groups and throughself-determination the ability to develop one's capacities. It is "theinstitutionalized conditionsthatmake it possible for all to learnand use satisfying skills in socially recognized settings, to participatein decisionmaking, and to express theirfeelings, experience,and perspectiveon social life in contexts where otherscan listen."52 The strengthof Young'sargument twofold. First,it emphasizesparticiis as a key democraticideal while acknowledgingthe importanceof pation wealthis not so muchan end as it politicaland social equality.Redistributing is a prerequisiteto the ability to participatedemocraticallyin the processes and institutionsof collective life.
Justice equally requires... participation public discussion and processes of demoin craticdecisionmaking.All personsshouldhavethe rightandopportunity participate to in the deliberationand decisionmakingof the institutionsto which theiractionscontribute

402

POLITICAL THEORY/ June 2002 or whichdirectlyaffecttheiractions.... Democracyis bothanelementanda conditionof social justice.53

Second, it challenges Shklar'sconceptionof citizenshipas standing,not by over standingbut by conmerely expressing a preferencefor participation the eliminationof oppressionto thepracticeof participation. Shklar's necting for the exclusion of African Americans and white women is to remedy includethemin the polity.Young'sremedyis notjust theirinclusionbut also theirparticipation, which is necessary for a group's self-determination and the developmentof an individual'scapacities. Young'sconcept of a social grouphas been one of the most controversial Liberalssuch as RonaldBeinerchargethatit promotes partsof herargument. the "ghettoization" identitiesandundermines significanceof the state. of the Postmodernists such as ChantalMouffe criticize it as essentialistand unable to account for the constructionof new identities. Criticaltheorists such as Nancy Fraserargue that the concept is modeled too closely on the ethnic group,andas a resultgender,class, race, andsexualitydo not fit into it well.54 for Young'saccountof the social groupis problematic,particularly the reasons pointed out by Mouffe and Fraser.The debate as it standsso far,however, overlooksthe real limitationof the concept:it does not considerprivilege as a problemof justice as well as oppressionanddomination.As a result, like Connolly, Young does not consider that a politics of difference might imply the dissolution of privileged social groups. A critiqueof privilege is implied in her analysis, since the oppressionof one groupis almost always An done for the advantageof another. explicit analysisof privilege,however, would have avoided many of the pitfalls of her concept of a social group, since it shifts the problem from subordinategroups to the anti-democratic natureof dominantgroups.It would also redressthe centraldifficultyof her which would grantspecific controversial proposalfor grouprepresentation, for oppressedgroups. The paradoxof this proposalis that it representation presumesthe presenceof oppressedgroupsyet its purposeis to end oppression; hence the proposalinitiatesits own obsolescence. A political program for the dissolution of the privilegedgroup,however,does not requiregroup for representation, abolitiondoes not bringaboutequalitybetweengroupsso of much as it transformsthe very structure grouprelationsin the polity. Nevertheless,Young'semphasison participation helps to revealthe limits of inclusion in challenging the whiteness of American democracy.Comwith a critiqueof privilege,I towardparticipation biningYoung'sorientation dilemma. The latterelecan overcome the participation-inclusion suggest, mentof the synthesisis foundin LaniGuinier'scritiqueof majoritytyranny.

DILEMMA Olson / THE PARTICIPATION-INCLUSION

403

THETYRANNY THE WHITE OF MAJORITY In The Tyranny the Majority,Guinierarguesthatthe centraldangerof of majorityrule is not thatit threatensthe rightsof individualsor minoritiesbut that it is a winner-take-allsystem in which 50 percent+ 1 of the voters win everythingwhile everyone else gets nothing.This turnspolitics into a zerosum competitionfor power ratherthana means of includingeveryonein the processes of governance.This dangeris exacerbatedin a polity in which the majorityis raciallyprejudicedagainstthe minorityto such an extent thatthe minority is consistently excluded from representationand policy making. When this happens,majorityruleperpetuates racialinequality,as the combinationof a winner-take-all and white prejudiceturnsAfricanAmerisystem cans into permanent political minorities.Permanent minoritystatusprevents African Americansfrom participating meaningfullyin politics, even when theirpolitical rightsareguaranteed the VotingRights Act. Whetherin the by Herrenvolkor colorblinderas, "Racialpolarizationin the electorateand in the legislative body ... [transforms] majorityrule into majoritytyranny."55 Guinierproposesa procedural remedyfor the problemof (white)majority Democraticprocedures,she holds, arejust as important substanas tyranny. tive valuesor ideals, for "procedural in a veryrealsense, shapesubstanrules, tive outcomes."56 Eliminatingpermanentmajoritiesrequiresturningzerosum electoral outcomes into "positive-sum"outcomes, or results in which everyone wins or at least takes a turnat winning. She proposesreplacing50 with a percent+ 1 majoritiesand the territorial districtingof representatives of cumulative voting, in which voters receive the same numberof system votes as thereareseats to vote for,butrather thanbeing limitedto voting only for representatives withintheirgeographicdistrict,they can vote for anyrepresentative.Further, voters can distribute theirvotes as they please, "plumpthem with one candidateor distributing them among severalaccording ing" to the intensityof theirpreferences.Such a system,Guinierargues,would not only make it likely that at least one of a voter's candidateswill be elected, it Cumulativevoting providescitiencouragesgreaterpolitical participation. zens with an incentiveto organizealliancesto vote as a single bloc or to form strategic coalitions with other groups to gain mutual benefits, since "any It politically cohesive group can vote strategicallyto win representation."57 would encouragepeople to vote accordingto theirinterestsrather thanwhere they live (as geographicdistrictsdo) or who they are (as race-baseddistricts as do). It would eliminategerrymandering well as "safe"districtscontrolled one party that are largely immune to political competition.Cumulative by voting, Guinierargues,would make elections competitiveand give citizens an incentive to participate beyond simply voting.

404

POLITICAL THEORY/ June 2002

Guinier's argumentdemonstratesthat majority tyranny does not just exclude minorities;it builds white advantageinto the electoral process and even given the protectionsof the Voting Rights Act. inhibits participation, White privilege is normalized through ostensibly race-neutrallegislative system. Guiniermakes a qualifieddefense districtingand a winner-take-all of race-consciousdistrictingin Tyranny the Majority,arguingthat given of to the currentsystem of territorial districting,racial gerrymandering create or Latino districtsis sometimes necessary to ensure Black majority-Black andLatinopolitical representation.5 Ultimately,however,this solution candistricts becausethe creationof majority-Black not dislodge white advantage bodies (and as permanent includes people of color into representative only minoritiesat that). It does nothing to enhance the extent or quality of their A participation. better solution, she argues, would be to scrap group-based altogether(geographicas well as racial) and replace it with representation interest-based that representation employs cumulativevoting. The problem of the white majority,Guinier shows, cannot be resolved to throughinclusion alone. Inclusion,of course,is preferable life priorto the for Guinier,like Young, the goal is not simply to Voting Rights Act, yet ensurerepresentation minoritygroupsbut to enhancetheirparticipation. for "Theright to a meaningfulvoice does not measureparticipation simply by countingcompetitivevotes; it examines the extent to which a system mobidebatefrom a range lizes broad-based voterparticipation, fosters substantive of viewpoints, and provides and reinforces opportunitiesfor all voters to exercise meaningfulchoice throughoutthe process of decision making and Guinier'sproposalsare aimednot so much at securingrepregovernance."59 minoritiesbuttowardeliminating sentationfor permanent permanentmajorthe ities. This requiresundermining power of whiteness throughprocedures of that foster the participation everyone. Guinieroffers her proposalsin the spiritof fairnessand in the belief that they will fulfill the potentialof moderndemocracy.As such, her argument does not necessarilytest the boundariesof liberaldemocracy.Nevertheless, her critique of majority tyranny does have radical democratic potential because it connects a critiqueof racialprivilege with an orientationtoward to Guinier'scontribution democratictheoryis not her specific participation. and which areoverlyproceduralist havebeen suggested(andeven proposals, elsewhere,but her theoreticalorientation.6She demonstrates implemented) thatthe tyrannyof the white majorityremainsa centralproblemof American as democracyand shows how it is a problemof privilege and participation well as one of exclusionandinclusion.Herargument suggeststhatabolishing the white majoritywould not only include people of color, it would undermine normalizedwhite advantage.In so doing, it could expandparticipation

Olson / THE PARTICIPATION-INCLUSION DILEMMA

405

and foster political conditions that make more radicalforms of democracy possible. Guinierdoes not make this argument explicitly but she hints at the transformative of her proposalswhen she writes, "Thewinnerpossibilities take-some-but-not-all approachcontemplates 'strongdemocracy,'meaning an invigoratedelectoratethatparticipates opposedto spectates)through(as out the political process."6' The democraticproblemof whitenesspersistsafterthe Herrenvolk Its era. shift froma formof standingto a normhas obscuredandweakenedthe value of whitenessin some ways, butthe cross-class alliancecontinuesto function throughthe normaloperationsof contemporary democracy.It persists as a for democratictheory as well, not only in that it is the engine of problem racial discriminationbut also in that it continues to drive a wedge between inclusion and participation.Strategiesto include persons of color into the polity by giving themequalstandingwith whites do little to expandparticipation. Yet strategiesto expandparticipation easily end up bolsteringwhite can as Guinierandthe Canarsieboycottreveal.Neitherstrategy majoritytyranny, alone, then,is sufficientfor democratictheory.A politics thatemphasizesthe abolitionof whiteness, however,directlyconfrontsracialprivilege in a way thatincludes the excluded and encouragesthe expansionof democraticpardilemmaand suggests a criticipation.It resolves the participation-inclusion of liberaldemocraticinstitutionsas they presentlyexist. tique This is not to say that dissolving whiteness would be easy. It can be achievedin partthroughactivitiesthatundermine wages of whiteness,but the it also requiresthe creationof a new political hegemony that goes beyond colorblindnessin opposingnormalizedwhiteness.This is undoubtedlya difficult task, particularlygiven the public and psychological attachmentsto white identity. Yet I submit there is little alternative.So long as the white citizen simultaneously insists on his privileges and denies they exist, the potential for white reaction remains. So long as the politics of inclusion dominatesthinkingon race, democratictheory will continue to runinto the dilemmaandcontinueto havedifficultystretchingits participation-inclusion the boundariesof liberal democracy.A participatory imaginationbeyond politics must be an abolitionistpolitics.

NOTES
1. "View of Head of CommunityBoard,"New York Times,October30, 1972, 24. 2. LeonardBuder, "CanarsieReportsAttendanceGains,"New YorkTimes,November9, 1972, 1. For a full account, see JonathanRieder, Canarsie: TheJews and Italians of Brooklyn against Liberalism(Cambridge,MA: Harvard UniversityPress, 1985), chap. 7.

406

POLITICAL THEORY/ June 2002

this 3. Throughout essay I typicallyfocus on the AfricanAmericanexperiencein contrastto thatof whites. In doing so, I do not meanto reinforcethe assumptionthatraceis only a matterof Black and white. As I arguebelow, race is a relationshipthat distinguishesamong whites and not-whites,the latterof which can describea varietyof ethnic or culturalgroups.I use Black as the archetypeof not-whitenessin this essay because, as I explain, whiteness was largely constructedin the context of slavery and segregation. 4. Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals: ConflictingVisionsof Citizenshipin U.S. History(New Haven,CT: Yale UniversityPress, 1997), chaps. 8 and 9. MA: HarAmericanCitizenship:TheQuestforInclusion (Cambridge, 5. JudithN. Shklar, vardUniversityPress, 1991), 16. 6. Noel Ignatiev,How theIrishBecame White(New York:Routledge,1995);MatthewFrye and Jacobson,Whiteness a DifferentColor:EuropeanImmigrants theAlchemyof Race (Camof UniversityPress, 1998). bridge, MA: Harvard 7. Joel Olson, "The Democratic Problem of the White Citizen,"Constellations8, no. 2 (June2001): 163-83. 8. PierreL. van den Berghe, Race and Racism:A ComparativePerspective(New York: John Wiley, 1967), 18. 9. W.E.B. Du Bois, Black Reconstructionin America: 1860-1880 (New York:Atheneum, 1992), 700-1. 10. AnthonyW. Marx,MakingRace and Nation:A Comparisonof SouthAfrica, the United States, and Brazil (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress, 1998), 14-15. 11. The specific phrase"wagesof whiteness"comes from David R. Roediger,The Wagesof Class (New York:Verso, 1991). Whiteness:Race and the Makingof the American Working 12. Stephanie M. Wildman, with contributionsby MargalynneArmstrong,Adrienne D. Davis, and TrinaGrillo, Privilege Revealed: How Invisible Preference UnderminesAmerica (New York:New YorkUniversityPress, 1996), 29. 13. While I assumethatthe dissolutionof the Herrenvolk the civil rightsmovementis perby manent,numerousscholarshave noted uncannysimilaritiesbetween the aftermathof Reconthatthe civil rightsmovementstands structionand the post-civil rightsera today.My argument as a watershedin Americandemocracyshould be read with this warningin mind: we can go back. See, for example, Robin D. G. Kelley, Yo'Mama'sDisFUNKtional!Fightingthe Culture Warsin UrbanAmerica(Boston:Beacon, 1997);PhilipA. Klinknerwith RogersM. Smith, The UnsteadyMarch:TheRise and Decline of Racial Equalityin America(Chicago:Universityof Chicago Press, 1999). 14. Peggy Macintosh,"WhitePrivilegeandMale Privilege:A PersonalAccountof Coming to See CorrespondencesThrough Work in Women's Studies" (Working Paper No. 189, Wellesley College Centerfor Researchon Women, 1988), 1-2. 15. Karl Marx, "On the Jewish Question,"in Karl Marx and FrederickEngels, Collected vol. 3 (New York:International, Works, 1975), 153. 16. Neil Gotanda,"ACritiqueof 'OurConstitutionIs Color-Blind,'" StanfordLaw Review 44, no. I (November 1991): 1-68. 17. Michel Foucault,The Historyof Sexuality:VolumeI. An Introduction (New York:Vintage, 1990). 18. Lewis R. Gordon,Bad FaithandAntiblackRacism(AtlanticHighlands,NJ: Humanities White Supremacyin Post Civil Rights Press, 1995); Peniel E. Joseph," 'Black' Reconstructed: America,"The Black Scholar 25, no. 4 (Fall 1995): 52-55. The crowning glory of this conseactionhave been redefinedby theirproponentsas quence is thateffortsto eliminateaffirmative "civil rights initiatives."

DILEMMA Olson / THE PARTICIPATION-INCLUSION

407

is 19. My distinctionbetween standingandnormalization not meantto imply thatnormalizing practicesareexclusive to thepost-civil rightseraor thatstandingbelongs only to theHerrenvolk age. The residues of white standingcontinue to operatein racial profiling, INS raids, and that "drivingwhile Black."Likewise, Du Bois always understood the basis of white poweris not so much its official backing by the state as it is the fact that the white world's domination appears-especially to whites-as the normalcondition of society. "The present attitudeand actionof the white worldis not basedsolely uponrational,deliberateintent.It is a matterof conditionedreflexes;of long followed habits,customs andfolkways;of subconscioustrainsof reasoning andunconsciousnervousreflexes."W.E.B.Du Bois, Duskof Dawn: An Essay towardan 1995), 171-72. My pointis of Autobiography a Race Concept(New Brunswick,NJ:Transaction, is not so muchthatnormalization a "newform"of racismthathas replacedan "oldform"butthat to the shift from the Herrenvolk the colorblinddemocracyhas been accompaniedby a change in the generalmeans by which racial power operates. HarvardLaw Review 106, no. 8 (June 1993): 20. Cheryl Harris,"Whitenessas Property," 1713-14. 21. Ibid., 1721. 22. Ibid., 1715. 23. This analysis is suggestedby ImmanuelWallerstein'sworkon the meaningof the bourgeoisie in history.ImmanuelWallerstein,"TheBourgeois(ie)as Conceptand Reality,"in Race, Nation, Class: AmbiguousIdentities,ed. EtienneBalibarand ImmanuelWallerstein(London: Verso, 1991). 24. LawrieBalfour," 'A Most DisagreeableMirror':Race Consciousness as Double Consciousness,"Political Theory26, no. 3 (June 1998): 347. is 25. I assume that participation at the heartof proposalsfor a more radical,deliberative, or agonal,stronger, deeperdemocracy.Democratictheoryhas otherconcernsas communicative, and of well, such as a more equitabledistribution wealth, the educativeeffects of participation, the expansionof individualrights to include "social"or welfare rights. Nevertheless,whether throughcitizenship,civic associations,workplacedemocracy,councils, collectives, communes, deliberativespaces, or coalitions, democratictheoryis definedby the quest, in some manner,to underexisting liberaldemocracies.In orderto avoid go beyondthe limits of citizen participation confusionbetweenthis objectiveandthe philosophyof participatory democracyassociatedwith CarolePateman,C. B. Macpherson,and others,I will generallyreferto "democratic participation"insteadof "participatory democracy." 26. Shklar,AmericanCitizenship,30. 27. Ibid., 94. and 28. This dilemmais usuallyposed as a tensionbetweenpoliticalparticipation individual democracyprotectan individual'srightsagainsta majoritytyranny? rights:can a participatory Yet this version incorrectlyassumes that rights effectively preventwhite tyranny.The Bill of is Rightsexisted alongsideslaveryandlynch law,thuspittingrightsagainstparticipation not the best way to understand dilemma. the 29. The phrase is from Seyla Benhabib, "JudithShklar's Dystopic Liberalism,"Social Research 11, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 477-88. in 30. See, for example,HenryA. Giroux,"WhiteNoise: Towarda Pedagogyof Whiteness," Race-ing Representation: Voice, History, and Sexuality, ed. Kostas Myrsiades and Linda Myrsiades(Lanham,MD: Rowman& Littlefield, 1998). 31. BenjaminBarber, StrongDemocracy(Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1984). 32. RobertA. Dahl, On Democracy(New Haven,CT:Yale UniversityPress, 1998); Jiirgen MA: MITPress, The Habermas, Inclusionof the Other:Studiesin Political Theory(Cambridge,

408

POLITICAL THEORY/ June 2002

1998); David Held, Models of Democracy, 2d ed. (Stanford,CA: StanfordUniversity Press, 1996). 33. Michael Walzer,On Tolerance(New Haven, CT: Yale UniversityPress, 1997). 34. Seyla Benhabib,ed., Democracyand Difference:ContestingtheBoundariesof the Political (Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1996); William E. Connolly, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991). 35. WilliamE. Connolly,TheEthos of Pluralization(Minneapolis:Universityof Minnesota Press, 1995), xiv-xv. 36. Ibid., 197. 37. Ibid., 180. 38. Ibid., xv. 39. WilliamE. Connolly,"Pluralism, Multiculturalism the Nation-State: and Rethinkingthe Journalof Political Ideologies 1, no. 1 (February1996): 61. Connections," 40. Connolly,Ethos of Pluralization, 180. 41. Ibid., 184. 42. Ibid., 113. 43. Ibid., 129. 44. Ruy Teixeiraand Joel Rogers, America's ForgottenMajority:Whythe WhiteWorking Class Still Matters(New York:Basic Books, 2000). 45. Ibid., 162-63. 46. GeorgeLipsitz, ThePossessive Investment Whiteness: in How WhitePeople Profitfrom Identity Politics (Philadelphia:Temple University Press, 1998); Michael K. Brown, Race, State (Ithaca,NY: CornellUniversityPress, 1999);RobertC. Money,and theAmericanWelfare Lieberman,Shifting the Color Line: Race and the American WelfareState (Cambridge,MA: Harvard UniversityPress, 1998). 47. DerrickBell, Faces at the Bottomof the Well:The Permanenceof Racism (New York: Basic Books, 1992). Bell suggests that race-basedprogramsmight actuallybe more inclusive than class-based ones because programsthat expand the rights and powers of people of color ultimatelyexpandthe rightsandpowersof everyone,while class-basedor "universal" programs can actually sustainwhiteness. 48. I deliberatelyadd "as it relates to white identity"because I do not mean to suggest that modifyingdominantidentitieswill resultin the dissolutionof such identitiesin all cases. Argumentsfor the abolitionof otheridentitiesrequirea separate justificationthanthe one presented here. 49. Iris MarionYoung,Justiceand the Politics of Difference(Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1990), 66, 74-75. 50. Ibid., 37-38. fromat least 51. Ibid.,43. She defines a social groupas "acollective of personsdifferentiated one other groupby culturalforms, practices,or way of life." 52. Ibid., 91. 53. Young,Justice and the Politics of Difference,91. Further, Youngpoints out thatat times justice requiresinequality.EchoingMarx,she writes,"Apolitics of differencearguesthatequaland inclusion of all groups sometimes requiresdifferenttreatmentfor ity as the participation oppressed or disadvantagedgroups. To promote social justice, I argue, social policy should sometimes accordspecial treatmentto groups"(Ibid., 158). 54. RonaldBeiner,"WhyCitizenshipConstitutesa TheoreticalProblemin the Last Decade in of the TwentiethCentury," TheorizingCitizenship,ed. RonaldBeiner (Albany:StateUniversity of New YorkPress, 1995); ChantalMouffe, "Feminism,Citizenship,and Radical Demo-

Olson / THE PARTICIPATION-INCLUSION DILEMMA

409

cratic Politics,"in FeministsTheorizethe Political, ed. JudithButler and Joan W. Scott (New York: Routledge, 1992); Nancy Fraser, Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the "Postsocialist"Condition(New York:Routledge, 1997), chap. 8. 55. Lani Guinier, The Tyrannyof the Majority:FundamentalFairness in Representative Democracy (New York:Free Press, 1994), 103. 56. Ibid., 103. 57. Ibid., 15. 58. Ibid., 137-42. 59. Ibid., 93-94. 60. Forcriticismsof the problemsin implementingGuinier'sproposals,see MarkA. Graber, Lani GuinierandJamesMadisonon ElectoralSystems,"Consti"ConflictingRepresentations: tutionalCommentary no. 3 (Winter1996):291-307; PamelaS. Karlan,"DemocracyandDis13, Michigan Law Review 93, no. 6 (May 1995): 1273-96; and John L. Safford, Appointment," "JohnC. Calhoun,Lani Guinier,and MinorityRights,"PS: Political Science 28, no. 2 (June 1995): 211-16. 61. Ibid., 112.

a Joel Olson receivedhis Ph.D.fromthe University Minnesotain 2001 and is currently of visiting assistantprofessor of political theoryat ArizonaState UniversityWest.He can be reachedat joel.olson@asu.edu.