National Service Corp. v.

NLRC, 168 SCRA 125 (1988) -- The civil service does not include Government owned or controlled corporations (GOCC) which are organized as subsidiaries of GOCC under the general corporation law. F: Eugenio Credo was an employee of the National Service Corporation. She claims she was illegally dismissed. NLRC ruled ordering her reinstatement. NASECO argues that NLRC has no jurisdiction to order her reinstatement. NASECO as a government corporation by virtue of its being a subsidiary of the NIDC, which is wholly owned by the Phil. National Bank which is in turn a GOCC, the terms and conditions of employment of its employees are governed by the Civil Service Law citing National Housing v Juco. ISSUE: W/N employees of NASECO, a GOCC without original charter, are governed by the Civil Service Law. HELD: NO. The holding in NHC v Juco should not be given retroactive effect, that is to cases that arose before its promulgation of Jan 17, 1985. To do otherwise would be oppressive to Credo and other employees similarly situated because under the 1973 Consti but prior to the ruling in NHC v Juco, this court recognized the applicability of the Labor jurisdiction over disputes involving terms and conditions of employment in GOCC's, among them NASECO. In the matter of coverage by the civil service of GOCC, the 1987 Consti starkly differs from the 1973 consti where NHC v Juco was based. It provides that the "civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government owned or controlled corporation with original charter." Therefore by clear implication, the civil service does not include GOCC which are organized as subsidiaries of GOCC under the general corporation law.

Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) VS. NHA, 173 SCRA 33 F: Respondent NHC is a corporation organized in 1959 under the Uniform Charter of Government Corporations. Its shares of stock have been 100% owned by the Government from its incorporation. Petitioner TUPAS is a legitimate labor organization with a chapter in NHC. TUPAS filed a petition for certification election with DOLE. It was denied. HELD: The civil service now covers only govt owned or controlled corporations w/ original or legislative charters, that is those created by an act of Congress of by special law, and not those incorporated under and pursuant to a general legislation. xxx There is, therefore, no impediment to the holding of a certification election among the workers of NHC for it is clear that they are covered by the Labor Code, the NHC being a govt owned and/ or controlled corp. w/o an original charter.

Alliance of Government Workers v Minister of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA 1 (1983) F: Petitioner is a federation of unions in govt-owned corps. and in govt schools. It petitioned the SC for a ruling that PD 851, requiring "all employers... to pay their employees receiving a basic salary of not more than P1,000 a month... a 13th month pay," applies to govt employees HELD: NO. It is an old rule of statutory construction that restrictive statutes and acts w/c impose burdens on the public treasury or w/c diminish rights and interests, no matter how broad their terms do not embrace the Sovereign, unless the Sovereign is specifically mentioned. The Republic of the Phil. as a sovereign cannot be covered by a general term like "employer" unless the language used in the law is clear and specific to that effect. ISSUE 2: May government employees act through a labor federation which uses the collective bargaining power to secure increased compensation for its members? HELD: NO. The terms and conditions of employment in the Government including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof are governed by law. And this is effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules and regulations and not through Collective Bargaining agreements. Under the present constitution, (1973), GOCC's are now part of the civil service, thus, not allowed to use concerted activities to get other benefits or higher salaries different from that provided by law and regulation.

National Housing Corp. v. Juco, 134 SCRA 172 (1985) F: Juco was an employee of the NHA. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal w/ MOLE but his case was dismissed by the labor arbiter on the ground that the NHA is a govt-owned corp. and jurisdiction over its employees is vested in the CSC. On appeal, the

NLRC reversed the decision and remanded the case to the labor arbiter for further proceedings. NHA in turn appealed to the SC ISSUE: Are employees of the National Housing Corporation, a GOCC without original charter, covered by the Labor Code or by laws and regulations governing the civil service? HELD: Sec. 11, Art XII-B of the Constitution specifically provides: "The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision and instrumentality of the Government, including every government owned and controlled corporation. The inclusion of GOCC within the embrace of the civil service shows a deliberate effort at the framers to plug an earlier loophole which allowed GOCC to avoid the full consequences of the civil service system. All offices and firms of the government are covered. This consti provision has been implemented by statute PD 807 is unequivocal that personnel of GOCC belong to the civil service and subject to civil service requirements. "Every" means each one of a group, without exception. This case refers to a GOCC. It does not cover cases involving private firms taken over by the government in foreclosure or similar proceedings. xxx For purposes of coverage in the Civil Service, employees of govt- owned or controlled corps. whether created by special law or formed as subsidiaries are covered by the Civil Service Law, not the Labor Code, and the fact that pvt. corps. owned or controlled by the govt may be created by special charter does not mean that such corps. not created by special law are not covered by the Civil Service. xxx The infirmity of the resp's position lies in its permitting the circumvention or emasculation of Sec. 1, Art. XII-B [now Art IX, B, Sec. 2 (1)] of the Consti. It would be possible for a regular ministry of govt to create a host of subsidiary corps. under the Corp. Code funded by a willing legislature. A govt-owned corp. could create several subsidiary corps. These subsidiary corps. would enjoy the best of two worlds. Their officials and employees would be privileged individuals, free from the strict accountability required by the Civil Service Dec. and the regulations of the COA. Their incomes would not be subject to the competitive restraint in the open market nor to the terms and conditions of civil service employment. Conceivably, all govt-owned or controlled corps. could be created, no longer by special charters, but through incorp. under the general law. The Constitutional amendment including such corps. in the embrace of the civil service would cease to have application. Certainly, such a situation cannot be allowed

Quimpo v. Tanodbayan, 146 SCRA 137 -- Tanodbayan Has Jurisdiction over all Government Owned Firms Regardless of How Organized. F: F. Quimpo filed a complaint w/ the Tanodbayan (TB) charging G. Dimaano and D. Remo, manager and analyst of Petrophil, w/ viol. of RA 3019 for their refusal to pay Quimpo's fees as surveyor. The TB dismissed the complaint, however, on the ground that his jurisdiction extended only to govt owned corps. organized under a special law. Petrophil is a corp. organized under the Gen. Corp. Code; it was acquired by the govt to carry out its oil and gasoline programs. Quimpo filed a petition for certiorari, questioning the decision of the TB. The new TB confessed judgment. ISSUE: WON PETROPHIL is a government owned or controlled corporation whose employees fall within the jurisdictional purview of the Tanodbayan for purposes of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act? HELD: YES. Uphold the Tanodbayan jurisdiction. While it may be that PETROPHIL was not originally "created" as a GOCC, PETROPHIL became a subsidiary of PNOC and thus shed-off its private status. It is now funded and owned by the government as in fact, it was acquired to perform functions related to governmental programs and policies on oil. It was acquired not temporarily but as a permanent adjunct to perform essential government related functions.

CLU v Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991) F: The petitioner challenged Ex. Order No. 284 which in effect allowed Cabinet members, their undersecretaries and asst. secretaries and other appointive officials of the Executive Department to hold other positions in the govt., albeit, subject of the limitations imposed therein. The respondents, in refuting the petitioners' argument that the measure was violative of Art. VIII, Sec. 13, invoked Art. IX-B, Sec. 7, allowing the holding of multiple positions by the appointive official if allowed by law or by the pressing functions of his positions. HELD: By ostensibly restricting the no. of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or asst. secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the govt. and GOCCs, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Art. VIII, Sec. 13 prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself. If maximum benefits are to be derived from a dept. head's ability and expertise, he should be

allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other govt. offices or employment. xxx The stricter prohibition applied to the Pres. and his official family under Sec. 13, Art. VII as compared to the prohibition applicable to appointive officials in general under Art. IX, B, Sec. 7, par. 2 are proof of the intent of the 1987 Consti. to treat them as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions. Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the govt during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Consti. itself. xxx However, the prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Art. VII, Sec. 13 must not be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein w/o addition compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said official's office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise "any other office" w/in the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and function on said officials.

Flores vs. Drilon G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993 FACTS: The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged in this case. Paragraph (d) reads (d) Chairman administrator The President shall appoint a professional manager as administrator of the Subic Authority with a compensation to be determined by the Board subject to the approval of the Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex oficio chairman of the Board and who shall serve as the chief executive officer of the Subic Authority: Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority. ISSUE: Whether or not theproviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 is constitutional. RULI NG: The proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts. In full, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides: No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. In the case at bar, the subjectproviso directs the President to appoint an elective official,i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA). Since this is precisely what the constitutional proscription seeks to prevent, there is not doubt to conclude that theproviso contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. In any case, the view that an elective official may be appointed to another post if allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office, ignores the clear-cut difference in the wording of the two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. While the second paragraph authorizes holding of multiple offices by anappointive official when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, the first paragraph appears to be more stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against appointment or designation of anelective official to the government post, except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself. The appointment of Gordon as Chairman of the SBMA is null. However, despite his appointment to the said office, Gordon did not automatically forfeit his seat as Mayor of Olongapo City. Where, as in the case of respondent Gordon, an incumbent elective official was, notwithstanding his ineligibility, appointed to other government posts, he does not automatically forfeit his elective office nor remove his ineligibility imposed by the Constitution. On the contrary, since an incumbent elective official is not eligible to the appointive position, his appointment or designation thereto cannot be valid in view of his disqualification or lack of eligibility. This provision should not be confused with Sec. 13, Art. VI, of the Constitution where "(n)o Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government . . . during his term without forfeiting his seat...." The difference between the two provisions is significant in the sense that incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts only after they have been appointed to another government office, while other incumbent elective officials must first resign their posts before they can be appointed, thus running the risk of losing the elective post as well as not being appointed to the other post. As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto pursuant to a legislative act that contravenes the Constitution cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de facto officer who may retain the benefits he may received from the position he may have assumed

Cailles v. Bonifacio, 65 Phil 328 (1938) F: This is a quo warranto petition to oust respondent Bonifacio from the office of Provincial Governor of Laguna. It is contended that at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy and was elected to office, respondent was a Captain in the Philippine Army and for this reason, is ineligible to that office. HELD: Section 2, Art. XI of the 1935 Const. (similar to the 1987 provision) prohibits members of the Armed Forces from engaging in any partisan political activity or otherwise taking part in any election except to vote, but it does not ex vi termini grant or confer upon them the right of suffrage. As Section 431 of the Election Law, as amended disqualifies from voting only members in the active service of the Philippine Army and no claim is made that this discrimination is violative of the Constitution, it follows that the respondent, being in the reserve force, is not disqualified from voting. The respondent being a qualified elector and the possession by him of the other qualifications prescribed for an elective provincial office not being challenged, he is not ineligible to the office of provincial governor to which he has been elected. The constitutional provision mentioned contemplates only those in the active service otherwise it would lead to widespread disqualification of the majority of the able bodied men who are part of the reserve corps of the armed forces from voting and from being voted upon. Raison d' etre for the disqualification: Members of the armed forces are servants of the State and not the agents of any political group. Santos v. Yatco, 59 0G 548 (1959) F: This is petition for prohibition seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the order of Judge Yatco disallowing then Secretary of Defense Alejo Santos from campaigning personally for Governor Tomas Martin in the province of Bulacan. The petition was granted for the ff. reasons: The position of department secretaries is not embraced and included within the terms officers and employees in the Civil Service; When Santos, a Nacionalista campaigned for Gov. Martin, a candidate of the Nacionalista Party, he was acting as a member of the Cabinet in discussing the issues before the electorate and defending the actuations of the Administration to which he belongs; The question of impropriety as distinct from illegality of such campaign because of its deleterious influence upon the members of the armed forces, who are administratively subordinated to the Secretary of National Defense and who are often called upon by the COMELEC to aid in the conduct of orderly and impar tial elections, is not justiciable by the court.

Cayetano v. Monsod G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991 Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Issue: Whether the appointment of Chairman Monsod of Comelec violates Section 1 (1), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution? Held: The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C, that there shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneys called "associates." Hence, the Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown. Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, he Court said that, Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. Brillantes vs Yorac In December 1989, a coup attempt occurred prompting the president to create a fact finding commission which would be chaired by Hilario Davide. Consequently he has to vacate his chairmanship of the COMELEC. Yorac was temporarily placed as his substitute.

Brillantes then questioned such appointment urging that under Art 10-C of the Constitution in no case shall any member of the COMELEC be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity:. Brillantes claimed that the choice of the acting chairman should not be appointed for such is an internal matter that should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the president violates the independence of the COMELEC as a constitutional commission. ISSUE: Whether or not the designation made by the president violates the constitutional independence of the COMELEC. HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that although all constitutional commissions are essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the president in the discharge of their functions. The designation made by the president has dubious justification as it was merely grounded on the quote administrative expediency to present the functions of the COMELEC. Aside from such justification, it found no basis on existing rules on statutes. Yoracs designation is null and unconstitutional. National Press Club vs Comelec Facts: Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are prevented from selling or donating space and time for political advertisements; two (2) individuals who are candidates for office (one for national and the other for provincial office) in the coming May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election Issue and of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed. It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 66461 invades and violates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely, media-based election or political propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election Issue. Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda except those appearing in the Comelec space of the newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts, would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning candidates and Issue in the election thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion. Issue: Whether or Not Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 constitutional. Held: Yes. It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom of the press has to be taken in conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which may be seen to be a special provision applicable during a specific limited period i.e., "during the election period." In our own society, equality of opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial resources that one may have at one's disposal, is clearly an important value. One of the basic state policies given constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the egalitarian demand that "the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law." The essential question is whether or not the assailed legislative or administrative provisions constitute a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the operations of communication and information enterprises during an election period, or whether such act has gone beyond permissible supervision or regulation of media operations so as to constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media operations during election periods. Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By virtue of the operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in time to election periods. Section 11 (b) does not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or television stations of news or news-worthy events relating to candidates, their qualifications, political parties and programs of government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists in respect of candidates, their qualifications, and programs and so forth, so long at least as such comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report or commentary other coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for political office. Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political advertisements of particular candidates. The limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech of the candidates themselves is not unduly repressive or unreasonable. Adiong vs COMELEC Facts: COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 which provides that decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas, prohibiting posting in "mobile" places, public or private. Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections now assails the Resolution. In addition, the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and

irreparable injury with this prohibition. Issue: Whether or Not the COMELECs prohibition unconstitutional. Held: The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech. The preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. The so-called balancing of interests individual freedom on one hand and substantial public interests on the other is made even more difficult in election campaign cases because the Constitution also gives specific authority to the Commission on Elections to supervise the conduct of free, honest, and orderly elections. When faced with border line situations where freedom to speak by a candidate or party and freedom to know on the part of the electorate are invoked against actions intended for maintaining clean and free elections, the police, local officials and COMELEC, should lean in favor of freedom. The regulation of election campaign activity may not pass the test of validity if it is too general in its terms or not limited in time and scope in its application, if it restricts one's expression of belief in a candidate or one's opinion of his or her qualifications, if it cuts off the flow of media reporting, and if the regulatory measure bears no clear and reasonable nexus with the constitutionally sanctioned objective. The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free speech and expression. Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else. The restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship. FLORES vs. COMELEC Facts:The petitioner, Roque Flores, was proclaimed by the board of canvassers as having received the highest number of votes for kagawad in Brgy. Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, and thus became punong barangay pursuant to Sec 5 RA 6679.He was voted punong barangay during the 1982 elections, a separate position as that of Kagawad. The private respondent, Nobelito Rapisora ,protected the result and filed a protect before the MCTCTayum. He argued that the ballot, which only indicatedFlores, should be declared stray votes and should not be divided equally to them. In his defense, the petitioner argued that in accordance with the Omnibus Election Code, the 4questioned votes should be entitled to him under the equity of the incumbent rule, which states that if there are 2 or more candidates with the same full name and one of them is an incumbent and the ballot is written only on such full name, the vote is counted in favor of the incumbent. The lower court sustained the contention of the private respondent and subsequently declared him as thepunong barangay. Hence this petition. The petitioner argued that by not following the rule stated, he is deprived of his right to equal protection of the law since he is also an incumbent punong barangay running for election, thereby he should beentitled by the rule.Issue:Was the petitioner considered an incumbent to be entitled under the rule? Held:No. Under the new rule Resolution 2022- A passedby the Comelec, Barangay Captains who filed their candidacy for the office of Kagawad, which is another office,shall be deemed resigned in their former office. In his filing of candidacy, it stated that he is running for kagawad and not as a punong barangay. Thus, pursuantto the resolution, he deemed to resign his position as punong barangay when he filed for his candidacy as a kagawad. The rule cannot thus then be applied to the petitioner since pursuant to the resolution, he is not considered as an incumbent punong barangay, he is notwithin the same class as that of the incumbents The court cannot sustain the argument of the petitioner that since RA 669 speaks of 7 candidates for kagawad, the foremost of them is the punong barangay, and he should be regarded as running for the same office.

CORPUS VS. CUADERNO FACTS: Marino Corpus, Special Assistant to the Governor of the Central Bank, was administratively charged with dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty and violation of the internal regulations of the office. He was suspended by the Mnetary Board desoie the recommendation of the investigating committee that he be reinstated and there was no basis for actions against Corpus. The Board considered him resigned as of the date of his suspension. Corpus moved for

reconsideration but was denied. He filed the petition to CFI of Manila which favored him and declared the Resolution of the Board as null and void. He was awarded P5,000 as attorneys fees. Both Petitioner and respondent appealed the judgment. Petitioner was appealing the amount awarded to him contending that it was lower than what he has spent for attorneys fees. While the respondent claimed that an officer holding highly technical position may be removed at any time for lack of confidence by the appointing power who was Governor Cuaderno. ISSUE: Is the lack of confidence by the appointing power be a ground for removing an employee or a public officer? HELD: The Constitution distinguishes the primarily confidential from the highly technical employees, and to the latter the loss of confidence as a ground for removal is not applicable. No public officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for a cause provided by law. Pertaining to the petitioners claim for damages, the agreement between a client and his lawyer as to attorneys fees cannot bind the other party who was a stranger to the fee contract. While the Civil Code allows a party to recover reasonable counsel fees by way of damages, such fees must lie primarily in the discretion of the trial court.