Rwanda: The Political Science Perspective

Class: Critical Issues: Violent Conflict, War and Genocide

Instructor: Richard McCutcheon
By Carsten Kaefert (3012875)

Table of Contents
Rwanda: The Political Science Perspective.....................................................................................1
Abstract.......................................................................................................................................1
Explaining the Rwandan Genocide.............................................................................................2
Explanatory Variables for Genocide.......................................................................................2
1. Presence of an Exclusionary Ideology...........................................................................2
2. Ethnic “Capture” of the State........................................................................................3
3. Lack of Democratic Institutions....................................................................................3
4. International “openness”................................................................................................3
Modern War and Genocide.....................................................................................................4
Lessons for Genocide Prevention................................................................................................5
Bibliography................................................................................................................................7

Abstract
There are various ways of analyzing genocide. Political Science, at least within the liberal

school mainly focusing on power and its distribution, has to offer two: The empirical way of ex-

plaining genocide via a set of prerequisites or “explanatory variables”1 and in the context of 21st

century warfare or “war among the people”2, as Smith calls it.

Political Science also has a widely preventionist view on genocide, especially within the

field of International Relations (IR), focusing mainly on the positive or adverse effects of inter-

national regimes. Here the concept of state sovereignty is under special scrutiny.

1
Adam Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2007), 310.
2
Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London: Penguin Books, 2006), 183.

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Explaining the Rwandan Genocide

Explanatory Variables for Genocide

Empirically, all but one of the genocides and politicides that began between 1955 and

1998 occurred during or immediately after political upheavals[...] 3

This quote by Barbara Harff shows the importance of conflict in explaining genocide. She

did a comprehensive empirical study determining factors prevalent in countries where a genocide

occurred and rates how those affect the risk of genocide. According to Jones, she identifies five

basic explanatory variables for genocide4, out of which at least four5 apply to the case of

Rwanda:

1. Presence of an Exclusionary Ideology

According to Harrf, countries with a governing elite adhering “to an exclusionary ideology

ideology [are] two and a half time as likely”6 to experience genocide than others. With the pre-

valence of a Hutu Power ideology in Rwanda in the years leading to 1994, this was definitely

given. Gourevitch identifies this elite as the akazu, which “tightened its grip of the state”7. He de-

scribes its ideology as one identifying Tutsi (and moderate Hutu) as “internal enemies” and “RPF

'accomplices'”8 as early as 1990, thus providing the pretext for mass murder.

3
Barbara Harrf, “No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass
Murder since 1955,” American Political Science Review, 97: 1 (February 2003): 62, as quoted in: Jones,
Genocide..., 310.
4
cf. Jones, Genocide..., 310.
5
The variable left out is “presence or absence of genocidal precedents”, as Rwanda has had a history of violence
between Hutus and Tutsis, but (arguably) not a previous genocide.
6
Harrf, No Lessons..., as quoted in: Jones, Genocide..., 310.
7
Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families (New York:
Picador, 1998), 82.
8
Ibid., 83.

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2. Ethnic “Capture” of the State
The Hutu government in the years before 1994 has been described as “between Moderniza-

tion and Ethnocracy”9. Debiel dates this (Hutu ruling Tutsi) ethnocratic side of Rwandan politics

back to the social revolution of 1961, when the Hutu majority overthrew the feudal Tutsi govern-

ment (which has been backed by the colonial power Belgium for the better part of a century).10

Taking into consideration the strong influence of the aforementioned akazu (ethnical Hutus), it

becomes obvious, how deeply ethnicised the Rwandan state was – according to Harrf a fact mak-

ing “the risks of geno-/politicide two and a half times more likely”11 compared to other states.

3. Lack of Democratic Institutions

Following a military coup in 1973, Habyarimana governed the country basing his power to

a large part on the military and political violence. According to Debiel, he chose officials mainly

based upon their ethnicity and regional background, further securing his influence by outlawing

political parties and having potential enemies murdered.12 Given that Harrf finds that “once in

place, democratic institutions – even partial ones – reduce the likelihood of armed conflict and

all but eliminate the risk that it will lead to geno-/politicide”13, this can be counted as a strong

contributor to the genocide.

4. International “openness”
Harrf states that “the greater the interdependence with the global economy, the les likely

that [national] elites will target minorities […] for destruction”14. As Debiel explains, there was

9
Tobias Debiel, UN-Friedensoperationen in Afrika. Weltinnenpolitik und die Realität von Bürgerkriegen (Bonn:
Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden, 2003), 163. Translated from “zwischen Modernisierung und Ethnokratie”.
10
cf. ibid., 164
11
Harrf, No Lessons..., as quoted in: Jones, Genocide..., 310.
12
Debiel, UN-Friedensoperationen..., 165.
13
Harrf, No Lessons..., as quoted in: Jones, Genocide..., 310.
14
Ibid.

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dependence of Rwanda on foreign aid, but no mutual interdependence, as Rwanda – despite re-

form efforts by the Habyarimana regime – was a “poor agrarian state”15. Foreign aid and arms

shipments continuing to flow in to the perpetrators even during the genocide, especially from

France and Egypt,16 relieved the regime (and its supporters in the region) from the pressures of

international accountability, thus further fueling the conflict.17,18

Altogether, it becomes obvious that Rwanda in 1994 was highly vulnerable to genocide –

the aforementioned facts adding up to a risk of political mass killing at least six and a quarter

times higher than normal by a rough estimate.

Modern War and Genocide

War has changed its face since World War II and especially since the Cold War ended – and

with it the perspective of genocide has changed, as the two are closely related to each other. War

from a western, European perspective used to be a clash of two professional armies, not includ-

ing the civilian population.19 World War I ended this by introducing industrial warfare, which still

dominates our image of war – although it is as obsolete as classic napoleonian warfare.20 With

the nuclear bomb and the policy of mutually assured destruction arose another kind of warfare:

war among the people.21

Most wars are now civil wars and have a strong ethnic component. 22 They thereby prepare

the grounds for genocide or blur the distinction between genocide and the mere horrors of war-
15
Debiel, UN-Friedensoperationen..., 165.
16
Linda Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder. The Rwandan Genocide (London, New York: Verso, 2006), 338-347.
17
Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You..., 281.
18
Jones, Genocide..., 238.
19
Ibid., 311.
20
Smith, The Utility..., 188.
21
Ibid.,183.
22
Jones, Genocide..., 311.

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fare. Although they are not necessarily “more likely to produce genocide, but at the very least,

they contain a strong genocidal potential.”23 This in turn creates a “genocidal dynamic”24, which

tends to become central to the conflict.

This frame set applies all too well to the Rwandan genocide. In 1990, the Rwandese Patri-

otic Front (RPF), a mainly expatriate Tutsi rebel army, started an invasion of Rwanda, thus

providing a pretext for stepping up the persecution of Tutsis within the country. 25 This was the

background for some of the most extreme and influential exterminationist propaganda, promin-

ently the Ten Hutu Commandments.26 Thus a spiral of violence was created, fueled mainly by

Hutu Power extremists, who diligently prepared the genocide in the following years.

Lessons for Genocide Prevention

Both perspectives provide essential knowledge for the prevention of future genocides. Har-

rf's set of variables provides an useful tool for the identification of countries and populations at

risk, thus enabling preventive action before killing occurs. But to put this knowledge to an effect-

ive use, lessons from the second part have to be learned: war is not usually happening between

nations anymore, but within countries. Assuming the international community's intent to prevent

future genocides (which, given the incidents in Sudan, has to be doubted), a thorough change in

the way international relations are perceived has to happen. This is the paradigm shift away from

the focus on state sovereignty to human security. The idea of state sovereignty, as formulated for

the first time in the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, has “to be eroded”27. With the rise of interna-

tional regimes, most importantly in this context the Genocide Convention of 1948, this process
23
Ibid., 314.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid., 236f.
26
Ibid., 237.
27
Ibid., 317.

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has begun. In the wake of the violent conflicts of the 1990s a new approach to international rela-

tions arose, showing a possible way past the doctrine of state sovereignty: Responsibility to Pro-

tect.28 It redefines state sovereignty as a double-edged sword by adding a states responsibility to

protect its population to the definition.29 Arguing “there must be no more Rwandas”30, it tries not

only to make intervention easier, but even turn it into a responsibility of the international com-

munity.31

28
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa:
International Development Research Centre, 2001), VII.
29
Ibid., 69.
30
Ibid., 70.
31
Ibid.

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Bibliography
Tobias Debiel, UN-Friedensoperationen in Afrika. Weltinnenpolitik und die Realität von Bür-
gerkriegen (Bonn: Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden, 2003), 163-165

Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families
(New York: Picador, 1998), 82-83, 281

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect

(Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), VII, 69-70

Adam Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2007), 236-238,
310-311, 314

Linda Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder. The Rwandan Genocide (London, New York: Verso,
2006), 338-347.

Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London: Penguin
Books, 2006), 183, 188

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