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1. AGREEMENT
1.1 UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPT OF THE OFFER
An offer is the expression of person showing willingness to be legally bound by the states terms o Australian Woollen Mills v CW (1954) Halsburys LA: the expression of willingness to contract on terms stated: what is allfed to be an offer must have been intended to give rise, on its acceptance, to legal relations
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HELD
D was the MF of a product called the CSN which was designed to precent the user of the smoke ball from contracting the flu To promote the product, the company advertised in a newspaper to pay 100 pounds to any person who contracted the flu after using one of their smoke balls in the specified manner for a specified period The P, relying on the ad, purchased one of the smoke balls and used it in the prescribed manner and for the prescribed period. P contracted the flu and sued the company to recover the 10 pounds
By the Eng CA, that the P was entitled to recover Rejected companys argument that the promise was not binding because it was not made with anyone in particular Depending on the terms in the ad, the ad may constitute an offer, which if accepted forms a unilateral
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In determining whether the advertisement is a mere puff or an offer capable of being accepted and forming a contract, the court considers and objective test to see whether a RP in the position of the offeree would interpret the advertisement Relevant factors Vagueness of the statement Any other details in the advertisement which would be relevant in considerations
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The D was prosecuted under the Pharmacy Poisons act 1933 (UK) which prohibited the sale of prohibited drugs unless under the supervision of a registered pharmacist. o ISSUE: was the goods on the shelves with the prices an offer<? What time was the contract of sale formed? o HELD: Display of goods on shelves, even with marked prices was an invitation to treart Offer took place when the customer selected goods from the shelves and took them to the pharmacist at the cash register Pharmacist could then choose to accept or reject this offer Fisher v Bell [1961]: goods on display in a shop window were considered to be an invitation to treat. The test: how would the statement be regarded by a RP in the position of the offeree?
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Legal status is likely to be determined by same legal principles One which is open to the general public invitation to treat o Esp where sites provide info advising potential customers that the price will only be debited to the specified credit card when the retailer has established that the particular product is in stock. EBay International AG v Creative Festival Entertainment [2006] HELD: a contract to purchase tickets for Big Day Out was formed on terms displayed on a website where a purchaser, though clocking on the relevant buttons agreed to displayed terms and condictions. The purchaser was immediately required to make payment and received an email confirmation of the purchase.
1.3.2 AUCTIONS
(a) Where subject matter is unique Common: sales of land Advertisements for an auction used to attract maximum number potential bidders Usual description o Actual property o Location of auction o Does not bind the auctioneer to carry out the auction o An auctioneer may withdraw carious lots at the auction itself or to cancel the auction altogether without incurring any liability from potential bidders: Harris v Nickerson (1873) o liability may flow if the auctioneer advertises an auction, and at the time of the advertisement, he or she did not intend to hold the auction: Warlow v Harrison (1859) (b) Auctions with a reserve Reserve price = minimum price which the item could be sold for Akin to invitation to treat o Acceptance of the offer occurs when the auctioneer knocks the property down to the successful bidder Payne v Cave (1789): because the agreement is not formed until a bid is knocked don, a bidder can withdraw a bid (offer before this time (c) Auctions without a reserve Where it is advertised the property will be sold to the highest bidder not settled Warlow v Harrison is not clear authority FACTS: an auctioneer pledges himself that the sale shall be wthout reserve and that he or she in fact contracts that it shall be so; and the contract shall be made with the highest bidder. Barry v Davies FACTS: auction was advertised as being without reserve. Two engineer analysers (each valued at 14,000 pounds) were withdrawn from ale as the highest bid was 200 pounds for each. The unsuccessful bidder recovered 27,600 pounds, the difference between the bid and the market price, for breach of a collateral contract to sell to the highest bidder
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Legal status of bids: o Reserve: bidders make the offer, which is accepted if and when the auctioneer knowcks down the proper. o Without reserve: AGC (Advances) v McWhirter - FACTS: the auction was originally advertised as being with a reserve, but was ultimately sold without one. The auctioneer knocked the property down to the second highest, not the highest bid. The highest bidders lodged a caveat over the property on the basis that they were the purchasers of the property, the contract having been formed when they made the highest bid. The sellers then brought an action against the highest bidders for removal of the caveat. HELD: the caveat should be removed as the sellers had not entered into a contract with them. Even without a reserve, each bid represents an offer that could be accepted/rejected by the auctioneer. Since the offer was not accepted, contract had not formed. (d) Internet auctions Usual course: o Parties need to become registered users of the online auction site o Parties accept the relevant TCs of the site o Acceptance of the Cs will normally occur when the paertis click on the accept button Smythe v Thomas o FACTS: owner of aircraft, a registered eBay user listed the aircraft with a notiation of a minimum bid of $150,000. Another registered user made a big in accordance with eBay rules for $150,000. Both parties received a notification from eBay to the effect that the bidder had won the aircraft Despite having agreed to eBays TCs which required a seller to honour winning biddings at or above the sellers minimum bid, the owner of the aircraft denied any contractual obligation to sell on the basis that the owner had only contracted with eBay and not the bidding party o HELD: A binding contract had been formed between the two eBay users By listing the item on the site with a disclosed reserve the owner offered to sell the aircraft to the bidder who was the highest of any bidders within the specified period Be becoming registered users, the parties agreed to allow eBay or its computer to automatically disclose the bidding at a fixed time and generation of the winning bid is equivalent to the fall of the hammer in traditional auctions The traditional right of an auctioneer to execute a contract on behalf of the buyer or seller will not be a feature of online auctions Seiveweright v Brennan (2005): o A bid is accepted by the auctioneer, signified by the fall of the hammer. o Until the hammer falls, the auctioneer may decline a bid even if there had been a previous indication that the bid is accepted o HZD c McInnes [2007] Warlow v Harrison (1859)
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FACTS: relates to liability of the aucrioneer where thee auction was stated to be without reserve, not issue of contract formation HELD:
1.3.3 TENDERING
Used by both private and public sectors Owners who want to ensure they receive a range of competitive quotes may invite builders to tender for the project Builders submit tenders that contain a price for which the project can be provided, based on specifications by the owner The owner has the option of accepting the most attractive bid Can also be used to obtain competitive selling prices o Eg when a seller has a qty of stock which is no longer needed. o Seller may invite the public or a section of the public to tender for it o Once tenders are submitted, seller chooses to sell to the person submitting the most attractive selling price (a) Advertisements for tender Similar to an advertisement promoting an auction: Smythe v Thomas Most are designed to maximise tenders Legal status is generally the same as an auction with a reserve: It is an indication of a persons readiness to receive offers like an invitation to treat: Spencer v Harding (1870) Liability will depend considering each case of its own circumstances: Spencer v Harding Two potential situations where liability may arise o Where advertisement inviting tenders indicates the highest (or lowest) bid will be accepted. Acceptance occurs when a person submits the tender that turns out to be the highest tender: Harvela Investments v Royal Trust Company of Canada [1986], also dicta in Spencer v Harding (1870) o Blackpool v Fylde Aero Club v Blackpool Borough Council FACTS: no denial of the general proposition, a person could however, incur contractual liability for failing to comply with the agreed tendering process. The specific invitation to tender in this case indicated that all tenders submitted in the correct form by the due date would be considered which was sufficient to contract between the parties seeking the tender and the tenderer. Failure to consider tender put the party in breach of contract. (Aus case) Hughes Aircraft Systems v Airservices Australia (1997) FACTS: a letter setting out details of the tendering process including evaluation criteria, priorities, evaluation methodology, which was prepared by the body calling for tenders and signed by the two prospective tenderers. HELD: Upon signing the letter was held to constitute a binding contract binging on the party calling for tenders consideration for this process was the tenderers participation in the tenderers process. Wenzel v Australian Stock Exchange [2002] - FACTS: agreement giving rise to contractual obligations arose when a person applied for membership of the Aus Stock Exchange. BEFORE SINGLE JUDGE: the payment of the membership fee together with the submission of the application, the statutory declaration and the provision of the private and confidential info constituted consideration for
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the pre-admission contract. ON APPEAL: case distinguished from Hughes case, on basis that the application did not involve a preparation of complex documentation involving considerable expense (as in Hughes case) Lefkowitz v Great Minneapolis Surplus Store BAIT ADVERTISING: the practice of advertising certain goods at extremely low prices to attract customers to the store with the intention of selling them other goods at normal prices, rather than, or in addition to, those advertised. o Use ss35 ACL 2010 (Cth) (b) Individual tenders The advertisement itself will usually make it clear the there is no obligation to accept payments Blackpool case would also apply where an advertisement may constitute an offer being accepted by a person submitting the highest conforming tender.
1.3.5 OPTIONS
Ordinarily, an offeror may revoke an offer at any time before it is accepted. This is the case even if the offeror promises to keep the offer open for a time: Routledge v Grant (1828) If the offeree provides consideration eg by paying money, for the offeror to keep the offer open this arrangement becomes the granting of an option o Eg purchaser of land may wish to purchase a particular block (Block A) if he or she can also puchase the adjoining block (Block B). in exchange for a payment of a sum of money, the seller of block A gives the purchaser an option, for a specified period to buy that block. This is an example of a conditional sale. The sale become unconditional if and when the seller exercises the option and does what is required of them to complete the transaction: Traaywinds v Cooper [1989], Laybutt v Amoco Australia (1974) o If the seller fails to keep the offer open for the agreed period, and sells to another party, they will be in breach of contractual situation
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generally: o passenger will receive a ticket of some kind, o issues of contract formation (esp when it will take place) are important o exemption and exclusion clauses are important, and common, and will only assist the carrier if they are introduced before the contract has been formed. (a) Tickets from automatic vending machines Presence of machine ready to accept money, constitutes the offer When the passenger inserts money into the machine, they are seen to accept the offer o After this, no further terms can be introduced into the contract, to govern the transaction o Any terms appearing on the ticket issued by the machine that were not drawn to the passengers attention, could not be regarded as forming part of the contract (b) Purchase of tickets prior to carriage Use of display notices, depending on their prominence, may be incorporated into the contract: Where a ticket which is issued upon payment, has additional terms, I: Passenger makes an offer to pay for transport, the offer being accepted by the carrier when the money is handed over and the ticket is issue. It would be too late for any terms to be incorporated. II: passenger makes an offer to pay for transport. A counter-offer is then made by the carrier, who issues a ticket containing new terms. Counter offer is accepted, if the passenger does not return the ticket after a reasonable time to read the terms and consider the suitability. A crucial factor which decide whether the facts would fall in one of the two options is the time which a passenger has to read the terms before actual carriage. Different ways in which a contract of carriage can be formed: o Example A: a person wants to catch a ferry to the city. When the ferry docks, an agen of the carrier stands at the entry of the ferry. As each passenger boards, the agent, takes the fare and gives the passenger a ticket. No chance to read the terms on the ticker nor to decide whether or not the passenger would want to be bound by the conditions of carrirage. Same situation when the person boards the bus, pays fare, receives ticket and then takes a seat contract is formed when fare ishanded over and ticket is received: Wilkie v London Passenger Board [1947] If ticket is prepaid MacRobertson Miller Airline Services v Commissioner of State Taxation (WA) (1975) FACTS: to secure a flight with the airline, a passenger would approach the company, and if there were avl seats, the passenger would pay the fare and be issued with a ticket. The stage of that transaction would be considered the contract formation. HELD: in this context, the ticket would be the offer. The passenger accepted the offer on the terms in the ticket or by conduct (boarding the plane) or by not returning the ticket after having a reasonable time to read the terms Where tickets a prepaid, it could be argued that the contract was formed at time of payment and terms on ticket were subsequent, which did not form part of the contract Oceanic Line Special Shipping Co v Fay (1988) FACTS: At the time of purchase, the passenger received an exchange order which was exchanged
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for a ticket on the particular cruise upon boarding: HELD: by the HCA that contract was formed when the earlier exchange order was received by the passenger. Terms on the ticket did not form part of the contract Hollingsworth v Southern Ferries Ltd (The Eagle) [1977] it was suggested that there would be an implied term in a contract of carriage that a shipowner could dispose reasonable rules on passengers for their safety and for the proper running of the vessel Where the passenger prepays, and upon arrival at airport, collects a boarding pass instead of a ticket then they are not advised that the contract is subject to any terms. It is likely that the contract is formed at time of phone call, when the booking was made. In absence of express terms, a court may decide that contract is subject to the usual terms that govern these types of contracts. o Example B: an intending passenger approaches an airline counter at an airport. The airline issues a ticket in exchange for payment of money by the passenger. The ticket facilitates carriage of a passenger to a particular destination. (c) Purchase of ticket during court of carrirage Contract is formed before the purchase What is the actual offer/acceptance will bear little practical legal significance
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Art 16 (1) until a contract is concluded an offer may be revoked if the revocation reaches he offeree before he has despatched the acceptance (2) however an offer cannot be revoked (i) if it indicates, whether by stating a fixed time for acceptance or otherwise, that it is irrevocable or (ii) it was reasonable for the offeree to rely on the offer as being irrevocable and the offeree has acted in reliance on the offer. (a) Withdrawal in unilateral contracts An offeror cannot effectively withdraw an offer after the offeree has commenced acceptance of it: Abbott v Lance (1860) Vievers v Cordingly (1989): MacPerson J framed the position where the offer is made in exchange for the doing of an act or acts in the following way (a) acceptance takes place when he offeree elects to do the relevant act or acts; (b) the offer becomes irrevocable once the act or acts, which constitutes the consideration, has been partly performed. Mobil Oil v Lyndel Nominees (1998) o HELD: Fed Court did not agree that there was a GR that an offeror could not revoke an offer after acceptance had been commenced o Even if in a particular case, there was an implied promise not to revoke the offer after the acceptance had been commenced. Any purported revocation by the offeror would be ineffective. (b) Withdrawal where offer is to world at large If the offeror takes steps to use the same medium (if possible) to communicate the withdraw, they may be able to maintain that the offer was validly withdrawn even if one or more offerees were not made of the withdrawn (no current Aus authority)
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Manchester Diocesan Council v Commercial & General Investments: two possible bases for the rule that an offer will lapse within a specified time: (1) it is implied into the offer that if not accepted within a reasonable time, it is withdrawn [what is reasonable must be determined at the date of the offer, based on the circumstances existing at that time and circumstances reasonably likely to arise during the continuance of the offer ](2) if the offeree does not accept the offer within a reasonable time, the offeree must regard it as having refused it [actual conduct would be more appropriate to asses]
1.5.5 DEATH
(a) of the offeror Dickinson v Dodd: if a man who makes an offer dies, the offer cannot be accepted after he is dead, for it makes performance of the offer impossible o Applied in Fong v Cilli (1968) If contract relates to personal services it would be the intention of the offeror that the offer would lapse on the offerors death o Different for the sale of property (could be continued by the deceaseds estate) (b) Death of the offeree Reynolds v Atherton (1921): o HELD: the offer, having been made to a living person who ceases to be a living person before the offer is accepted, there is no longer an offer. o Indicates the test is one of intention if the contract is one for the offerees personal services, it would have been intended that the offer would be ceased on the offerees death. Different for sale of property (c) Options GR: options could be exercised despite the death of either parties Effect of death on an option may depend on its legal nature: Laybutt v Amoco Australia (1974) If an option is a conditiona contract, the option may confer on the offeree a right of specific performance. o The right may be enforced by the deceaseds estate If the option creates an irrevocable offer the offer may not be considered capable of acceptance following death:
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Carter v Hyde (1923): Issacs J regarded an option as an irrevocable offer, yet considered the right of the offeree to exercise the option to pass to executors to the offerees death.
1.7.1 OFFEREE MUST HAVE KNOWLEDGGE OF AND ACT IN RELIANCE ON, OFFER
consensus ad idem Tinn v Hoffman & Co (1873) o FACTS: A is aware that B wants to sell hr car. A leaves B a note in her letterbox offering to buy the car for $3,000. By coincidence, B rings A and leaves a msg on As answering machine, that she would be happy to sell her car to Anna for $3,00 o HELD: There were two separate offers, no acceptance R v Clarke (1927) o FACTS: Clarke had been arrested on a murder charge. He gave info which lead to the arrest and conviction of the real murderers and as a result was subsequently released. When he claimed the reward of 1000 pounds being offered by the gov for info leading to the arrest of the perpetrators, the gov refused to pay him o HELD: Clarke gave info to ensure that he was not charged with the murders, not in reliance of the reward.
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The buyerss order constituted a counter-offer as it contained different terms from the sellers original offer Stevenson, Jacques and Co v McLean (1880) o Facts: Stevenson, in response to a written offer from mcLean, telegrammed the latter asking whether the time of delivery and payment were negotiable. McLean treated this as a rejection and sold the items in qt for info, with the result that Stevensons question to a third party. o HELD: it was merely request for info. Contract was found. The current Aus position is that even if there is an agreement on the fundamental terms of the transaction, if the offeree adds an additional term, the counter-offer is made o Turner Kempson v Camm [1922] FACTS: offeree purported to accept an offer to sell a qty of raspberry pulp at stated price a contract was HELD not to eist because the offeree purported to add a term requiring delivery in three separate lots, with approx. 10 days in between each delivery. Brambles Holdings v Bathurst City Council (2001) qualification to this rule o HELD: contract was found to exist, despite the offer having been rejected by the offeree, on the grounds that the offeree had subsequently acted in a manner that would have caused a RP in the position of the offeror to believe the offer had been accepted. Maxitherms Boilers v Pacific Dunlop [1998] o FACTS: M submitted a quotation to P for installation of an autoclave. This quotation was subject to T&Cs attached; but none were attached. On 22nd March 1989, a fax was sent to P saying supply would be on Maxitherms standard terms as per previous quotation. Immediately upon this, this fax was accepted orally by P. further discussions took place between parties concerning specifics and on 3rd April, a document setting out Ms standard terms was sent to P. P then prepared an amended purchase order form and sent it together with a checque for 25% of the price to M. the form contained no terms other than a reproduction of one of Ms standard terms dealing with the method of payment. The autoclave was MFs and installed on ps premise. Unfortunately it exploded causing extensive damage to those premises. As a result, P sued M for breach of contract. By way of a defence, M relied on an exclusion clause contained in its TC. At first instance, it was held that these terms were not part of the contract. o Held: P and M did not reach a concluded agreemen on 22nd March 1989. o In determining whether and when a contract is made in the course of ongoing series of communications it is necessary to consider communication as a whole: Husey v Home Payne (1879)
For sale of international goods OPPOSITE POSITION UNCCISOGS, 1980 o Art 17: an offer, even if it is irrevocable, is terminated when a rejection reaches the offeror o Art 19: (1 )reply which is intended to accept but contain additional terms is a counter offer; (2) if the modications do no materially alter the terms of the offer, then it would constitute acceptance unless without undue delay, the offeror objects orally to the changes, if he does not do so, it is a contract; (3) additional items which extent one partys liability is considered to materially alter a contract. (a) Acceptance couched in different language It is arguable then that the offeree did not accept the same terms offered by the offeree
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Determination of whether acceptance arose, will depend on terms of the offer and acceptance If party has reached agreement on the terms, it is likely that a contract has come into existence despite differences in language between offer and acceptance: Carter v Hyde (1923), Cavallari v Premier Refrigeration (1952) Quadling v Robinson (1976) (b) Request by offeree for modification of performance Expressions of dissatisfaction by the offeree will not prevent contract formation if the offeree also indicates acceptance: Joyce v Swann (1864) Agreement is not prevented if the offeree, at the time of acceptance, seeks a concession from the offeror in terms of contractual performance: Clive v Beaumont (1848) (c) Divergence from terms of offer for benefit of offeror If conduct does not correspond to the terms of the offer, theres generally no agreement On the rare occasion, the offerees conduct represents terms more favourable to the offeror than those in the offerors offer, a court is likely to find that agreement exists: Ex parte Fealey (1897)
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if it has been accepted in a manner, more advantageous to the offeror, acceptance will be valid: eg replying my telephone or facisimile through a return post requirement likely to constitute acceptance: Tinn v Hoffman (1873) o if it was inserted for the offerees convenience, the offeree mat waive the benefit of the clause and accept in a different way: Manchester Diocesan Council v Commercial & General Investments [1970] o even if manner of acceptance was one prescribed in the offer, it may not be the only method of effective acceptance: Manchester case [1870] (b) acceptance by silence it is not open to an offeror to make an offer and advise the offeree that an agreement will have been formed unless the offeree communicates rejection of the offer.: Felthouse v Bindley (1862) where the seller delivers goods together with a notice that unless the goods are returned, within a specified period, or rejection of the offer is communicated in another way, the byer will be taken to have agreed to by the product NOW BANNED Refer to ss64, 65 TPA (c) acceptance by conduct if the offeror states that performing certain acts amounts to acceptance of offer, then they waive the need for offeree to communicate acceptance unilateral contracts communication of acceptance is impliedly waived: Carlils case Brogden v The Directors of the Metropolitan Railway Company: the courts may infer acceptance of an offer from the conduct of the parties, even if it was contemplated that acceptance would originally occur in a more formal place. Empirnall Holdings v Mahon Paull partners (1988): o FACTS: Property developer engaged an architect to undertake a property development Architect forwarded a printed contract to the property developer The developer preferred not to sign contracts and the architect was told of this Building work proceeded and a number of progress claims were paid by the developer to the architect In a claim for payment of outstanding feeds, the developer denied the existence of a contract o HELD: by the NSW CA, a contract EXISTED between the parties. o To protect consumers against being lulled into a contract by their inactivity, or liability that may arise in torts as a gratuitous bailee: S41 ACA 2010 (liability etc of recipient for unsolicited goods)
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(b)
(c) (d)
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contracts, correspondence from the offerors solicitor indicated that the contract would be formed by the receipt of the offerors solicitor of a contract signed by the offeree. (e) Revocation of acceptance prior to receipt no definitive Aus authoritiy In Nunnin case (Vic SC case) it was assumed that if the PR rule applied, the contract was formed when the acceptance was posted and a subsequent telephone call withdrawing acceptance would be ineffective
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Acceptance was by telegram to the Post Office. The Post Office communicated this via telex to the telex machine of the offeror Applying the rules, if acceptance was sent through telegram, PR would apply. If response by telegram is regarded as instantaneous then PR does not apply o HELD: the rule in Entores applied so that acceptance occurred only when communication was received by the offeror Leach Nominees v Walter Wright [1986] o FACTS: Offeree accepted by telephoning the msg to a public telex operator, who sent it to the offerors telex machine. o HELD: rationale for the PR applied equally to this case. He parties contemplated the acceptance would be by public telex and when the msg was committed to the public telex operator, the offeree had no way of knowing whether it was effectively communicated to the offeror. Since bth parties intended the acceptance to be by public telex, it was enough to indicate the offerors willingness to waive communication of acceptance before being bound
Topic 2 In the case of unilateral contract, it may remain within the offerees power unilaterally to complete the act of acceptance and thereby to furnish the executed consideration sought. The weight of authority suggests that a person who makes an offer susceptible of acceptance by performance of an ac, may not revoke that offer after the offeree has embarked upon performance of the act. There is no universal proposition that an offeror is not at liberty to revoke the offer once the offeree commences performance of the sought act of acceptance. Even if it be assumed that an offeror has impliedly promised not to revoke in consideration of a commencement of performance of the act of acceptance, it would not follow that a purported revocation would be ineffective. In the absence of specific relief in respect of that promise, the offerors revocation would be effective, although the offeror would be liable in dmg
1.11.2 POST
If PR applies, then contract is formed when and where the letter of acceptance has been posted
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Undecided in Aus law To overcome legal vacuum, traders will regularly transact business in a way which involves agreeing on issues surrounding contract formation
2 CONSIDERATION
Whether or no a promise is part of an agreement can be enforced, depends on, amongst other things, whether the promisee has given consideration for the promise C must be legally recognised A moral obligation is not sufficient to constitute consideration Only in rare cases is a contract not supported by consideration Stand alone lease problems have no problems in consideration it is only when parties vary the arrangement between themselves. English case of Williams v Roffey Brothers and Nicholls (Contractorss) may be open to criticism for pushing the boundaries of the rules on consideration o The decision reflects the commercial reality of operating in the construction industry The occasional judicial pronouncements eg Toohey J in Trident General Insurance v NcNiece Bros [1988] suggest that at least in limited circumstances, the absence of consideration may not prevent enforcement of promise. Development of promissory estopel answer to enforcement of a contract which lacks consideration NATURE OF THE CONSIDERATION
2.1
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HELD: P would not succeed. The reason provided was an action could not be brought upon a promise where the P is a stranger to the consideration Trident General Insurance v McNiece Bros (1988): Toohey J states that it was difficult to extract an exact ratio from the Tweedle case he concluded the P in Tweedle was not a party to the contract and did not provide consideration
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The usual case in a commercial context is that theres no dispute over the sufficiency of the consideration. Chappel & Co v Nestle [1960] o FACTS: to promote the sales of their chocolate bars, N offered a record for one shilling and sixpence plus three wrappers from sixpenny bars of chocolate. Chappel brought proceedings for infringement of copyright and N offered to pay a statutory royalty based on the shilling and sixpence. They did not include the value of the wrappers o ISSUE: while the wrappers were of no value (as they were thrown away), should they be included as part of the basis for determining the royalty to be paid using the purchase price of a bar as a benchmark? If a person wanted a record, they had to buy three sixpenny bars, o HELD: the wrappers formed part of the consideration because the one shilling and sixpence alone was not enough to obtain a record. Nestle had to pay a royalty based on three shillings. (b) Consideration need not be adequate The court is not interested in ensuring that a promisee provides value for the promisors promise o Not the courts role to ensure market value has been exchanged (c) it can be nominal Thomas v Thomas [1842] Niesmann v Collinridge (1921); Barnett v Ira L & AC (1952) (d) Sustainability of sufficiency principles Example: a father promises to transfer real estate to his daughter in consideration of I: the daughter paying him $100,000 - Enforceable II: daughter paying him $1. - enforceable III: daughters love and affection for her father - not enforceable by the law IV: daughter agreeing to conduct herself with sobriety and in a respectable, orderly and virtuous: Dunton v Dunton [1892] - some authority to suggest this is considerable it may be of value in the eyes of the law V: his faughter agreeing to complete the sale of an original Dobell painting to her father, the contract of sale having been entered into one month earlier. - Unenforceable; consideration not off value. Insufficient consideration for the promisee to promise to perform a pre-existing legal duty owed to the promisor (e) Repeating an existing duty imposed by the law A person cannot recover money they have been promised in return for performance of, or promise to perform, a duty imposed any the law because there would be no legal detriment Glasbrook Bros v Glamorgan Council Council [1925] o FACTS: industrial trouble at Glasbrook Bros coal mine resulted in the police being called in. the police felt that a mobile patrol would be sufficient to protect the premises, but the mine owners insisted that the police being billeted on the premises, with the mine owners to pay for this service at a special rate. The mine owners later refused to pay. o ISSUE: were the police doing more or nor more than what they were legally required?
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HELD: the police provided protection which was above and beyond what they considered effective and this was sufficient consideration to support the promise of payment by the mine owners. (f) Repeating an existing duty imposed by the law Insufficient consideration no detriment Stilk v Myrick [1809] o FACTS: a number of seamen signed on in London for a voyage to the Baltic and back. during the course of the voyage, two of them deserted and because the captain was unable to find two replacements, he promised the remaining sea men the wages of the two deserted seamen if they would work the ship safely back to London . this agreed to and the return journey was successfully completed by the owners refused to pay. o ISSUE: was the captains promise enforceable? o HELD: the sailors had undertaken all they could under the normal conditions of the voyage to bring the ship safely to port. The desertion of the two seaman did not extend the remaining seamans existing contractual duty; no new consideration Acts done in excess of duty would be good consideration: Hartley v Ponsonby (1871) o FACTS: nearly half the crew deserted the ship in port Phillip in 1852 and to encourage the remaining 19 sailors to complete the voyage back to Liverpool via Bombay, the captain promised them extra wages. Because the ship was so undermanned it was unseaworthy. When they arrived back in London the owners refused to pay the crew extra wages. o ISSUE: Did the crew provide more than was originally contracted of them? o HELD: sailing the ship back in an unseaworthy condition was more than the original contract required. Legal duty to care for children Jennings v Brown (1842): context where only the mother had a legal DOC for illegitimate children; a father promise to pay a sum of money if mother continued to care for the child was legally enforceable If the promisor derives some additional benefit by avoiding problems that can be associated with a promisee not performing,t he courts will be prepared to find that there is sufficient consideration to support a subsequent agreement: Williams v Roffey Bros [1990] o FACTS: carpenter entered into contract for a fixed sum, experienced financial difficulties midway through the job as he had underquoted. When carpenter told the D he was not able to fulfil his obligations, the D offered to pay him an extra sum to complete the work and have the project finished on time. The D ran the risk of having a penalty clause in his contract with a third party being imposed if the project was not finished on time. Williams continued to work but when the D failed to pay more of the contract price, he stopped work and claimed the balance owing under the original contract along with the additional payment. o ISSUES: was the promise of the additional payment enforceable or was it unsupported by consideration as the P was already under an existing legal duty? o HELD: Ds promise was enforceable. There was commercial benefit for the D in having the work completed on time and this amounted to sufficient consideration. o After reviewing relevant authorities, Glidewell LJ summarised what he considered to be the existing state of the law through a number of propositions (i) If A has entered into a contract with B to do work for, or to supply goods or services to B, in return for payment ny B; and
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At some stage before A has copeltely performed his obligations under the contract, B has reason to doubt whether A will or will not be able to. Complete his side of the bargain (iii) B thereupon, promises A an additional payment in return for As promise to perform his contractual obligations on time (iv) And as a result of giving his promise, B obtains in practice a benefit or obviates a disbenefit and (v) Bs promise is not given as a result of economic duress, or fraud on the part of A (vi) The benefit off B is capable of being consideration for Bs promise so that the promise is legally binding. Musumeci v Windadell (1994) o FACTS: the Pls (lessees) and the Df (lessor) had entered into lease of premises in a shopping centre. because the lessor had given a lease to a competitor of the Pl, lesses, the lesees trade was affected and they were unable to remain viable while continuing to pay for full rent. The parties therefore entered into an agreement under which the lessees were permitted to pay only two-thirds of the rent originally specified. o ISSUE: o HELD: found in favour of the lessees on the basis that the original lease had been altered. There had been consideration for the lessors promise to decrease the rental the practical benefit of continuing with the lessees as viable tenants rather than having to find other tenants and suing the lessees for the rental shortfall. o WILLIAMS V ROFFEY BROS should not be followed (1) failing to enforce such an agreement may protect a promisor from extortion that could result from a promisee threatening to abandon the contract unless granted a concession (2) the promise should not be enforced because the promisee does not receive any legal detriment by performing what they were already obliged to do and the promisor does not receive any legal benefit from receiving what was already due. (3) the effect of Williams v Roffey would be to leave no operation for the Stylk v Myrk rule. o Stylk v Myrick should still continue to operarte where the promisors promise was wholly gratuitous o For Williams to apply, and for the promise to be enforced, the promisee must be able to demonstrate that the promise to perform an existing contractual obligation was of sufficient practical benefit to the promisor (in that case, breach of the contract was worth more than the performance). (g) Promises to pay lesser amounts (h) Where promise is made to a third party: Scotson v Pegg (1861) o FACTS: P had contracted to sell goods to a third party, the goods to be delivered to the third partys nominees. The third party nominated the D. subsequently, the P and the D agreed that in consideration of the D unloading the same goods from the Ps ship at a specificed rate, the P would deliver the goods to the D. o ISSUE: o HELD: agreement between the P and the D was valid even though the P promised to do no more than to carry out the existing contractual duty owed to the third party. o Applied in New Zealand Shipping Co v A M Satterthwaithe [1975]: a valid contract existed between the shipper and the stevedore to unload the vessel, even though the stevefore was bound to its contract with the carrier to do the same. Performance of its
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contractual duty constituted acceptance of the shippers offer. In relation to the sufficiency of this conduct as consideration, the Privy Council noted that an agreement to do an act which the promisor is under an existing obligation to a third party to do, may well amount to valid consideration and does so in the present case o Pao On v Lau Yiu Long [1980] FACTS: the Pl (owners of shares in a private company) had in a prior agreement with the public company, undertaken not to sell 60% of the shares for at least one year. However the promise could also constitute consideration in a later agreement with a different party (the df the majority shareholder in the company), under which that party provided the P with an indemnity aganst loss. HELD: contract of indemnity could be enforced Aus a promise to carry out a pre-existing contractual duty owed to a third party can provide good consideration: Port Jackson Stevedoring v Salmond (1978) (i) Promises to pay lesser amounts Part payment of a debt Foakes v Beer (1884) o FACTS: a creditor, Mrs Beer, obtained judgement against the debtor (Dr Foakes) for 2,090.19 pounds. As the debtor was unable to pay this amount, the parties entered an agreement which the debtor paid the amount off over a period of time. If the payment was made in accordance with the agreement, the creditor undertook not to take any proceedings whaever on the said judgement. A judgement creditor is entited to be paid interest on a judgement debt until payment of debt is received in full. o ISSUES: if the agreement was enforceable, the creditor would not be able to be entitled to bring action for the interest o HELD: creditor enetitled to creceive the interest. The debtor had not provided consideration for the creditors promise to forgo interest Where this GR will not operate o Parties enter into a deed; here consideration is no required. Ss 188A of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) sets out the requirements for a personal insolvency agreement; here, creditors may agree to accept payment of something less than the full amount owing, in exchange for the debtor being released to a specific extent from his or her provable debts o Accommodation to benefit the creditor. Eg if the circumstnces surrounding the payment are altered to accommodate the wishes of the creditor so that the creditor received some benefit from the new arrangement, it may be good consideration Where time and place of payment of the debt is altered for the convenience of the debtor, this will NOT provide consideration for the creditors promise to forgo the balance of the debt: Vanbergen v St Edmunds Properties [1933] Amount owing is disputed o if this occurs, parties may enter into a compromise agreement. The rule in Pinnels case will not apply to this agreement. o There must be a genuine dispute about the amount owing H B F Dalgety v Moreton [1987] FACTS: real estate agent was appointed by sellers to find a seller for their farm. It was agreed that the real estate agent should be paid in accordance with the professional scale of charges adopted by the Real Estate Institute of NZ. After the sale, the sellers were invoiced for $9,786.98 in accordance with the scale. The sellers forwarded to the real estate agent a checque for $2,450.000 being the sellers estimate of costs on a work done basis. The cheque was banked by the real estate. The agent
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subsequently sued for the balance of the commission due; HELD: in favour of the real estate agent. The fact that the sellers were reluctant to pay the amont owing did not mean that there was a genuine dispute about the amount owing to him. Part payment by a third party o Hirachand Punamchand v Tenple [1911] FACTS: Debtors father wrote to the creditor and offered to pay a lesser sum in full discharge of his sons debt. He enclosed a draft for the lesser sum which the creditor cashed. The creditor subsequently brought an action against the debtor for the abalnce of the debt. ISSUE: did the offer of the smallr sum by the father (a third party) and the acceptance of it by the creditor ioerate as a discharge of debt? HELD: creditor lost. To do so would in effect be fraud on third party. The third party had paid the smaller sum in the belief that it was acceptable to discharge the debtors liability to the creditor. Legal ramifications between debtor and creditor afterwards creditor unlikely to recover owing amount after third party has paid off a lesser sum Welby v Drake (1825); Hirachand Punamchand v Temple [1911] o Hirachand Punamchand v Temple [1911] agreement between creditor and third party operated to extinguish the debt Criticism of Pinnels case o The rule does not reflect the expectation of reasonable people, or modern commercial realities o Rule does no allow business people to enter agreements that may provide each with a commercial benefit o When the creditor cannot pay the full amount, it may be more beneficial for the creditor to accept the smaller amount rather than spend further in legal costs in pursuit of the full amount o Rule does not apply when a third party intervenes to pay a smaller amount, or when the creditor and debtor alter terms to their agreement o Commercial realities prevented the landlord from recovering the tenant in Musumeci v Winadell (1994) (agreement by parties to decrease the rent payable was held enforceable) o The rule is consistent with the notion that a promise to perform a pre-existing contractual duty does not constitute good consideration
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FACTS: a son was disappointed about the way his father had distributed some property and made some repeated complaints about this distribution to his father. The son and father agreed that if the son ceased complaining about the distribution and also because of the natural love and affection the father had for his son, the son would not have to pay the money owing to the farther. HELD: the son had NOT provided good consideration for the fathers promise. The son had no right to complain because his father had a right to distribute property in anyway he say fit. The son promising not to do what he had no right to do NOT good consideration. Also authority that consideration must be real and identifiable.
2.4.2 PERFORMANCE OF EXISTING DUTIES 2.4.3 PART PAYMENT OF DEBT 2.4.4 COMPROMISE AND FORBEARANCE TO SUE
To prevent settlement of potential (r actual) legal claims, the court is willing to accept the validity of these agreements To constitute valid consideration, the party who promises, must be acting in good faith. He/she must have an honest belief that the claim may be successful Hercules Motors v Schubert (1953) o FACTS: S purchased a new car from HM and after a short time, found the paintwork faulty. HM acknowledged that something would have to be done and it was agreed that HM would repaint the car and restore it as new condition. It was also agreed that the work would be supervised by a paint company representative, who would detwrmine if the work was satisfactory. His report was unfavourable. o ISSUE: was this promise to restore the car to avoid being sued by S, capable of amounting to good consideration. o HELD: there was a genuine dispute between the parties and that the agreement to repaint, was a compromise of that dispute. The compromise was a good consideration for a new contract. (NZ authority) that the claim must not be vexatious or frivioulous: Miles v New Zealnd Alford Estate (1886), Couch v branch Investments [1980] o Wigan v Edwards (1973): this HC did not make the same requirement The promise/compromise not to sue must be bargained for: If the promise is to postpone enforcing a legal entitlement for a period or indefinitely (rather than compromising an entitlement under the contract), there must be evidence that this promise was made at the request, either express or implied of the other party: Player v Isenberg (2002)
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incurring personal expense in the process. After the P carried out these services, the D promised to pay him 100 pounds. The P sued to recover this amount. o HELD: P won. Although the promise to pay 100 pounds was made after the P had performed the services, it was presumed by the parties at the time the D requested the services that they would be paid for. The p performed the services on the basis and the later promise to pay was part of that same transaction Re Caseys patients: where services were performed and the subsequent promise for payment was held to be enforceable o Now extends to promise to act (or not to act) in a particular way: Pao on v Lau Yiu Long [1980] Pao on v Lau Yiu Long [1980] o FACTS: P owned the capital of a private company. The private company owned a building that a public company wished to acquire. To effect the transaction, the Ps sold their shares in the private company to the public company. In exchange, the Ps received shares in the public company. The Ds (majority shareholder in the public company) requested that the ps give the public company an undertaking not to sell 60% of those share for one year. This was to ensure that the market was not flooded with shares in the public company (effectively lowering the share price) To ensure that the Ps would not be disadvantaged, if the shares decreased n value, the D agreed to buy 60% of the shares after the period experied at $2.60 a share. Subsequently the ps realised that, should the second be carried out, the Ps would not benefit from an increased in the share price. Accordingly the Ps and Ds entered into an agreement to replace the previosu agreement to purchase the shares at $2.50 each, underwhich the D agreed to indemnify the Ps for any loss in respect of 60% of their holding, which would occur if the market closed at the end of the period less than $2.50. Share prices dropped and the Ps sought to rely on the contract of indemnity. The D refused to indemnify them on the basis that the Ps did not give consideration for promise to indemnify. o HELD: Ps won. In the circumstances of the case the Ps had provided consideration of the Ds indemnity. Consideration was the Ps promise made to the public company under the 1st agreement not to sell the shares for a year. This was given at the Ds request. The parties understood that at the time, the Ps needed to be compensated for any drop in price that may take place o Authority for when a benefit is conferred upon the promisee (where a promisee seeks to enfrce a pro
3 PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
In tesponse to the injustice which would a result when a person could not enforce their legal promise (where the promise was not supported by sufficient consideration moving from the promisee Where equitable estoppel is applied, a person will be prevented from going back on his or her word (legal promise)
70211 Contract Law There must be evidence of unconscionability before this will be applied
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3.1
COMMON LAW ESTOPPEL equitable estoppel is different from common law estoppel in particular, CL estoppel by conduct (CL in pais) o CL estoppel is referred to as a rule of evidence because it may help form the factual foundation for an action (but cannot be a cause of action on its own) o Estoppel relates to the existence of a contract between two parties the legal relationship is determined by reference to the terms of the contract o if during the state of affairs, the contract confers a cause of action on the party raising the estoppel, the cause of action may be enforced o source of legal obligation: the assumed contract ; estoppel is not a source of legal obligation only operates in relation to representations of past or existing fact does not compel adherence to representations of intention or promise same thing with equitable estoppel: Jordan v Money (1854) CL in pais: o Prevents a person from unjustly departing from an assumption/representation of past or existing fact that the other party has adopted or relied upon - unless that assumption/representation will cause the other party to cause detriment: Thompson v Palmer (1933) DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
3.2
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Facts HELD:
enforce those rights until the time passes without the parties being in the same position as before Both these case held the general principal that either due to negotiations or the conduct of one of the parties, a party to the contract could not insist on certain rights under the contract
The D leased a block of flats from the P at a certain ground rent. When WW2 roke ou, there was a downturn in business and the flats were not fully occupied. When it was clear that the D could not pay the rent out of profits from subletting the flats to others, it was agreed that the rent should be reduced by half, indefinitely At the end of the war, the busness recovered and the flats were all occupied The receiver of the landlord company commenced an action claiming it was entitled to full rent for the entire period
Denning, relied on the dicta from the above two cases and said that where a promise id made which to the knowledge of the person making the promise, is going to be acted upon by the person to which it is made to, the promisor will not be allowed to enege or act inconsistently with the promise
Combe v Coombe Principle in High Trees was clarified The principle: o Where one party, through their words/conduct , made a promise or assurance, which was intended to affect the legal relations between them and to be acted upon accordingly, then the promise/assurance cannot be revoked o Principle restricted to the limited sense of not allowing the promisor to act inconsistently with the promise o Case was not authority for creation of a new action in dmg for breach Principle then approved by the Privy Council in Tool Metal Manufacturing v tungsten Electric Motor Co [1955] Principle then adopted by the HC in Legione v Hately (1983)
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Several days later, the owners solicitors herd nothing, and submitted a document signed by the owner, by way of exchange. Owner proceeded with the demolishing A week later, Waltons underwent a restructuring that included a reconsideration of whether it wished to proceed with the transactions. It instructed the solicitor to go slow with the proceeds, and was aware that the demolition was proceeding Two months later, it informed the owners that it did not wish to proceed; building was 40% completed by then at no time had there been an exchange of contract necessary for the conclusion of a binding contract o HELD: By the majority The owner had been led to believe, and had acted upon the belief that an exchange of contracts would take place Equity will relieve a plaintiff on the notion that it would be unconscionable on the party of the other party to ignore the assumption All the various estoppels have been subsumed into one single doctrine o Difficulties for the owner in seeking relief (1) to seek relief on the basis of estoppel would be to rely on it as a source of rights rather than as a defensive tool as it had been applied in Combe v Combe, and (2) in the absence of an agreed consideration, to grant a remedy would be tantamount to enforcing a gratuitous promise. o The court recognised that there was more than one type of estoppel which would be applied through in equity; the common thread was that equity will come to the relief of a P who has acted to his detriment on the basis of a basic assumption in relation to which the other party has took part in that assumption and it would be unfair or unjust if he were left free to ignore that assumption Grundt v Great Boulder (1937) Equitable estoppel can both a sword (creation of new rights) and a shield (upholding existing rights) : Walton Stores Brennan points out the different between equitable estoppel and contract: o Contractual obligations arise by arrangement of parties. Equity created by esotppel may be imposed irrespective of what was agreed to between parties o Contractual obligations must be supported by considerable, estoppel does not o Measure of contractual obligations depends on terms of the contract; estoppel it is applied wherever necessary to prevent detriment resulting from unconscionable conduct Estoppel needs to be enforced with contract principle: Giumelli v Giumelli (1995) o Where there is a necessary prerequisite to an agreement having legal effect (eg having the agreement evidence in writing) this cannot be circumvented by estoppel Can be used against a public authority o Provided it does not hinder the exercise of statutory discretion in the public interest
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Representations or assumptions concerning the future, can only be dealt with through equity
3.3
3.3.1 GENERAL
equitable estoppel may apply in absence of pre-existing relationship of any kind: Walton Stores v Maher (1988), Birtstar v The Proprietors Ocean Breeze [1997] unconscionable conduct denotes a creation or encouragement by the D in the other party, of an assumption, that a contract will come into existence or a promise will be performed and for the party to rely on that assumption to their detriment: Walton Stores (1988) Walton Stores v Maher (1988) six points 1. P assumed a particular legal relationship existed between the P and the D or expected that one would come into existence 2. D induced P to assume 3. P acted to their detriment in reliance of that assumption 4. The D knew or intended the P to do so 5. The Ps action/inaction will occasion detriment if the assumption is not fulfilled 6. The D has failed to act to avoid that detriment o Note that numbers 2,4,6 reflect the elements of unconscionable conduct - Silvori v Babaro (1988) elements must be positively and will rarely be inferred esp the case where detriment is suffered: CW v Verwayen (1990) ; this also applies to all other elements Chellaram v Hina Shipping Co [1991] in the situation where parties have subsequently executed a formal contract that differs from pre-contractual negotiations (authority suggests that) if it is UC in the circumstances for the party to insist on his or her strict rights then an estoppel may arise even if it amounts to outflanking consideration or the principles concerning collateral contracts: State Rail Authority (NSW) v Health Outdoor (1986) (only influential) where a collateral contract is inconsistent with the main contract, the subsequent written contract will not preclude an equitable estoppel based on the prior promise if the necessary UC is present: Wright v Hamilton Island Enterprises [2003] Where parties subsequently execute a formal contact, which is expressed to constitute the entire contract between the parties, but then one party asserts that the other is estopped from relying on rights created by the written contract due to an assumption formed during negotiations: Skywest Aviation v CW (1995) o The parole evidence rule operates to exclude evidence of the alleged estoppel o Preceding statements are seen as being superseded by he later written document : Johnson Mathey v A C Rochester Overseas Corp (1990) o It would be a threat to stability of commercial relationships where dealings where precontractual statements become a sufficient basis for which to reject a valid contract: Skywest Aviation
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Silvori v baboro (1988): the principle operates on representations or promises as to future conduct Brennan in Maher the ssumption that a particular legal relationship then exited or would exist between the P and the D (and in the second case) that the D would not be free to withdraw from the expected legal relationsip. EK Nominees v Woolworths [2006] o There does not always need to be an expectation or assumption that the D wil not be able to withdraw o Whether it is UC for one party to withdraw, will depend on the nature of the risk of his/her withdraw which the other prty was induced to assume and the extent of to which reliance acted to the other partys detriment Austotel v Franklins Self Serve (1989): o FACTS: store premises were constructed and adapted to suit the purposes of a supermarket proprietor. The supermarket proprietor acquired special equipment and fittings and moved to terminate the lease on its existing premises. Negotiations failed to produce an agreement as to the rent payable for the new premises. o HELD: Silovi v Barbaro: (expansion) an assumption or exp that a contract will come into existence or a promise be performed or an interest granted to the P by the D (b) Clear and unambiguous The assumption must be clear and unambiguous: Legione v Hately (1983) UC is usually difficult to establish if the representation is ambiguous or unclear: Australian Crime Commission v Gray [2003] Estoppel requires a greater degree of certainty than is required for contractual undertaking: Woodhouse AC Israel v Nigerian Produce Marketing [1971] Representation cannot be clear and unequivocal if important indo is omitted: Mobil Australia v Lyndel Nominees (1998) A promise may be definite in the sense that there is a clear promise to do something even though that something is not precisely defined: FLinn v FLinn (1999) Where a P had the right to elect to have a license renewed, the absence of essential details such as the means and timing of the exercise of the right to elect, will not be fatal o The requirement of reasonableness would be implies and uncertainty would not fit into the objective criterion of this element: Wright v Hamilton Island [2003] o Promise cannot be open ended: Aus Crim Commission v Gray [2003] Aus Crim Commission v Gray [2003] o FACTS: The National Crime Authority identified Mr Gray as having transferred large sums of money on behalf of a drug syndicate. He subsequently agreed to provide evidence against the syndicate in return for immunity and witness protection for him and his wife While the Grays acted out of fear and the wish to obtain immunity they also relied on a statement by an NCA inspector who had explained the witness protection programme including the promise they would not suffer an financial disadvantage. In reliance of the statements, the Grays suffered substantial disadvantages including the loss of their identities, limits on their contact with friends and
Topic 2 family, Mr Grays inability to earn income and their need to sell Mrs Grays hairdressing business at a loss. While in protecton the Grays received money for accommodation, electricity, telephone and sustenance. After 6.5 years, the threat to the Grays was assessed at being minimal and their placement in the programme ended. A year later, they received an income tax assessment on the money that had been paid to them by the NCA; not long after Mr Gray died from lung and liver cancer
HELD: Both the Grays and NCA officer must have understood the promise of no financial disadvantage by entering the programme subject to the constraint of reasonableness Reasonableness measured in context of the case also that there would ne no ambiguity in the promise Promise was interpreted as the NCA providing support not only during the period of protection but also for a reasonable period (judged to be three years) thereafter to allow the Grays to be rehabilitated into the community Ambiguity is not a bar to UC relief would be granted in the form of minimum equity to do justice Where the originator of ambiguous document(s) intends for it to be relied upon, he or she may be obliged to bear the consequences of the ambiguity for which they are responsible for: Woodhouse AC Israel v Nigerian Produce [1972] Where a representation may have more than one meaning, it might still be regarded as clear and ambiguous if in the circumstances it would be reasonable for the representee to have interpreted the representation in a particular way o BUT the representation may be regarded as uncertain if in the circumstances it is not reasonable for the representee to rely on it: Galaxidis v Galaxidis [2004] Legione v Hately: it is not necessary for a representation to be clear in its entirety so long as it was sufficiently satisfies the estoppel requirement o A representation that a particular right would not be asserted for X days will not be unclear or unequivocal merely because the words used as to whether the words used are equivocal (c) Assumptions may be of fact or law Lorimer v State Bank of NSW (unrep, 5/07/1991) o Facts: a cotton farmer acted on the assumption that his bank would finance the hire purchase of cetain machinery in the development of his land o HELD: the farmer may have honestly but mistakenly believed that his assumption was as to the true facts (mistake of fact) or that what were the true facts amounted to a contract that obliged the bank to finance his plans (mistake of law) Also in Waltons v Maher o Mistake of fact: that an exchange of contracts would take place in due course o Mistake of law: that there would be a future legal relationship o
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in certain circumstances of encouragement by the D for the P to adhere to an assumption/expectation he or she had already formed OR as a resulted of being lulled into a false sense of security by the Ds failure to object to the A/E on which the P is known to be conducting: Walton Stores v Maher (1988); S&E Promotions v Tobin Brothers (1994) silence: o is usually no unequivocal there can be multiple reasons for a party to remain silent: Moratic v Lawrence James Gordon (2007) o will only be UC only where there is an attempt afterwards to assert a legal relationship different from the one which, to the knowledge of the silent party, the other assumed or expected. In this circumstance the onus is on the silent party to either (1) warn the other party that he or she denies the correctness of the assumption/expectation or that (2) to act so as to avoid an detriment that the other party may suffer in reliance of the a/e: Walton Stores v Maher (1988); Mathews v Doctrieve Corp (2003) the D must know or ought to know of the mistake being made to the P: Ampol v Mathews (1991) o wilful blindness is no excuse Ampol v Mathews (1991) o FACTS: The construction business of a corporate customer of Ampol was taken over by a new company bearing a similar name. the change was reflected in the repainting of he company vehicles and the printing of the letterhead. The bank accounts, or at least the number of the accounts, remained the same and checques were drawn on the accounts, sometimes in the old name more often in the new Nothing was done to close the acc with Ampol, in the name of the old company or create a new acc in the name of the new one No further steps were taken to revoke a guarantee of the old business obligations given to Ampol by the principals of the old company Business continued to be run in the same way as it did before and Ampol continued to supply the new company in the same way as it had previously supplied the old company o HELD: Failure of the old company to bring to notice of Ampol That the company had cased to trade and thereafter, Ampol should look to the new company for payment of accounts amounted to UC Estoppel given Lorimer v State bank of NSW (Unrep, 5.07/1991) o FACTS: bank was unaware that one of its farmers, a cotton farmer was acting under the assumption that the bank would finance his development plans. o Held: unable to rely one estoppel, two bank officers made it quite clear before he committed himself that they could give no assurance that the bank would provide the funding. It will be insufficient if the P orchestrates matters so that it appears that the Ds conduct allowed the P to adopt the assumption where the reality is otherwise: Skywest Aviation v the CW (1995)
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FACTS: SA provided surveillance services off the North Aus coast directed principally at illegal fishing and unauthorised landings on the Aus territory. After SAs contract was not renewed, a contract was awarded to amman Aviation (which was promply terminared by the CW When Aus Customs Service again invited tenders for the Costwatch contract, Skywest submitted a tender based on three Westwind aircradft appropriately modified for surveillance operations Found by the trial judge that when Skywest submitted their tender, it was aware that the cost of the modification of the aircraft avl to it to purchase, would exceed the amount it had stated in its tender. In the course of negotiations, the Chief Executive of SA and project manager both adopted a strategy or introducing into convos, the concept of equalisation (intending for the CW to be resp for the extra costs) in such a way that the Customs Service officer did not know what the duo had meant Skywest was awarded the tender. They subsequently claimed that the CW was estopped from denying responsibility for the costs of the modification of the aircraft it purchased o HELD: all the fostering of assumptions occurred on SAs behalf. The Customs Service Officer did nothing to induce a belief that the CW would pay for or contribute to any of the cost or modification outside of the tender Skywest knew that the officer was not aware of the meaning of the term equalisation and intended to keep the situation in that way o Similar result will follow if the representation made by the D was induced by the Ps misrepresentation: Office Trustee in Bankruptcy v Tooheys (1993) (b) Mere hope The D must have played such a part in the adoption of the A/E that it would be unfair or unjust if he were left free to ignore it: Walton Stores v Maher (1988) If a party places no part in the adoption of the A/E then there will be no UC by that part: Canberra Bushrangers v Byrne (Unrep, 21, December 1997) Where an A/E was formed even when there was an express statement made to dissuade that belief no UC: Lorimar v State Bank oF NSW Valbirn v Powprop [1991] o FACTS: despite clear indication by a restaurant proprietor that it would not lease particular premises, the owner of the premises risked the expense of making design and lay ut changes to its buildings in the hope that it might succesfully secure the proprietor as a tenant Negotiations fell through, o HELD: proprietor held not be estopped from denying there was an agreement to lease. Mere hope may be seen in operation where a particular interpretation is placed on an ambiguous representation by the party claiming estoppel: Chellaram & Co v China ocean Shipping Co [1991] o FACTS: solicitors for the D wrote to the Ps solicitor with we trust it will not be necessary for your client to commence proceedings until the settlement has been fully explored o When the time limitation on the action for breach of the contract expired, the P alleged the solicitors letter estopped the carrier from relying on the time bar
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HELD: noting in the solicitors statement suggested or justified the conclusion that nothing further needed to be said or done about the limitation period (c) Unauthorised representations No estoppel will arise if the rep is made by an agent who has no actual or ostensible authority to bind their principal (and the party who claims the estoppel knows this): State Rail Authority (NSW) v Health Outdoor (1986) The mere fact that a rep is not unauthorised will not necessarily prevent an estoppel from being estbl o Where it is made to the knowledge of the principle in circumstances where the principal knows or ought to know that the statement will be relied upon, a failiure to deny the statement may amount to the principals encouragement, for others to believe that the statement is authorised : Corpers (No. 664 v NZI Securities Australia (1989) Corpers (No. 664 v NZI Securities Australia (1989) o FACTS: D was an Aus subsidiary of a NZ finance company, and the mortgagee of a building in Syd CBD The owner of the building was continually in default wne went into receivership. The D unsuccessfully tried to sell the building by the mortgagees auction After the auction, representatives of the P approached a senior officer of the D, with a proposal involving the Ds officer lending the P $65million to buy the building. 3 days later the offiver advised the reps that he had referred it to NZ and they have approached it. The following day he supplied a letter setting out the terms on which the D would provide the financing and on the same dya, the P entered into an agreement to purchase thebuilding. In the mean time, the D and its NZ parent company were undergoing changes in its mgmt., and the executives were issued with written instructions limiting their lending authority. Following a daw of review, the D indicated that there was no way they would proceed with the deal o HELD: Although the officer had no actual/obs authority, a CL estoppel or alternatively and equatiable estoppel, had been made out. Ds conduct in knowingly and silently watching the D enter into the contract to purchase the building when it must have known it was only doing so because of the letter (promising finance) gave rise to estopell D bound by contract tolend the P the money
3.3.4 RELIANCE
the P must act or abstain from acting in realiance on the a/e: ASC v Malborogh Goldmines (1993) o reliance must be reasonable o departure from an a/e that is unreasonably formed or unreasonably relied upon will not normally constitute UC conduct by the D: ASC v Malborough Goldmines (1993) o in determining this, the Ps actual knowledge is relevant not any contructive notice (incl that the a/e was untrue): Standard Chartered Bank Aust v Bank of China (1991)
Topic 2
this req may be a signf impediment from successfully seeking estoppel on basis of noncontractual promise o a P may be reasonably expected to appreciate the fact that a voluntary promise does not form part of a binding contract, they cannot rely on it: Walton Stores v Maher (1988) o similar situation when a party is seeking to uphold a transaction, expressed to be subject to contract: Attorney-General (Hong Kong) v Humphreys Estate [1987] o this may also be a reason for why the court will not uphold estoppel for a respresentation by someone lacking the actual/osb authority to bing the D assessing the reasonableness, the following the relevant o characteristic of the P o whethere they were being advised by solicitors art the time: Kirton v nethery (unrep, NSW, 15/07/1996) Capital Market Brokers v Hamelyn UPC (unrep, NSW SC 02/05/1989): o No estoppel o Parties were stockbrokers and merchant bankers experienced in commerce who intended to have their soliciors prepare formal documentation Autotel Pty Ltd v Franklin Self Serve (1989):both parties were of substantial enterprises, well resourced and advised dealing in a commercial transaction having a great value they did not reach the point of agreement in terms which could have been enforced The mere fact that parties may have the benefit of legal advise or were contracting according to customary practice will not, by itself, necessary prevent an estoppel from arising : Walton Stores v Maher (1988) Its still possible for unreasonable reliance to form the basis of an equitable estoppel o (1) where a principle is aware of an unauthorised rep but takes no steps to disprove that rep and effectively adopts that as their own: important here the principles knowedge and the other partys reliance on unreasonable reliance o (2) failiure by D to disuade the P from relying on an A/E can amount to encouragement of that a/e - Where there has been reasonable reliance, and the D would have dissuaded the P from relying on the a/e: Walton Stores v Maher (1988)
3.3.6 DETRIMENT
the relevant detriment must be the Ps detriment, not the Ds: Gobblers Inc v Stevens (1993) o there must also be a link between the a/e created/encouraged and the detriment suffered: Re Ferdinando (1993)
Topic 2
this detriment must be the result of adopting the [assumption] in a position of material disadvantage if departure from A/E is permitted: Thompson v Palmer (1993) eg the P pursuing a particular course of action, such as failing to take the necessary steps to become ready and willing to perform the contract, where that is required: Foran v Wright (1989) insufficient if the P, merely relying on the money they have already planned to spend at an earlier time, resulting in no altered mode or living or other disadvantage: Lorimer v Bank of NSW ( unrep, 05/07/1991) detriment is determined at the date the D seeks to resile from the A/E or expectation he or she has encouraged/induced he other party to rely on it: Hawker Pacific v Helicopter Charter (1991) its insufficient for the P to change his/her position upon the a/e: Potter Partners v Balander (30/06/1989) something like a small peppercorn may constitute as valuable consideration such this small loss would not amount to signf disadvantage as req by estoppel: Hawker Pacific v Helicopter Charter (1991) disadvantage need not be substantial o Je Maintiendrai v Quaglia (1980): relevant detriment found where the P had been required to pay arrears of rental in a bulk amount rather than on a periodic basis o Stevens v Standard Chartered Bank (1989); where P had been required to negotiate an agreement for the removal of a caveat o Collin v Holden [1989]: where P had been forced to return to court and to fight a case on its merits after the D reneged on a settlement agreement reached by counsel involved in the case. No estoppel if the P suffers detriment after learning the assumption or expectation on which they relied on was without basis: Milchas Investments v Larkin (1989)
Topic 2
HELD: the CW was no entitled to defences in negligence Two judges decided it on the bases of equity Deane J applied a general doctrine of estoppel by conduct extending to representations about future facts and held that there was a prima facie entitlement to relief based on the assumed statement of affairs. The other judges who also decided on basis of equity held that the minimum equity to do justice was to compensate the P for his reliance loss o Case is authority that the court should only grant a remedy that is the minimum necessary to do justice between the parties o Note a number of cases which have granted a remedy based on the Ps expectation: Edwater Grazing v Pincevic Nominees [2001] o Maximum for remedy each was would be determined by question of degree it would be more appropriate for the reliance to be fulfilled where there has been reliance for an extended period or where there had been a substantial and irreversible detriment suffered o that reliance; where ill health, worry and stress might suffice if it can be proved. o Since the majority majority preferred the minimum justice method use this Giumelli v Giumelli (1995): expectation in reation to acquisition of an interest in property o Considered the different approaches to estoppel in CW v Verawyn, and held it was possible to grant relief to a prima face enetitlement o Cases which have followed Giuelli usually involve the acquisition of property. And tend to lead to the fulfilment of the entitlement; o The other cases: prima facie entitlement may be inequitably harsh Sullivan v Sullivan [2006] since Giumelli, Verawyn is probably not law. Any factors which may diminish the expectation: o Where the P has not done equity: Giumelli o If the expectation is uncertain or extravagant : Donis v Donis [2007] Whether relief should be granted so that it ay have an adverse effect on the rights of third parties o Silvori v Babaro (1988): remedy awarded was the grant of a personal license to the Ps, could with an interest in the nature of a profit a prendre, together was sufficient to prevent the equitable interest of the purchaser (acquired through contract for sale of and) from prevailing over earlier equitable rights. o It may affect the method of granting relief Giumelli v Giumelli, court was obliged to consider the matters that stood in the way or a simple order to convey the land to the P in accordance with the assumption he had been encouraged to make (court substituted an order for payment of money to the value of the land secured by a charge over the property for the lower courts order that the land be transferred to him o Forbes and Bundock v Aus Yachting Federation (unrep 04/04/1986): where a two man yachting crew had suffered detriment in reliance upon Olympic selection criteria published by the D. REMEDY was compensation for the wasted expenditure they had incurred (buying and air-freighting boating equipment at their own expense, to mitigate the competitive adv they would have otherwise suffered rather than denying the nomination of another third party crew to allow the plaintiffs to participate).
Topic 2
would reasonable people in the position of the parties, have considered the agreement as intended to be binding? Ermogenous case: relevant considerations: o Subject matter of agreement o Status of the parties to the agreement o The parties relationship to one another o The language used by the parties o The context in which the agreement was made. Ermogenous had recently case doubt over the traditional approaches of applying presumptions the correct is to look at all the circumstances, including the context in which agreement was formed and asses whether from an objective perspective, the parties can be regarded as intending their agreement to have legal cosnequences.
Topic 2
Pura v Kormehl [2004]: legal intention existed where two people in a romantic relationship entered into an agreement under which the woman would give up her employment and move in with the man and be paid $50000 per month by him for the rest of her life. (b) Separated couples Merrit v Merrit [1970]: parties had the intention when agreeing to the arrangements for the house. This was of a serious nature concerning a financial settlement between couples (c) Other family relationships Agreements here, based on natural love and affection no intention by parties Jones v Padavatton [1969] o Facts: Wilmott pp 122 o Feld: mother won, there was no legally binding agreement between the parties regarding the provision of maintenance (and then later the offer to live in the mothers house). It was only an agreement formed on goof faith despite the seriousness of the nature of the actions of the daughter in reliance of the offer Wakeling v Ripley (1951) o FACTS: PP 123 o HELD: more than a family/social arrangement. What was relevant was the serious consequences for the Ps, the P had to give up his salaries position and person and both having to move permanently to Aus. Todd v Nicol [1957]: elderly woman invited her sister and niece to move from Scotland to South Aus, in return for both being able to live with her. HELD: parties had intention Gors v Henderson; Henderson v Perpetual Trustee (WA) (1999) (Ds gave up accommodation and employment to live with and look after their step grandmother of the D in exchange for receiving real property upon her death. Held: lack of intention) Roufos v Brewster [1971]: intention where a business arrangement has been estbl between parties (who are related to each other) o Facts: pp 123 o Held: Brewsters unsuccessful. The court did hold that the parties entered unto a binding contract the agreement occurred in a commercial context. Ermogenous: onus is on party asserting legal relations existed then assess objectively all the factors relevant in determining whether this existed. (d) Social relations Heslop v Burns: no intention between friends o Facts: pp 124 This wil not be the case even when the arrangement has been made in the social setting o Simpkins v Pays [1995] parties who pool funds to enter a competition in one persons name may have legal intentions
Topic 2
when there is a dispute about an agreement having taken place in a business setting: Esso Petroleum v Comissioners of Customers and Excise [1976] o FACTS: There was legal intention upon a customer buying petrol in order to receive the gold coins of no intrinsic value. Promotion took in context of a business setting. And sales were promised as a result of the coins also the scheme had a potentially large commercial benefit to Esso. No intention can be proved by: o Express clause stating no intended legal consequences o Overall tenor of the particular document
4.4
Topic 2
Baldwin v Everingham (1993): facts, Wilmott pp 129 o QLD SC prepared to declaratory relief, o Cameron v Hogan was distinguished (changing social and political views), on basis of increased statutory recognition conferred on voluntary associations; political parties are now beyond a mere voluntary association Confirmation in Galt v Flegg [2003] Importance of proprietary interests and rights: Finlayson v Carr [1978]. Facts pp 129 o Membership of the Aus Jockey Clun carried important propriety rights. Rules for intentional legal relations needs to be constructed fund Ermogenous v Greek Orthodox of SA (2002): facts pp 127 o Intention was found when parties entered into an employment contract. o Archbishops employer was the Community, not the Church o If agreement was entered with the Church certain aspects would have still give way to legal relations: o Considered: subject matter of agreement (employment), conditions of employment in absence of any property, income or reputational interests involved, the court has no jurisdiction to decide issues giving rise to remedies for a non contractual relationship: Rush v WA Amateur Football League [2007] o pride and costs were not sufficient
Topic 2
Despite the use of words ex gratia payment in negotiations, the parties did intend to create legal relations Ex gratia does not indication that an agreement is to be without legal effect. It indicates that he party agreeing to pay does not admit any pre-existing liability on his party.
4.6.5
Letter of intent was inconsistent with the existing contract to buy. It was relevant in determining that neither parties had intention. Eg if a solicitor writes to a prospective client to place on record the understanding that all legal work or and incidental to the completion of a particular project , and that understanding is accepted - unlikely that parties had intention: JH Milner & Son v Percy Bilton [1966] o phrasing was too vague o
Topic 2
strict approach can be justified on the basis that it is not the task of the courts to write the agreement for the parties, nor can the courts formulate a remedy if it is not clear what the rights of the parties were in the first place. A contract rendered void by uncertainty may generate a right to a reasonable remuneration. Thus o if services are rendered under a void agreement, the person providing the services may sue for a reasonable payment (quantum meruit, ie "as much as he [or she] deserved"): Stinchcombe v Thomas [1957], LJ Hooker Ltd v WJ Adams Estates Pty Ltd (1977) o if goods have been supplied, a reasonable amount must be paid for them (quantum valebant, that is, "as much as they were worth"): o If goods can be recovered then the supplier may do so because no title passes under a void contract. But, apart from these ameliorative measures, the parties are left without any rights. GR: a court should do all in its power to uphold the arrangement that the parties have made, even if it is defective. o These are now unusual, though nevertheless still found, where a court will declare a contract void for uncertainty. o The courts use their interpretive powers to make sense of difficult or ambiguous language and, at times, are prepared to resort to the implied term to fill a gap: Twigg (t/as Adrian Twigg & Co) v Kung (1994)
Topic 2
if it is uncertain because it could have multiple meanings, its unlikely that itll be void foro uncertainty. The court, upon construction will decide the appropriate meaning: , Council of The Upper Hunter County District v Australian Chilling And Freezing Co Ltd 1968 any illusory clause: Whitlock v Brew (1968) - again the parties put a term in their sale agreement that the purchaser would lease part of the land to Shell (to run a service station on it) on such reasonable terms as commonly given under such a lease. The court held the agreement void for uncertainty. No evidence was led as to standard industry terms so 2 essential terms length of lease and rent were missing. . An agreement is not enforceable if it leaves out vital matters eg price or at least a way to fix a price In Hall v Busst (1960) 104 CLR 206 the vendor could re-buy the land at a future time at price plus an amount for additions and improvements less a reasonable sum to cover depreciation of all buildings and other property on the land. The Court said the contract was void for uncertainty as it could not tell which method of depreciation the parties had intended to use and hence the price was uncertain. Heffey, Robertson and Patterson say that if the High Court today considered the same facts it might construe the contract with more liberty. Scammell v Ouston [1941]: agreement too uncertain, no common hire purchase terms and the agreement required further agreement of the parties. o Facts: Willmott pp 89 Fitzgerald v Masters (1956) 95 CLR 420 the contract was to sell a farm. The last term said the sale included a set of further terms (the usual conditions of sale in use or approved by the Real Estate Institute of New South Wales relating to sales by private contract of lands under the Crown Lands Act). But these terms did not exist so that term was meaningless and therefore void. The term was severed from the rest of the contract terms. Biotechnology Australia Pty Ltd v Pace (1988) 15 NSWLR 130 the court emphasised that it would make decisions on certainty using an objective standard. An employment agreement provided that the salary would be supplemented by the option of the employee sharing in a senior staff equity share scheme, but such scheme was never implemented so the court held that term was void. Lend Lease Financial Planning v Southcap [1998]: agreement for lease in relation to outgoings, the tenant agreed to pay a proportion based on the area of the tenancy to include air-con electricity costs. This was sufficient certain o Approach indicates that the court is willing to uphold an agreement entered into by parties, esp when the facts indicate intention to be bound by the agreement. State of NSW v Banabelle Electrical (2002): clause in construction contract provided that disputes that arose between parties would be resolved by an expert as agreed between the parties or, if they did not agree, an expert nominated by a person named in the Annexure. No such person was named. HELD: VOID
5.3
Topic 2
Parties may provide for a standard, machinery or formula designed by the parties to take the place of their own agreement : Hawthorn Football Club v Harding [1988] Reference can be made in a direct way eg by incorporating standard hire purchase terms used by the particular hiring company: Scammell v HC and JG Ouston [1941] (but here, there were numerous forms of hire purchase transactions with various) Hillas and Co v Arcos (1932): facts Wilmott pp 91 o specifics agreed to in the original contract was sufficient to hold an option where the parties had a choice to pursue in future. Biotechnology Australia Pty Ltd v Pace (1988) 15 NSWLR 130 the court emphasised that it would make decisions on certainty using an objective standard. An employment agreement provided that the salary would be supplemented by the option of the employee sharing in a senior staff equity share scheme, but such scheme was never implemented so the court held that term was void.
5.3.3 SEVERANCE
test to see whether term can be severed from contract- The possibility of severance depends upon the intention of the parties. If you cannot sever, then the whole contract is void. (Fitzgerald v Masters (1956) if the offending clause forms an important part of the contract, parties will not have intended to be bound by its absence: Whitlock v Brew (1967) (facts, Wilmott pp 93) an uncertain clause can be saved if the offending part of that clause can be severed, leaving the clause still intact: MacDonald Holdings (Qld) v Nikolas [2007]
Topic 2
Drysdale (1880) (An agreement, by a married woman, that she should attend upon her aged father and mother as long as they lived, and provide them with necessary services, and in consideration thereof her father should, when requested, transfer to her his interest in land, was Held, void for uncertainty.) o Whether or not a court is prepared to give effect to vague domestic arrangements depends in part on the extent to which the parties, or one of them, have materially committed themselves: Palmer v Bank (NSW) [1973] (Promise to "look after" aged person till his death S by will provided that if N, a woman with whom he was living, did not survive him for 30 days, he appointed the plaintiffs, two friends of long standing but younger than himself, to be his executors and gave them the whole of his estate. Shortly afterwards, on a visit by the plaintiffs to S and N an oral arrangement was made between them that S and N would leave the property on the death of the survivor of S and N to the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs, a husband and wife, would move to live in S's house on the death of S or N and look after the survivor of S and N for the remainder of his or her life. N subsequently died, and the plaintiffs went to live in S's home where they cared for him until his death. Held, that the undertaking of the plaintiffs to "look after" the survivor of S and N referred to services which were, in the circumstances of the case, of a sufficiently definite character to constitute a legal obligation, and accordingly the oral arrangement between S and N and the plaintiffs constituted a legally binding and enforceable contract. Per curiam A court can never be bound by authority to hold that a particular form of words used by unprofessional people is so uncertain in meaning as to require that its use must always render any arrangement into which it enters too uncertain to be legally binding.) Where there is a generic description of some important term, and that description is not sufficient to identify the contents of the term, the court will hold that the contract is uncertain unless evidence is adduced regarding what was meant by the description: Palmer v Bank (NSW) (1975) Whitlock v Brew (1968), the words "upon such reasonable terms as commonly govern such a lease" were not sufficient to identify what those terms would be If evidence can be adduced to provide the missing content, then this type of defect may be cured: o Allcars Pty Ltd v Tweedle [1937] ("your usual hiring agreement"). o In Myam Pty Ltd v Teskera [1971] made it clear that, had evidence been adduced of the charge commonly used by the company, the clause would have been enforceable. McAuley v Greater Paramount Theatres (1922) FACTS, Wilmott pp 94 o Uncertainty removed before action commenced specific performance of contract was ordered.
5.4
INCOMPLETE AGREEMENT agreement to agree: when parties have not reached final agreement on the essential aspects of the case , leaving a matter or matters to be agreed at a later stage: Brooker Industries v Wilson Parking (1982) if an agreement to negotiate : Sometimes parties in their negotiation are not yet at the stage of entering into a detailed specific terms agreement, but wish to have a relationship with the other
Topic 2
party such as a joint venture. Their preliminary agreement is often known as a heads of agreement which contains terms to require the parties to negotiate further. Leading decision - Coal Cliff Collieries v Sijehama Pty Ltd (1991) FACTS, Wilmott pp 96 o Agreement to negotiation can be enforceable where (i) parties provided good consideration (ii) terms of the agreement to negotiate was sufficient certain o Also see Aiton Australia v Tansfield (1999): if parties indicate intention to be contractually bound in the future and the language of the agreement is such that the courts can attribute meaning to it, the agreement can be enforceable o LMI Australisia v Baulderstone Hornibrook [2001]: despite elements of the agreement be unenforceable, if the remaining elements are sufficiently cohesive, and coherent to stand as a contract in their own right, then it is enforceable. Vivian Fraser & Asociates v Shipton [1999]: no express Agreement to negotiate, noneed to consider its enforceability
Topic 2
Where there is a very wide discretion, the party is considered to have not made a promise at all: Loftus v Roberts (1909) [FACTS, Wilmott footnote 99) If discretion only relates to the way the parties carry out the obligation, contract is enforceable: Thornby v Goldberg (1965), Yaroomba Beach Development v Coeur de Lion (1989) (FACTS WILMOTT, PP 99)
5.5
Topic 2
Where parties have gone beyond the negotiation stage and intend to be legally bound, its more likely that a term will be imlied and the agreement enforced: Hildas v Arcos (1932) SOGS if property has been delivred and title passed, the court will seek to imply a term necessary for the validity of the agreement: Hall v Busst (1960)
(a) Contract is silent on price Contracts for sale of goods courts more likely to imply a term if the purchaser is willing to pay a reasonable price: Hall v Busst (1960) o Strengthened by intention of both parties to be bound eg when contract is partly executed and property in goods has passed Hall v Busst (1960) o Affirmed by ss 13(2) SOG Act 1923 (NSW) Courts will not imply a reasonable price for sale of land: Stock & Holdings v Arrowsmith (1964) (b) Contract provides for parties to agree in future Case authorities not entirely consistent SOG: courts may implu a term that foods will be sold at a reasonable price, upholding the contract: Foley v Classique Coaches [1934] o Where parties have not agreed to agree on a price in the future, it does not mean they have fixed the price: ss 13(1) SOG Act 1923 (NSW) Buyer is required to pay a reasonable price - ss 13(2) SOG Act 1923 (NSW) For sale of land or rental (option to renew rental) , not the case: Stock & Holdings v Arrowsmith (1964) (c) Contract makes provision for mechanism to complete Likely to be valid refer to above notes (d) Contract provide for payment of a reasonable price Inconsistent authorities Whether an agreement is sufficient certain depends on the nature of the subject matter. o Sale of goods reasonable price: an objective standard, does not require further agreement between party. If one party breaches the agreement, the court can assess the price to be attributed to the goods, and award damages: British Bank of Foreign Trade v Novinex [1949] Courts applying external mechanism for determining reasonable rental when the mechanism estbl by parties broke down: Brooker Industries v Wilson Parking (1982) South Syd City Council v Royal Botannical Garden [1999]; The Amble Inn v Ryan [2001] FOLLOWED Hall v Bussts approach with land contracts.
5.6
SUBJECT TO AGREEMENTS
Topic 2
When purchaser entered into an unconditional contract, and cannot contain finance to pay the vendor, they will be in breach of contract and may pay dmg: o Sub ject o finance clauses can be used, immediately binding on both parties; will com to an end when the purchaser cannot find finance Meehan v Jones (1984) authority
(a) Satisfactory finance Meehan v Jones (1984) clause was inserted for purchasers benefit who could determine whether finance was satisfactory o Needs to act honestly (b) Steps to be taken to obtain finance The purchaser is required to do all that is reasonable to obtain finance: Meehan o More purchasive if purchasers undertake to use their best endeavours to obtain finance: Jet City v Yenald Nominees (un rep, 09/04/1999) (FACTS, WILMOTT PP107) (subject to finance clause conferred a duty on the purchaser to act honestly and reasonably)
Topic 2
(a) M v C, category one Branca v Corbarro [1947] (FACTS, WILMOTT, PP 109) o Relevant: use of the words provisional and until in the agreement and payment of a deposit (b) Mv C, category two Niesmann v Collinridge (1921)- pp 109 o All essential elements had been agreed upon in the first agreement o Only item to be relevant on execution of formal contract was the date for payment of purchase money (c) MvC, category three M v C payment to seller (deposit) was made on the basis that if a formal contract was executed, the payment would be considered a deposit (d) Fourth: LMI Australasia v Hornibrook [2001]
5.7
TYPES OF UNCERTAINTY AND THEIR RESOLUTIONS They are: (1) uncertainty is due to imperfect or imprecise drafting. (2) deliberate omission where the parties have sketched out the structure of their agreement and have decided to leave certain matters for later resolution Vague or unclear language or a failure to reach agreement on some essential matter indicates a o lack of contractual intention: Horton v Jones (1935) (promise by defendant to leave his fortune to the plaintiff if she would look after him for the rest of his life held not to be couched in the language of contract.) Note: Schaefer v Schuhmann [1972] (A testator by codicil gave the house in which he lived and its contents to his housekeeper if she should still be employed by him as housekeeper at his death. The codicil had been prepared by the testator's solicitor on the testator's instructions given during the month following the first employment of the housekeeper. It had been posted to the testator. The testator's eyesight was not good and he asked the housekeeper to read it to him. She then called a taxi to take the testator to the bank where he executed the document that day. When the time came for the testator next to pay the housekeeper the wages due to her he told her that he did not propose to pay her any more because he had left her the house. He provided her with money to meet such household expenses as were paid for in cash but he paid her no wages thereafter. He died some five months after the execution of the codicil. Daughters of the testator made a testator's family maintenance application in respect of his estate) Held: o is evidence that no concluded bargain was reached o cannot provide the court with a basis for enforcing the supposed agreement;3 or renders the consideration illusory: Placer Development Ltd v Commonwealth (1969)
Topic 2
the courts do not like to hold a contract void for uncertainty, particularly if performance of the apparent agreement is well advanced: Sinclair v Schildt (1914), Turner v Bladin (1951) Upper Hunter County D C v Australian Chilling & Freezing Co Ltd (1968): As long as it is capable of a meaning the court will decide its application no narrow or pedantic approach is warranted.
Topic 2
Words that are included in error can be excised: Secured Income Real Estate (Aust) Ltd v St Martins Investments Pty Ltd (1979) Words that are obviously erroneous may be corrected: Booker Industries Pty Ltd v Wilson Parking (Qld) Pty Ltd (1982) The courts may look to the subsequent conduct of the parties to find a meaning to a clause that is obscure, or to fill a gap: Carr v Brisbane CC [1956]; eg o W & J Sharp v Thomson (1915) - (showing of a sample clarified what goods were being sold) o Kell v Harris (1915) (one party precluded from arguing uncertainty when both had willingly acted on particular interpretation of the agreement) Clauses that provide for o choice of performance: Head v Kelk (1961) o price variation: Peters American Delicacy Co Ltd v Champion (1928) (although an alteration of price may require buyer's consent if contract is to continue); York Air Conditioning & Refrigeration (Australasia) Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1949) (price variation clause in favour of buyer); Lewandowski v Mead Carney-BCA Pty Ltd [1973] (salary within a range); Kabwand Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [1989] (variable interest clause "conforming with general movements in the bank's interest rates" held enforceable) o are not uncertain, though at times they may come close to being illusory, if they involve an unfettered discretion concerning whether to perform or not: Placer Development Ltd v Commonwealth (1969); Biotechnology Australia Pty Ltd v Pace (1988) (option to participate in a non-existent equity sharing scheme held to be either illusory or uncertain); Bailes v Modern Amusements Pty Ltd [1964] (promise to repay loan when company considered it was in a position to do so held to be either illusory or uncertain)
Generally, agreements to agree will not be enforced if there is no external criterion or method of fixing the term or terms left unsettled: o Finality of agreement is one of the essential hallmarks of a contract. Where the parties have left an important part of the deal to be decided by later agreement, the courts regard this as an incomplete agreement: Booker Industries Pty Ltd v Wilson Parking (Qld) Pty Ltd (1982) Qualifications to this GR
(1) The rule ispractically inconvenient. Commercial people often wish to defer agreement on some important matter while they agree on the other essentials: In order to do so without risk of the agreement being held to be incomplete, the parties must provide either a formula within the contract, or machinery such as an arbitration clause, in the event of failure to agree on the deferred term.
(2) The rule, like the ambiguity rule, does not apply to inessential terms: JB Rogers Ltd v Harry Lesnie Ltd (1927)
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(3) The rule does not apply to sale of goods contracts in which the price is to be agreed later: Sale of Goods Act 1923 (NSW), s 13 If no agreement can be reached a reasonable price must be paid: rule is uncertain - Aus and NZ Banking Group v Frost Holdings [1989]
(4) In some cases the courts have shown a marked propensity to find a way around the rule.7 One particular device is the implied term. However, invoking an implied term to fill a gap deliberately (as opposed to inadvertently) left by the parties may not conform to the normal test applied for the implication of terms: Aus and NZ Banking Group v Frost Holdings [1989]
(5) It has been suggested that a contract that defers agreement on some essential term imposes an obligation to bargain in good faith to come to an agreement on the deferred term This approach avoids the drastic result of striking down the agreement and provides a remedy in the event of one of the parties failing to bargain in good faith: At the very least the courts will find an implied obligation to do all that is necessary to make a machinery provision work (eg obtaining a valuation).11
(6) An agreement to agree must be distinguished from a valid agreement to contract. a valid contract is an informal agreement that is immediately binding in which one of the terms is to enter into a more formal agreement later: Masters v Cameron (1954). If the content of the latter agreement is too uncertain, then the parties may only be bound by the preliminary agreement: Tern Minerals NL v Kalbara Mining NL (199
(7) agreements that are subject to some contingent condition- under which either the whole contract is suspended until the condition is satisfied or a particular obligation is suspended If the clause providing for this is itself uncertain, it would seem that the clause may be waived by the party for whose benefit it was inserted, despite the uncertainty: Meehan v Jones (1982 This is consistent with the principle that subsequent events may remove an initial uncertainty.
6 FORMALITIES
6.1 GUARANTEES
Certain building contracts require a gurantee must be in wirting and signed by a party to be charged in order to be enforceable - Home Building Act 1989 (NSW), s 7,
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where one occurs, there are two transactions (1) the principal one is between the lendor and the debtor (2) contract of grantee is entered into between the lender and the guarantor the secondary transaction guarantor is secondary liable to the lender. Liability will only arise if the principal transaction between is lender and debtor is valid and there has been a default in the principal transaction
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Terms of the facility are accepted with the consent and knowledge of the 3rd party ; it is the policy of the 3rd party to ensure that the debtor (holding company/subsidiary) is at all times in a position to meet its liabilities when it falls due Whether it is binding as a contract depends on its construction Was there an intention by the 3rd party and lendor to enter into legal relations? The presumption is that parties do intend if they enter into a commercial transaction. The onus is then on the 3rd party to show that despite the LOC, they did not intend to establ legal relations: Banque Brussels Lambert SA v Australian National Industries (1989)
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o where solicitors are involved then there are less difficulties( if any) Durrell v Evans (1862), facts pp 367- ISSUE whether printing of the Ds name at the top of the sales note by the agent was sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement o HELD: CITING Johnson v Dodgson (1837), when it is ascertained that the peron meant to be bound by it as a complete contract, the statute is satisfied, there being the note in writing showing terms of the contract and recognised by him o The court was satisfied that the agent was also acting as the agent for the D, statute had been satisfied o Refered to as the authenticated signature fiction concept o Used by HCA in Pirie v Saunders (1960) Pirie v Saunders (1960): if the name of the party to be charged (not the usual signature) is placed ont the document, it is to be treated as a signature for the purposes of the statute if such party expressly or impliedly indicates that they recognise the writing as being an authenticated expression of the contract o Durrell v Evans (1862) it does not matter where the name appears in the document or whether initials or some kind of mark is used to authenticate the document
6.2.2 CONTENT
No guidance by statute Harvey v Edwards, Dunlop & Co (1927): the document must contain all essential elements of the agreement
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(2)
(3) (4)
Twynam Pastoral v Anburn (1989): There are four matters which must be recorded in order to satisfy the statutory requirement The document must contain the parties to the contract: Williams v Byrnes (1863) o Provided that intention of parties is clear, then extrinsic material can be used to establish who unidentified parties are (if any): Rosser v Austral Wine & Spirit [1980] Property must be adequately described: South Cost Oils v Look Enterprises [1988] o If property is party of a set, then particular care needs to be taken to identify the one that is the subject of the contract: Pirie v Saunders (1961) o If freehold property is sold subject to an existing leasehold and the leasehold interest is known to the purchaser there is authority to suggest that the property if sufficiently described even if theres no reference to the lease: Timmins v Moreland Street Property [1958] The consideration for the promise (namely the price) must be recorded: Wain v Walters (1804) The principal terms of the contract must be disclosed: if parties require that time is off the essence then the condition should be included into the contract If a material term is omitted, which is for the benefit of the P, the P may be entitled to waive the benefit of that clause and seek enforcement of the contract without that clause: Petrie v Jensen [1954](facts, pp 370; HELD specific performance for the buyer, the clause regarding the undertaking to quit was inserted solely for the buyers benefit. Buyer entitled to waive the benefit and insist on performance of the contract) o This onus is on the P to prove the benefit was for themselves. o If the term is of benefit for both parties, then it cannot be waived and the contract will not be enforceable: Hawkins v Price [1947]
(b) acknowledgement of agreement Tiverton Estates v Wearwell [1875]: writing needs to contain an acknowledgement of agreement to satisfy statute o Adopted by Pirie v Saunders (1961), Woden Squash Courts v Zero Builders [1976], Coogee Esplanade Surf Motel v CW of Australia (1976) o Writing must include ack of agreement and of terms of the agreement Ackd can be express/implied Writing is sufficient (to imply) where there is no express denial of contract:
(c) signed by party or to be charged or agent If theres a purported contract to sell land and the seller claims not to be bound, the seller will be the party to be charged with for the purposes of any action brought o Same thing applies if the buyer makes the claim A person is considered to have signed a document even if their signature has not been recorded on the document o If the name of the party is placed on the doc, and the party has expressly/impliedly indicated that they recognise the writing as being an authenticated expression of contract, this is sufficient: Pirie v Saunders (1961), o Even if a person engages a solicitor to negotiate contract for sale of land, this is not sufficient to authorise the solicitor to execute the contract on the clients behalf
70211 Contract Law o Authorisation by agent must be express, need not be in writing
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6.3
JOINDER OF DOCUMENTS this happens when not all relevant info for a contract is contained in the one document. Instead, documents are joined together so as to contain all material terms Harvey v Edwards, Dunlop and CO (1927): it is possible to join documents either (i) by reference to another document or (ii) to some other transaction o Any document signed by the person to be charged or by someone authorised, which contain all essential terms of the agreement is a sufficient memorandum o The memorandum need not be contained in one document, it can be made out in several documents if they can be connected together o If you refer to another document, you are at liberty to give evidence as to what that other transaction is, and if that other transaction contains all the terms in writing, then you get a sufficient memorandum within statute by reading the two together: Stokes v Wicher [1921] o Affirmed by Woden Squash Courts v Zero Builders [1976]
(a) documents that are physically connected Can be joined: MEwan v Dynon (1877) Eg the ability to join an envelope to a letter. o Where the letter is signed by the defendant and sent to the pl, but the letter does not on its own, contain all the necessary info, the envelop can be joined with the letter. o There will be a note or memorandum of the info on the envelope, namely the name of the plaintiff: Pearce v Gardener [1897]
(b) documents that are executed at the same time Its not uncommon for a buyer to write a cheque for a deposit, send it to the seller and later receive a receipt from the seller (if seller is he party to be charged) its likely that the cheque could be joined to the receipt (document signed by the party to be joined): Saunderson v Purchase [1958] If buyer is to be charged the seller is unlikely to join receipt to the cheque since it is executed later than the checque it would be difficult to suggest that the cheque contained any express or implied reference to the later document If writing and exchange of cheque occurs concurrently: Timmins v Moreland Street Property [1958], facts pp 375 (oral agreement). ISSUE: whether there was a sufficient note or memorandum. o HELD: where cheque and receipt are signed and exchanged at the same meeting as part of the same transaction, they are said to be contemporaneously signed
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Document signed by party to be charged should be treated as incapable of referring to the other document merely because the latter, on a minute investigation of the order of the events at the meeting is found to have come second in the order of prep and signing:
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Todrell v Finch [2007], facts pp 377) (receipt to first developer did not adequately identify the parties, the price, the provision of a personal guarantee by a director of the purchasing entity; IT DID, acknowledge that it was paid in context of land sale transaction) o Issue: could the acknowledgment be joined with the later formal documentation (which the seller refused to sign)? The formal do did not exist when the receipt was signed o HELD: NO joinder, except in cases of contemporaneity, the document which is to be connected to and read with, the signed document, to create a sufficient memorandum, must exist at the time of the signature so it can be a document capable of being referred to by the signed document
6.4
ADEQUACY OF ELECTRONIC WRITING AND SIGNATURE http://www.galexia.com/public/research/articles/research_articles-art30.html writing in the traditional sense exists where a party to a contract is sent an elec communication containing relevant details of the info prints that info out: McGuren v Simpson [2004] (pp 378) o the Limitation Act 1968 (NSW) should be construed so as to accommodate technological changes. The email amounted to a written document o after clarifying issue of written documentation, the common law rules apply to determine whether the sender can be regarded as to have signed the document. Where a computer generated facsimile of the persons signature is used it is likely that the test will be satisfied, unless the person can prove that they did not cause the signature to appear on the document If elec com is not printed, theres US authority to support that it will suffice if it is capable of retrieval and reproduction in a visible form (doesnt matter whether it is eventually printed): Bazak Interntional Corp v Tarant Apparel Group (2005) The Electronic Tranactions Act 1999 (Cth) o S 9 and 10: relevant where under a law of the CW, a person is required to give info in writing and where the signature of the of a person is required (respectively) This will not apply to S&T legislation Electronic Transactions Act 2000 (30 November 2001) similarly requires info to be in writing or requires the signature of the person to be given o S5(1): word "transaction" is broadly defined in the Electronic Transactions Acts in the States and Territories to variously include contracts, agreements or other arrangements, and non-commercial transactions. o S7: transaction is not invalid because it took place by means of one or more electronic communications o Ss 8-9: transaction is not invalid because it took place by means of one or more electronic communications o S14: However, the purported originator of an electronic communication is bound by it only if the communication was sent by the purported originator or with his or her authority o S 8: The writing or the written note or memorandum required under the statute in relation to guarantees can be provided in electronic form with the creditors consent o S 9(1): a signature is taken to have been met in relation to an electronic communication if: o General exemptions: Some general activities or requirements may be exempt from the relevant ETA. These exemptions do not refer to a particular legal requirement
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set out in a specific piece of legislation. Rather they refer to a broad category of activity.
Categories Witnesses Wills Personal Service/Post Court Documents Power of Attorney Exempt? Yes No Yes Yes No Part 2 Division 2 Part 2 Applicable Provisions of the Electronic Transactions Act Part 2 Division 2 -
Legislation Consumer Credit (New South Wales) Code 1995 (NSW) (and regulations) Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) Election Funding Act 1981 (NSW) Freedom of Information Act 1989 (NSW) Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) Parliamentary Electorates and Elections Act 1912 (NSW) Poisons and Therapeutic Goods Act 1966 (NSW)
Applicable Provisions of Exempt Act All Section 23C - Instruments required to be in writing All All All Chapter 10 - How are people elected to civic office? All All
Applicable Provisions of the Electronic Transactions Act Section 7(1) Part 2 Division 2 Section 7(1) Part 2 Division 2 Section 7(1) Part 2 Division 2 Section 7(1) Part 2 Division 2 Section 7(1) Part 2 Division 2 Section 7(1) Part 2 Division 2 Section 7(1) Part 2 Division 2 Section 7(1) Part 2 Division 2
(1) a method is used to identify the signatory and the signatorys approval of the information communicated; (2) having regard to all the relevant circumstances at the time the method was used, the method was as reliable as was appropriate; and
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(3) the creditor consents to the formal requirements being met by the use of the method specified in (1). Faulks v Cameron (2004) (only judicial decision which has considered the application of the electronic transaction legislation) o Case appear to have presumed that printed emails constituted writing o More concerned with resolving whether a type-written signature on an email meant that the agreement had been signed McGuren v Simpson [2004], facts pp 282 o the Electronic Transactions Act (2000) NSW did not apply (the relevant electronic communication was sent prior to the commencement of the Act o the communication in question was a very short email with a simple name typed in plain text at the end of the email - the most common form of electronic communication. The specific legal requirement in question was Section 54(4) of the Limitation Act (1969) NSW, which states: o Section 54 (4): An acknowledgment for the purposes of this section must be in writing and signed by the maker. Section 54 (4): An acknowledgment for the purposes of this section must be in writing and signed by the maker. Court applied the authenticated signature fiction: where the PTBC appears on the alleged note or memorandum, because it has been typed in by the other parties, the doctrine will only apply where the PTBC expressly or impliedly acknowledges the writing as an authenticated expression of the contract so that the typed words will be deemed to be his signature o The doctrine does not apply to a document which is not recognisable as a note or memorandum of an agreement o In this case, the Ps name appeared in the email and the email contained an authenticated expression of a prior agreement. Email was considered a note of a concluded agreement and the Ps type written name was deemed to be a signature Emails which ended with the type written words Regards Angus and Regards Angus Cameron were held to be signed: Faulks Electronic signatures are not appropriate in all types of transactions o EFFECT OF STATUTORY NON-COMPLIANCE: COMMON LAW
6.5
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a contract failing to comply with statutory requirements will still be a valid contract of the contract is performed by parties, good title will pass: Watson v Royal Permanent Building Society (1888)
(a) recovery of deposit a deposit is paid by a buyer to earnestly bind the bargain: Howe v Smith (1884) if sale is not completed due to the buyers default the deposit is liable to forfeiture to the vendor: Freedom v AHR Construction [1987], facts pp 387 o HELD: partial payment of $47,000 by the Pl was more than a third of the purchase price, could not be considered a deposit A deposit generally represents 10% of the PP Defendant entitled to keep $14,000 (which was the 10% of the purchase price), even though the contract did not comply with formality requirements Where sale is not complete because of the sellers default the deposit is recoverable by the buyer. This is because the money had and received upon a total failiure of consideration where the consideration for which it was paid for was transfer which had not taken place: Fullbrook v Lawes (1876) o Action is brought in restitution
(b) recovery of amount more than deposit Fullbrook v Lawes (1876)- see above
(c) other restitutionary claims may be available Builders Licensing Act 1971 (NSW)ss 45 applied in Pavey v Mathews (1986), facts pp 388 o Held: P could claim on a quantum meruit basis for the value of the work done and materials supplied under an oral contract. Recovery permissible on retiturioanry grounds. Now the Home Building Act 1989 (NSW) applies: o S7 form of contract (1) A contract must be in writing and be dated and signed by or on behalf of each of the parties to it. (2) A contract must contain: (a) the names of the parties, including the name of the holder of the contractor licence shown on the contractor licence, and (b) the number of the contractor licence, and (c) a sufficient description of the work to which the contract relates, and
70211 Contract Law (d) any plans and specifications for the work, and (e) the contract price if known, and (f) any statutory warranties applicable to the work, and
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(g) in the case of a contract to do residential building work-a conspicuous statement setting out the cooling-off period that applies to the contract because of section 7BA. (3) The contract must comply with any requirements of the regulations. (4) If the contract price is known, it must be stated in a prominent position on the first page of the contract. (5) If the contract price is not known or may be varied under the contract, the contract must contain a warning to that effect and an explanation of the effect of the provision allowing variation of the price. The warning and explanation must be placed next to the price if the price is known. (6) A contract must not include in the contract the name of any person other than the holder of a contractor licence as, or so it may reasonably be mistaken to be, the holders name. (7) This section does not prevent the holder of a contractor licence with a business name registered under the Business Names Act 2002 from also referring in such a contract to the business name. o S10 enforceability of contracts and other rights
1) A person who contracts to do any residential building work, or any specialist work, and who so contracts: (a) in contravention of section 4 (Unlicensed contracting), or (b) under a contract to which the requirements of section 7 apply that is not in writing or that does not have sufficient description of the work to which it relates (not being a contract entered into in the circumstances described in section 6 (2)), or (c) in contravention of any other provision of this Act or the regulations that is prescribed for the purposes of this paragraph, is not entitled to damages or to enforce any other remedy in respect of a breach of the contract committed by any other party to the contract, and the contract is unenforceable by the person who contracted to do the work. However, the person is liable for damages and subject to any other remedy in respect of a breach of the contract committed by the person. (4) This section does not affect the liability of the person for an offence against a provision of or made under this or any other Act.
6.6
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If parties enter into an oral contract for the sale of land and relying on that contract, one party does certain acts, the courts may be willing to grant the person specific performance provided that four conditions are satisfied: Powercell v Cuzeno [2003]
Acts are unequivocally referable to some such contract as that alleged Acts done in reliance on the agreement and with knowledge of other party Acts done by party seeking to enforce contract Oral contract must be otherwise enforceable
E1: unequivocal acts The P needs to estble a denus between his/her acts and the contract which theya re seeking to enforce test see below Aus in McBride v Sandland (1918) adopted the strict approach on Maddison v Alderson (1883) (acts relied upon as part performance must be unequivocally and in their own nature, referable to such an agreement alleged) (acts of housekeeping held not be be evidence of contract, let alone one which concerns the deceaseds land) o Developed further in Regent v Millet (1976) Regent v Millet (1976), facts pp 389 HELD in addition to the Maddison test, o the giving and taking of possession by itself was a sufficient act of part performance o case acknowledged that it was possible that possession may be referable to some authority other than the contract alleged. Australia and NZ Banking Group v Widen (1990)- ANZ successfully enforced a mortgage agreement that was not sufficiently evidence in writing. The following acts of part-performance was held to be sufficient: o Provision of financial accommodation to the debtor o Obtaining an indemnity agreement o Taking a mortgage in blank and an authority to complete it Darter v Malloy [1993] facts pp 390. The court relied on the following PP o Allowing the defendant buyer into possession (parents continuing to occupy the premises) o Accepting a decreased rental from the parents pending settlement of the contract. The court in Darter in applying the Maddison test, considered the retention of existing possession, if coupled with reduction in weekly rent, was referable to a new contract between the buyer and seller. Lighting by Design (Aust) v Cannington Nominees [2008] (considers part performance in a contract formed by inference), facts pp 391. In split (2-1) decision, the following acts of PP were held to be sufficient: o The tenant remaining in possession of the premises coupled with the payment of rent at an increased rate subsequent to a rent review o Retrospective payment of increased rent o Payment of utilities o The delivery of certificates of insurance
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Roger v Millett makes it clear that allowing and taking possession of premises if couple with payment and improvement of theproperty, will be enough for a buyer to enforce the contrac
6.7
6.8 D
7 ACCEPTANCE