1) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.

VILLASOR Facts: A writ of execution (a writ to put in force the sentence that the law has given) was issued by the court against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to satisfy a judgment rendered against the Philippine Government. Issue: Whether or not the writ of execution, issued by respondent judge, is valid. Held: It was ruled that public funds cannot be the object of garnishment proceedings even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and even if the State liability had been adjudged. The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's action 'only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution' and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. 2) DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE VS. NLRC Facts: Petitioner Department of Agriculture (DA) and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the various premises of the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, nonpayment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as for damages against the DA and the security agency. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with the security agency for the payment of money claims of the complainant security guards. The DA and the security agency did not appeal the decision. Thus, the decision became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the DA and the security agency. Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the DA. Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case. Held: The basic postulate enshrined in the Constitution that the State may not be sued without its consent reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. A sovereign is exempt from suit based on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.

The rule is not really absolute for it does not say that the State may not be sued under any circumstances. The State may at times be sued. The States consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general law or a special law. Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim, or when it enters into a contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity.

But not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. A State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can this be deemed to have actually given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In the case, the DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character. But, be that as it may, the claims of the complainant security guards clearly constitute money claims. Act No. 3083 gives the consent of the State to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied. Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act 327, as amended by PD 1145, the money claim must first be brought to the Commission on Audit.
3) REPUBLIC V. FELICIANO [ 148 SCRA 424 ]

Facts: Petitioner seeks the review of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court revising the order of the Court of First Instance which dismissed the complaint of Pablo Feliciano for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land on the ground of non-suability of the State. Feliciano filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land consisting of four (4) lots with an aggregated area of 1,364.4177 hectares, situated in Barrio of Salvacion, Municipality of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Feliciano alleged that he bought the property in question for Victor Gardiola by virtue of Contract of Sale and followed by a Deed of Absolute Sale; that Gardiola had acquired the property by purchase from the heirs of Francisco Abrazado whose title to the said property was evidenced by an informacion posesoria that upon his purchase of the property, he took actual possession of the same, introduced various improvements therein and caused it to be surveyed in July 1952, which survey was approved by the Director of Lands on October 24, 1954. On November 1, 1954, President Ramon Magsaysay issued a Proclamation No. 90 reserving for settlement purposes, under the administration of te National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA), a tract of land situated in the Municipalities of Tinambac and Siruma, Camarines Sur, after which the NARRA and its successor agenby, the Land Authority, started subdividing and distributing the land to the settlers; that the property in question, while located within the reservation established under Proclamation No. 90, was the private property of Feliciano and should therefore be excluded. Feliciano prayed that he be declared the rightful and true owner of the property in question; that his title of ownership based on the informacion posesoria of his predecessor-in-interest be declared legal valid and subsisting and that defendant be ordered to cancel and nullify all awards to the settlers. ISSUE: Can the State be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of land? RULING: No, the suit against the State, under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly of by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. It may be invoked by the courts at any stage of the proceedings. Waiver of immunity, will not be inferred lightly, but must be construed strictly. Moreover, the Proclamation is not the legislative act. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be made by act of the legislative body.

4) QUIRICO DEL MAR vs. THE PHILIPPINE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION Del Mar averred that he served during World War II as chief judge advocate of the Cebu Area Command; he subsequently obtained an honorable discharge from the service on October 20, 1946 on a certificate of permanent total physical disability; he subsequently obtained an honorable discharge from the service on October 20, 1946 on a certificate of permanent total physical disability; in March 1950, the said Board discontinued payment of his monthly life pension on the ground that his receipt of a similar pension from the United States Government, through the United States Veterans Administration, by reason of military service rendered in the United States Army in the Far East during World War II, precluded him from receiving any further monthly life pension from the Philippine Government. PVA reiterated its contention that del Mar's receipt of a similar pension from the United States Government effectively barred him from claiming and receiving from the Philippine Government the monthly life pension and PVA also asserted that it is discretionary on its part to grant or discontinue the pension sought by del Mar. The action of del Mar was premature because of his failure to exhaust administrative remedies before invoking judicial intervention, and that the court a quo was without jurisdiction to try the case as del Mar demand partakes of a money claim against the PVA. After due trial, the court a quo rendered judgment upholding del Mar claims. This appeal raises several questions which will be discussed inse ria tim. 1. The PVA argues that the court a quo was without jurisdiction to try civil case because it involves a money claim against the said PVA a mere agency of the Government performing governmental functions with no juridical personality of its own and, in reality, partakes of an action against the Philippine Government which is immune from suit without its consent.Is the PVA exempt from the filing of an appeal bond? To resolve this issue, we must initially determine whether the PVA is an agency or instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines, and, in the affirmative, whether it exercises governmental functions. a) this Court referred to the claim of the private respondent therein as "a claim for a sum of money against the Government, which claim, if adjudged finally to be meritorious, would render the Republic of the Philippines liable therefor," since the funds from which the claim was to be satisfied were funds appropriated by Congress for the PVA; As a general proposition, the rule well-settled in this jurisdiction on the immunity of the Government from suit without its consent holds true in all actions resulting in "adverse consequences on the public treasury, whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of property." 2. del Mar alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to court action. a. in the present controversy involves a question solely of a legal nature, there arises no need for the litigant to resort to all administrative remedies available to him before seeking judicial relief. 3. The validity of section 6 of Regulation No. 2 of the "Rules and Regulations on Veterans' Benefits" adopted by the PVA constitutes the core of the present controversy. a.Pursuant to the foregoing, the PVA cancelled and discontinued the monthly life pension of del Mar reasoning that the latter's receipt of a similar pension from the United States Government precluded his enjoying any like benefit from the Philippine Government. The principle recognizing the necessity of vesting administrative authorities with the power to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and to effectual its policies, constitutes well established doctrine in this jurisdiction. The PVA's pretense that del Mar case falls under the clause of section 9 of Republic Act 65, as amended, which excepts those who "are actually receiving a similar pension from other Government funds" from the coverage of said section 9 predicated upon its interpretation that the phrase other Government funds" includes funds of the United States Government fails to persuade this Court as a valid argument to justify its cancellation of del Mar monthly life pens. 4.The rest of the assigned errors relate to the allege undue interference by the court a quo with the purely discretionary functions of the PVA in the matter of granting discontinuing the pension benefits.