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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
FOREWORD 2

TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

FIGURES 7

TABLES 8

REFERENCES 9

DEFINITIONS 11

ABBREVIATIONS AND/OR ACRONYMS 33

PART I - PLANNING, POLICY, AND RESPONSE GUIDANCE 44

C1. CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 45

C2. CHAPTER 2 - NUCLEAR WEAPON ACCIDENT RESPONSE PROCEDURES 52

C3. CHAPTER 3 - SHIPBOARD ACCIDENT RESPONSE 83

PART II - TECHNICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES OF RADIOLOGICAL 95


ACCIDENT RESPONSE

C4. CHAPTER 4 - RADIOLOGICAL HAZARD AND SAFETY ENVIRONMENTAL 96


MONITORING

C5. CHAPTER 5 - RESPIRATORY AND PERSONNEL PROTECTION 198

C6. CHAPTER 6 - CONTAMINATION CONTROL 206

C7. CHAPTER 7 - BIOASSAY PROCEDURES 216

C8. CHAPTER 8 - RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS, CHARACTERISTICS, HAZARDS, 225


AND HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS

C9. CHAPTER 9 - CONVERSION FACTORS FOR WEAPONS GRADE PLUTONIUM 232

C10. CHAPTER 10 - MEDICAL 239

C11. CHAPTER 11 - SECURITY 256

C12. CHAPTER 12 - WEAPON RECOVERY OPERATIONS 266

C13. CHAPTER 13 - COMMUNICATIONS 274

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C14. CHAPTER 14 - PUBLIC AFFAIRS 288

C15. CHAPTER 15 - LEGAL 320

C16. CHAPTER 16 - LOGISTIC SUPPORT 332

C17. CHAPTER 17 - TRAINING 342

PART III - SITE REMEDIATION GUIDANCE 345

C18. CHAPTER 18 - OVERVIEW OF THE SITE REMEDIATION PROCESS 346

C19. CHAPTER 19 - ACCIDENT SCENCE RESPONSE 351

C20. CHAPTER 20 - INTERMEDIATE ACTIONS 358

C21. CHAPTER 21 - LONG-TERM ACTIONS 365

PART IV - SPECIALIZED ASSETS AND POINTS OF CONTACT 372

C22. CHAPTER 22 - SUMMARY OF SPECIALIZED CAPABILITIES 373

C23. CHAPTER 23 - BIBLIOGRAPHY 384

APPENDICES

C3.AP1. SHIPBOARD FIREFIGHTING 89

C3.AP2. SHIPBOARD RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING AND CONTROL 91

C4.AP1. RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING EQUIPMENT 114

C4.AP2. RADIATION DETECTION AND MEASUREMENT 117

C4.AP3. ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING 128

C4.AP4. SPECIALIZED RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING, RADIAC REPAIR, AND 135


HAZARD ASSESSMENT/CAPABILITIES TEAMS

C4.AP5. AREA AND RESOURCES SURVEYS 160

C4.AP6. RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING, MEASUREMENT, AND CONTROL FORMS 166

C10.AP1. NON-RADIOLOGICAL TOXIC HAZARDS 251

C14.AP1. PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE/CONTINGENCY RELEASES 295

C14.AP2. RADIATION FACT SHEETS 301

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C14.AP3. PUBLIC AFFAIRS RESPONSE ORGANIZATION CONCEPT 311

C14.AP4. JIC/CIB ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMUNICATION AND LOGISTIC 314


SUPPORT/EQUIPMENT

C14.AP5. JIC/CIB RECOMMENDED KEY MESSAGES AND NON-RELEASABLE 316


INFORMATION

C14.AP6. CHECK LIST 319

C15.AP1. PERTINENT STATUTES AND INSTRUCTIONS 325

C16.AP1. LOGISTICS RESOURCES 339

C22.AP1. POINTS OF CONTACT 380

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

FIGURES
Figure Title Page
C1.F1. Accident Operational Responses 46
C1.F2. Relationshiip of Initial Response Actions 48
C1.F3. Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Reecovery Operations Flow Diagram 49,50
C2.F1. Nuclear Weapon Accident Notification Flow 54
C2.F2. Sample Accident Site Organization 59
C2.F3. Response Task Force General Composition 62
C2.F4. Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) Locations 80
C4.F1. Joint Hazard Evaluation Center Functional Organization 104
C4.F2. Sample Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) Form 112
C4.AP2.F1. Spectral Plot 123
C4.AP3.F1. Air Sampler Placement 131
C4.AP4.F1. HPAC Modeling Prediction Surface Dose 136
C4.AP4.F2. HPAC Modeling Prediction Hazards Area Effects 137
C4.AP4.F3. HPAC Process 138
C4.AP4.F4. Hotspot Fire Model Geometry 143
C4.AP4.F5. Hotspot Explosion Model Geometry 144
C4.AP4.F6. Hotspot Downwind Plume Centerline (Stability A-F) 145
C4.AP4.F7. Hotspot Plume Contour Plot 146
C4.AP4.F8. Hotspot Plum Contour Displayed on Geographical Map 147
C4.AP4.F9. ARAC PLOT Lung Dose 150
C4.AP4.F10. ARAC PLOT Deposition 151
C4.AP4.F11. Aerial Survey Results Early Phase Radiological Data 156
C4.AP4.F12. Aerial Survey Results Radiological Data Measurements, AMS Serpentine, and 157
Field Measurements
C4.AP4.F13. Aerial Survey Results Radiological Data Measurements, AMS Contours, and 158
AMS KIWI
C4.AP6.F1. Access Work Permit Form 168
C4.AP6.F2. Team Dress Requirements CCS Form 173
C4.AP6.F3. Team Entry/Exit Permit CCS Form 174
C4.AP6.F4. Analysis Data Form 175
C4.AP6.F5. Personnel Sample Form 179
C4.AP6.F6. Geographic Location Form 182
C4.AP6.F7. Field Sample Data Form 185
C4.AP6.F8. Field Measurement Data Form 188
C4.AP6.F9. JHEC Equipment Data Form 192
C4.AP6.F10. Air Sample Data Form 195
C5.F1. Aerial Survey Results Protective Action Guides (PAGs), Evacuation PAGs, and 202
Quarantine Areas
C6.F1. Personnel Contamination Control Station (Example) 209
C6.F2. Vehicle Contamination Control Station (Example) 215
C7.F1. Estimated 50-Year Committed Effective Dose 220
C11.F1. Security Concept 260
C13.F1. Signal Operating Instruction 285
C18.F1. Nuclear Accident Response Phases 346
C18.F2. The Site Remediation Process 348
C19.F1. Site Remediation: Early Stages 352
C19.F2. Remediation Phase Relationships 355

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C19.F3. SRWG Approval and Coordination Process 356


C21.F1. Notional Site Remediation Plan and Approval Process 365
C21.F2. Steps in the Approval Process 371

TABLES
Table Title Page
C2.T1. Nuclear Weapon Confirmation Guidelines 65
C4.AP2.T1. Commonly Considered Radioactive Contaminants and Their Primary Associated 120
Radioactive Emissions
C4.AP3.T1. Air Sampler Calibration 129
C4.AP3.T2. Air Sampler Placement (No. 2) Distance 131
C5.T1. Recommended Respiratory Protection Levels for Emergency Workers as a Function 200
of Airborne Contamination
C5.T2. Protective Devices for Emergency Worker as a Function of Surface Contamination 200
C6.T1. Contamination Control Station Materials List 211
C6.T2. CCS Personnel 212
C7.T1. Guidelines for Bioassay Sampling 222
C7.T2 Guidelines for Assignment of Priorities for Collection and Processing of Bioassays 223
C9.T1. Conversion Factors for Weapons Grade Plutonium 232
C9.T2. Conversion Table (CPM to µg/m or µCi/m ) AN/PDR-56 Alpha Meter
2 2 235
C9.T3. Conversion Table (CPM to µg/m2or µCi/m2) AN/PDR-60 or AN/PDR-56 Alpha 236
Meter
C9.T4. Conversion Table (MBq to mCi and µCi) 237
C9.T5. Conversion to SI Units 238
C10.T1. Heat Injury Prevention Guidelines 248
C17.T1. Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Training Courses 344

8 TABLES
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

REFERENCES

(a) DoD Directive 3150.8, "DoD Response to Radiological Accidents," June 13, 1996
(b) Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP), May 1, 1996
(c) DoD 8910.1-M, "DoD Procedures for Management of Information Requirements,"
June 1998
(d) DSWA 5100.52.1-L, "Nuclear Accident Response Capability Listing," April 1997
(e) DoD Directive 5200.8, "Security of Military Installations and Resources," April
25, 1991
(f) CJCSM 3150.03, "Joint Reporting Structures, Event and Incident Reports," June
19, 1998
(g) DoD Directive 5230.16, "Nuclear Accident and Incident Public Affairs (PA)
Guidance," December 20, 1993
(h) Joint DoD, DOE, and FEMA Agreement for Response to Nuclear Weapon
Accidents and Nuclear Weapon Significant Incidents, January 1981
(i) TP 20-11, "General Firefighting Guidance," July 1995
(j) Naval Ships Technical Manual (NSTM) 079, Vol II, "Damage Control - Practical
Damage Control," February 25, 1999
(k) BUMEDINST 6470.10A, "Irradiated or Radioactively Contaminated Personnel,"
December 7, 1998
(l) Federal Guidance Report No. 11, "Limiting Values of Radionuclide Intake and Air
Concentration and Dose Conversion Factors for Inhalation, Submersion and
Ingestion," EPA, 1988
(m) AR 40-14, "Control and Recording Procedures for Occupational Exposure to
Ionizing Radiation," September 1984
(n) NAVMED P-5055, "Radiation Health Protection Manual," December 2, 1992
(o) AFI 48-125, "The U.S. Air Force Personnel Dosimetry Program"
(p) AR 600-10, "The Army Casualty System," August 1987
(q) AFI 36-3002, "Casualty Services," August 1994
(r) BUPERS Manual Article 4210100, "Personnel Casualty Reporting," February 1982
(s) NCRP Report #37, June 1980
(t) Joint Pub 4-06.
(u) DA Circular 40-82-3, "Prevention of Heat Injury"
(v) Explosive Ordnance Disposal Procedures 60-1, August 1997
(w) "Internal Security Act of 1950" (50 USC 797)
(x) DoD Directive 5210.41-M, "Nuclear Weapon Security Manual," April 1994

9 REFERENCES
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

(y) DoD Directive 5210.41, "Security Policy for Protecting Nuclear Weapons,"
September 23, 1988
(z) DoD Regulation 5200.1-R, "Information Security Regulation," January 1997
(aa) DoD Directive 5210.2, "Access to and Dissemination of Restricted Data," January
12, 1978
(ab) CJCSI 6110.01, "CJCS-Controlled Tactical Communications Assets," June
25,1996
(ac) Allied Communications Publication 134, "Communications Assets," January 1975
(ad) U.S. Forces Command Manual 105-1,"Joint Communication Deployment and
Employment," June 1980
(ae) USA FM 24-2, "Spectrum Management," August 21, 1991
(af) AFI 33-118, "Radio Spectrum Frequency Management," August 1997
(ag) Joint Pub 3-61, "Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations," May 14, 1997
(ah) DoD Directive 5400.13, "Joint Public Affairs Operations," January 9, 1996
(ai) DoD Instruction 5400.14, "Procedures for Joint Public Affairs Operations,"
January 22, 1996
(aj) Nuclear Regulatory Guide 8.29, January 1984
(ak) DoD 4000.25-1-M, "Military Standards Requisitioning and Issue Procedure
(MILSTRIP)," May 1987

10 REFERENCES
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

DL1. DEFINITIONS

DL1.1.1. Access Procedures. See Explosive Ordnance Disposal Procedures.

DL1.1.2. Accident Response Group (ARG). A group of technical and scientific


experts, with specialized equipment; composed of a cadre of senior scientific advisors,
weapons engineers and technicians, experts in nuclear safety and high-explosive
safety, health physicists, radiation control technicians, industrial hygienists, physical
scientists, packaging and transportation specialists, and other specialists from the
Department of Energy (DOE) weapons complex. ARG maintains readiness to provide
DOE technical assistance to peacetime accidents and significant incidents involving
special nuclear materials anywhere in the world.

DL1.1.3. Accident Scene. The cordoned area surrounding an accident site from
which all non-essential personnel and resources are evacuated and prohibited.

DL1.1.4. Accident Site. The area surrounding the impact point in which hazards
to personnel (wreckage, fire, or damage) are readily identifiable.

DL1.1.5. Aerial Measuring System (AMS). Performs aerial measurements of


ground and airborne radioactivity over large areas by utilizing instrumentation for
detecting and recording gamma radiation, both as gross count rates and gamma energy
spectra. Equipment for determining the position of the aircraft is also integrated into
the system. Can be both fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft.

DL1.1.6. Airborne Radioactivity. Any radioactive material suspended in the


atmosphere.

DL1.1.7. Air Force Radiation Assessment Team (AFRAT). A field-qualified


team of worldwide deployable physicists and health physics technicians established at
the Institute for Environment, Safety, and Occupational Health Risk Analysis (IERA).
The mission of AFRAT is to provide commanders and leaders with viable solutions to
operational obstacles imposed by the presence of radioactive materials or radiation
hazards, nuclear weapon accidents, nuclear facility incidents, radiation releases, or
terrorist activity.

DL1.1.8. Air Sampler. A device used to collect a sample of the radioactive


particulates suspended in the air.

DL1.1.9. Alpha Particle, Radiation. A positively charged particle made up of

11 DEFINITIONS
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

two neutrons and two protons, emitted by certain radioactive nuclei. Alpha particles
can be stopped by thin layers of light materials, such as a sheet of paper, and pose no
direct or external radiation threat; however, they can pose a serious health threat, if
internalized.

DL1.1.10. Armed. The configuration of a nuclear weapon in which a single


signal initiates the action for a nuclear detonation.

DL1.1.11. Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI). A


tri-Service facility chartered in 1961 that conducts research in the field of radiobiology
and related matters essential to the operational and medical support of the U.S.
Department of Defense (DoD) and the Military Services. The institute collaborates
with other governmental facilities, academic institutions, and civilian laboratories in
the United States and other countries. AFRRI provides the Medical Radiobiology
Advisory Team (MRAT) component of the Defense Nuclear Advisory Team (DNAT).

DL1.1.12. Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC). A centralized


computer-based system that provides estimates of the transport, diffusion, and
deposition of radioactive or other hazardous material (HAZMAT) released to the
atmosphere and dose projections to people and the environment.

DL1.1.13. Background Count. (In connection with health protection.) The


background count includes radiation produced by naturally occurring radioactivity and
cosmic rays.

DL1.1.14. Background Radiation. The natural radioactivity in the environment.


Nuclear (or ionizing) radiation arising from within the body and from the surroundings
to which individuals are always exposed.

DL1.1.15. Becquerel. The International System unit of activity of a


radionuclide, equal to the activity of a quantity of a radionuclide having 1 spontaneous
nuclear transition per second. Symbolized as Bq.

DL1.1.16. BENT SPEAR. A DoD term used to identify and report a nuclear
weapon significant incident involving a nuclear weapon/warhead, nuclear component,
or vehicle when nuclear loaded.

DL1.1.17. Beta Particle, Radiation. An electron or positron emitted by an


atomic nucleus during radioactive decay. Beta radiation can be harmful depending
upon the dose and time of exposure; it is easily shielded by aluminum.

12 DEFINITIONS
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

DL1.1.18. Bioassay. The method(s) for determining the amount of internal


contamination received by an individual.

DL1.1.19. BROKEN ARROW. A DoD term to identify and report an accident


involving a nuclear weapon, warhead, or nuclear component

DL1.1.20. CentiGray (cGy). A unit of absorbed dose of radiation (one centiGray


equals one radiation absorbed dose [RAD]).

DL1.1.21. Combined Information Bureau (CIB). A facility at the scene of a


radiological accident or significant incident that occurred overseas to coordinate all
public affairs. The CIB includes representation from DOE, DoD, other agencies, and
foreign government organizations.

DL1.1.22. Consequence Management. Those planning actions and preparations


taken prior to an accident to identify, organize, equip, and train emergency response
forces and to develop the executable plans implemented in response to an accident,
and the actions taken following an accident to mitigate and recover from the effects of
an accident.

DL1.1.23. Contamination. The deposit, adsorption, or absorption of radioactive


material on or by structures, areas, personnel, or objects.

DL1.1.24. Contamination Control. Procedures to avoid, reduce, remove, or


render harmless, temporarily or permanently, nuclear materials contamination for the
purpose of maintaining or enhancing the efficient conduct of military operations.

DL1.1.25. Contamination Control Line (CCL). A control line surrounding the


radiological control area. Initially, the contamination control line extends 100 meters
beyond the known/suspected radiological contamination to provide a measure of
safety. Once the Contamination Control Station (CCS) is operational, the CCL
becomes the outer boundary that separates the reduced hazard area from the clean area.

DL1.1.26. Contamination Control Station. An area (tent or facility) specifically


designated for permitting ingress and egress of personnel and equipment to/from the
radiation control area. The outer boundary of the CCS is the CCL, and the inner
boundary is the line segment labeled the hot line. For illustration of the CCS, see
Figures C2.F2., C6.F1., and C6.F2.

DL1.1.27. Contamination Reduction Area (CRA). The area concept is employed

13 DEFINITIONS
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

at the CCS to eliminate (or reduce to an acceptable level) contamination adhering to


personnel in the contaminated area. The concept uses supervised, structured, and
meticulous clothing/equipment removal procedures precluding mechanical transfer of
contamination on a person/object and outside the CCS.

DL1.1.28. Critical Nuclear Weapons Design Information (CNWDI). TOP


SECRET RESTRICTED DATA or SECRET RESTRICTED DATA revealing the
theory of operation or design of the components of a thermonuclear or implosion-type
fission bomb, warhead, demolition munition, or test device. Specifically excluded is
information concerning arming, fusing, and firing systems; limited-life components;
and totally contained quantities of fissionable, fusionable, and high-explosive materials
by type.

DL1.1.29. Cumulative Dose (Radiation). The total dose resulting from repeated
exposure to radiation in the same region or of the whole body.

DL1.1.30. Curie (Ci). A unit of radioactivity; the activity of a quantity of any


radioactive nuclide undergoing 37 thousand million disintegrations per second, the
amount of activity in 1 gram of radium.

DL1.1.31. Custody. The responsibility for the control of, transfer and movement
of, and access to weapons and components. Custody also includes the maintenance of
and accountability for weapons, components, and radioactive materials.

DL1.1.32. Decay (Radioactive). The decrease in the radiation intensity or mass


of any radioactive material with respect to time.

DL1.1.33. Decontamination. The process of making any person, object, or area


safe by absorbing, destroying, neutralizing, making harmless, or removing
contaminated material clinging to or around it.

DL1.1.34. Decontamination Station. A building or location suitably equipped


and organized where personnel and material are cleansed of radiological contaminents.

DL1.1.35. Defense Coordinating Element. A staff formed to provide support to


the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) in a disaster area.

DL1.1.36. Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO). A Commander-in-Chief


(CINC)-appointed officer who serves as the DoD single point of contact to the Federal
Coordinating Officer (FCO) for the purpose of providing DoD resources during
disaster assistance operations.

14 DEFINITIONS
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

DL1.1.37. Director of Military Support (DOMS). The Secretary of Defense


directs the Secretary of the Army to act as the DoD executive agent to plan for and
commit DoD resources in response to requests from civil authorities. The DOMS
serves as the Army's action agent for planning and executing DoD's support mission to
civilian authorities within the United States.

DL1.1.38. Disaster Control. Measures taken before, during, or after hostile


action or natural or manmade disasters to reduce the probability of damage, minimize
its effects, and initiate recovery.

DL1.1.39. Disaster Control Group (DCG). The U.S. Air Force (USAF)
Response Force element that goes to the scene of a major accident or natural
catastrophe to provide command and control under the direction of the On-Scene
Commander (OSC).

DL1.1.40. Disaster Cordon. A physical barrier surrounding the accident scene


where control is established to preclude unauthorized entry.

DL1.1.41. Disaster Field Office (DFO). The on-scene focal point established by
the Senior Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Official (SFO), as
required, for coordinating the Federal response to a radiological accident or significant
incident. Representatives of other Federal, State, local, and volunteer agencies will be
located in the center.

DL1.1.42. Disaster Preparedness. That series of actions to control and manage


radiological accidents or incidents and bring them to a practicable conclusion within
the established security, response, and recovery framework. These actions include
initial and subsequent reporting response, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)
procedural action on the weapon(s), appropriate security, legal and medical aspects,
public information, and control of hazards caused by the accident. Control of the
accident-caused hazards includes survey of the incident/accident area to establish
isodose lines and all types of monitoring, personnel, and area decontamination, and
disposition of nuclear, high-explosive, and contaminated items.

DL1.1.43. Disaster Response Force. The USAF base-level organization that


responds to disasters/accidents, establishing command and control (C2) and supporting
disaster operations.

15 DEFINITIONS
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

DL1.1.44. Disaster Support Group. A USAF major command and field operating
agency headquarters command and control element. It coordinates and supports the
headquarters response to a contingency.

DL1.1.45. Dose. The amount of energy deposited in body tissue due to radiation
exposure. Various technical terms, such as dose equivalent, effective dose equivalent
and collective dose, are used to evaluate the amount of radiation an exposed person
receives. These terms are used to describe the differing interactions of radiation with
tissue as well as to assist in the management of personnel exposure to radiation.

DL1.1.46. Dose Rate Contour Line. A line on a map, diagram, or overlay


joining all points at which the radiation dose rate at a given time is the same.

DL1.1.47. Dosimetry. The measurement of radiation dose. It applies to both


the devices used (dosimeters) and to the techniques.

DL1.1.48. DULL SWORD. A team used in DoD to identify and report a nuclear
weapon safety deficiency.

DL1.1.49. Emergency Action and Coordination Team (EACT). The DOE senior
management team at headquarters that coordinates the initial Federal Radiological
Monitoring and Assessment Plan (FRMAP) response to radiological emergencies.

DL1.1.50. EMPTY QUIVER. A reporting term used by DoD to identify and


report the seizure, theft, or loss of a U.S. nuclear weapon.

DL1.1.51. Entry Control Point. The place where entry into and exit from the
disaster cordon is controlled. It is located on the disaster cordon near the onscene
control point.

DL1.1.52. Exclusion Area. Any designated area containing one or more nuclear
weapons, components, or radioactive materials.

DL1.1.53. Explosive Ordnance. All munitions containing explosives, nuclear


fission or fusion materials, and biological and chemical agents. This ordnance
includes bombs and warheads, guided and ballistic missiles, and artillery, mortar,
rocket, and small arms ammunition. Also, ordnance includes all mines, torpedoes, and
depth charges; pyrotechnics; clusters and dispensers; cartridges and propellant actuated
devices; electro-explosive devices; clandestine and improvised explosive devices; and
all similar or related items or components explosive in nature.

16 DEFINITIONS
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

DL1.1.54. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). The detection, identification,


field evaluation, rendering-safe, and/or disposal of explosive ordnance that has become
hazardous by damage or deterioration when the disposal of such explosive ordnance is
beyond the capabilities of personnel assigned to routine disposal.

DL1.1.55. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Incident. The suspected or detected


presence of unexploded ordnance or damaged explosive ordnance that constitutes a
hazard to operations, installation, personnel, or material. Not included in this
definition are the accidental arming or other conditions that develop during the
manufacture of high-explosive material, technical service assembly operations, or the
laying of mines and demolition charges.

DL1.1.56. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Procedures. Those particular courses or


modes of action for access to, recovery, rendering safe, and final disposal of explosive
ordnance or any HAZMAT associated with an explosive ordnance disposal incident.

DL1.1.56.1. Access Procedures. Those actions to exactly locate and gain


access to unexploded ordnance.

DL1.1.56.2. Recovery Procedures. Those actions to recover unexploded


explosive ordnance.

DL1.1.56.3. Render Safe Procedures. The portion of the explosive


ordnance disposal procedures involving the application of special explosive ordnance
disposal methods and tools to provide the interruption of functions or separation of
essential components of unexploded explosive ordnance to prevent an unacceptable
detonation.

DL1.1.57. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit. Personnel with special training


and equipment who render explosive ordnance (such as bombs, mines, projectiles, and
booby traps) safe, make intelligence reports on such ordnance, and supervise the safe
removal thereof.

DL1.1.58. Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance involving the


investigation, detection, location, marking, initial identification, and reporting of
suspected unexploded ordnance, by explosive ordnance reconnaissance agents, to
determine further action.

17 DEFINITIONS
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

DL1.1.59. Exposure. The level of radiation flux to which a material or living


tissue is exposed. The actual dose of radiation resulting from the exposure depends
upon a number of factors.

DL1.1.60. FADED GIANT. A reporting term to identify an event involving a


nuclear reactor or radiological accident.

DL1.1.61. Federal Coordinating Officer. Appointed by the Director of the


Federal Emergency Management Agency, on behalf of the President, to coordinate
Federal assistance to a State affected by a disaster or emergency. The source and
level of the Federal Coordinating Officer will likely depend on the nature of the
Federal response.

DL1.1.62. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). This Agency


establishes Federal policies for and coordinates all civil defense and civil emergency
planning, management, mitigation, and assistance functions of executive agencies.
FEMA assists local and State agencies in their emergency planning. Its primary role
in a radiological accident is one of coordinating Federal, State, local, and volunteer
response actions.

DL1.1.62.1. Emergency Information and Coordination Center (EICC). The


EICC is the location in FEMA Headquarters in Washington, DC, from which the
Emergency Support Team (EST) provides coordination support for Federal and State
emergency response activities to a radiological accident or emergency.

DL1.1.62.2. Emergency Response Team (ERT). An inter-Agency team,


headed by FEMA, deployed to a radiological emergency scene by the FEMA Director
to make an initial assessment of the situation and then provide FEMAs primary
response capability.

DL1.1.62.3. Emergency Support Team (EST). The FEMA Headquarters


team that carries out notification activation and coordination procedures from the
FEMA EICC. The EST is responsible for Federal Agency headquarters coordination,
staff support of the FEMA Director, and support of the SFO.

DL1.1.63. Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP). The


Federal plan to assist State and local government officials or other Federal Agencies in
the response to a radiological emergency in the United States, its possessions, and
territories.

18 DEFINITIONS
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

DL1.1.64. Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC).


A coalition of all Federal off-site monitoring and assessment efforts to assist the Lead
Federal Agency (LFA), State(s), and local authorities. A FRMAC, led by a DOE
FRMAC Director, is established in response to the LFA or State request when a major
radiological emergency is anticipated or has occurred.

DL1.1.65. Field Instrument for the Detection of Low-Energy Radiation


(FIDLER). A field survey instrument specifically designed to measure low-energy
x-rays and gamma rays from weapons grade plutonium. The detector consists of a
5-inch diameter by 1/16-inch thick sodium iodide crystal coupled through a quartz
light pipe to a 5-inch diameter photomultiplier tube. The detector is coupled to a
single-channel analyzer instrument such as the ESP-2 or E600.

DL1.1.66. Film Badge. A photographic film packet or badge carried by


personnel for measuring and recording gamma ray dosage permanently. Mostly
replaced by Thermoluminescent Dosimetry.

DL1.1.67. Final Disposal Procedures. See Explosive Ordnance Disposal


Procedures.

DL1.1.68. Follow-On Element. The USAF non-emergency response element of


a disaster response force that deploys to the accident scene after the initial response
element to expand C2 and perform support functions.

DL1.1.69. Formerly Restricted Data (FRD). Information removed from the


Restricted Data category upon determination jointly by DOE and DoD that such
information relates primarily to the military utilization of atomic weapons and that
such information can be safeguarded adequately as national security information.

DL1.1.70. Fragmentation Zone. A calculated distance that fragments created by


an explosion are projected.

DL1.1.71. Gamma-Ray, Radiation. High-energy electromagnetic radiation


emitted from atomic nuclei during a nuclear reaction. Gamma radiation requires thick
layers of dense materials, such as lead, for shielding. Potentially lethal to humans,
depending on the intensity of the field.

DL1.1.72. Half-Life. The time required for the activity of a given radioactive
species to decrease to half of its initial value due to radioactive decay. The half-life is
a characteristic property of each radioactive species and is independent of its amount

19 DEFINITIONS
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

or condition. The effective half-life of a given isotope in the body is the time in
which the quantity in the body will decrease to half as a result of both radioactive
decay and biological elimination.

DL1.1.73. Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability (HPAC). HPAC is a


forward deployable modeling capability available for Government,
Government-related or academic use. This software tool assists in emergency
response to hazardous agent releases. Its fast running, physics-based algorithms
enable users to model and predict hazard areas and human collateral effects in
minutes. HPAC provides the capability to accurately predict the effects of hazardous
material (HAZMAT) releases into the atmosphere and its impact on civilian and
military populations.

DL1.1.74. Hazardous Material (HAZMAT). Any material that is flammable,


corrosive, an oxidizing agent, explosive, toxic, poisonous, etiological, radioactive,
nuclear, unduly magnetic, a chemical agent, biological research material, compressed
gases, or any other material that, because of its quantity, properties, or packaging, may
endanger life or property.

DL1.1.75. High Explosive. An energetic material that detonates (instead of


deflagrating or burning); the rate of advance of the reaction zone into the unreacted
material exceeds that velocity of sound in the unreacted material.

DL1.1.76. Hot Line. The inner boundary of the contamination control station,
marked with tape or line. The station personnel use the line as the inner side being
contaminated and the side away from the accident as an area of reduced contamination.

DL1.1.77. Hotspot. A mobile radiological laboratory deployed with the DOE


ARG to conduct soil, water, and air samples as well as bioassays and whole body
counting. Hotspot is also a modeling program similar to HPAC.

DL1.1.78. Hot Spot. The region in a contaminated area in which the level of
radioactive contamination is considerably greater than in neighboring regions in the
area.

DL1.1.79. Ingestion Pathway. The means by which a person is exposed to


radiation through ingestion (i.e., hand-to-mouth, inhalation with open mouth, etc.).

DL1.1.80. Inhalation Pathway. The means by which a person at the accident


area or downwind is subjected to respiratory radiation exposure.

20 DEFINITIONS
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

DL1.1.81. Initial Render Safe Procedure. An EOD process that results in


electrical isolation of the high explosive preventing a nuclear yield.

DL1.1.82. Initial Response Force (IRF). That DoD entity directed to proceed to
the scene of a radiological accident or incident for the purpose of rendering emergency
assistance, including maintaining command and control of the accident site until
relieved by the Commander, Response Task Force (CRTF). Subject to its capabilities,
the IRF may be tasked to perform the following:

DL1.1.82.1. Rescue operations.

DL1.1.82.2. Accident site security.

DL1.1.82.3. Firefighting.

DL1.1.82.4. Initiation of appropriate EOD procedures.

DL1.1.82.5. Radiation monitoring.

DL1.1.82.6. Establishment of C2 and communications.

DL1.1.82.7. Public affairs activities.

DL1.1.83. Institute for Environmental, Safety, and Occupational Health Risk


Analysis. A USAF unit that provides consultant, engineering, and analytical support
in radiological, occupational, and environmental health programs. The USAF unit
offers a multitude of technical services on radiological problems. The radiological
field unit of the IERA is called the AFRAT.

DL1.1.84. Joint Communications Contingency Station Assets. The


communications station provides high-frequency radio, tropospheric scatter terminals,
automatic digital network terminals, manual secure voice, and other equipment.

DL1.1.85. Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE). Provides Chairman,


Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)-directed contingency and crisis communications to meet
operational and support needs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Services, Unified
Commands, Defense Agencies, and non-Defense agencies.

21 DEFINITIONS
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

DL1.1.86. Joint Hazard Evaluation Center (JHEC). A facility, staffed by


representatives from each of the agencies conducting hazard survey and radiological
operations, for the coordination of hazard survey data and radiological safety/health
physics matters on site.

DL1.1.87. Joint Information Center (JIC). A facility at the scene of a


radiological accident or significant incident to coordinate all public affairs. The JIC
includes representation from DOE, DoD, FEMA, and other Federal, State, and local
agencies.

DL1.1.88. Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center (JNACC). DoD and


DOE operate coordiating centers for exchanging and maintaining information about
radiological assistance capabilities and activities. These centers are separated
geographically but linked by direct communications networks.

DL1.1.89. Lead Federal Agency (LFA). The Agency that is responsible for
leading and coordinating all aspects of the Federal response is referred to as the LFA
and is determined by the type of emergency. In situations where a Federal Agency
owns, authorizes, regulates, or is otherwise deemed responsible for the facility or
radiological activity causing the emergency, and has authority to conduct and manage
Federal actions on site, that Agency normally will be the LFA.

DL1.1.90. Licensed Material. Source material, special nuclear material, or


byproduct material received, possessed, used, or transferred under a general or specific
license issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) or a State.

DL1.1.91. Linear Accelerator (LINAC). A DOE ARG asset that provides


high-energy radiography and real-time radiography in the field.

DL1.1.92. Liquid Abrasive Cutter (LAC). A DOE ARG remotely operated


cutting tool using high-pressure water and abrasive medium.

DL1.1.93. Maximum Permissible Dose. That radiation dose that a military


commander or other appropriate authority may prescribe as the limiting cumulative
radiation dose to be received over a specific period of time by members of the
command, consistent with operational military considerations.

DL1.1.94. Medical Radiobiology Advisory Team. AFFRIs team of highly


qualified radiation medicine physicians, health physicists, and related scientists who
provide state-of-the-art advice and assistance to CINCs of U.S. and allied forces,

22 DEFINITIONS
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

Federal Agencies, State and local governments, and others in radiological matters
including accidents and incidents of nuclear weapons, nuclear reactors, radiological
dispersal devices, and industrial/medical sources. They provide expertise for
emergency treatment of radiation injuries, operational health physics, physical and
bio-dosimetry, hazard prediction, and site remediation.

DL1.1.95. Monitoring. The act of detecting the presence of radiation and the
measurement thereof with radiation measuring instruments.

DL1.1.96. National Defense Area (NDA). An area established on non-Federal


lands located within the United States, its possessions, or territories for the purpose of
safeguarding classified defense information or protecting DoD equipment and/or
material. Establishment of an NDA temporarily places such non-Federal lands under
the effective control of DoD and results only from an emergency event. The senior
DoD representative at the scene will define the boundary, have the boundary marked
with a physical barrier, and have warning signs posted. The landowners consent and
cooperation will be obtained whenever possible; however, military necessity will
dictate the final decision regarding location, shape, and size of the NDA.

DL1.1.97. National Security Area (NSA). An area established on non-Federal


lands located within the United States, its possessions, or territories for the purpose of
safeguarding classified and/or restricted data information or protecting DOE equipment
and/or material. Establishment of an NSA temporarily places such non-Federal lands
under the effective control of DOE and results only from an emergency event. The
senior DOE representative having custody of the material at the scene will define the
boundary, have the boundary marked with a physical barrier, and have warning signs
posted. The landowners consent and cooperation will be obtained whenever possible;
however, operational necessity will dictate the final decision regarding location, shape,
and size of the NSA.

DL1.1.98. Need-to-Know. A criterion used in security procedures that requires


the custodians of classified information to establish, prior to disclosure, that the
intended recipient must have access to the information to perform his or her official
duties.

DL1.1.99. Nuclear Accident Response Capabilities Listing (NARCL). A listing


of DoD and DOE installations, facilities, or activities with nuclear accident/incident
response and radiation detection capabilities.

23 DEFINITIONS
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

DL1.1.100. Nuclear Component. Weapon components composed of fissionable


or fusionable materials that contribute substantially to nuclear energy released during
detonation. Nuclear components include radioactive boosting materials.

DL1.1.101. Nuclear Contribution. Explosive energy released by nuclear fission


or fusion reactions as part of the total energy released by a radiological accident or
incident. Any nuclear contribution equivalent to 4 or more pounds of trinitrotoluene
(TNT) is considered significant and would add beta and gamma radiation hazards to
other radiological and toxic hazards present at a radiological accident site.

DL1.1.102. Nuclear Detonation. A nuclear explosion resulting from fission or


fusion reactions in nuclear materials, such as from a nuclear weapon.

DL1.1.103. Nuclear Radiation. Particulate and electromagnetic radiation emitted


from atomic nuclei in various nuclear processes. The important nuclear radiations,
from the weapons effects standpoint, are alpha and beta particles, gamma rays, and
neutrons.

DL1.1.104. Nuclear Reactor Accident. An uncontrolled reactor criticality


resulting in damage to the reactor core or an event such as loss of coolant that results in
significant release of fission products from the reactor core.

DL1.1.105. Nuclear Safing. The prevention of a nuclear yield in the event of


accidental detonation of the high explosive (HE) of a HE assembly weapon or ignition
of the propellant of a gun assembly weapon.

DL1.1.106. Nuclear Weapon. . A complete assembly (i.e., implosion type, gun


type, or thermonuclear type), in its intended ultimate configuration which, upon
completion of the prescribed arming, fusing, and firing sequence, is capable of
producing the intended nuclear reaction and release of energy.

DL1.1.107. Nuclear Weapon Accident. An unexpected event involving nuclear


weapons that results in any of the following:

DL1.1.107.1. An accidental or unauthorized launching, firing, or use by U.S.


forces or U.S.-supported allied forces of a nuclear-capable weapons system.

DL1.1.107.2. Accidental, unauthorized, or unexplained nuclear detonation.

DL1.1.107.3. Non-nuclear detonation or burning of a nuclear weapon.

24 DEFINITIONS
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

DL1.1.107.4. Radioactive contamination.

DL1.1.107.5. Jettisoning of a nuclear weapon or nuclear component.

DL1.1.107.6. Public hazard, actual or perceived.

DL1.1.108. Nuclear Weapon Incident. An unexpected event involving a nuclear


weapon, facility, or component resulting in any of the following, but not constituting a
nuclear weapon(s) accident:

DL1.1.108.1. An increase in the possibility of explosion or radioactive


contamination.

DL1.1.108.2. Errors committed in the assembly, testing, loading, or


transportation of equipment, and/or the malfunctioning of equipment and material that
could lead to an unintentional operation of all or part of the weapon arming and/or
firing sequence or that could lead to a substantial change in yield or increased dud
probability.

DL1.1.108.3. Any act of God, unfavorable environment, or condition


resulting in damage to a weapon, facility, or component.

DL1.1.109. Nuclear Weapon Significant Incident. An unexpected event


involving nuclear weapons, nuclear components, or a nuclear weapon transport or
launch vehicle when a nuclear weapon is mated, loaded, or on board that does not fall
into the nuclear weapon accident category but that:

DL1.1.109.1. Results in evident damage to a nuclear weapon or nuclear


components to the extent that major rework, complete replacement, or examination or
recertification by DOE is required.

DL1.1.109.2. Requires immediate action in the interest of safety or nuclear


weapons security.

DL1.1.109.3. May result in adverse public reaction (national or


international) or inadvertent release of classified information.

DL1.1.109.4. Could lead to a nuclear weapon accident and warrants that


senior national officials or Agencies be informed to take action.

DL1.1.110. Nuclear Yield. The energy released in the detonation of a nuclear

25 DEFINITIONS
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

weapon, measured in terms of the kilotons or megatons of TNT, required to produce an


equivalent energy release.

DL1.1.111. Off Site. That area beyond the boundaries of a DoD installation or
DOE facility, including the area beyond the boundary of an NDA or NSA, that has
been or may become affected by a nuclear weapon accident or significant incident.

DL1.1.112. One-Point Detonation. A detonation of HE that is initiated at a


single point.

DL1.1.113. One-Point Safe. The criterion for design safety that a weapon must
have less than one chance in a million of producing a nuclear yield of more than 4
pounds of TNT (equivalent energy release) when the HE is initiated and detonated at
any single point.

DL1.1.114. On-Scene Commander. The senior person designated to coordinate


the response efforts at the accident scene prior to the arrival of the Response Task
Force Commanders.

DL1.1.115. On Site. That area around the scene of a radiological accident or


significant incident under the operational control of the installation commander,
facility manager, DoD CRTF, or DOE SEO. The on-site area includes any area
within an NDA or NSA.

DL1.1.116. Operational Exposure Guidance (OEG). Command guidance


establishing radiation exposure limits for assigned or attached personnel. OEG should
be established in advance of operations and included in Operations Plans (OPLANs),
Contingency Plans (CONPLANs), or Functions Plans (FUNCPLANs).

DL1.1.117. Oralloy. Enriched uranium. One of the primary fissionable


materials in nuclear weapons.

DL1.1.118. Particulate Radiation. Radiation in the form of particles (for


example, neutrons, electrons, and alpha and beta particles) as opposed to
electromagnetic radiation.

DL1.1.119. Personal Protective Clothing. Clothing consisting of coveralls, shoe


covers, cotton gloves, and hood or hair caps. Personal protective clothing provides
protection for the user from alpha-beta radiation but is primarily a control device to
prevent the spread of contamination. A respirator can be worn with the personal
protective clothing; this provides protection against the inhalation of contaminants.

26 DEFINITIONS
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

DL1.1.120. Personnel Reliability Program (PRP). A program implemented for


all personnel who control, handle, have access to, or control access to nuclear weapon
systems. The program covers selection, screening, and continuous evaluation of the
personnel assigned to various nuclear duties. The program seeks to ensure that
personnel coming under its purview are mentally and emotionally stable and reliable.

DL1.1.121. Physical Security. That part of security concerned with physical


measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to
equipment, facilities, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against
espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft.

DL1.1.122. Plutonium (Pu). An artificially produced fissile material. The


Pu-239 isotope is primarily used in nuclear weapons.

DL1.1.123. Protective Action Guide (PAG). A radiation exposure level or range


established by appropriate Federal or State agencies beyond which protective action
should be considered.

DL1.1.124. Protective Action Recommendation (PAR). Advice to the State on


emergency measures it should consider in determining action for the public to take in
order to avoid or reduce exposure to radiation.

DL1.1.125. Quantity/Distance (Q/D) Safety Standards. . Directives pertaining to


the amounts and kinds of explosives that can be stored and the proximity of such
storage to buildings, highways, railways, magazines, and other installations.

DL1.1.126. Radiation Absorbed Dose. RAD is an obsolete term. Commonly


used unit of absorbed dose radiation. It has been replaced by CentiGray (cGy).

DL1.1.127. Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS).


A World Health Organization (WHO) Collaborating Center that provides 24-hour
direct or consulting assistance to medical and health physics practitioners dealing with
radiation-related health problems or injuries from local, national, or international
radiation incidents. REAC/TS provides advice and assistance to the LFA responding
to nuclear events. In addition to their operational response capabilities, REAC/TS
provides extensive training opportunities for healthcare providers through their
in-residence and Mobile Training Team programs.

27 DEFINITIONS
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

DL1.1.128. Radioactivity. The spontaneous emission of radiation, generally


alpha or beta particles, often accompanied by gamma rays from the nuclei of an
unstable isotope.

DL1.1.129. Radioactivity Detection, Indication, and Computation. A term


designating various types of radiological measuring instruments or equipment.

DL1.1.130. Radiological Accident. A loss of control over radiation or


radioactive material that presents a hazard to life, health, property, or the environment,
or that may result in any member of the general population exceeding limits for
exposure to ionizing radiation.

DL1.1.31. Radiological Advisory Medical Team (RAMT). Special DoD


response teams located at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC),
Washington, DC, and the Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine
located in Landstuhl, FRG. The teams are specially trained to assist and furnish
guidance to the CRTF or other responsible officials at an accident site and to local
medical authorities concerning radiological health hazards and radiological exposure
criteria.

DL1.1.132. Radiological Air Sampling and Analysis Lab (RASCAL). A mobile,


self-sufficient analytical laboratory capable of supporting a large number of air
samples and providing rapid air sample analyses.

DL1.1.133. Radiological Assistance. That assistance provided after an accident


involving radioactive materials to:

DL1.1.133.1. Evaluate the radiological hazard.

DL1.1.133.2. Accomplish emergency rescue and first aid.

DL1.1.133.3. Minimize safety hazards to the public.

DL1.1.133.4. Minimize exposure of personnel to radiation of radioactive


materials.

DL1.1.133.5. Minimize the spread of radioactive contamination.

DL1.1.133.6. Minimize damaging effects on property.

28 DEFINITIONS
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

DL1.1.133.7. Disseminate technical information and medical advice to


appropriate authorities.

DL1.1.134. Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) Team. Trained and


equipped DOE teams available through DOE regional offices to provide first response
capability in radiological emergencies.

DL1.1.135. Radiological Control Area (RCA). The control area encompassing


all known, or suspected, radiological contamination at the site of a radiological
accident or significant incident.

DL1.1.136. Radiological Control (RADCON) Team. Special DoD radiological


team organized to provide technical assistance and advice in radiological emergencies.

DL1.1.137. Radiological Event. . Used to refer to any accident, incident, or


significant incident involving radioactive materials in DoD custody or any Improvised
Nuclear Device (IND) incident involving other materials. This includes BROKEN
ARROW, BENT SPEAR, and EMPTY QUIVER.

DL1.1.138. Radiological Survey. The directed effort to determine the


distribution of radiological material and dose rates in an area.

DL1.1.139. RANGER. A mobile, real-time mapping system that monitors large


areas of land for radiological contamination.

DL1.1.140. Recovery Procedures. See Explosive Ordnance Disposal Procedures.

DL1.1.141. Re-Entry Recommendations (RERs). Advice provided to the State


concerning guidance that may be issued to members of the public on returning to an
area affected by a radiological emergency, either permanently or for short-term
emergency actions.

DL1.1.142. Render Safe Procedures. See Explosive Ordnance Disposal


Procedures.

DL1.1.143. Residual Contamination. Contamination that remains after steps


have been taken to remove it. These steps may consist of nothing more than allowing
the contamination to decay naturally.

DL1.1.144. Response Task Force (RTF). A DoD response force appropriately

29 DEFINITIONS
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

manned, equipped, and able to coordinate all actions necessary to control and recover
from a radiological accident or significant incident. The specific purpose of the RTF
is to accompany weapon recovery and to provide radiological accident/significant
incident assistance. RTFs are organized and maintained by those Combatant
Commanders whose component commands have custody of nuclear weapons or
radioactive nuclear weapon components.

DL1.1.145. Restricted Data (RD). All data (information) concerning:

DL1.1.145.1. Design, manufacture, or utilization of nuclear weapons.

DL1.1.145.2. Production of special nuclear material.

DL1.1.145.3. Use of special nuclear material in the production of energy but


not including data declassified or removed from the restricted data category.

DL1.1.146. Roentgen. An obsolete unit of exposure of gamma (or x-ray)


radiation in field dosimetry.

DL1.1.147. Roentgen Equivalent Man/Mammal (REM). An obsolete unit of


dose replaced by the Sievert (Sv). One REM is the quantity of ionizing radiation of
any type which, when absorbed by man or other mammals, produces a physiological
effect equivalent to that produced by the absorption of 1 roentgen of x-ray or gamma
radiation.

DL1.1.148. Safing. As applied to weapons and ammunition, the changing from a


state of readiness for initiation to a safe condition.

DL1.1.149. Security Area. The area surrounding the accident site in an overseas
country where a two-person security policy is established to prevent unauthorized
access to classified defense information, equipment, or material. The cooperation by
local authorities and host nation consent should be obtained through prior host nation
agreements.

DL1.1.150. Senior Energy Official (SEO). Responsible for DOE's response


organization and the focal point for interfacing with DoD and other Agencies,
coordinating DOE asset deployment, integration (including identifying and
coordinating logistics requirements), and operations when DOE is in a support role to
DoD. When DOE is the LFA during a response, the SEO is responsible for the overall
Federal response, and the DOE OSC is responsible for the DOE response organization.

30 DEFINITIONS
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

DL1.1.151. Senior FEMA Official. A person appointed by the Director of


FEMA, or Directors representative, to initially direct the FEMA response at the scene
of a radiological emergency. Also acts as the Team Leader for the Advance Element
of the Emergency Response Team (ERTA).

DL1.1.152. Sievert (Sv). International System of Units (SI) unit of any of the
quantities expressed as dose equivalent. The dose equivalent in sieverts is equal to the
absorbed dose in grays multiplied by the quality factor (1 Sv = 100 REMs).

DL1.1.153. Site Remediation Working Group (SRWG). An organization formed


at the accident scene whose sole purpose is to focus on site remediation issues. The
SRWG draws upon the expertise of the various elements who respond to the accident
to form a coordinated site remediation team.

DL1.1.154 Special Nuclear Material (SNM). Plutonium and uranium enriched in


the 238 or 235 isotope, and any other material that DOE, pursuant to the provisions of
Section 51 of the AEA of 1954, determines to be special nuclear material. Does not
include source material.

DL1.1.155. Transuranic. Being an element having an atomic number greater


than that of uranium.

DL1.1.156. Tritium (T or H-3). Tritium is a radioactive isotope of hydrogen


having one proton and two neutrons in the nucleus. Tritium is a low-beta emitter and
poses a radiation hazard from inhalation.

DL1.1.157. Tuballoy (TU). A term, of British origin, for uranium metal


containing U-238 and U-235 in natural proportions; therefore, the term is considered
ambiguous, and its use is discouraged. This term is sometimes applied to depleted
uranium.

DL1.1.158. Two-Person Concept. A system designed to prohibit access by an


individual to nuclear weapons and certain designated components by requiring the
presence at all times of at least two authorized persons capable of detecting incorrect or
unauthorized procedures with respect to the task to be performed. Also referred to as
the two-person rule or policy.

31 DEFINITIONS
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

DL1.1.159. Two-Person Control. The close surveillance and control of materials


at all times by a minimum of two authorized persons, each capable of detecting
incorrect or unauthorized procedures with respect to the task to be performed and each
familiar with established security requirements.

DL1.1.160. Uranium (U). Uranium is a heavy, silvery white, radioactive metal.


In air, the metal becomes coated with a layer of oxide that will make it appear from a
golden-yellow color to almost black. Uranium is an alpha emitter. Uranium presents
chemical and radiation hazards and exposure may occur during mining, processing of
ore, or production of uranium metal. Uranium and its compounds have both toxic
chemical and radiation effects, depending on dose and exposure time, as well as type
of exposure, such as inhalation or skin contact.

DL1.1.161. Warhead. That part of a missile, projectile, torpedo, rocket, or other


munitions that contains the nuclear or thermonuclear system, HE system, chemical or
biological agents, or inert materials intended to inflict damage.

DL1.1.162. Warhead Section (WHS). A completely assembled warhead


including appropriate skin sections and related components.

DL1.1.163. Warning Order. A planning directive that describes the situation,


allocates forces and resources, establishes command relationships, provides other
initial planning guidance, and initiates subordinate unit mission planning.

DL1.1.164. Weapon Debris (nuclear). The residue of a nuclear weapon after it


has exploded or burned; that is, the materials used for the casing and other components
of the weapon, plus unexpended plutonium or uranium, together with fission products,
if any.

DL1.1.165. Weapons Recovery. Includes a comprehensive assessment of the


accident, neutralizing the weapon hazards, and removing, packaging, and shipping of
the weapon hazards.

32 DEFINITIONS
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

AL1. ABBREVIATIONS AND/OR ACRONYMS

AL1.1. AAC Ambient Air Concentration


AL1.2. AB Air Base
AL1.3. ACC Air Combat Command
AL1.4. ACE Adaptive Communications Element
AL1.5. AE Ammunition ship
AL1.6. AEA Atomic Energy Act
AL1.7. AF Air Force
AL1.8. AFB Air Force Base
AL1.9. AFCA (U.S.) Air Force Communications Agency
AL1.10. AFCIC Air Force Communications and Information Center
AL1.11. AFFF Aqueous Film Forming Foam
AL1.12. AFI (U.S.) Air Force Instruction
AL1.13. AFOC Air Force Operations Center
AL1.14. AFR Average Flow Rate
AL1.15. AFRAT Air Force Radiation Assessment Team
AL1.16. AFRRI Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute
AL1.17. Am Americium
AL1.18. AM Amplitude Modulation
AL1.19. AMC Air Mobility Command
AL1.20. AMS Aerial Measuring System
AL1.21. AOC Army Operations Center
AL1.22. AOE Fast combat support ship
AL1.23. AR (U.S.) Army Regulation
AL1.24. ARAC Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability
AL1.25. ARG Accident Response Group
AL1.26. ASD(PA) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
AL1.27. AT&T American Telephone and Telegraph
AL1.28. ATSD(NCB) Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear
and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs
AL1.29. AUTODIN Automatic Digital Network
AL1.30. Automated Secure Voice Communication System
AUTOSEVOCOM
AL1.31. AWP Access Work Permit
AL1.32. Be Beryllium
AL1.33. Bq Becquerel
AL1.34. BUMED Bureau of Medicine and Surgery

33 ABBREVIATIONS AND/OR ACRONYMS


DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

AL1.35. C2 Command and Control


AL1.36. Catalog of Naval Training Courses
CANTRAC
AL1.37. CAT Crisis Action Team
AL1.38. CCA Contamination Control Area
AL1.39. CCG Combat Communications Group (U.S.)
AL1.40. CCG Crisis Coordinating Group
AL1.41. CCL Contamination Control Line
AL1.42. CCS Contamination Control Station
AL1.43. CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
AL1.44. CDCE Contamination Disposal Coordinating Element
AL1.45. CDRH Center for Devices and Radiological Health
AL1.46. CE Civil Engineer (Air Force)
AL1.47. CE Corps of Engineers
AL1.48. CERCLA Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act
AL1.49. CF Composite Fiber
AL1.50. CF Conversion Factor
AL1.51. CFA Cognizant Federal Agency
AL1.52. CFM Cubic Feet per Minute
AL1.53. CFR Code of Federal Regulations
AL1.54. cGy CentiGray
AL1.55. CHPPM Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine
(Army)
AL1.56. Ci Curie
AL1.57. CIB Combined Information Bureau
AL1.58. CINC Commander-in-Chief
AL1.59. CJCS Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
AL1.60. CJCSI Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
AL1.61. CMAT Consequence Management Advisory Team (formerly
DNAT)
AL1.62. CNWDI Critical Nuclear Weapon Design Information
AL1.63. CO Commanding Officer
AL1.64. COM Chief of Mission
AL1.65. Commander, Naval Station
COMNAVSTA
AL1.66. COMSEC Communications Security
AL1.67. Contingency Plan
CONPLAN
AL1.68. CONUS Continental United States
AL1.69. CP Command Post
AL1.70. CPM Counts per Minute

34 ABBREVIATIONS AND/OR ACRONYMS


DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

AL1.71. CPR Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation


AL1.72. CPX Command Post Exercise
AL1.73. CRA Contamination Reduction Area
AL1.74. CRTF Commander, Response Task Force
AL1.75. CV Aircraft carrier
AL1.76. CVN Aircraft carrier, nuclear powered
AL1.77. DA Department of the Army
AL1.78. DAC Derived Air Concentration
AL1.79. DC Data Center
AL1.80. DCE Defense Coordinating Element
AL1.81. DCG Disaster Control Group
AL1.82. DCO Defense Coordinating Officer
AL1.83. DCS Defense Communications Systems
AL1.84. DDI Dymeryl diisocyanate
AL1.85. DDO Deputy Director of Operations
AL1.86. DECON Decontamination
AL1.87. DERA Defense Environmental Restoration Act
AL1.88. DFO Disaster Field Office
AL1.89. DII Defense Information Infrastructure
AL1.90. DNA Defense Nuclear Agency (see DSWA and DTRA)
AL1.91. DNAT Defense Nuclear Advisory Team (now CMAT)
AL1.92. DNWS Defense Nuclear Weapons School (formerly INWS)
AL1.93. DOC Department of Commerce
AL1.94. DoD Department of Defense
AL1.95. DoDD Department of Defense Directive
AL1.96. DoDG Department of Defense Guide
AL1.97. DoDI Department of Defense Instruction
AL1.98. DoDM Department of Defense Manual
AL1.99. DOE Department of Energy
AL1.100. DOE/AL Department of Energy/Albuquerque Operations
AL1.101. DOE/NV Department of Energy/Nevada Operations
AL1.102. DOI Department of the Interior
AL1.103. DOMS Director of Military Support
AL1.104. DOS Department of State
AL1.105. DOT Department of Transportation
AL1.106. DPM/m3 Disintegrations per Minute per cubic meter
AL1.107. DRF Disaster Response Force
AL1.108. DSFO Deputy Senior FEMA Official
AL1.109. DSN Defense Switched Network
AL1.110. DSWA Defense Special Weapons Agency (formerly DNA
and now part of DTRA)

35 ABBREVIATIONS AND/OR ACRONYMS


DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

AL1.111. DTPA Diethylenetriamine Pentaacetic Acid


AL1.112. DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency (includes what was
formerly DSWA)
AL1.113. DU Depleted Uranium
AL1.114. EAC Emergency Actions Committee
AL1.115. EACT Emergency Action and Coordination Team
AL1.116. ECP Entry Control Point
AL1.117. ECS Exercise Control Staff
AL1.118. EDTA Ethylenediamine Tetraacetic Acid
AL1.119. EEFI Essential Elements of Friendly Information
AL1.120. EICC Emergency Information and Coordination Center
(FEMA)
AL1.121. E-Mail Electronic Mail
AL1.122. EMR Electro-Magnetic Radiation
AL1.123. EMT Emergency Medical Team
AL1.124. EO Executive Order
AL1.125. EOC Emergency Operations Center
AL1.126. EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal
AL1.127. EPA Environmental Protection Agency
AL1.128. EPZ Emergency Planning Zone
AL1.129. ERT Emergency Response Team
AL1.130. ERT-A Emergency Response Team-Advance Element
AL1.131. ESC Executive Support Center
AL1.132. EST Emergency Support Team
AL1.133. FAA Federal Aviation Administration
AL1.134. fax facsimile
AL1.135. FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
AL1.136. FCDTRA Field Command, Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(now Albuquerque Operations)
AL1.137. FCO Federal Coordinating Officer
AL1.138. FDA Food and Drug Administration
AL1.139. FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
AL1.140. FIDLER Field Instrument for the Detection of Low-Energy
Radiation
AL1.141. FLTSAT Fleet Satellite
AL1.142. FM Frequency Modulation
AL1.143. FOE Follow-On Element
AL1.144. FOIA Freedom of Information Act
AL1.145. FRC Federal Response Center
AL1.146. FRD Formerly Restricted Data

36 ABBREVIATIONS AND/OR ACRONYMS


DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

AL1.147. FRERP Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan


AL1.148. FRMAC Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment
Center
AL1.149. FRMAP Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Plan
AL1.150. FRP Federal Response Plan
AL1.151. FRPCC Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating
Committee
AL1.152. FTS Federal Telecommunications System
AL1.153. FTX Field Training Exercise
AL1.154. Functional Plan
FUNCPLAN
AL1.155. GEP Ground Entry Point
AL1.156. GMF Ground Mobile Force
AL1.157. GMT Greenwich Mean Time
AL1.158. GPS Global Positioning System
AL1.159. GSA General Services Administration
AL1.160. Gy Gray (unit of dose)
AL1.161. Hazardous Materials
HAZMAT
AL1.162. HE High Explosive
AL1.163. HEPA High Efficiency Particle Air
AL1.164. HEU Highly Enriched Uranium
AL1.165. HF High Frequency
AL1.166. HHS Department of Health and Human Services
AL1.167 HICOM High Command
AL1.168. Department of Energy Mobile Counting Laboratory
HOTSPOT
AL1.169. HPAC Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability
AL1.170. HQ Headquarter(s)
AL1.171. HTO Tritium water vapor (also TO)
AL1.172. HTPB Hydroxyl Terminated Polybutadine
AL1.173. HUD Department of Housing and Urban Development
AL1.174. IC Inhaled Concentration
AL1.175. ICC Interstate Commerce Commission
AL1.176. ICRP International Council of Radiological Protection
AL1.177. IERA Institute for Environment, Safety, and Occupational
Health Risk Analysis
AL1.178. IHE Insensitive High Explosive
AL1.179. IMA Installation Medical Authority
AL1.180. IND Improvised Nuclear Device

37 ABBREVIATIONS AND/OR ACRONYMS


DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

AL1.181. International Marine Satellite


INMARSAT
AL1.183. INWS Interservice Nuclear Weapon School
AL1.184. IRE Initial Response Element
AL1.185. IRF Initial Response Force
AL1.186. ISB Independent Sideband
AL1.187. IV Intravenous; intravenously

AL1.188. JA Judge Advocate


AL1.189. JACC/CP Joint Airborne Communications Center/Command Post
AL1.190. JCCSA Joint Communications Contingency Station Assets
AL1.191. JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
AL1.192. JCSE Joint Communications Support Element
AL1.193. JCTA Joint Controlled Tactical Communications Assets
AL1.194. JHEC Joint Hazard Evaluation Center
AL1.195. JIC Joint Information Center
AL1.196. JLCO Joint Legal Claims Office
AL1.197. JMOCC Joint Maritime Operations Command Center
AL1.198. JNACC Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center
AL1.199. JNAIRT Joint Nuclear Accident/Incident Response Team
AL1.200. JOC Joint Operations Center
AL1.201. JS Joint Staff
AL1.202. JSCC Joint Security Control Center
AL1.203. JSCP Joint Strategic Capability Plan

AL1.204. keV Thousand Electron Volts


AL1.205. KIWI Ground measuring system named for a flightless bird

AL1.206. LAC Liquid Abrasive Cutter


AL1.207. LAN Local Area Network
AL1.208. LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory
AL1.209. LFA Lead Federal Agency
AL1.210. LGX Logistics Plans
AL1.211. Li Lithium
AL1.212. LINAC Linear Accelerator
AL1.213. LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
AL1.214. LMR Land Mobile Radio
AL1.215. LOS Limit of Sensitivity

AL1.216. uCi/m3 MicroCuries per cubic meter


AL1.217. iCi/m2 MicroCuries per meter squared

38 ABBREVIATIONS AND/OR ACRONYMS


DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

AL1.218. MARD Mobile Accident Response Development


AL1.219. MASt Military Anti-Shock (trousers)
AL1.220. MAST Mobile Ashore Support Terminal
AL1.221. MDS Meteorological Data Servers
AL1.222. MET Meteorological
AL1.223. MeV Million Electron Volts
AL1.224. MICFAC Mobile Integrated Command Facility
AL1.225. Military Standard Requisitioning and Issue Procedures
MILSTRIP
AL1.226. MOP Military Operational Posture
AL1.227. MPC Maximum Permissible Concentration
AL1.228. mph miles per hour
AL1.229. MRAT Medical Radiobiology Advisory Team
AL1.230. MRT Medical Radiology Team
AL1.231. MSHA Mine Safety and Health Administration

AL1.232. NAICO Nuclear Accident and Incident Control Office


AL1.233. NARCL Nuclear Accident Response Capability Listing
AL1.234. NARP Nuclear (Weapon) Accident Response Procedures
AL1.235. NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
AL1.236. NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
AL1.237. Naval Education and Training
NAVEDTRA
AL1.238. Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery
NAVMED
AL1.239. Naval School, Explosive Ordnance Disposal
NAVSCOLEOD
AL1.240. NBC Nuclear, Biological, Chemical
AL1.241. NCA National Command Authority
AL1.242. NCAIC Nuclear Chemical Accident/Incident Control
AL1.243. NCC National Coordinating Center
AL1.244. NCC Navy Command Center
AL1.245. NCRP National Council on Radiation Protection and
Measurements
AL1.246. NCS National Communications System
AL1.247. Naval Computer and Telecommunications Area
NCTAMSLANT Master Station, Atlantic
AL1.248. NDA National Defense Area
AL1.249. NDE Non-Destructive Evaluation
AL1.250. NECC National Emergency Coordination Center (FEMA)

39 ABBREVIATIONS AND/OR ACRONYMS


DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

AL1.251. NESDIS National Environmental Satellite Data and


Information Service
AL1.252. NIMA National Imagery and Mapping Agency
AL1.253. NIOSH National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health
AL1.254. NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
AL1.255. NMCC National Military Command Center
AL1.256. NMFS National Marine Fisheries Service
AL1.257. NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
AL1.258. NOS National Ocean Service
AL1.259. NRC National Response Center
AL1.260. NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
AL1.261. NSA National Security Area
AL1.262. NSC National Security Council
AL1.263. NSFO Navy Standard Fuel Oil
AL1.264. NSN National Stock Number
AL1.265. NSTM Naval Ships Technical Manual
AL1.266. NTS Nevada Test Site
AL1.267. NTSB National Transportation Safety Board
AL1.268. NWS National Weather Service

AL1.269. OAR Office of Oceanic and Atmospheric Research


AL1.270. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public
OASD(PA) Affairs)
AL1.271. Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
OATSD(NCB) (Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs)
AL1.272. OBA Oxygen Breathing Apparatus
AL1.273. outside continental United States
OCONUS
AL1.274. ODCSOP Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and
Plans
AL1.275. OEG Operational Exposure Guidance
AL1.276. OEMT Operational Emergency Management Team
AL1.277. OPLAN Operations Plan
AL1.278. Chief of Naval Operations Instructions
OPNAVINST
AL1.279. OPREP Chief of Naval Operations Instructions
AL1.280. OPSEC Operational Security
AL1.281. OSC On-Scene Commander
AL1.282. OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
.
AL1.283. PA Public Affairs

40 ABBREVIATIONS AND/OR ACRONYMS


DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

AL1.284. PACAF Pacific Air Forces


AL1.285. PAG Protective Action Guide
AL1.286. PAO Public Affairs Officer
AL1.287. PAR Protective Action Recommendation
AL1.288. Pb Lead
AL1.289. PF Protection Factor
AL1.290. PHS Public Health Service
AL1.291. PKP Purple K (fire extinguisher)
AL1.291. PL Public Law
AL1.292. PLA Principal Legal Advisor
AL1.293. POC Point of Contact
AL1.294. POL Petrolium, Oil and Lubricants
AL1.295. PPE Personal Protective Equipment
AL1.296. PRC Planned Requirements Conversion
AL1.297. PRP Personnel Reliability Program
AL1.298. PSA Public Service Announcement
AL1.299. Pu Plutonium

AL1.300. Q/D Quantity Distance

AL1.301. R Roentgen
AL1.302. RAD Radiation Absorbed Dose
AL1.303. Radiological Control
RADCON
AL1.304. RADIAC Radioactivity Detection, Indication, and Computation
AL1.305. RAM Radar Absorbent Materials
AL1.306. RAMT Radiological Advisory Medical Team
AL1.307. RAP Radiological Assistance Program
AL1.308. RASCAL Radiological Air Sampling Counting and Analysis Lab
AL1.309. RASO Radiological Safety Officer
AL1.310. RCA Radiological Control Area
AL1.311. RCL Radiological Control Line
AL1.312. RCO Regional Coordinating Office
AL1.313. RD Restricted Data
AL1.314. Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site
REAC/TS
AL1.315. REM Roentgen Equivalent Man/Mammal
AL1.316. RER Re-Entry Recommendation
AL1.317. RF Resuspension Factor
AL1.318. RI/FS Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study
AL1.319. ROE Rules of Engagement

41 ABBREVIATIONS AND/OR ACRONYMS


DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

AL1.320. RPM Remedial Project Manager


AL1.321. RSP Render Safe Procedure
AL1.322. RTF Response Task Force
AL1.323. RTR Real-Time Radiography

AL1.324. SAAM Special Assignment Airlift Mission


AL1.325. SCBA Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus
AL1.326. SCI Sensitive Compartmented Information
AL1.327. SECORD Secure Cord Switchboard
AL1.328. SEO Senior Energy Official
AL1.329. SFO Senior FEMA Official
AL1.330. SGF Super High Frequency
AL1.331. SITREP Situation Report
AL1.332. SNM Special Nuclear Material
AL1.333. SOFA Status of Forces Agreement
AL1.334. SOI Signal Operating Instructions
AL1.335. SR Site Remediation
AL1.336. SRP Site Remediation Plan
AL1.337. SRWG Site Remediation Working Group
AL1.338. SSB Single Sideband
AL1.339. SSN or Social Security Number
SSAN
AL1.340. Standard Agreement
STANAG
AL1.341. STU-III Secure Telephone Unit Third Generation
AL1.342. Sv Sievert (unit of exposure)
AL1.343. SWOP Special Weapons Ordnance Publication

AL1.344. T Time
AL1.345. Tactical Air Force Communications/Logistics Plans
TAC/LGX
AL1.346. TACSAT Tactical Satellite
AL1.347. TELEX Telephone Exchange
AL1.348. Th Thorium
AL1.349. TLD Thermo-Luminescent Dosimeter
AL1.350. TNT Trinitrotoluene
AL1.351. TO Tritium water vapor (also HTO)
AL1.352. TP Technical Publication
AL1.353. T ot Tritium
(HP3)
AL1.354. Tu Tuballoy

42 ABBREVIATIONS AND/OR ACRONYMS


DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

AL1.355. TWX Teletypewriter Exchange


AL1.356. TYCOM Type Commander

AL1.357. U Uranium
AL1.358. UCT Universal Coordinated Time
AL1.359. UHF Ultra High Frequency
AL1.360. U.S. United States
AL1.361. USA U.S. Army
AL1.362. USACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
AL1.363. USAF U.S. Air Force
AL1.364. USAFE U.S. Air Forces in Europe
AL1.365. U.S. Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency
USANCA
AL1.366. USC U.S. Code
AL1.367. USCA U.S. Code Anotated
AL1.368. U.S. Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command
USCINCACOM
AL1.369. U.S. Commander in Chief, European Command
USCINCEUR
AL1.370. U.S. Commander in Chief, Pacific Command
USCINCPAC
AL1.371. U.S. Commander in Chief, Southern Command
USCINCSO
AL1.372. USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture
AL1.373. U.S. Army Forces Command
USFORSCOM
AL1.374. USG U.S. Government
AL1.375. USMC U.S. Marine Corps

AL1.376. VHF Very High Frequency

AL1.377. WATS Wide Area Telephone Service


AL1.378. WHO World Health Organization
AL1.379. WHS Warhead Section
AL1.380. WHSR White House Situation Room
AL1.381. WRAMC Walter Reed Army Medical Center

43 ABBREVIATIONS AND/OR ACRONYMS


DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

PART I

PLANNING, POLICY, AND RESPONSE


GUIDANCE

44 PART I
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C1. CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

C1.1. REISSUANCE AND PURPOSE

This manual updates policy, responsibilities, and procedures for:

C1.1.1. Department of Defense (DoD) forces to prepare for and respond to a


radiological accident or event. This manual expands and prescribes procedures found
in DoD Directive (DoDD) 3150.8, DoD Response to Radiological Accidents, reference
(a).

C1.1.2. Standardizing, where appropriate, DoD methods and integrating them


with Department of State (DOS) responsibilities and procedures, Department of
Energy (DOE) responsibilities and procedures, and the Federal Radiological
Emergency Response Plan (FRERP) responsibilities and procedures, reference (b).

C1.1.3. Providing a framework for DoD elements responding to non-DoD


radiological events under the FRERP or interagency support agreements.

C1.2. POLICY

It is DoD policy that:

C1.2.1. DoD take the lead in responding to an accident or incident involving


radioactive materials when DoD is responsible for the material. DoD is responsible
for the material when the material is or was in DoD custody at the time of the accident,
incident, or loss.

C1.2.2. An Initial Response Force (IRF) be dispatched from the closest military
installation having an appropriate emergency response capability at the time of the
radiological event.

C1.2.3. A Combatant Commander will be designated as the supporting


Commander-in-Chief (CINC) and dispatch a Response Task Force (RTF) to relieve the
IRF.

45 CHAPTER 1
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C1.3. RESPONSIBILITIES

C1.3.1. There are three identifiable operational responses to a radiological


accident or event: initial response, emergency actions, and site remediation. Initial
response and emergency actions (Figure C1.F1.) have identifiable beginning and end
points but some actions may overlap; site remediation does not have an identifiable end
point. Planning for and execution of response activities covering each area mentioned
will overlap. Preparations and training for responses are not addressed in this manual.

C1.3.1.1. First Responders. Initial response begins when the accident


occurs. The response is comprised predominantly of actions by fire and rescue,
emergency medical, and law enforcement personnel whose response actions focus on
the treatment and rescue of people involved. The first responders may be civilian,
military (IRF), or a combination of both.

Figure C1.F1. Accident Operational Responses

Figure C1.F2., although not all-inclusive, illustrates the interrelationship of initial


response actions. When it is determined that the accident/event involves radiological
materials, the preceding agencies may be joined by explosive ordnance disposal,
contamination control, and other personnel with specific expertise unique to the
situation. IRF procedures and responsibilities are discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
Reconnaissance should be started as soon as possible after rescue and firefighting
actions are completed.

46 CHAPTER 1
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C1.3.1.2. Emergency Actions. The IRF initiates emergency actions that are
continued by the RTF upon arrival. The focus of activity will, over time, shift when
personnel involved in the accident are rescued and weapon recovery becomes the
prime concern of the Commander of the RTF (CRTF). See Chapter 2 for more on the
RTF. Once the radiological materials have been safely packaged and removed, the
third operational response, site remediation, becomes of primary concern. NOTE: A
radiological response may not always require weapons recovery and site remediation.

C1.3.1.3. Site Remediation. Initial site remediation actions may begin soon
after the accident occurs, but emergency actions take precedence. The importance of
site remediation grows steadily as emergency actions resolve the imminent danger.
The Site Remediation Working Group (SRWG) provides the forum within which the
site remediation process is formulated. The end point of the process cannot be
projected without an extended period of planning. Site remediation is discussed in
detail in Part 3 of this manual.

C1.3.2. Combatant Commanders tasked with responding to radiological accidents


are encouraged to supplement or modify this manual, as needed, to satisfy specific
Host Nation or Status of Forces agreements.

C1.3.3. The organizational structures provided for the IRF and RTF are notional
and based upon a large-scale response to a radiological accident. Specific
circumstances may necessitate modifications to the organizational elements in this
manual. Situational awareness and knowledge, coupled with sound professional
judgment, must be utilized to tailor the notional response structure and tasks provided
to accomplish the response mission. The Nuclear Weapon Accident Response
Recovery Operations Flow Diagram, Figure C1.F3., depicts the various response
actions and the approximate time of their occurrence. Also, Figure C1.F3. may be of
assistance in accident response planning.

47 CHAPTER 1
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

Figure C1.F2. Relationship of Initial Response Actions

48 CHAPTER 1
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

Figure C1.F3. Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Recovery Operations Flow Diagram

49 CHAPTER 1
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

50 CHAPTER 1
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C1.3.4. This manual is designed to furnish a general approach to a nuclear


weapon accident/event response. It is not a standalone manual. To be effective, the
procedures contained in this manual must be used in conjunction with DoD Directives,
Federal instructions, State/local plans, international/bilateral agreements, and theater
policy.

C1.3.5. All radiological monitoring, measurement, and control forms described in


this manual are operating documents. Operating documents are exempt from licensing
in accordance with paragraph C4.4.2. of DoD 8910.1-M, "DoD Procedures for
Management of Information Requirements," reference (c).

C1.3.6. All routine, situation, accident data, and incident reports are exempt from
licensing in accordance with paragraph C4.4.3. of DoD 8910.1-M, reference (c).

C1.3.7. All information collected relative to Public Information Releases is


exempt from licensing in accordance with paragraph C4.4.5. of DoD 8910.1-M,
reference (c).

C1.3.8. All investigative surveys are exempt from licensing in accordance with
paragraphs C3.8.2.2.4. and C4.4.8. of DoD 8910.1-M, reference (c).

51 CHAPTER 1
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C2. CHAPTER 2
NUCLEAR WEAPON ACCIDENT RESPONSE PROCEDURES

C2.1. INITIAL RESPONSE FORCE

C2.1.1. Selection. The IRF will normally be dispatched from the nearest military
installation having a disaster response capability. This installation need not have a
nuclear mission or radiological responsibility, but its IRF must accomplish certain
minimum functions as outlined below. If more than one installation is equal distance
from the accident, choose the installation most nuclear capable in accordance with
DSWA 5100.52.1-L, reference (d).

C2.1.2. Decision to Deploy. An IRF may be directed to deploy as the result of:

C2.1.2.1. A request for assistance by local authorities.

C2.1.2.2. Direction to do so by a Combatant Commander or the National


Military Command Center (NMCC).

C2.1.2.3. >The Installation Commander's decision.

C2.1.3. Minimum Composition. The IRF, as a minimum, should contain these


specialties (preferably with knowledge and training in radiological hazards and
emergency response procedures).

C2.1.3.1. Command element.

C2.1.3.2. Medical, Fire, and Rescue elements.

C2.1.3.3. Security element.

C2.1.3.4. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD).

C2.1.3.5. Communications element.

C2.1.3.6. Public affairs element.

C2.1.4. Extended Composition. If available, the IRF should contain these


specialties in addition to the above.

52 CHAPTER 2
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C2.1.4.1. Weapons maintenance specialists.

C2.1.4.2. Legal element.

C2.1.4.3. Engineering element.

C2.1.4.4. Radiological hazard control element.

C2.1.5. Minimum IRF Functions. The IRF, as a minimum, will:

C2.1.5.1. Establish DoD command and control (C2), at the scene. This will
normally be the IRF Commander and supporting elements; however, the establishment
of C2 will initially be by the first military presence at the accident scene until the
arrival of the IRF Commander.

C2.1.5.2. Establish contact with the NMCC and the responsible Combatant
Command (Figure C2.F1.). Once notified, the NMCC will maintain open
communications with the reporting unit. This link must be re-established immediately
if broken. The NMCC will determine when this conference may be terminated.

53 CHAPTER 2
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

Figure C2.F1. Nuclear Weapon Accident Notification Flow

C2.1.5.3. On foreign territory, establish contact with the U.S. Chief of


Mission (COM) and applicable Host Nation authorities.

54 CHAPTER 2
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

NOTE
During initial response, medical and firefighting responders should be given immediate and
unrestricted access to the accident site.
Medical and firefighting responders should coordinate with EOD personnel to determine
hazards in the accident area. The decision to withdraw medical and firefighting responders
should be made by the Senior Fire Official and/or the IRF Commander and only when these
responders are in immediate and excessive risk.
The evacuation and treatment of casualties are the highest priority. Security, PRP
requirements should not impede these actions, but EOD initial explosive safety issues must be
considered.
Firefighting activities needed to cool involved weapons or support medical response should
take priority over security, PRP requirements, and EOD considerations.
Casualties need not be decontaminated prior to administration of lifesaving or other significant
medical procedures, nor should evacuation or transport to medical facilities be delayed.
When the situation is stabilized, security and PRP requirements must be enforced, and EOD
teams should be permitted to initiate procedures to mitigate hazards.

C2.1.5.4. Extinguish fires. Local firefighting capabilities may be used. If


the weapon is exposed to high temperatures, civilian fire departments will require
advice on proper cooling of the weapon.

C2.1.5.5. Rescue, stabilize, and evacuate casualties. Local ambulances and


hospitals may be used. Casualties need not be decontaminated prior to evacuation,
transport to medical facilities, or treatment; however, care must still be taken to
minimize the spread of contamination. Decontamination (DECON) will occur once
casualties are medically stabilized. Ambulances departing with casualties will not be
decontaminated. Although it must be anticipated that such actions may spread
contamination to a medical facility, it is unlikely to pose a significant threat to medical
personnel and is appropriate whenever life threatening injuries exist. Responding
medical personnel should not be denied access to the accident site for reasons of
security, potential explosive hazards, or the nature of the accident, but should attempt
to coordinate with EOD personnel when available. If possible, EOD should mark a
clear path, or accompany emergency medical personnel into the accident site to assist
in avoiding radioactive, explosive, and toxic hazards.

C2.1.5.6. Establish a National Defense Area (NDA) or Security Area in


accordance with DoDD 5200.8, "Security of Military Installations and Resources,"
reference (e). If military security forces are unavailable or insufficient, local law
enforcement personnel may be asked to restrict access to the area until an NDA,
National Security Area (NSA), or Security Area is established.

C2.1.5.7. Secure the airspace over the accident site via the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) or Host Nation.

55 CHAPTER 2
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C2.1.5.8. Assess status of weapons and report this information to the NMCC.

C2.1.5.9. If EOD assets are available, perform Initial Render Safe Procedures
(RSPs) only. Beyond Initial RSP, EOD performs safing procedures on nuclear
weapons only, with direct support of the DOE Accident Response Group (ARG).

C2.1.5.10. Brief the CRTF before the RTF assumes control.

C2.1.6. Extended Functions. Depending upon the originating installation, some


IRFs may be capable of additional actions.

C2.1.6.1. If capabilities permit:

C2.1.6.1.1. Establish a temporary contamination control line, if required.

C2.1.6.1.2. Identify a forward operating location, staging area, and


reception center for follow-on forces.

C2.1.6.2. Provide necessary operational security.

C2.1.6.2.1. Have a security element for perimeter security, entry and


exit control, and protection of classified information and property.

C2.1.6.2.2. If internal resources are not available, request assistance of


local law enforcement officials to secure the area, prevent unauthorized entry, and
remove unauthorized personnel.

C2.1.6.2.3. Establish an operations area, base camp, and contamination


control area.

C2.1.6.2.4. Provide appropriate protective equipment for perimeter


guards who are posted in a contaminated area. When posting perimeter guards,
consider the possibility of contamination of clean areas due to wind shift and
resuspension of contaminants.

C2.1.6.3. Determine if contamination is present and the nature of the


contamination. The NMCC shall be advised if contamination is or is not detected.

C2.1.6.3.1. Determine and report weather conditions.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C2.1.6.3.2. Place air samplers upwind and downwind of the accident


site.

C2.1.6.3.3. Receive and use Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability


(ARAC) plots or Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability (HPAC) modeling
predictions, if previously requested.

C2.1.6.3.4. Determine the status and location of all radioactive material.

C2.1.6.3.5. If no radiation was released during the accident, prepare to


respond in the event of a release during recovery operations.

C2.1.6.4. Ensure that information conduits are established.

C2.1.6.4.1. Initiate and continue reporting in accordance with Chairman,


Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3150.03, "Joint Reporting Structures, Event
and Incident Reports," reference (f), until relieved by the CRTF. Reports shall not be
delayed to gather more information.

C2.1.6.4.2. Initiate Public Affairs (PA) procedures and establish direct


communications with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
(OASD(PA)).

C2.1.6.4.3. Provide appropriate news releases.

C2.1.6.4.4. If applicable and necessary, confirm the presence of nuclear


weapons in accordance with DoDD 5230.16, "Nuclear Accident and Incident Public
Affairs Guidance," reference (g). DoD policy is to neither confirm nor deny the
presence or absence of nuclear weapons at any specific location, but exceptions under
reference (b) are allowed when it is necessary to implement public safety actions or
reduce public alarm. Some Host Nation agreements may require automatic and
immediate confirmation of the presence of a nuclear weapon.

C2.1.6.4.5. If on foreign territory, establish liaison with applicable Host


Nation authorities and the U.S. COM.

C2.1.6.5. Protect the public and mitigate health and safety hazards.

C2.1.6.5.1. Coordinate with civil law enforcement agencies/Host Nation


law agencies.

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C2.1.6.5.2. Notify officials and personnel of potential hazards.

C2.1.6.5.3. Identify and decontaminate, as necessary, persons who may


have been contaminated.

NOTE
Personnel entering an area that is contaminated, suspected of containing contamination, or
who could be contaminated, should wear personal protective clothing and respiratory
protection until contamination levels are established. Personnel may then change to the
appropriate protective measures for the situation.

C2.2. TRANSITION OF INITIAL RESPONSE FORCE TO RESPONSE TASK


FORCE

C2.2.1. Summary

C2.2.1.1. The CRTF and staff should receive a briefing from the IRF prior to
the CRTF assuming command. The form and content of the briefing will vary
depending upon the location and nature of the accident and the relative arrival times of
the various response assets. The briefing may be developed and presented solely by
the IRF or could be a joint product of the IRF, RTF, and other responding Federal or
Host Nation staff elements. This chapter provides a template for the changeover
briefing. This template may be reduced, expanded, or otherwise modified, as needed.

C2.2.1.2. Nearly simultaneously with IRF to RTF changeover, the Joint


Nuclear Accident/Incident Response Team (JNAIRT) will transfer responsibility for
managing the DoD response from the NMCC to the supported Commander-in-Chief's
(CINC's) Command Center or other operations center.

C2.2.2. Briefing Template

C2.2.2.1. IRF Commander's introduction and general situation discussion.

C2.2.2.2. Weather

C2.2.2.2.1. Discussion of effect on recovery operations.

C2.2.2.2.2. Discussion of downwind contamination impact.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C2.2.2.3. Intelligence. Discussion of hostile collection or exploitation


efforts.

C2.2.2.4. Operations

C2.2.2.4.1. Diagram of the accident scene layout (Figure C2.F2.).

Figure C2.F2. Sample Accident Site Organization

C2.2.2.4.2. Location of weapons.

C2.2.2.4.3. RSPs.

C2.2.2.4.4. Known or estimated contamination.

C2.2.2.4.5. Contamination control procedures in place.

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C2.2.2.5. Security

C2.2.2.5.1. NDA, NSA, or Security Area established, as appropriate.

C2.2.2.5.2. Interactions with Host Nation, State, or local law


enforcement.

C2.2.2.5.3. Badging and access issues.

C2.2.2.5.4. Rules of Engagement (ROE).

C2.2.2.6. Medical

C2.2.2.6.1. Casualties or injuries.

C2.2.2.6.2. Status and impact on facilities.

C2.2.2.7. Legal

C2.2.2.7.1. Significant or unusual legal activity.

C2.2.2.7.2. Relationship with Host Nation or Federal and State


authorities.

C2.2.2.7.3. ROE.

C2.2.2.8. Logistics

C2.2.2.8.1. Personnel on site and expected to arrive.

C2.2.2.8.2. Status of messing and billeting.

C2.2.2.8.3. Status of support infrastructure.

C2.2.2.9. Public Affairs

C2.2.2.9.1. Media on site.

C2.2.2.9.2. Public awareness and concerns.

C2.2.2.10. Presentations by Host Nation or other Federal elements.

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C2.3. RESPONSE TASK FORCE

C2.3.1. The RTF (Figure C2.F3.) is organized by the Combatant Commander


having responsibility for responding to the accident in accordance with DoDD 3150.8,
reference (a). The RTF may be either Joint or formed from a single Service. On U.S.
territory, the RTF is responsible for DoD taskings in accordance with the FRERP,
reference (b). On foreign territory, the RTF is responsible for DoD taskings in
accordance with applicable Host Nation and Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs).

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Figure C2.F3. Response Task Force General Composition

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C2.3.2. Responsibilities. The CRTF shall:

C2.3.2.1. If possible, establish direct communications with the IRF


Commander prior to arriving at the site.

C2.3.2.2. Receive a briefing from the IRF Commander on the situation prior
to assuming command.

C2.3.2.3. Establish priorities for recovery of radiological material.

C2.3.2.4. Establish priorities for all other requests for emergency support,
secondary emergencies, and logistic requirements.

C2.3.2.5. Establish the Joint Operations Center (JOC).

C2.3.2.6. Establish the Joint Information Center (JIC)/Combined Information


Bureau (CIB).

C2.3.2.7. Establish the Joint Hazard Evaluation Center (JHEC) (Figure


C4.F1.).

C2.3.2.8. If possible, establish the Joint Legal Claims Office (JLCO).

C2.3.2.9. Establish the Joint Security Control Center (JSCC).

C2.3.2.10. Continue IRF activities, as required, and accomplish any actions


normally performed by the IRF that are not yet completed.

C2.3.2.11. If needed, ensure or establish secure communications with the


NMCC.

C2.3.2.12. Initiate or continue reporting in accordance with CJCSI 3150.03,


reference (f).

C2.3.2.13. On U.S. territory, establish or continue liaison with the Federal


Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) Disaster Field Office (DFO) (if the DFO
is established), DOE's Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center
(FRMAC), and local civil and law enforcement authorities.

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C2.3.2.14. On foreign territory, establish or continue liaison with the U.S.


Embassy, the Host Nation's civil emergency authorities, and local civil and law
enforcement authorities.

C2.3.2.15. Integrate civilian authorities into Command and Control and


response forces if the civilian community is affected. Provide necessary liaison
officers.

C2.3.2.16. Coordinate actions with any accident investigation board or


team. To the greatest extent possible, evidence necessary to the conduct of the
accident investigation shall be preserved; however, recovery and security of weapons
and safety of responders shall take priority.

C2.3.2.17. Assist the involved government (foreign, State, or local) with


ensuring health and safety of civilians. On foreign territory, the U.S. Embassy
representative will assist in implementing measures to satisfy Host Nation
requirements under applicable treaties or agreements.

C2.3.2.18. Provide required medical, logistical, and administrative support,


as needed, by follow-on Federal forces.

C2.3.2.19. If required, confirm the presence of nuclear weapons in


accordance with DoDD 5230.16, reference (g). The guidelines provided in Table
C2.T1. do not supplant this Directive's requirements.

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Table C2.T1. Nuclear Weapon Confirmation Guidelines


Confirmation Guidelines for the CRTF
It is DoD policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons at any particular installation
or location. There are two exceptions to this policy.

1. The CRTF is required to confirm the presence of nuclear weapons or radioactive nuclear components in
the interest of public safety if the public is, or may be, in danger of radiation exposure or other danger
posed by the weapon. The OASD(PA) shall be advised of this confirmation as soon as possible.

2. The CRTF may confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons to reduce or prevent widespread
public alarm. The OASD(PA) shall be advised before or, as soon as possible, after such notification.

Special Instructions for Accidents Outside the United States, its Territories, or Possessions.

1. If the specific Host Nation agreement does not say otherwise, the CRTF must have the concurrence of
the Combatant Commander and the Host Nation's government, via the U.S. COM, before making the
notifications above.

2. Some bilateral U.S.-Host Nation agreements, to conform with Host Nation statutes, may require an
immediate confirmation of the presence of nuclear weapons by Host Nation officials. The CRTF shall
support this notification and advise the Combatant Commander, DOS, U.S. COM, and OASD(PA), as
soon as possible, of the Host Nation's notification.

C2.3.2.20. Be responsible for the operation of the RTF in accordance with


the notional responsibilities below. The unique conditions of an accident shall
determine specific activities and the need for any modification to the notional RTF
organization. Situation awareness and sound professional judgment apply at all times.

C2.3.2.21. Initiate planning activities and actions, where possible, that


address site remediation (SR), the third operational response. Appoint a CRTF
representative, knowledgeable in SR matters, as personal liaison to State and local
authorities and the citizenry.

C2.3.3. Organization. The RTF should include, as a minimum, the nominal


elements below. Specific circumstances or applicable Host Nation agreements may
require modification of the recommended response structure and organization.

C2.3.3.1. Safety. The safety element will operate the JHEC. The JHEC
should:

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C2.3.3.1.1. Advise the CRTF of precautionary measures for residents


and other persons in potentially contaminated areas.

C2.3.3.1.2. Coordinate and integrate the capabilities of specialized


teams working on site.

C2.3.3.1.3. Implement applicable health and safety standards and


monitor the safety procedures of all personnel participating in weapon recovery
operations.

C2.3.3.1.4. Identify and monitor potentially contaminated personnel on


site, including decontamination efforts.

C2.3.3.1.5. If required, determine if contamination has been released.

C2.3.3.1.6. Recommend methods and procedures to prevent spread of


radioactive contamination and advise the public of health safety issues.

C2.3.3.1.7. Establish a contamination control line that marks the


approximate perimeter of the on-site contamination area.

C2.3.3.1.8. Establish and operate a Contamination Control Station


(CCS) for personnel and vehicles (Figures C6.F1. and C6.F2.). If necessary,
additional CCSs may be established.

C2.3.3.1.9. Initiate on-site hazard and radiation health, weapons


recovery, and safety and environmental monitoring.

C2.3.3.1.10. Brief and train people prior to entering potentially


contaminated areas not designated previously as radiation workers who will be
working in the contaminated area on personal protective equipment (PPE), hazards,
and safety measures.

C2.3.3.1.11. Establish dosimetry and documentation procedures during


personnel decontamination and remediation operations.

C2.3.3.1.12. Establish a bioassay program.

C2.3.3.1.13. Monitor the tempo of the response effort and, if required,


recommend safety standdown periods to preclude undue physical and mental fatigue.

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C2.3.3.1.14. Determine levels of contamination present and on-site


boundaries of contaminated areas through ground air samples and air surveys when
appropriate or required.

C2.3.3.1.15. Consider the possibility of resuspension and dispersion of


contamination in case of wind shifts.

C2.3.3.1.16. Develop and provide contamination plots and other


required data to the CRTF.

C2.3.3.1.17. Consolidate all radiological assessment information for


on-site recovery operations and provide it to the CRTF.

C2.3.3.1.18. Analyze and correlate all contamination data collected to


identify inconsistencies requiring further investigation.

C2.3.3.1.19. Review and correlate records from CCSs and other


personnel processing points to ensure bioassays or other appropriate followup actions
are taken.

C2.3.3.1.20. Coordinate off site with FRMAC and civilian authorities.

C2.3.3.1.21. Be prepared to present radiological contamination findings


and results at press conferences and community forums. Present data in clear,
concise, and non-technical briefings, outlining hazards, precautionary measures,
business recovery, and where to obtain more information and/or assistance.

C2.3.3.1.22. When the NDA, NSA, or Security Area is dissolved,


transfer applicable JHEC personnel and equipment to support FRMAC operations (if
on U.S. territory) or to the corresponding Host Nation authorities off site.

C2.3.3.1.23. On U.S. territory, assist the FRMAC in developing and


coordinating the SR plan. On foreign territory, assist Host Nation representatives in
developing and coordinating the SR plan.

C2.3.3.1.24. Refer all unofficial and media requests for information to


the JIC/CIB.

C2.3.3.1.25. Coordinate environmental protection plans.

C2.3.3.2. Security. The security element should:

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C2.3.3.2.1. Initiate or continue activities of the IRF security force.

C2.3.3.2.2. Maintain a Security Control Center.

C2.3.3.2.3. Recommend operational security measures.

C2.3.3.2.4. Ensure a secure perimeter for the NDA, NSA, or Security


Area.

NOTE: More than one NDA, NSA, or Security Area can be


established, as required.

C2.3.3.2.5. Locate the NDA, NSA, or Security Area perimeter outside


of the fragmentation zone. Coordinate with the JHEC and EOD to determine the
required radius.

C2.3.3.2.6. Provide for protection of exposed classified components


from viewing or overhead surveillance.

C2.3.3.2.7. Establish an Entry Control Point (ECP). If necessary,


multiple ECPs may be used, but should be minimized to the fewest necessary to
conduct the operation.

C2.3.3.2.8. Establish a standardized access control system to the


restricted area. This will include implementation and use of :

C2.3.3.2.8.1. An identification and/or badging system;

C2.3.3.2.8.2. Entry control logs; and

C2.3.3.2.8.3. A record of all personnel entering the accident areas


that will be transferred to the historian when no longer needed (as defined by the
CRTF).

C2.3.3.2.9. Have a security element for perimeter security, entry and


exit control, and protection of classified information and property.

C2.3.3.2.10. If necessary, establish a security alert force.

C2.3.3.2.11. Protect radiological materials, weapons and components,


other classified materials and information, and Government property.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C2.3.3.2.12. In case of further emergency responses into the NDA,


develop procedures that ensure immediate access by fire and medical responders.

C2.3.3.2.13. Provide for special areas within the NDA, NSA, or


Security Area, independently secured, for discussion of Critical Nuclear Weapon
Design Information (CNWDI), TOP SECRET, Sensitive Compartmented Information
(SCI), or other restricted information. Depending upon need and frequency of use, a
single area may be used.

C2.3.3.2.14. Provide security for special areas, independently secured,


for storage of classified documents, recovered nuclear weapons, weapon components,
weapon residue, and other radiological materials.

C2.3.3.2.15. As required, debrief personnel with access to classified


information.

C2.3.3.2.16. Coordinate security actions with State, local, or Host


Nation officials.

C2.3.3.2.17. Coordinate use-of-force with local and Host Nation law


enforcement officials.

C2.3.3.2.18. On U.S. territory, coordinate with the Principal Legal


Advisor (PLA) to ensure that actions of military security personnel do not violate the
Posse Comitatus Act.

C2.3.3.2.19. On foreign territory, coordinate with the PLA to ensure


actions of military security personnel do not violate SOFA or Host Nation laws.

C2.3.3.2.20. On U.S. territory, notify the Senior FEMA Official (SFO)


and FRMAC of personnel apprehended within the NDA or NSA. On foreign territory,
notify the applicable Host Nation law enforcement authorities of personnel
apprehended within the Security Area.

C2.3.3.2.21. Notify the CRTF, JHEC, JOC, and Legal element of


personnel apprehended inside the NDA, NSA, or Security Area.

C2.3.3.2.22. Coordinate with the JHEC to determine procedures for


handling unprotected personnel and human remains encountered in contaminated areas.

C2.3.3.2.23. Arrange for turnover of apprehended individuals to the

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

local law enforcement, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), or Host Nation


authorities, as applicable.

C2.3.3.2.24. Provide a military intelligence function.

C2.3.3.2.25. Provide advice and assistance in counterintelligence to the


CRTF staff. Counter potential terrorist and/or radical group activities or intelligence
collection efforts.

C2.3.3.2.26. Provide a liaison to and coordinate with Federal, Host


Nation, State, and local law enforcement and security agencies on threats to response
organizations and operations.

C2.3.3.2.27. Coordinate and advise the CRTF and security staff


regarding operations security.

C2.3.3.2.28. Investigate and report incidents of immediate security


interest to the CRTF and the security staff in cooperation with the FBI or applicable
Host Nation law enforcement authorities.

C2.3.3.2.29. Advise and assist the CRTF and the security staff on
matters of personnel and information security.

C2.3.3.2.30. Coordinate requests for large-scale photographic coverage


of the accident site.

C2.3.3.2.31. When appropriate, coordinate disestablishment of the


NDA, NSA, or Security Area with State, local, or Host Nation governments.

C2.3.3.3. Medical. The Medical element will oversee routine health


maintenance of RTF personnel. The Medical element should:

C2.3.3.3.1. Assist in accident-related emergency medical treatment and


in establishing health and safety programs to support response operations over an
extended period of time.

C2.3.3.3.2. Promptly treat RTF personnel and other responders who are
injured or become ill during recovery operations.

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NOTE
Lifesaving procedures shall not be delayed or precluded due
to radiation contamination.

C2.3.3.3.3. Assist in casualty DECON. Supervise the DECON of


support personnel should initial DECON efforts fail to achieve desired results.

C2.3.3.3.4. Assess and report the magnitude of the accident, numbers


and categories of injuries, suspected contamination, and priority for transport to a
medical facility.

C2.3.3.3.5. Advise medical facilities receiving casualties, in


coordination with radiological personnel, of possible contamination and measures that
can be taken to prevent its spread.

C2.3.3.3.6. Implement the collection of bioassay samples from response


personnel and ensure bioassay and external exposure data become part of individual
health records.

C2.3.3.3.7. Establish a heat/cold exposure prevention program, if


appropriate.

C2.3.3.3.8. Assist in obtaining radiation health history of all personnel


involved in accident response, including civilians in the surrounding community
exposed to radiation or contamination.

C2.3.3.4. Explosive Ordnance Disposal. As the primary element


responsible for weapon recovery, the EOD element will:

C2.3.3.4.1. Conduct weapons damage assessment.

C2.3.3.4.2. Perform RSPs augmented by Follow-on Accident Response


Group (ARG) support.

C2.3.3.4.3. Initiate systematic search to re-establish accountability of


weapons and components.

C2.3.3.4.4. Stabilize the site of nuclear and conventional hazards.

C2.3.3.5. Public Affairs. The PA element should:

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C2.3.3.5.1. Establish and jointly operate, with proper authorities, the


JIC/CIB and a PA program.

C2.3.3.5.2. Establish direct communications with OASD(PA), any


involved U.S. Embassies, and the Combatant Commander providing the RTF.

C2.3.3.5.3. Advise the CRTF and staff members on media relations and
prepare them for news conferences.

C2.3.3.5.4. Prepare news releases. Emphasis should be placed on


achieving public understanding and addressing public concerns about nuclear and
radiological issues, including SR.

C2.3.3.5.5. Notify civilian authorities of precautions taken and other


measures needed to protect public health and property. Present data in clear, concise,
and non-technical briefings outlining hazards, precautionary measures, business
recovery, and where to obtain more information and/or assistance.

C2.3.3.6. Legal. The Legal element will:

C2.3.3.6.1. Advise the CRTF and functional staff elements on any legal
matters related to the response effort.

C2.3.3.6.2. Organize and supervise the legal functional element at the


site, including establishing and operating a Claims Office.

C2.3.3.6.3. Locate in or near the JOC with direct access to the CRTF.

C2.3.3.6.4. If possible, include at least two counsels and one legal clerk
that should allow for 24-hour operations in support of the JOC. The counsels must be
capable of addressing complex and politically sensitive issues involving national
defense policy and response operations that result from the accident.

C2.3.3.6.5. To the greatest extent possible, take immediate action to


ensure preservation of factual and evidentiary information for both safety
investigations and claims resolution. This includes photographs and/or videos,
interviews with witnesses, documentation of radiological hazards and safety
procedures, identification of responding forces and civilians at or near the accident
scene, and appropriate recording and receipting of property.

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C2.3.3.6.6. Be knowledgeable concerning the authority and


responsibility of DoD as well as other Federal Departments and Agencies involved in a
radiological accident. This includes the relationships between Federal (and as
appropriate), State, local, and Host Nation authorities, as well as jurisdictional
principles, security requirements, claims administration, the authority to establish an
NDA, use of force, evacuation of civilians, and damage to public or private property.

C2.3.3.6.7. Establish liaison with all major functional elements of the


CRTF's staff to make all elements aware of the need for coordination of planned
actions. Maintain a prioritized list of planned actions and events and a record of
completed actions.

C2.3.3.6.8. Identify and establish liaison with local law enforcement


officials, legal authorities, and local and State emergency response organizations.

C2.3.3.6.9. Review operational plans to identify potential legal problems


and to ensure they are legally sufficient, with emphasis on security, radiological safety,
and documentation of factual evidence for use in resolving claims or in litigations.

C2.3.3.6.10. Coordinate on the Rules of Engagement (ROE) prior to


finalization.

C2.3.3.6.11. Coordinate legal issues with the principal legal advisors of


other participating Departments or Agencies, as required. For consistency, all legal
advice and assistance should be coordinated jointly through the DoD primary legal
advisor.

C2.3.3.6.12. Upon request, and if resources permit, provide legal advice


and assistance to other Federal Agencies involved in the response effort.

C2.3.3.6.13. When required, coordinate legal issues with the Combatant


Commander's and DoD's General Counsels.

C2.3.3.6.14. Ensure that personnel involved refer all queries for


information to the Public Affairs Officer (PAO).

C2.3.3.6.15. Coordinate with the PAO to review proposed public


statements for legal sufficiency and implications.

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C2.3.3.6.16. Establish a Claims Office at a location easily accessible to


the public and mutually agreeable to local officials.

C2.3.3.6.17. Ensure that any information provided to claimants is in


accordance with established policies and that queries for any information other than
claims procedures are referred to the PAO.

C2.3.3.6.18. When possible, collocate the Claims Office facility with


the Civil Emergency Relief and Assistance Office. As soon as the claims processing
facility is established, information regarding the location should be provided to the
JIC/CIB for inclusion in a news release.

C2.3.3.7. Protocol. It is the responsibility of the Protocol element to provide


support to any senior military or civil official visiting the accident scene.

C2.3.3.8. Financial. The Military Service having custody of the nuclear


weapon or radiological materials at the time of the accident is responsible for
reimbursing, upon request, the Combatant Command providing the RTF and, upon
request, other Federal Agencies with a direct or supporting role in the response effort.
The Financial element shall track expenditure of funds and requests for reimbursement.

C2.3.3.9. Communications. The Communications element will:

C2.3.3.9.1. Establish timely external communications to higher


headquarters. The accident site may be in a remote area lacking military or civil
support installations.

C2.3.3.9.2. Ensure voice connectivity with the NMCC/JNAIRT,


OASD(PA), DoD Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center (JNACC), and the
supported CINC with conferencing capability.

C2.3.3.9.3. Coordinate frequency usage of all response organizations to


prevent interference and radio operations in areas where electromagnetic emissions
may create explosive hazards or affect electronic and field laboratory instruments.

C2.3.3.9.4. Provide secure field phones for EOD operations, if needed.

C2.3.3.9.5. Establish secure and non-secure voice communications.

C2.3.3.9.6. Establish local radio nets and assign call signs.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C2.3.3.9.7. Provide ultra-high frequency (UHF)/very-high frequency


(VHF) nets for command (secure), weapon recovery (secure), radiological operations
(secure), security, and public affairs.

C2.3.3.9.8. Provide telephone communications between fixed-site


locations, such as between the JOC and JHEC.

C2.3.3.9.9. Provide multiple secure and non-secure telephones to


support response force elements.

C2.3.3.9.10. Determine the need for any additional communications


assets. Communication sources and capabilities are discussed in detail in Chapter 13.

C2.3.3.9.11. If required, request Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS),


deployable communications assets.

C2.3.3.9.12. Establish communications links with the NMCC and


Defense Communications System (DCS) from remote locations.

C2.3.3.9.13. Establish access to the DCS for record communications.

C2.3.3.9.14. Provide secure voice communications via satellite,


telephone, or high frequency (HF).

C2.3.3.9.15. If required, obtain leased commercial communications.

C2.3.3.9.16. If required, request frequency clearances.

C2.3.3.9.17. Coordinate communications assets and frequency


requirements of response organizations and coordinate these actions with the National
Communications System (NCS) Representative.

C2.3.3.9.18. Coordinate with other Federal, State, and local officials to


ensure mutual communications support and eliminate interference.

C2.3.3.9.19. If required, publish a Signal Operating Instruction (SOI) for


all response organizations.

C2.3.3.10. Logistics. The Logistics element should:

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C2.3.3.10.1. Consist of personnel to control the materiel, administrative,


and supply functions.

C2.3.3.10.2. In coordination with the JOC and Safety element, provide


for medical evacuation of acute casualties.

C2.3.3.10.3. Using the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA),


identify the military installations nearest the accident site, determine their support
capabilities, and establish liaison to alert the base of the potential support requirements.

C2.3.3.10.4. Using Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA)


5100.52.1-L, "Nuclear Accident Response Capabilities Listing (NARCL)," reference
(d), request assistance from DoD installations, DOE facilities, or other activities with
nuclear weapon accident response and radiation detection capabilities.

C2.3.3.10.5. Request, via the CRTF and CINC, a Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS) project code from the Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocations Board.

C2.3.3.10.6. Provide logistics support to DOE in accordance with the


"Joint Department of Defense, Department of Energy, and Federal Emergency
Management Agency Agreement for Response to Nuclear Weapon Accidents and
Nuclear Weapon Significant Incidents," reference (h). Coordination with the DOE
Support Team Coordinator should be accomplished.

C2.3.3.10.7. Plan for operations during both the Crisis Management and
Consequence Management phases to involve up to 2,500 personnel. The
Consequence Management, Site Remediation (SR), and recovery phase may extend to
a period of 6 months or longer. As a minimum, billeting and mess services will be
provided.

C2.3.3.10.8. Provide personal protective and other specialized clothing.

C2.3.3.10.9. Provide water for DECON of equipment and personnel


DECON stations and temporary fixation of contaminants by sprinkling or leaching.

C2.3.3.10.10. Provide for electrical power.

C2.3.3.10.11. Provide general purpose vehicles for the response force.

C2.3.3.10.12. Provide for vehicle maintenance.

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C2.3.3.10.13. Provide for petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL).

C2.3.3.10.14. Assist in providing materials for packaging and shipping


of weapons, components, contaminated waste, and other radioactive materials.

C2.3.3.10.15. Provide sanitation facilities.

C2.3.3.10.16. Provide appropriate laundry facilities for contaminated


and uncontaminated clothing.

C2.3.3.10.17. Provide heavy equipment for base camp construction and


recovery/remediation actions.

C2.3.3.10.18. Provide for airfield cargo support for air delivery of


support equipment to remote sites.

C2.3.3.10.19. Provide for transport from the airfield or nearest military


installation.

C2.3.3.10.20. Provide documentation of accident-related costs.

C2.3.3.10.21. If required, include DECON criteria and hazardous


working condition clauses in any contracts awarded to assist in the recovery effort.
Contractual work shall be coordinated with the RTF Legal element.

C2.3.3.10.22. Develop and disseminate procedures for requesting


logistical or administrative support.

C2.3.3.10.23. Provide, as authorized, billeting, messing, and


transportation support for news media.

C2.3.3.11. Contracting. Contracting support will include, but not be limited


to, local purchase agreements, long-term rental of facilities and equipment, and
immediate procurement of communications, computers, and transportation services.
To accomplish these actions, the contracting representative will:

C2.3.3.11.1. Establish local service contracts to facilitate logistics


support for the following services:

C2.3.3.11.1.1. POL

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C2.3.3.11.1.2. Water

C2.3.3.11.1.3. Food

C2.3.3.11.1.4. Sanitation

C2.3.3.11.1.5. Maintenance

C2.3.3.11.1.6. Laundry

C2.3.3.11.1.7. Administration equipment

C2.3.3.11.1.8. Specialized equipment/clothing items, as needed

C2.3.3.11.1.9. Lodging

C2.3.3.11.2. Consider purchase agreements for equipment/supplies that


may not be returnable following recovery operations.

C2.3.3.11.3. Document all accident response/recovery-related costs.

C2.3.3.12. Command and Control. The CRTF will establish the JOC. The
manning of the C2 element will be determined by the Combatant Commander and
CRTF. The JOC, which will operate 24 hours each day, should:

C2.3.3.12.1. Continue or initiate submission of reports in accordance


with CJCSI 3150.03, reference (f).

C2.3.3.12.2. Develop and implement a radioactive materials recovery


plan in coordination with DOE ARG, including packaging requirements, transportation
from site, and final disposition.

C2.3.3.12.3. Establish coordination with applicable Service and


National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) accident investigation teams.

C2.3.4. Other Assets and Follow-On Forces. Many Federal, State, local, or Host
Nation organizations will respond to an accident. These capabilities will normally be
integrated into the RTF. Otherwise, arrangements must be made to keep these
organizations informed of activities of the RTF.

C2.3.4.1. U.S. Department of Energy

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C2.3.4.1.1. Senior Energy Official (SEO). The SEO will:

C2.3.4.1.1.1. Be operationally responsible to the Lead Federal


Agency (LFA) On-Scene Commander (OSC) for provision of DOE support on scene.

C2.3.4.1.1.2. Be responsible for and serve as the point of contact


for DOE support to the LFA, when DOE is not the LFA.

C2.3.4.1.2. The Accident Response Group. The DOE ARG will:

C2.3.4.1.2.1. Deploy an Advance Team consisting of a Team


Leader, Senior Scientific Advisor, and other specialists to determine if any additional
DOE assets are needed.

C2.3.4.1.2.2. Deploy accident equipment and additional personnel


after coordination through the CRTF and DOE EOC. The request will be routed
through the DoD JNACC.

C2.3.4.1.2.3. Be responsible for providing assistance to the CRTF


for on-site activities.

C2.3.4.1.3. Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center.


Established initially by DOE to define and monitor the radiological impact of an
emergency. FRMAC will:

C2.3.4.1.3.1. Be responsible for coordinating all Federal off-site


monitoring and assessment activities during a response to a radiological emergency,
including response to nuclear weapons accident, to assist the LFA, State(s), and local
authorities, in accordance with the provisions of the FRERP, reference (b).

C2.3.4.1.3.2. Provide various operational resources, including


radiation detection and measurement equipment, communications support, and aerial
monitoring capability, as appropriate.

C2.3.4.1.3.3. Following the initial phase of the emergency, provide


off-site support to EPA when it assumes long-term leadership/management of the
FRMAC.

C2.3.4.1.4. Radiological Assistance Program (RAP)

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C2.3.4.1.4.1. Request for Assistance. Requests for RAP assistance


may be directed to one of the eight Regional Coordinating Offices (RCOs) or to the
DOE Headquarters Emergency Operations Center (Figure C2.F4.). RAP is
implemented on a geographic region basis to maintain a flexible response capability.

C2.3.4.1.4.2. Team Composition.

Figure C2.F4. Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) Locations

C2.3.4.1.5. Radiation Emergency Accident Center/Training Site


(REAC/TS). Additional REAC/TS information is provided in Chapter 10, "Medical
Support."

C2.3.4.1.5.1. Request for Assistance. REAC/TS may be contacted


directly to request assistance or the 24-hour Methodist Medical Center Disaster
Network may be contacted. Numbers are listed in the Points of Contact (POCs)
section at the end of this document.

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C2.3.4.1.5.2. The DOE REAC/TS will, upon request, provide


worldwide consultative or direct medical and radiological assistance at the REAC/TS
facility or at the accident scene. Specifically, REAC/TS has expertise in and is
equipped to conduct:

C2.3.4.1.5.2.1. Medical and radiological triage.

C2.3.4.1.5.2.2. DECON procedures and therapies for external


contamination and internally deposited radionuclides.

C2.3.4.1.5.2.3. Diagnostic and prognostic assessments of


radiation-induced injuries.

C2.3.4.1.5.2.4. Radiation dose estimates by methods that


include cytogenetic analysis, bioassay, and in vivo counting.

C2.3.4.2. Other DOE Assets, Capabilities, and Resources. Other DOE


assets, capabilities, and resources are described in Chapter 4, "Radiological Hazard
and Safety Environmental Monitoring," including the Aerial Measuring System (AMS)
and the ARAC.

C2.3.4.3. The Federal Emergency Management Agency will:

C2.3.4.3.1. Establish a DFO at a location selected in cooperation with


State and local officials.

C2.3.4.3.2. Initially staff the DFO with an Emergency Response Team


(ERT).

C2.3.4.3.3. Be concerned primarily with non-radiological off-site


support to State and local agencies.

C2.3.4.3.4. At FEMA's request, include a representative from the


General Services Administration (GSA) to assist response forces in obtaining local
services and supplies.

C2.3.4.4. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). DTRA provides


the Defense Nuclear Advisory Team (DNAT) in accordance with reference (a). The
DNAT will integrate into the RTF staff and assist the CRTF.

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C2.3.4.5. Other Forces. The FRERP, reference (b), provides capabilities


and responsibilities of other responding Federal elements.

C2.4. SITE REMEDIATION WORKING GROUP

C2.4.1. Overview. SR planning and actions may begin almost simultaneously


with the arrival of the IRF, but formalization of the process generally comes after
stabilization of the emergency situation. The CRTF will form, with representation
from Federal, State, and local agencies, the SRWG, which will:

C2.4.1.1. Analyze the type and extent of the contamination.

C2.4.1.2. Develop a plan to mediate the affected area.

C2.4.1.3. Receive Federal, State, and local government approval for the plan.

C2.4.1.4. Execute the plan.

C2.4.1.5. Monitor the results.

C2.4.2. Description of the SRWG. The SRWG will expand and contract with
changing conditions at the accident scene. As operations are completed, the SRWG
may absorb some cells from other response organizations, or the CRTF may decide to
keep those elements separate and use the SRWG as a final coordination and approval
group. Membership, size, and location of the SRWG are flexible and dynamic.
Coordination and approval of the long-term plan may take an extended period of time
and concentrated effort, requiring a substantial SRWG membership. Once the plan is
agreed upon, the SRWG's role should become that of monitor and advisor. Members
will likely return to their normal responsibilities, meeting on an ad hoc basis to address
issues that arise in implementing the plan.

C2.4.3. SRWG Leadership. Leadership of the SRWG will depend on several


factors, such as time elapsed since the accident, scope of the remediation problem,
location of remediation activity, and the desires of the State or Host Nation. Initially
the SRWG will be directed by the LFA but the State/Host Nation may exercise its
authority over the contaminated area and assume SRWG leadership. SRWG is
discussed in detail in Part 3 of this manual.

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C3. CHAPTER 3
SHIPBOARD ACCIDENT RESPONSE

C3.1. GENERAL

A shipboard nuclear weapon accident differs from land-based scenarios in several


aspects. A fire or explosion associated with the accident has the potential to cause
loss of the ship. Results of shipboard fires are well known and documented in repair
party training and procedures manuals. Explosions, whether from a nuclear weapon
or some other source (for example, petroleum fuels or conventional weapons) can
cause severe damage affecting the safety and seaworthiness of the ship. Although the
initial response by shipboard personnel will be the same whether an accident occurs at
sea or in port, the frequent lack of immediate assistance at sea increases the importance
of correct and adequate response by shipboard personnel. A significant difference is
that the ship may, depending on the damage sustained, be directed to another location
for weapon recovery operations and DECON.

C3.2. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

In a nuclear weapon accident, the Commanding Officer (CO) will focus attention on
saving the ship and crew, protecting the public from health hazards, and keeping the
chain-of-command informed of the situation. This chapter provides guidance
concerning aspects of a nuclear weapon accident response unique to the shipboard
environment.

C3.3. RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS

A ship's damage control organization will provide the initial response to a shipboard
nuclear weapon accident and will be augmented by the following.

C3.3.1. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment. Composed of one officer


and at least five enlisted EOD specialists assigned to ships in a Battle Group or
detachments permanently assigned to major U.S. port facilities throughout the world
trained to respond to a nuclear weapon accident.

C3.3.2. Ship/Submarine Emergency Weapon Safing Team. Composed of


members of the ship's crew, this team performs emergency weapon safing procedures

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in the absence of an EOD team. The team will utilize procedures outlined in the Type
Commander (TYCOM) Nuclear Weapons Manual.

C3.3.3. Radiation Monitoring Team. Comprised of members of the ship's crew,


this response element is trained to operate Radioactivity Detection, Indication, and
Computation (RADIAC) instruments and man the contamination control stations or
DECON stations.

C3.4. EQUIPMENT

The AN/PDR-73 is used to detect tritium. The AN/PDR-56 alpha survey instrument
is the ship's primary RADIAC instrument used in nuclear weapons accident response.
The AN/PDR-27 low range beta-gamma survey instrument is used primarily by initial
entry teams to determine gamma dose rate and is carried by all ships. The functions
of these instruments are discussed in Appendix C3.AP2. The availability of air
monitoring equipment to a ship depends on the ship's weapons maintenance capability
for airborne radioactive material detection equipment. EOD teams have equipment
for detection of gaseous radioactivity.

C3.5. PRE-ACCIDENT PREPARATION

The key to responding to a nuclear weapon accident is planning, training, and adhering
to precautionary measures during critical stages. In addition to possessing a well
exercised shipboard Nuclear Weapon Accident Bill, ships should take the following
preventive measures during weapons movements when the chance for a nuclear
weapon accident is at its peak:

C3.5.1. Have Damage Control parties alerted with protective equipment,


calibrated RADIAC, and firefighting equipment.

C3.5.2. Station security forces in the immediate area of the movement.

C3.5.3. Ensure that the medical department and EOD detachment (when
available) are on alert.

C3.6. ACCIDENT

C3.6.1. If the ship or submarine is moored when the accident occurs, the IRF will
be derived from the ship or submarine. The nearest shore installation with nuclear

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accident response capability will provide assistance to the ship/submarine IRF and
augmentation will be provided by an RTF. The shore installation support will be
contingent upon the location of the accident and the ability to continue with the
primary mission of the shore installation. These procedures have been established in
previous chapters. The major differences in port lay in the flexibility provided by the
ship.

C3.6.2. At sea, the possibility of augmentation by an RTF will be diminished and


the action by the ship's forces in effecting the response will be critical. Some
additional assistance by specialized units may be provided by ships in the vicinity.
Also, EOD detachments may be deployed into the area by several transportation
methods.

C3.6.2.1. Initial Response Procedures. These procedures are the most


crucial in gaining control of a nuclear accident or incident. Accordingly, all ship force
personnel who, by the nature of their official duties, may become directly or indirectly
involved in a nuclear accident or incident, are trained to perform the following
procedures:

C3.6.2.1.1. When a nuclear accident or incident occurs the senior person


present shall take charge at the scene and direct available personnel to:

C3.6.2.1.1.1. Attempt to save the lives of personnel involved.

C3.6.2.1.1.2. Attempt, when required, to extinguish a fire involving


weapons or radioactive material using the firefighting guidance provided in the
Technical Publication (TP) 20-11, "General Firefighting Guidance," reference (i), and
Appendix C3.AP1.

C3.6.2.1.1.3. Establish a security perimeter surrounding the


accident scene, limiting access to authorized personnel only. The security perimeter
aboard ship may be defined by securing hatches to a compartment. In all cases, once
the hatches have been secured, only personnel authorized by the senior person present
shall be allowed at the accident scene.

C3.6.2.1.1.4. Direct all personnel at the scene to take emergency


breathing precautions. As a minimum personnel shall cover their noses and mouths
with a handkerchief or similar item to minimize inhalation of HAZMAT and smoke.

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C3.6.2.1.1.5. Notify the Office of the Deck (OOD) or Command


Duty Officer (CDO), via the most expedient means, that an accident has occurred in a
compartment.

C3.6.2.1.2. Upon notification of an accident or incident, the OOD or


CDO shall:

C3.6.2.1.2.1. Initiate routine announcements over the 1MC as


follows: "NO EATING, DRINKING, OR SMOKING IS ALLOWED UNTIL
FURTHER NOTICE."

C3.6.2.1.2.2. Initiate standard shipboard damage control procedures


including initiating a radiation plot, identifying route(s) to decontamination (DECON)
station, recommend changes to ships heading to vent smoke, toxic gases, and
contaminated firefighting water. Near shore releases should be done as a last resort
action.

C3.6.2.1.2.3. Prepare to initiate DECON station procedures.

C3.6.2.1.2.4. Initiate initial Operations Report (OPREP)-3.

C3.6.2.1.2.5. Make preparation, if in an in-port status, for assisting


the IRF or RTF Commander.

C3.6.2.1.2.6. Continue OPREP-3 situation reports, as required.

C3.6.2.1.2.7. Request if required, helicopter/parachute insertion of


nearest EOD Detachment.

C3.6.2.2. Follow-On Response Procedures. These procedures are an


extension of the initial response procedures; however, they include more detailed
procedures for providing positive control of an accident scene. The responsibility of
executing these procedures rests with the senior person on board or, in the case of an
in-port accident, the shore establishment's designated IRF.

C3.6.2.2.1. As soon as practicable after notification of an accident or


incident, damage control radiological control (RADCON) should conduct beta/gamma
detection operations. RADCON AN/PDR-27 monitors should then proceed to the
extremities of the accident scene, maintaining constant surveillance of the instrument
to detect increases in gamma radiation. Any radiation reading above normal

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background shall be reported immediately in accordance with standard TYCOM


procedures.

C3.6.2.2.2. In the absence of EOD personnel, the ship or submarine's


emergency weapon surfing team may perform emergency procedures outlined in the
TYCOM Nuclear Weapons Manual, as directed by the CO, providing the weapons are
not too severely damaged.

C3.6.2.2.2.1. Enter the compartment where the accident occurred


and render the weapons/materials safe using approved procedures and equipment.

C3.6.2.2.2.2. Report completion of EOD procedures to the OOD or


CDO and be available to assist in the DECON of affected areas.

C3.6.2.2.3. Public Affairs. At sea, PA will be the responsibility of the


Fleet Commander. The CO is responsible for informing the ship's crew regarding PA
releases and prior to their debarking or using any non-official off-ship
communications, on procedures for responding to requests for information from the
press or from families. When the ship is in port, PA will be coordinated by the Fleet
Commander or his designated area coordinator.

C3.6.2.2.4. Security. Unless accident damage to the ship and/or


weapon(s) has destroyed the normal security provisions for the weapon(s), additional
security will not be needed. Additional security is provided, if required, to ensure
continued weapon protection and to prevent unauthorized access.

C3.6.2.2.5. Debriefings. All ship's crew members with information as


to the cause of the accident, and particularly those personnel who observed the extent
of damage to the weapon(s), should be identified to assist in the accident investigation
and debriefed to assess potential internal damage to the weapon.

C3.6.2.2.6. Follow-On Response at Sea. Weather and sea conditions,


the extent of damage to the ship, remaining hazards to the ship and crew, and the time
required to get either expert assistance on board or move the ship to suitable facilities,
will all affect the specific follow-on response actions that the CO might direct while at
sea. Also, guidance will be provided by the Fleet Commander, and the higher
authority must have estimates of damage to the ship and weapon(s). Moreover, the
ship must be provided information on the estimated time of arrival, the nature of any
technical assistance being sent, and be directed to an appropriate port. Much of the
technical assistance discussed in Chapter 2 may be airlifted to the accident ship, or a

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suitable ship in the vicinity for direct assistance at sea, when dictated, due to damage,
contamination, or other conditions.

C3.6.2.2.6.1. Logistics. Resources will be limited to those on


board. Priority should be given to performing operations to minimize any hazards to
ship's personnel and damage to critical equipment, including RADIACs.

C3.6.2.2.6.2. Ship DECON. The amount of DECON ship's


personnel will be able to perform will be limited by the number of RADIACs available
to monitor and remonitor surfaces being decontaminated and to operate the
Decontamination Station. Simple cleaning techniques are frequently effective in
reducing, if not removing, contamination from many of the surfaces on a ship.
DECON techniques are described in Appendix C3.AP2.

C3.6.2.2.7. Follow-On Response in Port. The follow-on response in


port will be the responsibility of the shore establishment, and will follow procedures
described in Chapter 2.

C3.6.2.3. Claims. Any contaminated personal property belonging to ship's


personnel should be collected and marked with the owner's identification. In general,
DECON of high value items, or items that the owner cannot easily replace, must not be
attempted by ships personnel. Replacement of personal property that cannot be
decontaminated shall be processed in accordance with applicable claims regulations.

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C3.AP1. APPENDIX 1 OF CHAPTER 3

SHIPBOARD FIREFIGHTING

C3.AP1.1. GENERAL

C3.AP1.1.1. Normal shipboard firefighting and damage control procedures will


apply to fires involving nuclear weapons with the following provisions:

C3.AP1.1.1.1. Extinguishing the fire has priority.

C3.AP1.1.1.2. Cooling of any weapons involved in the fire or in close


proximity should be performed to the maximum extent that fire hoses permit.

C3.AP1.1.1.3. Cooling should be continued after the fire is extinguished


until the weapon is at ambient temperature.

C3.AP1.1.2. The primary suppressant for a fire involving a nuclear weapon is


narrow angle fog (wide angle fog for submarines). The propellants used in any
weapon, conventional or nuclear, produce oxygen once ignited. They cannot be
extinguished with smothering agents, and some may cause the retention of heat within
the weapon. This factor does not preclude the use of foam, CO2, Purple K (fire
extinguisher) (PKP), Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF), or other suppressants on
aircraft fuel, Navy Standard Fuel Oil (NSFO), or other petroleum fuel fires that involve
a nuclear weapon.

C3.AP1.1.3. Narrow angle fog or a firefighting agent should be sprayed over the
complete length of the weapon(s) and/or both sides in a sweeping motion to cool the
weapon and its HE contents until the weapon is at ambient temperature. When using
foam to fight a fire surrounding an intact weapon, water should not be used to cool the
weapon because water will float the foam away, which could allow reignition of the
fire.

C3.AP1.1.4. For below deck fires, all response personnel going below decks will
wear a Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) (for example, Oxygen Breathing
Apparatus (OBA) and Scott Air Pack); top side personnel will wear gas masks. Any
firefighters responding initially without respiratory protection should be relieved as
soon as possible. Repair party personnel will wear protective clothing as specified in
NSTM 079, Volume II, "Damage Control - Practical Damage Control," reference (j).
Involvement of a nuclear weapon does not require additional protective clothing for

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firefighting personnel. A backup firefighting team, with appropriate respiratory


protection, will be prepared to relieve, or rescue, teams at the scene.

C3.AP1.1.5. During firefighting actions, the flow of potentially contaminated


water should be noted and the wetted surfaces considered contaminated until
monitoring can be performed. The flow of potentially contaminated water should be
controlled to the extent possible, and dewatering operations should not be performed in
port until testing determines if the water is contaminated. The best method of
controlling the potentially contaminated water will be ship and situation unique.

C3.AP1.1.6. Fires involving nuclear weapons in enclosed shipboard spaces


should be vented to the atmosphere as soon as practical to deplete the presence of
toxic, caustic, and radioactive gases. When venting shipboard spaces, care should be
taken to minimize the possible contamination of the exterior of the ship. In the event
of a magazine accident, the normal exhaust system shall be secured and emergency
ventilation procedures used. Portable blowers (for example, Red Devil Blowers)
should be used if there is no installed blowout system. Recommend use of "snorkel
hosing" with high capacity filters in conjunction with portable blowers to reduce
possible contamination to portable blowers and ensure contamination in smoke
exhausted is directed outside the skin of the ship. In all cases, the exhaust vent should
be on the leeward side of the ship. After the fire is extinguished and when in port,
unfiltered venting should not be done if it results in contamination being spread to
nearby shore establishments or communities.

C3.AP1.1.7. Upon extinguishing a fire involving a nuclear weapon, a reflash


watch will be set to provide an immediate response to any recurrence of the fire.

C3.AP1.1.8. Potentially contaminated equipment used to fight the fire should be


placed in a designated area until monitoring and necessary DECON can be performed.

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C3.AP2. APPENDIX 2 OF CHAPTER 3

SHIPBOARD RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING AND CONTROL

C3.AP2.1. GENERAL

Monitoring for radioactivity is performed initially to identify radioactive material. If


radioactivity is found, monitoring continues to determine the extent of the
contaminated area. Personnel monitors are to identify contaminated personnel who
require DECON, and to prevent the spread of radioactive material to uncontaminated
parts of the ship.

C3.AP2.1.1. Control of Contamination. Standard damage control procedures


should be used to limit damage and the spread of contamination. Fire boundaries shall
be set and maintained to prevent the spread of fire. Additionally, at the outset of an
accident, the ship should be maneuvered, if possible, so the wind is on the beam and
carrying any contamination away from the ship.

C3.AP2.1.1.1. Ship Monitoring. If contamination was released during the


accident, it should be confirmed that portions of the ship thought to be uncontaminated
are in fact "clean." Monitors should be directed initially to check passageways at
hatches, doors, ladders, and other locations where most personnel would place their
hands or feet. If contamination is found, its location should be marked for DECON
and remonitoring. Contamination tracked, or carried, onto hard surfaces can be
usually removed with soap and water, or by wiping with a clean, damp cloth. Then
monitors should be directed toward the expected contaminated area. The boundaries
of the contaminated area should be defined. Then personnel should be advised of
these boundaries and the procedures for crossing them, if required, for essential ship
operations.

C3.AP2.1.1.2. Air Monitoring. Airborne radiological monitoring shall be


conducted to the extent instrumentation will allow; however, many ships are not
equipped with air samplers. Monitoring surfaces for loose surface contamination will
be the most reliable indicator of airborne contamination. If Table C5.T2., "Protective
Devices for Emergency Workers as a Function of Surface Contamination," is used,
table values should be divided by 100 to correct for the higher resuspension factors
(0.001 vice the 0.00001 used to develop the table) that can be expected from shipboard
surfaces.

C3.AP2.1.2. Decontamination Station. The DECON Station will be normally

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located at a compartment entrance. Most ships will have insufficient RADIAC


instruments to support more than one DECON Station. If potentially contaminated
personnel are both above and below decks, routes to minimize their movement through
clean areas should be established. Access to the DECON Station must be possible
from both contaminated and uncontaminated areas. A shower and wash basin should
be designated for use in DECON procedures. The wash facilities need not be in the
immediate vicinity of the DECON Station, although such a location is preferable.

C3.AP2.1.2.1. Until the absence of gamma radiation is confirmed by


monitoring at the accident site, personnel should be monitored at the DECON Station
with the AN/PDR-27 and the AN/PDR-56. Once the absence of gamma radiation is
confirmed, use of the AN/PDR-27 is no longer necessary. The use of earphones with
RADIACs is required. This practice results in easier, more accurate monitoring. The
user's attention is not focused on the RADIAC's meter movement, lessening the
possibility of damage or inadvertent probe contamination during the monitoring
process.

C3.AP2.1.2.2. Personnel monitoring should include the front and backs of


hands, forearms, torso, and legs; a thorough check of the forehead, cheeks, nose, and
mouth area; and finally, the ankles and feet. The preliminary readings in the areas
most likely to be contaminated (for example, the hands and feet) should be made with
the probe 1/8 to 1/16th inches from the monitored surface. If the person is not
obviously contaminated, contact readings may be used for the remainder of the
monitoring. If clothing is damp, inaccurate alpha contamination evaluation and
detection is probable. Damp clothing should be removed, assumed contaminated, and
the person's skin dried prior to evaluation for the presence of alpha contamination.

C3.AP2.1.2.3. To conserve the expenditure of protective clothing, initial


personnel monitoring must be performed prior to the removal of the clothing. If no
contamination or contamination below the acceptable emergency remaining levels of
contamination is found on the protective clothing, it should be removed and placed in
containers for clothing to be reused. Booties and gloves should be kept separate. If
contamination levels greater than the acceptable levels are found, the protective
clothing should be removed and placed in a container marked for contaminated
clothing.

C3.AP2.1.2.4. Personnel who had contamination on their protective clothing


should be remonitored after removing the protective clothing. If contamination is also
on their personal clothing, the clothing should be removed, placed in a plastic bag
labeled as contaminated clothing, and the fact noted in the DECON Station log. If

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contamination is on the skin, it can normally be removed by washing with nonabrasive


soap and water. When washing, be sure not to puncture or abrade the skin through
excess scrubbing. Following each washing, the skin should be thoroughly dried
before monitoring to determine if the procedure removed the alpha contamination.
Shampoo contaminated hair several times. Final monitoring should be made with the
probe in contact with the skin. If two washings do not reduce contamination levels on
the skin or hair, individuals should be referred to the Medical Department for further
DECON under medical supervision. Bureau of Medicine and Surgery Instructions
(BUMEDINST) 6470.10A, reference (k), provides detailed guidance on personnel
DECON procedures and should be available to the Medical Department. When all
contamination cannot be removed, the residual level should be recorded in medical
records, the DECON Station log, and the CO should be advised. Disposition of the
contaminated individual(s) will be determined by the Medical Department cooperating
with the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED).

C3.AP2.1.3. Protective Clothing. Any close-knit clothing should prevent


contamination of the skin and provide protection from alpha contamination. If
personal protective clothing is unavailable, coveralls are recommended for personnel
entering the contaminated area to repair damage or perform DECON operations.
Openings in the clothing should be taped. When working in a wet environment,
waterproof clothing should be used for personal protective clothing, if possible. Much
of the protection provided by coveralls will be lost if the material becomes soaked.
Liquids soaking the clothing can carry contamination from the outer surface of the
clothing. When removing contaminated clothing, care should be taken to prevent the
outside of the clothing from contacting the skin.

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C3.AP2.1.4. Clothing Decontamination. The limited stock of protective clothing


on board a ship may be exhausted rapidly during DECON operations at sea. At sea,
protective clothing and other launderable equipment can be laundered, if necessary,
without damage to the equipment or the washing machine. Automatic washing
machines should be clean and free of soap scum to prevent deposition of
contamination. If DECON agents are used, they will aid in keeping washers free of
contamination. After laundered items have completely dried, they must be checked
for any remaining contamination. Items contaminated above acceptable emergency
levels and that do not show any appreciable contamination reduction after three
successive launderings should be packaged for disposal as radioactive waste.
Machines used to launder contaminated clothing should not be used for normal laundry
until after they have been fully cycled empty, allowed to dry, and monitored to ensure
they are free from contamination.

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PART II

TECHNICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE


ISSUES OF RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENT
RESPONSE

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C4. CHAPTER 4
RADIOLOGICAL HAZARD AND SAFETY
ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING

C4.1. GENERAL

A nuclear weapon accident is different from other accidents due to the possibility of
radioactive contamination at the immediate accident site and extending beyond the
accident vicinity. The complexities of a nuclear weapon accident are compounded
further by general lack of public understanding regarding radiological hazards. The
CRTF must, therefore, quickly establish a vigorous and comprehensive health physics
program to manage the health and safety aspects of a nuclear weapon accident. A
good health physics program provides for civil authority/official involvement in the
cooperative development of response efforts and an SR plan.

C4.2. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This chapter provides information on health physics and guidance concerning the
radiological safety and other hazards associated with a nuclear weapon accident. Also
included is information on the radiological control resources available, the hazards and
characteristics of radioactive materials present, and suggested methods for detecting
these hazards and protecting personnel from them. This information assists the CRTF
in the operations under his control. The JHEC is the CRTF's organizational means to
task on-site hazard and radiological data collection and analyze data collected for the
most accurate and complete hazard/radiological assessment. The chapter furnishes
recommendations, advice, sample forms, and assistance to civil authorities with
jurisdiction over areas affected by the accident. Also, weapon systems contain
nonradioactive toxic materials, such as beryllium, lithium, lead, propellants, high
explosives, oxidizers, and plastics. These hazards are discussed later in this volume.
The JHEC coordinates closely with the FRMAC. The FRMAC supports the CRTF
with off-site monitoring and assessment.

C4.3. SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

DoD has an obligation to protect response force personnel and the public from on-site
hazards associated with a nuclear weapon accident and to mitigate potential health and

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safety problems. To accomplish this, DoD establishes a JHEC with the following
objectives:

C4.3.1. Determine if radioactive contamination has been released.

C4.3.2. Advise the CRTF of precautionary measures for residents and other
persons in potentially contaminated areas. Convey risk assessment information.

C4.3.3. Identify and monitor potentially contaminated personnel on site,


including decontamination efforts, and establish a bioassay program.

C4.3.4. Determine levels of contamination present and on-site boundaries of the


contaminated areas through ground and air surveys.

C4.3.5. Establish dosimetry and documentation procedures during personnel


decontamination and remediation operations.

C4.3.6. Recommend methods and procedures to prevent resuspension and spread


of radioactive contamination.

C4.3.7. Assist the LFA in remediation planning with assistance from EPA, which
will likely have a larger role during the recovery phase, and assistance from DOE, if
necessary.

C4.3.8. Manage and advise for actual and potential medical casualties.

C4.4. RESOURCES

C4.4.1. Response Force Resources. Response forces should have a full


complement of operable and calibrated radiological monitoring equipment. Sufficient
quantities of materials should also be available for replacement or repair of critical or
high failure rate components such as mylar probe faces. Replacement plans are
necessary because RADIAC equipment available to IRFs will not meet initial
operational needs after a large release of contamination. Though IRFs are equipped
and trained to conduct radiation surveys for low levels of radioactive contamination, it
is difficult to accomplish over rough surfaces like rocks, plants, and wet surfaces.
Specialized DoD and DOE teams are better equipped to conduct low-level
contamination monitoring, and monitoring should wait until the teams arrive.
Appendix C4.AP1. contains a list of radiological monitoring equipment used by the
Services, with a summary of their capabilities and limitations. Additionally, personnel

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should be cognizant of the various units in which contamination levels might be


measured or reported and the method of converting from one unit to another. A
conversion table for various measurements is provided in Chapter 9.

C4.4.2. Specialized Teams. Several specialized teams are available within DoD
and DOE with substantial radiological monitoring, hazard assessment, and instrument
repair capabilities; moreover, they can provide field laboratories and analytical
facilities. Specialized teams, when integrated into the RTF, provide adequate
technical resources to make a complete assessment of the radiological hazards.
Additionally, specialized DOE teams, which have off-site responsibilities, should be
integrated into the RTF. The DTRA runs the DoD portion of the JNACC at its
Alexandria, VA, Telegraph Road facility. Hazards Prediction and Assessment
Capability (HPAC) development support is located here as well as the CMAT, which
is an established and trained specialized team of senior advisors deployed to assist the
IRF and RTF in the management of all phases following a nuclear weapon accident.
Integration of specialized team operations is accomplished best through establishment
of a JHEC, as discussed in paragraph C4.3., above. When not required on site, DoD
specialized teams should assist in the off-site radiological response efforts.
Specialized teams are:

C4.4.2.1. The following specialized teams or resources are discussed in


detail in the remaining chapters.

C4.4.2.1.1. U.S. Army (USA) Radiological Advisory Medical Team


(RAMT).

C4.4.2.1.2. USA RADCON Control Team.

C4.4.2.1.3. U.S. Air Force (USAF) Radiation Assessment Team


(AFRAT).

C4.4.2.1.4. DOE AMS.

C4.4.2.1.5. DOE ARAC.

C4.4.2.1.6. DOE Mobile Accident Response Group Unit (DOE Mobile


Counting Laboratory [HOT SPOT]).

C4.4.2.1.7. DOE Ranger Environmental Monitoring Capability.

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C4.4.2.1.8. DOE Radiological Air Sampling Counting and Analysis Lab


(RASCAL).

C4.4.2.1.9. DOE Mobile Decontamination Station.

C4.4.2.1.10. CMAT.

C4.4.2.1.11. DoD EOD Teams.

C4.4.2.1.12. DTRA HPAC.

C4.5. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

This concept of operations assumes that an accident has resulted in release of


contamination to areas beyond the immediate vicinity of the accident site. The
distinction between on site and off site is significant for security and legal purposes;
however, for effective collection and meaningful correlation of radiological data, the
entire region of contamination must be treated as an entity. The on-site and off-site
distinction should be considered only when assigning areas to monitoring teams.
Possible response force actions are addressed first in this concept of operations. Only
limited equipment and expertise may be available to the IRF.

C4.5.1. Initial Response Force Actions. Within the constraints of available


resources, the IRF should determine the absence or presence of any radiological
problem and its nature, minimize possible radiation hazards to the public and response
force personnel, identify all persons who may have been contaminated and
decontaminate them as necessary, provide appropriate news releases, and notify
officials/personnel of potential hazards.

C4.5.1.1. Pre-Deployment Actions

C4.5.1.1.1. Prior to departing for the accident site, delivery


arrangements should be made for hazard plots, if available, to assist in determining
possible areas of contamination and avoid contamination of response teams and
equipment. ARAC and HPAC plots will provide theoretical estimates of the radiation
dose to personnel downwind at the time of the accident. Also, plots will provide the
expected location and level of maximum contamination deposition on the ground. A
detailed discussion of ARAC and HPAC is in Appendix C4.AP4. As it becomes

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known, specific accident data described in the appendices should be provided to the
ARAC facility at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL).

C4.5.1.1.2. If an advance party is deployed, at least one trained person


should have radiation detection instruments to determine if alpha emitting
contamination was dispersed and to confirm that no beta and/or gamma hazard exists.
The sooner that confirmation of released contamination is established, the easier it will
be to develop a plan of action and communicate with involved civil authorities.

C4.5.1.2. Initial Actions

C4.5.1.2.1. If the CRTF, or an advance party, deploys by helicopter to


the accident site, an overflight of the accident scene and the downwind area can
provide a rapid assessment of streets or roads in the area and the types and uses of
potentially affected property. During helicopter operations, flights should remain
above or clear of any smoke and at a sufficient altitude to prevent resuspension from
the downdraft when flying over potentially contaminated areas. The landing zone
should be upwind, or crosswind, from the accident site.

C4.5.1.2.2. After arrival at the site, a reconnaissance team consisting of


EOD and/or other specialties should enter the accident site to inspect the area for
hazards, determine the type(s) of contamination present, measure levels of
contamination, mark a clear path, mark hazards, perform initial site stabilization and
emergency procedures, and assess weapon status. The approach to the scene should
be from an upwind direction, if at all possible. The accident situation indicates
whether PPE or respiratory protection is required for the initial entry team. PPE and
respiratory protection should always be donned before entering a suspect area. Every
consideration should be given to protecting the initial entry team and preventing undue
public alarm. Until the hazards are identified, only essential personnel should enter
the possible contamination or fragmentation area of the specific weapon(s). The
generally accepted explosive safety distance for nuclear weapons is 770 meters (2,500
feet); however, the contamination may extend beyond this distance. Explosive safety
distances may be found in classified EOD publications and in explosive safety
instructions and manuals. At this point, a temporary contamination control line should
be considered. Later, when the boundary of the contaminated area is defined and
explosive hazards are known, the control line may be moved for better access to the
area. Contamination, or the lack of it, should be reported immediately to the CRTF.

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C4.5.1.2.3. If radiation detection instruments are not yet on scene,


observations from firefighters and witnesses and the condition of the wreckage or
debris may give an indication of the possibility of contamination. Anticipated
questions that may be asked to evaluate the release of contamination are:

C4.5.1.2.3.1. Was there an explosive detonation?

C4.5.1.2.3.2. Has a weapon undergone sustained burning?

C4.5.1.2.3.3. How many intact weapons or containers have been


observed?

C4.5.1.2.3.4. Do broken or damaged weapons or containers appear


to have been involved in an explosion or fire?

C4.5.1.2.4. If no contamination was released by the accident, the


remaining radiological action becomes preparation for response in the event of a
release during weapon recovery operations.

C4.5.1.3. Actions to be taken if contamination is detected. Authorities


should be notified and the assistance of specialized radiological teams and the DOE
AMS requested. The highest priority should be action to initiate general public hazard
abatement. Do not delay or omit any lifesaving measures because of radioactive
contamination. If precautionary measures have not been implemented to reduce the
hazard to the public, civil authorities/officials should be advised of the situation and
consider possible actions. Actions that should be initiated include:

C4.5.1.3.1. Dispatch monitor teams, with radios if possible, to conduct


an initial survey of the security area.

C4.5.1.3.2. Prepare appropriate news releases.

C4.5.1.3.3. Determine if medical treatment facilities with casualties


have a suitable radiation monitoring capability. If not, dispatch a monitor to
determine if the casualties were contaminated. Initiate notification of monitoring
teams available in the private sector. Also assist in ensuring that contamination has
not spread in the facility. Procedures that a medical treatment facility may use to
minimize the spread of contamination are described in Chapter 10.

C4.5.1.3.4. Initiate air sampling.

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C4.5.1.3.5. Identify, in conjunction with civil authorities/officials, of


witnesses, bystanders, and others present at the accident scene.

C4.5.1.3.6. Establish a CCS and a personnel monitoring program. If


available, civil authorities/officials should have monitoring assistance provided at
established personnel processing points.

C4.5.1.3.7. Make arrangements to have the contamination fixed as soon


as possible so that it does not get resuspended and inhaled.

C4.5.1.3.8. Implement procedures to protect response personnel.


Protective coveralls (personal protective clothing), hoods, gloves, and boots are
necessary to protect response personnel from contamination and prevent its spread to
uncontaminated areas. If airborne contamination exists, respiratory protection is
required. Respiratory protection can be provided in most instances by using
Service-approved protective masks. If extremely high contamination levels of tritium
are suspected in a confined area, firefighting and other special actions require a
positive pressure SCBA. Unless an accident is contained within an enclosed space,
such as a magazine, only those personnel working directly with the weapon need take
precautions against tritium.

C4.5.1.3.9. Develop and implement plans for controlling the spread of


contamination. Administrative controls must stop contamination from being spread by
personnel or equipment and protect response force personnel and the general public.
This control is usually established by determining a control area and limiting access
and exit through a CCS. The perimeter of the contamination control area will be in
the vicinity of the line defined by the perimeter survey; however, early in the response
before a full perimeter survey is completed, a buffer zone may be considered. If the
control area extends beyond the NDA or security area, the assistance of civil
authorities/officials will be required to establish and maintain the control area
perimeter. Personnel and equipment should not leave the control area until monitored
and decontaminated. Injured personnel should be monitored and decontaminated to
the extent their condition permits. A case-by-case exception to this policy is
necessary in life threatening situations.

C4.5.1.3.10. Establishing the location and initial operation of the


Command Post, Operations Area, JHEC, and Base Camp is discussed in Chapter 2.

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C4.5.2. Response Task Force Actions. Upon arrival on scene, the RTF
personnel review the IRF actions. Actions include the status of identification and care
of potentially contaminated people, casualties, and fatalities; the results of radiation
surveys and air sampling or ARAC and/or HPAC-calculated assessment if survey is not
completed; radiological response assets on scene or expected; logs and records; and the
location for the JHEC. Representatives from DOE, FEMA, and EPA will be on scene
within a few hours after the response force. They, and civil officials, are the primary
off-site health and safety interface with the public; however, the RTF should continue
to provide assistance and radiation monitoring support, as necessary. During those
periods early in the response when EOD operations limit access to the accident site,
radiological survey teams should only support the weapon recovery efforts. Off-site
radiological surveys require coordination with civil authorities. This arrangement can
be understood by explaining the role of the JHEC and FRMAC, and by inviting the
civil government-approved radiological response organization to participate in
FRMAC operation. DoD specialized teams and the DOE ARG are integral parts of
the RTF. The CRTF should integrate DOE ARG radiological assets into the JHEC
organization.

C4.5.2.1. Joint Hazard Evaluation Center. The JHEC is the organization


that oversees the on-site hazard and radiological data collection and assessment
efforts. By analyzing data, it provides accurate and complete on-site
hazard/radiological recommendations. The JHEC Director should be knowledgeable
about data on site and how to best employ the technical resources available. The
recommended functional organization is shown in Figure C4.F1.

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Figure C4.F1. Joint Hazard Evaluation Center Functional Organization

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C4.5.2.1.1. On-site monitoring data is processed through and further


distributed by the JHEC to the FRMAC.

NOTE: Appropriate COMSEC should be exercised in the exchange of on-site


data/information because of it potentially being classified.

C4.5.2.1.2. JHEC is the single control point for all hazard/radiological


on-site data and will provide the most rapid information available to both military and
civil users. Data provided to the JHEC for analysis, correlation, and validation
include all hazard data on site. After the initial response, the JHEC establishes a
radiation and dosimetry program that meets the needs and requirements for personnel
working in or entering the on-site contamination control area. The JHEC should:

C4.5.2.1.2.1. Collect radiological and hazard data required by the


CRTF on site. Refer all unofficial requests for contamination information to the JIC.

C4.5.2.1.2.2. Run HPAC for an initial contamination plot and make


it available to the CRTF. Correlate plot with survey results for confirmation/validity.
Rerun the model, as required.

C4.5.2.1.2.3. Analyze and correlate all contamination data collected


to identify inconsistencies that require further investigation.

C4.5.2.1.2.4. Provide contamination plots and other required data to


the CRTF.

C4.5.2.1.2.5. Review and correlate records from CCSs and other


personnel processing points to ensure bioassays or other appropriate followup actions
are taken.

C4.5.2.1.2.6. Implement CRTF's health and safety standards and


monitor the safety procedures of all participating in weapon-recovery operations.

C4.5.2.1.2.7. Brief and train people not designated previously as


radiation workers who will be working in the contaminated area on PPE, hazards, and
safety measures.

C4.5.2.1.3. Consolidate all radiological assessment information for


on-site recovery operations and provide it to the CRTF.

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C4.5.2.1.4. When the NDA is dissolved, JHEC personnel and resources


may be integrated into FRMAC operations.

C4.5.2.2. Materials Sampling

C4.5.2.2.1. Environmental Sampling

C4.5.2.2.1.1. Air sampling is conducted to determine if airborne


contamination is present. Also, it provides a basis for estimating the radiation
dose/exposure that people without respiratory protection may have received since the
air sampling instruments were emplaced.

C4.5.2.2.1.2. Soil, water, vegetation, and swipe sampling of hard


surfaces are required. Sampling should be initiated in the contaminated area soon
after the accident. Samples must also be taken at locations remote from the
contaminated area to verify background readings. After this, samples are required
periodically during the recovery process to determine radioactive material migration
and dispersion and to substantiate DECON/recovery completion. The JHEC in
cooperation with FRMAC will determine on-site sampling parameters, such as, sample
location(s), method, frequency, volume of sample, and size.

C4.5.2.2.2. Bioassay Program

C4.5.2.2.2.1. Bioassay methods estimate the amount of radioactive


material deposited in the body. The methods use either direct measurement, e.g.,
sensitive x-ray detectors placed over the chest (lung counting) and/or other organs, or
detection of radioactivity in the excrete (nasal mucous, feces, or urine).

C4.5.2.2.2.2. A bioassay program for potentially affected


individuals is recommended to determine if an internal uptake occurred.
Implementation of a bioassay program and the documented results will be important in
the equitable settlement of any legal actions that may occur in the years following a
nuclear weapon accident. Personnel monitoring and bioassay programs are discussed
in this paragraph and bioassay techniques in Chapter 7.

C4.5.2.3. Work Force Protection. Standard radiation accident and incident


response procedures provide guidance for personnel protection during the first few
days. As conditions stabilize, regulations governing work in radiation areas should be
implemented. Consideration must be given to participating organizations' or Services'
methods and previous doses, and whether their procedures do not jeopardize health

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and safety or unduly impair operations. The JHEC is responsible for implementing
the CRTF's health and safety standards and closely monitoring the safety procedures of
all participating organizations. Personnel entering the contaminated areas, if not
trained to work in a contamination environment, should be given specific guidance.

C4.5.2.4. Radiological Surveys. Radiological surveys and other radiological


data are required by the CRTF and civil authorities/officials to identify actions to
minimize hazards to the response force and the public. Site characterization and
DECON and remediation planning will also need this information. Radiological
survey and data requirements must be given to the FRMAC for implementation to meet
this requirement in an expeditious manner. Prior to extensive survey initiation, the
following must be completed: select appropriate detection equipment, calibrate
instruments, and determine the background readings. Surveys include NDA
perimeter, area, and resource/facility surveys. The survey process can require days to
weeks to complete. Survey procedures are located in Appendix C4.AP5. and forms in
Appendix C4.AP6.

C4.5.2.5. Radiological Advisory to the Joint Information Center/Combined


Information Bureau. All public release of information will be processed in
accordance with DoDD 5230.16, reference (g), and made through the JIC/CIB.
Public interest in the actual or perceived radiological hazard resulting from a nuclear
weapon accident will produce intense public concern and media scrutiny of response
operations. The JIC/CIB requires assistance from the JHEC and FRMAC in preparing
press releases to minimize and allay these concerns. Any portion of the public that
may have been advised to take precautionary measures will seek clear, understandable
explanations of methods to protect their health and property. The public must be
provided information through the JIC/CIB and the Community Emergency Action
Team (CEAT) explaining the potential hazards, in terms that recognize the populace's
knowledge level and understanding of radiation and its effects.

C4.5.2.6. Fixing of Contaminants. Fixatives should be used to reduce


resuspension and the spread of contamination. If water is readily available, it may be
used as a temporary fixative to reduce resuspension. Other more permanent fixatives
may be used to reduce the spread of contamination by resuspension and runoff from
highly contaminated areas. The use of fixatives in areas of low-level contamination is
usually inappropriate. Fixatives may enhance or hinder DECON and remediation
operations and affect radiation survey procedures, and in fact may generate mixed
waste or be in conflict with EPA regulations. The DOE ARG can provide information
on the advantages and disadvantages of different types of fixatives and methods of
application. They should be consulted prior to application of permanent fixatives.

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C4.5.2.7. Recovery/Remediation

C4.5.2.7.1. Recovery. This activity includes the initial reconnaissance,


the render safe procedures, hazard removal, and disposition of the weapons and
components. The two-person concept must be enforced strictly when working with
nuclear weapons. In the early stages of accident response, following all of the
required security measures may be difficult; however, the CRTF should implement
necessary security procedures as soon as possible. The initial entry will determine the
preliminary weapon(s) status and hazards in the area. In the process of determining
the weapon condition, a search may be required to find the weapon(s). The CRTF
directs the initiation of the render safe procedures. The EOD team advises the CRTF
of the safest and most reliable means for neutralizing weapon hazards.

C4.5.2.7.2. Site Remediation. Procedures/methods to return the


accident scene to a technically achievable and financially acceptable condition begin
early in the response effort. SR becomes a major issue after classified information,
weapons, weapon debris, and other hazards are removed. Several factors have
significant influence on SR decisions and procedures, such as size of the contaminated
area and topographical, geological, hydrological, meteorological, and demographic
information. Other important aspects are utilization of the area and civil
authorities/officials prerogatives for the area. Remediation will include those
measures to remove or neutralize the contamination. A component of the CMAT is
capable of analyzing options and providing the on-site commander with costs.

C4.5.2.8. Disposal of Contaminated Waste. CCS operations and JHEC field


laboratory operations create considerable quantities of contaminated waste.
Provisions are required, therefore, to store this waste temporarily in the contaminated
area until it can be moved to a disposal site. Procedures for the disposal of
contaminated waste are addressed as part of SR. The SRWG will develop a plan to
dispose of contaminated waste as part of SR.

C4.5.2.9. Logistics Support for Recovery/Radiological Operations.


Radiological response assets arrive with sufficient supplies to last a few days. High
use items that soon require resupply include hundreds of sets of personal protective
clothing each day, 2-inch masking or duct tape, varied sizes of polyethylene bags,
marking tape for contaminated materials, and respirator filters. Personal protective
clothing may be laundered in special laundry facilities (discussed in Appendix
C16.AP1.) and reused. The turnaround time, when established, determines the
approximate amount of anti-contamination clothing required. Close liaison will be

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required between the JHEC and the RTF supply officer. Disposable personal
protective clothing may prove more logistically feasible in some circumstances. See
C16.AP1.

C4.5.3. Radiological Hazards. The primary radiological hazard associated with a


nuclear weapon accident is from fissile material, particularly alpha emitters.
Sufficient quantities of beta/gamma emitters to pose a significant health problem will
not normally be present at a nuclear weapon accident.

C4.5.3.1. Radiological Hazard Assessment. From the outset, concern exists


about the potential health hazard to the general public, particularly to those residing
near the accident site. Consideration of possible radiation exposures is the primary
method of estimating the potential health hazard. If no beta/gamma radiation is
present, the primary risk is inhalation of alpha emitters that may cause a long-term
increase in the probability of radiation-related diseases. Initial hazard assessments
will, of necessity, be based on limited information, assumptions, and worst case
projections of possible radiation doses received. ARAC and HPAC, described in
Appendix C4.AP4., provide theoretical projections of the maximum internal radiation
dose people may have received if outdoors without respiratory protection from the time
of release to the effective time of the predictive plot. Exposure to resuspended
contaminants normally results in doses that are a small fraction of that dose that would
be received from exposure to the initial release for the same time period.
Contamination released by the accident should not normally affect the safety of public
water systems with adequate water treatment capability.

C4.5.3.2. Reduction of Public Exposure. The hazard assessment must be


followed quickly by recommended precautionary and safety measures to protect the
public from exposure. To control and minimize exposure, radioactive contaminants
must be prevented from entering the body and confined to specific geographic areas so
that the contamination can be removed systematically. Methods for reducing the
exposure to the public should be implemented by, or through, civil
authorities/officials. Although political and possibly international issues are likely to
be involved, the ultimate decisions on measures to be taken should be based on health
and safety considerations.

C4.5.3.2.1. The IRF may need to advise civil authorities/officials of


recommended actions and provide technical assistance until appropriate civilian assets
arrive. When contamination has been released, or when probable cause exists to
believe that contamination was released, the implementation of precautionary measures

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to reduce exposure to radiation or contamination are appropriate, even though the RTF
personnel may not arrive for some time.

C4.5.3.2.2. Protective measures include:

C4.5.3.2.2.1. Establishing a Contamination Control Area (CCA).


This operation requires identifying people in the area at the time of the
accident/incident and/or restricting access to the area. Any vehicles or people exiting
the area should be identified and directed to go to a monitoring point immediately.

C4.5.3.2.2.2. Sheltering. Sheltering is used to minimize exposure


to the initial release of contamination as it moves downwind and to minimize exposure
to resuspended contamination prior to an evacuation. Sheltering is implemented by
advising the people to seek shelter and the procedures to follow. The effectiveness of
sheltering depends on following the procedures provided. Pets should be gathered and
sheltered as well to prevent spread of contamination. Livestock can continue to range
free since they have little intimate contact with the general public.

C4.5.3.2.2.3. Evacuation. Contaminated areas must be defined


and an evacuation procedure developed and implemented by civil authorities. Civil
authorities will be responsible for the evacuation but may require radiological advice
and assistance. Immediate evacuation of downwind personnel should be discouraged
since the probability of inhalation of contaminants may increase. Explosive or toxic
materials may present an immediate hazard to people near the accident site and
immediate evacuation would then be required.

C4.5.3.2.2.4. Fixing Areas of High Contamination. Areas of high


contamination must be controlled to prevent spread by resuspension, water runoff, or
movement of personnel. Although fixing of contamination is part of the SR process,
some fixing procedures may be necessary long before SR plans are implemented.

C4.5.4. Respiratory and Whole Body Protection. Protection of the general


public, response force members, and workers in the accident area from exposure
through inhalation is extremely important. Refer to Chapter 5 for additional guidance.

C4.5.5. Radiation Surveys. Extensive radiation surveys will be required to


identify and characterize the area so that DECON and remediation plans may be
developed and the results evaluated. Determining that contamination was released by
the accident is very important; if release occurred, priority must be given to the actions
to identify and minimize the hazards to people. These actions are included in
Appendix C4.AP5.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C4.5.6. Site Remediation. SR involves negotiating cleanup levels and fixing or


removing contamination. The removal is time consuming and requires an extensive
workload to collect, remove, decontaminate, if appropriate, and replace the top soil.
Monitoring is required during the removal process to verify that cleanup has been
achieved.

C4.5.7. Verification. The DECON effectiveness will be verified by


remonitoring/resurveying the accident scene to determine that the cleanup levels are
achieved.

C4.5.8. Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) and Re-Entry


Recommendations (RERs) provide appropriate protective action and re-entry
recommendations to the public. PARs are generally provided to the State through the
LFA. The State then has the final determination in what PARs are issued/enacted.
The PARs and RERs will have been coordinated/reviewed by the cognizant Federal
authority (DoD) and responsible civilian authorities/officials. The PARs and RERs
will consider Protective Action Guides (PAGs) issued by EPA and State agencies. In
an accident, PARs for initial notification or evacuation would likely not be prepared
formally. The notification in the accident area would occur via visual means or word
of mouth. Evacuation of approximately a 600-meter disaster cordon might occur
automatically or at the direction of civilian law enforcement personnel. A PAR for a
controlled evacuation could be formalized in anticipation of a subsequent release of
HAZMAT or radioactive contamination. The PAR/RER format may include, as a
minimum, problem, discussion, action, coordination, and approval sections (the format
should be site and situation specific). A sample PAR for controlled evacuation is
shown in Figure C4.F2., below.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

Figure C4.F2. Sample Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) Form

112 CHAPTER 4
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C4.6. ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN ANNEX

Procedures and information appropriate for inclusion in the Radiological Hazard


Safety Annex to the accident response plan include:

C4.6.1. A description of the JHEC organization and responsibilities.

C4.6.2. Procedures for operation of the JHEC.

C4.6.3. Procedures for establishing and maintaining the Contamination Control


Line (CCL).

C4.6.4. Procedures for ensuring that all indigenous personnel possibly exposed to
contamination are identified, screened, and treated. This function is an ARG (on-site)
and/or FRMAC (off-site) responsibility initially.

C4.6.5. Guidelines for determining radiation survey and DECON priorities.

C4.6.6. Procedures for ensuring that response force personnel working in the
contaminated area are properly protected.

C4.6.7. Procedures for recording and maintaining pertinent data for the
radiological safety of response force personnel.

C4.6.8. Procedures for recording, correlating, and plotting the results of


radiological surveys and data collection instrumentation (i.e., air samplers).

C4.6.9. Procedures for JHEC and FRMAC interfacing.

C4.6.10. Procedures for JHEC incorporation into the FRMAC.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C4.AP1. APPENDIX 1 of CHAPTER 4

RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING EQUIPMENT

C4.AP1.1. INSTRUMENTS AND INSTRUMENT SETS


Alpha Survey Instruments
Instrument Type Scale Indicator Description
AN/PDR-56 Scintillation 0 to 1000K, CPM/17 Small auxiliary probe provided for monitoring
4 ranges cm2 irregular objects. Mylar probe face is very fragile;
a puncture disables the instrument.
Accompanying x-ray probe is calibrated for 17
keV with associated meter scale from 0 to 10/m2
in four ranges.
AN/PDR-77 Scintillation 0 to 999K 100cm2 See Instrument Sets.
cpm Digital
Auto
Ranging
AN/PDR-60 Scintillation 0 to CPM/60 Intermediate and high-range alpha survey. Mylar
(PAC-IS) (See beta 2,000K, 4 cm2 probe face is very fragile; a puncture disables the
and gamma ranges instrument.
capabilities, below)
PRM-5 Scintillation 0 to 500K, CPM Portable, high-, and low-range instrument for
4 ranges detecting plutonium contamination through
measurement of associated x-rays and low
energy gamma radiation. Effective in inclement
weather and much less subject to damage
during field use.
Ludlum Model 3 Scintillation 0 to 400K CPM Portable, high- and low-range instrument.
(See beta and Similar in operation and function to the
gamma capabilities, AN/PDR-60.
below)
Ludlum Model 2220 Scintillation 0 to 500K, CPM Liquid crystal display and integral digital readout.
4 ranges

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

Beta and Gamma Survey Instruments


Instrument Type Scale Indicator Description
AN/VDR-2 Geiger-Muller Digital Auto Gy/hr Portable Beta/Gamma Survey Instrument.
Ranging 0 Displays total accumulated dose or dose rate.
to 9.99Gy/hr (Replaces the AN/PDR 27 for Army applications.)
AN/PDR-60 Geiger-Muller 0 to R/hr Measures intermediate gamma using the 2R
(PAC-ISAGA) 2,000K; 4 range. May use Pu-gamma detector (PG-1) for
ranges inclement weather. Also measures alpha (see
(See alpha PAC-IS above). Gamma probe still operates if
capabilities, alpha probe is damaged.
above)
Ludlum Model Geiger-Muller 0 to 200 mR/h Portable high- and low-range analyzer similar to
3 mR/h AN/PDR-60. Probe 44-6 uses a G-M tube to
detect beta and gamma. Probe 44-9 detects
(See alpha low-energy gamma, 0 to 200 mR/h.
capabilities,
above)
AN/PDR-27 Geiger-Muller 0 to 500; 4 mR/h Low range; suitable for personnel monitoring for
ranges beta/gamma emitters only. Not useful for alpha
emissions. May saturate and read 0 in high
radiation fields above 1,000 R/hr.
AN/PDR-43 Geiger-Muller 0 to 500; 3 R/h High range; will not saturate in high radiation
ranges area. Readings in gamma fields other than
Co-60 may be inaccurate to greater than 20
percent.
IM-174/PD Integrating ion 0.1 to 10; 0 R/h High range. Logarithmic scale. Temperature
(Gamma) chamber to 500 sensitive.
ADM-300A Geiger-Muller Gamma: Portable Beta/Gamma Survey Instrument (with
10 to 10,000 uR/hr BP-100 or BGP-100 Beta/ Beta Gamma Probe).
R/hr Built in Beta Gamma detection/monitoring
Beta: capability without additional probes. High range.
10 to 5 uR/hr BGP-100 can be located up to 300 feet from the
R/hr ADM-300. Saturation level of 100000R/h.
Ludlum Model Scintillation 0 to 5 mR/hr uR/h (To Be Provided.)
19 (Gamma)

Instrument Sets
Instrument Description
AN/PDR-77 The AN/PDR-77 will accept a maximum of eight different probes. Each probe is automatically
RADIAC Set recognized and has unique calibration information stored in non-volatile memory. The
AN/PDR-77 comes with three probes. A 100cm2 ZnS Alpha probe, a two Geiger tube
beta/gamma probe, and a 5-inch NaI low-energy x-ray probe capable of measuring and
determining surface contamination levels of Pu and Am-241 in µCi/m2. An accessory kit is
available that contains a GM pancake probe and 1" x 1.5" NaI micro-R probe.
Violinist II - Includes the Field Instrument for the Detection of Low Energy Radiation (FIDLER), high-voltage
FIDLER power supply, and pre-amplifier and Violinist II. The Violinist II consists of a battery operated
Instrument Set 256-channel analyzer and a pre-programmed microprocessor. When calibrated appropriately,
measures and determines surface contamination levels of Pu and Am-241 in µCi/m2.
Ranger Includes the FIDLER/Violinist II and a position determining system. The microwave ranging
system uses a base station, fixed repeaters, and mobile units. The mobile units transmit
FIDLER radiation data to the repeaters and base station. Readings, contamination density,
and isopleths are developed in near real-time. The microwave ranging system is limited to near
line of sight. Dense vegetation, buildings, and hills may affect the ranging signal.

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Tritium Survey Instruments


Instrument Scale Indicator Description
T-446 0 to 10 µCi/m3 Portable; automatic scale switching; trickle charger for NiCad F
cells. With adapter kit, has urinalysis capability with 5-minute
response. Filters particulate to .3 microns; not sensitive to smoke
and paint fumes.
T-290A 0 to µCi/m3 Portable air sampler. Must be rezeroed after 15 minutes of
1,000; concentration of operation; hourly thereafter. Sensitive to smoke and paint fumes.
3 gas in chamber Battery pack available for cold weather operation.
ranges
AN/PDR-73 0 to µCi/m3 Portable air monitor comprising radiacmeter IM-245/PDR, designed
10K; to detect gaseous radioactive contamination in the ambient air. The
4 instrument is capable of continuous air sampling and is calibrated to
ranges read directly the level of tritium. Powered by (12) internal
rechargeable "C" cell batteries or it may be powered by 115 VAC, 60
Hz when in continuous use.
AN/PDR-74 0 to µCi/m3 The portable radiation detection, indication, and computation
100K; (RADIAC) set contains an IM-246 air monitor to detect gases.
3 Calibrated in terms of tritium activity but can be used to monitor
ranges other radio gases. Powered by D-cells. Alarm sounds at preset
meter reading.

Dosimeters
Instrument Capability and Limitations
Self-Reading Ionization Reusable device for measuring exposure to x-ray and gamma radiation.
Chamber Dosimeter
Can provide false positive readings due to charge leakage and sensitivity to
mechanical shock.
Non-Self- Reading Ionization Reusable device for measuring exposure to x-ray and gamma radiation.
Chamber Dosimeter
Can provide false positive readings due to charge leakage and sensitivity to
mechanical shock. Requires separate reading device.
Film Badge Provides measurement and permanent record of beta and gamma doses over a
wide dosage range. Special neutron films are available. Ten-percent dose
accuracy depending upon quality control during development.

Sensitive to light, humidity, aging, and exposure to x-rays. Delay between


exposure and dose reading due to processing time.
Thermo-Luminescent Measures gamma radiation dose equivalents up to 10,000 Roentgen Equivalent
Dosimeter(TLD) Man/Mammal (REM). Accurate to within a factor of two when the energy of the
neutrons is unknown.

After long periods of exposure, damaged or bent cards delay processing, static
electric discharge causes spurious readings, and temperatures greater than 115
°F reduce sensitivity. Delay between exposure and dose reading due to central
processing of TLDs.

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C4.AP2. APPENDIX 2 OF CHAPTER 4

RADIATION DETECTION AND MEASUREMENT

(The Inference of Plutonium Contamination using the


Field Instrument for the Detection of Low Energy Radiation [FIDLER])

C4.AP2.1. OVERVIEW

C4.AP2.1.1. Quantitative measurements of radioactive contamination in the field


are extremely difficult. Particles having short ranges, such as alpha and low energy
beta radiation, are significantly and incalculably affected by minute amounts of
overburden, for example, dust or precipitation; therefore, detection rather than
measurement is a more realistic goal for alpha-beta surveys. More penetrating
radiations, such as gamma and higher energy x-rays, are affected less by such
overburden; however, these elements require special attention to field calibration
techniques in order to convert meter readings to contamination estimates.

C4.AP2.1.2. Field survey of uranium is best accomplished through measurement


of x-rays in the 60 to 80 kilo electron volt (keV) range emitted by uranium isotopes
and daughters. For plutonium, the best technique is to detect the accompanying
contaminant Am-241, which emits a strong 60 keV gamma ray. Knowing the original
assay and the age of the weapon, the ratio of plutonium to americium can be calculated
accurately and thus the total plutonium contamination determined.

C4.AP2.1.3. Many of the factors that cannot be controlled in a field environment


can be managed in a mobile laboratory that can be brought to an accident/incident
site. Typically, the capabilities include gamma spectroscopy, low background
counting for very thin alpha- and beta-emitting samples, and liquid scintillation
counters for extremely low energy beta emitters such as tritium.

C4.AP2.2. GENERAL

C4.AP2.2.1. Scope. This appendix provides detailed information on the


instrumentation and associated techniques used to perform radiological monitoring at
an incident/accident involving the release of radioactive material. This appendix is
not intended to serve as a "user's manual" for the various instruments; however, it
includes sufficient detail to provide an understanding of the limitations of field
measurement techniques and thus provides for proper application and the use of

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

techniques in case of an emergency. For completeness, some elementary


characteristics of different kinds of radiation are included. Throughout this appendix
the word "radiation" will refer only to nuclear radiation found at a nuclear
incident/accident.

C4.AP2.2.2. Detection Versus Measurement

C4.AP2.2.2.1. Nuclear radiation cannot be easily detected. Thus, radiation


detection is always a multi-step, highly indirect process. For example, in a
scintillation detector, incident radiation excites a florescent material that de-excites by
emitting photons of light. The light is focused onto the photocathode of a
photomultiplier tube that triggers an electron avalanche. The electron shower
produces an electrical pulse that activates a meter read by the operator. Not
surprisingly, the quantitative relationship between the amount of radiation actually
emitted and the reading on the meter is a complex function of many factors. Since
control of those factors can only be accomplished well within a laboratory, only in a
laboratory setting can true measurements be made.

C4.AP2.2.2.2. On the other hand, detection is the qualitative determination


that radioactivity is or is not present. Although the evaluation of minimum levels of
detectability is a considerable quantitative challenge for instrumentation engineers, the
task of determining whether a meter records anything is considered much easier than
the quantitative interpretation of that reading.

C4.AP2.2.2.3. The above discussion suggests that the same equipment can be
used for either detection or measurement. In fact, generally, detectors have meters
from which numbers can be extracted; however, to the extent that the user is unable to
control factors that influence the readings, those readings must be recognized as
indications of the presence of activity (detection) only and not measurements.

C4.AP2.2.2.4. In the discussions that follow, personnel must be aware of the


limitations imposed by field conditions and their implications on the meaning of
readings taken; therefore, instructions are careful to indicate the extent to which
various instruments may be used as measurement devices or can be used only as
detectors.

C4.AP2.3. TYPES OF RADIATION

C4.AP2.3.1. General. Four major forms of radiation are commonly found


emanating from radioactive matter: alpha, beta, gamma, and x-radiation. The

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

marked differences in the characteristics of these radiations strongly influence their


difficulty in detection and, consequently, the detection methods used.

C4.AP2.3.2. Alpha. An alpha particle is the heaviest and most highly charged of
the common nuclear radiations. As a result, alpha particles very quickly give up their
energy to any medium through which they pass, rapidly coming to equilibrium with
and disappearing in the medium. Since nearly all common alpha radioactive
contaminants emit particles of approximately the same energy, 5 million electron volt
(MeV), some general statements can be made about the penetration length of alpha
radiation. Generally speaking, a sheet of paper, a thin layer (a few hundredths of a
millimeter) of dust, any coating of water or less than 4 centimeters of air are sufficient
to stop alpha radiation. As a result, alpha radiation is the most difficult to detect.
Moreover, since even traces of such materials are sufficient to stop some of the alpha
particles and thus change detector readings, quantitative measurement of alpha
radiation is impossible outside of a laboratory environment where special care can be
given to sample preparation and detector efficiency.

C4.AP2.3.3. Beta. Beta particles are energetic electrons emitted from the nuclei
of many natural and manmade materials. Being much lighter than alpha particles,
beta particles are much more penetrating. For example, a 500 keV beta particle has a
range in air that is orders of magnitude longer than that of the alpha particle from
plutonium, even though the latter has 10 times more energy; however, many
beta-active elements emit particles with very low energies. For example, tritium emits
a (maximum energy) 18.6 keV beta particle. At this low an energy, beta particles are
less penetrating than common alpha particles, requiring very special techniques for
detection (see Chapter 8).

C4.AP2.3.4. Gamma and X-Radiation. Gamma rays are a form of


electromagnetic radiation and, as such, are the most penetrating of the four radiations
and easiest to detect. Once emitted, gamma rays differ from x-rays only in their
energies, with x-rays generally lying below a few 100 keV. As a result, x-rays are less
penetrating and harder to detect; however, even a 60 keV gamma ray has a typical
range of a hundred meters in air and might penetrate a centimeter of aluminum. In
situations in which several kinds of radiations are present, these penetration properties
make x-ray/gamma ray detection the technique of choice.

C4.AP2.3.5. Radiations from the Common Contaminants. Table C4.AP2.T1.


lists some of the commonly considered radioactive contaminants and their primary
associated radiations.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

Table C4.AP2.T1. Commonly Considered Radioactive


Contaminants and Their Primary Associated Radioactive Emissions
Alpha Beta Gamma X-rays
Am-241 X X X
H-3 X
Pu-239 X X
Th-228 X X
Th-230 X X
Th-232 X X
U (nat.) X X X
U-235 X X
U-238 X X X

C4.AP2.4. ALPHA DETECTION

C4.AP2.4.1. Because of the extremely low penetration of alpha particles, special


techniques must be employed to allow the particles to enter the active region of a
detector. In field instruments such as the AN/PDR-56 and -60, an extremely thin
piece of aluminized mylar film is used on the face of the detector probe to cover a thin
layer of florescent material. Energy attenuation of the incident alpha radiation by the
mylar is estimated to be less than 10 percent; however, use of this film makes the
detector extremely fragile. Thus, contact with literally any hard object, such as a
blade of hard grass, can puncture the film, allowing ambient light to enter the detection
region and overwhelm the photomultiplier and meter. (Even sudden temperature
changes have been shown to introduce stresses that can destroy a film.) In addition,
contact with a contaminated item could transfer contamination onto the detector; thus,
monitoring techniques must be used that keep the detector from contacting any surface
(however, recall that the range of the alpha radiation is less than 4 centimeters in air).
This requirement to be within a few centimeters of monitored locations without ever
touching one makes use of such detectors impractical except for special, controlled
situations (for example, monitoring of individuals at the hot line or air sampler filters).

C4.AP2.4.2. As discussed above, the sensitivity (minimum detectability) of an


alpha detector is not dictated by the ability of the active region of the detector to
respond to the passage of an alpha particle; counting efficiency for alpha detectors is
25 to 60 percent of the alpha particles from a distributed source that reach the detector
probe. Fortunately, alpha detectors in good repair normally have a fairly low
background: there are few counts from cosmic and other spurious radiation sources

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

and the elimination of most electronic noise is easy with state-of-the-art instruments.
As a result, count rates in the order of a few hundred counts per minute are easily
detectable on instruments such as the AN/PDR-60. However, the detectability is
dominated by the ability of the alpha particles to get into the active region of the
detector, which depends upon such factors as overburden (amount of dust and/or
moisture lying between the alpha emitters and the detector), and the proximity of the
detector to the emitters.

C4.AP2.4.3. In demonstrations conducted in the laboratory, a sealed alpha source


(Am-241) was monitored with a well maintained AN/PDR-60 alpha probe and meter.
Dust and water were sprinkled onto the source and changes noted. It was found that a
drop of water, a heavy piece of lint, or a single thickness of tissue paper totally
eliminated all readings. A light spray of water, comparable to a light dew, reduced
readings by 40 to 50 percent. A layer of dust that was just visible on the shiny source
had minimal effect on the count rate; however, a dust level that was only thick enough
to show finger tracks reduced readings by 25 percent. These simple demonstrations
reinforced the knowledge that detection of alpha particles in any but the most ideal
situations is most problematical. The leaching or settling of contaminants into a
grassy area or the dust stirred up by vehicular traffic on paved areas will significantly
decrease or eliminate alpha detection.

C4.AP2.5. BETA/GAMMA DETECTION

C4.AP2.5.1. Gamma rays and high energy (>1 MeV) beta particles are highly
penetrating radiations. As a result, the major problems listed for alpha detection do
not apply. Furthermore, at the energies of concern in nuclear weapon
accidents/incidents, detection efficiency for most detectors is relatively high. Thus,
beta/gamma detection is relatively easy.

C4.AP2.5.2. From a detection standpoint, unfortunately, high energy beta and


gamma radiation are not produced in the most likely radioactive contaminants (for
example, plutonium, uranium, or tritium). Rather, the major potential source of
beta/gamma emitters is from fission product radioelements that could be produced in
the extremely unlikely event of a partial nuclear yield. Beta/gamma detection,
therefore, has no quantitative use in determining the extent of plutonium or uranium
contamination but is used as a safety precaution to determine any areas containing
hazardous fission products.

C4.AP2.5.3. Common gamma detectors are scintillation detectors (using


scintillation media different from that described above for alpha detection) or gas

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ionization type detectors (ion chambers, proportional counters, or Geiger-Mueller


counters). In either case, the high penetrability of the radiation allows the detector to
have reasonably heavy aluminum, beryllium, or plastic windows and to be carried at a
0.5 to 1.0m height. Dimensions of the active region of the detector (for example, the
thickness of a scintillation crystal) can be made larger to increase sensitivity. Because
the detection efficiencies are reasonably insensitive to energies in the energy regions of
interest, the detectors can be calibrated in terms of dosage (RAD or REM), rather than
in terms of activity. This practice reflects the common use for beta/gamma detectors.

C4.AP2.5.4. Typical of a beta/gamma detector is the Ludlum Model 3 with a


Ludlum 44-9 "pancake" (Geiger-Mueller) probe. Minimum detectability for such a
detector is a radiation field that produces readings two to three times greater than the
background (no contaminant, natural radiation plus electronic noise) reading.
Customarily, this corresponds to a few hundredths of a millirem per hour.

C4.AP2.6. X-RAY DETECTION

C4.AP2.6.1. For low energy (l7 to 100 keV) x-rays, the scintillation detector is
again the instrument of choice. Window thickness is again a factor, though not as
much as with alpha particles. For example, the half-thickness for absorption of 17
keV x-rays in aluminum is 0.4 mm and in air is about 4 meters. These factors increase
rapidly with energy. For 60 keV x-rays, the distances become 2.5 cm and 190 m,
respectively. Thus, for x-rays above 15 keV, an x-ray detector can be held at a
comfortable height (0.5 m) above the contaminated surface.

C4.AP2.6.2. The size of an electronic pulse produced by an x-ray in a


scintillation-type detector is proportional to the energy of the x-ray. This has a most
important application, commonly called pulse-height discrimination. Because of the
relatively low (10s of keV) energy of the x-rays of interest, an x-ray detector and its
electronics must be quite sensitive. Unfortunately, such a detector is sensitive also to
the myriad radiations from natural sources and to common low-level electronic noise.
The result is a deluge of signals that overwhelm the pulses from sought after x-rays.
To remove the unwanted signals, circuitry is installed in the meter to ignore all pulses
whose size lies below a user selectable lower level (threshold). In cases of high
(natural) background, it is also useful to discard all pulses whose size is greater than a
user selectable upper level. The accepted pulses, therefore, are only those from the
desired x-rays and that small amount of background that happens to fall in the same
pulse size region.

C4.AP2.6.3. Unfortunately, pulse-height discrimination is not as "easy" as

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

described above. In fact, the signals from the detection of identical x-rays will not be
identical in size; rather, a large number of such detections will produce a distribution
of pulse sizes that cluster about a mean pulse size. If one sets the lower-level
discriminator slightly below and the upper level slightly above the mean pulse size, a
large fraction of the desired pulses will be eliminated, resulting in a significant
decrease in detector response; however, setting the discriminator levels far from the
mean will admit too much background, thereby masking the true signals. See Figure
C4.AP2.F1. Thus, the setting of discriminator levels requires a qualitative judgment
that can significantly affect the readings from a given contamination. Furthermore,
since the width of the pulse size distribution depends in a most complicated way upon
the condition and age of the detector, it is impossible to specify one setting for all
similar instruments. Rather, techniques have been developed to establish the
sensitivity of a given detector, with its electronics, in a field environment. This
technique is described in the following section.

Figure C4.AP2.F1. Spectral Plot (Showing Normal Spread of Pulses from a Mono-Energetic
Source Mixed with aTypical Background Spectrum and Indicating Typical Discriminator
Settings)

C4.AP2.6.4. In spite of the above complications, the scintillation detector remains


the instrument of choice for detection of x-ray emitting radioactive contamination.
One such detector is the FIDLER. A FIDLER (4" x 1 mm. NaI [T1]) probe, in good
condition, mated to a Ludlum 2220 electronics package, can detect 60 keV activity as

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

low as 0.2 microcuries per meter. In a typical weapon grade mix for a medium aged
weapon, this mix would correspond to about 1 microcurie of plutonium per square
meter. Furthermore, since the x-rays are much less affected by overburden than are
alpha particles, the radiation monitor has much better control of the factors that
influence its meter readings. As a result, the monitor can make quantitative
measurements of the amount of radiation and infer the actual amount of contamination
with far greater confidence than with any other field technique.

C4.AP2.7. DETECTION OF URANIUM AND PLUTONIUM

C4.AP2.7.1. Although uranium and plutonium are alpha emitters, they and their
daughters also emit x-radiation; therefore, as discussed above, the instrument of choice
for detection of these elements is a scintillation detector.

C4.AP2.7.2. The detection of uranium contamination is fairly straightforward.


Among the radiations emitted in the decay of Uranium-235 and its daughters is an 80
keV x-ray. Setup and field calibration of the detector as described in this chapter
allows measurement of the x-ray activity per square meter and thus evaluation of the
uranium contamination. Confidence in the accuracy of these measurements is in the
11- to 25-percent range.

C4.AP2.7.3. The detection of plutonium is somewhat more complicated.


Plutonium-239 and its daughters emit a 17 keV x-ray that can be detected with a
FIDLER detector. However, absorption of that relatively low energy x-ray by
overburden plus interference by background signals in the same range as the desired
x-ray make measurement of the 17 keV a highly uncertain technique. The
determination of plutonium contamination can be made more confidently through the
following, indirect technique.

C4.AP2.7.3.1. Weapons grade plutonium contains several isotopes: in


addition to the dominant Pu-239, there is always a trace amount of Pu-241. Pu-241
beta decays, with a half-life of 14.35 years, to Am-241. Am-241 subsequently decays
with the emission of a 60-keV x-ray which, like the 80-keV x-ray of uranium, is
relatively easy to detect under field conditions. Thus, a most sensitive technique for
the detection of weapons grade plutonium is to detect the contaminant Am-241 and
infer the accompanying plutonium.

C4.AP2.7.3.2. Clearly, this technique requires more information than the


direct detection of radiation from the most plentiful isotope, such as knowledge of the
age and original assay of the weapon material; however, decay times, weapon age, and

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

assay are known or controllable quantities, whereas overburden and its effect on alpha
and low energy x-radiation are not. Thus, the safeguards community has standardized
upon the detection of plutonium via its americium daughter.

C4.AP2.7.4. To facilitate the calculations and calibration needed to measure


plutonium contamination by x-ray detection in the field, the LLNL has produced a
series of utility codes called the Hotspot Codes1, available for IBM-compatible
computers in both DOS and Windows 95/98NT4 versions. The Hotspot Codes
include an interactive, user-friendly utility routine called FIDLER that steps a user
through the process of calibrating an x-ray detector. The FIDLER code is applicable
to any x-ray detector if the full calibration technique, involving a known americium
calibration source, is used.

C4.AP2.7.5. Particularly useful in the FIDLER code is the provision to aid in the
measurement of the geometric factor for any specific detector. Measurements made at
the Ballistic Research Laboratory and the LLNL2 have shown that the value of K(h)
for h = 30 cm can vary from less than 0.4 m2 to more than 1.0 m2, apparently
depending upon external configuration and subtle internal details of a particular
FIDLER probe. For this reason, the FIDLER code contains both a detailed laboratory
procedure and a field expedient procedure for determining K(h) for a given detector.
The code provides also a default value of 0.5 m2. This value was chosen to give a
relatively conservative reading indication of contamination per count rate.

C4.AP2.8. LABORATORY TECHNIQUES

As discussed above, laboratory procedures are necessary to make quantitative


measurements of radiation contamination. For this reason, mobile laboratories are
available within DoD and DOE for deployment to an accident site. Although specific
instrumentation will vary, the types of laboratory analyses fall into three categories:
gamma and x-ray spectroscopy, alpha-beta counting, and liquid scintillation.
1 Steven G. Homann, Hotspot Health Physics Codes for the PC. Laurence Livermore National Laboratory UCRL-MS-106315
(March 1994).
2 Steven G. Homann, Hazard Control Department, Laurence Livermore National Laborator, private communication.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C4.AP2.8.1. Gamma and X-Ray spectroscopy. The major tools involved in


gamma and x-ray spectroscopy are a reasonably high-resolution gamma/x-ray detector
(such as an HPGe or selectively high resolution NaI) and a multi-channel analyzer.
With this equipment it is possible to accurately determine the energies of the gamma
and x-radiation emitted by a contaminated sample. Generally, spectroscopic
techniques are not used for absolute measurements of amount of contamination (i.e.,
microcuries) in a sample; however, by adjusting for the energy dependence of
detection efficiencies and using standard spectral unfolding techniques, the relative
amounts of various isotopes present in the contaminant may be determined
accurately. Recalling the discussions in the preceding sections, immediate application
can be seen for such information: for example, spectroscopy allows determination of
the relative abundance of Am-241 to Pu-239, resulting in accurate calibration of the
most sensitive (FIDLER) survey techniques.

C4.AP2.8.2. Alpha/Beta Counting

C4.AP2.8.2.1. Another laboratory technique, alpha/beta counting, results in a


reasonably accurate determination of the absolute amount of contamination in a
sample. Two types of counters are common and both are fairly simple in principle.
In one, a reasonably sensitive alpha/beta detector, such as a thin layer of ZnS mated to
a photomultiplier tube, is mounted in a chamber that is shielded to remove background
radiation. A sample, made very thin to minimize self-absorption, is inserted into the
chamber under the detector. In some apparatus, air is evacuated from the chamber to
eliminate air absorption of the radiation. The count rate is then measured. Knowing
the geometry of the experiment permits translating the count rate to an absolute
evaluation of sample activity.

C4.AP2.8.2.2. Another alpha/beta technique involves gas-flow proportional


counters. In these devices, a sample is inserted into the chamber of a proportional
counter. Any emitted radiation causes ionization of the gas in the counter that is
electronically amplified and counted.

C4.AP2.8.2.3. In both types of alpha/beta counter, the most difficult,


sensitive part of the experiment is the sample preparation. To achieve absolute
measurements of activity, absorption of the radiation must be minimized by the
overburden caused by the sample itself. Techniques used include dissolution of the
sample onto a sample holder; evaporation of the solvent leaves a very thin, negligibly
absorbing sample. Clearly, quantitative alpha/beta counting is a difficult,
time-consuming process.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C4.AP2.8.3. Liquid Scintillation

C4.AP2.8.3.1. In a few cases, notably in the detection of beta radiation from


tritium, the energy of the radiation is so low--and the resultant absorption is so
high--that solid samples cannot be used for quantitative analysis. In these cases,
dissolving the contaminant in a scintillating liquid may be possible. Glass vials of
such liquid can then be placed in a dark chamber and the resulting scintillation light
pulses counted using photomultipliers.

C4.AP2.8.3.2. Again, the outstanding difficulty with this process is in the


sample preparation. Scintillation liquids are extremely sensitive to most impurities
that tend to quench the output of light pulses. As a result, the most common technique
for liquid scintillation sample gathering is to wipe a fixed area (typically 100 square
centimeters) of a hard surface in the contaminated area with a small piece of cloth.
The cloth can then be immersed totally in scintillation liquid in such a way that
subsequent light emission will be visible to one of the photomultipliers in the analysis
chamber. Alternatively, the cloth can be replaced by a special plastic material that
dissolves in scintillation liquid without significantly quenching light output. In either
case, the technique works best when the contamination can be gathered without large
amounts of local dirt, oil, etc.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C4.AP3. APPENDIX 3 OF CHAPTER 4

ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING

C4.AP3.1. GENERAL

The collection and analysis of samples provides numerical data that describe a
particular situation. The JHEC will provide direction for sampling procedures. The
sampling criteria will be situation and site dependent. The results then may be used
for the formulation of a course of action. This appendix addresses air, soil,
vegetation, water, and swipe samples.

C4.AP3.1.1. Air Sampling. Air sampling is conducted to determine if airborne


contamination is present. It provides a basis for estimating the radiation dose that
people without respiratory protection may have received. The time required to
respond to an accident and initiate an air sampling program will result normally in little
or no data being obtained during the initial release of contamination when the highest
levels of airborne contamination are expected. Most air sampling data obtained during
an accident response will reflect airborne contamination caused by resuspension.
Even though this discussion is directed primarily at airborne contamination caused by
resuspension, the recommended priorities and procedures will permit as much
information as possible to be collected on the initial release if air samplers are
positioned soon enough. Priority should, therefore, be given to initiation of an air
sampling program as soon as possible after arrival on scene. Whether or not data is
obtained on the initial release, air sampling data will be needed immediately to assess
the hazard to people still in the area, to identify areas and operations that require
respiratory protection, and to identify actions required to fix the contaminant to reduce
the airborne hazard and spread of contamination. When using filtration to collect
particulate samples, the selection of filter medium is extremely important. The filter
used must have a high collection efficiency for particle sizes that will deposit readily in
the lung (5 microns or less).

C4.AP3.1.2. Response plans should include provisions for establishing an air


sampling program. This plan would include sufficient air monitors (battery powered
or a sufficient number of portable electric generators), air monitor stands, filter paper,
personnel to deploy samplers and collect filters, analysis capability, and a method to
mark and secure the area monitors against tampering. Also important is a means to
ensure that air samplers are properly calibrated (see Table C4.AP3.T1.) Staplex air
samplers use the CKHV calibrator for a 4-inch filter and CKHV-810 calibrator for the

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

8-inch x 10-inch filters. Normally, 1,000 cubic feet per minute (CFM) of air must be
sampled for accurate results.

Table C4.AP3.T1. Air Sampler Calibration


Filter Type Calibration Kit Flow Rate Operation Time
4" TFA #41 CKHV 18 CFM 55 min
4" TFA #2133 CKHV 36 CFM 28 min
4" TFA "S" CKHV 70 CFM 15 min
8" x 10" TFA-810 CKHV-810 50 CFM 20 min

C4.AP3.2. AIR SAMPLING TIME

The period of time over which an air sample is collected determines the volume of air
sampled. Variables that affect the accuracy of air sampling results include the type of
sampling equipment used, the accuracy with which contaminants on the filter can be
measured, and the size of the sample. The sum of the errors can be offset, in part, by
increasing the total volume of the sample collected. Increasing sample time presents
no real difficulty when the interest is in long-term average concentrations, precision of
results, or in detection of very low levels of contamination, as will be the case during
DECON and remediation operations. During the initial response, when the interest is
in rapid evaluation of air contamination to identify areas where high concentrations of
airborne contamination could pose a hazard to unprotected persons in relatively short
periods of time, short sampling times are appropriate. When taking samples for rapid
evaluation, samplers should be operated long enough to sample a minimum of 1,000
cubic feet of air. Once that data required for prompt evaluation is obtained, an air
sampling program should be established to obtain 24-hour samples (equipment
permitting), or high volume samples on a regular basis.

C4.AP3.3. AIR SAMPLER PLACEMENT

Sampler positioning is directed toward the first 24 to 48 hours following an accident,


or until an air sampling program tailored to the specific situation can be implemented.
During this period, the number of air samplers available will be limited and should be
placed to obtain the maximum amount of information possible.

C4.AP3.3.1. The amount of airborne contamination caused by resuspension will


vary from location to location as a function of surface type, physical activity, surface
wind patterns, and the level of contamination on the ground. Recommendations on

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the initial placement of samplers assume that the mix of surface types is relatively
constant throughout the area, that air samplers will be placed to minimize any localized
wind effects, and that the location of physical activity in the area (for example,
response actions or evacuation) will be known and controlled. The main variables in
determining the amount of airborne contamination will be ground contamination levels
and wind speed. To provide the quickest and most accurate estimate of the maximum
concentrations of airborne contamination, priority should therefore be given to placing
an air sampler at or near the most highly contaminated area that is accessible.

C4.AP3.3.2. Figure C4.AP3.F1. shows the recommended placement of air


samplers. The sampler number indicates the priority that should be given to
placement. All air sampling locations should be marked with a unique number or
symbol on a stake so that data may be correlated with other information in the
following days. During the initial response, sampler No. 1 is placed downwind from
the accident site to determine the hazard in the immediate area of the accident and
should operate continuously. The distance should be modified in a downwind
direction, if necessary, to permit access by a clear path for placement and periodic
readings and filter changes. The time of readings and/or filter changes should be
coordinated with EOD personnel. Sampler No. 2 is placed downwind from the
accident at a distance dependent upon the wind velocity (see Table C4.AP3.T2.).
Modifications to this location should be considered based on accessibility, the location
of nearby populated areas, and microclimatology. Downwind samplers should be
operated until it can be determined that no airborne contamination exists at their
locations and that actions taken upwind of the location or changes in meteorological
conditions will not result in airborne contamination. Sampler No. 3 is placed
approximately 610 meters upwind of all contamination and outside the contamination
control area to obtain simultaneous background air samples for use in interpretation of
other readings. Background samples should be collected concurrently with the sample
of interest, if possible, since the amount of naturally occurring airborne radioactive
particulates may vary as a function of time due to wind changes. Air sampler No. 4 is
placed at the CCS and operated continuously during CCS operations, since personnel
leaving the contaminated area may carry and resuspend contaminants. The amount of
contamination resuspended in this manner is expected to be small. During the initial
phases of response, consideration should be given to using all additional samplers, if
available, in downwind locations to supplement sampler No. 2, particularly when
populated areas are in or near the contaminated area.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

Figure C4.AP3.F1. Air Sampler Placement

Table C4.AP3.T2. Air Sampler Placement (No. 2) Distance


Wind Speed Approximate Downwind Distance
(MPH) (Knots) (Meters) (Feet)
6 to 10 4 to 9 1,000 3,300
11 to 15 10 to 13 1,500 5,100
16 to 20 14 to 17 2,000 6,600
Above 20 Above 17 2,500 8,200

C4.AP3.4. AIR SAMPLE DATA RECORDING

For air sampling data used in the overall radiological assessment and confirmation of
field calculations and confirmed or validated later by laboratory analysis, all pertinent
data must be recorded. An air sampling log containing all of the following data should

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

be maintained. When filters are changed, they should be placed in a plastic bag for
laboratory analysis and annotated with the following information:

C4.AP3.4.1. Type and serial number of sampler.

C4.AP3.4.2. Location of sampler, including identification of field marking (stake)


used to mark location.

C4.AP3.4.3. Average flow rate and/or volume of air.

C4.AP3.4.4. Date.

C4.AP3.4.5. Start and stop time of sample.

C4.AP3.4.6. Wind direction and weather conditions.

C4.AP3.4.7. Type of filter.

C4.AP3.4.8. Field readings on filter and time made, particularly if readings were
taken without changing filter, including radiation detection instrument type and serial
number as well as designation of attached probe used to monitor the filter.

C4.AP3.4.9. Laboratory facility to which the filter was sent for processing.

C4.AP3.5. AIR SAMPLE ANALYSIS

Air sampler filters can be analyzed using radioanalytical techniques by DOE,


RADCON, and AFRAT personnel, or by using a calculation method. The
calculations shown below are for field use in calculating gross activity on the filter.
Any background radiation from naturally occurring radionuclides (i.e., radon, thoron,
and their daughters) should be subtracted when applying the calculated results to
protection standards. This calculation is done by subtracting the gross activity of the
background sampler (No. 3) from the gross activity of the sampler of interest when
making rapid evaluations. Background corrected results may also be obtained by
letting the naturally occurring radon, thoron, and their daughters decay to
background. The radon chain may be considered completely decayed after almost 4
hours, and the thoron chain after almost 3 days. Remeasurement after these times
permits identification of the amount of sample activity caused by these elements.
During rapid field calculations early in the response, the check for radon is appropriate
if, or when, levels of airborne contamination detected are at or slightly above the

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

established levels. The 3-day decay time precludes checking for thoron during the
initial response.

C4.AP3.5.1. The following equation may be used for initial field evaluation of air
sampling data to obtain rough estimates of airborne contamination utilizing the
AN/PDR-60 or AN/PDR-56 (with the large probe attached) and 8 x 10-inch or 4-inch
(round) Whatman #41 filters. Results measured in Disintegration's per minute per
cubic meter (dpm/m3).
dpm/m3 = cpm x CF - Background
_____________
AFR x T (min) Reading

where cpm = Alpha meter reading on air filter in counts per minute
CF = Conversion factor (1,000 for AN/PDR-60; 4,000 for AN/PDR-56) includes unit
conversions, area correction factors, and other constants, assuming use of 8 x
10-inch Whatman #41 filter paper. For 4-inch, (round) filter paper, the conversion
factors are 200 and 800 for the AN/PDR-60 and AN/PDR-56, respectively.
AFR = Average Flow Rate of the air sampler in cubic feet per minute
T = Time in minutes the air sampler was running

C4.AP3.5.2. If other alpha instruments or filters are being used, the following
equation should be used for field evaluation of air sampling data. Results measured in
dpm/m3.
dpm/m3 = cpm x Af
_________________
0.5 x m3 x F x Ef x Ec x Ac

where cpm = Alpha meter reading on air filter in counts per minute
Af = Area of filter used (any units)
m3 = Total volume of sampled air in cubic meters
F = Alpha absorption factor for filter used (from manufacturer's specifications)
Ef = Collection efficiency of filter used (from manufacturer's specifications)
Ec = Efficiency of counting instrument
Ac = Area of filter actually counted by the instrument (same units as Af)

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C4.AP3.6. ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLES

C4.AP3.6.1. Soil. Soil sampling procedures depend on the purpose of the


sampling program. In all cases, careful selection of control (background) samples is
required to allow interpretation of results. The following minimum quantities are
necessary for analysis.

C4.AP3.6.1.1. Gamma spectrometry plus gross alpha and/or gross beta--2


kilograms of soil (approximately 1 square-foot area 3 inches deep).

C4.AP3.6.1.2. Gross alpha and/or gross beta only--100 grams.

C4.AP3.6.1.3. For a specific alpha and/or beta radionuclide, particularly


Pu-239 (plutonium)--consult the appropriate Service laboratory.

C4.AP3.6.2. Water

C4.AP3.6.2.1. Surface and/or waste discharge sources--2 liters.

C4.AP3.6.2.2. Drinking water sources--1 liter.

C4.AP3.6.3. Vegetation. The minimum sample volume is 3 liters of densely


packed sample and should be double plastic bagged or packed in a 1-gallon widemouth
plastic jar.

C4.AP3.6.4. Swipes. Filter paper discs are used for taking swipe tests.
Whatman #41 filter paper, 4.25 cm, FSN 6640-00-836-6870, is recommended for
swipes. If this is unavailable, other filter paper with a maximum diameter of 1 3/4
inches may be substituted. Place a small "x" IN PENCIL ONLY on the outer edge of
the filter paper on the side that is to touch the radioactive source or area being tested
for contamination. Each swipe should be taken from an area of about 100 cm2 by
gently rubbing two or three times with the dry filter paper disc. The swipe is then
placed, unfolded, in a properly completed Service form for a Swipe Container. If
forms are unavailable, a plain envelope containing the required collection information
may be substituted.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C4.AP4. APPENDIX 4 OF CHAPTER 4

SPECIALIZED RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING,


RADIAC REPAIR, AND HAZARD
ASSESSMENT/CAPABILITIES TEAMS

C4.AP4.1. GENERAL

C4.AP4.1.1. This appendix provides information on Service radiation monitoring


teams (health physics, bioassay specialists, and a radiation equipment repair team) and
on DOE and related monitoring and assessment capabilities.

C4.AP4.1.2. The detection/measurement of different types of radiation and the


inherent difficulties have been enumerated; however, in the event of an
incident/accident, radiation detection/measurement must be completed. The need of
preliminary data on the absence/presence of radiation for the CRTF is imperative.
Many military units and some civilian firms/agencies possess alpha and gamma
detection capabilities. These units/firms have equipment and individual monitor
capabilities that can provide radiation measurements and preliminary survey data;
however, a finite definition of the accident area is needed to plan, initiate, and
complete SR.

C4.AP4.1.3. The radiological characterization of the accident site is an iterative


process involving the systematic integration of data produced by several assessment
techniques. The following describes those resources available to enable theoretical,
preliminary, and definitive site characterization for the CRTF.

C4.AP4.2. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

C4.AP4.2.1. DTRA Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability. HPAC is a


forward deployable modeling capability available for Government,
Government-related, or academic use. This software tool assists in emergency
response to hazardous agent releases. Its fast running, physics-based algorithms
enable users to model and predict hazard areas and human collateral effects in
minutes. HPAC provides the capability to accurately predict the effects of HAZMAT
releases into the atmosphere and its impact on civilian and military populations. The
following paragraphs provide information regarding the HPAC modeling prediction
shown in Figures C4.AP4.F1. and C4.AP4.F2.

C4.AP4.2.1.1. HPAC provides the capability to accurately predict the effects

135 CHAPTER 4, APPENDIX 4


DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

of HAZMAT releases into the atmosphere and its impact on populations. The
software uses integrated source terms, high-resolution weather forecasts, and
particulate transport to model hazard areas produced by accidents. One of HPAC's
strengths is fast access to real-time weather data via Meteorological Data Servers
(MDS). HPAC also has embedded climatology or historical weather for use when real
weather is not available.

Figure C4.AP4.F1. HPAC Modeling Prediction - Surface Dose

136 CHAPTER 4, APPENDIX 4


DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

Figure C4.AP4.F2. HPAC Modeling Prediction - Hazards Area Effects

C4.AP4.2.1.2. HPAC models nuclear collateral effects of concern that may


result from military or industrial accidents. HPAC provides source information on
potential radioactive releases from nuclear weapons or reactor accidents.

C4.AP4.2.1.3. HPAC includes the SCIPUFF model for turbulent transport, a


new and advanced technology that provides a highly efficient and accurate prediction
for a wide range of hazard scenarios. HPAC can also help answer the question--"How
good is the prediction?"--providing probabilistic solutions to the atmospheric transport
problem. HPAC builds source terms for hazardous releases for input to the
atmospheric transport model, SCIPUFF. The current code hosts operator-friendly
"incident" setup capability. Sample HPAC projects are provided that may be edited to
suit a wide range of user requirements or incidents. Additional improvements in the
software are planned, but user feedback will ensure that these improvements include a
user's perspective, not just a scientist's.

C4.AP4.2.1.4. The HPAC Process. The overall process starts first with the
need to assess a hazard, then the statement of the problem in detail, followed by the

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

definition of the hazardous incident or source in HPAC. Meteorological data must be


available. Then the SCIPUFF code transports the hazardous cloud (or "puffs") in the
turbulent atmosphere. Effects of the HAZMAT at geographical locations are
calculated, and the results are provided to the user on a map or as a cross-section of the
atmosphere. The overall process is summarized in the following illustration (Figure
C4.AP4.F3.).

Figure C4.AP4.F3. HPAC Process

C4.AP4.2.1.5. Weather and Terrain. Weather is a key ingredient to the


HPAC process. Although SCIPUFF is an accurate and efficient transport model, the
results of a hazardous release are first and foremost affected by weather and how well
the meteorology is defined. There are two types of inputs: observations and gridded
numerical model data. Meteorological (MET) data are time sensitive. To keep the
level of understanding required to use HPAC and logistics to a minimum, the simpler
MET inputs to SCIPUFF (surface and upper air observations) will be presented here.
More advanced and accurate capabilities, such as very high resolution mesoscale
weather models, are available on DTRA's MDS.

C4.AP4.2.1.5.1. In general, meteorological observations are very


representative of the real world at the time and location where the data are taken.

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Assuming the weather does not change, reasonable results can be obtained for a period
of 2 to 4 hours after the surface observations are taken. Upper air observations may
be representative of a somewhat longer period of time. Observations at more
locations, over a longer time period are needed to accurately assess longer duration,
longer range, and more lethal releases.

C4.AP4.2.1.5.2. Forecasts and/or updated observations are needed for


longer duration releases, but gridded forecast data are sometimes difficult to obtain and
often are not accurate for transport applications. A single set of meteorological
observations becomes less representative with distance from the observation site, with
time from which the data are taken, around complex terrain, near sunrise and sunset,
near weather fronts, urban areas, and land/water interfaces.

C4.AP4.2.1.5.3. Fast access to weather data for HPAC users became


highly advanced with the introduction of the DTRA MDS. Obtaining weather data is
as easy as a click on a mouse with HPAC's weather request generator, which provides
access to forecast model and observation data in minutes.

C4.AP4.2.1.5.4. Terrain may have a large effect on where HAZMAT


are transported. In addition to working with a variety of weather data types, HPAC
works with two types of terrain data. By default, HPAC assumes a flat earth for the
terrain, and this may be a reasonable approximation for small spatial domains;
however, users may choose to use complex, 3-D terrain data describing the
topographic variations. When the complex terrain option is used, it automatically
invokes a mass consistent wind and turbulence model that is embedded within HPAC.
The digital terrain data files contained in HPAC were developed using DTED® Level
0, a product of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). HPAC terrain
models include an urban setting to closely approximate the effects of high-rise
buildings.

C4.AP4.2.2. U.S. Army Radiological Control Team. The RADCON Team is a


specialized response force located at Fort Monmouth, NJ, and organized to provide
technical assistance, support, and advice to the CRTF in radiological emergencies.

C4.AP4.2.2.1. The USA RADCON Team is organized to:

C4.AP4.2.2.1.1. Provide a 4-hour response capability to any nuclear


accident or radiological emergency.

C4.AP4.2.2.1.2. Perform detailed radiological surveys for alpha, beta,


and gamma radiation.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C4.AP4.2.2.1.3. Maintain a mobile radiological analysis laboratory


capable of providing on-site analysis of virtually every type of swipe or sample that
may be taken as a result of nuclear materials accident or incident.

C4.AP4.2.2.1.4. Supervise and provide technical advice for DECON


operations.

C4.AP4.2.2.1.5. Provide NIST traceable calibration and repair services


for portable radiation detection equipment.

C4.AP4.2.2.1.6. Provide a team of health physicists and specialists to


serve as the radiological component of the Department of the Army (DA) Service
Response Force. This team provides the On-Scene Commander with technical
assistance and advice necessary to make comprehensive assessments on all radiological
aspects of accidents or incidents. The team provides advice and management
regarding radiological safety, operational support, and radiological control and
containment of the accident site.

C4.AP4.2.2.2. Requests for additional information should be directed to


USA RADCON personnel. RADCON team assistance may be requested through the
USA Operations Center or the JNACC. Phone numbers are listed in Appendix
C22.AP1.

C4.AP4.2.3. USAF Institute for Environment, Safety, and Occupational Health


Risk Analysis (IERA). The IERA, Brooks Air Force Base (AFB), TX, 78235,
provides many radiation protection services as follows:

C4.AP4.2.3.1. Conducts calibration, traceable to the National Institute of


Standards and Technology (NIST), and minor repair services for portable instruments
used and owned by the USAF Medical Service for the detection and measurement of
electromagnetic and ionizing radiation.

C4.AP4.2.3.2. Maintains the USAF stock of low energy photon field survey
instruments with trained operators to support disaster operations.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C4.AP4.2.3.3. Deploys a field-qualified team of health physicists, health


physics technicians, and equipment called the AFRAT. This team is capable of
responding worldwide to radiation accidents with air transportable equipment for
detecting, identifying, and quantifying any type of radiation hazard; radioisotope
analysis of selected environmental, biological, and manufactured materials; and on-site
equipment maintenance and calibration.

C4.AP4.2.3.4. Conducts special projects dealing with long- and short-term


evaluations of radiation exposures.

C4.AP4.2.3.5. Requests for additional information should be directed to


IERA personnel. IERA services may be requested through the USAF Operations
Center or the JNACC.

C4.AP4.3. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Services of DOE capabilities will be requested by the DOE SEO.

C4.AP4.3.1. Hotspot Health Physics Codes

C4.AP4.3.1.1. The Hotspot Health Physics Codes were developed for the
DOE's ARG to provide emergency response personnel and emergency planners with a
fast, field-portable set of software tools for evaluating incidents involving radioactive
material. Hotspot codes are a first-order approximation of the radiation effects
associated with the atmospheric release of radioactive materials. The Hotspot
atmospheric dispersion models are designed for a short-term (less than 24 hours)
release duration. Users requiring radiological release consequences for release
scenarios over a longer time period or more sophisticated modeling capabilities, e.g.,
complex terrain; multi-location real-time wind field data; etc., are directed to such
capabilities as the Department of Energy's ARAC computer codes. The Hotspot codes
have been completely revised to take advantage of the Windows® 95/98/NT operating
system environment. The DOS version of Hotspot will also be supported.

C4.AP4.3.1.2. Four general programs--Plume, Explosion, Fire, and


Resuspension--estimate the downwind radiological impact following the release of
radioactive material resulting from a continuous or puff release, explosive release, fuel
fire, or an area contamination event. Additional programs deal specifically with the
release of plutonium, uranium, and tritium to expedite an initial assessment of
accidents involving nuclear weapons.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C4.AP4.3.1.3. The FIDLER program is a tool for calibrating radiation survey


instruments for ground-survey measurements and initial screening of personnel for
possible plutonium uptake in the lung.

C4.AP4.3.1.4. The Nuclear Explosion program estimates the effects of a


surface-burst nuclear weapon. These include prompt effects (Neutron and gamma,
blast, and thermal), and fallout information. Fallout includes arrival time, dose rate at
arrival time, and integrated dose contours for several time periods (e.g., first 6 hours,
first day, first week, etc.).

C4.AP4.3.1.5. Hotspot is a hybrid of the well-established Gaussian plume


model, widely used for initial emergency assessment or safety-analysis planning.
Virtual source terms are used to model the initial atmospheric distribution of source
material following an explosion, fire, resuspension, or user-input geometry.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

Figure C4.AP4.F4. Hotspot Fire Model Geometry

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

Figure C4.AP4.F5. Hotspot Explosion Model Geometry

C4.AP4.3.1.6. Hotspot incorporates a full International Commission on


Radiological Protection, Part 30 (ICRP-30) library. The library contains Dose
Conversion Factors (DCFs) for inhalation, submersion, and ground shine. In addition
to the inhalation 50-year Committed Effective Dose Equivalent DCFs, acute (24-hour)
DCFs are available for estimating non-stochastic effects. This acute mode can be
used for estimating the immediate radiological impact associated with high acute
radiation doses (applicable target organs are the lung, small intestine wall, and red
bone marrow).

C4.AP4.3.1.7. The ICRP Publication 30 Respiratory Tract and ICRP-30 Part


IV Systemic models are the basis for the DCFs. A one micrometer activity median
aerodynamic diameter (1 AMAD), and ICRP-26/30 tissue weighting factors are
assumed. Hotspot supports both classic units (rem, rad, curie) and SI (Sv, Gy, Bq)
units. Users can add radionuclides and custom mixtures (up to 50 radionuclides per
mixture).

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C4.AP4.3.1.8. Tables and graphical output can be directed to the computer


screen, printer, or a disk file. The graphical output consists of dose and ground
contamination as a function of plume centerline downwind distance, and radiation
dose and ground contamination contours. Users have the option of displaying
scenario text on the plots.

Figure C4.AP4.F6. Hotspot Downwind Plume Centerline (Stability A-F)

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

Figure C4.AP4.F7. Hotspot Plume Contour Plot

C4.AP4.3.1.9. Radiation dose and ground contamination contours can also


be saved as mapping files for display on geographical maps. Latitude and Longitude,
Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM), and Military Grid Reference System (MGRS)
geographical coordinate systems are supported for interfacing Hotspot dispersion
contours with commercial mapping systems.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

Figure C4.AP4.F8. Hotspot Plume Contours Displayed on Geographical Map

C4.AP4.3.1.10. Hotspot strictly follows the well-established Gaussian


model, and does not use any "black-box" techniques. All algorithms are presented and
referenced in the documentation. Operating instructions for the Windows version are
located on the extensive onboard help feature.

C4.AP4.3.2. Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability. ARAC is a DOE and


DoD resource, directed by LLNL, that provides support to emergency response teams
during accidents involving radioactive materials.

C4.AP4.3.2.1. ARAC provides the user with computer model estimates of


the contamination distribution resulting from a nuclear weapon accident. ARAC
products include computer-generated estimates of the location and contamination
levels of deposited radiological material and radiation dosage to exposed population in
the surrounding areas. Until time and equipment permit completion of extensive
radiation surveys and bioassays, ARAC projections will assist in assessing the potential
impact of an accident and in identifying areas for initial investigation by response force
radiological teams.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C4.AP4.3.2.2. In the event of a nuclear weapon accident at or near an


ARAC-serviced facility, the ARAC Center will be alerted by the facility's personnel
using the ARAC site system computer located at the installation, immediately after the
initial report to the NMCC is completed. If the accident occurred in a continental
United States (CONUS) area, remote from an ARAC-serviced DoD installation,
notification of ARAC will come through the NMCC's JNAIRT; however, ARAC may
be contacted directly by the installation initiating the OPREP-3 by calling ARAC's
emergency number: commercial (925) 422-9100.

C4.AP4.3.2.3. During normal working hours (currently 0730 to 1615 Pacific


Time), initial estimates of the extent of contamination can be ready for transmission
from ARAC approximately 30 minutes after ARAC has received notification of the:

C4.AP4.3.2.3.1. Accident location.

C4.AP4.3.2.3.2. Time of accident.

C4.AP4.3.2.3.3. Type and quantity of weapons involved in the accident


(weapon information should be transmitted using the line number(s) contained in
reference (h)).

C4.AP4.3.2.4. Responses outside the hours listed above are subject to an


additional 60- to 90-minute delay.

C4.AP4.3.2.5. Every effort should be made to provide updated or


supplementary information to the ARAC Center as soon as it is available. Desired
information includes:

C4.AP4.3.2.5.1. Observed wind speed and wind direction at the time of


the accident and subsequent weather changes.

C4.AP4.3.2.5.2. Description of accident particulars, including line


numbers for the specific weapon(s) releasing contamination, type and amount of fuel
involved (ARAC has typical values for DoD aircraft and other transport vehicles), and
measured contamination at specific locations with respect to the contamination source,
if available.

C4.AP4.3.2.5.3. Specific details of accident fire or explosion, such as


mechanism of the release (HE detonation or fire), duration of any fire, and height and
size of the plume or cloud (if available from reliable observers).

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C4.AP4.3.2.6. Approximately 30 minutes after the ARAC facility has been


notified of the necessary accident information, a computer-generated estimate of
maximum credible ground-level contamination spread and projected whole-body
effective dose to exposed persons in the downwind area will be available.
Conservative assumptions are made in calculating the amount of radiological material
released so that these initial projections place an upper bound on levels of resulting
contamination and dose. Weapons at risk, when exposed to unusual stress during the
accident, may undergo a nonnuclear high explosive detonation. It is assumed that all
the nuclear material at risk will be released in an aerosolized form. Similar
conservative assumptions are made where specific accident information is missing or
unknown. If the accident location is not close to an ARAC-serviced CONUS site, the
initial projections will probably not include geographic features (roads, city
boundaries, etc.). ARAC-projected doses will assist initial response efforts in
evaluating the potential hazard to the general public until comprehensive radiation
measurements and bioassays can be performed. Projected deposition patterns will
assist estimates of SR efforts.

C4.AP4.3.2.7. Approximately 60 to 90 minutes after notification of ARAC, a


more refined projection will be available if somewhat less conservative assumptions
are made in estimating the actual amount of material at risk released during the
accident. (Estimates are now based on only those weapons known to have undergone
an HE detonation). For consequence analyses, ARAC can generate a calculation
based on a meteorological forecast to give projected contamination patterns in case of
dispersal during a weapon safing operation. Although the initial projections are
shown typically on a 30 by 30-kilometer grid, these refined projections may cover
either a larger or smaller area depending on the downwind extent of the
contamination. Note that ARAC can generate projection plots to match a given map
scale (for example, 1:50,000) for ease of overlaying the projected deposition pattern.

C4.AP4.3.2.8. When available, ARAC may be transmitted to the ARAC site


system computer located at most ARAC-serviced sites. If the site does not have a site
system computer, the projections can be telefaxed. The following paragraphs provide
information regarding the ARAC example "initial" projections shown in Figures
C4.AP4.F4. and C4.AP4.F5.

C4.AP4.3.2.8.1. Geographic Contour Display. Release location is


centered in this area (refined projections may have release location offset from center)
with a 2,000-foot fragmentation circle drawn around the release point. The display is
always oriented with north toward the top. A maximum of three contoured areas will

149 CHAPTER 4, APPENDIX 4


DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

be shown emanating from the release point that will, in most cases, overlay a
geographic representation, showing road networks and waterways, etc., of the area
around the accident site. Printed across the top of each graphic display area will be
the title of the underlying computer estimation denoting either a "50-Year Whole Body
Effective Dose" or "Cumulative Deposition" plot.

Figure C4.AP4.F9. ARAC PLOT - Lung Dose

150 CHAPTER 4, APPENDIX 4


DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

Figure C4.AP4.F10. ARAC PLOT - Deposition

C4.AP4.3.2.8.2. Descriptive Notes. To the right of the contour display


will be a legend. The first line is a title line for these notes. The second line will
denote the date and time that the specific computer model estimation was produced.
Lines three through six will be reserved for general amplifying remarks about the
computer estimation. Line seven identifies either the dose integration period or total
deposition period time, as appropriate. (NOTE: All times will be shown as "Z" time.
"Z" is equivalent to Universal Coordinated Time [UCT], which has replaced the more
familiar Greenwich Mean Time [GMT]). Line nine shows the radiological material
modeled, and the height above ground level at which the contour levels are calculated
and displayed. Lines 10 through 22 will show the specific computer estimation action
levels as calculated for that particular plot. The next several lines (down to the scale
of the display shown in both kilometers and feet) comprise three separate blocks of
information. Within each block is an area showing a particular contour cross-hatch
pattern used to mark areas in the contour display where the dose or deposition is
greater than the stated value, the area covered by this particular pattern in square

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

kilometers, and abbreviated, generalized actions that may be considered within this
area. Note that the area given will encompass the area of all higher levels shown (for
example, the area given for exceeding 25 Roentgen Equivalent Man/Mammal (REM)
is the sum of the area covered by the 25 and 150 REM contour patterns). There are a
maximum of three cumulative deposition and four dose exposure levels for which
projections are made. Only the areas with the three highest projected levels will be
shown on any ARAC plot. Projected cumulative depositions are for levels greater
than 600, 60, and 6 microCuries per square meter (µCi/m2). Dose exposures are
projected for levels greater than 150, 25, 5, and 0.5 REM, which refer to a 50-year
whole body effective dose via the inhalation pathway.

C4.AP4.3.2.9. The wording that accompanies the action levels in the legend
follows:

C4.AP4.3.2.9.1. 50-Year Whole Body Effective Dose "Exposure Action


Levels." Projected doses apply only to people outdoors without respiratory protection
from the time of the accident until the valid time of the plot, and recommended actions
are to reduce the projected dose to those people exposed.

C4.AP4.3.2.9.1.1. Greater than 50 REM--Immediate respiratory


protection and evacuation recommended.

C4.AP4.3.2.9.1.2. Greater than 25 REM--Prompt action required;


respiratory protection required; consider sheltering or evacuation.

C4.AP4.3.2.9.1.3. Greater than 5 REM--Respiratory protection


required; recommend sheltering; consider evacuation.

C4.AP4.3.2.9.1.4. Greater than 0.5 REM--Consider sheltering.

C4.AP4.3.2.9.2. Cumulative Deposition "Exposure Action Levels"

C4.AP4.3.2.9.2.1. Greater than 600 µCi/m²--Immediate action may


be required until the contamination is stabilized or removed; issue sheltering
instructions; recommend controlled evacuation.

C4.AP4.3.2.9.2.2. Greater than 60 µCi/m²--Supervised area; issue


sheltering instructions; recommend controlled evacuation 2 to 14 days.

C4.AP4.3.2.9.2.3. Greater than 6 µCi/m²--Restricted area; access


on need only basis; possible controlled evacuation required.

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C4.AP4.3.2.9.3. The wording of the preceding deposition action levels


was contracted because of space limitations on the ARAC plots. The full wording
follows:

C4.AP4.3.2.9.3.1. Greater than 600 µCi/m²--Immediate action


required. Urgent remedial action may be needed from within a few hours up to 2
days. Full personal protective clothing and respiratory protection required by all
emergency staff in this area. Residents should remain indoors with doors and
windows closed. HVAC and room air conditioners should be turned off. Controlled
evacuation of children and adults should be considered urgent. All work on, or the
use of, agricultural products and/or meat and poultry must be controlled and further
action regarding them assessed.

C4.AP4.3.2.9.3.2. Greater than 60 µCi/m²--Supervised area.


Controlled evacuation should be considered and may have to occur, lasting between
about 2+ days and 2+ weeks or more. All activities should be considered carefully
and supervised. Full anti-contamination clothing and respirators required for all
personnel engaged in heavy work or dusty, windy operations. Residents should
remain indoors with windows closed unless evacuation is in progress or there is no
significant airborne hazard and none forecast to occur via resuspension.

C4.AP4.3.2.9.3.3. Greater than 6 µCi/m²-Restricted area. Entry


restricted to those who live, work, and/or have a need to be there. DECON personnel
and public health and safety staff should wear limited personal protective clothing.
Controlled evacuation of residents, especially children, is possible during DECON if
there is a possibility of airborne contamination via resuspension.

C4.AP4.3.3. Aerial Measuring System

C4.AP4.3.3.1. General. The DOE AMS has four capabilities available to


support a weapon accident: aerial radiological mapping, aerial search for weapons
and/or weapon components, multispectral/hyperspectral/thermal imagery, and aerial
photography.

C4.AP4.3.3.2. Aerial Radiological Mapping. Aerial radiological surveys


provide rapid assessment and thorough coverage of large areas and yield average
ground concentration of the contaminant. The system can also be used to quickly
prepare lower sensitivity, but appropriately scaled, incident site maps.
Instrumentation includes large volume, sodium-iodide gamma-ray detectors, data

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

formatting and recording equipment, positioning equipment, meteorological


instruments, direct readout hardware, and data analysis equipment. A variety of
DOE-owned aerial platforms (fixed-wing and helicopter) are dedicated to supporting
this mission. Also, equipment capable of being mounted on a variety of DoD
helicopters is available to perform survey missions, as needed. The availability of
NATO-standard pods reduces the time required for airframe preparation.

C4.AP4.3.3.2.1. In a nuclear weapon accident, a preliminary


radiological survey would establish whether radioactive materials had been dispersed
from the weapon. Dispersion patterns and relative radiation intensities, immediately
available from the initial survey, may be used to guide radiation survey teams to the
areas of heaviest contamination. AMS personnel will assist interpreting and
correlating their information with other radiological survey data through the FRMAC.
Additional data processing will establish the identity and concentration of the isotopes
involved. Subsequent surveys could provide data on the progress of cleanup
operations.

C4.AP4.3.3.2.2. The first radiological survey conducted after a weapon


accident is likely to follow this protocol and timeframe:

C4.AP4.3.3.2.2.1. The fixed-wing aircraft would arrive 6 to 12


hours following notification.

C4.AP4.3.3.2.2.2. The fixed-wing aircraft would then be refueled


and the crew would obtain instructions within 2 hours.

C4.AP4.3.3.2.2.3. A survey would then be conducted in a


serpentine pattern of survey lines 0.5 to 5 miles apart to determine:

C4.AP4.3.3.2.2.3.1. Radiological deposition outline.

C4.AP4.3.3.2.2.3.2. Direction of the plume centerline.

C4.AP4.3.3.2.2.3.3. Approximate radiation levels along the


plume centerline.

C4.AP4.3.3.2.2.3.4. Dominant isotopes.

C4.AP4.3.3.2.2.4. The survey information would then be


transmitted by radio or satellite telephone to the FRMAC during the survey.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C4.AP4.3.3.2.2.5. The analysis laboratory would arrive 4 hours


(plus driving time) after notification.

C4.AP4.3.3.2.2.6. Full analysis of flight results would be available


6 to 12 hours after the flight is completed or after the analysis laboratory arrives.

C4.AP4.3.3.2.3. After the first broad survey is completed, a series of


smaller area surveys would be initiated with the AMS helicopter. The flight altitude
would likely be 100 to 150 feet with 200-foot line spacings and has a detector field of
view around 300 feet in diameter. The purpose of these surveys would be to map the
contaminated area in detail. The length of time required to complete this series of
surveys may be from 1 to 5 days, depending upon the area to be surveyed and the
weather.

C4.AP4.3.3.2.4. Another survey that could be initiated is called KIWI.


KIWI uses the same system used on a helicopter, but is mounted on a four-wheel drive
vehicle instead. Unlike the AMS helicopter, the KIWI is approximately 3 feet above
the ground and has a detector field of view around 10 feet in diameter. KIWI gives a
high-spatial resolution mapping of contamination.

C4.AP4.3.3.2.5. The results of an aerial survey to produce early phase


radiological data and radiological data measurements are shown in Figures
C4.AP4.F11., C4.AP4.F12., and C4.AP4.F13.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

Figure C4.AP4.F11. Aerial Survey Results - Early Phase Radiological Data

156 CHAPTER 4, APPENDIX 4


DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

Figure C4.AP4.F12. Aerial Survey Results - Radiological Data Measurements, AMS


Serpentine, and Field Measurements

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

Figure C4.AP4.F13. Aerial Survey Results - Radiological Data Measurements, AMS


Contours, and AIMS KIWI

C4.AP4.3.3.2.5. The sensitivity of the system depends upon the flight


altitude, area of contamination, and the interference of other isotopes (both natural and
manmade). Experience has shown that the lower level of detectability of Am-241 can
be expected to be 0.03 to l.0 µCi/m², and 0.03 to 0.3 µCi/m² for both Cs-137 and
I-131. The americium concentrations indicated represents on the order of 1 to 10
µCi/m² of plutonium.

C4.AP4.3.3.2.6. Comparison with ground-based survey and sample


results should be done with caution. The area sampled in a single aerial measurement
is on the order of 1,000 times the area sampled by a FIDLER-type instrument at 1 foot
above the ground and 1,000,000 times larger than the area sampled by an alpha probe
or a soil sample. The aerial survey results average scale averages and take into
account the overall effect of roads, ditches, water bodies, vegetation cover, and terrain
effects.

C4.AP4.3.3.3. Aerial Search. In certain scenarios, the aerial search

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

capabilities available from AMS capabilities may need to be employed. These consist
of gamma and neutron detector modules designed for the DOE-owned B0-105 or Bell
412 helicopters or portable modules that can be used in helicopters, such as the UH-60
and UH-1 with appropriate modifications. This capability may be useful only for
certain sources of known detectability and normally requires low altitudes (100 feet or
less) and slow speeds (approximately 60 knots). Aerial search personnel will be able
to determine the appropriate flight parameters when notified of the particular scenario.

C4.AP4.3.3.4. Aerial Multispectral/Hyperspectral/Thermal Imagery. Aerial


imagery using a variety of sophisticated sensor suites can be used to locate debris that
has scattered around the accident site. Rigorous analyses allows for specific
georeferences to be applied to each pixel of an image.

C4.AP4.3.3.5. Aerial Photography. Two major photographic systems are


used to acquire detailed aerial photos over a site. One system consists of a large
format aerial mapping camera operated in fixed-wing aircraft, which produces detailed
aerial photographs. A second system operates out of helicopters, utilizing the
Hasselblad 70mm cameras to produce color photographs. Film from the Hasselblad
system can be produced and printed under field conditions. Large prints up to 20 x 24
inches produced to map scales can be printed on site generally within hours of the
completion of the flight. Digital photography is also available.

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C4.AP5. APPENDIX 5 OF CHAPTER 4

AREA AND RESOURCE SURVEYS

C4.AP5.1. SURVEYS

C4.AP5.1.1. General. Extensive radiation predictions and surveys will be


required to identify and characterize the area for decontamination and to develop and
evaluate remediation plans. During the initial hours of the response, available
radiation survey instruments and monitoring personnel for survey operations will be
limited. Determining whether contamination was released by the accident must be
done immediately. If a release occurred, priority must be given to those actions
required to identify and minimize the hazards to people. These actions include
identification of the affected area (perimeter survey) to permit identification of
potentially contaminated people. Each successive survey operation will be based in
part on the information gained from earlier operations. Initial radiation surveys may
be based on ARAC information, if available, or only on the knowledge that
contamination will be dispersed downwind. Later surveys will be based on the initial
survey data and AMS plots. Days will be required to complete comprehensive
contamination characterization.

C4.AP5.1.2. General Survey Procedures. Selection of instrumentation,


identification of the edge of contamination, determination of the location of
measurements made, and data recording procedures are similar for most survey
operations.

C4.AP5.1.2.1. Selection of Instrumentation

C4.AP5.1.2.1.1. Alpha Instruments. nstruments that detect Alpha


radiation can detect lower levels of contamination than instruments that detect low
energy gamma radiation. Under field conditions, however, alpha radiation has an
extremely short detection range and its detection may be blocked by nothing more than
surface moisture. Alpha surveys are possible only under dry conditions, for example,
after any morning dew has evaporated. The fragility of the Mylar probe face on most
alpha instruments combined with the short detection range of alpha radiation results in
a high rate of instrument failure when field use requires measurement of contamination
on rough ground or other irregular surfaces. Alpha instruments should therefore be
used primarily for personnel and equipment monitoring at the hot line. Field use
should be limited to only smooth surfaces like pavement and buildings.

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C4.AP5.1.2.1.2. Low Energy Gamma Instruments. Instruments capable


of detecting the low energy gamma ray and x-ray radiations from plutonium, and its
americium daughter, may be used to detect contamination. Low energy gamma/x-ray
instruments are not subject to damage by surfaces being monitored and field surveys
can be rapidly conducted. Low energy gamma instruments are, therefore, the
recommended instruments for field surveys of plutonium contamination, whereas the
SPA 3 probe is more useful for measuring the medium energy gamma radiation from
uranium. For the best detection efficiency, low energy x-ray surveys should be
conducted prior to any rainfall, and during the first 5 days after the accident before part
of the measurable low energy radiation present is screened by the plutonium migrating
into the soil. The best instrumentation for low energy gamma/x-ray surveys uses
FIDLER probes, which will not normally be available until the specialized teams
arrive. The type and amount of low energy gamma and x-ray radiation present
depends on the age of the plutonium. Many weapons will contain plutonium more
than 10 years old, resulting in higher signal strengths for the same level of
contamination as that produced by a "new" weapon; therefore, the age of the plutonium
and projected signal strength should be determined as soon as possible. The age of
the plutonium in a weapon can be obtained from the DOE ARG.

C4.AP5.1.2.2. Perimeter Contamination Levels. When alpha instruments


are used to establish the perimeter, readings of 500 counts per minute (CPM) are
recommended for instruments with 60-cm probe area and 105 CPM for instruments
with 17-cm probes be used to mark the perimeter. When low energy gamma/x-ray
instruments are used to establish the perimeter, a reading of twice the background is
recommended to mark the perimeter. FIDLERs are recommended to perform
perimeter surveys, with alpha instruments the second choice. If FIDLERs are
unavailable, and if weather or field conditions preclude the use of alpha instruments,
the AN/PDR-56F, with the x-ray probe attached, may be used. If fission products
were caused by the accident, priority should be given to establishing a 10 mR/hr
perimeter.

C4.AP5.1.2.3. Fixing Survey Points

C4.AP5.1.2.3.1. For radiation monitoring data to be useful, the point


where it is collected must be identifiable on a map or aerial photo of the area. Global
positioning equipment may be unavailable to determine precise positions in the early
phases of response, or the immediate need for radiological data may outweigh the time
required to determine precise positions.

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C4.AP5.1.2.3.1.1. Data points should be marked in some manner so


that the point can be later relocated for other actions, or the position determined
precisely for later correlation of the data with other information.

C4.AP5.1.2.3.1.2. A numbered or uniquely identified stake may be


used to mark the location on soil, and a similar unique identification painted or
otherwise marked on pavement or other hard surfaces for later reference. When
engineering survey equipment is not being used, the monitoring log, or data collection
record, should show the identification marking used at each point, and an estimated
position to use immediately following data collection.

C4.AP5.1.2.3.1.3. Estimated positions may be street addresses in


urban areas, the estimated distance down a street or road from an identifiable
intersection, compass bearings taken on two or more identified reference points, or any
other reference that can be located on the maps being used. If a vehicle is used during
the initial perimeter survey, the odometer mileage from an intersection or other known
point may be adequate for identifying positions in sparsely populated areas.

C4.AP5.1.2.4. Recording Survey Data

C4.AP5.1.2.4.1. If an engineering survey is being performed


concurrently with the radiological survey, recording procedures must ensure that
positional data being recorded at the transit position and radiological data being
recorded by the monitors can be correlated. Monitoring and survey teams' records
should include the following information:

C4.AP5.1.2.4.1.1. Team member names.

C4.AP5.1.2.4.1.2. Type instrument and serial number.

C4.AP5.1.2.4.1.3. Date and start/stop time of survey.

C4.AP5.1.2.4.1.4. Data location mark (stake number or other


marking) when used.

C4.AP5.1.2.4.1.5. Estimated or surveyed position.

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C4.AP5.1.2.4.1.6. Instrument reading indicating if the reading is


"Gross," meaning background radiation reading has not been subtracted or "Net,"
meaning the background radiation reading has been subtracted from the instrument
reading.

C4.AP5.1.2.5. Perimeter Surveys

C4.AP5.1.2.5.1. Initial Perimeter Survey. Rapid identification of the


perimeter of the contaminated area is required to prevent undue alarm, to aid in
identifying affected people, and to establish controls to prevent the spread of
contamination. The CRTF and civil authorities will need at least a rough plot of the
perimeter as soon as possible upon which to base their actions. The urgency of
perimeter definition is directly related to the population in the area. Streets and roads
will normally provide rapid access to populated areas, although the location of rivers
or other terrain features that may hinder access to portions of the potentially
contaminated area must be considered when directing the perimeter survey. The
contaminated area may be a mile or more wide and several miles long, therefore use of
widely separated monitoring points and a vehicle to move between monitoring points
should be considered when directing the initial perimeter survey. ARAC projections,
if available, will assist in determining the area and distance the perimeter survey teams
may be required to cover, and perimeter survey procedures may be adjusted
accordingly. If perimeter survey teams are equipped with a radio, a position report at
the perimeter locations on each traverse will provide an immediate location of the
perimeter to the command center and permit team progress to be tracked. While not
classified, transmission of radiation readings should be discouraged on unsecured
nets. Results of the perimeter survey (measurement data, pattern sketch, etc.), should
be sent to ARAC, which can then be used to refine the source team and the disposition
pattern.

C4.AP5.1.2.5.2. Full Perimeter Survey. FIDLERs should be used when


performing a full survey of the perimeter. This may not be possible until after the
specialized teams arrive and may take weeks to complete. The procedure most likely
to be used will consist of monitoring in and out along the edge of the area with
readings being taken about every 50 feet. If weather or terrain require the use of the
AN/PDR-56 x-ray probe on the initial perimeter survey, the full perimeter survey can
result in an expansion of the perimeter. If an alpha instrument was used for the initial
perimeter survey, the perimeter established by the full perimeter survey should be
about the same size or slightly smaller.

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C4.AP5.1.2.6. Area Surveys. Radiological surveys of the contaminated area


are required to identify areas requiring the replication of fixatives, to support
decontamination and remediation planning, and to determine DECON effectiveness.
The first survey covering the entire area will be provided most times by the AMS.
The initial AMS helicopter data will be available 4 to 5 hours after completion of
survey flights. Fixed-wing survey results are normally available 1 hour after
completion of the flight. The AMS plot requires interpretation by trained analysts.
Ground survey data is required to validate and support analysis of the plot. Some of
the supporting ground data may be provided by the initial perimeter survey. Ground
surveys to support DECON planning will be performed with FIDLERs. Usually some
form of grid survey will be used with the grid size determined by the desired accuracy
of estimated activity between grid points and measurement errors associated with the
instruments. From several days to over a week may be required to complete a ground
survey of the entire area. Ground surveys validating DECON effectiveness may
require several months to complete due to the low levels of contamination remaining,
and the desired precision.

C4.AP5.1.2.7. Building Surveys

C4.AP5.1.2.7.1. Radiological surveys of buildings within the


contaminated area will be required to determine the appropriate DECON actions.
Alpha instruments may be used on most building surfaces; however, use of FIDLERs
may be necessary on surfaces that may damage alpha instruments, or on materials such
as carpets, where contamination may be below the surface and screened from alpha
instruments. The amount of removable contamination present must be determined by
wiping surfaces with a piece of material, or swipe, which is then monitored for
contamination it adsorbed. Laboratory counting equipment should be used to
determine the amount of removable contamination absorbed by the swipe. Initial
building surveys should be performed only on the exterior unless the building is in use.

C4.AP5.1.2.7.2. Civil authorities should establish procedures for either


building owners and/or tenants, or an appropriate civil authority, such as a policeman,
to accompany monitors when surveying building interiors. If interiors are surveyed
before the surrounding area has been decontaminated, methods that minimize tracking
of contamination into buildings should be used (for example, cover shoes with plastic
bag immediately before entering buildings and ensure gloves are uncontaminated).
Interior contamination levels will vary because of the time of year, the type of heating
or cooling system used, and whether or not people were in the building at the time of,
or following the accident. Interior contamination levels will be only a fraction of the

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exterior levels at the same location. The primary source of interior contamination is
expected to be airborne contaminants entering the building through heating or cooling
systems, and doors, windows, or other openings during the initial cloud passage; or
contamination tracked or carried into the building by people or animals. The sealing
of doors, windows, chimneys, and ventilators on evacuated buildings in highly
contaminated areas may minimize further contamination of the interior during DECON
of the surrounding area. When monitoring the interior of a building, initial monitoring
should be on the floor in the main traffic pattern (doorways, halls, and stairs), and on
top of horizontal surfaces near heating or cooling duct outlets, windows, and other
openings into the building. If no contamination is found at these locations it is very
likely no contamination entered the building. If contamination is found, additional
monitoring should be performed. Monitoring results from furnace and
air-conditioning filters should be included in building survey records.

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C4.AP6. APPENDIX 6 OF CHAPTER 4

RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING, MEASUREMENT,


AND CONTROL FORMS

Accurate records should be maintained of exposure times and levels of exposure


for all personnel entering and exiting the accident area. Additionally, a complete
radiological history should be made for each individual who is actually contaminated.
This appendix contains examples of forms used by DOE ARG and other responders to
document and record this information. Forms can be obtained from the JHEC Data
Center (DC).

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Form 1 Access Work Permit


-
This form contains data that must be obtained for access of personnel entering/exiting through the
CCS. Forms 2 and 3 accompany this form to the CCS.
Form 2 Team Dress Requirements - CCS
-
This form lists PPE and dosimetry items required to be worn at the accident site.
Form 3 Team Entry/Exit Permit - CCS
-
This form is used to document hotline (CCS) entry/exit values.
Form 4 Analysis Data
-
This form is used to record sample analysis data that can be sent to the JHEC.
Form 5 Personnel Sample
-
This form is used to document the collection of a personnel sample bioassay.
Form 6 Geographic Location
-
This form is to be used to document the connection between a location ID and the geographic
coordinates for the location ID.
Form 7 Field Sample Data
-
This form is used to document a field sample collected at a specific location.
Form 8 Field Measurement Data
-
This form is used to document a field measurement performed at a specific location.
Form 9 JHEC Equipment Data
-
This form is used to document equipment used at an accident site.
Form Air Sample Data
10
This form is used to document the collection of an air sample filter.

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Figure C4.AP6.F1. Access Work Permit Form

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Figure C4.AP6.F2. Team Dress Requirements - CCS Form

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Figure C4.AP6.F3. Team Entry/Exit Permit - CCS Form

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Figure C4.AP6.F4. Analysis Data Form

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Figure C4.AP6.F5. Personnel Sample Form

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Figure C4.AP6.F6. Geographic Locations Form

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Figure C4.AP6.F7. Field Sample Data Form

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Figure C4.AP6.F8. Field Measurement Data Form

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Figure C4.AP6.F9. JHEC Equipment Data Form

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Figure C4.AP6.F10. Air Sample Data Form

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C5. CHAPTER 5
RESPIRATORY AND PERSONNEL PROTECTION

C5.1. GENERAL

During a radiological emergency, health officials must act to protect the public and
response forces from potential health hazards associated with the emergency. This
chapter addresses protective clothing and respiratory protection including protection
factors, protective action guide, and resuspension factors.

C5.2. RESPIRATORY PROTECTION

Plutonium and uranium particulates are the most serious source of airborne
radioactivity at an accident site unless fusion has occurred. These particulates may be
present in the cloud and smoke from a breached or burning weapon, but settle to the
ground shortly thereafter. The radioactive particles may become resuspended in the
air by surface winds and by soil disturbing operations, including vehicular traffic.
Resuspension is highly dependent upon specific conditions (for example, type and
condition of soil or surface, vegetation, moisture present, and time since deposition)
and is difficult to measure and predict. Respiratory protection prevents airborne
contamination from entering the lungs and is provided by SCBA, or respirators that
filter particulates out of the ambient air. Respiratory protection devices adversely
affect productivity and effectiveness and their use is not recommended except when
airborne contamination is present or expected. In hot climates, respiratory protection
devices can result in heat injuries, including death, and a heat injury prevention
program, as discussed in Chapter 10, should be implemented when temperatures
exceed 70 °F.

C5.2.1. Protection Factors (PFs). The amount of protection from inhaling


airborne particulate contaminants provided by a given device is called its PF. PFs
vary primarily as a function of anthropometrical data, mask fit, and mask design. PFs
are determined by dividing the Ambient Air Concentrations (AAC) of a contaminant
by the Inhaled Concentration (IC) or amount of contaminant that enters the mask; thus
PF = AAC/IC. A test facility/chamber using probe equipped test masks in a chamber
containing a nontoxic contaminant is required for quantitative tests to determine the PF
for each individual. A deployable fit test facility may be obtained through JNACC.
PFs of up to 2,000 can be achieved with properly fitted respirators. If the mask passes
a qualitative smoke test around the edges of the mask it is assumed a PF above the

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nominal value is achieved. Demand type SCBAs (air supplied on inhalation) cause
negative mask pressure during inhalation and provide no more protection from
contaminants than a respirator. Pressure demand SCBAs (i.e., always under positive
pressure) provide a nominal PF of 10,000.

C5.2.2. Protective Action Guidelines. Protective action guidelines are developed


to identify protective devices to limit exposure to the lungs from inhalation of
contaminants to agreed-upon limits. Since most responders are not radiation workers,
i.e., they are not formally trained nor medically examined, the appropriate Derived Air
Concentration (DAC), should be that in the Federal Guidance Report, No. 11,
reference (l). The DAC for Pu-239 is 3 x 10-7 microbequerel/m³ for plutonium in
non-chemically active forms that would be expected after a fire. This corresponds to
18 dpm/m³ as the lower level in Table C5.T1. The guidelines provided are intended
for use until health physics personnel at the scene can develop situation-specific
instructions. In deriving the guidelines, a PF of 100 was assumed and the Maximum
Permissible Concentration (MPC) of activity in the air being inhaled was based on an
MPC for radiation workers of 40 picocuries/cubic meter (pCi/m³ ) per 40-hour week.
This calculation assumes possible exposures at this rate over the period of a year and is
approximately 10 times greater than the 1 pCi/m³/168-hour week MPC for the general
public. Radiation dose is a function of level of activity and exposure time; therefore,
if exposure time of workers is being tracked, a person could be permitted to enter an
area of higher activity without adequate respiratory protection for a shorter period of
time without exceeding dose limits. In many areas, especially during thermal
inversions, radon daughter products will be detected in air samples. A background
sample of the same length and counted the same time after collection as the on scene
sample allows proper background subtraction; however, typical radon concentrations
completely mask 18dpm/m³. Samples should be recounted at approximately
20-minute intervals, the rough half-life of radon daughter products. When the
measured activity remains approximately constant, the residual activity consists of
actual contamination and a possible, but generally small, contribution from thoron
daughter products that is easily subtracted by background measurements. The time
versus dose approach should be applied in emergencies, as appropriate; that is, if a
person suffers heat stroke the respirator should be removed immediately to meet the
urgent medical requirement to cool the person, since the short unprotected exposure
during evacuation from the area for treatment will limit the amount of contaminant that
is inhaled. Table C5.T1. provides respiratory protection guidelines to use when air
sampling data provides a basis for assessing airborne contamination levels. Calculated
activity levels should be corrected for background activity before entering the table.

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Table C5.T1. Recommended Respiratory Protection Levels for Emergency Workers as a


Function of Airborne Contamination
Airborne Alpha Activity Respiratory Protection
dpm/m3 above background
Below 100 dpm/m3 No respiratory protection needed.
100 to 10,000 dpm/m3 Full-face respiratory protection required (M-series Protective Mask or
NIOSH/MSHA approved HEPA respirator).
Above 10,000 dpm/m3 Pressure demand SCBA or limited entry restricted to essential personnel
wearing full-face respiratory protection. Source of contamination should be
fixed as soon as possible.

Air sampling data is unavailable until some time after response personnel have arrived
on scene. During the initial response, and when working in areas where available air
sampling data may not be applicable, the use of Table C5.T2. is recommended. Table
C5,T2. provides guidelines for protective requirements based on measurements of
surface contamination levels. These recommendations in Table C5.T2. provide
guidelines for personal protective measures that may be taken by first responders until
the situation can be evaluated by health physics personnel. Conversion from
microcuries per meter squared µCi/m²) to CPM were made using the equation in
Chapter 9 conversion factor charts for measurements on soil. Using Table C5.T2. is
appropriate during the initial approach to the area when using respirators in
uncontaminated areas may create undue public alarm. If contamination levels
detected during the initial approach indicate high levels of contamination, wearing of
respirators by people entering the contaminated area is recommended until air
sampling data is available to assess the actual airborne hazard. Table C5.T2.
guidelines should not be used in the downwind area until after the contamination cloud
released by the accident has dispersed (several hours after the fire is extinguished or
after the explosion).

C5.T2. Protective Devices for Emergency Worker as a Function of Surface Contamination


Surface Contamination Respiratory Protection
µ Ci/m²
<6 No respiratory protection or protective clothing.
6 to < 60 No respiratory protection for limited entries of up to 4 hours. Full protective clothing.
60 to < 600 Air purifying respirator and full protective clothing.
Above 600 Wear pressure demand SCBA and full protective clothing. Source of
contamination should be fixed as soon as possible.

C5.2.3. Protective Action Guides. In order to facilitate decision making during

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radiological emergencies, the EPA and FOA have developed PAGs to guide the actions
(e.g., sheltering, evacuation, food embargoes, etc.) taken to mitigate the health
consequences of an accident/emergency. These guides allow for various actions to be
taken to protect human health, and for State and local officials to develop emergency
response plans. A PAG is the projected dose (to a reference individual) from an
unplanned release of radioactive material at which a specific protective action to
reduce or avoid that dose is warranted. It is important to note that PAG dose values
include only the future dose that can be avoided by taking the specific protective action
considered. An example of PAGs are shown in Figure C5.F1. Not all PAGs are the
same as in Figure C5.F1; some may be depicted as charts, graphs, tables, etc.

C5.2.4. Air Sampler Equipment. TF-1A Air Particles. Commonly referred to as


a STAPLEX, the TF-1A is capable of sampling air for particles down to 0.01 microns
in diameter, depending on the filter paper used. A flow meter is used to determine
rate of air flow. Cellulose filters are used normally and retained for laboratory
analysis. Field estimates of airborne contamination can be derived from measurement
of filter contamination with field survey instruments.

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Figure C5.F1. Aerial Survey Results - Protective Action Guides (PAGs), Evacuation PAGs,
and Quarantine Areas

C5.2.5. Resuspension Factors (RFs). Other than during the initial release of
contamination, airborne radioactivity is caused by resuspension. One means of
estimating the potential airborne hazard caused by a given level of surface
contamination is by using RFs. The RF is defined as the activity in the air (µCi, psi,
dpm, etc.) per unit volume (usually m³) divided by the activity on the ground below
expressed in the same activity unit per unit area. The dimension of the RF is then
inverse length, usually m-1.
RF = airborne activity = dpm / m3 = m-1
_________________ ________
ground activity dpm / m2

The method of computing airborne contamination levels is contained in the air


sampling appendix. In theory, the surface is assumed to have an infinite plane of
uniform texture with a uniform level of contamination. In practice, the contaminated
area has varied levels of contamination, is finite in size, and may contain a variety of

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surfaces with different resuspension characteristics. For wind speeds below 20 miles
per hour (mph), only those surfaces within approximately 200 meters can contribute to
the airborne contamination. For wind speeds of more than 30 mph, surfaces as much
as 900 meters away may contribute. Averaging of ground activity levels from these
areas may be considered when computing RFs. RFs may provide a method of roughly
estimating airborne contamination levels for use with Table C5.T1. in areas where air
sampling data is unavailable. When using RFs to estimate airborne contamination
levels, the types and levels of contamination on surfaces in the area where the RF was
computed and those in the area of interest should be considered. RFs may vary from
10-5 to 10-7 for plutonium newly deposited on soil and up to 10-3 on pavement. RFs
are affected by the following:

C5.2.5.1. Soil Disturbing Operations. Mechanical disturbance, such as


vehicular traffic may increase RFs by as much as 100 times in the vicinity of the
disturbance.

C5.2.5.2. Wind. RFs vary proportionally to the cube of the wind speed.

C5.2.5.3. Rain or Moisture. Leaching of plutonium into the soil by rain or


sprinkling may reduce RFs by 10 to 100 times or more. Surface and airborne alpha
contamination levels may not be measurable with an alpha meter for some time after
rain or sprinkling due to the shielding action of the moisture.

C5.3. PROTECTIVE CLOTHING

Protection from contamination can be provided by any close weave cotton material or
disposable suits. The outfit includes the standard anti-contamination coveralls, boot
covers, gloves, mask, and hood. The outfit openings should be taped using masking or
other appropriate adhesive tape. Disposable suits or the battle dress uniforms or
equivalent with a hood and mask may be used provided the outfit openings are taped.
For identification, the person's name and team should be written on tape and placed on
his/her back and chest.

C5.4. PERSONNEL SAFETY PRECAUTIONS

C5.4.1. Do not eat, chew, smoke, or drink in areas where radioactive materials
are handled.

C5.4.2. Handle radioactive material only when necessary and keep handling time

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as short as possible. Health hazards are increased by extended exposure. Flaking,


scratches, and fractures of radioactive material are sources of contamination. Do not
handle radioactive materials with bare hands.

C5.4.3. If wounded by a contaminated item or while in a contaminated area, take


the following steps:

NOTE: Steps (d), (e), (f), and (g) do not apply to tritium exposure or contamination.

a. Leave contaminated area.

b. Remove contaminated clothing or contaminated material at DECON line.

c. Obtain medical assistance as soon as possible.

d. Irrigate the wound with copious amounts of water. Do not induce bleeding. Pack
the wound with gauze and wrap tightly with Curlex or ace bandage. Remove the
dressing at medical treatment facility and check the dressing for contamination. You
will not detect the presence of contamination in the wound without swabbing it with a
cotton-tipped applicator, drying the applicator, and monitoring it in a counting
chamber. The liquids present in the wound will mask almost all emissions.

e. Wound debridement should not be attempted outside of a medical treatment


facility. The wound should only be irrigated, packed loosely with sterile gauze, and
wrapped. Debridement must take place in an emergency room or operating room. An
appropriate survey instrument and technician must be available during treatment to
confirm the wound has been decontaminated prior to closure. Wound debridement
must not be continued to the point of functional compromise. If contamination is still
suspected, again, pack the wound with sterile gauze, wrap, and redress the wound in
24 hours. The wound should not be sutured closed but should be allowed to heal by
second intention (tissue granulation).

f. You cannot check the wound for contamination without a cotton-tipped applicator
or gauze swab. It must be allowed to dry and then counted.

g. Any metallic particles must be assumed to be radioactive unless confirmed


otherwise. Handling tongs and a lead pig should be standing by during wound
debridement to receive a "hot particle" or metal foreign body.

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C5.4.4. If any form of internal contamination is suspected, immediately report to


a medical authority.

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C6. CHAPTER 6
CONTAMINATION CONTROL

C6.1. CONTAMINATION CONTROL

C6.1.1. General. Contamination control minimizes the spread of contamination;


therefore, rigid, established operating procedures must be followed to achieve the
objective of contamination control. Procedures consists of:

C6.1.1.1. Initial monitoring upon arrival to determine the preliminary site


characterization and personnel contamination.

C6.1.1.2. Anti-contamination procedures to minimize the spread of


contamination.

C6.1.1.3. Strict contamination control line procedures to control


contamination spread during response/recovery/remediation operations.

C6.1.1.4. A contamination control capability must be available on site


beginning with the IRF initial reconnaissance through to RTF final recovery
operations. It is imperative to personnel safety that a CCS is established and operating
while personnel are in the contaminated area.

C6.1.2. Personnel Monitoring and Decontamination. Personnel who were


potentially exposed during the accident, subsequent cloud passage, or post-accident
entry into the contaminated area should be given a high priority in response actions.
People to be considered include casualties, bystanders and sightseers, military and
civilian response personnel, and residents, business employees, and customers in the
contaminated area. Initial definition of the perimeter of the contaminated area was
discussed previously. Early definition of the perimeter is important so that potentially
contaminated people may be identified and measures taken to prevent the
contamination of additional people. Initially, the military may have the only effective
radiation detection instruments at the scene and may monitor potentially contaminated
civilians. Responsibility for monitoring civilians will shift to DOE, State radiation
control personnel, or civilian authorities/representatives as they arrive on scene with
appropriate instruments. Monitoring of personnel is normally done at a CCS;
however, during the initial response when the number of radiation detection
instruments and monitoring personnel is limited, alternative procedures must be
devised if large numbers of people are involved. Depending on resources and

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requirements, the IRF and/or RTF Commander may decide to establish more than one
CCS. If sufficient resources exist to support multiple stations, processing
contaminated or potentially contaminated civilian residents may be desirable through a
station separate from that used for response force personnel.

C6.1.2.1. Monitoring and Decontaminating Potentially Exposed Medical


Treatment Facilities. Immediately following an accident, injured personnel may be
removed for medical treatment, or fatalities may be moved to a hospital or morgue
without being monitored for contamination. The potential contamination of a medical
treatment facility, morgue, or ambulance could present a health problem for the staff
and other patients. Therefore, judgments must be made as to whether casualties have
been removed from the contaminated area and, if so, what facilities are involved.
Those facilities and the transportation resources used should be notified of the
potential problem. Paragraph C10.5. describes procedures a medical facility may use
to control the spread of contamination. Dispatch of a radiological monitoring team to
check the vehicles and facilities involved for contamination, and to assist in DECON
or other measures, as appropriate, to prevent the spread of contamination should be
given the highest priority.

C6.1.2.2. Contamination Control Station

C6.1.2.2.1. The CCS is used to ensure radioactive contamination is not


transferred from an area that is already contaminated to an area that is not
contaminated through the orderly processing of personnel, equipment, and vehicles
entering and leaving the contaminated area. The quantities of material, manpower
requirements, and physical layout of the CCS discussed in this chapter are notional and
are provided for information only. The actual amounts of material used and physical
location of CCS elements will depend upon conditions on scene at an actual accident.

C6.1.2.2.2. Persons present at the accident site or in known


contaminated areas must be identified and screened to determine whether
decontamination or other corrective action is required. Normally this action is done at
a CCS. Casualties should be monitored and decontaminated to the extent injuries
permit; however, urgent medical treatment has priority and exceptions may be
necessary. Procedures for handling contaminated casualties are outlined in Chapter
10. An example of a CCS is shown in Figure C6.F1. When processing a large group
of people, this type of station will process a person about every 4 minutes if no
contamination is found. If equipment and monitors are available, additional lines
should be established in the station to process large numbers of people. When
processing people whose personal clothing is contaminated, the clothing should be

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bagged separately and a receipt issued for those articles retained. A priority system
should be established to permit immediate processing of EOD personnel, monitoring
team leaders, and others whose presence or information is needed to facilitate other
response operations. The location of the CCS should be governed by the following
constraints:

C6.1.2.2.2.1. It must be located in an area free of contamination.

C6.1.2.2.2.2. Ideally, it will be located directly upwind of the


accident, but terrain or other considerations may dictate another location. If not
upwind, it must be far enough away to prevent airborne or resuspended contamination
from entering the CCS.

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Figure C6.F1. Personnel Contamination Control Station (Example)

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C6.1.2.2.2.3. Initially, it should be located outside the


fragmentation zone as well as beyond the perimeter of the contaminated area. After
all explosives have been rendered safe, the CCS may be moved closer to the accident
site, if appropriate.

C6.1.2.2.2.4. It should be in an area relatively free of weeds,


bushes, and rocks. A paved or flat compacted surface is recommended.

C6.1.2.3. Materials and Manpower

C6.1.2.3.1. The materials listed in Table C6.T1. are necessary to


establish a CCS. Some items are expendable and will need replacement over time.
Suitable items may be substituted, as necessary. Frequency and volume of personnel
and equipment processing will determine if additional items are needed. Use of
National Stock Numbers (NSNs) when ordering will expedite process.

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Table C6.T1. Contamination Control Station Materials List


Equipment Quantity
Alpha particle monitoring equipment 4
Low-level beta/gamma monitoring instrument 4
Dosimeters as needed
2-inch or wider masking tape 3 rolls
Nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) marking kit or substitute 1
Stools or chairs 4
55-gallon drums or equivalent for storing contaminated items 4
Plastic bags; sized to fit the barrels/drums used 20
Brushes 4
Whisk brooms 4
Shovels 4
Traffic cones, ropes, and stakes as needed
Protective masks (SCBA, if available) as needed
Personal Protective suits as needed
Cotton gloves as needed
Booties or footcovers as needed
Water container; 5 gallons or larger 1
Paper towels or substitute as required
Liquid soap; 1 gallon or more 1
Tables 5
Craft paper, butcher paper, or substitute 1 roll
Rain suits, ponchos, or substitute as needed
Surgical masks 1 box
Organic solvents; 1 gallon or more 1
Large tent (20 or 40 men) or trailer w/popup sun covers as needed
Portable generator (as needed) 1
Portable heaters, air-conditioners, fans as needed
Blankets as needed
Litters 4
Plastic sheeting 1 roll
Bar Soap - Dozen as needed
Towels as needed
Cotton Swabs as needed
Bioassay Containers as needed
Hair Brushes as needed
Shampoo as needed

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C6.1.2.3.2. Each shift of the CCS must have the personnel listed in
Table C6.T2. All should be dressed in personal protective suits and masks. Volume
and frequency of equipment and personnel processing will determine if more are
needed.

C6.T2. CCS Personnel


Position Function
One medical doctor and health physicist Monitor general health and treat personnel injuries.
One CCS supervisor Monitor supply levels and control flow through the CCS.
One security guard Monitor for unauthorized or unprocessed access/egress.
Eight assistants Accomplish activities as directed by the CCS supervisor.
One RADIAC repair person Repair any RADIAC equipment from the CCS.
One TDL/dosimeter monitor Issue dosimetry, log out/in personnel that go to/from site.

C6.1.2.4. Procedures for Personnel Entering the Contaminated Area

C6.1.2.4.1. Dressout procedures:

C6.1.2.4.1.1. Don personal protective suits or coveralls.

C6.1.2.4.1.2. Using masking tape, write the individual's name and


team name or function on the front and back of each suit.

C6.1.2.4.1.3. Put on shoe covers and tuck suit legs into shoe covers.

C6.1.2.4.1.4. Using masking tape, tape the openings at the top of


the shoe covers.

C6.1.2.4.1.5. Don and adjust mask; then remove.


NOTE
All equipment will be functionally checked prior to donning gloves.

C6.1.2.4.1.6. Don gloves and tuck sleeves into the glove tops.

C6.1.2.4.1.7. Using masking tape, tape the openings at the top of


the gloves.

C6.1.2.4.1.8. Put on mask.

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C6.1.2.4.1.9. Don hood and tape the bottom of the hood to the
coveralls.

C6.1.2.5. CCS Processing. If an accident occurs near a populated area and


several hundred people are potentially contaminated, available radiation detection
instruments and monitoring personnel may be inadequate to process the people fully
and quickly. The assumption is that the potentially contaminated people are not
response personnel. If only a few radiation detection instruments are available, use of
an abbreviated monitoring procedure may be considered to expedite processing.
Contamination of the hands, seat, and shoes or lower legs may be caused by handling
contaminated objects or moving and sitting in contaminated areas. Contamination of
the upper chest or neck and head area is indicative of exposure to airborne
contamination. Contamination around the nose or mouth is an indicator of internal
contamination. Nasal swipes should be used to follow up on individuals with positive
indications of contamination around the nose and mouth. If radiation detection
instruments are unavailable to monitor the people involved, procedures to
decontaminate all people coming from the contaminated area should be used
immediately. Provisions should be made to monitor them later when instruments are
available. Such a procedure would require provisions to collect and receipt for
clothing, shower and shampoo the people, and issue replacement clothing. Each
article of clothing should be bagged separately, if feasible, and all clothing placed in a
single large bag and a receipt issued. Watches, jewelry, and the contents of pockets
and pocketbooks should not be highly contaminated, if at all, and should be retained by
the individual. If those items are highly contaminated they should be inventoried,
bagged, and an itemized receipt issued. Although the contamination may be retained
with the clothing, an overriding need exists to assure the people that they are being
cared for; therefore, a gym or other facility with dressing rooms and high-capacity
showers may be appropriate for processing people. Soap, shampoo, towels, and
stocks of replacement clothing must be obtained. People processed in this manner,
and their collected clothing, should be monitored as soon as possible.
Uncontaminated clothing should be returned at the earliest possible time.

C6.1.3. Vehicle Monitoring. Vehicles used by the response force in the


contaminated area will remain there for future use and not require immediate
monitoring or DECON. If members of the public in the contaminated area are sent, or
go, to the CCS or other processing points using their own vehicles, the vehicle should
be monitored before being moved away from the area. An example of a vehicle CCS
is shown in Figure C6.F2. All outer surfaces and the air filter may have been
contaminated by airborne contamination, while wheel wells, tires, and the rear end

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may be contaminated from driving across contaminated areas. Unless the windows
were down, or ventilators open, detectable contamination of the interior is most likely
on those surfaces in contact with the vehicle occupants, for example, floorboards and
seats. If only external surfaces of a vehicle are contaminated, DECON should be
relatively easy to perform, if done before bonding between the contaminant and the
vehicle paint occurs. Also, rapid DECON and return of private vehicles may reassure
the public that consideration is being given to their interests and property. Monitoring
and decontamination of vehicles is time consuming and may not yield a "clean"
vehicle. Recommend individuals drive to multiple collection sites, park, and transfer
to commuter buses for transport to CCS areas. The vehicles can be monitored, time
permitting, without the spread of contamination.

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Figure C6.F2. Vehicle Contamination Control Station (Example)

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C7. CHAPTER 7
BIOASSAY PROCEDURES

C7.1. BIOASSAY

C7.1.1. Bioassays are procedures that estimate the amount of radioactive material
deposited in the body, either by direct measurement, using sensitive x-ray detectors
placed over the chest (lung counting) and/or other organs, or by detection of
radioactivity in excreta (feces and urine). Therefore, a number of factors must be
known in addition to the quantity and isotopic distribution of the material to make an
accurate estimate of the dose.

Chemical form
Route of intake
Elapsed time from intake
Organ(s) containing the material
Distribution pattern
Organ(s) mass(es)
Biological half-life
Particle size of the original material
Decay scheme of the radioisotope

Complex mathematical models have been developed that take each of these into
account.

C7.1.2. Three methods are used to determine the amount of material present in
the body. Each method has specific advantages and disadvantages and the specific
methods in any given situation will be determined by the health physicists.

C7.1.2.1. Fecal Sampling. Fecal sampling can be an effective means of


detecting inhaled insoluble material that has been transported from the lungs to the GI
tract and excreted. Fecal samples can be quickly screened using low energy gamma
detectors such as the FIDLER to estimate the plutonium or americium content. For
more definitive results, chemical separation and low-level counting techniques (which
may take days or weeks) must be used. Fecal samples should not be collected until at
least 48 hours after exposure to permit passage of the contamination through the GI
tract. (Samples collected sooner than this may not be representative and may, in fact,
give a false sense of security.) The optimal time for sampling is between 2 and 3 days

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after the inhalation, however, samples collected weeks or months after an intake may
still be useful, depending upon the size of the intake. Samples should be collected in
well-sealed bags. Local medical supply houses or medical facilities should have
collection kits (which fit onto a standard toilet seat), which may make sample
collection easier. Figure C7.F1. may be used to roughly estimate the committed
effective dose equivalent from inhalation of weapons grade plutonium based on
contamination detected in a single fecal sample.

C7.1.2.2. Urine Sampling. Urine sampling is a less sensitive indicator of


plutonium exposure; only a tiny fraction of the amount inhaled is excreted through
urine. This fraction also depends on solubility of the plutonium in the original
aerosol. Samples taken during the first 5 days after the exposure may not reflect the
quantity of plutonium inhaled due to the time required for movement through the
body. Urine samples must be processed in a chemistry laboratory before
quantification is possible, but screening for very high levels (by gamma scanning for
Am-241) can sometimes be done in the field. Samples should be submitted in plastic
or glass bottles with well sealed tops. Figure C7.F1., below, may be used to roughly
estimate the committed effective dose equivalent from inhalation of weapons grade
plutonium based on contamination detected in a single urine sample. Samples taken
for several years after exposure can be used since plutonium is insoluble in the lung.
Material is generally released from the lung into the bloodstream over a very long
period of time. Some material may be so insoluble, it may not even show up in the
urine for several years. Single voiding urine samples should be collected from all
personnel suspected of being exposed (via inhalation) to significant quantities of
uranium. The optimal time for such samples is from 24 to 48 hours after exposure,
although samples collected for days or weeks after an intake may be useful depending
upon the size of the intake. Such samples must be processed by a radiochemical
laboratory -- these analyses typically take several days to several weeks. Since
uranium from normal environmental sources will always be present in the urine, care
must be taken to determine whether the level of uranium detected is significantly
greater than this "background" level. Single voiding urine samples should be collected
from all personnel suspected of being exposed to significant quantities of tritium. The
optimal time for such samples is from 4 to 8 hours after exposure, although samples
collected for days or weeks after exposure may still be useful. Sample collected
sooner than 4 hours after exposure may not be representative. Normally such samples
must be processed in a radiochemistry laboratory (using liquid scintillation counters)
but portable liquid scintillation counters are available in some emergency response
organizations. Urine sampling is the main way of determining tritium uptake.

C7.1.2.3. Lung Counting. Lung counting is the direct measurement of

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emitted x-rays and gamma radiation (typically Am-241 in a weapons accident) from
the body with a sensitive low energy photon detector. Lung counters are used at
National Laboratories, commercially, and at some hospitals and universities. Most
lung counters are immobile systems using large shielded rooms (special trailer
mounted systems can be obtained through DOE in a few days), and the patient must be
sent to the facility. Inhaled plutonium remains in the lungs for extended periods of
time. Portable FIDLER (or similar) detectors can be used for rough screening
measurements. However, such measurements can be easily distorted by small
amounts of surface contamination, and should only be performed by experienced and
qualified personnel. Figure C7.F1. may be used to roughly estimate the committed
effective dose equivalent from inhalation of weapons grade plutonium based on the
results of a lung scan for Am-241.

C7.1.3. Interpretation of Single Bioassay Results - Weapons Grade Plutonium.


Figure C7.F1. may be used to make a rough initial estimate of the dose significance of
a single bioassay measurement (Am-241 gamma scan) obtained after acute inhalation
of weapons grade plutonium. The curves represent the 50-year committed effective
dose equivalent (CEDE) implied by a 24-hour urine or fecal sample result of 1 (one)
microcurie of Am-241, or a lung count of 1 (one) microcurie of Am-241, on a given
day after inhalation. Note that these curves are using the Am-241 result from a
gamma count as a "marker" for the entire mix of plutonium and americium found in
weapons grade plutonium. Accordingly, these curves cannot be used directly for
plutonium results -- they must be used with Am-241 results. Note also that this figure
cannot be used for interpretation of uranium or tritium bioassay results.

The following steps are used:

1. Move right along the horizontal (X-axis) to the number of days between
inhalation and sample collection. (Note the logarithmic axis.)
2. Move up to the curve of interest (urine sample, fecal sample, or lung
count).
3. Move left to read the dose-per-microcurie on the vertical (Y-axis).
4. Multiply this dose-per-microcurie by the actual sample or measurement
result.

Example of Use:

A fecal sample was collected about a week after a person was exposed to a fire
involving weapons grade plutonium. The plutonium involved in the fire is known to
be about 30 years old. A "screening" gamma scan was performed on this sample -

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giving a result of 5.0 x 10-5 microcuries (about 110 dpm) of Am-241. What is the
approximate dose implied by this single result?

The fecal sample dose-curve is represented by the heavy dashed line. At 7 days after
inhalation, the dose-per-microcurie value is about 2 x 105 rem. Multiplying this value
by the actual fecal sample result of 5.0 x 10-5 microcuries gives an implied 50-year
committed effective dose equivalent of about 10 rem.

Cautions about Use:

There are many potential sources of uncertainty and error in using a single bioassay
measurement to estimate dose. Different exposure or intake scenarios, individual
biological differences, sample collection and analysis uncertainties all contribute to
this overall uncertainty. Accordingly, such "single-point" dose estimates should be
viewed as rough indicators, at best.

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Figure C7.F1. Estimated 50-Year Committed Effective Dose

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

Technical Notes for Figure C7.F1.

These curves are generated by estimating the fraction of an inhaled intake that would
be excreted via the urine or feces, or retained in the lungs, on any particular day after
intake. Dividing the actual bioassay result by these "intake excretion fractions" or
"intake retention fractions" gives an estimate of the initial intake. Multiplying this
estimated intake value by a "dose conversion factor" (dose per unit intake) gives an
estimate of the dose.

The material inhaled is assumed to be a 30-year old mixture of "weapons grade"


plutonium, as characterized by the LLNL "Hotspot" Health Physics Computer
Programs. (The Am-241 concentration is about 4,300 parts per million.) The
material is assumed to have "Class Y" (very insoluble) lung solubility characteristics
and to have a particle size distribution of 1 micron AMAD. Since the Am-241 is
assumed to have "grown-in" to the plutonium matrix, the Am-241 is assumed to have
the same lung solubility characteristics as the plutonium. It is also assumed that this
Am-241 will have the same systemic retention and excretion characteristics as the
"parent" plutonium. These assumptions are somewhat simplistic, but are likely to
provide a conservative estimate of dose.

For consistency with current guidelines and regulations, the following models were
used to generate the intake excretion and retention fractions used in Figure C7.F1.:

ICRP-30 Respiratory Tract Model


ICRP-30 GI Tract Model
"Jones" Plutonium Excretion Model

The intake excretion and retention fractions were calculated, but are essentially the
same as those published in Lessard, et al.

Dose conversion factors were taken directly from Federal Guidance Report 11,
reference (l). This report uses the ICRP-30 Respiratory Tract and GI Tract Models,
the ICRP-48 Systemic Model for Plutonium and Americium, and the tissue weighting
factors of ICRP-26.

Note on newer biokinetic models: The ICRP has recently introduced a new
Respiratory Tract Model (ICRP-66) and new biokinetic models for plutonium and
americium (ICRP-67). Use of those models, coupled with corresponding dose
conversion factors (ICRP-71) produces dose estimates that are generally from 2 to 5

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times lower than those of Figure C7.F1. Thus, the curves of Figure C7.F1. probably
provide a conservative estimate of doses from such an intake.

C7.2. BIOASSAY PROCEDURES

C7.2.1. Administration of a bioassay program for affected civilians may be the


responsibility of the State or Federal agency or affected country. The guidelines in
Table C7.T1. are provided to assist the response force or civilian authorities
conducting initial screening in advising individuals contaminated when requested to
provide urine or fecal samples for analysis. Advisors explain that sample analysis will
determine if the individual received a detectable radiation dose when contaminated.
The bioassay procedures used will be established by health physicists responding to
the accident. If possible, all follow-up bioassay monitoring or sampling protocols
should be established by a health physicist who has specific experience and expertise
in the internal dosimetry of plutonium and/or uranium. The Department of Energy's
Accident Response Group normally has such dosimetry assets available. When
bioassay samples are collected, every effort should be made to keep samples and their
containers free of contamination from the environment, clothing, or skin. Since
tritium contamination cannot be detected by CCS monitoring, anyone suspected of
having been exposed to tritium should follow the guidelines in Table C7.T1. A
bioassay program is recommended for all individuals without respiratory protection
and found to be contaminated. This program will determine if any dose was received,
and provides assurance to those who did not receive a dose, that their health was not
affected. To provide similar assurance to all people in the contaminated area,
bioassays may be appropriate even for people who were not found to be contaminated;
moreover, some people never in contaminated areas will request tests to ensure they
were not affected by the accident.

C7.T1. Guidelines for Bioassay Sampling


Suspected Feces Optimum Sampling Urine Optimum Sampling Sample
Radioactive Material Time After Exposure Time After Exposure Quantity
Plutonium 2 to 3 days 2 to 3 weeks 24 hours total
Uranium 2 to 3 days 24 hours 24 hours total
Tritium N/A 4 to 8 hours 1 voiding

C7.2.1.1. Bioassay Priorities. If a nuclear weapon accident occurs near a


populated area, obtaining bioassay samples from large numbers of people may be
necessary. Accurate identification of all bioassay samples (full name, ID and/or
Social Security number, age, gender, address, phone number, date and time of

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collection) is imperative. The specific reason for sampling (e.g., "facial


contamination: 50,000 cpm alpha" or "1 mile downwind during initial plume passage"
should also be included to aid in later prioritization of processing. Considering the
potential for public concern for their possible exposures, it would probably be better to
err on the side of collecting too many samples, rather than too few samples). Note
that samples can be collected from large numbers of people during the optimal
collection time period, and then stored for later analysis on a prioritized basis. Fecal
samples should be frozen, and urine samples should be refrigerated (not frozen.)

NOTE: Since it is very difficult for a significant amount of plutonium to be


incorporated into the body without gross contamination of skin or clothing also
occurring, initial alpha monitoring that identifies contaminated personnel also can
provide a method for assuring that those with the greatest possibility of radiation
exposures (that may affect their health) are given priority treatment.

Table C7.T2., applicable only to people not wearing respiratory protection; provides
recommended guidelines for the assignment of priorities for bioassay analysis.
Response force personnel will normally be equipped with protective clothing and
respirators, when required. Bioassays for response force personnel will be performed
in accordance with Service regulations and as directed by the CRTF.

C7.T2. Guidelines for Assignment of Priorities for


Collection and Processing of Bioassays

Alpha Contamination Level on Clothing or Skin


Priority 60 cm2 17 cm2 probe
HI Above 300,000 cpm Above 75,000 cpm
MED 50,000-300,000 cpm 12,500-75,000 cpm
LO Below 50,000 cpm Below 12,500 cpm

Personnel falling in the HI priority category in Table C7.T2. may have had a
substantial plutonium intake. Conversely, exposure to airborne contamination that
produces a surface contamination level in the LO category will be less likely to result
in a significant deposition in the lungs. To ensure alpha meter readings provide a
valid guide for assignment of priorities, individuals should be asked, during screening,
if they have bathed or changed clothes since the time of possible contamination. A
record must be made and retained for future reference of all personnel screened and
the results of both alpha meter screening and bioassays. Use of the Radiation Health
History and Bioassay Screening Forms contained in Appendix C4.AP6. should be
considered.

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C7.2.1.2. Nasal Smears. Contamination on a wipe (e.g., a cotton swab)


from inside the nasal passage is a possible indicator of plutonium inhalation. If initial
alpha meter screening indicates probable plutonium or uranium inhalation, a nasal
smear shall be collected for analysis by specialized teams when they arrive on site.
However, due to the biological half-life of nasal mucus, a nasal smear is a reliable
indicator only if collected during the first hour after the exposure. Accordingly,
prompt nasal samples can be collected by any personnel, as long as they are taken
carefully and labeled appropriately. Great care must be taken to avoid
cross-contamination from the face, hands, or other sources during collection of nasal
smear samples. Ideally, separate swabs should be taken from each nostril. Each of
these should be bagged separately, then placed in another bag labeled with name, ID
number (as applicable) and collection date and time. After collection, the swabs must
not be placed into any gels or liquids since this would prohibit alpha particle counting.

C7.2.2. Personnel Exposure and Bioassay Records. Documentation should be


maintained on all personnel who enter the Radiological Control Area (RCA), or who
may have been contaminated prior to establishment of an RCA. Examples of forms
used for recording data on personnel working in the RCA, or who may have been
exposed to contamination downwind from the accident, are contained in Appendix
C4.AP6. To ensure appropriate followup actions are completed on all exposed, or
potentially exposed people, a copy of all CCS logs, other processing station records,
bioassay data, and other documentation identifying people who were or were not
contaminated should be provided to the JHEC for consolidation into a single data file.
This data file is subject to Privacy Act Regulations, and must be retained as part of the
permanent accident records; therefore, procedures for handling data obtained on
non-DoD personnel should be coordinated with the CRTF's legal officer. Data
obtained on DoD personnel will be needed to satisfy Service-specific requirements
contained in (U.S.) Army Regulation (AR) 40-14, "Control and Recording Procedures
for Occupational Exposure to Ionizing Radiation;" Naval Bureau of Medicine and
Surgery (NAVMED) P-5055, "Radiation Health Protection Manual;" (U.S.) Air Force
Instruction (AFI) 48-125, "The USAF Personnel Dosimetry Program," references (m),
(n),and (o). These records shall be retained and become part of the individual's
permanent medical record.

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C8. CHAPTER 8
RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS, CHARACTERISTICS,
HAZARDS, AND HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS

C8.1. RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS

C8.1.1. General. The characteristics and hazards and health considerations of


plutonium, uranium, tritium, and thorium are provided. This chapter assumes that the
elements are in their pure, weapons-grade form and no fission has occurred.

C8.1.2. Plutonium (Pu) and Americium (Am). Plutonium is a heavy metal with a
shiny appearance similar to that of stainless steel when freshly machined. After short
exposure to the atmosphere, it will oxidize to a dark brown or black color. Americium
is a daughter product of plutonium decay and is not considered as a separate element in
this manual.

C8.1.2.1. Radiological Characteristics. Plutonium and americium are


primarily alpha emitters except Pu-241, which is primarily a beta emitter.
Isotope Primary Particle Emitted Half-Life in Years
Plutonium 239 alpha 24,100
Plutonium 240 alpha 6570
Plutonium 241 beta 14.4
Plutonium 242 alpha 376,000
Americium 241 alpha 432

C8.1.2.1.1. Weapons-grade plutonium (including americium) emits two


detectable photons: a 17 keV x-ray and a 60 keV gamma ray. The 17 keV x-ray may
be shielded after 5 days of dry weather or after a rain as the contamination migrates
into the ground. The 60 keV gamma ray (provided by Am-241) continues to be
detectable.

C8.1.2.1.2. A critical mass can be obtained from several hundred grams


or more of plutonium, depending upon the geometry of the container and the material
surrounding or near the mass. Recovery personnel should consult EOD technical
publications and with the DOE ARG to ensure that the possibility of aggregating a
critical mass of recovered material is considered and avoided.

C8.1.2.2. Hazards and Health Considerations

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C8.1.2.2.1. When dispersed in an accident, plutonium is considered the


most significant radiological hazard. The primary hazard results from inhalation and
subsequent deposition in the lungs. From the lung, plutonium enters the bloodstream
and is deposited in the bone and liver. Bone deposition may produce bone diseases
many years later. Due to its extremely long physical and biological half lives,
plutonium is held within the body for a lifetime. The hazards from americium are
comparable to those of plutonium.

C8.1.2.2.2. The elimination of plutonium from the body is extremely


slow. If a person contaminated internally is given prompt medical treatment with a
chelating agent, plutonium retention may be significantly reduced.

C8.1.2.2.3. A properly fitted respirator and standard personal protective


clothing can provide adequate protection for plutonium contamination expected at an
accident site.

C8.1.2.2.4. Smoke from a fire or explosion involving plutonium can


carry particles of plutonium into the air, causing an inhalation hazard.

C8.1.3. Uranium (U). Uranium is a heavy metal that occurs in nature in


significant quantities. When newly machined, it has the appearance of stainless
steel. After short exposure to the atmosphere, it will oxidize to a golden-yellow color
and from that into black.

C8.1.3.1. Radiological Characteristics


Isotope Primary Particle Emitted Half-Life in Years
Uranium 238 alpha 4,500,000,000
Uranium 235 alpha 710,000,000
Uranium 234 alpha 2,150,000

C8.1.3.1.1. Types of Uranium. Three forms of uranium have been used


in nuclear weapons: natural uranium, depleted uranium (DU), and enriched uranium.

C8.1.3.1.1.1. Natural Uranium. When uranium is separated from


its ore, the resulting mixture of uranium is natural uranium. It is almost pure U-238.
Natural uranium in metal form is called tuballoy.

C8.1.3.1.1.2. Depleted Uranium. Uranium with some amount of


its U-235 extracted is DU. It is also called U-238.

226 CHAPTER 8
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C8.1.3.1.1.3. Enriched Uranium. Enriched uranium contains more


than the naturally occurring amount of U-235. It is enriched through chemical and
metallurgical processes, and can be used in nuclear weapons to produce a yield.

C8.1.3.1.2. A critical mass can be obtained from several hundred grams


or more of uranium, depending upon the geometry of the container and the material
surrounding or near the mass. Recovery personnel should consult with EOD technical
publications and with the DOE ARG to ensure that the possibility of aggregating a
critical mass of recovered material is considered and avoided.

C8.1.3.2. Hazards and Health Considerations

C8.1.3.2.1. Radiological hazards associated with any uranium isotope


are generally less severe than those of plutonium. If uranium is taken internally, a
type of heavy metal poisoning may occur. Lung contamination due to inhalation may
cause a long-term hazard.

C8.1.3.2.2. When involved in fire, uranium will melt and form a slag,
with only a portion of it oxidizing; however, the possibility of hazardous airborne
contamination exists, and protective measures must be taken to prevent inhalation or
ingestion. A protective mask and standard personal protective clothing will protect
personnel against levels of uranium contamination expected at an accident site. If
multiple weapons were involved in a severe fire in which the warheads may have
melted, there is a potential for critical geometry to be achieved if the U-238 melted and
pooled.

C8.1.4. Tritium (T or H3). Tritium is a radioactive isotope of hydrogen and


diffuses very rapidly in the air. The diffusion rate is measurable even through very
dense materials such as steel. Tritium combines chemically with several elements.
This chemical reaction produces heat. Like normal hydrogen, tritium can combine
combustively with air, forming water and releasing large amounts of heat. Metals
react with tritium in two ways: plating, the deposition of a thin film of tritium on the
surface of the metal; or hydriding, the chemical combination with the metal. In either
case, the surface of the metal becomes contaminated. In a fire, tritium combines
spontaneously with oxygen in the air and will also replace ordinary hydrogen in water
or other hydrogenous material (grease or oil), causing these materials to become
radioactive. Metal tritides deposit in the lung. The tritium involved is bound with the
metal. Only after an extended period of time will the tritium be available for
absorption and elimination via the urine. The low energy betas continue to deposit
energy in lung tissue until the material is removed from the lung.

227 CHAPTER 8
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C8.1.4.1. Radiological Characteristics. Tritium emits a weak beta particle


and decays into a stable helium-3 atom.
Isotope Primary Particle Emitted Half-Life in Years
tritium beta 12.26

C8.1.4.2. Hazards and Health Considerations

C8.1.4.2.1. Tritium is a health hazard when personnel are engaged in


specific weapon render safe procedures, when responding to an accident that occurred
in an enclosed space, and during accidents that occurred in rain, snow, or a body of
water.

C8.1.4.2.2. In its gaseous state, tritium is not absorbed by the skin to any
significant degree. The hazardous nature of tritium is due to its ability to combine
with other materials. Tritium water vapor (TO or HTO) is readily absorbed by the
body by inhalation and absorption through the skin. The radioactive water entering
the body is chemically identical to ordinary water and is distributed throughout the
body tissues. Tritium that has plated upon a surface or combined chemically with a
material is a contact hazard.

C8.1.4.2.3. The body normally eliminates and renews 50 percent of its


water in about 8 to 12 days. This biological half-life varies with the fluid intake.
Since tritium oxide is water, its time in the body may be significantly reduced by
increasing the fluid intake. Under medical supervision, the biological half-life may be
reduced to 3 days. Without medical supervision, a recommended procedure is to have
the patient drink 1 quart of water within 1-half hour of exposure. Thereafter, maintain
the body's water content by imbibing the same amount excreted until medical
assistance is obtained.

C8.1.4.2.4. A SCBA and protective clothing will protect personnel


against tritium for a short time. A filter mask offers no protection.

C8.1.5. Thorium (Th). Thorium is a heavy, dense gray metal that is about three
times as abundant as uranium. Thirteen isotopes are known, with atomic masses
ranging from 223 through 235.

228 CHAPTER 8
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C8.1.5.1. Radiological Characteristics. Thorium 232 is the principal


isotope. It decays by a series of alpha emissions to radium 225. Thorium 232 is not
fissionable, but is used in reactors to produce fissionable U-233 by neutron
bombardment. A non-nuclear property of thorium is that when heated in air, it glows
with a dazzling white light.
Isotope Primary Particle Emitted Half-Life in Years
thorium 223 to 235 alpha 14,100,000,000

C8.1.5.2. Hazards and Health Considerations. Thorium presents both a


toxic and radiological hazard.

C8.1.5.2.1. Toxicologically, thorium causes heavy metal poisoning


similar to lead or the uranium isotopes.

C8.1.5.2.2. Biologically, thorium accumulates in the skeletal system


where it has a biological half-life of 200 years.

C8.1.5.2.3. A properly fitted respirator and standard personal protective


clothing will protect personnel against levels of thorium contamination expected at an
accident site.

C8.2. FISSION PRODUCTS

The materials considered thus far are used in weapons in pure forms and in
combinations with other elements. Due to weapon design, the probability of a nuclear
detonation as a result of an accident is unlikely. If fission occurs, the products of the
reaction may pose a severe hazard. In general, fission products are beta and gamma
emitters and are hazardous, even when external to the body. To predict and estimate
the quantity of fission products is difficult since the amount of fission is unknown, and
to further complicate the situation, the relative isotopic abundances will change with
time as the shorter lived radioisotopes decay. An estimate of the hazard may be
obtained by beta and gamma monitoring.

C8.3. GAMMA MONITORING

When approaching a nuclear weapon involved in an incident/accident, always


monitor to ascertain all possible radiation hazards.

229 CHAPTER 8
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C8.3.1. Always survey for gamma radiation because some fission products may
be present. Observe maximum permissible exposure (MPE) in paragraph C8.3.1.4.

C8.3.1.1. OFF SCALE GAMMA SURVEY. If the gamma survey


instrument being used has a meter capable of indicating a maximum of 3 roentgens per
hour (or less) and the meter goes offscale, do not enter the area because the actual
radiation level is unknown.

C8.3.1.2. SATURATED GAMMA SURVEY INSTRUMENT. Many


gamma survey instruments will become saturated when placed in a strong field. A
saturated instrument may indicate a false low or zero reading.

C8.3.1.3. INVERSE SQUARE LAW. The radiation intensity emitted from


a given point source is inversely related to the distance from that source. If a dose
rate, Rl, is taken at distance, D1, from the source, a second unknown dose rate, R2, can
be calculated for a second (different) distance, D2, using the following equation:
R2 - R1 X (D1/D2) squared)

R1 = Dose rate at distance D1 from a point source of GAMMA.


R2 = Unknown dose rate at distance D2 from a point source of GAMMA.
D1 = Known distance from point source of GAMMA where R1 was measured.
D2 = Known distance from point source of GAMMA for which R2 will be calculated.

C8.3.1.4. STAY TIME. The MPE for an individual in a given radiation


field before reaching a predetermined maximum cumulative dose is computed as
follows:

NOTE: Use highest maximum reading to determine stay time.

230 CHAPTER 8
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

T = D/R

T = Time of exposure to ionizing radiation expressed in hours or decimal fractions thereof.


R = Dose rate expressed in R/hr or mR/hr as determined from the BETA/GAMMA instrument.
D = The predetermined maximum yearly cumulative dose:
(0.5 rem) per year
500 mrem - non-occupational (general public)
5 rem - accident/incident response
25 rem - to save valuable property
100 rem - to save lives
Other - as determined by the on-scene commander (OSC) consistent with operational military
consideration.

NOTE: No individual less than 18 years of age or women known to be pregnant shall
be occupationally exposed to radiation in excess of that allowed to any individual in
the general population.

C8.3.1.5. CUMULATIVE DOSE. The dose an individual receives over a


specific period of time in a given radiation field is computed as follows:
D = R(T)

D = Cumulative dose received expressed in roentgens or milliroentgens.


R = Dose rate expressed in R/hr or mR/hr as determined from the BETA/GAMMA instrument.
T = Time of exposure to ionizing radiation expressed in hours or decimal fractions thereof.

231 CHAPTER 8
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C9. CHAPTER 9
CONVERSION FACTORS FOR WEAPONS
GRADE PLUTONIUM

Assumptions:
1. Conversions are for weapons grade plutonium only, with no americium.
2. Density of soil 1.5 g/cm3.
3. Specific activity (alpha only) 0.075 Ci/g.
4. Contamination of soil is to the depth of 1 cm.

Table C9.T1. Conversion Factors for Weapons Grade Plutonium


To Convert Into Multiply by

µCi/m 2 µg/m 2 13
µCi/m 2 dpm/m2 2.2 x 10-6
µCi/m2 dpm/cm2 220
µCi/m2 dpm/g 150
µCi/m2 µCi/g 6.7 x 10-5
µCi/m2 pCi/g 67
µg/m2 µCi/m2 0.075
µg/m2 dpm/m2 1.7 x 105
µg/m2 dpm/cm 2 17
µg/m2 dpm/g 11
µg/m2 µCi/g 5 x 10-6
µg/m2 pCi/g 5

dpm/m2 µCi/m2 4.5 x 10-7


dpm/m2 µg/m2 6.1 x 10-6
dpm/m2 dpm/cm2 10-4
dpm/m2 dpm/g 6.7 x 10-5
dpm/m2 µCi/g 3.0 x 10-11
dpm/m2 µCi/g 3.0 x 10-5
dpm/cm2 µCi/m2 4.5 x 10-3
dpm/cm2 µg/m 6.l x 10-2
dpm/cm2 dpm/m2 104
dpm/cm2 dpm/g 0.67
dpm/cm2 µCi/g 3.0 x 10-7

232 CHAPTER 9
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

Table C9.T1. Conversion Factors for Weapons Grade Plutonium--Continued


To Convert Into Multiply by

dpm/cm2 pCi/g 0.3


dpm/g µCi/m2 6.8 x 103
dpm/g µg/m2 0.091
dpm/g dpm/m2 1.5 x 104
dpm/g dpm/cm2 1.5
dpm/g µCi/g 4.5 x 10-7
dpm/g pCi/g 0.45

µCi/g µCi/m2 1.5 x 104


µCi/g µg/m2 2 x 105
µCi/g dpm/m2 3.3 x 1010
µCi/g dpm/cm2 3.3 x 106
µCi/g dpm/g 2.2 x 106
µCi/g pCi/g 106

pCi/g µCi/m2 1.5 x 10-2


pCi/g µg/m2 0.20
pCi/g dpm/m2 3.3 x 104
pCi/g dpm/cm2 3.3
pCi/g dpm/g 2.2
pCi/g µCi/g 10-6

µ units units 10-6


units µ units 106

The conversion of alpha instrument readings in cpm into quantifiable units is affected
by the type of surface and meter efficiency. For accurate conversions, a surface sample
from the area measured should be analyzed with laboratory equipment and the conversion
factor for that area computed. The table below provides approximate factors for conversion
of alpha readings in cpm into µg/m 2 for various surfaces using the following equation:

233 CHAPTER 9
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

µg/m2 - correction factor x cpm

Type of Surface Correction Factor


Soil .006
Concrete .005
Plywood .004
Stainless Steel .0025

The correction factors consider unit and area conversions, nominal instrument efficiency
during field use, and assume a 60-sq-cm probe area (AN/PDR-60 or PAC-1S). Correction
factors should be multiplied by 4 for use with the AN/PDR-56. Tables C9.T2. and C9.T3.
were prepared from the preceding conversion table and equation for users of the AN/PDR-56
and AN/PDR-60, respectively.

234 CHAPTER 9
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

Table C9.T2. Conversion Table (CPM to µ g/m2 or µ Ci/m2)


AN/PDR-56 Alpha Meter
CPM SOIL CONCRETE PLYWOOD STAINLESS STEEL

AN/PDR-56 µ g/m2 µ Ci/m2 µ g/m2 µ Ci/m2 µ g/m2 µ Ci/m2 µ g/m2 µ Ci/m2


Pu-239 Pu-239 Pu-239 Pu-239 Pu-239 Pu-239 Pu-239 Pu-239

50 1.2 .09 1.0 .075 .8 .06 .5 .038


100 2.4 .18 2.0 .15 1.6 .12 1.0 .075
200 4.8 .36 4.0 .30 3.2 .24 2.0 .15
400 9.6 .72 8.0 .60 6.4 .48 4.0 .30
600 14.4 1.08 12.0 .90 9.6 .72 6.0 .45
800 19.2 1.44 16.0 1.20 12.8 .96 8.0 .60
1,000 24.0 1.80 20.0 1.50 16.0 1.20 10.0 .75
1,200 28.8 2.16 24.0 1.80 19.2 1.44 12.0 .90
1,500 36.0 2.70 30.0 2.25 24.0 1.80 15.0 1.13
2,000 43.2 3.24 36.0 2.70 28.8 2.16 18.0 1.35
2,200 52.8 3.96 44.0 3.30 35.2 2.64 22.0 1.65
2,500 60.0 4.50 50.0 3.75 40.0 3.00 25.0 1.88
2,800 67.2 5.04 56.0 4.20 44.8 3.36 28.0 2.10
3,000 72.0 5.40 60.0 4.50 48.0 3.60 30.0 2.25
4,000 96.0 7.20 80.0 6.00 64.0 4.80 40.0 3.00
5,000 120.0 9.00 100.0 7.50 80.0 6.00 50.0 3.75
8,000 192.0 14.40 160.0 12.00 128.0 9.60 80.00 6.00
10,000 240.0 18.00 200.0 15.00 160.0 12.00 100.0 7.50
11,000 264.0 19.80 220.0 16.50 176.0 13.20 110.0 8.25
12,000 288.0 21.60 240.0 18.00 192.0 14.40 120.0 9.00
25,000 600.0 45.00 500.0 37.50 400.0 30.00 250.0 18.75
50,000 1,200.0 90.00 1,000.0 75.00 800.0 60.00 500.0 37.50
75,000 1,800.0 135.00 1,500.0 112.50 1,200.0 90.00 750.0 56.25
100,000 2,400.0 180.00 2,000.0 150.00 1,600.0 120.00 1,000.0 75.00
150,000 3,600.0 270.00 3,000.0 225.00 2,400.0 180.00 1,500.0 112.50
200,000 4,800.0 360.00 4,000.0 300.00 3,200.0 240.00 2,000.0 150.00
300,000 7,200.0 540.00 6,000.0 450.00 4,800.0 360.00 3,000.0 225.00

NOTE: To convert µCi/m2 to Becquerels/m2 (Bq/m2), multiply by 3.7 x 104.

235 CHAPTER 9
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

Table C9.T3. Conversion Table (CPM to µ g/m2 or µ Ci/m2)


AN/PDR-60
CPM SOIL CONCRETE PLYWOOD STAINLESS STEEL

AN/PDR-60 µ g/m2 µ Ci/m2 µ g/m2 µ Ci/m2 µ g/m2 µ Ci/m2 µ g/m2 µ Ci/m2


Pu-239 Pu-239 Pu-239 Pu-239 Pu-239 Pu-239 Pu-239 Pu-239

50 0.3 .023 .25 .019 .2 .015 .125 .009


100 0.6 .045 .50 .38 .4 .03 .25 .019
200 1.2 .09 1.0 .075 .8 .06 .5 .038
400 2.4 .18 2.0 .15 1.6 .12 1.0 .075
600 3.6 .27 3.0 .23 2.4 .18 1.5 .113
800 4.8 .36 4.0 .30 3.2 .24 2.0 .15
1,000 6.0 .45 5.0 .38 4.0 .30 2.5 .19
1,200 7.2 .54 6.0 .45 4.8 .36 3.0 .23
1,500 9.0 .68 7.5 .56 6.0 .45 3.8 .28
1,800 10.8 .81 9.0 .68 7.2 .54 4.5 .34
2,200 13.2 .99 11.0 .83 8.8 .66 5.5 .41
2,500 15.0 1.13 12.5 .94 10.0 .75 6.3 .47
2,800 16.8 1.26 14.0 1.05 11.2 .84 7.0 .53
3,000 18.0 1.35 15.0 1.13 12.0 .90 7.5 .56
4,000 24.0 1.80 20.0 1.50 16.0 1.20 10.0 .75
5,000 30.0 2.25 25.0 1.88 20.0 1.50 12.5 .94
8,000 48.0 3.60 40.0 3.00 32.0 2.40 20.0 1.50
10,000 60.0 4.50 50.0 3.75 40.0 3.00 25.0 1.88
11,000 66.0 4.95 55.0 4.13 44.0 3.30 27.5 2.06
12,000 72.0 5.40 60.0 4.50 48.0 3.60 30.0 2.25
25,000 150.0 11.25 125.0 9.38 100.0 7.50 62.5 4.69
50,000 300.0 22.50 250.0 18.75 200.0 15.00 125.0 9.38
75,000 450.0 33.75 375.0 28.13 300.0 22.50 187.5 14.06
100,000 600.0 45.00 500.0 37.50 400.0 30.00 250.0 18.75
150,000 900.0 67.50 750.0 56.25 600.0 45.00 375.0 28.13
200,000 1,200.0 90.00 1,000.0 75.00 800.0 60.00 500.0 37.50
300,000 1,800.0 135.00 1,500.0 112.50 1,200.0 90.00 750.0 56.25

NOTE: To convert µCi/m2 to Becquerels/m2 (Bq/m2), multiply by 3.7 x 104.

236 CHAPTER 9
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

Table C9.T4. Conversion Table (MBq to mCi and µ Ci)


MBq mCi MBq µ Ci

7,000 189. 30 810


6,000 162. 20 540
5,000 135. 10 270
4,000 108. 9 240
3,000 81. 8 220

2,000 54. 7 189


1,000 27. 6 162
900 24. 5 135
800 21.6 4 108
700 18.9 3 81

600 16.2 2 54
500 13.5 1 27
400 10.8 0.9 24
300 8.1 0.8 21.6
200 5.4 0.7 18.9

100 2.7 0.6 16.2


90 2.4 0.5 13.5
80 2.16 0.4 10.8
70 1.89 0.3 8.1
60 1.62 0.2 5.4

50 1.35 0.1 2.7


40 1.08

237 CHAPTER 9
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

Table C9.T5. Conversion to SI Units


1 Ci = 3.7 x 1010 Bq
1 Bq = 2.7 x 10-11 Ci

1 REM = 10-2 Sv
1 Sv = 100 REM

1 RAD = 10-2 Gy
1 Gy = 100 RADs

SI Units:
Becquerels (Bq)
Sieverts (Sv)
Gray (Gy)

238 CHAPTER 9
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C10. CHAPTER 10
MEDICAL

C10.1. GENERAL

C10.1.1. Radioactive contamination may be a result of a nuclear weapon


accident. In instances when radioactive contamination is not dispersed (for example,
the September 1980 TITAN II explosion at Damascus, AR), the medical requirements
are greatly simplified. Specifically, emergency lifesaving procedures in any major
disaster are applicable to a nuclear weapon accident. Even without the presence of
radioactive contamination, other weapon specific non-radioactive toxic hazards may
exist; however, lifesaving procedures should not be delayed or omitted due to radiation
contamination. The presence of radioactive contamination should not by itself delay
emergency medical response although other weapon-specific non-radioactive hazards
should be considered prior to emergency care being rendered.

C10.1.2. If radioactive contaminants are dispersed, difficult problems result, and


medical personnel must now treat people who may be contaminated. Treatment of
contaminated patients requires special techniques and training. In some instances,
these special techniques can be applied by the accident response force medical
personnel. On other occasions, sophisticated treatment available only at special
medical facilities will be required. As with any response function, training must be
conducted prior to an accident.

C10.2. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This chapter provides guidance concerning the medical requirements resulting from a
nuclear weapon accident. In addition to recommended procedures, available
resources, their location, and how to obtain them are discussed also.

C10.3. SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

Medical personnel will assist in accident-related emergency medical treatment and in


establishing health and safety programs to support response operations over an
extended period of time. To accomplish this, medical personnel will be required to:

C10.3.1. Promptly treat accident casualties and injuries or illnesses.

239 CHAPTER 10
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C10.3.2. Assess and report the magnitude of the accident; for example, numbers
and categories of injuries, suspected contamination, and priority for transport to a
medical facility.

C10.3.3. Advise medical facilities receiving casualties, in coordination with


radiological personnel, of possible contamination, and measures that can be taken to
prevent its spread.

C10.3.4. Implement the collection of bioassay samples from personnel that were
in the area as well as response personnel and ensure that bioassay and external
exposure data becomes part of the health records.

C10.3.5. Establish a heat/cold exposure prevention program and other


environmental prevention measure programs.

C10.3.6. Assist in casualty DECON and supervise the DECON of personnel


when initial external DECON efforts fail to achieve desired results.

C10.3.7. Manage remediation of internal contamination.

C10.3.8. Assist in obtaining radiation health history of all personnel involved in


accident response, including civilians in the surrounding community exposed to
radiation or contamination as a result of the accident.

C10.4. RESOURCES

Medical support assistance, specialized in radiological health matters, is available from


DoD and DOE through the DoD JNACC. Although numerous resources are available,
all may not be required for response to a given accident. Resources discussed in the
following paragraphs should be studied and reviewed in advance. When an accident
occurs, assets should be requested when needed.

C10.4.1. Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI). The AFRRI


maintains a Medical Radiobiology Advisory Team (MRAT) to provide state-of-the-art
medical radiobiology advice supporting a nuclear accident response. This team
consists of physicians and scientists working in radiobiology research. Their mission
is to provide the medical groups responding to radiobiological emergencies with the
most current medical guidance regarding the treatment of radiation casualties. This
advice is derived from validated, military relevant radiobiology research and is within

240 CHAPTER 10
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

reasonably accepted standards of care. Subject areas of expertise include, for


example, hematology, biological response modifiers, infectious disease, dosimetry, and
behavioral analyses. If needed, liaison with other medical centers and laboratories
specializing in radiobiology can be facilitated. Through means of telephone
communications (available 24 hours a day), the MRAT provides radiobiology advice
to medical staffs and CRTFs within a response time of 4 hours. In addition, within 24
hours, the team is prepared to deploy and provide advice at an accident site or medical
treatment facility. Upon request of the CRTF, or responsible medical officials, the
physician members of the MRAT supplement the designated primary medical
treatment teams in the treatment of radiation injuries. Additional information about
the MRAT can be obtained by contacting the Director, Armed Forces Radiobiology
Research Institute, Bethesda, MD 20814-5145. The MRAT is deployed with the
DNAT.

C10.4.2. U.S. Army Radiological Advisory Medical Team. Special DoD


response teams are located at Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC),
Washington, DC, and the Center for Health Promotion and Preventive medicine
located in Landstuhl, FRG. The teams are specially trained to assist and furnish
guidance to the CRTF or other responsible officials at an accident site and to local
medical authorities concerning radiological health hazards and radiological exposure
criteria.

C10.4.2.1. The RAMT provides the following functions:

C10.4.2.1.1. Providing guidance relative to the potential health hazards


to personnel from radiological contamination or exposure to ionizing radiation,
DECON procedures, medical treatment, medical surveillance, and radiation exposure
control.

C10.4.2.1.2. Evaluating survey data to provide technical medical


guidance to the responsible officials utilizing radiologically contaminated areas.

C10.4.2.1.3. Monitoring potentially contaminated medical facilities,


equipment, casualties, and advise on the proper techniques for radiological
contamination control.

C10.4.2.1.4. Advising the commander regarding the potential health


hazards from exposure to sources of ionizing radiation and the DECON of personnel,
medical treatment facilities, and medical equipment.

241 CHAPTER 10
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C10.4.2.1.5. Advising on early, and followup, laboratory and clinical


procedures.

C10.4.2.1.6. Assisting the CRTF with the bioassay program.

C10.4.2.2. Each RAMT is comprised of as a minimum, a team leader, who is


a nuclear medical science officer with training in radiological monitoring and radiation
dose estimation, and a medical officer with appropriate training and experience with
the treatment of patients contaminated with radioactive materials. Also, as a
minimum, two qualified health physics technicians are on the team with experience
and training in radiation detection and measurement techniques. All team members
have a minimum security clearance of SECRET and attend required training. The
RAMT can be augmented for extended operations.

C10.4.2.3. Additional information can be obtained from the Commander,


WRAMC, MCHL-HP/RAMT, Washington, DC, 20307-5001. The RAMT will
normally be alerted by the U.S. Army Operations Center (AOC) and may be alerted by
the Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center (JNACC) or National Military
Command Center (NMCC). The U.S. RAMT will deploy CONUS on request of the
AOC, U.S. Army Material Command (AMC) Operations Center, U.S. Army Medical
Command (MEDCOM), or the depot commander. The U.S. RAMT will deploy
OCONUS on direction of the AOC or MEDCOM. The Europe RAMT will deploy
within theater on requests from the JNACC, AOC, Europe Nuclear Accident
Coordinating Center, or OSC. Either RAMT will deploy outside their theater on
direction of the AOC.

C10.4.3. Department of Energy. Major DOE installations have medical, health


physics, and monitoring support capabilities that may be able to assist. Additionally,
DOE facilities that handle radiological material routinely are equipped to administer
medical treatment for radiological casualties. The REAC/TS, Oak Ridge, TN, is
prepared to deal with all types of radiation exposure and can provide expert advice and
assistance. REAC/TS personnel will normally deploy to the accident site with an
initial stock of medications capable of lessening the effects of internalized radioactive
particles as a part of the DOE ARG. Until REAC/TS personnel arrive, advice on the
treatment of contaminated patients may be obtained through the REAC/TS Center.
Additional REAC/TS assistance can be requested through either the DOE Team
Leader, or JNACC.

C10.5. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

242 CHAPTER 10
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

Medical problems resulting from a nuclear weapon accident vary in complexity


depending primarily on the presence, or absence, of radioactive contamination. Other
factors such as a delayed initial response time (that is, a remote accident) or
nonavailability of medical personnel can add to the difficulty of proper medical
response. This concept of operations is directed toward the medical response
function, and is applicable to both the IRF and RTF.

C10.5.1. Pre-Accident Preparation. Before an accident occurs, the response


forces (IRF or RTF) medical officer is identified, supporting medical personnel
assigned and equipment identified. Generally, the IRF is equipped and manned to
provide emergency medical treatment, while the RTF should be equipped and manned
to support a long-term response effort. The proximity of existing medical treatment
facilities to the accident site is a factor in determining the size and capabilities of the
medical support element actually deployed. All medical personnel at the accident site
shall be trained on the hazards and procedures for treatment of radiation accident
victims. In addition to radioactive materials, several other weapon-specific substances
may be present that are toxic hazards to personnel. Of primary concern are beryllium
(Be), lithium (Li), lead (Pb) and smoke or fumes from various plastics. A discussion
of the general characteristics, hazards, and health considerations associated with these
substances is presented in Appendix C10.AP1.

C10.5.2. Emergency Rescue and Treatment. A high priority at any accident is


the rescue and treatment of casualties. The probability of response force involvement
in the initial rescue and treatment procedures depends on response time. The longer it
takes to get to the accident, the greater the probability that casualties will have been
treated and removed by civilian authorities. If possible, EOD personnel and/or
radiation monitors should mark a clear path, or accompany emergency medical
personnel into the accident site to assist in avoiding radioactive, explosive, and toxic
hazards. However, weapon render safe operations may preclude EOD personnel from
accompanying medical personnel into the accident site. Protective clothing,
appropriate for the medical risk to the patient and radiological risk to the provider,
shall be worn by emergency medical personnel. Respiratory protective devices shall
be worn based on the nonradiological hazards (smoke or fumes) or as required by the
guidelines in Chapter 4 when entering the accident area. Respiratory protection
should not be required when treating patients outside the contaminated area, but care
should be exercised in removing and handling patient's clothing. Suggested casualty
handling procedures for emergency response to a nuclear weapon accident follow.

C10.5.2.1. Assess and assure an open airway, breathing, and circulation of

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the victims. Administer cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), if necessary, using a


bag-mask, positive pressure ventilator, or, mouth-to-mouth resuscitation.

C10.5.2.2. Move victims, if possible, away from the contaminated area.


Take routine precautions. Do not delay customary lifesaving procedures (drugs,
Military Anti-Shock (MAS) trousers) because of radiological contamination.

C10.5.2.3. Administer intravenous (IV) fluids.

C10.5.2.4. Control hemorrhage and stabilize fractures.

C10.5.2.5. If a victim is unconscious, consider medical or toxic causes, since


radiation exposure does not cause unconsciousness or immediate visible signs of injury.

C10.5.2.6. Triage or sort the casualties by priority of life or limb threatening


injury. Categories for emergent or immediate evacuation, delayed and dead should be
utilized by the on-site medical team.

C10.5.2.7. After the immediate medical needs are met, coordinate with
available RADCON personnel to monitor the victims for possible contamination
before transporting to the hospital. Note and record the location and extent (in cpm)
of the contamination, and the instrument used, on a field medical card, then place this
card in a plastic bag and attach to the patient's protective mask or in another fashion
that will prevent loss. Also, ensure that open wounds are covered with a field dressing
to keep out contamination if the wound is uncontaminated or to contain the
contamination if the wound is contaminated. Removal of contaminated clothing is
advisable provided the medical authority decides that their removal is not
contraindicated. Finally, wrap the patient in a clean sheet to contain any loose
contamination during evacuation. Casualty decontamination, particularly wound
decontamination, of seriously injured patients is best performed in a medical treatment
facility.

C10.5.2.8. Determine if corrosive materials were present at the accident


scene, since these materials can cause chemical burns. Take all possible precautions
to prevent introduction of contaminated materials into the mouth.

C10.5.2.9. No medical personnel or equipment should leave the


contaminated area without monitoring for contamination; however, transporting the
seriously injured victim should not be delayed for monitoring or DECON.

C10.5.2.10. Attendant medical personnel will then process the patients

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through the CCL. AS LONG AS THE PATIENT REMAINS WRAPPED IN THE


SHEET, HE/SHE DOES NOT POSE A THREAT OF SPREADING
CONTAMINATION AND COMPROMISING THE CONTAMINATION CONTROL
LINE. Hence, these patients should be evacuated without DECON. The patient will
then be transferred to the "clean" side of the hot line and placed in the charge of
"clean" medical personnel residing on the uncontaminated side of the CCL. The
patient can then be loaded into the ambulance or evacuation vehicle and be transported
to the receiving medical facility.

C10.5.2.11. To ensure that the receiving facility is prepared for the arrival of
the victims, notify the facility of the following:

NOTE: Procedures listed in above paragraphs C10.5.2.11.3., C10.5.2.11.4., and


C10.5.2.11.5. may be determined en route to the medical facility if radiation detection
instruments are available, but not at the expense of medical care. Use of a single
medical facility for contaminated casualties should be considered if a facility has
sufficient capacity.

C10.5.2.11.1. Number of victims.

C10.5.2.11.2. Area of injuries, vital signs (if known), and triage


category.

C10.5.2.11.3. Extent of contamination, if known.

C10.5.2.11.4. Areas of greatest contamination.

C10.5.2.11.5. Any evidence of internal contamination.

C10.5.2.11.6. The radionuclide and the chemical form, if known, and by


what instrument it was measured.

C10.5.2.11.7. Any exposure to nonradiological toxic materials.

C10.5.2.12. Upon arrival at the hospital, take patients immediately to the


area designated for the receipt of contaminated patients. If no such area exists then
take the patients to the emergency room. Prior to entry of the patient into the hospital,
attendant medical personnel will ensure that the hospital has instituted the proper
precautions. These precautions include, but are not limited to:

C10.5.2.12.1. The room used has an isolated air supply.

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C10.5.2.12.2. Covering the area with plastic sheeting or absorbent-lined


plastic diapers (chucks) to contain loose contamination.

C10.5.2.12.3. Ensuring that personnel have the appropriate radiation


detection instrumentation, i.e., alpha scintillation detectors, and they are versed in the
use of this equipment.

C10.5.2.12.4. That personnel are wearing proper protective clothing.


For this type of accident scenario, surgical gowns, gloves, shoe covers, and masks,
should be appropriate for protection against alpha contamination.

C10.5.2.13. The DECON of the patients may then begin. These measures
include:

C10.5.2.13.1. Carefully opening the sheet or plastic wrapping


surrounding the patient avoiding spreading any contamination.

C10.5.2.13.2. Removing clothing by cutting away the sleeves and


trouser legs and folding the contamination in on itself. This method parallels the
standard methods of removing patient clothing in a nuclear, biological, or chemical
(NBC) environment. These articles of clothing will then be bagged to contain the
contamination. The removal of contaminated clothing may remove up to 90 percent
of the contamination if the clothing is dry.

C10.5.2.13.3. Remaining contamination can be located with the use of


monitoring equipment and then removed by washing with soap and water. Suspect
areas include the hair, face and neck, and hands, as well as other exposed areas of the
body due to injuries or torn clothing.

C10.5.2.13.4. The ambulance or evacuation vehicle will not be returned


to normal service until it is monitored and decontaminated and such efforts have been
confirmed by attending radiological monitors.

C10.5.3. Liaison with Civil Authorities. Emergency evacuation of contaminated


casualties may have occurred prior to the arrival of response force personnel at an
off-base accident. Additionally, some may have arrived from the contaminated area
before appropriate controls were implemented; if so, follow-on responders must liaise
with area medical facilities to ensure that proper procedures are taken to prevent the
spread of contamination. It must be determined if local medical facilities have the
ability to monitor and decontaminate their facilities or if assistance is required. The

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following procedures may be used by medical facilities not prepared for radiological
emergencies and to reduce the spread of contamination.

C10.5.3.1. Use rooms with an isolated air supply.

C10.5.3.2. Use scrub clothes, shoe covers, and rubber gloves, and bag them
and any other clothing, sheets or materials that may have come in contact with the
patient when leaving the room.

C10.5.3.3. Obtain radiation monitoring assistance for detecting plutonium or


uranium.

C10.5.3.4. Use plastic sheeting on floors to facilitate decontamination and


cleanup.

C10.5.3.5. Use isolation-control procedures.

C10.5.4. Processing of Fatalities. The remains of deceased accident victims


should, in general, be treated with the same respect and procedures used in any
accident; however, all fatalities must be monitored for contamination, and
decontaminated if necessary, prior to release for burial. The determination of whether
DECON is to be done before an autopsy should be made by the examining
authorities. Any radiological support for autopsies should be arranged on a
case-by-case basis. Service procedures for handling casualties are contained in AR
600-10, AFI 36-3002, and BUPERS Manual Article 4210100, references (p), (q), and
(r). Civil authorities must be notified of any civilian casualties as quickly as possible,
and if required, aid in identification of the deceased prior to DECON. Additional
technical guidance concerning the handling of radioactively contaminated fatalities can
be found in the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP)
Report, Number 37, and JCS Pub 4-06, references (s) and (t).

C10.5.5. Medical Clearing Facility. A medical clearing facility should be


established near the CCS with supplies for medical treatment of response force
injuries, and to assist in DECON of skin. Minimum response force medical staffing
after the initial emergency response should include a medic, with a physician, and
health physicist, on call. Should an injury occur within the RCA and injuries permit,
the injured person should be brought to the CCS and clearing facility by personnel and
vehicles already in the area. A separate first aid station may be needed to support the
base camp.

C10.5.6. Collection of Bioassay Samples. Bioassay programs and techniques are

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discussed in Chapter 7. Collection of required biosamples from response force


personnel is normally a responsibility of medical personnel. Procedures for collecting
and marking samples should be coordinated with the JHEC. The JHEC will also
provide guidance on where samples should be sent for analysis. Depending on
Service procedures, urine samples may be required of all personnel who enter the
RCA, or of those suspected to have internalized radioactive material.

C10.5.7. Hot/Cold Weather Operational Conditions

C10.5.7.1. The reduction in natural cooling of the body caused by wearing


full personal protective clothing with hoods and respirators increases the probability of
heat injuries. Heat injuries (stroke, exhaustion, or cramps) can occur with the ambient
air temperature as low as 70 °F when wearing full protective gear. Preventive
measures to reduce heat injuries include acclimatization, proper intake of salt and
water, avoidance of predisposing factors to heat illness, monitoring of temperatures,
scheduling of adequate rest or cooling periods, and educating the work force on heat
injury symptoms and remedial actions. Adequate water intake is the single most
important factor in avoidance of heat injuries. Frequent drinks are more effective than
the same quantity of water taken all at once. Although ambient temperature may be
used, Wet Globe Temperature, or Botsball temperature, is a more effective method of
monitoring heat conditions. Table C10.T1. is taken from Department of the Army
(DA) Circular 40-82-3, "Prevention of Heat Injury," reference (u), and provides
guidelines as a function of Botsball temperature. These guidelines assume fully
acclimatized and fit personnel who are normally dressed and working at a heavy rate.
The circular recommends subtracting 10 degrees from the measured Botsball
temperature when protective clothing is worn, and using the adjusted Botsball
temperature to determine preventive actions to be taken.

Table C10.T1. Heat Injury Prevention Guidelines


Botsball Temperature Heat Condition Water Intake (qts/hr) Work/Rest Cycle (min)
80 to 83 Green 0.5 to l.0 50/10
83 to 86 Yellow 1.0 to 1.5 45/15
86 to 88 Red 1.5 to 2.0 20/30
Above 88 Black 2.0 20/40

C10.5.7.2. Specialized personnel cooling equipment (for example, cooling


vest) should be used to allow additional stay-time for personnel in extreme heat
conditions.

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C10.5.7.3. The use of cold weather gear, personal protective clothing, and
respiratory equipment presents severe demands on personnel. Personnel must be
monitored closely to prevent frostbite and other cold weather effects.

C10.5.8. Public Affairs Considerations. All medical staff personnel should be


aware of the sensitive nature of issues surrounding a nuclear weapon accident. All
public release of information should be approved by the CRTF and coordinated with
the JIC/CIB as discussed in Chapter 14. Medical personnel should ensure that public
affairs personnel are informed of medical information provided to medical facilities
receiving potentially contaminated patients and that queries for nonmedical
information are referred to PA personnel.

C10.5.9. Base Camp Medical Support. Base camp support requirements include
treatment of on-the job injuries and sickness, inspection of field billeting and messing
facilities, evaluation of the adequacy of restroom facilities and sewage disposal, and
water supply. Those personnel treated for cuts or open sores should be prohibited
from entering the contaminated area until the wound is sufficiently bandaged to
exclude possible contamination. Their supervisors should be notified of the
restriction.

C10.6. ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN ANNEX

The medical annex should describe responsibilities and special procedures used by the
medical staff. This annex should include procedures for:

C10.6.1. Differentiating between medical and radiological safety/health physics


personnel.

C10.6.2. Receiving and treating contaminated patients.

C10.6.3. Establishing and operating a medical clearing facility at the accident


scene, including controlling contaminated patients.

C10.6.4. Identifying and locating facilities for treating internal contamination.

C10.6.5. Evacuating contaminated casualties to major medical facilities.

C10.6.6. Decontaminating and processing the remains of deceased.

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C10.6.7. Establishing the relationship of the response force medical staff and
specialized medical teams responding to the accident.

C10.7. SPECIALIZED COURSES FOR MEDICAL RESPONSE PERSONNEL

C10.7.1. Radiological Hazards Training Course (RHTC). Several classes are


scheduled each year at the Defense Nuclear Weapons School (DNWS), Kirtland AFB,
NM. The course provides training in the organization and functions of IRF teams and
in techniques in monitoring contaminated areas. This training includes the principles
of nuclear devices, related hazards in a nuclear weapon accident or incident, hazards of
explosive materials, and IRF operation.

C10.7.2. Medical Effects of Ionizing Radiation. Classes are scheduled each year
by the AFRRI at various locations. Topics include biological effects of ionizing
radiation, medical operations in a nuclear environment, and medical treatment of
nuclear and nuclear-related injuries.
(http://www.afrri.usuhs.mil/www/outreach/meir/meirschd.htm refers.)

C10.7.3. Handling of Radiation Accidents by Emergency Personnel. A 3


1/2-day course scheduled several times each year at the REAC/TS, Oak Ridge, TN.
This course emphasizes the practical aspects of handling a contaminated victim.
Topics discussed in the course are the fundamentals of radiation, how to detect and
measure it, how to prevent the spread of contamination, and other topics related to the
care for contaminated accident victims.

C10.7.4. Health Physics in Radiation Accidents. A 4 1/2-day course for health


physicists and radiation protection technologists who may be called upon to respond to
accidents involving radioactive materials and injury to personnel. The major topics
covered are radiological emergency procedures and the role of the health physicist in a
medical environment. Classes are scheduled at the REAC/TS, Oak Ridge, TN.

C10.7.5. Medical Planning and Care in Radiation Accidents. This 4 1/2-day


course presents an advanced level of information on the diagnosis and treatment of
acute local and total body radiation exposure, internal and external contamination,
combined injuries, and multi-casualty incidents involving ionizing radiation. Classes
are scheduled at the REAC/TS, Oak Ridge, Tn.

250 CHAPTER 10
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C10.AP1. APPENDIX 1 OF CHAPTER 10

NON-RADIOLOGICAL TOXIC HAZARDS

C10.AP1.1. GENERAL

Several weapon-specific non-radiological hazards may be present as a result of a


nuclear weapon accident. Some of those hazards are mentioned below. Additional
information on them and other non-radiological hazards not mentioned can be obtained
through DOE.

C10.AP1.2. PURPOSE

This appendix provides information useful in implementing training programs for


medical personnel responding to nuclear weapon accidents.

C10.AP1.3. NON-RADIOLOGICAL TOXIC HAZARDS

C10.AP1.3.1. Beryllium

C10.AP1.3.1.1. Beryllium is a light, gray-white nonradioactive metal, hard


and brittle, and resembles magnesium.

C10.AP1.3.1.2. Hazards and Health Considerations. In its solid state


(normal state), beryllium is not a personnel hazard. However, in powder, oxide, or
gaseous form, it is extremely dangerous. Inhalation is the most significant means of
entry into the body. Because it oxidizes easily, any fire or explosion involving
beryllium liberates toxic fumes and smoke. When beryllium enters the body through
cuts, scratches, or abrasions on the skin, ulceration often occurs. One of the
peculiarities of beryllium poisoning is that no specific symptoms are apparent. The
most common symptom is an acute or delayed type of pulmonary edema or
berylliosis. Other commonly occurring signs and symptoms are ulceration and
irritation of the skin, shortness of breath, chronic cough, cyanosis, loss of weight, and
extreme nervousness. Another hazard of beryllium is its interference with wound
healing. A wound contaminated with traces of beryllium will not heal until the metal
is removed. Beryllium or its compounds, when in finely divided form, should never
be handled with the bare hands but always with rubber gloves. An M17, or equivalent
protective mask/respirator, and personal protective clothing must be worn in an area
known, or suspected, to be contaminated with beryllium dust. SCBA is necessary

251 CHAPTER 10, APPENDIX 1


DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

when beryllium fumes or smoke are present. DECON of personnel, terrain, or


facilities will be similar to radiological DECON. An effective method, when
applicable, is vacuum cleaning, using a cleaner with a high efficiency particle air
(HEPA) filter. Since beryllium is not radioactive, its detection requires chemical
analysis in a properly equipped laboratory. Direct detection in the field is impossible.

C10.AP1.3.2. Lithium

C10.AP1.3.2.1. Lithium and its compounds, normally lithium hydride, may


be present at a nuclear weapon accident. Due to its highly reactive nature, naturally
occurring lithium is always found chemically with other elements. Upon exposure to
water, a violent chemical reaction occurs, producing heat, hydrogen, oxygen, and
lithium hydroxide. The heat causes the hydrogen to burn explosively, producing a
great deal of damage.

C10.AP1.3.2.2. Hazards and Health Considerations. Lithium can react


directly with the water contained in the body tissue causing severe chemical burns.
Also, lithium hydroxide is a caustic agent that affects the body, especially the eyes, in
the same manner as lye (sodium or potassium hydroxide). Respiratory protection and
firefighter clothing are required to protect personnel exposed to fires involving lithium
or lithium hydrides. An SCBA is necessary if fumes from burning lithium components
are present. Protection for the eyes and skin is necessary for operations involving
these materials.

C10.AP1.3.3. Lead. Pure lead and most of its compounds are toxic. Lead
enters the body through inhalation, ingestion, or skin absorption. Inhalation of lead
compounds presents a very serious hazard. Skin absorption is usually negligible,
since the readily absorbed compounds are seldom encountered in sufficient
concentration to cause damage. Upon entry into the body, lead will concentrate in the
kidneys and bones. From the bone deposits, lead will be liberated slowly into the
bloodstream causing anemia and resulting in a chronic toxic condition. Lead
poisoning displays several specific characteristics and symptoms. The skin of an
exposed individual will turn yellowish and dry. Digestion is impaired with severe
colicky pains, and constipation results. With a high body burden, the exposed
individual will have a sweet, metallic taste in his mouth and a dark blue coloring of the
gums resulting from a deposition of black lead sulfide. Lead concentrations within the
body have been reduced successfully by using chelating agents. An M17 or
equivalent protective mask will protect personnel against inhalation of lead compounds.

C10.AP1.3.4. Plastics. When involved in a fire, all plastics present varying

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degrees of toxic hazards due to the gases, fumes, and/or minute particles produced.
The gaseous or particulate products may produce dizziness and prostration initially,
mild and severe dermatitis, severe illness, or death if inhaled, ingested, placed in
contact with the skin, or absorbed through the skin. Any fire involving plastics that
are not known to be harmless should be approached on the assumption that toxic fumes
and particles are present. This includes all nuclear weapon fires.

C10.AP1.3.5. High Explosives. Information on pressed, cast, and insensitive HE


will be extracted from EOD Procedures Publication 60-1, reference (v), after a DOE
classification review.

C10.AP1.3.6. Hydrazine. Hydrazine is used as a missile fuel or as a fuel in some


aircraft emergency power units. Hydrazine is a colorless, oily fuming liquid with a
slightly ammonia odor. It is a powerful explosive that when heated to decomposition
emits highly toxic nitrogen compounds and may explode by heat or chemical
reaction. Self-igniting when absorbed on earth, wood, or cloth, the fuel burns when a
spark produces combustion; any contact with an oxidized substance such as rust can
also cause combustion. When hydrazine is mixed with equal parts of water, it will not
burn; however it is toxic when inhaled, absorbed through the skin, or taken internally.
Causing skin sensitization as well as systemic poisoning, hydrazine may cause damage
to the liver or destruction of red blood cells. The permissible exposure level is 0.1
parts per million and a lower concentration causes nasal irritation. After exposure to
hydrazine vapors or liquids, remove clothing immediately and spray exposed area with
water for 15 minutes. SCBA is required in vapor/liquid concentrations.

C10.AP1.3.7. Red Fuming Nitric Acid. Red nitric acid is an oxidizer for some
missile propellant systems. It is a reddish brown, highly toxic corrosive liquid with a
sharp, irritating, pungent odor. Dangerous when heated to decomposition, it emits
highly toxic fumes of NOx and will react with water or steam to produce heat and
toxic corrosive and flammable vapors. The permissible exposure level is two parts per
million, although a lower concentration causes nasal irritation, severe irritation to the
skin, eyes, and mucous membranes. Immediately after exposure, wash acid from skin
with copious amounts of water. SCBA is required in vapor/liquid concentrations.

C10.AP1.3.8. Solid Fuel Rocket Motors. Rocket motors (composed of dymeryl


diisocyanate (DDI), cured hydroxyl terminated polybutadine (HTPB) polymer,
ammonium perchlorate, and aluminum powder or other cyanate, butadiene, perchlorate
or nitrate-based compounds) present severe explosive hazards upon accidental
ignition. If rocket motors ignite or catch fire, evacuate to a safe distance.

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C10.AP1.3.9. Composite Fibers (CFs). CFs are carbon, boron, and graphite
fibers that are milled into composite epoxy packages that are integral aircraft structural
members. Upon fire or breakage of the epoxy outer layer, CF strands can be emitted
into the environment and become a respiratory tract, eye, and skin irritation hazard.
In the immediate accident area or location where a composite package has broken
open, the fibers can cause severe arcing and shorting of electrical equipment.

C10.AP1.3.10. JP-10. JP-10 is used as a missile fuel. It is a clear liquid and has
a kerosene-like odor. Recommended special firefighting procedures are to use a water
spray to cool fire-exposed surfaces and to protect personnel. Wear self-contained
breathing apparatus when firefighting in confined spaces. JP-10 is an aspiration
hazard. It is slightly toxic by inhalation. Do not allow liquid or mist to enter lungs.
Vapor contact causes very little to no eye irritation. High heat, sparks, open flame, or
strong oxidizers may ignite JP-10 fuel.

C10.AP1.3.11. TH Dimer. Similar to JP-10, TH Dimer is also a missile fuel


with the same color and odor characteristics. The hazards and firefighting precautions
are also similar. TH Dimer can cause gastrointestinal irritation (vomiting and
diarrhea) and nausea. For prolonged and/or repeated skin contact, appropriate
impervious clothing is required (gloves, boots, pants, coat, face protection, etc.).

C10.AP1.3.12. Composite Materials. Composite materials are solids that are


composed of two or more substances having different physical characteristics. Such
materials could be at the site of a nuclear weapon accident and pose additional health
and safety hazards if involved in a fire or explosion. Composite materials are broken
down into three categories:

C10.AP1.3.12.1. Composite. A physical combination of two or more


materials, i.e., fiberglass (glass fiber and epoxy).

C10.AP1.3.12.2. Advance Composite. A material composed of high


strength/high stiffness fibers (reinforcement) with a resin (matrix). Examples include
Graphite/Epoxy, Kevlar/Epoxy, and Spectra/Cyanate Ester.

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C10.AP1.3.12.3. Advance Aerospace Material. A highly specialized


material used to fulfill unique aerospace construction/environment/performance
requirements. Examples include Beryllium, Depleted Uranium, and Radar Absorbent
Materials (RAMs).

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C11. CHAPTER 11
SECURITY

C11.1. GENERAL

The presence of nuclear weapons or components at an accident site requires


implementation of an effective security program as soon as possible. When an
accident occurs at a military installation, security assistance may need to be obtained
from civil authorities/officials until sufficient military forces arrive. Additionally,
off-installation accidents could require the establishment of an NDA to permit control
of civilian land by military forces. Even after establishment of the NDA, close
coordination with civil law enforcement agencies is essential to an effective security
program. The equivalent DOE area for an incident/accident involving DOE
equipment/materials is an NSA. Overseas, there is no equivalent to the NDA. The
OSC will establish a disaster cordon or Security Area, to restrict entry and to provide
for public safety.

C11.2. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This chapter provides guidance for planning and conducting security operations at the
scene of a nuclear weapon accident and discusses security requirements, many unique
to a nuclear weapon accident. Also, the chapter outlines a concept of operations to
satisfy these requirements.

C11.3. SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS.

The security program at the accident scene should meet the following requirements:

C11.3.1. Provide effective control of the accident area.

C11.3.2. Protect nuclear weapons and components.

C11.3.3. Protect classified materials and information.

C11.3.4. Protect Government property.

C11.3.5. Provide effective coordination with civil law enforcement agencies/Host


Nation law agencies.

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C11.3.6. Provide unencumbered entry of medical and health physics personnel


into the area when required.

C11.3.7. Provide necessary operational security (OPSEC).

C11.3.8. Counter potential terrorist and/or radical group activities or intelligence


collection efforts.

C11.4. RESOURCES

C11.4.1. Initial Response Force. The IRF will have a security element for
perimeter security, entry and exit control, and protection of classified information and
property. Since sufficient personnel will not likely be included in the IRF security
elements responding to a nuclear weapon accident, augmentation may be required.
Security forces can expect to encounter large numbers of people attracted to the
accident scene, and care should be exercised to ensure that only experienced security
personnel are in supervisory positions. Installations with a nuclear weapon capability
should maintain equipment to control an accident site. This requirement should
include rope and stanchions for barricading the accident site, NDA and entry control
point signs, and portable lights. The IRF should provide security personnel with
anti-contamination clothing and protective masks in the event that security requires
their presence within the RCA. Riot control gear should be available if crowd control
is required. Normally, security personnel possess equipment such as weapons and
ammunition, cold weather gear, protective masks, hand-held radios, canteens, and
helmets.

C11.4.2. Response Task Force. The RTF security officer should assess
manpower requirements and ensure that sufficient additional security personnel are
included in the RTF. IRF security personnel may become part of the RTF security
element. The security officer should be prepared to meet all security requirements on
a 24-hour basis without degrading the alertness and capability of his or her personnel
to respond.

C11.4.3. Civilian Response. Civilian law enforcement response depends on the


location of the accident site. If the accident occurs off a military installation near a
populated area, local police, fire, and rescue units will be notified and may be on scene
when the IRF arrives. Civilian law enforcement personnel may augment military
security personnel, if requested.

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C11.5. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

C11.5.1. Accident Assessment. Upon arrival at the accident site, the security
officer must assess the situation. This assessment includes an evaluation of ongoing
emergency response operations and actions of local law enforcement agencies, and
provides the foundation for the security program. While the assessment is made,
security should be established at the accident site in cooperation with civil
authorities. When overseas, the civilian authorities/officials will be requested to
establish a Security Area (Disaster Cordon) to ensure public safety and appropriate
security. This must be done in close coordination with the DOS COM.
Fragmentation hazard distances and the possibility of contamination should be
considered when posting initial security personnel around the scene. This initial
security is not to be confused with the NDA, which may not yet be established and
may be different in size. The Security officers should consider the following elements
in their assessment:

C11.5.1.1. Threat (real and potential danger to the secure area).

C11.5.1.2. Location (on or off military installation).

C11.5.1.3. Demographics and accident environment (remote, rural, suburban,


and urban).

C11.5.1.4. Terrain characteristics (critical or dominating features).

C11.5.1.5. Contamination (radiation intensity and extent and other


HAZMAT).

C11.5.1.6. Accident hazards (HEs, rocket motors, or toxic chemicals).

C11.5.1.7. Local meteorological conditions (include speed and direction of


prevailing winds).

C11.5.1.8. Transportation network in accident area (access routes, types, and


quantities of vehicles).

C11.5.1.9. Structures in accident area (type and quantity).

C11.5.1.10. Safety of security personnel (fragmentation distances,


contamination, and cold/hot weather).

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C11.5.2. National Defense Area

C11.5.2.1. An NDA may be required any time an accident involving nuclear


weapons or components occurs on non-Federal property. The NDA may or may not
encompass the entire RCA. Security of any portion of the RCA existing outside the
NDA is a matter of public safety and should be provided by civilian
authorities/officials; however, military assistance may be requested. (Note: To
complement security for an NDA consider the following concept--Military only,
control actual NDA perimeter. Extending out, another perimeter manned by military
and civilian law enforcement. Out further, another perimeter manned by civilian law
enforcement. This concept allows for two perimeters with law enforcement personnel
to contain/control civilian population before gaining access to the actual security area.
This concept is depicted in Figure C11.F1.)

C11.5.2.2. DoDD 5200.8, and Section 21 of the Internal Security Act of


1950, references (e) and (w), provide the basis for establishing an NDA only in the
United States. This area is established specifically to enhance safeguarding
Government property located on non-Federal land. The Senior DoD representatives
are authorized to designate an NDA, and then only to safeguard Government
resources, irrespective of other factors. The Commander should seek legal advice on
any decisions regarding establishment, disestablishment, or modification of the NDA.
Not applicable to overseas locations.

C11.5.2.3. The IRF and RTF Commander designating the NDA must ensure
its boundaries are clearly defined and marked. Area boundaries are established to
minimize interference with other lawful activities on and uses of the property.
Initially, the dimensions of the NDA may be quite large, which is necessary until more
specific information is available regarding the location of the Government material.
The boundary is defined by some form of temporary barrier, for example, rope and
wire. Warning signs as described in DoDD 5210.41-M, "Nuclear Weapon Security
Manual," reference (x), should be posted at the entry control station and along the
boundary and be visible from any direction of approach. In areas where languages
other than English are spoken, bilingual signs should be considered.

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Figure C11.F1. Security Concept

C11.5.2.4. Once the NDA has been established, the Commander must
determine whether overflight restrictions are necessary to ensure the security and
safety of the area. If so, a request should be made to the Air Traffic Control Center
responsible for the geographic area in which the NDA is located. The physical
dimensions of the restricted area must be reasonable while affording the security and
safety the Commander seeks. The restrictions should be relaxed as conditions permit
and eliminated as soon as practical.

C11.5.2.5. The Commander who establishes the NDA should advise civil
authorities/officials of the authority and need for the NDA and the security controls in
effect. If possible, the Commander should secure the landowners' consent and
cooperation; however, obtaining such consent is not a prerequisite for establishing the
NDA.

C11.5.2.6. In maintaining security of the NDA, military personnel should use


the minimum degree of control and force necessary. Sentries should be briefed
thoroughly and given specific instructions for dealing with civilians. All personnel
should be aware of the sensitive nature of issues surrounding an accident. Moreover,
controls should be implemented to ensure that public affairs policy is strictly adhered
to, and that requests for interviews and queries concerning the accident are referred to
public affairs personnel. Civilians should be treated courteously, and in a helpful, but

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watchful manner. No one should be allowed to remove anything, nor touch any
suspicious objects. Special provisions should be made to provide unencumbered
access by medical and health physics personnel treating casualties, including deceased,
within the security area.

C11.5.2.7. Local civil authorities/officials should be asked to assist military


personnel in preventing unauthorized entry and in removing unauthorized personnel
who enter the NDA. Apprehension or arrest of civilian personnel who violate any
security requirements at the NDA should normally be done by civilian authorities. If
local civil authorities are unavailable, or refuse to give assistance, on-scene military
personnel should apprehend and detain violators or trespassers. Disposition should be
completed quickly following coordination with the legal officer. The SFO should be
notified of each apprehension and the actions taken. The security officer must ensure
that actions of on-scene military personnel do not constitute a violation of the Posse
Comitatus Act that prohibits use of DoD personnel to execute local, State, or Federal
laws, unless authorized by the Constitution or an Act of Congress.

C11.5.2.8. When all Government resources have been located, the CRTF
should consider reducing the size of the NDA. When all classified Government
resources have been removed, the NDA will be disestablished. Early coordination
with State and local officials permits an orderly transfer of responsibility to State and
local agencies when reducing or disestablishing the NDA.

C11.5.3. Accidents Overseas. In the event of a nuclear incident/accident in a


country outside the United States, the U.S. Government respects the sovereignty of the
government of that country. Civil authorities there will be asked to establish a
Security Area (Disaster Cordon) to restrict access and to provide for public safety.
On- and off-site authority at a nuclear weapon accident/incident rests with such
Government officials/representatives except that the United States shall maintain
custody of the weapon(s) and/or classified components.

C11.5.4. Security Procedures

C11.5.4.1. Sentry posts around the NDA should be in locations that enable
guards to maintain good visual contact. This action prevents unauthorized persons
from entering the NDA undetected between posts and ensures that none of the guards
violate the two-person concept. Lighting should be provided, night vision equipment
supplied, or guard spacing adjusted, to ensure that visual contact can be maintained at
night. Each guard should have a means of summoning assistance, preferably a radio,
or be in contact with someone who does. Consideration should be given in obtaining

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portable intrusion detection system sensors. This type of equipment will reduce
security personnel requirements and the possibility of radiation exposure to them.

C11.5.4.2. During the initial emergency response, entry and exit of


emergency units and other personnel may be largely uncontrolled. The security
officer should recognize that during initial response, necessary lifesaving, fire
suppression, and other emergency activities may temporarily take priority over security
procedures; however, as response operations progress, standard security measures
specified in DoDD 5210.41, "Security Policy for Protecting Nuclear Weapons,"
reference (y), must be enforced. As soon as possible, an entry control point should be
established. When personnel from various Federal and/or civilian authorities/agencies
arrive at the control point, leaders of the groups should be escorted to the operations
center. An identification and badging system should be implemented, entry control
logs established, and a record of all personnel entering or exiting the accident area
made and retained.

C11.5.4.3. A security operations center or control point should be established


as the focal point for security operations and be located close to the entry control
point. Its location should be fixed so that personnel become familiar with the
location. Representatives of all participating law enforcement agencies should be
located at the security operations center and able to communicate with their personnel.

C11.5.4.4. A security alert force should be considered, although early in the


accident response, sufficient personnel may be unavailable to form such a force.

C11.5.5. Security Considerations

C11.5.5.1. Some components in nuclear weapons may reveal classified


information by their shape, form, or outline. Specified classified components must be
protected from sight and overhead photographic surveillance.

C11.5.5.2. Individuals with varying degrees of knowledge and appreciation


for security requirements will assist in response operations. A comprehensive and
effective information security program is available as outlined in DoDD 5200.1-R,
"Information Security Regulations," reference (z), and should be promulgated in
coordination with the DOE Team Leader. The content of the information security
program should be briefed to everyone in the weapon recovery effort.

C11.5.5.3. CNWDI access verification may have to be waived temporarily


during the initial phases of accident response. When the urgency of the initial
response is over and order has been established, compliance with DoDD 5210.2,

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"Access to a Dissemination of Restricted Data," reference (aa), and Service-specific


directives, regulations, and/or instructions should prevail.

C11.5.5.4. The two-person concept is addressed in DoD and Service


directives. Security officers establish and enforce procedures to ensure only
authorized personnel are granted access to the site areas that require two-person
concept compliance.

C11.5.5.5. In the initial emergency response, Personnel Reliability Program


(PRP) requirements may have to be waived due to a lack of PRP-certified personnel.
When certified personnel are available, they should be used in security positions that
require them. Security personnel assigned to directly guard nuclear weapons and
components must be PRP certified. PRP personnel should be used on the perimeter, if
available.

C11.5.5.6. An area should be available within the security perimeter where


EOD and DOE personnel can discuss CNWDI-related to weapon(s) recovery
operations. Also, areas will be established for storage of classified documents,
recovered weapons, and weapon components. The security officer must ensure that
adequate security is provided for these areas.

C11.5.5.7. If a base camp is established to support the response operation,


traffic control signs should be posted, law enforcement procedures developed, and a
base camp entry control point established. Verification of vehicle trip authorization,
restriction of curiosity seekers, access to the camp, and maintaining order and
discipline within the camp may be parts of base camp security functions.

C11.5.6. Military Intelligence. Intelligence personnel should be used to the


fullest extent and incorporated actively in the overall security posture, including, but
not limited to:

C11.5.6.1. Advice and assistance in counterintelligence to the CRTF and


security staff.

C11.5.6.2. Liaison and coordination with Federal, State, and local agencies
and civilian authorities/officials, on threats to response operations (for example, hostile
intelligence collection efforts and terrorist activities).

C11.5.6.3. Coordination and advice to the CRTF and security staff regarding
operations security.

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C11.5.6.4. Investigating and reporting incidents of immediate security


interest to the CRTF and the security staff (in cooperation with the local office of the
FBI).

C11.5.6.5. Advise and assist the CRTF and security staff on matters of
personnel and information security necessary to maintain high standards of security.

C11.5.6.6. Receiving requests for large-scale photographic coverage of the


accident site.

C11.6. ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN ANNEX

The security annex should describe the responsibilities and procedures of the security
forces. IRF and RTF forces may prepare an annex in advance that could be modified
to fit the circumstances. The security annex should include:

C11.6.1. Security operating procedures including perimeter access/entry


procedures, establishing and maintaining an NDA or Security Area, information
security, Rules of Engagement (ROE), and use of deadly force.

C11.6.2. Descriptions of the interface with Federal, State, and civilian law
enforcement officials. Specific points of contact and phone numbers may be
contained in a separate appendix to be expanded in the event of an accident.

C11.6.3. Procedures for locating and operating the security operation center.

C11.6.4. Guidance for handling unprotected personnel encountered in


contaminated areas.

C11.6.5. Procedures for coordinating with RADCON personnel to ensure that


sentry posts outside the RADCON area are not affected by the resuspension of
contaminants during wind shifts.

C11.6.6. Procedures for coordinating with medical and health physics personnel
engaged in treatment of casualties and corpses within the security area.

C11.6.7. A description of the subversive/unfriendly threat, including an impact


assessment on response operations; this and related information may be included in a
separate intelligence annex.

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C11.6.8. Administrative and logistic requirements, for example, maintenance of


entry logs and badges, expected amounts of rope, stanchions, and signs to establish and
maintain the NDA, Security Area, such as special communications and clothing
requirements.

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C12. CHAPTER 12
WEAPON RECOVERY OPERATIONS

C12.1. GENERAL

A mixture of weapons, weapon components, contaminants, and other hazardous debris


may be at a nuclear weapon accident site. The number and type of weapons, the
extent of damage, and the location of weapons, weapon components, and hazards are
of primary concern. If the weapons appear to be intact, and radioactive contaminants
have not been dispersed, the complexity of the problem is lessened considerably;
however, even intact weapon(s) may pose significant recovery problems with potential
explosive and contamination hazards. A continuing assessment of the situation is
needed to determine the best method for conducting weapon recovery.

C12.2. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This chapter provides information about weapon operations following a nuclear


weapon accident. Also, requirements and planning are discussed to develop
operational plans for recovery of nuclear weapons, weapon components, and other
HAZMAT.

C12.3. SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

Service responsibilities for weapon recovery operations include all actions through
transfer of weapon custody to a designated DOE representative. During weapon
recovery operations, personnel:

C12.3.1. Determine the status and location of the weapon(s), including whether
HE detonations occurred.

C12.3.2. Assess weapon(s) damage.

C12.3.3. Perform site stabilization, render safe, and continuation procedures on


the weapon(s).

C12.3.4. Initiate a systematic search until the location for the weapon(s) and all
weapon components is known.

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C12.3.5. Establish an area and develop procedures for processing/packaging


contaminated weapon(s) and components.

C12.3.6. Perform necessary actions for transport or shipping of the weapon(s) and
components for interim storage and/or final disposition.

C12.4. RESOURCES

The CRTF can request many types of support during the accident response operation.
The principal resources available to meet weapon recovery responsibilities are EOD
Teams and the DOE ARG.

C12.4.1. Explosive Ordnance Disposal. Military EOD personnel are responsible


for the actual performance, supervision, and control of hands-on weapon recovery
operations. The following guidelines apply to the employment of EOD teams:

C12.4.1.1. The Combatant Commander having primary responsibility for C2


on site at the accident provides, or obtains from the owning service, EOD teams to
perform required procedures on the weapon(s).

C12.4.1.2. Any Active Duty Service or Combatant Command EOD teams


can provide emergency support until the designated EOD team arrives. Emergency
support is limited to initial weapon assessment, emergency RSP, and site stabilization.

C12.4.1.3. USN EOD teams recover weapons located underwater because


only USN EOD personnel are trained in these diving techniques.

C12.4.1.4. EOD personnel, officers and enlisted, are graduates of the Naval
School, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (NAVSCOLEOD) at Eglin AFB, FL, formally
Indian Head, MD. They are trained in access techniques and are the only personnel
qualified to perform RSPs. Also, they are trained to identify, detect, contain and/or
eliminate explosive, radiological and toxic hazards associated with nuclear weapons.
Intensive training is conducted on RSPs.

C12.4.1.5. The EOD team provided, or obtained, by the Service having


primary C2 responsibility will safe the weapon(s). If an extremely hazardous
situation exists, the initial responding EOD team with the publications and capabilities
to safe the weapon should do so.

C12.4.1.6. The organization of EOD teams varies among Services as does the

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number and seniority of personnel assigned; however, all teams have the same basic
capabilities and are trained in RADCON and monitoring techniques applicable to their
operations. They have the necessary communications and personal safety equipment
to operate in an accident environment. Moreover, teams have a background in
weapon design information enhanced by coordination with DOE scientific advisors on
arrival at the accident scene. While tasks assigned to EOD personnel are clearly in the
realm of weapon safing and disposal, they must operate within the framework of the
overall response group and conduct operations only as directed by the CRTF.

C12.4.1.7. The EOD teams actions, by priority are:

C12.4.1.7.1. Prevention of nuclear detonation.

C12.4.1.7.2. Prevention of a nuclear contribution or an HE detonation.

C12.4.1.7.3. Identification, detection, containment, and elimination of


explosives and, if required, radiological hazards resulting from the accident or incident.

C12.4.1.7.4. Protection of personnel against hazards noted in


C12.4.1.7.1. through C12.4.1.7.3., above.

C12.4.2. Department of Energy. The DOE ARG includes weapon design


personnel and explosive experts familiar with weapons and associated hazards. The
ARG provides technical advice and assistance in the collection, identification,
decontamination, packaging, and disposition of weapon components, weapon debris,
and resulting radioactive materials; and technical advice and assistance to EOD teams
in RSP and recovery procedures. Each nuclear weapon has RSPs developed,
evaluated, coordinated, and authenticated as binding jointly by DoD and DOE. Since
weapons may have been subjected to extreme stress during an accident, consideration
may be given to the DOE unique equipment to assess the applicability of these
procedures.

C12.4.2.1. DOE radiographic capabilities are available for field diagnostics


of damaged weapons in the event of an incident/accident. The Los Alamos National
Laboratory (LANL) has fieldable radiographic units with accompanying film, film
processing, and viewing equipment. The LLNL has an equivalent radiographic
capability that serves as a backup to the LANL unit.

C12.4.2.2. DOE aerial radiological surveys by the AMS assist in locating


weapons and weapon components. This capability is addressed in Appendix C4.AP4.

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C12.4.2.3. Additional information concerning the ARG, DOE radiographic


capabilities, the AMS, and other DOE capabilities may be obtained from the JNACC.

C12.5. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

Weapon recovery begins with the initial reconnaissance, proceeds through the conduct
of RSPs, and ends with hazard removal and disposal of the weapons and components.
These operations are discussed in this concept of operations. The two-person concept
must be strictly enforced when working with nuclear weapons. In the early stages of
accident response, personnel may find it difficult to follow all of the required security
measures; however, the CRTF should implement necessary security procedures as soon
as possible.

C12.5.1. Initial Entry. During the initial entry, weapons and the aircraft, vehicle,
ship (submarine) or missile wreckage present several hazards. Nuclear weapons and
some components contain conventional explosives and other HAZMAT. Nuclear
material may have been dispersed on impact, during detonation of explosives, or by
combustion in a fire. Weapons may need stabilizing to prevent further damage or
explosions. Other explosive items that may be encountered include conventional
munitions, aircraft fire extinguisher cartridges, engine starter cartridges, pyrotechnics,
and egress or extraction devices. Leaking fluids, liquid oxygen, propellants,
oxidizers, shredded or torn metals, and composite materials/fibers present additional
hazards. The IRF marks these hazards, as well as marking a clear pathway/entryway.
IRF EOD teams determine weapons condition, perform initial site stabilization, and
perform emergency render safe procedures as required by the situation.

C12.5.2. Render Safe Procedures. The CRTF is responsible ultimately for the
proper implementation of any render safe procedures. The EOD team evaluates and
analyzes the accident situation and advises the CRTF of the safest and most reliable
means for neutralizing weapon associated hazards. RSPs may begin, if required, as
soon as the reconnaissance has been completed. Handling of nuclear weapons in an
accident must be done according to written procedures. If the weapon is in a stable
environment, no immediate actions should occur until a coordinated weapon recovery
procedure has been developed by EOD personnel and DOE ARG representatives.
These procedures must be approved by the CRTF after coordination with the DOE
Team Leader and the senior member of the EOD Team. Consideration must be given
to the following when determining a course of action:

C12.5.2.1. Explosive ordnance and accident debris are inherently dangerous,

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but some minimum number of personnel may have to be exposed to hazards to


complete the mission.

C12.5.2.2. Consequences should be evaluated before exposing personnel to


hazards.

C12.5.2.3. When available, DOE radiographic equipment is used to assess


internal damage and aid standard EOD procedures. ARG capabilities and knowledge,
combined with EOD team procedures and experience in render safe procedures under
hazardous conditions, provide the best method of determining a weapon's condition
before it is moved.

C12.5.2.4. Staging, DECON, packaging, and the method, type, and final
disposition of shipment should be an integral part of the RSP planning phase.

C12.5.2.5. The high priority given to weapon recovery operations does not
inherently imply a need for rapid action. Personnel and public safety must never be
sacrificed solely for speed.

C12.5.3. Nuclear Weapon Security. The two-person concept must be enforced


strictly when working with nuclear weapons. The CRTF should ensure that all
personnel are familiar with the concept and that it is strictly enforced. Physical
security safeguards required to prevent unauthorized access to classified information
and proper control and disposition of classified material must be strictly enforced
during all operations involving the weapon(s) or weapon components. Because of the
technical information requirements during nuclear weapon operations, some
documents at the accident scene may contain CNWDI. The sensitive information
contained in these documents requires that security measures be implemented
consistent with the highest classification assigned. Personnel working in an area
containing CNWDI should be properly cleared and authorized until recovery
discussions are complete and the items have been covered or removed.

C12.5.4. Search Techniques. The location of all weapons and components must
be determined. Depending upon the accident circumstances, weapons and weapon
components may be scattered and/or buried over a large area. A systematic search
may be required over a large area until accountability for all the weapons and weapon
components is re-established. The search may become a time-consuming operation
requiring numerous personnel. The search method used by the CRTF depends on
many factors including the number of personnel available, topography, and
environmental conditions. Metal detectors and RADIAC equipment may be needed to
locate all weapons and components. As components are found, their location should

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be marked, the position recorded on a map, and photographed. The items should be
removed to a storage area after coordination with accident investigators, safety and
security permitting. If all components are not found, the EOD team leader should
coordinate with the ARG and make recommendations to the CRTF concerning
additional search procedures that can be tried, and at what point the search for
components will cease. Search techniques that may be employed are:

C12.5.4.1. Course Search. A search in loose crisscrossing patterns designed


to locate weapon components rapidly. This technique is used by EOD and
radiological monitoring personnel to search the accident area soon after the accident
has occurred.

C12.5.4.2. Aerial Radiological and Photographic Survey. This technique is


used to identify areas of significant radioactive intensity to assist in locating missing
weapon components and provide high resolution photography.

C12.5.4.3. Instrument Search. Metal and radiation detectors monitor those


areas where weapons or components were previously found. This method may
supplement the visual search.

C12.5.4.4. Visual Search. A search normally conducted by a slow-moving


line of personnel positioned abreast at various intervals dependent upon the object to
be located.

C12.5.4.5. Scarifying Procedure. Components may have been buried during


the accident or subsequently covered by wind action. A road grader equipped with
scarifiers (large steel teeth) is used to plow a surface. Search teams should follow the
graders and conduct a visual and/or instrument search for missing components. This
system has proven successful in past search operations. Coordination must be made
with the JHEC prior to implementing techniques to assess personnel protection
requirements due to resuspension and the potential impact on site DECON and
restoration.

C12.5.5. Hazard Removal. Another major step in weapon recovery begins with
the removal of identified hazards. The CRTF establishes priorities for removing all
hazards so that other response personnel may conduct operations. It is unsafe for
anyone but task trained personnel under EOD supervision to clear an area of broken,
scattered, or resolidified HEs.

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C12.5.6. Disposal. After the weapons are evaluated by EOD and DOE as safe
for movement and in coordination with accident investigators, weapons are moved to a
designated weapon storage area.

C12.5.6.1. On-site disposal of HE depends on available space and hazards


presented, including resuspension of contaminants. Storage area or disposal sites
should be large enough to minimize hazards to personnel in the event of a detonation.
The distances that storage areas are separated from other operations is determined by
the type and amount of explosives stored. An isolated and segregated area should be
set aside for the exclusive storage of exposed or damaged explosives.

C12.5.6.2. If open storage is used, protection from the elements and


information sensors, including satellite surveillance, must be provided for weapons and
weapon components.

C12.5.7. Storage of Explosives. If explosive items cannot be stored separately, a


balance of safety and practical considerations requires assignment of each item to a
storage group based on compatibility characteristics.

C12.5.8. Custody. Each Service has publications that address the storage,
security, and safety aspects associated with nuclear weapons. These publications also
address requirements for the custody of nuclear weapons and weapon components.
Moreover, performance of EOD procedures does not, in itself, constitute transfer of
custody to the EOD team. Final disposition of damaged weapon(s) and/or
components involves return of these devices to DOE; therefore, close coordination
between the CRTF and the DOE team leader is necessary throughout the weapon
recovery phase. Custody of damaged weapon(s) and components is transferred to
DOE at a point determined jointly by the CRTF and the DOE team leader.

C12.5.9. Packaging and Marking. Transportation specialist consultation is


required for weapon(s), weapon components, and/or explosives damaged or subjected
to extreme forces during accidents. Before weapon(s), weapon components, and/or
explosives are shipped, they must be packaged to ensure that no contamination
breaches the container and that the environment experienced during shipment will not
cause further damage or explosions. To ensure this requirement, special packing,
shipping, marking, and safety instructions must be obtained to comply with
transportation regulations from the DoD, DOE, and Department of Transportation
(DOT).

C12.5.10. Shipment. When the disposition decision has been made, DoD or

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DOE may be assigned the primary responsibility for moving the weapons. Nuclear
weapons will be moved by the safest means and over the safest routes. Movement
should be kept to a minimum. Shipments of weapons/weapon components will be
routed to a DOE facility for examination, analysis, and final disposition.

C12.6. ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN ANNEX

The weapon operations annex/recovery plan should establish the procedures used
during weapon operations. This annex should include:

C12.6.1. Definition of the relationship between EOD personnel and DOE weapon
experts and their respective responsibilities.

C12.6.2. Guidelines for establishing electromagnetic radiation hazard areas.

C12.6.3. Reference for explosive arcs to assist the RTF and IRF commanders.

C12.6.4. Procedures for locating and identifying weapon components and debris.

C12.6.5. Procedures for re-establishing accountability for weapons and weapon


components.

C12.6.6. Procedures for establishing a secure staging/storage area.

C12.6.7. Procedures for moving weapons and components to the secure


staging/storage area.

C12.6.8. Procedures for packaging weapon components.

C12.6.9. Procedures for shipping weapons and components.

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C13. CHAPTER 13
COMMUNICATIONS

C13.1. GENERAL

C13.1.1. Fast, reliable, and accurate communications are essential for nuclear
weapon accident response operations. Moreover, securing adequate internal
communications to support activities at the accident scene is a time sensitive
operation. Equally critical to effective C2 is the timely establishment of external
communications to higher echelons, particularly in the Washington, DC, area.
Therefore, the communications officers of the IRF and RTF must take immediate
action to ensure that appropriate communications equipment is identified and requested
early in response operations. Information must be made accessible. In general, the
value of information increases with the number of users.

C13.1.2. Effective response to a nuclear weapon accident relies heavily on a


communications officer's knowledge about secure and non-secure tactical, strategic,
and commercial communications systems. He or she must be able to apply
conventional and imaginative methods and ensure that required communications are
available. He or she should be equally adept at establishing communications support
in remote locations, or in areas near existing communications systems.

C13.1.3. In addition to military communications at the accident site, DOE,


FEMA, State, and/or civilian officials establish their own internal communication
systems. Careful attention must be afforded to ensure that these systems are
interoperable.

C13.2. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This chapter provides guidance for establishing communications systems and


capabilities to support response operations. The communication requirements of both
the IRF and RTF are discussed, including internal/external communications support for
personnel at the accident scene. Also included are descriptions of communication
systems hardware (e.g., telephone, radio, satellite, and visual signal) that are available
to support these operations.

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C13.3. SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

The CRTF requires internal communications with the operations center and forces in
the field to control and keep abreast of response activities. External communications
with higher echelons of command are necessary to keep key personnel informed.
Many initial communications requirements can be met by unsecure voice
communications; however, both secure voice and record communications are required
early in the response period. Communication requirements:

C13.3.1. Establish internal communications.

C13.3.1.1. Telephone communications between fixed site locations, for


example, the operations center and the JIC/CIB.

C13.3.1.2. Field phones for EOD operations (secure phones are desirable).

C13.3.1.3. UHF/VHF nets. Several UHF/VHF nets including Command


(Secure Communications desirable), Weapons Recovery Operations (Secure),
Radiological Operations (Secure Communications desirable), Security, and Public
Affairs.

C13.3.1.4. Establish a local computer network or access to a local computer


network. If possible, establish virtual command and control requiring password
access.

C13.3.2. Establish external communications.

C13.3.2.1. Telephone communications with the Combatant Command's


Operations Center, the Service Operations Center, the National Military Command
Center (NMCC), and OASD(PA). Conferencing may suffice early in the response.

C13.3.2.2. Multiple telephone lines to support response force elements.

C13.3.2.3. Secure voice via satellite, telephone, or HF.

C13.3.2.4. Access to the DCS for record communications.

C13.3.2.5. Internet access.

C13.3.3. Coordinate frequency usage of all response organizations to prevent


interference and radio operations in areas where electromagnetic emissions may create
explosive hazards or affect electronic and field laboratory instruments.

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C13.3.4. Obtain frequency clearances, as necessary.

C13.3.5. Prepare a Signal Operating Instruction (SOI) guide for use by all
response organizations.

C13.4. RESOURCES

Communications capabilities and resources for nuclear weapon accident recovery


operations vary widely. Resources are as familiar as the telephone or as sophisticated
as satellite capable secure voice radio. Communications assets must be capable of
deployment to, and operation in, remote locations. The following depicts a variety of
communication resources for response organizations. Because the same equipment
supports numerous contingencies, only those assets required for a specific nuclear
weapon accident response effort should be requested. Resources are available from
DoD, other Federal organizations, or commercial sources.

C13.4.1. Service Assets. The Military Services maintain communications assets


organic to combat support units as well as for contingency assets. Information about
specific assets as well as procedures for requesting and tasking Service assets can be
obtained from the respective Service operations centers, or operational commanders.
Telephone numbers are contained in Appendix C22.AP1.

C13.4.1.1. U.S. Army. U.S. Army Signal organizations are designed to


support deployed forces from the theater Army level down to the smallest unit. Major
communications support includes C2, C3, and automation systems. Essential
elements of these areas include long-haul transmission systems (SHF and UHF satellite
terminals), voice (Mobile Subscriber Equipment and TRI-TAC Voice Switches),
record communications traffic (e.g., TRI-TAC Message Switches), FM and HF radio
systems (e.g., SINCGARS), and data communications networks.

C13.4.1.2. U.S. Air Force. Tactical communications assets are available


from both Combat Communication Groups (CCGs) and HAMMER ACE as described
in paragraph C13.4.1.2.1., below.

C13.4.1.2.1. HAMMER ACE. HAMMER ACE is a rapidly deployable


team with military and commercial off-the-shelf technology communications
equipment. The mission of Hammer ACE is to provide initial secure C2
communications. The team deploys within 3 hours of notification and establishes
communications within 30 minutes of arrival on site. HAMMER ACE personnel and

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equipment can be transported on C-21, or equivalent-type aircraft, or commercial


airliners. Hammer ACE communications capabilities allow for intra- and inter-site
communications. Secure satellite communications provide voice, facsimile (fax), and
data through International Marine Satellite (INMARSAT) (commercial satellite)
terminals and military AN/PSC-5 EMUT, UHF satellite radios. The secure satellite
link provides interface with STU-III, Defense Switched Network (DSN), and
commercial telephone systems through the HAMMER ACE Ground Entry Point (GEP)
located at Scott AFB, IL. Other capabilities include ground-to-air communications
with frequency ranges to cover fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft from all Services and a
securable Land Mobile Radio (LMR) network with a repeater and base station for local
communications. The LMRs are capable of interfacing with the secure satellite
system. Additional equipment available includes digital cameras, HI-8 video
camcorders, Global Positioning System (GPS), RF scanner, document scanner,
document printer, image printing system, and an imagery platform. HAMMER ACE
equipment is capable of operating with commercial power, rechargeable batteries,
vehicle batteries, solar panels, and portable generators. HAMMER ACE deploys
enough power providing equipment to sustain 72-hour operations. Communications
expertise provided by HAMMER ACE can assist the CRTF with evaluation of the
situation and determine what, if any, additional capabilities are required.

C13.4.1.2.1.1. Requests for emergency HAMMER ACE support


should be made directly to the Scott AFB, IL, Command Post or through the JNACC.
Phone numbers are listed in Appendix C22.AP1. Any available communications
media may be used to submit requests; however, verbal requests should be followed in
writing within 24 hours. The requesting Agency must provide the following
information with the request.

C13.4.1.2.1.1.1. Deployment location, including coordinates, if


available.

C13.4.1.2.1.1.2. Situation, including type of emergency.

C13.4.1.2.1.1.3. POCs.

C13.4.1.2.1.1.4. Remarks concerning any unusual conditions


for which the team should prepare.

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C13.4.1.2.1.2. Requests for additional information should be


directed to Headquarters (HQ), USAF Communications Agency (AFCA)/SYH,
HAMMER ACE, Scott AFB, IL, or through the Internet by linking to
www.afca.scott.af.mil/hammer-ace/ Web site. Phone numbers are listed in Appendix
C22.AP1.

C13.4.1.3. U.S. Navy. The Joint Maritime Operations Command Center


(JMOCC), Mobile Integrated Command Facility (MICFAC), and the Mobile Ashore
Support Terminal (MAST) comprise the U.S. Navy's Joint Maritime Command
Information System (JMCIS), the U.S. Navy's tactical ashore communications
capability. These systems were fielded to replace the Ashore Mobile Contingency
Communication System (AMCC). Although these capabilities primarily support the
naval component commander of a CINC or Joint Task Force, their modular
organization makes these systems ideally suited for use with liaison teams or in
support of contingency requirements.

C13.4.1.3.1. Mobile Ashore Support Terminal (MAST). The smallest


component of the JMOCC is the MAST. MAST is transported either as modules in
fixed-wing aircraft or helicopters, or in a shelter on a HMMWV. It can be set up in
less than 3 hours by two members of its four-person, full-time crew. Communications
equipment for MAST includes the following:

C13.4.1.3.1.1. AN/VRC-93 UHF tactical satellite (TACSAT) radios.

C13.4.1.3.1.2. INMARSAT.

C13.4.1.3.1.3. STU IIIs.

C13.4.1.3.1.4. Two desktop computers.

C13.4.1.3.1.5. Facsimiles.

C13.4.1.3.1.6. One organic 5-kW gasoline generator.

C13.4.1.3.2. The MAST units are, at all times, under the operational
control of the respective Fleet CINCs. All deployments of the MAST are approved by
the Fleet CINC based on requests submitted by subordinate commands. Contingency
requests should be forwarded to the Fleet CINC as expeditiously as possible. When
the MAST is deployed, and until it returns to its host command, it is under the custody
and operational control of the designated supported command.

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C13.4.1.3.3. Mobile Integrated Command Facility (MICFAC).


MICFAC includes all of MAST's functionality plus intelligence processing systems
with inherent imagery and databases. The ability to process record message traffic
through its larger connectivity links is an added feature to this suite of equipment.
The transmission systems are significantly enhanced with the addition of SHF and
military multiband radios. As the voice communications ability is improved through
the addition of a telephone switch, more subscribers in the facility will also have
telephone service. MICFAC can be air transported by the equivalent of two C-130s,
or by mobilizer-equipped trailers, and set up in approximately 8 hours by four of its
eight-person, full-time crew.

C13.4.1.4. U.S. Marine Corps (USMC). Present Marine Corps C4I systems
mix some analog transmission equipment with digital transmission and switching
equipment that is compatible with TRI-TAC. During contingency operations, and if
approved by the support CINC, the Marine Air Ground Task Force Headquarters can
extend Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) common users services (IP Router,
DSN, Secure Voice Systems, DMS/AUTODIN) through a DII entry point by way of a
GMF satellite link.

C13.4.2. Joint Chiefs of Staff-Controlled Assets. JCS contingency support


communications resources are requested according to procedures contained in CJCSI
6110.01, "CJCS-Controlled Tactical Communications Assets," and in Allied
Communications Publication 134, "Communications Assets," references (ab) and
(ac). Additional information regarding these assets can be obtained from the JCS
Contingency and Crisis Management Division.

C13.4.2.1. Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE). Details of the


JCSE deployment/employment concepts capabilities and logistics requirements
contained in U.S. Forces Command Manual 105-1, "Joint Communication Deployment
and Employment," reference (ad), can be obtained by contacting the JCSE at McDill
AFB, FL. The JCSE is a contingency support unit consisting of USA, USN, USAF,
and USMC personnel and a variety of communications equipment including:

C13.4.2.1.1. Switchboards.

C13.4.2.1.2. HF radio.

C13.4.2.1.3. Microwave/troposcatter radios.

C13.4.2.1.4. UHF and VHF radios (secure and non-secure).

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C13.4.2.1.5. Secure record communications terminals.

C13.4.2.1.6. Weather dissemination equipment.

C13.4.2.1.7. UHF and SHF satellite terminals.

C13.4.2.1.8. Secure TELEFAX (DACOM 412).

C13.4.2.1.9. KY-65, KY-70, and KY-75 secure voice devices.

C13.4.2.1.10. The AN/URC Joint Airborne Communications


Center/Command Post (JACC/CP).

C13.4.2.1.10.1. The JACC/CP, commonly referred to as


JACKPOT, consists of several pieces of equipment mounted in air transportable vans.
The JACC/CP has four major components-operations center, communications control,
generator, and an air-conditioner/accessory trailer.

C13.4.2.1.10.2. The JACC/CP can provide one HF, single sideband


(SSB) voice or teletype communication channel over its 1-kw transceivers or HF,
double independent sideband (ISB) with a total of four independent 3-kilohertz
(3SPKHz) voice or teletype channels over its 10-kW system. The 10-kW system is
limited to ground operations only. The JACC/CP also contains three radios, an
AN/ARC-73 (VHF/alternating modulation [AM]), AN/ARC-54 (VHF/frequency
modulation [FM]), and an AN/ARC-51 BX (VHF/AM), for ground-to-ground and
ground-to-air communications.

C13.4.2.1.10.3. The voice radio system may be connected to a


10-line, 20-line, or 30-line, four-wire/two-wire telephone switchboard. The
switchboard can connect any telephone subscriber to another telephone or a JACC/CP
radio.

C13.4.2.1.10.4. The complete JACC/CP can be transported in a


winch-equipped C-130 or larger aircraft. A wide lowboy trailer must be used to
transport the vans any distance or over other than paved/gravel roads.

C13.4.2.1.10.5. The JACC/CP can be deployed within 24 hours


from the time the JCS issues deployment approval messages.

C13.4.2.2. JCS-Joint Controlled Tactical Communications Assets (JCTCA).


Details on the JCTCA are in the USA plans for deployment of mobile/transportable

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communications assets controlled by the JCS. During normal duty hours, additional
information can be obtained from the USA Information Systems Command
Contingency Branch, Fort Huachuca, AZ, or from their Emergency Operations Center
(EOC). Phone numbers are in Appendix C22.AP1. The JCTCA consists of heavy
mobile/transportable equipment that can be deployed separately or in packages by
C-141/C-5 aircraft. Equipment includes:

C13.4.2.2.1. Switchboards

C13.4.2.2.2. HF radio

C13.4.2.2.3. Troposcatter radios

C13.4.2.2.4. Medium speed AUTODIN terminals

C13.4.2.2.5. Manual secure voice switch and terminals

C13.4.2.2.6. Super high frequency (SHF) satellite terminals

C13.4.2.3. Other JCS Controlled Assets. Most SHF satellite terminals are
under JCS deployment control. These terminals include the Ground Mobile Forces
(GMF) terminals assigned to the Military Services. The USA 235th Signal Company,
Fort Monmouth, NJ, maintains UHF and SHF research and development satellite
terminals that can be deployed for contingency operations and exercises. Also, the
USAF has communication assets similar to those in the JCTSA. They are located at
the 3rd CCG and the 281st CCG, Air National Guard, Tinker AFB, OK. Equipment
in the van includes a Secure Cord Switchboard (SECORD), KY-3 secure voice
terminals, and a narrow band (HY-2) trunk that will interface with the Automated
Secure Voice Communication System (AUTOSEVOCOM). The van is outsized and
requires C-5 aircraft transport.

C13.4.3. DOE Assets. The DOE maintains emergency response, air


transportable communications services, and hardware. Systems include a multi-point
telephone switch, fax, HF/VHF radio networks (with pagers), video teleconferencing, a
terrestrial microwave system, and data communications including local area networks
(LANs) and high speed transmission. A multi-channel satellite system is available to
provide long-haul transmission capability. Single-channel INMARSAT terminals,
with data interface, are included for advance party use and emergency backup. Secure
communications include voice, fax, still and full-motion video, and data. Field
communications are listed into the DOE Emergency Communications Network (ECN)
via satellite.

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C13.4.4. FEMA Assets. Deployable communication assets used by FEMA


response groups are maintained at the FEMA regional office level. Although the
specific equipment varies between FEMA regions, the FEMA response contingent
usually arrives with the following capabilities:

C13.4.4.1. HF Radio (voice only) for external communication to their


regional office, the State Disaster Response Headquarters, and the Emergency
Information and Coordination Center (EICC) in Washington, DC.

C13.4.4.2. VHF radio to support on-scene DFO Federal Response Center


(FRC) (internal) communications. Equipment includes hand-held radios, suitcase
repeater, and suitcase base station with telephone interconnect. The quantities of
these assets will vary depending on the size of the FEMA response contingent.

C13.4.5. Commercial Assets. In CONUS, acquisition of supporting


communications systems from commercial carriers (for example, American Telephone
and Telegraph [AT&T]) is possible. Commercial carriers can provide
communications to a remote area via transportable microwave, carrier systems, or
cable. Leased services, including telephone, data Teletypewriter Exchange (TWX),
Telephone Exchange (TELEX), and Wide Area Telephone Service (WATS), are
available in most locations.

C13.5. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

Nuclear weapon accidents present a variety of technical, logistical, and operational


communications problems. Several factors, including the location of the accident, the
response force involved, and the C2 arrangements of those forces, contribute to the
complexity of the problems. This concept of operations focuses on the actions of the
military response force(s) communications officer(s). The approach is to present
items of concern sequentially without regard to whether the IRF or the RTF
communications officer takes the action. Incumbent upon the RTF communications
officer is the responsibility to ascertain what has been accomplished prior to arrival,
and to carry on from that juncture.

C13.5.1. Initial Actions. The initial task of the response force communications
officer is to determine the communications assets at, or close to, the accident site. The
local telephone company, State/local officials, or civilian authorities can provide
information on the communication infrastructure near the accident scene, and the
capabilities for long-haul and local communications. Once existing capabilities are

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determined, the communications officer should use these resources with deployed
assets to establish an effective communications network.

C13.5.1.1. In remote or sparsely populated areas, the initial communication


capability may consist of only hand-held, short range VHF/FM radios, portable HF
radios, or wire (field phones). Conversely, if an accident occurs close to a populated
area, a coin operated telephone, or even a business or private telephone may be
available immediately for emergency use. In either case, additional leased
communications such as WATS can be obtained to augment available
communications. Naturally, more time is required to provide leased assets to remote
areas; therefore, the requirements must be identified and requested at the earliest
possible time. Follow-on deployment of mobile communications provides the
response force with additional local telephone and radio, as well as long-haul secure
voice and record capabilities.

C13.5.1.2. Another method of communications for external (long-haul)


communications, particularly if assets are limited, is the telephone conferencing
capability of Service operations centers and/or the NMCC. Further, if communication
can be established from the site to the DoD JNACC, the DoD JNACC will assist by
relaying information or coordinating with other forces/agencies. When requested by
the Services, the DoD JNACC arranges for transportation of specialized
communications resources.

C13.5.1.3. The CRTF may spend considerable time away from the CP. The
response force communications officer must, therefore, plan communication methods
to support the mobility of the CRTF. Radio nets provided for CRTF communications
should have sufficient range and be capable of frequent use. If possible, the net
should be secure and have a radio/wire integration capability into the local
switchboard and long haul voice circuits. The staff directors for support and
operations, and the special staff advisors should be included in this net.

C13.5.1.4. The communications officer must take prompt action to obtain


frequency clearances. Radio frequencies are managed at the national level by the
Military Communications-Electronics Board (Joint Frequency Management Office).
Each Service has membership on the board. Moreover, each Military Department has
a frequency management office, but in most cases these offices have delegated the
authority to assign frequencies to area coordinators. Additional details may be
obtained from USA FM 24-2, "Spectrum Management," or USAF Instruction 33-118,
"Radio Spectrum Frequency Management," references (ae) and (af). DOE and FEMA
communications personnel should coordinate frequency requirements through their

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own channels and keep the military communications officer advised. Failure to obtain
valid frequency authorizations could result in interference with other critical
communications. The use of unauthorized frequencies could lead to embarrassment
for the U.S. Government (USG).

C13.5.1.5. One of the more complex problems facing the response force
communications officer is preparation of a SOI. The SOI should be an easy-to-use
instruction containing the capabilities and limitations of equipment and detailed
"how-to-use" procedures for all available systems. The instructions should be
unclassified, if possible, and widely distributed. As a minimum, they should include
system descriptions (charts and diagrams are helpful), an on-site telephone directory,
dialing and telephone routing instructions, message addresses, message handling
instructions and routing indicators, radio procedures and call signs, secure voice
procedures, and communications security (COMSEC) operations security procedures,
including Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFIs). An outline of a typical
SOI is at Figure C13.F1.

C13.5.1.6. Although COMSEC instructions are a part of the SOI, COMSEC


deserves additional emphasis. Enemy or dissident elements may be able to intercept
and exploit C2 communications systems and traffic used for response to nuclear
weapon accidents. Compilations of individually unclassified items concerning
weapons communicated during recovery procedures may well be classified, and
unfriendly elements may be able to compile these items; therefore, the communications
officer must plan to defeat this threat by determining the EEFI for the operation, and
then by acting to preclude interception or exploitation of this information. COMSEC
actions to prevent exploitation of EEFIs may include using secure transmission
facilities, communications discipline, codes and authenticators, and changing call signs.

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Figure C13.F1. Signal Operating Instruction

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C13.5.2. Follow-On Actions. As additional response forces deploy to the


accident scene and a support base camp is established, additional communication
resources will be deployed or acquired concurrent with the buildup. As this buildup
occurs, the response force communications officer should establish and maintain a list
of communications assets and capabilities on scene. The list should include assets and
frequencies belonging to non-DoD agencies identifying potential mutual interference,
and should ensure that all possible assets are considered when meeting overall
communication requirements. Coordination should be made with the appropriate
representative from Federal and civilian authorities/officials agencies possessing
on-scene communication systems.

C13.5.2.1. As emphasized throughout this chapter, increasing the quantity of


communications assets and routing those assets into the appropriate users hands is of
primary importance as the response organization grows. Additional communication
assets, primarily in the form of telephones and VHF/FM radios, are needed for
effective operation of the JIC/CIB, and to support radiological monitoring and SR
operations.

C13.5.2.2. As the response operations peak, so will the communications


support required. As the response transitions into site remediation, the primary
communications should be routine situation reports, supply Military Standard
Requisitioning and Issue Procedures (MILSTRIP) messages, and other administrative
messages. After the weapon(s) and weapon components are removed from the site,
little or no need will exist to communicate by secure voice; however, record
communications support provided on site during the early response and weapon
recovery should continue through SR.

C13.6. ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN ANNEX

Procedures and information appropriate for the communications annex to the accident
response plan include:

C13.6.1. A description of actual or projected requirements and the location of


assets to fill requirements.

C13.6.2. Procedures for establishing communications links with the NMCC and
DCS from remote locations.

C13.6.3. Procedures for obtaining leased commercial communications.

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C13.6.4. Procedures for obtaining Service- and JCS-deployable communications


assets.

C13.6.5. Procedures for establishing local radio nets and assignment of call signs.

C13.6.6. Procedures for obtaining frequency clearances.

C13.6.7. Procedures for coordinating communications with non-DoD agencies.

C13.6.8. Procedures for using secure/clear fax resources.

C13.6.9. Preparation of an integrated communications plan.

C13.6.10. Procedures for using the Ethernet, Intranet, or Internet.

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C14. CHAPTER 14
PUBLIC AFFAIRS

C14.1. GENERAL

C14.1.1. A nuclear weapon accident has immediate public impact. PA activities


during the initial accident response are perhaps among the most critical aspects of the
entire response and site remediation process. Within minutes of the accident, news
media could be at the scene. Local citizens will seek information about how the
accident affects them. A proactive, comprehensive public affairs program must be
conducted to expedite the flow of information to the public and internal audiences.
Timely, accurate information and frequent updates are essential to keep the public and
news media informed, consistent with national and operations security.

C14.1.2. DoD response element commanders will face a wide range of complex
PA issues as they respond to a nuclear weapons accident. The PA functions will
include news media relations, internal or command information, and public outreach.
Foremost among the CRTF responsibilities is notification to the public, through the
news media, that a nuclear weapons accident has occurred, in accordance with DoD
policy, provided in reference (g). The CRTF's PAO must establish and maintain
coordination with Federal, State, and local response organization PA
representatives/spokespersons to ensure unity of effort. Especially important is
communication with the OASD(PA). The CRTF's PAO will establish a JIC (or ensure
establishment of a CIB overseas) as a single point of interface between the military and
news media representatives covering the response. Providing accurate, timely
information is essential in establishing and maintaining credibility with the public, the
news media, and response forces.

C14.2. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This chapter provides general PA guidance for a nuclear weapon accident occurring in
the United States, its territories, and possessions or overseas.

C14.3. POLICY

General DoD policy is to ensure that reporters are granted access to all unclassified
activities. The DoD policy for U.S. nuclear weapons accidents and incidents, DoDD

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5230.16, reference (g) is to provide effective PA activities near the scene of a nuclear
weapon accident to expedite the flow of information to the public and the internal
audience. While it is also DoD policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence or
absence of nuclear weapons or nuclear components at any specific location, exceptions
exist when a nuclear accident occurs. Joint Pub 3-61, "Doctrine of Public Affairs in
Joint Operations," reference (ag) provides further guidance.

C14.3.1. In the United States, its territories, or possessions, DoD policy requires
the CRTF to confirm the presence of nuclear weapons or radioactive nuclear
components in the interest of public safety or to reduce or prevent widespread public
alarm. Notification of public authorities is required if the public is, or may be, in
danger of radiation exposure or other danger posed by the weapon or its components.

C14.3.2. Statements confirming the presence of nuclear weapons should contain


information about the possibility of injury from HE weapon components and/or
potential radiation exposure. If injury or radiation exposure is unlikely, that should
also be stated. OASD(PA) should be notified in advance, or as soon as possible
thereafter, if these exceptions are used.

C14.3.3. Overseas, unless bilateral agreements exist, the CRTF must have the
concurrence of the host government, through the U.S. COM, prior to confirming the
presence of nuclear weapons or radioactive nuclear components.

C14.3.4. Contingency statements for the above exceptions are provided in


Appendix C14.AP1. Radiation information fact sheets for the general public and
medical personnel are in Appendix C14.AP2.

C14.4. RESPONSIBILITIES

The CRTF's PA responsibilities are indicated below. The supported CINC may
impose additional requirements contained in appropriate Service regulations. The
CRTF PAO will:

C14.4.1. Protect classified information. The CRTF must practice "security at the
source" to ensure no classified, sensitive, or privacy information is provided to the
media or public. The CRTF is responsible for reviewing all information pertaining to
nuclear weapons intended for public release. Information about nuclear weapon and
component design and their storage is classified. In addition, unclassified, controlled
nuclear information must be protected from public release. When JIC/CIB
responsibility is transferred, care should be taken to ensure nuclear weapons

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information proposed for public release is reviewed by appropriate U.S. DoD and
DOE offices.

C14.4.2. Establish direct communications with OASD(PA) from the accident


scene. The CRTF should ensure that the PAO at the scene expeditiously establishes
direct communications with OASD(PA) by any means available. Communications are
essential. The CRTF is the senior DoD representative at the scene and must have
access to current policy guidance and statements issued at the national level. Direct
communications also ensure that timely, accurate information can be provided at the
national level. Contact telephone numbers are located in Appendix C22.AP1.

C14.4.3. Establish an Information Coordination Cell (ICC) in cooperation with


State and local authorities in the United States, and with DOS, and Host Nation
authorities outside the United States. The ICC should be collocated with the CRTF
and his counterparts. In the United States, the ICC should be composed of one senior,
co-equal PA representative from the CRTF, the local authorities, and the State
emergency response organization. Overseas, the ICC should be composed of the
senior U.S. military PAO, the Host Nation military public relations officer, and a local
emergency response authority. The purpose of the ICC is to plan, manage, and
coordinate the on-scene PA response. Appendix C14.AP3. addresses the PA response
organization concept.

C14.4.4. Establish a JIC/CIB in cooperation with the State and local/DOS, Host
Nation, and local authorities near the accident scene. The CRTF establishes a
JIC/CIB in cooperation with FEMA, DOE, State and local agency officials/DOS, Host
Nation, as appropriate, and in accordance with reference (g), (ag), DoDD 5400.13,
"Joint Public Affairs Operations," reference (ah), and DoD Instruction 5400.14,
"Procedures for Joint Public Affairs Operations," reference (ai). Located near the
scene, the JIC/CIB serves as the focal point for information about the accident and the
response. A JIC/CIB location in a permanent structure such as a hotel or office
building is preferred due to support requirements. Local emergency management
officials often have facilities available or designated that may be used during a nuclear
weapons accident. The CRTF should provide dedicated administrative,
communications, and logistic support for the JIC/CIB. A list of support equipment is
located in Appendix C14.AP4.

C14.4.4.1. In the United States, its territories, and possessions, the CRTF has
the primary responsibility to establish and direct the JIC until the response effort
transitions to another agency for near- and long-term follow-up monitoring functions.

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C14.4.4.2. Overseas, the CRTF responsibility may vary, depending on


whether a bilateral agreement has been signed with the country. In the absence of an
agreement specifying responsibilities, the CRTF will work with the U.S. COM to
establish and codirect a CIB with the Host Nation.

C14.4.5. Identify and establish, in cooperation with State and local


authorities/DOS, and Host Nation authorities, a media briefing area near the accident
scene, but not in a location that interferes with response activities.

C14.4.6. Provide news media support at the accident scene. The CRTF is
authorized to provide support to news media representatives covering a nuclear
weapon accident. Support will be the same as that authorized on a military
reservation; for example, transportation, logistic, and administrative. Support will
depend upon the situation and available resources. The media should be briefed in the
extent of support available.

C14.4.6.1. Military and local authorities should jointly establish a media


center. Most local authorities already have locations designated for this. The
important thing is that the media center should be located far enough away from the
scene so as not to interfere with the recovery operation. Initial information provided
to the media should be limited to basic, releasable facts. A media work area should be
established as soon as practical. When possible, it should be collocated with the
media briefing area.

C14.4.6.2. Photographers and film crews may arrive on scene before a


cordon is established. The first PAO on scene should ensure that the initial
emergency response force has covered classified or sensitive material. The PAOs
should work with police/security personnel to identify suitable vantage points for
photographers.

C14.4.6.3. Pre-approved handouts, video footage, and photos on background


information should be made available, as appropriate.

C14.4.6.4. The media may be allowed access to the accident site after the
area has been made safe and secure. Media will be escorted at all times.

C14.4.6.5. Briefings should be conducted as soon as possible and as often as


practical (when there is new information to provide). Specialists should be available
for briefings and interviews.

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C14.4.6.6. The media should be provided regular photo and film


opportunities with specialists and members of the response force, as appropriate.

C14.4.6.7. A media pool facility may be formed if all the media cannot be
accommodated near the accident scene. The media will decide which organizations
will be represented at the facility.

C14.4.6.8. Official photographs or video taken by response force personnel


or audiovisual crews may be released to the media via the JIC/CIB after security
review to ensure it does not contain classified information or military controlled
technology.

C14.4.7. Provide internal information. The CRTF should ensure that all
(military and civilian) response force personnel are briefed on the PA policy when they
in-process and ensure that they are provided information on accident response through
an internal information program.

C14.4.7.1. When press releases and statements are issued to the media, they
should also be disseminated to the internal audience. Commanders and technical
experts may speak to response force and base audiences in a "town meeting" format if
circumstances warrant. A telephone number should be designated as a rumor control
number. Information about logistics matters such as mess hours, laundry turn-in
times, etc., should be distributed by the organizations responsible for providing the
services. A newsletter on response activities and issues should be produced regularly
and distributed to response personnel.

C14.4.8. Work with State and local or Host Nation authorities to identify and
respond to public outreach needs. The CRTF should identify public concerns about
the accident response and take appropriate action in cooperation with the SFO, State
and local authorities, or the U.S. COM and Host Nation military personnel. As soon
as DoD PA personnel arrive at the accident scene, they should ensure a mechanism is
in place to plan a public outreach program and to analyze feedback from the public, the
media, and local authorities to ensure the PA program meets the affected public's
needs. Programs should be initiated, modified, or stopped based on data evaluation.
Public concerns will probably include health and safety, response and recovery, impact
on economy, impact on environment, and legal claims. Phone lines should be
established with a published number for public inquires.

C14.4.9. Review and evaluate media reports about the accident response to
ensure accurate information is provided to the public. The CRTF should ensure the

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JIC/CIB monitors media reports to determine if key messages are understood and
disseminated through the media to the public. JIC/CIB recommended key messages
and non-releasable information are listed in Appendix C14.AP5. Information
obtained should be provided to response organizations on scene as well as higher
headquarters.

C14.4.10. Planning tips the CRTF can use in a response situation are located in
Appendix C14.AP6.

C14.5. RESOURCES AND ROLES

The DoD IRF and RTF commander should have PAOs from the supporting installation
and/or staff as members of the response force. At least one PAO should be part of the
IRF. Other PA support is available from the organizations listed below, and
interagency cooperation will be required to ensure accurate and consistent
communication with the media and the public.

C14.5.1. Department of Defense. The OASD(PA), as the senior DoD PA


organization, coordinates with the White House, DOS, DOE, FEMA, and other
appropriate Federal Departments and Agencies. PAOs from the CINC's component
commands may augment the CRTF's PA staff. A DTRA, CMAT PAO will provide
advice and assistance in the JIC/CIB.

C14.5.2. Department of Energy. A DOE PAO will accompany the DOE Senior
Official to the accident scene and be present in the JIC/CIB. Other DOE PA
personnel from DOE field operation offices, national laboratories, and DOE
contractors may also be requested to augment the JIC/CIB operations.

C14.5.3. Department of State. The U.S. COM will be the focal point for
diplomatic and political decisions pertaining to the U.S. Government response. The
COM will be assisted by a team from the Embassy's Emergency Action Committee
(EAC), with augmentation as required.

C14.5.4. Federal Emergency Management Agency. When the accident occurs in


the United States or its territories, a FEMA PA affairs representative will accompany
the SFO to the scene and work in the JIC. Additional FEMA resources are available
from FEMA HQ, regions, and FEMA's corps of reserve PAOs.

C14.5.5. Other Federal Organizations. PAOs from other Federal Agencies


involved in the response effort may be present at the scene and should be integrated

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into the JIC. Typically, there will be representatives from Agencies such as Health
and Human Services, EPA, Department of Agriculture, and DOT.

C14.5.6. State and Local. PAOs from State and local response organizations,
especially fire, police, and emergency management, are key to a successful response.
They will probably arrive at the accident scene before Federal response forces. State
and local representatives should be encouraged to become co-equal partners in PA
operations. Shared Federal/State/local leadership of PA operations should ensure a
timely, accurate, and coordinated response. If that is not possible, plans and
information must be closely coordinated with State and local PA personnel and they
should be encouraged to send representatives to help set up and participate in the JIC
and media briefing area. State public affairs on-scene representatives may come from
emergency response, agriculture, environmental, health, safety, and transportation
agencies. Local PA on-scene representatives should be expected from fire, police, and
emergency management organizations.

C14.5.7. Overseas. The theater PAOs will coordinate with the U.S. Embassy in
the Host Nation, as well as OASD(PA), to respond to a U.S. nuclear weapon accident
overseas. Host Nation PAOs should be expected to respond. They include
representatives from military; national-level health, safety, agricultural, and
environmental; and local response organizations. Local fire, police, and emergency
management PAOs should be expected on scene and will probably arrive before U.S.
forces. These officials are integral to a successful PA operation. In the absence of a
bilateral agreement, they should be encouraged to form a combined, coordinated
response modeled on the JIC concept. See Appendix C14.AP3.

C14.5.8. The Internet and the Worldwide Web offers an efficient means for
response forces to communicate messages and information worldwide.

C14.5.8.1. Following confirmation of a U.S. nuclear weapons accident,


"DefenseLINK" should have a Web site available for information about the accident.
The JIC/CIB should ensure releasable information is forwarded to this site. As soon
as practical, the JIC/CIB should determine whether a joint/combined response force
Web site is more appropriately handled by a local or other organization.

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C14.AP1. APPENDIX 1 OF CHAPTER 14

PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE/CONTINGENCY RELEASE

C14.AP1.1. CONTINGENCY RELEASES


CONTINGENCY RELEASE NUMBER 1

"When Public Is Probably in Danger"


(Does confirm)

(Format of sample release to be used if public safety considerations require announcement that
a nuclear weapon has been involved in an accident and contamination is likely because of fire
or conventional high explosives detonation of the weapon. Make the following statement
locally or from competent authority if no local authority is available.)

An/a (aircraft/railroad train/truck/other) accident occurred (state time and location). The
accident involved a nuclear weapon that contains conventional high explosives and radioactive
material.

There is no danger of a nuclear detonation.

The public is warned to stay out of the area (or indicate the area) (now under surveillance by
guards) because the conventional high explosives in the weapon (have detonated, are burning,
may detonate). Again, there is no danger of nuclear detonation, but there is a danger from the
conventional high explosives in the weapon that (have detonated, are burning, may detonate).

An experienced Federal response team has been ordered to the scene of the accident.

The most immediate danger in an accident of this kind is the effect of the blast caused by
detonation of the conventional high explosives in the weapon. Local scattering of nuclear
material in the form of finely divided dust may have resulted near the accident site and
downwind from the explosion (fire). This poses little risk to health unless taken into the body by
breathing or swallowing, and it is considered unlikely that any person would inhale or swallow
an amount that would cause illness. As a precaution and until further evaluations are made,
anyone within a (to be filled in by CRTF or Deputy Director of Operations [DDO], NMCC) radius
of the accident site, particularly downwind from this site (specify boundary where possible), is
encouraged to remain indoors.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

(NOTE: If applicable, the following shall be included in the release.)

The following precautionary measures are recommended to minimize any risk to the public.

The most appropriate initial action is to remain calm and inside homes or office buildings. Turn
off fans, air-conditioners, and forced air heating units. Drink and eat only canned or packaged
foods that have been inside. Trained monitoring teams will be moving through the area
wearing special protective clothing and equipment to determine the extent of any possible
contamination. The dress of these teams should not be interpreted as indicating any special
risk to those indoors. If you are outside, proceed to the nearest permanent structure. If you
must go outside for critical or lifesaving activities, cover your nose and mouth and avoid stirring
up and breathing any dust. It is important to remember that your movement outside could
cause yourself greater exposure and possibly spread contamination to those already supervised
and protected.

(If plutonium is involved): One of the materials involved is plutonium. Plutonium is both a
poison and a radiation hazard. The radiation given off consists of alpha particles that do not
have sufficient energy to penetrate buildings, most clothing, or even the outer skin. Therefore,
short-term exposure to contamination outside the body will pose negligible health risk.

(If uranium is involved): One of the materials involved is uranium. Contamination by uranium
fragments or small particles dispersed by conventional (chemical) explosions or burning of a
weapon is primarily a chemical health hazard (heavy metal poisoning similar to the lead
poisoning associated with some paints), not a radiological hazard.

The public is asked to stay out of the area (under surveillance or closed off by guards) (and, if
true) until a monitoring team, now en route to the site of the accident, can survey the ground
and determine the exact area affected by the accident. As a result of the explosion (fire), any
fragments found near the scene of the accident may be contaminated and should be left in
place. If fragments have been picked up, avoid further handling and notify (authorities) for
proper retrieval and disposition

Continuous announcements will be made as more information is known. It is expected that


these immediate protective precautionary actions will be required for the next 4 to 6 hours.

A U.S. (Service) team from (name of installation) is en route to (has arrived at) the scene of the
accident.

We have no details yet on civilian or military casualties (or give number only of civilian and
military casualties) or property damage.

The (type of carrier) was en route from (name of facility) to (name of facility). The cause of the
accident is under investigation.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

CONTINGENCY RELEASE NUMBER 2

To notify the general public

"No Radiological Danger to the Public"

(Confirms to reduce public alarm)

(Format of sample release to be used initially when no danger to the public from contamination
or blast exists, but when confirmation of the presence or absence of a nuclear weapon or
nuclear components significantly prevents or reduces widespread public alarm that will result
from unusual activity at the incident site.)

A U.S. (type) aircraft (other type of transportation) carrying hazardous material, classified
cargo, or unarmed nuclear weapon(s) crashed (or other circumstances) at approximately
(location and time).

The public is requested to stay out of the area (add, if true: under surveillance by guards)
to prevent any remote possibility of hazard from the accident (or conventional high explosives
detonation) and to avoid hampering removal operations. There is no need for evacuation.
(There is no danger of nuclear detonation.)

The cause of the accident is under investigation. Further details will be provided as they
become available.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

CONTINGENCY RELEASE NUMBER 3


To notify the general public

"When Public Is Possibly in Danger"

(Confirms possibility of contamination in a nuclear weapon accident)

(Format of sample release to be used when nuclear weapons or nuclear components have
been involved in an accident and the possibility exists for contamination due to fire or explosion,
and details are unknown. The release to the general public should only be used after the area
has been secured. Release can be modified as indicated below depending on audience.)

MINIMUM ANNOUNCEMENT

A U.S. (type) aircraft (other type of transportation) carrying unarmed nuclear weapons or
nuclear components crashed (or other circumstances) at (location) at approximately (time).

The public is asked to stay out of the accident area in the interest of safety due to the
possibility of hazard from the accident (or conventional high-explosives detonation) and to avoid
hampering recovery operations. (There is no danger of nuclear detonation.)

Add the following for appropriate officials

Fire, rescue, and other emergency services personnel should approach the area with
caution from upwind and be equipped with protective clothing and breathing apparatus. Any
local official at the scene of the accident or who has left the site who can provide details on the
situation should call this number (________________). Current information from the accident
scene will assist response personnel in responding to the accident and providing additional
public safety guidance. If contact with the accident scene is established, determine the
following: condition of aircraft and/or vehicle (such as burning, evidence of explosion, or extent
of damage); condition of accident site (such as fire or blast damage); or evidence of obvious
cargo (such as shapes or containers). Avoid handling any debris at the crash site.

If the aircraft is transporting nuclear weapons containing insensitive high explosives or


weapons overpacked with accident resistant containers, there is a much lower probability of a
detonation, and the fire should be fought as long as there is a reasonable expectation of saving
lives or containing the fire. The weapons, or containers, if exposed, should be cooled with
water.

Law enforcement officials should prevent unauthorized personnel from entering the site and
picking up fragments of the plane (vehicle) or its cargo. If any fragments have already been
picked up, avoid further contact or handling. Notify (authorities) for retrieval and proper
disposition.

A U.S. (Military Department) team from (name of installation) is en route to (has arrived at)
the accident scene.

We have no details yet on civilian or military casualties or property damage.

The cause of the accident is under investigation. Further details will be provided as they
become available.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

CONTINGENCY RELEASE NUMBER 4-A

"To Notify Local and State Officials


When Public Is Possibly in Danger"
(Neither confirms nor denies)

Format of sample release to be used if public safety considerations require notifying local and
State officials that hazardous cargo has been involved in an accident, the possibility exists for
contamination due to fire or explosion and details are unknown.)

MINIMUM ANNOUNCEMENT

A U.S. (type) aircraft (other type of transportation) carrying HAZMAT crashed (or other
circumstances) approximately (location) at (time).

Visitors are warned to stay out of the area of the accident in the interest of public safety. Fire,
rescue, and other emergency services personnel should approach the area with caution from
upwind and be equipped with protective clothing and breathing apparatus. Use of water
directly on the aircraft should be avoided unless needed to save property or lives. Any local
official at the scene of the accident who can provide details on the situation should make a
telephone call to this number (local phone). Current information from the accident scene will
assist in evaluating the accident and providing additional public safety guidance.1

EXPANDED ANNOUNCEMENT

If there is no immediate threat to life, and the fire cannot be extinguished immediately (5
minutes), the fire should be contained and allowed to burn out. Water as a firefighting agent
should be used with caution due to possible adverse reaction with materials involved in the fire.

Law enforcement officials should prevent unauthorized personnel from entering the site and
picking up fragments of the plane (vehicle) or its cargo. If any fragments have been picked up
already, avoid further contact or handling. Notify (authorities) for retrieval and proper
disposition.

Military personnel have been dispatched (will be dispatched) and will arrive (are scheduled to
arrive) soon at the site.
____________________
1If contact with the accident scene is established, determine the following:
- Condition of aircraft (burning, evidence of explosion, extent of damage, etc.)
- Condition of accident site (fire, blast, or damage)
- Evidence of obvious cargo (shapes or containers)

Determine the need for a public announcement of nuclear weapons involvement based on the
responses to the above.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

CONTINGENCY RELEASE NUMBER 4-B

To Notify the General Public


"When Public Is Possibly in Danger"
(Neither confirms nor denies)

(Format of sample release to be used if public safety considerations require making a PUBLIC
RELEASE that hazardous cargo was involved in an accident, the possibility exists for
contamination due to fire or explosion, and details are unknown.)

A U.S. (type) aircraft (other type of transportation) carrying HAZMAT crashed (or other
circumstances) approximately (location) at (time). The public is warned to stay out of the area
(under surveillance by guards) in the interest of safety and to aid operations at the accident
scene.

A U.S. (Military Service) team from (name of installation) is en route to (has arrived at) the
scene of the accident.

We have no details yet on civilian or military injuries or property damage.

Further announcements will be made as more information is known.

C14.AP1.2. IN RESPONSE TO QUERY ONLY

Question: "Are nuclear weapons stored at (name of facility) or (name of facility)?"

Reply: "It is Department of Defense policy neither to confirm nor deny the presence
of nuclear weapons at any particular location."

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C14.AP2. APPENDIX 2 OF CHAPTER 14

RADIATION FACT SHEETS

FACT SHEET 1

CHARACTERISTICS, HAZARDS AND HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS OF PLUTONIUM

(For release to the general public)

The accident at (to be filled in) has resulted in the release of the radioactive substance
plutonium. Persons who are downwind from the accident may become exposed to this
substance by coming into contact with contamination (radioactive material that has coated or
fallen upon the surfaces of structures, the ground, or objects) from the mishap. Also, very
small amounts of plutonium may have been spread by the winds to adjacent areas.
Radiological survey teams are monitoring these suspected areas to determine the presence of
plutonium and to measure the levels, if present. No immediate danger exists to anyone, and
no medical intervention is necessary; however, some actions may help prevent further
contamination or minimize its spread to clean areas.

Plutonium, which is abbreviated Pu, is a heavy metal that has a shiny appearance, similar to
stainless steel when freshly machined. After exposure to the atmosphere for any period of
time, it will oxidize to a dark brown or black appearance. When released from a weapons
accident, plutonium may not be readily seen by the naked eye, but in areas close to the
accident, its presence may be assumed in dust and dirt on the ground or on flat surfaces, and
from ash resulting from the accident fire.

Plutonium is an alpha radiation emitter; that is, it radiologically decays by the emission of an
alpha particle, a very heavy radioactive particle. Alpha particles do not substantially penetrate
materials. Their range in air is only a few inches at most. This means that alpha radiation is
not a hazard to people as long as it remains external to the body. The epidermis, or outer dead
layer of the skin, is sufficient protection for exposure to this isotope from sources external to the
body. No external hazard exists to people walking through an area contaminated with
plutonium. Alpha radiation can, however, represent an internal radiation hazard when
plutonium is taken into the body by inhalation of contaminated air, eating contaminated food, or
getting contamination into a wound or cut. In actuality, contamination from ingestion is unlikely
to be a problem, since plutonium is very poorly absorbed through the intestines. Less than .02
percent will be absorbed, or 2 of every 10,000 atoms eaten. Likewise, absorption from wounds
is not a probable means of significant contamination either, since contamination of a cut or
laceration will likely introduce only very small amounts of plutonium into the body. Because of
its poor absorption, only inhaling plutonium particles is likely to result in any amount of internal
radiation exposure.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

Inhaled plutonium is retained in the lungs in much the same manner that people in a dust storm
inhale dust. This "dust" settles in the lungs. Once in the lungs, a low percentage of plutonium
may be translocated by the bloodstream to the liver and the bones. This deposition can be
prevented by using "chelation" compounds, such as ethylenediamine tetraacetic acid (EDTA) or
diethylenetriamine pentaacetic acid (DTPA), which hasten the excretion of plutonium from the
body via the urine. The use of these chelating compounds is not without some medical hazard
to the individual, since they are administered intravenously, and should be performed by a
physician who has been in contact with appropriate agencies to coordinate the use of these
drugs.

Plutonium in a weapon has a radiological half-life (the length of time it takes for the plutonium to
lose one half of its radioactivity) of more than 24,000 years. This long half-life means that its
radioactivity does not decrease substantially by nuclear decay or disintegration. Likewise,
elimination of plutonium from the body is also a very slow process. Biological elimination of
plutonium can be improved significantly by the use of the chelating agents mentioned above.

Therefore, until the limits of contamination are determined, the public is advised to follow a few
simple guidelines to minimize the spread of contamination, and there will be little, if any,
hazard. Remain inside and minimize opening doors and windows. Turn off fans,
air-conditioners, and forced air heating units that bring in fresh air from the outside. Use them
only to recirculate air already in the building. Children should not play outdoors. Fruits and
vegetables grown in the area should not be eaten. Individuals who think they have inhaled
some plutonium should not be unduly concerned. The inhalation of plutonium is not an
immediate medical emergency. Very sensitive monitoring equipment is being brought into this
area to survey the inhabitants of suspected contamination area(s) for inhaled radiation, and
once established, this will be made available to those who need it.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

FACT SHEET 2

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT FACT SHEET ON PLUTONIUM

(For Medical Personnel)

Plutonium is a highly reactive element that can exhibit five oxidation states, from three to
seven. The principal routes into the body are via inhalation and contaminated wounds;
ingestion and contaminated intact skin are unimportant.

Inhalation is probably the most significant route of contamination in a nuclear weapons


accident. Retention in the lungs depends on particle size and the chemical form of plutonium
involved. Generally, in a weapons accident, plutonium will be in the form of an oxide that has a
pulmonary retention half-time of up to 1,000 days.

Absorption via wound contamination will result in a translocation of some of the material to the
skeleton and liver. The majority will remain in the vicinity of the wound and may result in the
formation of a fibrous nodule within months to years. The possible development of a sarcoma
or carcinoma in such nodules is a matter of concern, although there have been no reports of
such in the literature.

After entry into the body, some of the plutonium is solubilized by the body fluids, including blood,
and is redistributed within the body. Ultimately, it will be distributed by the blood to the skeleton
(45 percent), liver (45 percent), and the other tissues (10 percent). The retention half-times are
estimated to be 200 years (whole body), 100 years (skeleton), and 40 years (liver).

All medical treatment for plutonium contamination or inhalation should be coordinated with the
appropriate Service medical department or with REAC/TS because of the hazard of the
substances involved. DTPA compounds are defined as investigational drugs that require the
advice and concurrence of REAC/TS before administration. REAC/TS can be contacted at
the following number: (423) 576-3131.

Treatment of plutonium-contaminated wounds should involve copious washing and irrigation to


attempt to dislodge the contamination. If possible, washings should be saved for later counting
to determine contamination levels. More extensive treatment by excision requires judgment in
assessing the area involved, the difficulty of excision, and the total quantity in the wound.
Greater than 4 mCi of Pu embedded in a wound would be considered a candidate for such
treatment. It is not expected that the physician will need to make this determination, since a
specialized team to perform such monitoring can be made available from the CRTF or his or
her representative. Immediate chelation therapy with DTPA (consult REAC/TS for protocol)
should be accomplished prior to surgical excision to prevent possible systemic absorption of
Pu. In burn cases, flushing with sterile saline or water will remove a great deal of
contamination. The remainder will likely be removed when the eschar sloughs off.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

DTPA treatment given immediately following wound or burn treatment has been shown to
remove up to 96 percent of the remaining plutonium. In the case of inhaled plutonium, the
results have been relatively disappointing, since the oxide forms of Pu are transferred at a
relatively slow rate from the lungs into the systemic circulation. Thus, little systemic burden of
Pu is available for chelation in the early period after exposure and there is never a time when a
sizable systemic burden is available in the extracellular spaces for effective chelation.

In spite of this, DTPA should be used as soon as possible after significant inhalation exposures,
since the oxides may not be the only compound present. Attempts to stimulate phagocytosis
and the mucociliary response, or to use expectorant drugs, have not been successful in animal
studies; however, this may not be true in humans.

The only demonstrated useful procedure in enchasing the clearance of insoluble particles, such
as plutonium oxides, from the lung is bronchopulmonary lavage. The risk of this procedure
versus the risk of future health effects from the estimated lung burden must be very carefully
weighed. The use of repeated lavages should remove 25 to 50 percent of the plutonium that
would otherwise be retained in the lung. Again, advice should be sought from Service medical
command and REAC/TS.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

FACT SHEET 3

PLUTONIUM FACT SHEET

(For Operational Commanders)

As Operational Commander, you will be assaulted by many needs at once in determining the
actions to be taken in coping with a nuclear weapons accident. You should have had the
opportunity to review the preceding fact sheets for the general public and medical personnel.
Several facts are important to keep in mind, as general guidance.

By the time you have arrived at the scene, the weapons will generally have suffered low order
detonations if they are going to do so. This low order detonation produces a cloud of finely
dispersed plutonium that falls out over the area downwind, depending on particle size, wind
direction and speed, and amount of explosives in the detonation. A very worst case situation is
shown on the ARAC plots that are made available to you. The initial ARAC plots show the
detonation of all weapons involved, utilizing all the available explosives. The actual scenario
should be less, perhaps 10 to 100 times less, based on the actual survey data from the site.

The cloud will deposit its radioactive material within minutes of the accident. Unless it happens
on base, or you are at the scene, there is little you can do to prevent inhalation from the cloud
passage. After initial cloud passage, the inhalation of material from the accident is by
resuspending the plutonium by operations in the area of cloud passage, such as walking.
DOE can calculate a dose equivalent for persons in the area of the initial cloud passage.
Generally, these people will be in the area of hundreds of REM of exposure to the lungs. Note
that this is only from the cloud passage; doses from resuspension will be on the order of 100 to
1,000 times less.

The important point is that the ARAC plot generally overestimates the total dispersion of
plutonium, and the dose estimate is based only on cloud passage, not later resuspension of the
plutonium; therefore, basing your sheltering plans on these numbers can easily result in a
significant overestimation of the real problem.

Sheltering should be recommended for the downwind population, but you must be careful to
avoid the impression of extreme hazard from the plutonium. Your sheltering advisory should
indicate that there is a contamination hazard and a slight inhalation hazard. Care should be
taken not to increase tension over the incident. You and your PAO should emphasize that
people should remain indoors as much as possible, keep houses closed to prevent
contamination, and other ideas as outlined in the public release.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

Generally, the resuspension of plutonium in the original areas of contamination is not severe,
except for the area very close to the accident site. To prevent the spread of material in this
area, early thought should be given to spraying with some sort of fixative to prevent
resuspension/spread of the plutonium. Something as simple as hand sprayers with vegetable
oil may be used to bind the plutonium into the soil/surface around the site. A secondary
advantage is that this method lowers the airborne hazard for the workers inside the control
boundaries and may help in making the eventual cleanup process move faster. It will, however,
mask the plutonium from some alpha detection RADIACs, such as the AN/PDR 56. Generally,
these types of instruments are used only for monitoring people or material leaving the site, not
site contamination surveys.

In dealing with a nuclear weapons accident, some of the concepts that are generally employed
in handling injuries and/or fatalities on board ship do not hold true, or may be
counterproductive. Such an example would be keeping the population under tight sheltering
requirements or restricting traffic from the contamination area downwind. Any
recommendation for the civilian populace will be just that, recommendations. The military has
no authority in the contamination areas unless they are military areas, or are within the NDA.
Utilize the local authorities, and have the FEMA representative assist in this function.

Some concept of the exact magnitude of the risk people experience from the incident can be
compared with the risks outlined in the Nuclear Regulatory Guide 8.29, reference (aj). The
Service/DOE health physicists should be consulted to give the best approximation of the public
risk; this can be compared with the risks in the guide.

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FACT SHEET 4

CHARACTERISTICS, HAZARDS, AND HEALTH CONSIDERATION OF URANIUM

(For Operational Commanders)

Some nuclear weapons may contain uranium. Uranium is a mild to moderately radioactive
material that can be hazardous if inhaled in large quantities. In a nuclear weapons accident, it
is possible that the uranium in the warhead of the weapon gets dispersed into the air by fire or
explosion of the high explosives in the weapon. (NOTE: this is not a nuclear detonation.)
The heat and smoke from the fire or explosion can carry small particles of uranium into the air.
As the smoke plume travels downwind, the particles of uranium begin to settle to the ground,
leaving a track of contamination on the ground surface and vegetation. Larger particles will
settle out first, smaller particles may travel much further. The highest levels of uranium
contamination will be in the immediate area of the accident. In general, the further away from
the accident, the lower the levels of uranium contamination can be expected.

Uranium is a heavy metal, somewhat like lead. Uranium is a naturally occurring mineral that is
mildly radioactive. As found in nature, uranium consists mostly of the isotope U-238, with small
quantities of U-235 and extremely small quantities of U-234. This so-called "natural uranium" is
only mildly radioactive, emitting alpha and beta radiation and low levels of gamma radiation.
The half-life of U-238, the major constituent of natural uranium, is 4.5 billion years. It is likely
that uranium released in the circumstances of a weapons accident is in the chemical form of
uranium oxide.

Uranium can be "enriched" - that is, the concentration of U-235 can be increased, by a number
of methods. Commercial nuclear reactors use uranium that has been enriched so that the
U-235 makes about 5 percent of the total uranium mass (the rest is U-238.) Some nuclear
weapons use highly enriched uranium (HEU) in which the U-235 makes up more than 90
percent of the total mass of uranium. The uranium left over from the enrichment process is
called "depleted" uranium - because it has only about one-third as much U-235 as natural
uranium. Nuclear weapons may contain several types of uranium, from depleted to highly
enriched.

Uranium can be a mild to moderate radiation hazard if it is inhaled. Uranium is not particularly
hazardous if it remains outside the body. If uranium is inhaled, the lungs and other organs of
the body can receive doses of radiation; however, a person must inhale a very large quantity of
uranium in order to get a significant dose of radiation. Even if the uranium was involved in a
fire or explosion, it is unlikely that anyone would get a serious radiation dose from inhalation. It
is much more likely that dispersal of uranium would create more of a "nuisance" contamination
problem.

Compared to plutonium (the major hazardous material in many nuclear weapons), uranium is
not very hazardous. In a nuclear weapons accident in which both plutonium and uranium have
been dispersed, the hazard from plutonium will be far more serious than that from uranium.
Although uranium emits alpha radiation (that can result in internal radiation doses if taken into
the body) very much like plutonium, pound-for-pound, uranium is from 1,000 to 100,000 times
less radioactive than plutonium. A person would have to inhale roughly 1,000 to 100,000
times as much uranium mass to get the same dose as they would from plutonium. In addition,
uranium does not remain in the body as long as plutonium; therefore, the radiation dose
received by the organs is somewhat lower.

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Depleted and natural uranium is at least 100 times less radioactive than HEU. It is unlikely that
accidents involving dispersal of depleted or natural uranium will result in any significant radiation
doses. HEU contamination presents more of a problem than depleted or natural uranium, but
is still far less of a problem than plutonium contamination.

If a person is directly exposed to a smoke plume from a fire or explosion involving uranium, they
may have been exposed to significant levels of airborne uranium. If they are in areas where the
ground was contaminated, they may have been exposed to a much lower level of uranium that
was re-suspended into the air. If a person thinks they may have been exposed to uranium (as
described above) they should contact the appropriate State or Federal authorities and let them
know. The authorities will arrange for appropriate radiation detection tests to be made. These
tests may include the collection of urine samples, and/or scheduling for a "lung count"
examination. Depending upon the chemical form of the uranium that has been inhaled, some
portion of the uranium in the body is excreted in the urine. Urine samples can be analyzed for
the presence of uranium. (NOTE: All people have a low concentration of uranium in their
urine from the trace quantities of uranium in the normal diet.) Lung count is a procedure
performed by placing very sensitive radiation detectors near a person's chest to look for low
energy x-rays emitted by the uranium mixture. Typically, the person reclines on a table or in a
chair while the detectors are placed very near the chest wall. A lung count is not like an x-ray
exam. A lung count is a completely passive exam - the detectors do not emit any radiation, and
the person does not receive any radiation dose from the exam. A "quick" screening lung scan
can be performed in about 10 or 15 minutes. A more sensitive exam performed at a special
"whole body counting" facility typically takes about 45 to 50 minutes.

In general, uranium is more hazardous to children than adults, due to the smaller size and
different metabolism of children. In order to assure that children are adequately protected,
protective action guidelines established by EPA take this increased sensitivity into account.

If uranium remains outside of the body, it is not particularly hazardous. The beta and gamma
radiation emitted by uranium is relatively weak, and uranium emits only low levels of this
radiation. The intensity of these gamma rays is so low that the measurable radiation field from
uranium only extends a few feet away from solid uranium metal. Even high levels of uranium
contamination on the ground will not produce any significant external radiation hazards.

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FACT SHEET 5

CHARACTERISTICS, HAZARDS, AND HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS OF TRITIUM

(For Operational Commanders)

Some nuclear weapons have small metal bottles that contain tritium, a radioactive gas. In an
accident involving nuclear weapons, it is possible that these gas bottle systems may be
damaged, and some or all of the tritium gas released into the air. Tritium gas that is released
into the air will be quickly diluted and dispersed, and is not likely to be a significant hazard,
unless there was a fire or explosion at the accident, and then it would only be a hazard to
people in the immediate area of the accident.

Tritium is a radioactive form of the element hydrogen. From a chemical standpoint, tritium
atoms behave just like hydrogen atoms. Tritium is often stored and used in the form of a gas.
Like hydrogen, tritium combines readily with many other elements. For example, a tritium atom
can take the place of a hydrogen atom in a water molecule, to form what is called "tritiated
water," sometimes called "HTO."

Some tritium is produced naturally, by the interaction of cosmic rays in the earth's atmosphere.
These cosmic ray interactions produce about 4 million curies of tritium every year worldwide.
This tritium is incorporated into rainwater, resulting in a low, but measurable "background," level
of tritium in almost all water. The concentration of tritium in surface water is typically on the
order of 10 to 50 picocuries per liter.

Tritium is also produced in nuclear reactors. This manufactured tritium can be separated and
purified for a variety of uses. There is no difference between manufactured tritium and tritium
that is produced naturally. Tritium is used in nuclear weapons, fusion research, luminous signs
and watches, and in biomedical research.

Tritium gas is relatively harmless, since very little of it is absorbed into the body, even if inhaled;
however, if there were a fire or explosion at the same time as the tritium was released, some or
all of the tritium gas would probably be converted into tritium-oxide, (HTO). When people are
exposed to HTO in the air, some of it is inhaled, and some of it can be absorbed through the
skin.

The radiation doses that might be received from exposure to the smoke plume decrease rapidly
with distance away from the accident. People who were directly exposed to the smoke plume,
very close to the accident site (within a few hundred yards) might receive radiation doses
greater than the occupational limit of 5 rem. Beyond a few hundred yards, doses would be
well below a few rem. Beyond about 1/2 mile, the dose to a person who was directly in the
smoke plume is likely to be less than the dose a person receives every year from natural
background radiation.

Tritium is relatively easy to detect with appropriate instruments. Tritium on surfaces can be
detected by rubbing a small piece of filter paper over the surface, and then "counting" the
radioactivity on the paper (which is placed in a small vial) in an instrument called a "liquid
scintillation counter." Tritium in water or other liquid can be counted by placing a sample of the
liquid in a small vial and then counting the vial in the liquid scintillation counter. Tritium in the
air can be measured by sampling the air with a "flow-through ionization chamber" instrument,
which gives a real time reading of the concentration of tritium in air.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

The form of tritium that is most likely to get inside the body is HTO in the form of water vapor (in
the air.) Airborne tritium (as tritiated water vapor) can be inhaled, and can also be absorbed
through the skin. When people are exposed to tritiated water vapor, about 2/3 of the total
intake comes from inhalation of the tritium, and about 1/3 comes from absorption of the tritium
through the skin. Tritium can also be incorporated into crops, which then can be ingested.

Once tritium is inside the body, it behaves just like water - and is distributed rapidly and
uniformly throughout the entire volume of body water, where it can deliver a radiation dose to
the soft tissues of the entire body. Tritium is eliminated from the body at the same rate and via
the same pathway as water is eliminated from the body - excretion of urine and feces, sweat,
and loss through exhalation.

The amount of time required for half of the tritium remaining in the body to be removed from the
body is called the "biological half life." Since tritium in the body behaves just like water, and
since the body's water is continually eliminated and replaced, the biological half life of tritium is
very short - about 10 days.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C14.AP3. APPENDIX 3 OF CHAPTER 14

PUBLIC AFFAIRS RESPONSE ORGANIZATION CONCEPT

C14.AP3.1. INFORMATION COORDINATION CELL

An ICC of PA decision makers should be established to develop a PA strategic plan


that incorporates key messages and ensures frequent coordination with higher
headquarters and organizations not represented in the JIC/CIB. The ICC should
consist of a senior U.S. military, State emergency response (or foreign national
government/military), and local (police and emergency response) PA officer. The
ICC should be located with the CRTF and other senior response leadership.

C14.AP3.1.1. The ICC should:

C14.AP3.1.1.1. Authorize JIC/CIB release of information.

C14.AP3.1.1.2. Ensure response personnel are prepared for press briefings


and interviews.

C14.AP3.1.1.3. Ensure adequate staffing, equipping, and support of the


JIC/CIB and any sub-JICs/CIBs.

C14.AP3.2. JIC/CIB

The JIC/CIB is established for media relations; however, internal information and
public outreach programs may be collocated in separate areas of the JIC/CIB, as
appropriate.

C14.AP3.2.1. The JIC/CIB should include representatives from all participating


organizations that have PA personnel. Computer and administrative support is
required.

C14.AP3.2.2. PA personnel must be assigned to the accident scene to handle


media at that site and to gather information to provide to the JIC/CIB and ICC.

C14.AP3.2.3. JIC/CIB personnel research, prepare, and coordinate responses for


media queries; notify media of briefings; arrange interviews; coordinate photo, film,
and video opportunities; and monitor media reports and provide feedback to the ICC.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C14.AP3.2.4. The JIB/CIB personnel support the ICC by setting up press


briefings, providing recordings and transcripts of briefings and key interviews,
arranging and briefing media escorts, and ensuring frequent contact with the
media/media center.

C14.AP3.2.5. The U.S. military ICC director should establish an internal


information program for U.S. military personnel.

C14.AP3.2.6. The U.S. military ICC director should ensure a public outreach
program is established and ensure participation by response force PA and other
members, as appropriate.

C14.AP3.2.7. JIC/CIB layout should include:

C14.AP3.2.7.1. Private JIC/CIB director work area with telephones for the
co-directors.

C14.AP3.2.7.2. Media response area with telephones.

C14.AP3.2.7.3. Multi-agency work area with telephones.

C14.AP3.2.7.4. Administrative support area.

C14.AP3.2.7.5. Conference area for JIC/CIB meetings.

C14.AP3.2.7.6. A multimedia area to collect, monitor, and review media


coverage.

C14.AP3.3. MEDIA CENTER

The media center is the media work area. This should be collocated with the media
briefing area, when possible.

C14.AP3.4. MEDIA BRIEFING AREA

The CRTF PAO, working with local authorities (police, emergency response, and
county), should select a large area with adequate seating, acoustics, power, and
lighting for media briefings. This should be collocated with the media center, when
possible.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C14.AP3.5. SUB-JIC/CIB

PA representatives should be assigned to the accident site to gather information, escort


media, and distribute internal information products to on-site personnel. The CRTF
should provide these personnel with adequate communications, logistic, and
transportation support.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C14.AP4. APPENDIX 4 OF CHAPTER 14

JIC/CIB ADMINSTRATIVE, COMMUNICATION AND


LOGISTIC SUPPORT/EQUIPMENT

Administrative, communications and logistic support/equipment needed to support an


established JIC/CIB:

• Personal computers, to include laptop systems with CD-ROM capabilities (access to


a response force intranet and Internet desired)

• Portable television satellite antennas

• Printers and ink cartridges

• Software and blank disks

• Photocopier machine(s) and access to offset printing

• Copy paper

• Furniture to support multiple work areas

• Visual information, audiovisual and sound reinforcement equipment

• Graphics capability/support

• Professional quality multi-system still and video cameras, video recorders, and
playback systems (film, developing equipment, digital electronic imaging equipment)

• 35mm slide and overhead projectors

• Appropriate directional and/or information signs

• Tape recorders and battery chargers

• AM-FM radios

• Blank audio and videotapes

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

• Office supplies

• News sources to include: Televisions and radio receivers (portable, battery


operated); wire services; newspapers; magazines; and electronic bulletin boards, news
banks, and databases

• Position locators and/or navigational equipment

• Power converters (110 and 220 volt)

• Extension cords, plug adapters and power strips

• Various types of batteries

• Mobile radios

• Cellular phones

• Answering machines

• Facsimile machines

• Support vehicles (for public affairs staff and media pools/escort)

• Satellite communications

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C14.AP5. APPENDIX 5 OF CHAPTER 14

JIC/CIB RECOMMENDED KEY MESSAGES AND NON-RELEASABLE


INFORMATION

C14.AP5.1. JIC/CIB RECOMMENDED KEY MESSAGES

The responsibility for public safety rests with local emergency response officials.
CRTF release of information to those officials must not be confused with release of
information to the general public. It is crucial to publicly confirm a nuclear weapons
accident and confirm radioactive contamination (if true) as soon as this information is
received and confirmed. Delay will lead to public speculation (response forces will
show up in personal protective suits), possible panic, and loss of credibility. Delay
may also cause members of the public to be unnecessarily exposed to low levels of
radiation that may be released during the accident.

INITIAL PHASE

Safety

• Public safety is our first priority.

• Trained military and civilian personnel are responding.

• There is no risk of a nuclear detonation.

• Please stay away from the cordon so that we can work without interference.

• Preventing any further injuries or loss of life is paramount.

• Please continue to listen to local TV and radio for further advice.

Sympathy

• We deeply regret this accident has occurred.

• Our thoughts and condolences go out to families and friends of those involved.

• We are working closely with all involved military and civilian organizations.

316 CHAPTER 14, APPENDIX 5


DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

• We are working together as a team.

• Hundreds (thousands) of trained military and civilian personnel are responding.

• We are bringing our best people and the most advanced equipment to deal with
this emergency.

Disclosure

• We are here to coordinate the initial response.

• We will give you information as soon as it becomes available.

• We want to answer your questions.

• We do not have all the answers.

Compensation

• There will be an investigation.

• Procedures will be established to handle requests for compensation.

C14.AP5.2. JIC/CIB NON-RELEASABLE INFORMATION

The JIC/CIB must ensure the media and public understand early on that there will be
some information that is not expected to be released by the CRTF or the JIC/CIB.

Political

• U.S. host national diplomatic efforts

• Foreign relations

• North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

• Russia, China, etc.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

Policy

• Future nuclear program/posture

• Deterrence

• Legality of nuclear weapons and their use

• Nuclear disarmament

• Weapons safety record

• U.S. nuclear weapons overseas

• Accident investigation arrangements

• Details of government-to-government agreements/arrangements

Operational

• Nuclear weapon command and control arrangements

• Location of nuclear weapons (excluding those involved in the accident)

• Transportation of nuclear weapons (frequency of flights and routes)

• Specific weapon design/characteristics/modifications

• Weapon recovery plans (routes, packaging, and containerization )

• Cost of cleanup/remediation

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C14.AP6. APPENDIX 6 OF CHAPTER 14

CHECK LIST

• Recommend CRTF confirms (nuclear weapons accident occurred and radiation


contamination).

• Communication with the OASD(PA) and appropriate local and State PA


personnel. Overseas, ensure communication with the theater PAO, U.S. Embassy
and, as appropriate, foreign military, and local and national PA personnel.

• Ensure security review of, coordinate (legal, weapons, medical, radiological, and
SR), and authorize release of information about U.S. nuclear weapon accident
response.

• With local authorities, and where appropriate foreign military, establish an ICC, JIC,
or CIB, a media center and briefing area.

• Develop a PA plan with key messages.

• Monitor media reports and provide feedback to response organizations and higher
headquarters.

• Establish an internal information program.

• Establish and participate in a public outreach program to provide information to the


public.

• Ensure adequate communications, transportation, logistic, computer/information


system, and administrative support for PA response staff.

• Ensure adequate transportation, communication, and logistic support for media, as


appropriate.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C15. CHAPTER 15
LEGAL

C15.1. GENERAL

The occurrence of a nuclear weapon accident will present a myriad of complex legal
problems for the Commander of the IRF and the CRTF. The CRTF represents the
USG to the general public, State and local officials, the Executive Departments, and
other Federal Agencies. Legal issues range from complex questions regarding
jurisdiction and authority to exclude the general public from specific areas, to payment
of simple personal property claims. The response force organization should include a
legal element to advise and assist the CRTF in resolving these issues. The Senior
military member of the legal element responding with the staff of the CRTF is the DoD
PLA to the CRTF.

C15.2. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This Chapter identifies specific requirements, resources, and actions to resolve legal
issues. Also, it provides a reference list of statutory authorities, regulations, and
instructions.

C15.3. SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

The PLA will:

C15.3.1. Advise the CRTF and functional staff elements on any matters related to
the accident.

C15.3.2. Organize and supervise the legal functional element at the site of the
accident, including establishing and operating a claims processing facility.

C15.3.3. Coordinate technical legal matters with a higher authority, when


required.

C15.3.4. Coordinate legal issues with the principal legal advisors of other
participating Departments or Agencies, as required.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C15.3.5. Provide legal advice and assistance to other Federal officials, upon
request.

C15.3.6. Review operational plans to identify potential legal problems and ensure
that they are legally sufficient, with emphasis on security, radiological safety, and
documentation of evidence for use in resolving claims or in litigation.

C15.3.7. Legal personnel work closely with PAO to ensure no hidden legal
implication will impact on response efforts.

C15.4. RESOURCES

C15.4.1. The provision of timely and sound legal advice and assistance is
dependent upon adequate personnel and communication among functional elements.
The designated legal element of the RTF should include, at a minimum, two attorneys
and one legal clerk. The legal element of the IRF response force should remain at the
site as an additional resource. Depending upon the nature of, and circumstances
surrounding an accident, additional personnel may be required. Predesignated
response forces should ensure that the assigned legal element is aware and capable of
addressing the complex and politically sensitive national defense issues that evolve
from a nuclear weapons accident as well as managing and administering a claims
processing facility.

C15.4.2. Other Federal Departments and Agencies may include a legal advisor as
an element of their response force. To assure consistency, all legal advice and
assistance should be coordinated jointly through the DoD PLA.

C15.4.3. The General Counsel, DTRA, is a member of the CMAT, and will
deploy to the accident site to provide expert advice and assistance to the PLA.

C15.5. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

This concept establishes guidelines for the operation of the PLA and his or her staff.
Circumstances surrounding an accident are the driving force of the sequential order.

C15.5.1. Planning. The PLA must be knowledgeable concerning the authority


and responsibility of the DoD as well as that of the various other Federal Departments
and Agencies in a nuclear weapon accident. Inherent in this event are the
relationships between local, State, national, and international authorities, as well as

321 CHAPTER 15
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

jurisdictional principles, security requirements, environmental requirements, and


claims administration. Inasmuch as requests for legal advice require immediate
response, and adequate research facilities are unlikely to be available on site,
designated legal elements should prepare a handbook of references, including those
listed at Appendix C15.AP1. These references provide the authority and some
background for subject areas, such as establishment of the NDA, law enforcement, use
of force, evacuation of civilians, and damage to public or private property. The
handbook should be tailored to the respective Service or Agency.

C15.5.2. Initial Actions

C15.5.2.1. The CRTF and staff must have immediate access to the PLA;
accordingly, the legal element should be located in or near the JOC/CP.

C15.5.2.2. The provision of timely and legally sound advice and assistance is
based primarily upon communication; therefore, liaison must be established with all of
the major functional elements of the CRTF's staff to make all elements aware of the
need for coordination of planned actions.

C15.5.2.3. The claims processing facility should be established at a location


easily accessible to the public and mutually agreeable to local officials. Dependent
upon circumstances, more than one claims facility may be required. When possible,
the claims processing facility should be collocated with the civil emergency relief and
assistance office. As soon as the claims processing facility is established, information
regarding the location should be provided to the JIC/CIB for inclusion in a news
release.

C15.5.2.4. Claims processing personnel should be aware of the sensitive


nature surrounding the accident. The PLA ensures that any information provided to
claimants is according to established policies, and that queries for any information
other than claims procedures are referred to the PAO.

C15.5.2.5. Response efforts may necessarily result in the disturbance and/or


destruction of physical evidence that may later prove to be significant in resolution of
claims or litigation. Accordingly, the PLA should take immediate action to ensure
preservation of factual and evidentiary information for both safety investigations and
claims resolution. This includes photographs and/or videos, interviews with
witnesses, documentation of radiological hazards and safety procedures, identification
of responding forces and civilians at or near the accident scene, and appropriate
recording and receipting of property.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C15.5.2.6. The PLA must identify and establish liaison immediately with
local law enforcement officials, legal authorities, and local and State emergency
response organizations.

C15.5.2.7. To ensure that legal advice is timely, responsive, and consistent,


the PLA should establish liaison with legal advisors representing other Federal
Agencies at the accident site.

C15.5.3. Follow-On Actions. The PLA, or a representative, remains at the scene


until the response operation is complete. The PLA advises the CRTF when the claims
processing facility should cease operation.

C15.5.4. Public Affairs. Adverse publicity is inherent to a nuclear weapon


accident simply by its occurrence. Mishandling of PA may impact on claims and
litigation, result in a loss of confidence by the public in the actions of the USG in the
cleanup process, or have long-term political and financial implications that could
undermine support for the Nation's nuclear deterrent capability. It is therefore
essential that:

C15.5.4.1. Legal personnel work closely with the PAO to ensure that no
hidden legal implications will impact on response efforts.

C15.5.4.2. All personnel involved in the response effort are required to refer
all media and public queries for information to the PAO.

C15.6. ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN ANNEX

Accident response plans should include a Legal Annex that:

C15.6.1. Identifies the resources to be deployed with the legal element.

C15.6.2. Provides a checklist or synopsis of the actions to be taken by the PLA


immediately upon arrival at the site.

C15.6.3. Establishes a policy requiring all functional elements to coordinate


actions with the PLA.

C15.6.4. Provides guidelines for documentation of physical evidence that may be


significant in the resolution of claims or litigation.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C15.6.5. Describes procedures for establishing and operating a claims processing


facility.

C15.6.6. Identifies technical channels of communication.

C15.6.7. Identifies applicable environmental laws, regulations, directives, and


instructions.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C15.AP1. APPENDIX 1 OF CHAPTER 15

PERTINENT STATUTES AND INSTRUCTIONS

C15.AP1.1. AUTHORITY FOR RESPONSE TO ACCIDENT

C15.AP1.1.1. Executive Order (E.O.) 12656, "Assignment of Emergency


Preparedness Responsibilities," 53 FR 47491, November 18, 1988.

C15.AP1.1.2. White House Memorandum, 19 January 1988, Subject "National


System for Emergency Coordination."

C15.AP1.1.3. 42 U.S. Code Annotated (USCA) Sec. 5121 et seq. (Public Law
93-288, amended by Public Law 100-107), "The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief
and Emergency Assistance Act."

C15.AP1.1.4. E.O. 12148, "Federal Emergency Management," 44 FR 43239, July


20, 1979.

C15.AP1.1.5. E.O. 12241, "National Contingency Plan," 45 FR 64879,


September 29, 1980.

C15.AP1.1.6. "Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP)," May


1, 1996.

C15.AP1.1.7. DoDD 3150.8, "DoD Response to Radiological Accidents," June


13, 1996.

C15.AP1.1.8. DoDD 3025.1, "Military Support to Civil Authorities," January 15,


1993.

C15.AP1.1.9. DoDD 3025.15, "Military Assistance to Civil Authorities,"


February 18, 1997.

C15.AP1.1.10. DoDD 3150.5, "DoD Response to Improvised Nuclear Device


(IND) Incidents," March 24, 1987.

C15.AP1.1.11. DoDD 5230.16, "Nuclear Accident and Incident Public Affairs


(PA) Guidance," December 20, 1993.

C15.AP1.1.12. DoDD 5410.14, "Cooperation with U.S. News Media

325 CHAPTER 15, APPENDIX 1


DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

Representatives at the Scene of Military Accidents Occurring Outside Military


Installations," October 25, 1963.

C15.AP1.1.13. 44 CFR Part 206, "Federal Disaster Assistance for Disasters On or


After November 23, 1988."

C15.AP1.1.14. "Federal Response Plan," April 1999.

C15.AP1.2. AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH RESTRICTED AREA TO PROTECT


CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

C15.AP1.2.1. 50 USCA § 797, "Security Regulations."

C15.AP1.2.2. 42 USCA § 2271, "General Provisions."

C15.AP1.2.3. DoDD 5200.8, "Security of Military Installations and Resources,"


April 25, 1991.

C15.AP1.2.4. DoDD 5210.2, "Access to and Dissemination of Restricted Data."

C15.AP1.2.5. DoDD 5210.41, "Security Policy for Protecting Nuclear Weapons,"


September 23, 1988.

C15.AP1.2.6. DoDD 5210.56, "Use of Deadly Force and the Carrying of


Firearms by DoD Personnel Engaged in Law Enforcement and Security Duties,"
February 25, 1992.

C15.AP1.3. CRIMINAL STATUTES

C15.AP1.3.1. 18 USCA § 111, "Assaulting, Resisting, or Impeding Certain


Officers or Employees."

C15.AP1.3.2. 18 USCA § 231, "Civil Disorders."

C15.AP1.3.3. 18 USCA § 241, "Conspiracy Against Rights."

C15.AP1.3.4. 18 USCA § 245, "Federally Protected Activities."

C15.AP1.3.5. 18 USCA § 372, "Conspiracy to Impede or Injure Officer."

C15.AP1.3.6. 18 USCA § 641, "Public Money, Property, or Records."

326 CHAPTER 15, APPENDIX 1


DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C15.AP1.3.7. 18 USCA § 793, "Gathering, Transmitting, or Losing Defense


Information."

C15.AP1.3.8. 18 USCA § 795, "Photographing and Sketching Defense


Installations."

C15.AP1.3.9. 18 USCA § 796, "Use of Aircraft for Photographing Defense


Installations."

C15.AP1.3.10. 18 USCA § 797, "Publication and Sale of Photographs of Defense


Installations."

C15.AP1.3.11. 18 USCA § 1361, "Government Property or Contracts."

C15.AP1.3.12. 18 USCA § 1362, "Communication Lines, Stations, or Systems."

C15.AP1.3.13. 18 USCA § 1382, "Entering Military, Naval, or Coast Guard


Property."

C15.AP1.3.14. 18 USCA § 2101, "Riots."

C15.AP1.3.15. 18 USCA § 2231, "Assault or Resistance."

C15.AP1.3.16. 18 USCA § 2381, "Treason."

C15.AP1.3.17. 18 USCA § 2384, "Seditious Conspiracy."

C15.AP1.4. AUTHORITY OF FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

C15.AP1.4.1. 18 USCA § 3052, "Powers of Federal Bureau of Investigation."

C15.AP1.4.2. 42 USCA § 2271(b), "General Provisions."

C15.AP1.5. AUTHORITY FOR MILITARY ACQUISITION OF LAND AND JUST


COMPENSATION FOR PROPERTY

C15.AP1.5.1. 10 USCA § 2672a, "Acquisition: Interests in Land When Need Is


Urgent."

C15.AP1.5.1.1. Amendment V. U.S. Constitution.

327 CHAPTER 15, APPENDIX 1


DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C15.AP1.6. AUTHORITY FOR PAYMENT OF CLAIMS

C15.AP1.6.1. 10 USCA §§ 2731-2738, "Military Claims."

C15.AP1.6.2. 28 USCA § 2672, "Administrative Adjustment of Claims."

C15.AP1.7. ENVIRONMENTAL AUTHORITIES

C15.AP1.7.1. 42 USCA § 4321, et seq., "National Environmental Policy Act."

C15.AP1.7.2. 42 USCA §§ 9601-9675, "Comprehensive Environmental


Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980."

C15.AP1.7.3. E.O. 11514, as amended by E.O. 11991, 42 FR 26967, May 24,


1978, "Protection and Enhancement of Environmental Policy." 35 FR 4247, March 7,
1970.

C15.AP1.7.4. 33 USCA §§ 1251-1386, "Federal Water Pollution Control Act."

C15.AP1.7.5. 16 USCA §§ 1531-1544, "Endangered Species Act."

C15.AP1.7.6. 33 USCA §§ 2701-2761, "Oil Pollution Act."

C15.AP1.7.7. 42 USCA §§ 7401-76719, "Clean Air Act."

C15.AP1.7.8. 42 USCA §§ 6901-6992K, "Resource Conservation and Recovery


Act."

C15.AP1.7.9. CFR Part 300, "National Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution
Contingency Plan."

C15.AP1.7.10. E.O. 12580, "Superfund Implementation," 52 FR 5923, January


23, 1987, as amended by E.O. 13016, August 28, 1996.

C15.AP1.7.12. DoDD 6050.7, "Environmental Effects Abroad of Major DoD


Actions," March 31, 1979.

C15.AP1.7.13. E.O. 12114, "Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal


Actions," 44 FR 1957, January 4, 1979.

328 CHAPTER 15, APPENDIX 1


DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C15.AP1.7.14. 40 CFR, Part 300, "The National Oil and Hazardous Substance
Pollution Contingency Plan."

C15.AP1.7.15. DoDD 5030.41, "Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution


Prevention and Contingency Program," June 1, 1977.

C15.AP1.7.16. DoD Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance Document.

C15.AP1.7.17. DoD Instruction 4715.5, "Management of Environmental


Compliance at Overseas Installations," April 22, 1996.

C15.AP1.8. MISCELLANEOUS

C15.AP1.8.1. 5 USCA § 552. as amended, "Freedom of Information Act."

C15.AP1.8.2. 5 USCA § 552a, as amended, "Privacy Act."

C15.AP1.8.3. 5 USCA § 552b, "Government in Sunshine Act."

C15.AP1.8.4. DoDD 5030.14, "Disclosure of Atomic Information to Foreign


Governments and Regional Defense Organizations," July 24, 1981.

C15.AP1.8.5. DoD Directive 2000.12, "DoD Antiterrorism/Force Protection


(AT/FP) Program," April 13, 1999.

C15.AP1.8.6. DoD Instruction 2000.16, "Combating Terrorism Program


Standards."

C15.AP1.8.7. DoD Directive 3020.36, "Assignment of National Security


Emergency Preparedness (NSEP) Responsibilities to DoD Components," November 2,
1988.

C15.AP1.8.8. DoD Directive 5100.46, "Foreign Disaster Relief," December 4,


1975.

C15.AP1.8.9. DoD 5200.8-R, "Physical Security Program."

C15.AP1.8.10. DoD Directive 5525.5, "DoD Cooperation with Civilian Law


Enforcement Officials," January 15, 1986.

329 CHAPTER 15, APPENDIX 1


DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C15.AP1.8.11. 28 USCA §§ 2671-2679, "Federal Torts Claims Act."

C15.AP1.9. POSSE COMITATUS ACT, EXCEPTIONS TO THE POSSE


COMITATUS ACT, AND RELATED STATUTES

C15.AP1.9.1. 18 USCA § 1385, "Use of Army and Air Force as Posse


Comitatus."

C15.AP1.9.2. 10 USCA § 331, "Federal Aid for State Governments."

C15.AP1.9.3. 10 USCA § 332, "Use of Militia and Armed Forces to Enforce


Federal Authority."

C15.AP1.9.4. 10 USCA § 333, "Interference with State and Federal Law."

C15.AP1.9.5. 10 USCA § 371, "Use of Information Collected During Military


Operations."

C15.AP1.9.6. 10 USCA § 372, "Use of Military Equipment and Facilities."

C15.AP1.9.7. 10 USCA § 373, "Training and Advising Civilian Law


Enforcement Officials."

C15.AP1.9.8. 10 USCA § 374, "Maintenance and Operation of Equipment."

C15.AP1.9.9. 10 USCA § 375, "Restriction of Direct Participation by Military


Personnel."

C15.AP1.9.10. 10 USCA § 376, "Support Not to Affect Adversely Military


Operations."

C15.AP1.9.11. 10 USCA § 377, "Reimbursement."

C15.AP1.9.12. 10 USCA § 382, "Emergency Situations Involving Chemical or


Biological Weapons of Mass Destruction."

C15.AP1.9.13. 18 USCA § 175, "Prohibitions with Respect to Biological


Weapons."

C15.AP1.9.14. 18 USCA § 831, "Prohibited Transactions Involving Nuclear


Materials."

330 CHAPTER 15, APPENDIX 1


DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C15.AP1.9.15. 18 USCA § 2332c, "Use of Chemical Weapons."

C15.AP1.9.16. 18 USCA § 2332e, "Requests for Military Assistance to Enforce


Prohibition in Certain Emergencies."

C15.AP1.10. TREATIES

C15.AP1.10.1. Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident.

C15.AP1.10.2. Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or


Radiological Emergency.

C15.AP1.10.3. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (Rio


Declaration).

C15.AP1.10.4. Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of


Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (Busel Convention).

C15.AP1.10.5. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a


Transboundary Context.

C15.AP1.10.6. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of


Wastes and Other Materials (1972 London Convention).

C15.AP1.10.7. Applicable Status of Forces Agreement.

331 CHAPTER 15, APPENDIX 1


DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C16. CHAPTER 16
LOGISTICS SUPPORT

C16.1. GENERAL

The Military Service or Agency providing assistance or responding to a nuclear


weapon accident will fund costs initially incurred within existing funds. The Military
Service or Agency having possession of the nuclear weapon or nuclear weapon
components at the time of the accident is responsible for reimbursing, upon request,
the Military Service or Agency providing assistance or response. These costs are in
addition to normal operating expenses, and that are directly chargeable to, and caused
by, the incident/accident. DoDD 4000.25.1-M, "Military Standards Requisitioning
and Issue Procedure (MILSTRIP)," reference (ak) is used, as feasible, and
supplemented by local service contracts. The amount of logistics support depends
upon the location of the accident and the extent of contamination, if any. If an
accident results in extensive contamination, Crisis Management and Consequence
Management actions, including Site Remediation (SR) and recovery operations may
involve up to 2,500 people, extending to 6 months or longer to complete. Specific
accident needs may increase or decrease these requirements. As a minimum, billeting,
messing, and sanitation services will be provided.

C16.2. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This chapter provides guidance on logistics support matters peculiar to a nuclear


weapon accident. Included are discussions for establishing a project code, base camp
support, transportation, and some radiological support.

C16.3. SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

Commanders and logistics officers of forces responding to a nuclear weapon accident


should determine the availability of assets and facilities at, or near, the scene of the
accident and initiate actions to obtain support to satisfy the following requirements:

C16.3.1. Medical evacuation of acute casualties.

C16.3.2. Rapid transport (air or ground) from the airhead or the nearest military
installation during early stages of accident response.

332 CHAPTER 16
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C16.3.3. Airhead cargo support for air delivery of supplies to remote sites.

C16.3.4. Transportation.

C16.3.5. Messing and billeting facilities for response force personnel.

C16.3.6. Sufficient water, potable and/or non-potable, to support response force


personnel, equipment and personnel DECON stations, temporary fixation of
contamination by sprinkling, and leaching operations.

C16.3.7. Maintenance support.

C16.3.8. Sanitation facilities for response force personnel and news media.

C16.3.9. Heavy equipment for base camp construction and recovery/remediation


operations.

C16.3.10. POL.

C16.3.11. Packaging and shipping materials for weapons, components, and


contaminated waste.

C16.3.12. Electrical power.

C16.3.13. Personal protective and other specialized clothing (climate dependent).

C16.3.14. Laundry facilities for contaminated and uncontaminated clothing.

C16.3.15. Logistical support unique to the JIC/CIB (see Chapter 14, "Public
Affairs").

C16.3.16. Documentation of accident-related costs.

C16.4. RESOURCES

Response to a nuclear weapon accident is a high priority operation, and all required
resources from DoD, DOE, and other Federal Agencies with a radiological or disaster
response capability are normally available to the accident response forces. Use of
local facilities and equipment near the accident scene, such as National Guard armories
and vehicles, gymnasiums, and hotels, may be viable solutions to some of the logistic

333 CHAPTER 16
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

problems. Military installations near the accident site may provide a supply point,
messing, and billeting for response force personnel.

C16.4.1. Base Camp Support. If accident location dictates the establishment of a


base camp for response personnel, HARVEST EAGLE/HARVEST FALCON, a
mobile messing and billeting package maintained by the USAF, may be used. Details
on HARVEST EAGLE/HARVEST FALCON capabilities and request procedures are
in Appendix C16.AP1.

C16.4.2. Personnel Protective Clothing. Sources of personal protective clothing


are in Appendix C16.AP1.

C16.4.3. Contaminated Clothing Laundering Facilities. Commercial


contaminated clothing laundry facilities are available and can be identified with the
assistance of the DoD JNACC.

C16.4.4. General Services Administration Support. A GSA representative may


accompany FEMA personnel and can assist in obtaining telephone service, office and
other building spaces, and other administrative and support services.

C16.5. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

The importance of the logistics staff officer's involvement in the development of the
accident response plan from its conception cannot be overemphasized. It is a basic
responsibility to ensure that decontamination and remediation operations are
supportable. Base camp logistics support represents a rather routine situation and is
almost totally dependent on the number of personnel involved and the duration of the
operation.

C16.5.1. Planning. Planning is initiated to identify the location and availability


of items not organic to the response organization and that might be a limiting factor to
the response effort. Such items may include mylar for radiation instrument probe
faces, protective masks, mask filters, and anti-contamination clothing. The logistics
staff at the accident site should be tailored to support requirements, but as a minimum
should consist of the following:

C16.5.1.1. A materiel control officer.

C16.5.1.2. Three or four administrative supply personnel to maintain the


document register and submit requisitions.

334 CHAPTER 16
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C16.5.2. Project Code Generation. Immediately upon notification of a nuclear


weapon accident, the RTF logistics staff officer should request assignment of a JCS
project code from the Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocations Board, an Agency of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, through the CRTF, Joint Staff (JS), Military Service
Headquarters, or unified or specified command headquarters, as appropriate. Once
approved, all response-related requisitions should contain the JCS project code. For
processing purposes, requisitions with a JCS project code will be ranked above all
other requisitions with the same priority designator. Upon assignment of a JCS
project code, the Defense Logistics Agency will disseminate implementing instructions
to all concerned. The JCS project code request includes the following information:

C16.5.2.1. The type of project code required (always 9 Alpha Alpha).

C16.5.2.2. Project name.

C16.5.2.3. Service monitor or coordinator.

C16.5.2.4. Proposed effective date.

C16.5.2.5. Proposed termination.

C16.5.2.6. Force/activity designator.

C16.5.2.7. Brief narrative background on the nature of the requirement.

C16.5.2.8. Where available, units and forces using the project code should be
included.

C16.5.3. Installation Support. The logistics staff officer identifies military


installations nearest the accident site and establishes liaison to determine their support
capabilities. The installations should be alerted of potential support requirements. If
the nearest installation is not within 2 to 3 hours of driving distance, consideration
should be given to requesting helicopter support to assist in meeting urgent logistic
requirements during the early days of the accident response. Procedures for
submitting requisitions and picking up supplies from nearby military installations
should be established.

C16.5.4. Base Camp Establishment. The accident location determines if a base


camp is needed for feeding and billeting response force personnel, or if local facilities
can be used. Any military base within acceptable driving distance and available local

335 CHAPTER 16
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

facilities should be considered before establishing a base camp. If required,


HARVEST EAGLE and HARVEST FALCON kits may be requested from the USAF.
When establishing a base camp, water supply and sanitation facilities must be
considered. If a power generating facility is required, it should be positioned so that it
can provide power for both the base camp and operations center areas.

C16.5.5. Vehicular Support. A wide variety of vehicles, both in tonnage and


purpose, are required to support response operations. If operations continue more
than 30 days, equipment maintenance may become a major consideration. To keep
the number of maintenance personnel on site to a minimum, frequent rotation of
vehicles with the providing organization is recommended. As an alternative,
consideration may be given to replacing unit vehicles with rented or leased vans with
six- to nine-passenger and cargo carrying capacity when an off-road capability or
vehicle mounted radio is not a specific requirement. A sufficient supply of GSA or
Defense Energy Support Code (DESC) general use credit cards should be held or
readily available for refueling vehicles used in areas where Government fueling
facilities may not be available. Vehicles in contaminated areas should not be removed
for maintenance or returned to the owning organization until after they have been
decontaminated. Minor on-site maintenance of contaminated vehicles may, therefore,
be necessary. Base camp construction and/or SR may also require heavy equipment.
If resources are obtained through a contract, and work will be done in the
contaminated area, decontamination criteria and hazardous working conditions will be
addressed in the contract.

C16.5.6. Support for the Department of Energy. The DoD is responsible for
providing logistics support to DOE elements, upon request. DOE's logistics
requirements, including those of DOE's advance party, will be identified and
coordinated by the DOE Support Team Coordinator. The CRTF should be prepared
to provide logistics support in coordination with the SEO and the DOE Support Team
Coordinator.

C16.5.7. Local Service Contracts. Use of local service contracts to facilitate


logistics support is recommended for the following services:

C16.5.7.1. POL.

C16.5.7.2. Water.

C16.5.7.3. Sanitation.

C16.5.7.4. Maintenance.

336 CHAPTER 16
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C16.5.7.5. Laundry of noncontaminated clothes.

C16.5.7.6. Radiological waste.

C16.5.8. Contaminated Clothing Laundry Support. Decontaminating and


cleaning personal protective clothing is a critical requirement supporting accident
response operations. Additionally, it may be necessary for the response force to assist
in decontamination of area residents' clothing. The identification of commercial
laundry facilities that provide this service can be made through the DoD JNACC.

C16.5.9. Dissemination of Procedures. Provisions should be made to ensure that


all personnel or units responding to the accident are provided written information
describing procedures to follow in requesting logistical or administrative support.
This information should indicate clearly to whom requests should be submitted, and
the approval authority. The status of all requests should be monitored and any
problems encountered reported to the requesting person or organization.

C16.5.10. News Media and JIC/CIB Support. Advance planning should take into
account the possible billeting, messing, and transportation support for news media as
authorized by DoD and Service directives. The number of media personnel could
vary from a small number to hundreds depending upon the severity of the accident.
Close coordination is required with the PAO to determine specific requirements. The
JIC/CIB should be provided full logistical support including transportation, expendable
and non-expendable equipment, and supplies. Specific requirements will be
determined by the PAO.

C16.6. ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN ANNEX

The Logistic Support annex should provide procedures for establishing and
maintaining support for response force operations. This annex should include:

C16.6.1. Procedures for obtaining appropriate JCS and/or Service project codes.

C16.6.2. Procedures for establishing and supporting a base camp in remote areas.

C16.6.3. Procedures for establishing maintenance support or equipment rotation


during extended operations.

C16.6.4. Procedures for laundering contaminated clothing, including shipping, if


required.

337 CHAPTER 16
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C16.6.5. Sources of personal protective clothing.

C16.6.6. Procedures for delivery of requisitioned material to the accident site.

338 CHAPTER 16
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C16.AP1. APPENDIX 1 OF CHAPTER 16

LOGISTICS RESOURCES

C16.AP1.1. HARVEST EAGLE/HARVEST FALCON KITS

C16.AP1.1.1. HARVEST EAGLE and HARVEST FALCON kits are air


transportable operations support sets for supporting units that operate in remote
locations where pre-positioning is not politically or economically feasible. The kits
include tents, field kitchens, cots, and similar housekeeping items. Additional
equipment includes generators, NF2 "Lightalls," shower and laundry facilities, water
storage bladders, and water purification equipment. The kits do not include vehicles,
personal equipment items (such as parkas, bedding, or sleeping bags), or expendables
(such as food, fuel, or medical supplies). HARVEST EAGLE and HARVEST
FALCON kits are designated war reserve materiels and maintained in a
ready-to-deploy status in CONUS by the 4400 Mobility Support Flight, Robbins AFB,
GA. These kits are under the operational control of HQ Air Combat
Command/Logistics Plans (ACC/LGX).

C16.AP1.1.2. Each HARVEST EAGLE kit can support 550 people, whereas the
HARVEST FALCON kit can support 1,100 people. Each total kit can be transported
on 14 C-141B aircraft. Kits are configured in four separately deployable packages,
each designed to support 275 people. If HARVEST EAGLE or HARVEST FALCON
kits are required at an accident scene, the on-scene staff must make arrangements for
personnel to unpack and assemble the equipment, and to manage billeting space and
operate the field kitchens. Special teams, such as USAF Prime BEEF and RIB units
can be requested to provide additional support.

C16.AP1.1.3. HARVEST EAGLE and HARVEST FALCON kits are designated


war reserve material and are maintained by ACC, U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE),
and Pacific Air Forces (PACAF). Number of kits per command varies.

C16.AP1.2. PERSONNEL PROTECTIVE CLOTHING SOURCES

C16.AP1.2.1. Either permanent or disposable personal protective clothing is used


for nuclear accident response.

C16.AP1.2.2. Disposable Personal Protective Clothing. Sources for disposable


personal protective clothing are:

339 CHAPTER 16, APPENDIX 1


DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C16.AP1.2.2.1. DA Services, Inc., Defense Apparel


247 Addison Road
Windsor, CT 06095
Phone: 1-800-243-3847
Fax: (860) 688-5787
www.daway.com

C16.AP1.2.2.2. Lancs Industries, Inc.


12704 NE 124th Street
Kirkland, WA 98034
Phone: (425) 823-6634
Fax: (425) 820-6784

C16.AP1.2.2.3. Norvell
164 Edgewood Street
Alexandria, TN 37012
Phone: (615) 529-2855
Fax: (615) 529-2853

C16.AP1.2.2.4. RSO, Inc.


P.O. Box 1526
Laurel, MD 20725-1526
Phone: (301) 953-2482
Fax: (301) 498-3017
www.rsonic.com

C16.AP1.2.2.5. Vallen Safety Supplies


5551 Midway Parkplace, NE
Albuquerque, NM 87109
Phone: (505) 344-6631
Fax: (505) 344-0301
www.vallen.com

C16.AP1.2.2.6. FRHAM Safety Products, Inc.


P.O. Box 3491
Rock Hill, SC 29732
Phone: (803) 366-5131
Fax: (803) 366-2005
www.frhamsafety.com
AND

340 CHAPTER 16, APPENDIX 1


DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

P.O. Box 101177


Nashville, TN 37224
Phone: (615) 254-0841
Fax: (615) 726-2514

C16.AP1.2.27. Durafab Disposables, Inc.


P.O. Box 658
Cleburne, TX 76031
Phone: (800) 255-6401
www.k-caway.com

C16.AP1.2.3. Permanent Personnel Protective Clothing. NSN for permanent


personnel protective clothing are:

ITEM SIZE NSN

Coveralls, Radioactive Small/medium 8415-00-782-2815


Coveralls, Radioactive Large, extra large 8415-00-782-2816
Hood, Radioactive Contaminant 8415-00-782-2808
Hood, M6A2 4240-00-999-0420
Gloves, Cloth 8415-00-634-5026
Glove Shells, Radioactive 8 through 10 8415-00-782-281 through 8415-00-782-2814
Contaminant
Shoe Covers Small through extra 8430-01-712-2872 through
large 8430-01-721-2876
Overshoes, Combat Small 8430-01-048-6305

C16.AP1.3. CONTAMINATED CLOTHING LAUNDERING FACILITIES

Commercial contaminated clothing laundry facilities may be used at various locations


throughout the United States. The DoD JNACC assists in identifying any commercial
facilities near an accident site.

341 CHAPTER 16, APPENDIX 1


DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C17. CHAPTER 17
TRAINING

C17.1. GENERAL

The Services have the responsibility to ensure that accident response personnel are
efficiently trained. The management of nuclear weapon accident response depends on
the availability of well trained and skilled personnel. To achieve and maintain a
posture capable of responding well to a nuclear weapon accident, commanders of
designated response forces should ensure that their personnel have the knowledge and
training necessary to fulfill their responsibilities; therefore, designated CRTF and other
key personnel should attend appropriate courses offered by the DNWS and the
respective Services at the earliest opportunity.

C17.2. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This chapter informs senior staff planners and potential CRTFs about training courses
available in nuclear weapon accident response.

C17.3. ORGANIZATIONAL TRAINING

When organizational nuclear weapon accident response training exercises are


conducted, consideration should be given to inviting external organizations with which
the exercising unit would expect to interface in an actual accident, to observe or
participate in the exercise. These exercises can provide the basis for developing draft
recovery plans/portions of plans that are not accident specific. The JNACC is willing
to participate in organizational training, operational commitments permitting.

C17.4. TRAINING COURSES

C17.4.1. Defense Nuclear Weapons School. The DNWS at Kirtland AFB, NM,
offers a variety of courses designed to develop and maintain a nuclear weapon
emergency response capability. These courses are available to all Service personnel
and employees of the Federal Government whose positions require special skills and
knowledge in nuclear weapon emergency situations. A list of available courses at the
DNWS is in Table C17.T1.

342 CHAPTER 17
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C17.4.2. Service Schools. Specific course information for Service schools is


found in the following:

C17.4.2.1. DA Pamphlet 351-4, "USA Formal Schools Catalog."

C17.4.2.2. Catalog of Naval Training Courses (CANTRAC), Vol. SP11,


"Naval Education and Training (NAVEDTRA) 10500."

C17.4.2.3. AF Catalog 36-2223, "USAF Formal Schools Catalog."

C17.4.2.4. DoDD 5010.16, "Defense Management Education and Training


Program," July 28, 1972.

C17.4.3. The FEMA, National Emergency Training Center, Emmittsburg, MD,


offers the FRERP Workshop (Course E358).

C17.4.4. Specialized courses for medical response personnel.

C17.4.4.1. Handling of Radiation Accidents by Emergency Personnel. A 3


1/2-day course scheduled several times each year at the REAC/TS, Oak Ridge, TN.
This course emphasizes the practical aspects of handling a contaminated victim.

C17.4.4.2. Health Physics in Radiation Accidents. A 4 1/2-day course for


health physicists and radiation protection technologists who may be called upon to
respond to accidents involving radioactive materials and injury to personnel. Classes
are scheduled at the REAC/TS, Oak Ridge, TN.

C17.4.4.3. Medical Planning and Care in Radiation Accidents. This 4


1/2-day course presents an advanced level of information on the diagnosis and
treatment of acute local and total body radiation exposure, internal and external
contamination, combined injuries, and multi-casualty incidents involving ionizing
radiation. Classes are scheduled at the REAC/TS, Oak Ridge, TN.

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Table C17.T1. Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Training Courses


COURSE CONTENT DURATION

Radiological Accident Provides training in responsibilities; problem resolution involved in 4-1/2 days
Command, Control, and a radiological weapons accident
Coordination (RAC3) Course
Nuclear Weapons Technical Provides an overview of the nuclear weapons technical inspection 1 day
Inspection Course (NWTIC) process
Radiological Hazards Provides medical personnel training to be members of an 4 days
Training Course (RHTC) emergency response team and set up a CCS
Radiological Emergency Covers the scope of actions required to respond to a radiological 10 days
Team Operations accident as a radiological emergency team member, basic physics,
(RETOPS) Course accident/ incident history, and Federal response plans and
capabilities
Joint Nuclear Explosive Provides detailed sustainment training for officers and enlisted in 5 days
Ordnance Disposal Course nuclear EOD operations
(JNEODC)
Joint DoD/DOE Nuclear Provides an overview of safety, security, and control features 1-1/2 days
Surety Executive Course incorporated into stockpiled nuclear weapon systems
(JNSEC)
Nuclear Weapons Effects Basic familiarization in effects of nuclear weapons and information 1 day
Course (NWEC) found in numerous DoD publications
Commander and Staff Provides worldwide deployable mobile training to promote a 3 days
Radiological Accident fundamental understanding of complex radiological accident
Response (CASRAR) response issues and to involve/ integrate the Commander's staff
Workshop
Radiological Emergency To provide worldwide deployable mobile training tailored to specific 3 to 5 days
Team Orientation (RETOR) organization/installation radiological emergency response needs
Course
Medical Effects of Ionizing Provides medical personnel with background material relating to 4 days
Radiation (MEIR) Course human injury and combat effectiveness in a nuclear weapons
detonation or accident scenario

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PART III

SITE REMEDIATION GUIDANCE

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C18. CHAPTER 18
OVERVIEW OF THE SITE REMEDIATION PROCESS

C18.1. INTRODUCTION

SR is that phase of the radiological accident response that primarily deals with
remediation of the affected area. SR is closely integrated with other phases of
accident response (Figure C18.F1.). Many of the response teams that arrive early on
to support the emergency response and recovery phases will remain at the accident site
in some capacity to support SR. Remediation actions at the site may begin as early as
the initial response phase and last for years after the radiological material is
recovered. Ideally, the work of SR begins when response organizations develop plans
to integrate their forces with other Federal, State, and local response organizations at
an accident site.

Figure C18.F1. Nuclear Accident Response Phases

C18.2. THE SITE REMEDIATION PROCESS

SR can be viewed in five steps: planning, site characterization, conducting


intermediate actions, developing a long-term plan, and implementing the plan. Figure
C18.F2. illustrates these steps and their key actions. In actuality, the SR process is

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ongoing. Many actions overlap from one step to the next as response forces address
the difficult problem of remediating contaminated land, buildings, and property to
agreed upon safe levels. By understanding the key actions required in each step,
primary response organizations can refine their plans and organizational structures to
meet the demanding tasks of SR.

C18.2.1. Develop Plans and Procedures. The overall purpose of Part III is to
assist the CRTF and supporting organizations in developing and refining SR plans and
procedures. The five-step process described below was developed by SR experts in
an attempt to identify key actions that must be accomplished during the SR effort.

C18.2.2. Conduct Site Characterization. The key actions identified in this step
are highly technical in nature, but a comprehensive and complete characterization of
the problem is necessary to an effective SR effort. Current Service and DOE guidance
addresses this step in detail.

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Figure C18.F2. The Site Remediation Process

C18.2.3. Initiate Intermediate Actions. Intermediate actions are discussed in


detail in Chapter 20. Planners must recognize that some SR actions will begin very
soon after the accident, before the full SR effort has begun. Events in this step may
take days or weeks to complete and have a significant impact on the final SR plan.
During this step, the SRWG is formally established.

C18.2.4. Develop Long-Term Plan. Once the radiological material and classified
components have been removed from the accident site, developing the SR plan
becomes the primary goal of the CRTF and other supporting organizations responding
to the accident. This step will involve extensive coordination and approval at all
levels before a final plan evolves. While a budget should be developed, the cost of

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remediation should not be the driving factor in developing a plan. Realize that it may
take months, or perhaps years, to complete.

C18.2.5. Implement Plan. Once all plans have been approved, various elements
will implement the plan, monitored by an LFA representative and the State and local
government. Members of the SRWG continue to provide advice and assistance to the
LFA and State during this period.

C18.3. ROLE OF THE CRTF

C18.3.1. Upon arrival at the accident scene, the CRTF faces the challenge of
integrating forces from diverse Federal and Service accident response organizations to
recover the radiological material, ensure the safety of all personnel in the area, and
remove the material and all classified components as quickly and safely as possible.
At the same time, the CRTF must work closely with Federal, State, and local officials
to ensure public health and safety issues are adequately addressed. At times, these
priorities may appear to be in conflict, but public health and safety concerns are always
paramount. Recognizing the role of State and local authorities and the importance of
public involvement throughout the SR process is vital to a successful SR effort.

C18.3.2. The State or local governments have the primary responsibility for
planning the recovery of the affected area. Recovery planning will be initiated at the
request of the States. The Federal Government will, on request, assist the State and
local government in developing off-site recovery plans prior to the deactivation of the
Federal response.

C18.3.3. Regardless of where the accident occurs, the CRTF plays a key role in
ensuring that DoD fulfills its responsibilities in accident site recovery and cleanup.
This role varies somewhat depending on the location of the accident. The CRTF
always maintains primary responsibility for recovery and removal of material and
classified components. Once accomplished, the focus is on the SRWG in the
development of an SR plan. If the accident occurs on a military installation or on
Federal property, the CRTF takes the lead in SR activities and cleanup with a major
responsibility for coordination with other Federal, State, and local authorities. If the
accident occurs off an installation or Federal property with DoD in possession, then
DoD assumes the role of the LFA. In this case, the CRTF retains a major role in
development of the SR plan by the SRWG and in supporting State and local authorities
who will direct the SR effort.

C18.3.4. Coordination with all supporting organizations is critical. Support from

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other Federal Agencies responding to the accident is coordinated through the DFO,
chaired by FEMA. In addition, the State will probably deploy a forward element of
its emergency management division to the accident site. This organization, which
normally works directly for the Governor, will take the lead in remediation of affected
State property. Coordination with local jurisdictions that may be affected is essential
throughout the process.

C18.3.5. The CRTF's role in directing and coordinating SR activities changes as


the activities at the accident scene progress from initial recovery operations to
intermediate and long-term activities. Chapter 19 discusses more fully the role of the
CRTF, responding organizations represented in the SRWG and the overall SR process.

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C19. CHAPTER 19
ACCIDENT SCENE RESPONSE

C19.1. INTRODUCTION

C19.1.1. In the area of SR, the challenge for the CRTF is to form a cohesive and
effective organization at the accident scene that can address the wide variety of SR
issues in support of State and local governments. The expertise to accomplish this
task comes from separate and distinct organizations that respond to the accident. The
CRTF must integrate Federal, State, and local resources in order to achieve the goal of
remediation to a level that is technically and fiscally achievable within socially and
politically acceptable guidelines. The primary organization for coordinating Federal
resources, when DoD is the LFA, is the SRWG.

C19.1.2. The SRWG is an organization formed at the accident scene whose sole
purpose is to focus on SR issues. The SRWG draws upon the expertise of the various
elements who respond to the accident to form a coordinated SR team. Membership in
the SRWG will vary, depending on the extent of contamination at the accident scene.
SRWG members should have the requisite qualifications and level of authority to plan
and coordinate SR activities on behalf of their organizations.

C19.1.3. The timing for forming the SRWG is unique to the specific conditions of
the accident. Most of the agencies, organizations, and groups that eventually have
representation on the SRWG are present from the early stages of accident response.
An informal SRWG could form even as weapon recovery operations are ongoing;
however, the expectation is that the SRWG, as a formal, authoritative and responsible
organization, will be convened after weapons are removed, classified components and
documents are recovered, but prior to the deactivation of the Federal response. The
SRWG will remain active after deactivation, if continued support to State and local
governments is requested.

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C19.2. EARLY SITE REMEDIATION EFFORTS

C19.2.1. Early efforts addressing SR are likely to be less formal as the CRTF
concentrates on the successful recovery and removal of the nuclear weapons. At this
stage, small numbers of people are working separately on issues related to SR.
Elements of the SRWG exist in an informal relationship that is coordinated by the
CRTF. Figure C19.F1. illustrates this relationship. During this stage, the CRTF is
responsible for coordination and communication among key SR elements.

Figure C19.F1. Site Remediation: Early Stages

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C19.2.2. These separate elements will begin the process of SR. Some
preliminary planning within the JHEC is possible as contamination and damage
information becomes available. The JHEC is the CRTF's single control point for all
on-site hazard/radiological data and has access to off-site information through
coordination with the FRMAC.

C19.2.3. The FRMAC, employing DOE assets other than those supporting the
RTF, conducts off-site response to a radiological accident as directed by DOE during
the emergency phase, with subsequent transfer to the appropriate lead agent for
intermediate and long-term actions. It provides information and support to the State
and the CRTF as well as the JHEC in the development of the SR plan. The Director
of the FRMAC will assign a representative to the SRWG.

C19.2.4. FEMA, in accordance with the FRERP, forms the DFO to coordinate
Federal, State, and local agencies' assistance to the CRTF for off-site accident response
functions other than radiological monitoring and assessment. It will continue
operations into the remediation phase. The SFO, Director of the DFO, has a major
coordinating function as the CRTF's official liaison with State, local, and public
representatives at the site.

C19.2.5. The State will establish a forward operations center at the accident scene
to maintain close coordination with the CRTF and Governor's office. State and local
representatives will also participate in the DFO and FRMAC. State and local
representatives must be included in early stages of SR planning and throughout
development and implementation of the long-term plan.

C19.3. REMEDIATION PHASE: THE SRWG

C19.3.1. As weapon recovery operations wind down, the focus of activity shifts
to SR. Using guidance from Federal, State, and local authorities, the SRWG becomes
the central planning agent for SR and begins the SR activities described in detail in the
following chapters. In accomplishing this, the SRWG will be constantly reaching out
to organizations at the accident site (Figure C19.F2.) as well as to those in a position of
authority to gather information, make decisions, and affect SR activities.

C19.3.2. The SRWG is expected to be a dynamic organization with a varied


composition. Leadership will depend on many factors, such as time elapsed since the
accident, scope of the remediation problem, location of remediation activity, and the
desires of the State. The SRWG may be directed by the LFA or the State. Figure

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C19.F2. illustrates how the SRWG interacts with other elements in the SR process.
While the SRWG includes important representation by State and local interests,
assistance and advice from several Federal Agencies, coordinated through the DFO
and FRMAC, may be needed to solve specialized problems, for example:

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) - crop damage


Department of the Interior (DOI) - Federal lands
Department of Commerce (DOC) - industrial damage
Department of Transportation (DOT) - highway, railway closures
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) - housing assistance
Health and Human Services (HHS) - medical services
- Food and Drug Administration (FDA) - food contamination
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) - public health concerns
General Services Administration (GSA) - contracting assistance
Corps of Engineers (CE) - water supply
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) - non-radiological impact
Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI) - cleanup cost estimates

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Figure C19.F2. Remediation Phase Relationships

C19.3.3. The SRWG should apply a similar coordination process to take full
advantage of State and local assets, as well as additional DoD and DOE resources, that
may be available.

C19.3.4. Using this coordinated approach, the SRWG's role is to make


recommendations, monitor implementation of approved intermediate actions and their
impact on long-term recovery and begin long-term SR planning. During the SR phase
of accident response, the SRWG will coordinate with a variety of sources both at the
accident site and at other locations. Members have the responsibility to coordinate
long-term remediation plans at higher levels but should have the expertise necessary to
advise accident site authorities on immediate remediation actions. Figure C19.F3.
illustrates the complicated process of drafting, approving, and implementing an SR

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plan using the SRWG as the central planning organization. Representing interests of
the Federal, State, and local governments and the public, SRWG members must have
the authority to make some independent decisions when time does not permit
coordination and approval at higher levels. This is especially true where intermediate
actions are concerned.

Figure C19.F3. SRWG Approval and Coordination Process

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C19.4. EVOLUTION OF THE SRWG

The SRWG will expand and contract with changing conditions at the accident scene.
As recovery operations are completed, the SRWG may absorb some cells from other
response organizations, or the SRWG Director may decide to keep those elements
separate and use the SRWG as a final coordination and approval group. Membership,
size, and location of the SRWG are flexible and dynamic. Coordination and approval
of the long-term plan may take an extended period of time and concentrated effort,
requiring a substantial SRWG membership. Once the plan is agreed upon, the
SRWG's role should become that of monitor and advisor. Members will likely return
to their normal responsibilities, meeting on an ad hoc basis to address issues that arise
in implementing the plan.

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C20. CHAPTER 20
INTERMEDIATE ACTIONS

C20.1. INTERMEDIATE ACTIONS

C20.1.1. Step 3 in the SR Process is to initiate intermediate actions. Intermediate


actions are those steps taken to achieve three principal goals: protect public health
and environment, restore essential services, and develop the basis for a long-term
plan. Some intermediate actions will occur very early in the accident response, before
the formation of the SRWG. The CRTF should consider these factors:

C20.1.1.1. Intermediate actions will have an impact on future SR decisions.

C20.1.1.2. There is a need for visible and immediate SR actions that will
require rapid State and Federal approval.

C20.1.1.3. Remediation decisions at this early stage will be influenced by


political and social factors as well as technical goals and limitations.

C20.1.1.4. While authority for remediation decisions could rest with the
State/local representatives, responsibility for remediation costs and damages is
expected to remain with DoD.

C20.1.1.5. Priorities of Federal, State, and local authorities and special


interest groups may differ.

C20.1.1.6. Intermediate actions will vary depending on the circumstances


surrounding the accident.

C20.1.2. The CRTF must weigh each of these factors, in coordination with other
Federal, State, and local authorities, in deciding which intermediate actions to take.

C20.2. IMPORTANCE OF INTERMEDIATE ACTIONS

C20.2.1. Perhaps the most important objective of intermediate actions is to


demonstrate to the community and public officials that steps are being taken to restore
their pre-accident quality of life as soon as possible; however, this should only be done
within the parameters of public health and safety.

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C20.2.2. Initially, SR planners should develop a process or structure which, to the


extent possible, permits the eventual return to normalcy for the affected area.
Including public participation in the development of this process allows the people to
have their questions answered and gains public confidence in the SR plan that will
emerge.

C20.2.3. Intermediate actions should concentrate on those problems that are most
important or can be accomplished quickly and easily. For example:

C20.2.3.1. Reopen transportation arteries that may have been closed (i.e.,
highways, bridges, railways, and airports).

C20.2.3.2. Minimize health and safety threats. Attempt to certify as safe


from contamination any affected water and food sources; otherwise, ensure the rapid
and plentiful supply of food and water from alternate sources.

C20.2.3.3. Identify remediation means and materials that are already present
among Federal, State, local, and private/commercial resources. Knowledge of what is
available may reduce response time and cost.

C20.2.3.4. Address the short-term economic impact on the area and people.
Confer with FEMA as to relief alternatives available such as disaster declaration or
Federal assistance from other sources that can provide immediate assistance.

C20.2.4. Effective intermediate actions such as these, properly coordinated and


communicated to the public, can be instrumental in building public trust and
confidence in the remediation effort.

C20.3. INTERMEDIATE ACTION PLANNING

C20.3.1. The typical intermediate actions identified in this section are not meant
to be exhaustive. These were identified as areas of emphasis all planners should
consider in developing organizational site remediation plans.

C20.3.2. Protecting public health and safety is the most important consideration
when site remediation becomes the focus of attention. Earlier steps taken by accident
response forces should be reviewed for adequacy and applicability for the present and
future, including:

C20.3.2.1. Public service announcements (PSAs) on television and radio

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explaining what is happening, how to find shelter/protection, and/or what type of


materials to use.

C20.3.2.2. Control of transportation arteries in the affected area.

C20.3.2.3. Application of appropriate fixatives.

C20.3.2.4. Testing water sources.

C20.3.2.5. Testing air and soil for contamination.

C20.3.2.6. Controlled evacuation of affected population.

C20.3.2.7. Controlled access to contaminated areas.

C20.3.2.8. Certification of contamination-free areas and resources.

C20.3.3. As long as contamination exists, there is a possibility that people may


receive an uptake of radioactive material or an external radiation exposure. It is likely
that as SR is initiated, limited DECON will have been accomplished. As a result,
protective action should be taken to minimize radioactive material uptake via ingestive
pathway methods. Some that should be considered are:

C20.3.3.1. Develop PSAs on proper handling of food, both fresh and


packaged.

C20.3.3.2. Monitor food and water sources.

C20.3.3.3. Embargo foods from contaminated lands and water sources.

C20.3.3.4. Seek alternate food sources.

C20.3.3.5. Establish examining stations for followup monitoring.

C20.3.3.6. Establish a bioassay program.

C20.3.3.7. Implement inspection program for restaurants along with food


production and handling businesses.

C20.3.4. There is little doubt that feared or actual radiation damage to the
environment will dominate public, political, and media discussions, second only to
concerns for public health and safety. SR managers must be prepared to demonstrate

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that the actions being taken are necessary and environmentally sound. Plans should
consider:

C20.3.4.1. Test soil for contamination.

C20.3.4.2. Apply fixatives, as appropriate.

C20.3.4.3. Conduct air sampling.

C20.3.4.4. Analyze contamination level of rivers, lakes, and streams.

C20.3.4.5. Minimize threat to fish and wildlife by removing contamination


from their respective habitats.

C20.3.4.6. Identify temporary and safe storage areas for waste.

C20.3.5. Among the earliest questions will be those concerning a return to


normalcy. Remediation of services should be a priority for SR planners. The plan
should consider actions necessary to restore:

C20.3.5.1. Water supply.

C20.3.5.2. Electricity.

C20.3.5.3. Highways.

C20.3.5.4. Heating fuels.

C20.3.5.5. Gasoline.

C20.3.5.6. Refuse pickup.

C20.3.5.7. Mail delivery.

C20.3.5.8. Sewage treatment.

C20.3.5.9. Sanitation.

C20.3.5.10. Health care.

C20.3.5.11. Transportation systems.

C20.3.6. The largest and most complicated challenge, after weapon recovery, is

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the containment of contamination. There are many avenues by which contamination


can be spread. Consideration should be given to the following:

C20.3.6.1. Limit access, ground and air.

C20.3.6.2. PSA to stay inside when/if threat exists.

C20.3.6.3. Apply fixatives.

C20.3.6.4. Restrict water distribution.

C20.3.6.5. Movement of birds and animals.

C20.3.7. Re-entry to contaminated areas by residents to care for pets, obtain


essential items, or secure property may be possible on a limited basis. Careful
consideration should be given to the potential difficulties that may arise. Security
personnel should:

C20.3.7.1. Determine circumstances under which residents can return


temporarily.

C20.3.7.2. Verify that contamination levels are not hazardous.

C20.3.7.3. Evaluate the impact of not allowing access to residents.

C20.3.7.4. Maintain adequate security.

C20.3.7.5. Limit exposure time.

C20.3.7.6. Have adequate decontamination facilities.

C20.3.7.7. Provide proper protective clothing for limited entry, when


required.

C20.3.7.8. Allow only a manageable number of people into the area.

C20.3.7.9. Caution residents against disturbing the area.

C20.3.8. Consider the public impact of early SR actions. This may be the
beginning of a protracted period of inconveniences that will be imposed upon the
population. Carefully evaluate planned actions and:

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C20.3.8.1. Keep the public informed: dispel rumors and inaccuracies


immediately.

C20.3.8.2. Involve public officials and residents in planning.

C20.3.8.3. Explain hazards and how to avoid them.

C20.3.8.4. Provide health and medical services for affected individuals.

C20.3.8.5. Control the number of visible response personnel, if operationally


possible.

C20.3.9. Realize that, in a highly visible operation like SR, political oversight is
to be expected. Do not fail to include political considerations in decision making.
Strongly recommend:

C20.3.9.1. The establishment of a political liaison office.

C20.3.9.2. Inviting participation or observation by representatives of Federal,


State, and local political officials, when operationally possible.

C20.3.9.3. Seeking input from public interest and environmental groups.

C20.3.10. Cost benefit considerations should be a factor, albeit perhaps minor, in


any operation as expensive as SR is expected to be. While return of the affected area
to its original state may be the desire of residents, the cost of that last marginal
improvement could be prohibitive. Recognize that:

C20.3.10.1. Costs may be difficult to assess in the short and intermediate


terms.

C20.3.10.2. ''Level of risk'' rather than ''cleanup level'' is the preferred


benchmark/goal.

C20.3.11. Unless the accident site is in an isolated location, it is likely there will
be at least a short-term economic impact on residents. Depending on location, the
CRTF may have to address such issues as:

C20.3.11.1. Agricultural losses.

C20.3.11.2. Pressing for disaster area designation for Federal relief.

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C20.3.11.3. Loss of work by residents.

C20.3.11.4. An impact on tourism.

C20.3.12. The pre-accident usage of the affected area will dictate (to some
extent) the site remediation priorities to be set and methods to be used. Residential,
commercial, industrial, agricultural, forested - each requires a unique remediation plan.

C20.3.12.1. Contamination of two or more types of areas complicates SR.

C20.3.12.2. Prioritize for best use of remediation efforts and resources.

C20.3.12.3. The proposed remediation action may necessitate a long-term


change from prior usage.

C20.3.12.4. Timeframe for returning the area to near normal usage varies by
affected area.

C20.3.13. Any Intermediate Action plan should also examine the impact on
long-term SR. Questions to be addressed include:

C20.3.13.1. Will this step have to be reversed? At what cost, financially or


in good will?

C20.3.13.2. Can the action increase size of contaminated area?

C20.3.13.3. What are the potential long-term political and social


considerations?

C20.3.14. Remember the goals of intermediate actions: protect public health and
environment, restore essential services, and develop the basis for a long-term plan.
Intermediate actions are the start of an effective SR effort. They should be considered
by the CRTF from the onset.

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C21. CHAPTER 21
LONG-TERM ACTIONS

C21.1. LONG-TERM ACTIONS

C21.1.1. Long-term actions are those steps taken to achieve ultimate remediation
of the affected area to an agreed acceptable level as determined by all concerned. The
major goals of this step are to:

C21.1.1.1. Protect the public health and environment (long term).

C21.1.1.2. Restore the affected area to a level that is technically and fiscally
achievable within socially and politically acceptable guidelines.

C21.1.2. The method of achieving these goals will be detailed in the final SR plan
developed by the SRWG. During this step of the process, there is a gradual shift away
from accident scene-oriented activities and intermediate actions to long-term
planning. During this step, the SRWG membership tackles the difficult process of
completing a plan of action that will gain Government and public approval. Figure
C21.F1. denotes the shift in responsibility from the accident scene to higher level
Federal and State organizations during this step.

Figure C21.F1. Notional Site Remediation Plan and Approval Process

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C21.2. CHANGING ROLES AND RELATIONSHIPS

C21.2.1. The SRWG continues to play a major role in developing the SR plan;
however, as the focus of activity shifts to long-term planning, the roles and
relationships of organizations supporting the SRWG will change. While
circumstances will dictate the precise changes, planners should anticipate the following:

C21.2.1.1. The CRTF's role will diminish as a leader in the SR effort. DoD
will likely retain the role of LFA, but the CRTF will become more of a coordinator.
His deputy or designated representative may assume the lead role for DoD in the
SRWG. As the preliminary plan is submitted and the lengthy process of approval
begins, expect DoD to assign a Remedial Project Manager (RPM) to replace the CRTF
in this role.

C21.2.1.2. State and local officials will assume more authority for
coordinating the SRWG and developing the final remediation plans. Federal response
organizations will continue their supporting roles.

C21.2.1.3. Proposed SR actions will get greater public scrutiny. There will
be increased public and political influence on the decision-making process.

C21.2.1.4. Initiating actions will be more complicated, requiring approval at


more levels of Government before any SR activity begins.

C21.2.1.5. The Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee


(FRPCC) will likely assume the role of coordinating national-level approval of the
long-term plan.

C21.2.2. Regardless of the changing roles and relationships, the SRWG remains
as the central planning organization for SR. During this phase, the SRWG will
consider many of the typical long-term actions identified below.

C21.3. PLANNING FOR LONG-TERM ACTIONS

C21.3.1. Long-term SR actions are similar in many respects to those carried out
in the intermediate action phase. A high level of public involvement can be expected
as SR transitions to a long-term program. The CRTF/RPM and staff should be
prepared to respond accordingly and consider the following areas when addressing
long-term actions:

366 CHAPTER 21
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C21.3.1.1. Environmental groups will be closely monitoring the actions


proposed and taken.

C21.3.1.2. Citizens committees may form to influence plan development and


ensure compliance.

C21.3.1.3. Congressional interest will be extensive throughout the process.

C21.3.1.4. Legal officers should be prepared to respond to expected lawsuits.

C21.3.1.5. Business representatives may be pushing for expeditious


resolution of complications affecting commercial enterprises.

C21.3.1.6. Public presentations/press releases/press briefings/press


interviews or newsletters should be considered as a means to keep the public informed.

C21.3.2. Establishing cleanup criteria may be a long process as various interests


propose their own preferred standards. SR planners emphasize that preliminary plans
should be based on a health risk assessment analysis rather than cleanup levels.
Achieving consensus among those directly involved may be the greatest task facing the
remediation authorities. Ultimately, the standard must be developed in consultation
with officials at Federal, State, and local levels. It is suggested that:

C21.3.2.1. It first be determined what has to be cleaned up.

C21.3.2.2. Decontamination steps to reach the agreed levels be determined.

C21.3.2.3. The standard, the bases of the standard, and how to reach it be
clearly stated and explained during the approval process.

C21.3.3. Waste disposal may be a monumental challenge due to the variables of a


nuclear weapon accident. Planners must:

C21.3.3.1. Determine the type of material to be removed (i.e., water, soil,


sand, stone, rock, and trees).

C21.3.3.2. Determine the level of contamination in the waste material.

C21.3.3.3. Determine the quantity of contaminated materials and waste to be


removed.

367 CHAPTER 21
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C21.3.3.4. Determine where radioactive waste will go for processing and/or


disposal.

C21.3.3.5. Consider on-site disposal.

C21.3.3.6. Locate appropriate shipping containers - determine size and


composition.

C21.3.3.7. Select the type or types of transportation: air, rail, highway, or


water.

C21.3.3.8. Identify the best route, depending on means of transportation.

C21.3.3.9. Maintain coordination between CRTF/RPM, SFO, and civilian


authorities.

C21.3.3.10. Obtain needed approvals.

C21.3.4. Potentially, health risks exist until the last container of waste is
removed, so health concerns must remain a major part of the remediation program.
Basically, it is a continuation of the program established as an intermediate action and
includes, but is not limited to:

C21.3.4.1. An effective contamination monitoring program.

C21.3.4.2. Maintenance of security around the contaminated area.

C21.3.4.3. Continued bioassay programs.

C21.3.4.4. Monitoring of food sources, packaging, and handling.

C21.3.5. Medical tracking of people actually or potentially contaminated is a


responsibility of DoD. Planners should address:

C21.3.5.1. Monitoring of bioassay program results for remediation workers


and the public.

C21.3.5.2. Extended followup monitoring of exposed individuals.

C21.3.5.3. Source of medical personnel.

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DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C21.3.5.4. Determining how long to track.

C21.3.5.5. Computerization of program for ease of monitoring.

C21.3.6. The economic impact of remediation activities needs to be considered to


the maximum extent possible. For example:

C21.3.6.1. Legal ramifications, i.e., lawsuits, challenges to authority to


perform tasks.

C21.3.6.2. Federal disaster assistance: amount, source, and disbursement.

C21.3.6.3. Will the restrictions within the contaminated area result in a loss
of jobs, temporarily or permanently?

C21.3.6.4. Apprehensive citizenry: will they move away, lowering the


economic viability of the area?

C21.3.6.5. If a tourist attraction, what actions are needed to dispel negative


public perceptions?

C21.3.7. It is not enough simply to design a long-term remediation program of


actions that will return the affected area to agreed conditions; a long-term monitoring
plan to ensure goals are being reached must be included. Suggested steps:

C21.3.7.1. Develop and gain approval of the monitoring plan along with the
overall program.

C21.3.7.2. Make regular reports to public; keeping them informed precludes


many problems.

C21.3.7.3. Computerize the process.

C21.3.8. Environmental consequences of any action, planned or accidental, have


to be at or near the top of the long-term remediation program.

C21.3.8.1. Consider the impact of a Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study


(RI/FS).

C21.3.8.2. Bring environmental interest groups into the planning process


early.

369 CHAPTER 21
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C21.3.8.3. Expect to receive legal challenges over any or all actions affecting
the environment.

C21.3.9. Remediation of the area is a highly visible undertaking that will be


praised and criticized. Avoid being affected by either extreme and maintain focus on
the goal by keeping in mind that:

C21.3.9.1. Supporting State and local decisions, if possible, makes the job
easier.

C21.3.9.2. Reaching consensus on what is technically achievable while being


socially and politically acceptable will be a considerable challenge.

C21.3.9.3. While a budget should be developed, the cost of remediation


actions should not be the driving factor in developing a remediation plan. It should be
understood though, that ignorance, fear, and exaggeration of the risks can drive the
cleanup costs to enormous extremes. Therefore, the agreed upon cleanup goals and
their bases must be realistic, clear, concise, and well published.

C21.4. THE APPROVAL PROCESS

C21.4.1. This guidance has emphasized the concept of coordination and


communication among all SR participants throughout the planning and remediation
process. Final approval of the SR plan may be a lengthy and complicated process
requiring coordination with multiple levels of government and extensive public
involvement. Figure C21.F2. summarizes this process.

370 CHAPTER 21
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

Figure C21.F2. Steps in the Approval Process

C21.4.2. Under the direction of the lead agency, the SRWG performs a remedial
PA. State, Federal, and local authorities will provide an initial review that paves the
way for a remedial SI, which builds upon the information collected in the remedial
PA. This environmental study solicits formal public comment on the remediation
plan; however, site remediation planners emphasize that any plan that overlooks public
comment throughout the process is flawed. After the SI, the RI/FS is conducted. The
purpose of the RI is to collect data necessary to adequately characterize the site for the
purpose of developing and evaluating effective remedial alternatives. The FS is to
ensure that appropriate remedial alternatives are developed and evaluated such that
relevant information concerning the remedial action options can be presented to a
decision maker and an appropriate remedy selected. Final remediation goals will then
be determined. Planners should not wait until the RI/FS to incorporate public views
and concerns. The SRWG will consider all comments on the plan, revise accordingly,
and submit a final plan for approval. The site remediation plan will ultimately be
approved by the Governor of the State involved and by the Federal Government. The
mechanism for accomplishing this approval on the Federal side is not completely clear;
however, the FRPCC is expected to coordinate Federal approval of the plan at the
national level.

371 CHAPTER 21
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

PART IV

SPECIALIZED ASSETS AND POINTS OF


CONTACT

372 PART IV
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C22. CHAPTER 22
SUMMARY OF SPECIALIZED CAPABILITIES

C22.1. GENERAL

Numerous units and organizations with specialized capabilities are discussed


throughout this manual. This chapter summarizes these units and organizations and
the capability or service they offer. The CRTF has at hand, for weapon recovery,
removal, and contamination containment, the assets of numerous DoD and DOE
accident response organizations. From these, the CRTF identifies personnel and
equipment that will contribute to the planning and execution of a successful response
through SR.

C22.2. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This chapter provides a ready reference to units and organizations that maintain
specialized capabilities. Each unit or organization is organized by title, specialized
capability, or service.

C22.3. UTILIZATION

A summary of the capabilities of organizations and specialized units is provided.


Appendix C22.AP1. provides telephone numbers for requesting services, or additional
information on organizational or specialized unit capabilities discussed in this
document.

C22.4. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DoD will be named the LFA if the emergency involves one of its facilities or any
nuclear weapon in which it has responsibility/custody. Required resources will vary
to some extent depending on the contamination problem (e.g., urban/rural, land/water,
and agricultural/industrial) and DECON method(s) selected. Federal, State, and local
government agencies, along with commercial enterprises, can be expected to provide
either the specific resources or the funding by which the necessary assets can be
acquired. A JHEC will be established to oversee the on-site radiological data

373 CHAPTER 22
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

collection and assessment efforts and exchange data with the FRMAC. Within the
JHEC is a high level of knowledge of the contamination problem both on and off site
and how best to employ the technical resources available.

C22.4.1. Joint Chiefs of Staff-Controlled Assets

C22.4.1.1. Joint Communications Contingency Station Assets (JCCSA).


JCCSA is a communications asset consisting of heavy mobile/transportable equipment
deployable by C-141/C-5 aircraft.

C22.4.1.2. Joint Communications Support Element. The JCSE is a


contingency support unit consisting of USA, USAF, and USMC personnel and a
variety of communications equipment. A part of this equipment, the AN/URC
JACC/CP, consists of several pieces of equipment mounted in air transportable vans.

C22.4.1.3. Defense Threat Reduction Agency. DTRA runs the DoD portion
of the JNACC at its Alexandria, VA, Telegraph Road facility. HPAC development
support is located here as well as the CMAT (formally, the DNAT). The CMAT is an
established and trained specialized team of senior advisors deployed to assist the
CRTF and his staff in the management of recovery operations through the SR phase
following a nuclear weapon accident. A part of the CMAT capability is the AFRRI's
MRAT. This team can assist medical personnel and commanders by providing
state-of-the-art medical radiobiology advice by telephone or at the accident scene.
DTRA's HPAC is a forward deployable modeling capability to accurately predict the
effects of HAZMAT releases into the atmosphere and its impact on populations. Also
available throughout the response phase will be one or more of the Service-sponsored
radiological and health physics units: AFRAT, RAMT, and the RADCON Team.
Release of these teams during SR, particularly those not of the Service that owns the
weapon(s), is likely, provided their radiological expertise is replaced by civilian health
organizations with similar capabilities. Regular monitoring of remediation personnel
and area residents for exposure to contaminated materials must continue.

C22.4.1.4. Other Joint Chiefs of Staff-Controlled Communication Assets.


SHF satellite terminals, GMF terminals, and other communications assets can also be
deployed on request.

C22.4.2. U.S. Air Force

C22.4.2.1. HARVEST EAGLE and HARVEST FALCON Kits. HARVEST


EAGLE and HARVEST FALCON kits consist of air transportable operations support
sets with tents, field kitchens, collapsible cots, and other housekeeping items. Each

374 CHAPTER 22
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

HARVEST EAGLE kit can support 550 people and each HARVEST FALCON kit can
support 1,100 people. Each can be transported on 14 C-141B aircraft. If kits are
required at an accident scene, the on-scene staff must make arrangements for personnel
to unpack and assemble the equipment, and to manage billeting space and operate the
field kitchens. Special teams, such as USAF PRIME BEEF and PRIME RIB units can
be requested to provide additional support.

C22.4.2.2. Institute of Environmental, Safety, and Occupational Health Risk


Analysis. This organization has a deployable team of health physicists, health physics
technicians, and equipment, collectively called the AFRAT. AFRAT provides
assistance in radiological health matters.

C22.4.2.3. HAMMER ACE. HAMMER ACE is a rapidly deployable team


equipped with commercial off-the-shelf technology communications equipment. See
Chapter 13 for further discussion.

C22.4.3. U.S. Army

C22.4.3.1. Radiological Advisory Medical Team. This team will provide


radiological health hazard guidance to the CRTF, other officials, and local medical
authorities.

C22.4.3.2. Radiological Control Team. This team was established to


provide technical assistance and advice to the CRTF in all kinds of radiological
emergencies. Assets include an air transportable mobile radiological laboratory and
various types of air and field monitoring equipment.

C22.5. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

DOE responds to a nuclear weapon accident with multiple capabilities that are
available to the CRTF. Coordination of these resources will be through existing DoD
and DOE channels. Like the DoD assets, a number of DOE's response resources
certainly will remain for SR.

C22.5.1. Department of Energy Accident Response Teams. Requests for these


services should be coordinated with the SEO.

C22.5.1.1. Accident Response Group. The ARG is DOE's primary technical


response element for a nuclear weapons accident. ARG is comprised of technical and
scientific experts, with specialized equipment, composed of a cadre of senior scientific

375 CHAPTER 22
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

advisors, weapons engineers and technicians, experts in nuclear safety and HE safety,
health physicists, radiation control technicians, industrial hygienists, physical
scientists, packaging and transportation specialists, and other specialists from the DOE
weapons complex. The ARG maintains a technically capable staff knowledgeable of
all the nuclear weapons in the U.S. inventory. Team members are responsible for
assessing the condition of weapons involved in an accident and providing technical
advice to the DoD EOD teams in developing joint plans for recovery of damaged
weapons. ARG maintains readiness to provide DOE technical assistance to peacetime
accidents and incidents involving nuclear materials anywhere in the world.

C22.5.1.2. Aerial Measuring System. A system that can provide aerial


radiological surveys and aerial photography. This capability should be of value in the
early stages of remediation. Additional information on AMS is in Chapter 4.

C22.5.1.3. Contaminated Laundering Facilities. Commercial facilities may


be contracted by DOE near the accident site.

C22.5.1.4. Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability. This unit can quickly


provide computer-generated estimates of the distribution of radioactive contaminants
released into the atmosphere. This capability will be of great value in the earliest
stages of an accident until a full survey is completed. Additional information on
ARAC is in Chapter 4.

C22.5.1.5. Mobile Accident Response DOE Mobile Counting Laboratory


(Hotspot). Two air transportable trucks and trailers with equipment to analyze,
identify, and document radioactive contamination. This is another important asset to
the CRTF in evaluating the radiological threat that remains after weapon(s) removal.

C22.5.1.6. Non-Destructive Evaluation (NDE) Response Capability. Two


units capable of taking and developing radiographs of weapons using cobalt or x-ray
sources.

C22.5.1.7. The Radiation Emergency Assistance Center Training Site. A


WHO Collaborating Center that provides 24-hour direct or consulting assistance to
medical and health physics practitioners dealing with radiation-related health problems
or injuries from local, national, or international radiation incidents. REAC/TS
provides on-scene medical support to DOE's ARG and FRMAC when they are
deployed. Also, REAC/TS provides advice and assistance to the LFA responding to
nuclear events. Additional information on REAC/TS is provided in Chapters 2 and 10.

C22.5.1.8. RANGER. The Ranger is a mobile, real-time mapping system

376 CHAPTER 22
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

that efficiently monitors large areas of land for radioactive contamination. It can use
either a commercially available line-of-site microwave ranging system or a GPS for
determining its geographic position and location of the data taken. The Ranger can be
operational in 2 hours.

C22.5.1.9. Transportable Decontamination Station. Equipment to perform


field personnel DECON. An obvious necessity until levels of contamination are
reached that are no longer a threat.

C22.5.1.10. Radiological Air Sampling Counting and Analysis Lab.


RASCAL is a mobile, self-sufficient analytical laboratory capable of supporting a large
number of field-deployed air-sampling stations. RASCAL rapidly analyzes air sample
filters and feeds this information to the JHEC. It is capable of processing one gamma
air sample every 100 seconds and three alpha-spectroscopy samples each hour. Setup
time is approximately 3 hours.

C22.5.1.11. 6 meV PORTAC. This system radiographs a damaged or


suspect weapon to provide information on its internal condition. The system can
image a large variety of materials, from lower-density foams and HEs to high-density,
special nuclear materials. The portable LINAC can be used with film and/or the
Real-Time Radiography (RTR) system.

C22.5.1.12. Portable Liquid Abrasive Cutter (LAC). The LAC uses an


extremely high-pressure jet of water (30,000 pounds per square inch) into which
abrasive particles are fed to cut through any material accurately and rapidly, with no
heat or sparks, while minimizing the frictional forces being imparted to the material
being cut. For local operations, the LAC can be set up and ready to operate in about
30 minutes. For remote operation, setup time is about 2 hours.

C22.5.1.13. Radiological Assistance Program Team. RAP teams are


regionally-based, fully trained health physics personnel who are equipped to respond
to all types of radiological incidents and can normally be on scene in 2 to 6 hours after
notification. The responding RAP team(s), who are normally the first responders at
the emergency or incident scene, will characterize the radiation environment at the
scene, advise on the hazards and risks of the radiation and/or radioactive materials
involved, and assist in controlling and mitigating immediate radiation exposures to
workers and the public and the spread of radioactive contamination to the
environment. Additional information on RAP is in Chapter 2.

C22.5.1.14. Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center


(FRMAC). The FRMAC coordinates and manages all Federal radiological monitoring

377 CHAPTER 22
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

and assessment activities during major radiological emergencies when the United
States in support of State, local, and tribal governments through the Local Federal
Agency (LFA).

C22.6. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

FEMA is responsible for coordinating the overall Federal response in support of State
and local authorities. FEMA will dispatch an SFO (or designate a FEMA Region
Official to act as the Deputy SFO) and an ERT to establish at a location identified in
conjunction with the State, the DFO, which serves as a focal point for Federal
interactions with State and local authorities.

C22.7. OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES

C22.7.1. Department of Agriculture. The USDA has the responsibility and the
ability to determine the safety of meat and poultry products for human consumption.

C22.7.2. Department of Health and Human Services. The HHS has the
capability to analyze food and environmental samples for radioactivity content and
provide radiological advice.

C22.7.3. Department of Transportation. DOT can arrange special transportation


activities and assistance in contacting consignors and consignees of shipments.

C22.7.4. Environmental Protection Agency. EPA has monitoring teams to


measure and evaluate contamination and to advise of actions to be taken for the
protection of the public health and safety.

C22.7.5. Federal Bureau of Investigation. The FBI is the LFA for improvised
nuclear devices, incidences, and terrorist nuclear-related activities in the United States,
territories, and possessions.

C22.7.6. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The NRC's responsibility


includes regulation of commercial nuclear power reactors; non-power research, test,
and training reactors; fuel cycle facilities; medical, academic, and industrial uses of
nuclear materials; and the transport, storage, and disposal of nuclear materials and
waste.

378 CHAPTER 22
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C22.8. STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES

The capabilities of State and local agencies to assist in the resolution of the initial
radiation emergency could be limited by lack of equipment and training. However,
State and local agencies have considerable resources that will be critical to the
successful development and implementation of the intermediate and long-term plans to
remediate the affected area. Mentioned throughout this manual, these are health and
medical technicians, emergency management officials, environmental experts, civil
engineers, law enforcement and security personnel, transportation, logistics, legal
representatives, and PA.

379 CHAPTER 22
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C22.AP1. APPENDIX 1 OF CHAPTER 22

POINTS OF CONTACT

C22.AP1.1. MILITARY COMMAND CENTERS


National Military Command Center DSN 227-6340
Commercial 703-697-6340
JFCOM DSN 262-6000
Commercial 757-836-6000
EUCOM DSN 314-432-3000
Commercial 049-711-680-3000
PACOM DSN 315-477-5186
Commercial 808-477-5186
SOUTHCOM DSN 567-4900
Commercial 305-437-4900
ACC RTF DSN 574-4816
Commercial 757-764-4816
Navy RTF DSN
Commercial
U.S. Air Force Operations Center DSN 227-6103
Commercial 703-697-6103
U.S. Navy Operations Center DSN 225-0231
Commercial 703-695-0231
U.S. Army Operations Center DSN 227-0218
Commercial 703-697-0218
U.S. Marine Corps Operations Center DSN 225-7399
Commercial 703-695-7366
Director of Military Support (DOMS) DSN 227-3203
Commercial 703-697-3203

380 CHAPTER 22, APPENDIX 1


DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C22.AP1.2. COORDINATION CENTERS


Office of the Secretary of Defense DSN 364-9320/22
Executive Services Center Commercial 703-769-9320/22
Office of the Assistant Secretary of DSN 227-5131
Defense (Public Affairs) (OASD(PA)) Commercial 703-697-5131
Fax 703-697-3501
Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating DSN 221-2102
Center (JNACC) Commercial 703-325-2102
Department of Defense (DoD) DSN 221-2102/3/4
Commercial 703-325-2102/3/4
DOE Operations Center Commercial 202-586-8100
DOE Accident Response Group Commercial 505-845-4667
FBI Operations Center Commercial 202-324-6700
DOS Operations Center Commercial 202-647-1512
FEMA Rapid Response Information System (RRIS) Handled through DOE Ops Center
Commercial 202-586-8100
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Operations Center Commercial 301-816-5100
U.S. Coast Guard National Response Center Commercial 1-800-424-8802

C22.AP1.3. INFORMATION ON DoD SPECIALIZED CAPABILITIES


DoD
Defense Threat Reduction Agency Consequence Management Advisory Team DSN 221-2102/3/4
(CMAT)
(formally DNAT) Commercial (703)
325-2102/3/4
JCS Contingency and Crisis Management Division (JCS-controlled contingency DSN 227-0007 Commercial
communications)
Joint Communication Support Element (JCSE) DSN 968-4141
Commercial
JCS Controlled Tactical Communications Assets DSN 879-6591/6925
Commercial
AFRRI Medical Radiobiological Advisory Team DSN 295-0530
(MRAT) Commercial 301-295-0530

381 CHAPTER 22, APPENDIX 1


DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

U.S. Air Force Assets


HQ Air Combat Command/LGSCE (HARVEST DSN 867-2166/7
EAGLE) Commercial 505-475-2166/7
HQ Air Combat Command/LGSCF (HARVEST DSN 867-7412
FALCON) Commercial 505-475-7412
Scott AFB, IL Command Post DSN 576-5891
Commercial 618-256-5891
(HAMMER ACE) DSN 576-3431
Commercial 618-256-3431
Email AFCA-SYH@scott.af.mil
U.S. Air Force Radiation Assessment Central Time Zone duty hours
Team (AFRAT) DSN 240-3486
Commercial 210-536-3486
After duty hours, Brooks AFB
Command Post
DSN 240-3278
Commercial 210-536-3278
Pager 210-553-0848
U.S. Air Force Institute for Central Time Zone duty hours
Environment, Safety and Occupational DSN 240-3486
Health Risk Analysis (IERA) Commercial 210-536-3486
After duty hours, Brooks AFB
Command Post
DSN 240-3278
Commercial 210-536-3278

U.S. Army Assets


Soldier Biological and Chemical Command DSN 584-2933
(SBCCOM) Operations Center (U.S. Army) Commercial 410-436-2933
U.S. Army Radiological Control (RADCON) DSN 992-9723
Team Commercial 732-532-9723
FAX 732-542-7161
After duty hours, DSN 992-3266
Commercial 732-532-3266
U.S. Army Radiological Advisory Medical DSN 642-0058
Team (RAMT) Commercial 202-356-0058
FAX 202-356-0086

U.S. Marine Corps Assets


CBIRF DSN 751-9067
Commercial 910-451-9067

382 CHAPTER 22, APPENDIX 1


DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C22.AP1.4. OTHER AGENCIES

Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Commercial 202-857-8400


Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Commercial 404-639-3235
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Commercial 202-475-8383
NRC Commercial 301-816-5100
Backup 301-415-0550

C22.AP1.5. DOE ASSETS

The DOE assets listed below may be contacted directly for assistance or requests for
assistance may be directed to the DOE HQ EOC.

Request for assistance for any other DOE asset should be directed to the DOE HQ
EOC.

24-Hour Commercial
DO HQ Emergency Operations Center 202-586-8100
RAP-1 (DOE Brookhaven Area Office) 516-344-2200
RAP-2 (DOE Oak Ridge Operations Office) 423-576-1005
RAP-3 (DOE Savannah River Ops Office) 803-725-3333
RAP-4 (DOE Albuquerque Ops Office) 505-845-4667
RAP-5 (DOE Chicago Operations Office) 630-252-4800
RAP-6 (Idaho Operations Office) 208-526-1515
RAP-7 (DOE Oakland Ops Office) 925-637-1794
RAP-8 (DOE Richland Ops Office) 509-373-3800
Radiation Emergency Accident Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) 423-576-3131
REAC/TS (alternate number) Methodist Medical Center Disaster Network 423-481-1000
Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC) 925-422-9100

C22.AP1.6. INFORMATION ON DOE SPECIALIZED CAPABILITIES

DOE Defense Program Office of Emergency Response (DP-23) Commercial 301-903-3558

383 CHAPTER 22, APPENDIX 1


DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

C23. CHAPTER 23
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Section 5121, et seq. of title 42 U.S. Code Annotated (U.S.C.A.) (Public Law 93-288,
amended by Public Law 100-707), "The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act."

Section 4321, et seq. of title 42 U.S.C.A., "National Environmental Policy Act."

Section 9601, et seq. of title 42 U.S.C.A., "Comprehensive Environmental Response,


Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)."

AFI 31-401, "Managing the Information Security Program," July 1994.

AFI 32-4001, "Disaster Preparedness Planning and Operations," May 1, 1998.

AR 380-150, "Access to and Dissemination of Restricted Data," September 1978.

AR 40-13, "Medical Support-Nuclear/Chemical Accidents and Incidents," February 1, 1985.

DoD Directive 5210.42, "Nuclear Weapon Personnel Reliability Program (PRP)," May 25,
1993.

DTRA-AR-40H, "Weapons of Mass Destruction Terms Handbook," July 1, 1999.

EPA-520/1-88-020, September 1988.

Executive Order (E.O.) 12241, "National Contingency Plan."

Federal Response Plan (FRP) for Public Law 93-288, as amended.

ICRP Publication 26, "Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological


Protection," Pergamon Press, NY, NY, 1977.

ICRP Publication 30 Part 1, "Limits for Intakes of Radionuclides by Workers," Pergamon


Press, NY, NY, 1979.

384 CHAPTER 23
DoD 3150.8-M, December 1999

ICRP Publication 48, "The Metabolism of Plutonium and Related Elements," Pergamon
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