Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v. City of Cebu Case No. 4 G.R. No.

L-14526 (March 31, 1965) Chapter III, Page 82, Footnote No.23 FACTS: The Petitioner contends that the ordinance implemented by Respondent should be declared null and void because the ordinance seeks to generate revenue by collecting wharfage from vessels which dock at the public wharves of piers located in the said City but owned by the National Government. According to Respondent, the legislature made no distinction between those owned by the City of Cebu and the National Government and that consequently, both fall within the scope of the power granted. Petitioners assail this construction erroneous in the light of the meaning of public wharf as it may have bearing on the right to charge wharfage. ISSUE: W/N the City of Cebu, through its ordinance, has the right to charge wharfages from docks which are owned by the National Government. HELD: The term public refers to the nature of use of the pier or wharves. Hence, the power to impose wharfage rests on a different basis and that is ownership. The Court also referred to the previous subsection of the questioned portion of the ordinance pointing out that it implies a distinction with regard to those docks that are owned by the City and those of the National Government. The Court states that only those which are constructed by the City shall be considered as its property Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc. Case No. 158 G.R. No. 111097 (July 20, 1994) Chapter V, Page 208, Footnote No. 130 FACTS: PAGCOR, created by P.D. 1896, leased a building belonging to Pryce in order to prepare to open a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Various civic organizations, religious elements, womens and youth groups, and even the local officials angrily denounced the project. The Sangguniang Panlungsod swiftly enacted two ordinances disallowing the building of the planned casino. Petitioners argue that by virtue of the Local Government Code (LGC), the Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of casinos by passing ordinances to protect the general welfare of their citizens from the harmful effects of gambling. ISSUE:

W/N the two ordinances as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro are valid. HELD: The two local ordinances are not valid. In Basco v. Phil. Amusements and Gaming Corp., this Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree. Under the LGC, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress gambling and other prohibited games of chance. Since the world gambling should be read as referring to only illegal gambling which, like theot her prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or suppressed. On the assumption of a conflict between P.D. 1869 and the LGC, the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance.

People v. Terrada, et. al. Case No. 229 G.R. No. L-23625 (November 25, 1983) Chapter VII, Page 293, Footnote No. 42 FACTS: On November 1951 and May 1952, Appellees Obo, Gundran, and Terrado applied for and were issued free patents for contiguous parcels of land situated in Camarines Sur. These parcels of land were forest land and as such are not disposable. On March 1962, three separate informations for falsification of public document were filed against the Appellees for having conspired with one another through false and fraudulent misrepresentations alleging that they had all the qualifications and had complied with all legal requirements of the law to entitle them to a free patent. Appellees claim that the crime has already prescribed according to the RPC, but the State argues that the crime has not prescribed under Act No. 3585 where the crime of perjury prescribes in 8 years. ISSUE: W/N the prescriptive period to be applied should be 10 years under the RPC or 8 years under Act No. 3585. HELD: The 8 year prescriptive period should be applied. Penal statutes must be strictly applied. Where a crime is punishable by both a special law and the RPC but

with different prescriptive periods, the one favorable to the accused or the shorter prescriptive period should be applied.

Ordillo v. COMELEC Case No. 192 G.R. No. 93054 (December 4, 1990) Chapter XI, Page 437, Footnote No.24 FACTS: A plebiscite was held pursuant to R.A. No. 6766 (Organic Act creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region) with the votes of the people in the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Kalinga-Apayao, Ifugao, Abra and the city of Baguio. Out of the provinces, only Ifugao managed to get a majority vote. Resolutions and memorandum from the COMELEC and the Secretary of Justice states that only provinces voting favorably in the plebiscite shall constitute the region. ISSUE: W/N Ifugao being the only one which voted for the creation of CAR can alone, legally and validly constitute a region. HELD: Art. X, Sec. 15 of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that there shall be created autonomous regions consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas From this, it can be derived that the term region used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. The provisions of R.A. No. 6766 also show that the Congress never intended that a single province may constitute the Autonomous Region.

People of the Philippines vs. Muoz Case No. 217 G.R. No. L-38969 (February 9, 1989) Chapter XI, Page 446, Footnote No.42 FACTS: The Defendant was convicted of three count s of murder. The penalty for murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death but this was modified by Art. 3, Sec. 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution providing that any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion temporal.

ISSUE: W/N this Court would adhere to theMas an gkay ruling that the abolition of the death penalty limited the penalty for murder to the remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium. HELD: No. In the case at bar, the Court found that the applicable sentence would be the medium period of penalty prescribed in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, which does not follow theMas ang kay ruling, and that would be reclusion perpetua.

Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Case No. 190 G.R. No. 78780 (July 23, 1987) Chapter XI, Page 447, Footnote No.46 FACTS: Petitioners submit that any tax withheld from their emoluments and compensations as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Sec. 10, Art. 8 of the Constitution mandating that during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased, even as it is anathema to the ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned by the Constitution. ISSUE: W/N the salary of the members of the judiciary is subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers. HELD: Yes. The salary of the members of the judiciary is subject to the general income tax. According to Perfecto vs. Meer, income taxes are part of the diminution of judges salaries because the independence of judges is of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries. Endencia vs. David confirmed Perfecto vs. Meer. However both decisions must be discarded because the framers of the fundamental law (i.e. Fox, Concepcion, and Bernas), as the alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning of Sec. 10 Art. 8 of the 1987 Constitution; that is, to make the salaries of the members of the judiciary taxable.