TaxfarmingasariskreductionstrategyunderthePtolemies JGManning DRAFTNOTTOBECITED RiskandthemanagementofriskinPtolemaicEgypt I examine in this paper one of the most distinctive and important aspects of the

the Ptolemaiceconomy,thetaxfarmingsystem.1Thecollectionoftaxrevenueunderthe Ptolemies, well known in its general details and summarized in Prauxs classic account of the Ptolemaic economy (1939), differed considerably from the classic pharaoniceconomyoftheNewKingdom.Themaindifferencewasintheamountof taxescollectedincoinbythePtolemies.Wedonotknowhowearlythemechanism wasfirstintroduced,butitisseentobeinfulloperationbythemiddleofthethird century BC in the critically important text known as the Revenue Laws papyrus (= pRev.).2 I argue here that the tax farming system was intentionally introduced to reduce inherent risk both in the ecology of Egypt and also in the realm of the politicaleconomy. The introduction of the tax farming system to Egypt by the early Ptolemaic kings has often been viewed as one of the methods deployed to reduce risk by placingindividualsbetweenthestateandrevenuesources.Thenatureofrisk,and its avoidance, was one of the defining features of Horden and Purcells Mediterranean.Thiswastruebothinrainfallareasaswellasirrigatedlandscapes suchasEgyptwhoseinterannualvariability,anditseffectsonpoliticalhistory,are toowellknowntobereviewedhere.Bothindividualsandinstitutionsavoidedrisk by maintaining scattered land portfolios, a diversity of strategies and overproduction (Horden and Purcell 2000:273). Indeed risk was everywhere in Egypt, given the dynamic ecology and interannual variability of water supply. Is Ptolemaictaxfarminganotherexampleofsuchattitudestowardrisk? In ancient times, the larger temples and their managed estates in land, animalsandpeople,constitutedtheprimarymanagersofrisk.BarryKemp(2006) summarizesthesystemoftheNewKingdomwell,althoughsomecautionisinorder inbuildingupageneralpictureofancientEgyptiantaxationbecauseofthenatureof the sources. The institutional overlap, and the individual officials rentseeking behavior caused the expected problems. Nevertheless the basics are sufficiently clear. Royal revenue derived from royally owned estates as well as from other
1

Ontaxfarming,seeHarper(1934);Praux(1939:45059),Rostovtzeff(1941:32830);Bingen (1978);Turner(1984).TherulesoftaxfarmingarelaidoutinpRev.,122.ForanEnglishtranslation seeBagnallandDerow(2004:18195).Cf.UPZ112(Oxyrhynchitenome,204/03BC),an announcementoftheauctionfortheannualtaxfarminanome. 2 An early Ptolemaic demotic text (pBM 10528, Thebes, 291 BC), published by Glanville (1939); Depauw(2000:7074)hasoftenbeensuggestedtobeataxfarmingcontract.Itsearlydatewouldbe importantevidenceforPtolemaicpenetrationofthesouthernEgyptianeconomy,orforthefactthat thebasicsystemofbindingthepersonalliabilityofofficials,inthiscasetempleofficials,bycontract forthecollectionoftaxrevenuemayhavepredatedthePtolemies.

revenue from lands and resources taxed via officials loyal to the king. The system retained an ad hoc charactertaxes were levied from local production when required.Revenuewasestablishedonthebasisofcadastralsurveysperformednot each year but when major adjustments to the land tenure regime required it. The king and the temples acted as buffers against risk by grain storage capacity and redistributionoffoodtothelargenumbersofindividualsinonewayoranothertied totempleestates. Thenewstatesystem The Ptolemaic system, and the related institutions of money, banking and public auction,allderivedfromfourthcenturyBCGreek,especiallyAthenian,experience.3 IntheAtheniansystemtaxfarmingwasused,asindeedwastypicaloftaxfarming systems generally as a means of collecting taxes efficiently, in the absence of a bureaucratic system. The Ptolemies, on the other hand, inherited an ancient bureaucraticstructure,which,likethePersiansbeforethem,theycontinued. TheformationofthePtolemaicstatemarkedthereturntoapharaonicmodel.The dynastywasbothanhistoricalandacurrentfeatureofAsianstatesasastabilizing mechanism.Theking,onceagain,unitedterritoryandcultpractice.Ptolemaicrule was,then,amajorshiftfromPersianruleintermsofpoliticalideology.4Inthisshift, the Ptolemies were similar to the Seleukids in insisting on making a major break with Persian rule, at least in terms of ideology.5 The Ptolemaic state was a centralizedbureaucraticempirewhosecorewasanancientbureaucraticempire, the effects of Persian rule not withstanding (Eisenstadt 1993). Ptolemaic governancehasbeenunderstoodbymanyscholarsasacontinuationofpharaonic practice although caution is in order since the term pharaonic is overbroad (Praux1939;Delia1993:194).Thecontinuationofapharaohatthecenterofthe state was, primarily, an ideological one. To be sure the institutional basis of Ptolemaic society was different than in New Kingdom times. We are, of course, on thinicetryingtomeasureinstitutionalchangesincedetailsforthefirstmillennium are notoriously meager. Still, many basic features appear to be continued at least from Saite times and, of course, some institutions, e.g. kingship, the economic and religious role of temples and their estates, the scribal tradition of bureaucratic recordkeepinganddocumentmaking,weremucholderthanthat. Bagnall(1976:10)summarizesthebasicissuewell: WefinddiversityinPtolemaicEgyptbecauseitalreadyexisted, becauseitwaseasiertocopewithitthantochangeit,andbecause

3Xen.,Ways4.1920. 4WemightcontrastPtolemaicattitudestokingshipwiththePersianinnotingherethatacopyofthe

famousBehistuninscription,theclassicstatementbyDariusIofPersianroyalideology,wasordered to be sent to each province of the empire and displayed in a prominent location. An Aramaic copy survivesfromElephantineislandperhaps,likethebiographyofDariusfoundatElephantine,merely reflectingcuriosity(Ray1994:57)aboutthePersiansinthisJewishcolony.SeeBriant(2002:123); GreenfieldandPorten(1982). 5Austin(2003:128).

government policy encouraged a lack of uniformity in new development.6 Therewere,thus,severalchannelsofPtolemaicpoliticalpower.Governance was both traditional and personal. Claims to political legitimacy, therefore, were couchedintermsofpharaonicinstitutionsaboveallthekingasthecentralizing principalofthestate,andbutalsohadtobenegotiatedwithstakeholders,which included citizens in the two Ptolemaic poleis, Alexandria and Ptolemais, military communities and Egyptian priests.7 Some of these features were essentially new withthePtolemiessincethePersiansdidnotfoundnewcitiesinEgyptanddidnot trulysupportpharaonicgovernance.Thecausesofsomeoftheresistanceobserved laterinthethirdcenturymaybefoundinsuchinherentancienrgimeresistance to Ptolemaic centralization and revenue collection. As Eisenstadt stressed, the endemic coexistence of these different types of limitation on generalized power is characteristic of the political systems of the historical bureaucratic polities, and is alsoafundamentalprerequisiteoftheircontinuity(1993:30506). Asinotherinstancesofpoliticaltakeover,thePtolemieswantedtoestablish astablepoliticalorder,anequilibrium,andtoshiftresourcesawayfromtraditional ancient power structures to more generalized ones (Eisenstadt 1993:14). Royal imagestendtoofferthemodernobserverapictureeitherofanEgyptianpharaohor ofaMacedoniankinginAlexandria,butthiscapturesneitherthepoliticaldynamics nor the aims of the regime. Part of this ambiguity was the result of Ptolemaic practicality, using and adopting the symbols of both Greek and Egyptian political powertotheirownends.TheimageofPtolemyIVonthestelarecordingtheRaphia decree,showinghiminMacedonianmilitarycustom,onahorserearingupinfront of his enemy Antiochus III, but also wearing the Egyptian double crown, is an excellentexampleofthePtolemaicstateshybridnature,reflectedextensivelyinthe literatureandartoftheperiod.8TheEgyptianstatealwayshadtobeflexibleenough to adjust to a variable flood regime. In most years the flood was relatively predictable,asParkstressed,chaoticflooddistributionovertimehasnointrinsic implications for frequent catastrophe (1992:101). It does however have serious implicationsforthestateintermsofstructure,revenuecapture,anddevelopment. Politicalstabilitywasdirectlylinkedasmuchtolongtermfloodtrendsasitwasto thedynasticmechanismandtoexternalthreats.9 Creatingcoalitions In Habers analysis of authoritarian governments (2006), a political takeover is analyzedasagameplayedbetweentherulerandkeyconstituentgroups: Neithersideinthisgameplaysfromastateofnature:theyinherit
6Cf.Gellner(1983)onthelackofincentivetoimposeauniformculture. 7Theprivilegedgroupsbenefitedfromtaxationpolicy.SeeClarysseandThompson(2006). 8 See the comments by Thompson (1988:118, with plate vi). On the decree, see Thissen (1966);

Simpson(1996),Winnicki(2001).Ma(2003:18990)stressestheimageshybriditywell. 9OnNiletrendsandthepoliticalconsequencesfordynasticEgypt,seeBell(1970);(1971);(1975); Butzer(1980);Seidlmayer(2001);Bonneau(1993)forGrecoRomantimes.

apreexistingsetofpoliticalinstitutionsandorganizations,along withaneconomyandsociety.Thismeansthatthegamehasmultiple outcomes.Aclosereadingofthecasestudyliteratureindicates, however,thatthesetofthedictatorswinningstrategiesissmall.He may terrorize launching organizations leadership, coopt them by providingthemwithprivategoods,orraisetheircostsofcollective action by proliferating yet more organizations. Each of these strategiesgeneratesquitedifferentpropertyrightssystems,andeach of those property rights systems have consequences for economic growthanddistribution. The fourteenth century Arab historian Ibn Khaldun, in his analysis of the Abbasid caliphate,waswellawareofthephenomenon: (Therulers)maintaintheirholdoverthegovernmentandtheir owndynastywiththehelp,then,eitherofclientsandfollowerswho grewupintheshadowandpowerofgroupfeeling,oroftribal groupsofadifferentdescentwhohavebecometheirclients. (TheMuqaddimah3.2) The launching organization that Haber refers to was the military, already clearly established in the armys declaration of Ptolemy as king in 306 BC, and at leastsomeofthekeypriesthoods.Allthreestrategies,terror,cooptationandraising the cost of collective action may have been in play. To be sure, Ptolemy coopted elites and created organizations that competed against each other, thus making coordinationatthelocalleveldifficult.10Suchstrategyisrevealedacrossthegamut of Ptolemaic society, in the military sphere, in warfare and military privilege, and alsointhesupportoftemples,and,aswewillseeinthenexttwochapters,alsoin the economic and legal spheres.11 Such a system, created, at least to the modern observer,structuraltensionsinPtolemaicsocietyandtheconflictsbetween theinterestsoftheagriculturaladministration, thefinancialadministration,thecontrollerswho supervisedthisfinancialadministration,themore orlessindependentbusinessmenwhofarmedtheroyal revenues,thesmalllocalcontractors,andallthe guarantorswhowereinvolvedinthetaxfarming systemofthethirdcentury.12
10 Again Fatimid parallels suggest themselves. See for example the comments by Goitein (1967:33)

on rival military factions. It is possible to see in the increasing exemptions in the salt tax some collective bargaining between groups and the state was at work here. Cf. Clarysse and Thompson (2006/1:5659). 11 Soldiers received a kind of diplomatic immunity from lawsuits in Alexandria, a law preserved in pHal.1:12465(midthirdcenturyBC). 12Bingen(1984:191).

 A new Greek bureaucratic order was established to realign loyalties of the key constituent groups of the ruling classes.13 There was the inner circle of the court, the friends of the king as they were called, the GrecoMacedonian bodyguardandthemilitaryclassgenerally,andhighofficialsinchargeofdiplomatic matters, correspondence, and military and civil administration.14 This Greco Macedonian ethnoclass, to borrow Briants term of the Achaemenid ruling elite, wasclearlythepowersurroundingthethroneinitially.15Weknowlittleaboutthis inner circle beyond the literary representations of some of the more notorious figures (Rowlandson 2007). Ma (2003), following Briants analysis of Hellenistic kings extending the traditions of the Persian kings in ruling over diverse local populations, makes much use of the images of ruling elite power even in local EgyptiancontextssuchasthedepictionofPtolemyIVintheRaphiastela.Buthow much impact this really had on the local population is difficult to see. The point is that the Ptolemies, as other hellenistic kings, created a uniform ideology that inserted their new kingship into ancient traditions. Thus Ptolemy IV depicted in Macedonian military dress on a rearing horse in the Raphia text is the visual equivalentofManethosEgyptianhistory,whichinsertedthePtolemiesintothelong lineoflegitimateEgyptiankings,andthebuildingofnewentrancegatesatancient temples. Muchofthisnewstructurestoodonthebaseofveryancientinstitutions,the nome, or provincial administrative structure, driven by the irrigation system that required local monitoring and control, village organization and family traditions.16 The Egyptian elite, the ancient priestly classes, was also crucial to the new bureaucratic structure. This new bureaucratic order, however, did not displace demotic as the language of the villages or of the local bureaucracy. As in the New Kingdomstate,localbureaucracywasnormallyratherindependentofthekingand his circle.17 Land was generally held communally in family or lineage groups. Inheritance of shares of real property was the result of a partible inheritance system.Butrealdivisionscouldbeachieved.Landwasfrequentlyleased.Thisflood recessionsystemthattiedhouseholdstolandportfoliosisalreadyobservablein MiddleKingdom(ca.1900BC)privatedocuments.18 This locally dictated village structure centered on agricultural production was deeply rooted historically, as were the temples and priestly organizations. Herein lay the cause of a good amount of what Bingen (1984) has called the structuraltensionsofthePtolemaicstate.Thelimitedeconomicrestructuringthat waspossiblecreatedakindofarenaofsocialconflictbetweenanewmentalityand
13

For a general comparative analysis, see Eisenstadt (1993:1332). For state formation in the Hellenisticcontext,seeMileta(2002). 14OnthekingsinnercircleintheHellenistickingdoms,seeHabicht(1958);Herman(19801981); McKechnie(1989:20415).Cf.Theoc.,Id.17.9394,withbriefcommentsbyHunter(2003:16869). 15Briant(2002)withMa(2003). 16Onlocalelitecontrolofwater,Bonneau(1993);Allam(1999);Eyre(1994). 17OntheNewKingdombureaucracy,andtheextentofcentralcontroloverlocalstructures,seevan denBoorn(1988:31731). 18TheHekanakhtepapers(Dynasty12,ca.1900BC),forwhichseeAllen(2002).OnancientEgyptian villagestructure,seeLehner(2000).

an ancient system, between Greeks, Egyptians and other social groups competing forresources.Gainingcontroloverandthecooperationofimportantconstituencies, andthesearchforautonomybythesegroups,wereconstantlyinconflict.Inpart,I argue,thesetensionwereoneresultofPtolemaicpoliticalstrategyoutlinedabove, to coopted elites and to raise the cost of collective action by proliferating institutionsinwhichtheseelitescompeted. Taxfarming ThescaleoftheEgyptiancountrysideNilerivervalley,theDelta,theFayyum,and we presume to some extent the oases in the western desert and the new foundations on the Red seaand the shortage of manpower typical in premodern states,alteredtheAtheniansystemsubstantially.Itwasaboveallthestatesneedfor cash, what Eisenstadt called free floating resources, in an age on continuous warfareandmercenariesthatledthePtolemaickingstodeploythesysteminEgypt, not without problems. Indeed all of the theoretical predictions of tax farming bribery,collusion,evasion,informationproblemsareborneoutbythePtolemaic documentation. The terminology of Ptolemaic tax farming documents is fourth centuryAthenian,andtheearlyPtolemaicadaptationshowsthatthekingsreliedon Greek fiscal institutions that had worked well during the fourth century, and attemptedtoapplythemtothenewsettingofEgypt.Theirapplicationtotheancient economic structure during the third century BC reveals much about the nature of thereformsoftheeconomicsystem.Behinditsusewas,ofcourse,thedesireofthe rulertocreatestablerevenuestreams,i.e.tosmoothincome,inanenvironmentof informationassymetry. InthepreservedsectionsofpRev,alargetext,datedto259BC,areconcerned withthefarmingofmoneytaxes,thetaxesonorchardsandvineyards,twooilcrops (sesame and castor oil) and banks.19 The text does not cover all types of revenue that were collected by tax farming.20 Thus the Ptolemaic system, as in Republican Rome, would seem to combine both direct (i.e. taxes on production) and indirect taxation. The taxation of the land itself, being the most valuable asset in the state, waslefttotheancientsystemofstateagentcollection(cf.Kiser1994:293).Bingens (1978) perceptive analysis has demonstrated that the text is not a codified treatmentoftheneweconomy,asRostovtzeff(1922)oncesuggestedbut,rather,a whole series of texts collected together that imply that the process of using tax farmingwasarecursiveorexperimentalprocess,beingsolvedinrealtime.21 ThereareunusualfeaturesofthePtolemaicsystem.Unlikeinfourthcentury Athens, where the tax farmers were responsible for the entire system, the tax farming and collection functions were very often decoupled in the Ptolemaic
19

For pRev., see Grenfell and Mahaffy (1896), Praux (1939:6593), Bingen (1952), (1978). On Ptolemaicintentions,seeSamuel(1983). 20Otherareassubjecttothefarmingoftaxesincludebeerandnatronproduction,andthetaxonsale transactions(egkuklion). 21PartsofpRev,writteninseveraldifferenthands,showcorrectionsandchanges.Theexperimental nature of some aspects of Ptolemaic tax farming that is suggested by pRev. is predicted by agency theory,andderivesfromtheneedoftherulertooptimize(orstabilize?)revenueinanenvironment ofassymetricinformation.Cf.Kiser(1994:293).

system.22AsPraux(1939:450)hasobserved,thetaxfarmingsystemwouldseem tobesuperfluousgiventhebureaucracyinchargeofcollectingthevarioustaxes.In mosttaxfarmingsystems,taxcollectiondevolvedeithertostateagentsortothetax farmers themselves, the state thus utilizing a system of collection in lieu of a bureaucracy.ThePtolemaictaxfarmingsystemestablishedacontractbetweenthe state and the tax farm, stating in writing the rights and obligations of the two parties.Thecontractalsoestablishedadefinedrevenuestream.Theentireprocess wasbegunbyannouncingapublicauction,anotherGreekinstitution,forthefarm. The Ptolemaic system was a hybrid (Praux uses the term graft), like so muchelseinthePtolemaicsystem,inwhichcertaintaxeswerefarmedbutcollected, at least in the mature Ptolemaic system, by state agents (logeutai), a traditional featureoftaxcollectioninEgyptandwidespreadintheHellenisticworld.23Sowhy thedecoupling?24ThetraditionalanswerhasbeenthatthePtolemiesweresolving one of the basic problems of tax farming for the statedistrust of tax collectors loyalty. They may be part of the answer. But there are other considerations. First, theuseofstateagentstocollectthetaxmay,liketheissuanceoftaxreceipts,have protected the taxpayers from a naturally over extracted system. Secondly, the politicaleconomyofthestate,thevarietyoftaxescollected,andthestatesneedfor cashmayalsobebroughtin.TheearlykingsneededtoattractGreeksfamiliarwith the monetary economy in order for them to extract the required revenue that the kings needed to maintain their power base. Tax farming created an incentive structure that aligned the interest of individuals with the rulers and, at the same time,aidedtherulerinmaintainingamonopolyonpoliticalpowerinthecapital.A largestate,andtherealitiesofGreekagentsofthekingthroughoutthecountryside mobilized wherever they were and for whatever need presented itself (Bingen 1978:168)shapedthesystem.Indirecttaxeswereusuallythefocusoftaxfarming, and the emphasis was placed on the taxes in money, Greeks had knowledge and access to capital, served as a kind of loan to the ruler to finance the army (Kiser 1994:289). Taxfarmingwasoftenusedwheremonitoringandtransactioncostsarehigh, poor communication conditions existed, and a lack of record keeping prevailed (KiserandKane2007).Kisers(1994)studyofearlytaxfarmingsystemssuggests several factors were at work in the choice of farming certain taxes, among which werethesizeofthestate,andcasesofhighvariability,mobilityandmeasurabilityof thetaxedasset. InKisersmodel,therulerhastheaimofmaximizingrevenueandwillchoose ataxationsystemthatproducesthemostefficientsolutiontotheagencyproblem. ThePtolemaicsolutionfitsthemodel,butitwasthecreationofstable,predictible, rather than maximal, revenues that the Ptolemies were after. Efficiency in raising cash, required to finance military operations, may be an explanation here. The
22FortheAtheniantaxfarmingsystem,seeStroud(1998),RhodesandOsborne(2003)discussinga

very interesting Athenian inscription (SEG xlvii 96, 374/3 BC) recording a law concerned with the grain supply to Athens utilizing tax farming. On the decoupling, see the remarks by Bingen (1978:166). 23Ontheroleofstateagentsincollectingrevenue,seePolyb.22.13.2ontheviceroyofCyprus. 24ThedecouplingmaynothavebeenpatoftheoriginalPtolemaictaxfarmingsystem.

introduction of banks played an important role in the collection and payments of farmedtaxes.25Therewerethreetypesstateorroyalbanks,concessionarybanks licensedbythestateandprivatebanksthatemergedinthesecondcenturyBCand appeartohavereplacedconcessionarybanks.26Itistheroyalbanksthatconcern ushere.Theyformed,alongwiththetaxfarmers,andtheuseofstategranariesthat collected taxes in kind, the intermediary between production and state revenues. Thegranariesreceivedpaymentsingrainandhelddepositsofindividualtaxpayers. The state granaries were also an important means by which of the local state bureaucracywaspaid. Publicbidsfortherighttocollectacertaintaxfortheshortterm(oneyear,in somecasesforlongerperiods)inaspecificterritorywerepostedbythetaxfarmers atroyalbanks.Theauctionprocessservednotonlytoguaranteerevenuesbutalso may have functioned as a recruiting device to incorporate persons within the bureaucraticstructure(Eisenstadt1993:129).Thecompetitivenatureofthesystem provided an incentive to collect the tax.27 We might expect in such a shortterm system that there was an increased incentive to overcollect. But pRev. 122, fragmented as it is, suggests that the use of written contracts carefully specified rights and duties of the tax farmers. Despite the administrative theory, however, abuses by tax farmers are reported. Now many people are coming down river to thecity(Alexandria),onecomplaintgoes,andarelodgingcomplaintsagainstyou (afinancialofficialintheMemphitenome),yoursubordinatesandespeciallythetax farmers for abuses of power and fraudulent exactions, and some even allege blackmail.28Anewsystem,butanancientcomplaint. Thesaleofataxfarmoccurredinnameofkingatapublicauction,inGreek and Egyptian.29 Such sales were organized at the nome and toparchic level; the name and nationality of the successful bidder was declared in front of oikonomos. Writtentendersprecededthebidding,andthesuccessfulbidwasoftensecuredby personalguarantorsandthetakingofaroyaloath.30Thetaxfarmfunctionedtofix the amount of the tax, to control revenue collection and accounting and to determinewhetherthecollectedamountwashigherorlowerthanthatcontracted, (Bingen1978:167). The royal banks were the instruments of state control, and the tax farming systemwasanimportantaspectofPtolemaiceconomicpower,byincentivizingthe collection, and smoothing royal income throughout the year (tax farmers were requiredtopayintoroyalbanks,throughthetaxcollectors,monthly)andoverthe longer term. We would expect to find the farmers of the tax and the collectors working together, and indeed there is good evidence to suggest that this is what
25NowsummarizedinBogaert(1994),idem(2001).SeealsoGeens(2008);VandorpeandClarysse

(2008). 26Bogaert(19981999);Geens(2008). 27 A sense of the atmosphere of an auction is conveyed byPLBat, vol. 20, 30.1015 (142/141 BC); pKlnVI260(213BC). 28UPZ113(156BC).Trans.Austin(2006:text321). 29Praux(1939:451)withbibliography. 30 Cf.theelaborateprocessofalandauctiondetailedinpEleph14(ca.223BC,Edfu;=Selectpapyri2, text233).

happened(ClarysseandThompson20061:77).Informationmaybeimportanthere (cf. Rostovtzeff 1941:329); just as the use of ethne, such a system of tax collection may also have reinforced group identity and so have been another means of preventingcollectiveactionagainstthestate.Taxfarmerscouldbejailedinthecase of failure of collection.31 The system had built in very powerful incentives to performandwasreinforcedbypersonalrelationships.32 The tax farming system was an introduction from the fourth century Greek world. It is difficult to see how the system affected the overall performance of the Ptolemaic economy. As in other subjects deploying the papyri as an historical source,wemustdistinguishbetweentheintentionsoftheinstitutionandthesocial realities that these texts may or may not reflect. Nevertheless we may take as a proxy measure the states ability to penetrate local economic structure in the monetization of the economy, strongly associated with the tax farming system. Wheredidriskcomein?Theanswerliesinseveralareas.One,theecologyofitself createdinherentriskforthestateinbeingabletopredictrevenue.Secondly,forthe newGreekstate,therewastheriskofdisloyalbureaucraticofficialsandscribesthat wasinherited.Athirdareaofriskwasthelackofinformation.Fourthly,therewas there risk of coalitions aligning against the crown. The reduction of these risks to the state was certainly one of the aims of the institution, allowing the state to predictrevenueandtocreateanincomesmoothingdevice.Buttheaimofthetax farming system also reflects the political economy of the state. On one hand, the rulersrequiredrevenue,andloyalcoalitionsofelite.Ontheotherhand,inorderto survive,thekingscreatedinstitutionsthatraisedthecostsofcollectiveaction.The taxfarming system would appear to function both as a means to mobilize elite participation in the state and as a means of creating arenas of competition that fragmentedpotentialoppositiontothestate. AttheendofhisexcellenttreatmentofpRev,JeanBingenaskedthequestion: Did the king deliberately associate himself with this world of handlers of money andcredit,bigandsmall,inorderforthemtocollaborateinthesystematiccreation of a new type of economy? My answer to this question is yes, and that it is the nature of the political economy between the Hellenistic rulers and the ancient institutional structures, and the scale of Hellenistic states that we can define Hellenisticeconomies.Finleywaswrongtoexcludethemasaparticulareconomic typewithintheancienteconomy. SourcesCited Allam(1999) Austin, M.M. (2003). The Seleukids and Asia, in A companion to the Hellenistic world.Ed.AndrewErskine.Malden,MA:Blackwell.Pp.12133.
31pTebt.III772(236BC=BagnallandDerow[2004],text101). 32pTebt.I40(117BC=BagnallandDerowtext97)showingapatronclientrelationship.

 Bell,Barbara(1971).Thedarkagesinancienthistory:I.ThefirstdarkageinEgypt, AmericanJournalofArchaeology75.Pp.126. ________. (1975). Climate and the history of Egypt:the Middle Kingdom, American JournalofArchaeology79.Pp.22369. Bonneau, Danielle (1993). Le Rgime administratif de l'eau du Nil dans l'gypte grecque,romaineetbyzantine.Leiden. Butzer,Karl(1980).LongtermNilefloodvariationandpoliticaldiscontinuitiesin pharaonicEgypt,inThecausesandconsequencesoffoodproductioninAfrica.Ed.J. DesmondClarkandStevenA.Brandt.Berkeley.Pp.136. Bingen, Jean (1952). Papyrus Revenue Laws. Nouv. d. du texte. Gttingen:Hubert. SammelbuchgriechischerUrkundenausgypten,Beiheft1. ________. (1978). Le papyrus RevenueLaws.Tradition grecque et Adaptation hellnistique. Opladen. Republished as The revenue laws papyrus: Greek tradition andhellenisticadaptation,inHellenisticEgypt.Monarchy,society,economy,culture. EdwithanIntroductionbyRogerS.Bagnall.Pp.15788. ________. (1984). Les tensions structurelles de la socit ptolmique, in Atti del XVII Congresso internazionale di papirologia. Naples. Pp. 92137. Reprinted in Hellenistic Egypt. Monarchy, society, economy, culture. Ed. Roger Bagnall. Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,2007.Pp.189205. Bogaert, Raymond (1994). Trapezitica Aegyptiaca. Recueil de Recherches sur la BanqueengypteGrcoromaine.PapyrologicaFlorentina,vol.25.Florence. Briant, Pierre (2002). From Cyrus to Alexander. A History of the Persian Empire. Winona Lake, Indiana. Trans. Peter T. Daniels. Originally published as Histoire de lEmpire perse de Cyrus Alexandre. 2 vols. Achaemenid History, vol. 10. Leiden:NederlandsInstituutvoorhetNabijeOosten,1996. Clarysse, Willy & Dorothy J. Thompson (2006). Counting the people in Hellenistic Egypt.2vols.CambridgeClassicalStudies.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. Depauw,Mark(2000).ThearchiveofTeosandThabisfromearlyPtolemaicThebes. Turnhout:Brepols. Eisenstadt,S.N.(1993[1963]).Thepoliticalsystemsofempires.Withanewforeword bytheauthor.NewBrunswick:TransactionPublishers.

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